[G.R. No. 82606. December 18, 1992.] PRIMA PARTOSA-JO, petitioner, vs.

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and HO HANG (WITH ALIASES JOSE JO AND CONSING), respondents. Leo B. Diocos for petitioner. Antonio Ramas-Uypitching for private respondent. SYLLABUS 1. REMEDIAL LAW; JUDGMENT; AMBIGUITY CAUSED BY OMISSION OR MISTAKE IN DISPOSITIVE PORTION OF DECISION; MAY BE CLARIFIED BY THIS COURT BY AMENDMENT EVEN AFTER JUDGMENT BECOME FINAL. The dispositive portion of the decision in question was incomplete insofar as it carried no ruling on the complaint for judicial separation of conjugal property although it was extensively discussed in the body of the decision. Nevertheless, the technicality invoked in this case should not be allowed to prevail over considerations of substantive justice. After all, the technical defect is not insuperable. We have said time and again that where there is an ambiguity caused by an omission or mistake in the dispositive portion of the decision, this Court may clarify such ambiguity by an amendment even after the judgment has become final. In doing so, the Court may resort to the pleadings filed by the parties and the findings of fact and the conclusions of law expressed in the text or body of the decision. 2. CIVIL LAW; FAMILY CODE; PROPERTY RELATIONS BETWEEN HUSBAND AND WIFE; CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP OF GAINS; DISSOLUTION THEREOF BY PETITION FOR JUDICIAL SEPARATION OF PROPERTIES; GROUNDS. Art. 178(3) of the Civil Code has been superseded by Article 128 of the Family Code. Under this provision, the aggrieved spouse may petition for judicial separation on either of these grounds: 1. Abandonment by a spouse of the other without just cause; and 2. Failure of one spouse to comply with his or her obligations to the family without just cause, even if said spouse does not leave the other spouse.

3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ABANDONMENT, EXPLAINED. Abandonment implies a departure by one spouse with the avowed intent never to return, followed by prolonged absence without just cause, and without in the meantime providing in the least for one's family although able to do so. There must be absolute cessation of marital relations, duties and rights, with the intention of perpetual separation. This idea is clearly expressed in the above-quoted provision, which states that "a spouse is deemed to have abandoned the other when he or she has left the conjugal dwelling without any intention of returning." 4. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; SUFFICIENT CAUSE PRESENT IN CASE AT BAR. The record shows that as early as 1942, the private respondent had already rejected the petitioner, whom he denied admission to their conjugal home in Dumaguete City when she returned from Zamboanguita. The fact that she was not accepted by Jo demonstrates all too clearly that he had no intention of resuming their conjugal relationship. Moreover, beginning 1968 until the final determination by this Court of the action for support in 1988, the private respondent refused to give financial support to the petitioner. The physical separation of the parties, coupled with the refusal by the private respondent to give support to the petitioner, sufficed to constitute abandonment as a ground for the judicial separation of their conjugal property. Their separation thus falls also squarely under Article 135 of the Family Code, providing as follows: Art. 135. Any of the following shall be considered sufficient cause for judicial separation of property: . . . (6) That at the time of the petition, the spouses have been separated in fact for at least one year and reconciliation is highly improbable. 5. ID.; FAMILY CODE; MADE APPLICABLE IN CASE AT BAR. The amendments introduced in the Family Code are applicable to the case before us although they became effective only on August 3, 1988. As we held in Ramirez vs. Court of Appeals, 72 SCRA 231: The greater weight of authority is inclined to the view that an appellate court, in reviewing a judgment on appeal, will dispose of a question according to the law prevailing at the time of such disposition, and not according to the law prevailing at the time of rendition of the appealed judgment. The court will

therefore reverse a judgment which was correct at the time it was originally rendered where, by statute, there has been an intermediate change in the law which renders such judgment erroneous at the time the case was finally disposed of on appeal. 6. ID.; ID.; PROPERTY RELATIONS BETWEEN HUSBAND AND WIFE; CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP OF GAINS, DISSOLUTION THEREOF BY JUDICIAL SEPARATION OF PROPERTIES; DIVISION BETWEEN SPOUSES. The order of judicial separation of the properties in question is based on the finding of both the trial and respondent courts that the private respondent is indeed their real owner. It is these properties that should now be divided between him and the petitioner, on the assumption that they were acquired during coverture and so belong to the spouses half and half. As the private respondent is a Chinese citizen, the division must include such properties properly belonging to the conjugal partnership as may have been registered in the name of other persons in violation of the Anti-Dummy Law. DECISION CRUZ, J p: The herein private respondent, Jose Jo, admits to having cohabited with three women and fathered fifteen children. The first of these women, the herein petitioner, claims to be his legal wife by whom he begot a daughter, Monina Jo. The other two women and their respective offspring are not parties to this case. In 1980, the petitioner filed a complaint against Jo for judicial separation of conjugal property, docketed as Civil Case No. 51, in addition to an earlier action for support, also against him and docketed as Civil Case No. 36, in the Regional Trial Court of Negros Oriental, Branch 35. The two cases were consolidated and tried jointly. On November 29, 1983, Judge German G. Lee, Jr. rendered an extensive decision, the dispositive portion of which read:

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing arguments and considerations, this court hereby holds that the plaintiff Prima Partosa was legally married to Jose Jo alias Ho Hang, alias Consing, and, therefore, is entitled to support as the lawfully wedded wife and the defendant is hereby ordered to give a monthly support of P500.00 to the plaintiff Prima Partosa, to be paid on or before the 5th day of every month, and to give to the plaintiff the amount of P40,000.00 for the construction of the house in Zamboanguita, Negros Oriental where she may live separately from the defendant being entitled under the law to separate maintenance being the innocent spouse and to pay the amount of P19,200.00 to the plaintiff by way of support in-arrears and to pay the plaintiff the amount of P3,000.00 in the concept of attorney's fees. prcd As will be noticed, there was a definite disposition of the complaint for support but none of the complaint for judicial separation of conjugal property. Jo elevated the decision to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the ruling of the trial court in the complaint for support. 1 The complaint for judicial separation of conjugal property was dismissed for lack of a cause of action and on the ground that separation by agreement was not covered by Article 178 of the Civil Code. When their motions for reconsideration were denied, both parties came to this Court for relief. The private respondent's petition for review on certiorari was dismissed for tardiness in our resolution dated February 17, 1988, where we also affirmed the legality of the marriage between Jose and Prima and the obligation of the former to support her and her daughter. This petition deals only with the complaint for judicial separation of conjugal property. It is here submitted that the Court of Appeals erred in holding that: a) the judicial separation of conjugal property sought was not allowed under Articles 175, 178 and 191 of the Civil Code; and b) no such separation was decreed by the trial court in the dispositive portion of its decision.

The private respondent contends that the decision of the trial court can no longer be reviewed at this time because it has long since become final and executory. As the decretal portion clearly made no disposition of Civil Case No. 51, that case should be considered impliedly dismissed. The petitioner should have called the attention of the trial court to the omission so that the proper rectification could be made on time. Not having done so, she is now concluded by the said decision, which can no longer be corrected at this late hour. We deal first with the second ground. While admitting that no mention was made of Civil Case No. 51 in the dispositive portion of the decision of the trial court, the petitioner argues that a disposition of that case was nonetheless made in the penultimate paragraph of the decision reading as follows: It is, therefore, hereby ordered that all properties in question are considered properties of Jose Jo, the defendant in this case, subject to separation of property under Article 178, third paragraph of the Civil Code, which is subject of separate proceedings as enunciated herein. The petitioner says she believed this to be disposition enough and so did not feel it was necessary for her to appeal, particularly since the order embodied in that paragraph was in her favor. It was only when the respondent court observed that there was no dispositive portion regarding that case and so ordered its dismissal that she found it necessary to come to this Court for relief. Cdpr The petitioner has a point. The dispositive portion of the decision in question was incomplete insofar as it carried no ruling on the complaint for judicial separation of conjugal property although it was extensively discussed in the body of the decision. The drafting of the decision was indeed not exactly careful. The petitioner's counsel, noting this, should have taken immediate steps for the rectification of the omission so that the ruling expressed in the text of the decision could

have been embodied in the decretal portion. Such alertness could have avoided this litigation on a purely technical issue. Nevertheless, the technicality invoked in this case should not be allowed to prevail over considerations of substantive justice. After all, the technical defect is not insuperable. We have said time and again that where there is an ambiguity caused by an omission or mistake in the dispositive portion of the decision, this Court may clarify such ambiguity by an amendment even after the judgment has become final. 2 In doing so, the Court may resort to the pleadings filed by the parties and the findings of fact and the conclusions of law expressed in the text or body of the decision. 3 The trial court made definite findings on the complaint for judicial separation of conjugal property, holding that the petitioner and the private respondent were legally married and that the properties mentioned by the petitioner were acquired by Jo during their marriage although they were registered in the name of an apparent dummy. There is no question therefore that the penultimate paragraph of the decision of the trial court was a ruling based upon such findings and so should have been embodied in the dispositive portion. The respondent court should have made the necessary modification instead of dismissing Civil Case No. 51 and thus upholding mere form over substance. In the interest of substantive justice, and to expedite these proceedings, we hereby make such modification. And now to the merits of Civil Case No. 51. The Court of Appeals dismissed the complaint on the ground that the separation of the parties was due to their agreement and not because of abandonment. The respondent court relied mainly on the testimony of the petitioner, who declared under oath that she left Dumaguete City, where she and Jo were living together "because that was our agreement." It held that an agreement to live separately without just cause was void under Article 221 of the Civil Code and could not sustain any claim of abandonment by the aggrieved spouse. Its conclusion was that the only

remedy available to the petitioner was legal separation under Article 175 of the Civil Code, 4 by virtue of which the conjugal partnership of property would be terminated. The petitioner contends that the respondent court has misinterpreted Articles 175, 178 and 191 of the Civil Code. She submits that the agreement between her and the private respondent was for her to temporarily live with her parents during the initial period of her pregnancy and for him to visit and support her. They never agreed to separate permanently. And even if they did, this arrangement was repudiated and ended in 1942, when she returned to him at Dumaguete City and, he refused to accept her. The petitioner invokes Article 178 (3) of the Civil Code, which reads: ARTICLE 178. The separation in fact between husband and wife without judicial approval, shall not affect the conjugal partnership, except that: xxx xxx xxx

has left the conjugal dwelling for a period of three months or has failed within the same period to give any information as to his or her whereabouts shall be prima facie presumed to have no intention of returning to the conjugal dwelling. Under this provision, the aggrieved spouse may petition for judicial separation on either of these grounds: 1. Abandonment by a spouse of the other without just cause; and

2. Failure of one spouse to comply with his or her obligations to the family without just cause, even if said spouse does not leave the other spouse. Abandonment implies a departure by one spouse with the avowed intent never to return, followed by prolonged absence without just cause, and without in the meantime providing in the least for one's family although able to do so. 5 There must be absolute cessation of marital relations, duties and rights, with the intention of perpetual separation. 6 This idea is clearly expressed in the above-quoted provision, which states that "a spouse is deemed to have abandoned the other when he or she has left the conjugal dwelling without any intention of returning." The record shows that as early as 1942, the private respondent had already rejected the petitioner, whom he denied admission to their conjugal home in Dumaguete City when she returned from Zamboanguita. The fact that she was not accepted by Jo demonstrates all too clearly that he had no intention of resuming their conjugal relationship. Moreover, beginning 1988 until the final determination by this Court of the action for support in 1988, the private respondent refused to give financial support to the petitioner. The physical separation of the parties, coupled with the refusal by the private respondent to give support to the petitioner, sufficed to constitute abandonment as a ground for the judicial separation of their conjugal property. In addition, the petitioner may also invoke the second ground allowed by Article 128, for the fact is that he has failed without just cause to comply

(3) If the husband has abandoned the wife without just cause for at least one year, she may petition the court for a receivership, or administration by her of the conjugal partnership property or separation of property. The above-quoted provision has been superseded by Article 128 of the Family Code, which states: ARTICLE 128. If a spouse without just cause abandons the other or fails to comply with his or her obligations to the family, the aggrieved spouse may petition the court for receivership, for judicial separation of property, or for authority to be the sole administrator of the conjugal partnership property, subject to such precautionary conditions as the court may impose. llcd The obligations to the family mentioned in the preceding paragraph refer to marital, parental or property relations. A spouse is deemed to have abandoned the other when he or she has left the conjugal dwelling without any intention of returning. The spouse who

with his obligations to the family as husband or parent. Apart from refusing to admit his lawful wife to their conjugal home in Dumaguete City, Jo has freely admitted to cohabiting with other women and siring many children by them. It was his refusal to provide for the petitioner and their daughter that prompted her to file the actions against him for support and later for separation of the conjugal property, in which actions, significantly, he even denied being married to her. The private respondent has not established any just cause for his refusal to comply with his obligations to his wife as a dutiful husband. Their separation thus falls also squarely under Article 135 of the Family Code, providing as follows: ARTICLE 135. Any of the following shall be considered sufficient cause for judicial separation of property: xxx xxx xxx

between him and the petitioner, on the assumption that they were acquired during coverture and so belong to the spouses half and half. As the private respondent is a Chinese citizen, the division must include such properties properly belonging to the conjugal partnership as may have been registered in the name of other persons in violation of the Anti-Dummy Law. The past has caught up with the private respondent. After his extramarital flings and a succession of illegitimate children, he must now make an accounting to his lawful wife of the properties he denied her despite his promise to her of his eternal love and care. LLpr WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the assailed decision of the respondent court is MODIFIED. Civil Case No. 51 is hereby decided in favor of the plaintiff, the petitioner herein, and the conjugal property of the petitioner and the private respondent is hereby ordered divided between them, share and share alike. This division shall be implemented by the trial court after determination of all the properties pertaining to the said conjugal partnership, including those that may have been illegally registered in the name of other persons. SO ORDERED.

(6) That at the time of the petition, the spouses have been separated in fact for at least one year and reconciliation is highly improbable. The amendments introduced in the Family Code are applicable to the case before us although they became effective only on August 3, 1988. As we held in Ramirez vs. Court of Appeals: 7 The greater weight of authority is inclined to the view that an appellate court, in reviewing a judgment on appeal, will dispose of a question according to the law prevailing at the time of such disposition, and not according to the. law prevailing at the time of rendition of the appealed judgment. The court will therefore reverse a judgment which was correct at the time it was originally rendered where, by statute, there has been an intermediate change in the law which renders such judgment erroneous at the time the case was finally disposed of on appeal. The order of judicial separation of the properties in question is based on the finding of both the trial and respondent courts that the private respondent is indeed their real owner. It is these properties that should now be divided

[A.M. No. MTJ-92-716. October 25, 1995.] MA. BLYTH B. ABADILLA, complainant, vs. JUDGE JOSE C. TABILIRAN, JR., Presiding Judge, 8th MCTC, Manukan and Jose Dalman, 9th Judicial Region, Manukan, Zamboanga del Norte, respondent. cdasia SYLLABUS 1. CIVIL CODE; PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS; MARRIAGE; WHEN SANCTITY THEREOF VIOLATED; EFFECT IN CASE AT BAR. Contrary to his protestations that he started to cohabit with Priscilla Baybayan only after his first wife, Teresita Tabiliran, had long abandoned him and the conjugal home in 1966, it appears from the record that he had been scandalously

and openly living with said Priscilla Baybayan as early as 1970 as shown by the fact that he begot three children by her, namely Buenasol, Venus and Saturn, all surnamed Tabiliran. Buenasol was born on July 14, 1970; Venus was born on September 7, 1971; while Saturn was born on September 20, 1975. Evidently, therefore, respondent and Priscilla Baybayan had openly lived together even while respondent's marriage to his first wife was still valid and subsisting. The provisions of Sec. 3(w) of the Rules of Court and Art. 390 of the Civil Code which provide that, after an absence of seven years, it being unknown whether or not the absentee still lives, the absent spouse shall be considered dead for all purposes, except for those of succession, cannot be invoked by respondent. By respondent's own allegation, Teresita B. Tabiliran left the conjugal home in 1966. From that time on up to the time that respondent started to cohabit with Priscilla Baybayan in 1970, only four years had elapsed. Respondent had no right to presume therefore that Teresita B. Tabiliran was already dead for all purposes. Thus, respondent's actuation of cohabiting with Priscilla Baybayan in 1970 when his marriage to Teresita B. Tabiliran was still valid and subsisting constitutes gross immoral conduct. It makes mockery of the inviolability and sanctity of marriage as a basic social institution. According to Justice Malcolm: "The basis of human society throughout the civilized world is that of marriage. It is not only a civil contract, but is a new relation, an institution on the maintenance of which the public is deeply interested. Consequently, every intendment of the law leans toward legalizing matrimony." (Civil Code, 1993 Ed., Volume 1, p. 122, Ramon C. Aquino). By committing the immorality in question, respondent violated the trust reposed on his high office and utterly failed to live up to the noble ideals and strict standards of morality required of the law profession. (Imbing v. Tiongson, 229 SCRA 690). 2. ID.; ID.; LEGITIMATION; CONSTRUED; WHEN NOT APPLICABLE; CASE AT BAR. An examination of the birth certificates of respondent's three illegitimate children with Priscilla Baybayan clearly indicate that these children are his legitimate issues. It was respondent who caused the entry therein. It is important to note that these children, namely, Buenasol, Venus and Saturn, all surnamed Tabiliran, were born in the year 1970, 1971, and

1975, respectively, and prior to the marriage of respondent to Priscilla, which was in 1986. As a lawyer and a judge, respondent ought to know that, despite his subsequent marriage to Priscilla, these three children cannot be legitimated nor in any way be considered legitimate since at the time they were born, there was an existing valid marriage between respondent and his first wife, Teresita B. Tabiliran. The applicable legal provision in the case at bar is Article 269 of the Civil Code of the Philippines (R.A. 386 as amended) which provides: Art. 269. Only natural children can be legitimated. Children born outside of wedlock of parents who, at the time of the conception of the former, were not disqualified by any impediment to marry each other, are natural. Legitimation is limited to natural children and cannot include those born of adulterous relations (Ramirez vs. Gmur, 42 Phil. 855). The Family Code (Executive Order No. 209), which took effect on August 3, 1988, reiterated the above-mentioned provision thus: Art. 177. Only children conceived and born outside of wedlock of parents who, at the time of the conception of the former, were not disqualified by any impediment to marry each other may be legitimated. 3. ID.; ID.; ID.; RATIONALE. The reasons for this limitation are given as follows: 1) The rationale of legitimation would be destroyed; 2) It would be unfair to the legitimate children in terms of successional rights; 3) There will be the problem of public scandal, unless social mores change; 4) It is too violent to grant the privilege of legitimation to adulterous children as it will destroy the sanctity of marriage; 5) It will be very scandalous, especially if the parents marry many years after the birth of the child. (The Family Code, p. 252, Alicia V. Sempio Diy). 4. LEGAL ETHICS; NOTARY PUBLIC; COMPENSATION; RULE; WHEN VIOLATED; CASE AT BAR. Respondent himself admitted that he prepared and notarized the documents wherein he charged notarial fees. Though he was legally allowed to notarize documents and charge fees therefor due to the fact that there has been no Notary Public in the town of Manukan, this defense is not sufficient to justify his otherwise corrupt and illegal acts. Section 252 of the Notarial Law expressly provides thus: Sec. 252. Compensation of Notaries Public No fee, compensation, or reward of any

sort, except such as is expressly prescribed and allowed by law, shall be collected or received for any service rendered by a notary public. Such money collected by notaries public proper shall belong to them personally. Officers acting as notaries public ex-officio shall charge for their services the fees prescribed by law and account therefor as for Government funds. (Notarial Law, Revised Administrative Code of the Philippines, p. 202.) Respondent's failure to properly account and turn over the fees collected by him as Ex-Officio notary to the municipal government as required by law raises the presumption that he had put such fund to his personal use. cdlex 5. JUDICIAL ETHICS; JUDGES; VIOLATION OF THE CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT; CASE AT BAR. With respect to the charge that respondent prepared an Affidavit of Desistance in a rape case filed before his sala for which he collected the amount of P500.00 from the complainant therein, respondent merely denied the said imputation but failed to offer any evidence to support such denial. Denial, if unsubstantiated by clear and convincing evidence, is a negative and self-serving evidence which deserves no weight in law and cannot be given greater evidentiary value over the testimony of credible witnesses who testify on affirmative matters (People v. Amaguin, 229 SCRA 166). It is unfortunate that respondent had failed to adhere to, and let this remind him once again of Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, to wit: Canon 2 A judge should avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all activities. DECISION PER CURIAM p: "We have a list of these crooked judges whose actuations have been found to be patently wrong and indefensible. There ought to be no objection or compunction in weeding them out from the service. If they are not booted out now, it will take from here to eternity to clean this Augeun stable." 1 Indeed, our judicial structure is supposed to be manned by magistrates chosen for their probity, integrity, impartiality, dedication and learning. And so, any judge wanting in any of these qualities should be broomed off and

out of the bench in order to improve the judicial landscape. Screening off the misfits, considering the great number of judges and justices in the country at present, is the arduous and Herculean task of this Court. The effort if dramatized with rectitude and sincerity should bring about the strengthening of the people's abiding faith in democracy and the integrity of our courts of justice. The herein administrative case arose from a complaint, dated September 8, 1992, filed by Ma. Blyth B. Abadilla, a Clerk of Court assigned at the sala of respondent, Judge Jose C. Tabiliran, Jr., of the 8th Municipal Circuit Trial Court, Manukan, Zamboanga del Norte. Respondent stands charged with "gross immorality, deceitful conduct, and corruption unbecoming of a judge." In her verified complaint, complainant Abadilla, in respect to the charge of gross immorality on the part of the respondent, contends that respondent had scandalously and publicly cohabited with a certain Priscilla Q. Baybayan during the existence of his legitimate marriage with Teresita Banzuela. Adding ignominy to an ignominious situation, respondent allegedly shamefacedly contracted marriage with the said Priscilla Baybayan on May 23, 1986. Complainant claims that this was a bigamous union because of the fact that the respondent was then still very much married to Teresita Banzuela. Furthermore, respondent falsely represented himself as "single" in the marriage contract (Exh. "A") and dispensed with the requirements of a marriage contract by invoking cohabitation with Baybayan for five years. cda Of persuasive effect on the charge of immorality is the fact that, earlier, respondent's wife filed a complaint in the case entitled, Teresita B. Tabiliran vs. Atty. Jose C. Tabiliran, Jr., 115 SCRA 451. Respondent stood charged therein for abandoning the family home and living with a certain Leonora Pillarion with whom he had a son.

In respect of the charge of deceitful conduct, complainant claims that respondent caused to be registered as "legitimate," his three illegitimate children with Priscilla Baybayan, namely: Buenasol B. Tabiliran born on July 14, 1970 Venus B. Tabiliran born on Sept. 7, 1971 Saturn B. Tabiliran born on Sept. 20, 1975 by falsely executing separate affidavits stating that the delayed registration was due to inadvertence, excusable negligence or oversight, when in truth and in fact, respondent knew that these children cannot be legally registered as legitimate. The following acts are alleged to have constituted the charge of corruption: (1) Utilizing his office time, while being a judge, in the private practice of law by the preparation and notarization of documents, out of which he charged fees beyond the authorized rates allowed as Ex-Officio Notary Public. These acts which, according to the charge, amount to the private practice of law, prejudice public interest. Complainant submitted the following documents in support of these allegations: a) Affidavit of Ponciana Geromo (Annex "B"), attesting to the fact that respondent Judge Tabiliran prepared a Simultaneous Deed of Sale, (Annex "C", Doc. No. 901, Page No. 77, Book No. V, Series of 1991 of Ex-Officio Notary Public Jose C. Tabiliran, Jr.) and collect P600.00 from the vendees (par. 10(a) a-1 Complaint, p. 9 records); b) Receipt prepared under instruction of the respondent showing that he received P250.00 thru MCTC Aide Ely O. Inot for preparation and notarization of Joint Affidavit declaring the correct ages of Carlo Manzano, Lodmila Cinco, Kadapi Amad, Jul Samud and Amman Eddai dated November 12, 1991, when the legal fees therefor should have been P10.00 only (Annex "D") (par. 10(a) a-2 Complaint, p. 9 records);

c) Another receipt (Annex "E") prepared thru the direction of the respondent dated November 12, 1991, showing that said respondent received from Reynaldo Subebe the sum of P150.00 for preparation and notarization by him of a Joint Affidavit declaring the correct age of Agata Luna, Rosie Miranda and Jose Juneser Adrias (par. 10 (a) a-c Complaint, p. 9 records); d) Still another receipt (Annex "F") dated November 12, 1991, signed by the respondent himself showing that he received from Nelly Baradas the sum of P50.00 for preparation and notarization of Joint Affidavit attesting to the correct age of one Luzviminda Jacoba (par. 10(a) a-d Complaint, p. 9 records); e) Another receipt (Annex "G") dated November 12, 1991, issued by the respondent, showing that he received from Torres P. Modai the sum of P50.00, thru the same Ely O. Inot, MCTC Aide, for preparation of Joint Affidavit attesting to the correct age of Flores Jalampangan (par. 10 (a) a-e Complaint, pp. 9 & 10 records). (2) Accepting bribes from parties-litigants in his Court as supported by an affidavit (Annex "M") executed by a certain Calixto Calunod, a court aide, stating that he saw Edna Siton, complainant in a criminal case tried by respondent, hand over to the latter a bag of fish and squid which respondent Judge received. (3) Preparing an Affidavit of Desistance in a case filed with his sala out of which he collected the amount of P500.00 from the accused Antonio Oriola, as supported by the affidavits of Arcelita Salvador, the complainant therein, and Benito Sagario, one of the persons present when the accused perpetrated the acts aforesaid. (Submitted as Annexes "I" and "J", respectively.) Complainant manifests that the commission by the respondent of the foregoing acts renders him unfit to occupy the exalted position of a dispenser of justice. By the example shown by the respondent, the public had allegedly lost confidence in the administration of justice, perceiving as is

evident to see that the person occupying the position of a judge lacks the morality and probity required of one occupying such a high office. Respondent, in his comment, dated December 25, 1992, declared that his cohabitation with Priscilla Baybayan is not and was neither bigamous nor immoral because he started living with Priscilla Baybayan only after his first wife had already left and abandoned the family home in 1966 and, since then, and until the present her whereabouts is not known and respondent has had no news of her being alive. He further avers that 25 years had already elapsed since the disappearance of his first wife when he married Priscilla Baybayan in 1986. Respondent cited Sec. 3(w), Rule 131 of the Rules of Court and Art. 390 of the Civil Code in order to show the legality of his acts: "After the absence of seven years, it being unknown whether or not the absentee still lives, he is considered dead for all purposes except for those of succession." (Rule 131, Sec. 3(w), Rules of Court.) "After an absence of seven years, it being unknown whether or not the absentee still lives, he shall be presumed dead for all purposes, except for those of succession." (Art. 390, Civil Code.) The case of Jones vs. Hortiguela, 64 Phil. 179, where this Court held that for the purpose of the civil marriage law, it is not necessary to have the former spouse judicially declared an absentee is to respondent's mind, a case in point. He admits that he indicated in his marriage contract that he was then "single," but he denied the charge that he acted with deceit or false misrepresentation, claiming that, since there were only three words to choose from, namely: Single, Widow or Divorced, he preferred to choose the word "single," it being the most appropriate. Besides, both he and Priscilla executed a joint affidavit wherein his former marriage to Banzuela was honestly divulged.

On the charge of corruption, respondent submitted certifications (Annexes "4" & "5") from the Mayor of Manukan, Zamboanga del Norte, attesting to the fact that there was no Notary Public in Manukan and, as such, respondent may be allowed to notarize documents. He denied having charged exorbitant fees. He claims that all the amounts received by him were used to subsidize office expenses, since the funds he had been receiving from the municipal government were not enough to cover expenses in maintaining his office. Respondent submitted a certification (Annex "6") from the Accounting Department of the Municipal Government of Manukan to the effect that his yearly expenditures were more than the yearly appropriations. Respondent finds support in Canon 4, Rule 4.01 of the Code of Judicial Conduct which states: "A Judge may, with due regard to official duties, engage in activities to improve . . . the administration of justice." Respondent vehemently denies the charge of bribery claiming that it was inconceivable for him to receive a bag full of fish and squid since his residence was 42 kilometers from Jose Dalman where his courtroom or office was located. It takes one an hour and a half by bus to reach Katipunan and so, by the time he reaches his house, the fish and the squid should have become rotten. In support of his denials, respondent submitted as Annex "8", an affidavit of Ely D. Inot, their court Interpreter who declared: xxx xxx xxx

"3. That last June 6, 1991, I was with the Municipal Judge, Jose C. Tabiliran, Jr., from the morning until we went home in the afternoon and we in fact dined together in the local Carenderia of Jose Dalman as it is the usual ways of the Judge to eat lunch together with the court personnel; 4. That when we went home in the afternoon of that day we were also together riding in a bus, the Lillian Express and until I drop in Roxas and he proceeded to Katipunan where his residence is;

5. That all the time during that day I did not noticed him bringing anything except his 'Hand Bag' which he used to carry in going to the office;" (Annex "8", Affidavit of Ely O. Inot, December 17, 1992.) xxx xxx xxx

his services; and (2) for preparing an affidavit of desistance in a case pending in his Court and receiving payment for it. In his report and recommendation dated August 3, 1993, Executive Judge Angeles found that: ON GROSS IMMORALITY: In contracting marriage with Priscilla Q. Baybayan on May 23, 1986, (p. 13 of the records), respondent did not hide the fact that he was married to Teresita T. Banzuela, having disclosed it in his affidavit jointly executed with Priscilla Q. Baybayan on May 23, 1986 (p. 115 of the records), particularly paragraph 4 thereof which reads: "4. That affiant Jose C. Tabiliran, Jr., was formerly married to Teresita T . Banzuela but who left and abandoned their family home sometime in 1965 in Katipunan, Zamboanga del Norte, and until now at present her whereabouts is not known." It was therefore a marriage contracted under Article 83(2) of the Civil Code which, although bigamous, remains valid until automatically terminated by the recording of the affidavit of reappearance of the absent spouse (Art. 42, Family Code). Respondent's assertion that since 1965 to the present, his first wife Teresita T. Banzuela had left their conjugal dwelling and did not return, her whereabouts being unknown, was not controverted. Living as husband and wife pursuant to an authorized bigamous marriage, respondent cannot be said to be acting in an immoral and scandalous manner, and the immoral stigma of extra-marital union since 1969 duly declared in their aforesaid joint affidavit, may be considered cleansed by their marriage in 1986, if Art. 1395 of the Civil Code on ratification on contracts in general is allowed to be applied, it being ratification of marital cohabitation. Article 76 of Civil Code, now Art. 34 of the Family Code was intended to facilitate and encourage the marriage of persons who have been living in a state of concubinage for more than five years (Tolentino, Civil Code, Book I, 1974 Ed., p. 245, cited in Ernesto L. Pineda, Family Code, 1992 Ed., p. 38). Indicating his civil status in the marriage contract as

Finally, respondent tags as a fabricated lie the charge that he prepared an Affidavit of Desistance in a case pending in his sala and thereafter charged the accused, Antonio Oriola, the sum of P500.00 for legal services. The complainant, he said, was the one who induced Arcelita Salvador (the complainant in the rape case) to execute an affidavit (Annex "I") in support of the charge of corruption against respondent. Complainant's filing of the present case was motivated by revenge and resentment because, earlier, respondent filed an administrative case (A.M. No. P-91-597) against her for "Insubordination and Serious Misconduct." The Supreme Court decided to reprimand her with a warning that a repetition of her acts will be severely dealt with. Respondent claims that the complainant had nevertheless repeatedly continued to do acts of insubordination in the following manner: 1) She continues to keep court records and has kept refusing to hand them over to respondent inspite of verbal and written orders; 2) She refused to receive a memorandum from the Vice-Mayor requiring the Clerk of Court to submit an Annual report; 3) She refused to prepare the said annual report required of her as Clerk of Court; 4) She continue to refuse to obey just and lawful orders of the Court.

On April 12, 1993, by resolution of this Court En Banc, the herein administrative case was referred to Executive Judge Jesus O. Angeles of the Regional Trial Court, Dipolog City, for investigation, report and recommendation. Judge Angeles found respondent guilty only on two (2) counts of corruption: (1) for acting as notary public and collecting fees for

"single" is hardly considered a misrepresentation of fact, specially to the solemnizing officer, Municipal Mayor Jacinto C. Ruedas, Jr. to whom the aforesaid joint affidavit was submitted. ON DECEITFUL CONDUCT: Respondent's children begotten with Priscilla Q. Baybayan, namely: Buenasol B. Tabiliran, Venus B. Tabiliran and Saturn B. Tabiliran, all of whom were born before their marriage, were disclosed and made known to the solemnizing officer and the latter himself, in his affidavit dated May 23, 1986 (p. 116 of the records) which supports the marriage contract of respondent with Priscilla Q. Baybayan, having shown such fact. Exhibit P which purports to be an affidavit of Lydia T. Zanoria dated May 27, 1993, consisting of three pages, was submitted by the complainant for the purpose of proving her charge that the respondent falsely executed his three separate affidavits, namely: Exhibit K dated May 24, 1983 regarding the late registration of birth of his daughter Buenasol B. Tabiliran; Exhibit M dated May 28, 1988 regarding the late registration of birth of his third child Saturn B. Tabiliran; and his affidavit dated May 27, 1988, Exhibit O, in reference to the late registration of birth of his second child Venus B. Tabiliran, stating inadvertence, excusable negligence or oversight as the reasons for the delayed registration of their births, without however presenting said affiant Mrs. Zanoria, consequently denying respondent the opportunity to cross examine her. Her affidavit is not among those brought out in the pre-hearing conference, and was not discussed during the hearing itself, submitting it only after the investigation proper was terminated. The supposed affiant claimed she was the government midwife who attended to the births of respondent's three children, denying, as the affidavit shows, negligence, inadvertence or oversight on her part to register their birth on time. Not having been presented for respondent to confront her, or an opportunity to do so, Exhibit P cannot be considered evidence of the charge. An affidavit is hearsay unless the affiant is presented (People vs. Villeza, 127 SCRA 349), or admitted by the party against whom it is presented.

ON CORRUPTION: 1. Acting as Notary Public during office hours, and collecting fees:

Respondent has admitted having prepared the documents and collected fees, in the instances specified in par. 10 of the complaint, namely: (1) affidavit of Ponciana Geromo; (2) Joint Affidavit of Carlo Manzano, Lodmila Cinco, Kadapi Amad, Jul Samud and Amman Eddai; (3) Joint Affidavit of Agata Luna, Rosie Miranda and Jose Juneser Adrias; (4) Joint Affidavit on the correct age of Luzviminda Jacoba; and (5) Joint Affidavit on the correct age of Flores Jalampangan, but not necessarily on the accuracy of the amounts therein stated as having been collected by him from them (please see PreHearing Order of May 20, 1993 of the Investigating Judge). Seeking justification of his acts, respondent submitted Annexes 4 & 5 of his comments (pp. 118 and 119, records) which are certifications of Manukan Mayor Eugene U. Caballero attesting that in the absence of a Notary Public in Manukan town, respondent who is a Judge thereat was allowed "to prepare and ligalize (sic) documents." He declared "the fees derived from the preparation and notarization of documents were mostly used by respondent to buy supplies and materials of his Office," explaining that his office needs cannot be sustained by the appropriations of the local government which are inadequate. On page 120 of the records, his Annex 6 shows a shortage in his appropriations for supplies. And supplies from the Supreme Court can only be obtained if secured personally but has to assume the expenses for transportation, freight and handling. Respondent Judge maintains that the Code of Judicial Conduct does not prohibit him from acting as Notary Public, and the fees he has received were much lower than the rates prescribed by the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, Zamboanga del Norte Chapter, submitting Annex 3, p. 117 of the records, to prove it. Further justifying his act under Canon 4, Rule 4.01 of the Code of Judicial Conduct which provides that a judge may, with due regard to official duties,

engaged in activities to improve the administration of justice, respondent claims that due to his efforts, he was able to secure an extension room of his office covering a floor area of 24 square meters, from the Sangguniang Pampook of Region IX based in Zamboanga City, costing P19,000.00 per certification shown in his Annex 7 (page 121 of the records). In the light of 1989 Code of Judicial Conduct vis-a-vis the power of Municipal Trial Court Judges and Municipal Circuit Trial Court Judges to act in the capacity of Notary Public Ex-Officio, the Honorable Supreme Court in A.M. No. 89-11-1303, MTC, Dec. 19, 1989, has ruled: "MTC and MCTC Judges assigned to municipalities or circuits with no lawyers or notaries public may, in their capacity as notary public ex-officio perform any act within the competency of a regular Notary Public, provided that: (1) all notarial fees charged be for the account of the Government and turned-over to the municipal treasurer (Lapea, Jr. vs. Marcos, Adm. Matter No. 1969-MJ, June 29, 1982, 114 SCRA 572); and (2) certification be made in the notarized documents attesting to the lack of any lawyer or notary public in such municipality or circuit." LLpr Although absence of a notary public commissioned for, and residing in Manukan town, even in Jose Dalman which is within his circuit is confirmed, respondent Judge while he may be justified in so acting as notary public, did not, however, comply with requirement No. 1 which obliged him to charge for the account of the Government and turn-over to the municipal treasurer all notarial fees. And there is no way of determining the truth of his assertion that the notarial fees he collected were "mostly used" to buy supplies and materials for his office, absent any accounting. 2. Accepting Bribe from Parties-litigants:

presented the Court Interpreter Ely O. Inot, who "confirmed that there was squid and fish contained in a plastic bag which was left in Aseniero Carenderia by a person unknown to her and some members of the Court staff. When informed by the carenderia owner that the stuff was intended for Judge Tabiliran, the latter told them to cook it, and they afterwards partook of it without the Judge who already boarded the passenger bus." (Record of Proceedings, p. 1, par. No. 1, dated June 11, 1993). Being her witness, complainant is bound by her testimony. This particular charge is, therefore, not proved. 3. Preparing Affidavit of Desistance and Collecting Fee for his Services:

Admitting the existence of Annex H found on page 21 in the records, respondent, however, denied the imputation therein contained by affiant Calixto Calunod that he received a sando bag full of fish and squid from a certain Edna Siton who had a case with respondent's court as complainant in a certain criminal case. Instead of calling the affiant himself, complainant

Under this count, two affidavits both sworn before 2nd Asst. Provincial Fiscal Valeriano B. Lagula were submitted: one by Arcelita Salvador, complainant in an attempted rape case who was categorical in her declaration that respondent Judge asked and received from Pitoy Oriola, brother of accused Antonio Oriola the amount of P500.00 after the Judge prepared the affidavit of desistance and motion to dismiss which he made her sign (Annex I, p. 40 records). Benito Sagario who was present executed another separate affidavit, Annex J found on page 41 in the records, confirming it. In admitting the affidavit, respondent, however, denied the imputation, asserting that it is false, but without confronting them or presenting witnesses to dispute their accusation. He could have demanded that the affiants, including the persons they mentioned were present in the transaction, namely: accused Antonio Oriola, his brother Pitoy Oriola, Ignacio Salvador, and INC Minister Antonio Calua be required to appear for his confrontation, but respondent chose not, contended himself only with the explanation that it was just the handiwork of complainant Abadilla and her husband, a major in the military who is an active member of the Iglesia Ni Cristo of which affiant Arcelita Salvador also belonged, which is bare and unsubstantiated. No other conclusion can be drawn other than holding, as the Investigating Judge does, that this particular charge is true. Evidently, Judge Tabiliran wants to avoid meeting them by way of confrontation. If he is innocent, and is certain the charge is fabricated, he will surely raise hell to

insist that he confronts them face to face. Clearly, his deportment betrays his insistence of innocence. On Respondent's Counterclaim: It was not proven. On the contrary, the controverting evidence shows that the records of Criminal Case No. 2279 referred to in his Annex 9, p. 123 of the records, were not in the possession of complainant. Quite obviously, Ely O. Inot, respondent's Court Interpreter tried to cover up the fact that the same were already being kept by Judge Tabiliran before he issued the memorandum, Annex 9. Complainant, who is respondent's Clerk of Court was not, therefore, in a position to comply with his Order. Also, Mrs. Abadilla's failure to prepare the annual report of the Court in 1992 as called for in Annexes 10 and 10-A was, contrary to respondent's claim, not by reason of her obstinate refusal to obey her superior but, by sheer impossibility to comply, considering that monthly reports upon which the annual report shall be based, were not prepared by her, not because of her refusal to do so which is among those included in her job description, but because the Judge himself took the work from her for no other reason than to establish the false impression that the complainant is disobedient to the Judge, and does not attend to her duties. By and large, there is no harmony in their office. Complainant and respondent are not in talking terms. They are hostile to each other. Respondent's complaint that Mrs. Abadilla spat saliva in front of him whenever they meet each other; destroying the Court dry seal by throwing it at him one time she was mad; showing face; and sticking out her tongue to him, are all puerile acts which the undersigned cannot conclude as sufficiently established even with the testimony of Mrs. Ely O. Inot which is far from being definite and categorical, whose actuation is understandable because Judge Tabiliran, being her superior, has moral ascendancy over her (Record of Proceedings, June 11, 1993). The undersigned believes that the problem is on Judge Tabiliran, and not on Mrs. Abadilla, who has been in the service as Clerk of Court under a

previous Judge of the same Court for quite long without any complaint having been filed. The evidence disputing his counterclaim tends to show that respondent tried to build up a situation of undesirability against his Clerk of Court whom he wanted pulled out from her position in his Court. Other Matters Not Covered By The Complaint And Comments: The authority to investigate being confined only to matters alleged in the complaint on the basis of which respondent filed his comments, other matters not therein covered which complainant brought out by way of presenting documentary exhibits, (from Exhibit AAA to HHH), are not subject of this report and recommendation. RECOMMENDATION: The charge of GROSS IMMORALITY and DECEITFUL CONDUCT have not been proven, but the undersigned believes evidence is sufficient to sustain a pronouncement of guilt on two counts of CORRUPTION, namely: acting as notary public and collecting fees for his services in preparing affidavit of desistance of a case in his Court. Likewise, acts of oppression, deceit and false imputation against his Clerk of Court are found duly established. WHEREFORE, suspension of the respondent Judge from the service for a period of three months is recommended. THE FOREGOING CONSIDERED, We hold the respondent culpable for gross immorality, he having scandalously and openly cohabited with the said Priscilla Baybayan during the existence of his marriage with Teresita B. Tabiliran. Contrary to his protestations that he started to cohabit with Priscilla Baybayan only after his first wife, Teresita Tabiliran, had long abandoned him and the conjugal home in 1966, it appears from the record that he had been scandalously and openly living with said Priscilla Baybayan as early as 1970 as shown by the fact that he begot three children by her, namely Buenasol, Venus and Saturn, all surnamed Tabiliran. Buenasol was born on July 14, 1970; Venus was born on September 7, 1971; while Saturn was born

on September 20, 1975. Evidently, therefore, respondent and Priscilla Baybayan had openly lived together even while respondent's marriage to his first wife was still valid and subsisting. The provisions of Sec. 3(w) of the Rules of Court and Art. 390 of the Civil Code which provide that, after an absence of seven years, it being unknown whether or not the absentee still lives, the absent spouse shall be considered dead for all purposes, except for those of succession, cannot be invoked by respondent. By respondent's own allegation, Teresita B. Tabiliran left the conjugal home in 1966. From that time on up to the time that respondent started to cohabit with Priscilla Baybayan in 1970, only four years had elapsed. Respondent had no right to presume therefore that Teresita B. Tabiliran was already dead for all purposes. Thus, respondent's actuation of cohabiting with Priscilla Baybayan in 1970 when his marriage to Teresita B. Tabilaran was still valid and subsisting constitutes gross immoral conduct. It makes mockery of the inviolability and sanctity of marriage as a basic social institution. According to Justice Malcolm: "The basis of human society throughout the civilized world is that of marriage. It is not only a civil contract, but is a new relation, an institution on the maintenance of which the public is deeply interested. Consequently, every intendment of the law leans toward legalizing matrimony." (Civil Code, 1993 Ed., Volume 1, p. 122, Ramon C. Aquino). By committing the immorality in question, respondent violated the trust reposed on his high office and utterly failed to live up to the noble ideals and strict standards of morality required of the law profession. (Imbing v. Tiongson , 229 SCRA 690). LLjur As to respondent's act of eventually marrying Priscilla Baybayan in 1986, We are not in a position to determine the legality thereof, absent all the facts for a proper determination. Sufficient for Our consideration is the finding of the Investigating Judge, that the said marriage is authorized under Art. 83 (2) of the Civil Code. With respect to the charge of deceitful conduct, We hold that the charge has likewise been duly established. An examination of the birth certificates (Exhs. "J", "L", & "M") of respondent's three illegitimate children with Priscilla Baybayan clearly indicate that these children are his legitimate

issues. It was respondent who caused the entry therein. It is important to note that these children, namely, Buenasol, Venus and Saturn, all surnamed Tabiliran, were born in the year 1970, 1971, and 1975, respectively, and prior to the marriage of respondent to Priscilla, which was in 1986. As a lawyer and a judge, respondent ought to know that, despite his subsequent marriage to Priscilla, these three children cannot be legitimated nor in any way be considered legitimate since at the time they were born, there was an existing valid marriage between respondent and his first wife, Teresita B. Tabiliran. The applicable legal provision in the case at bar is Article 269 of the Civil Code of the Philippines (R.A. 386 as amended) which provides: ARTICLE 269. Only natural children can be legitimated. Children born outside of wedlock of parents who, at the time of the conception of the former, were not disqualified by any impediment to marry each other, are natural. Legitimation is limited to natural children and cannot include those born of adulterous relations (Ramirez vs. Gmur, 42 Phil. 855). The Family Code (Executive Order No. 209), which took effect on August 3, 1988, reiterated the above-mentioned provision thus: ARTICLE 177. Only children conceived and born outside of wedlock of parents who, at the time of the conception of the former, were not disqualified by any impediment to marry each other may be legitimated. The reasons for this limitation are given as follows: 1) The rationale of legitimation would be destroyed;

2) It would be unfair to the legitimate children in terms of successional rights; 3) There will be the problem of public scandal, unless social mores change; 4) It is too violent to grant the privilege of legitimation to adulterous children as it will destroy the sanctity of marriage;

5) It will be very scandalous, especially if the parents marry many years after the birth of the child. (The Family Code, p. 252, Alicia V. Sempio Diy). It is clear, therefore, that no legal provision, whether old or new, can give refuge to the deceitful actuations of the respondent. It is also erroneous for respondent to state that his first wife Teresita disappeared in 1966 and has not been heard from since then. It appears that on December 8, 1969, Teresita filed a complaint against respondent entitled, Tabiliran vs. Tabiliran (A.C. No. 906) which was decided by this Court in 1982. In the said case, respondent was sued for abandonment of his family home and for living with another woman with whom he allegedly begot a child. Respondent was, however, exonerated because of the failure of his wife to substantiate the charges. However, respondent was reprimanded for having executed a "Deed of Settlement of Spouses To Live Separately from Bed," with a stipulation that they allow each of the other spouse to live with another man or woman as the case may be, without the objection and intervention of the other. It was also in the same case where respondent declared that he has only two children, namely, Reynald Antonio and Jose III, both surnamed Tabiliran, who are his legitimate issues. Thus, his statements in his affidavits marked as Exhs. "M-4" and "O-4" that Saturn and Venus are his third and second children respectively, are erroneous, deceitful, misleading and detrimental to his legitimate children. With respect to the charge of corruption, We agree with the findings of the Investigating Judge that respondent should be found culpable for two counts of corruption: (1) acting as Notary Public; and (2) collecting legal fees in preparing an Affidavit of Desistance of a case in his court. Respondent himself admitted that he prepared and notarized the documents (Annexes "C", "D", "E", "F" and "G") wherein he charged notarial fees. Though he was legally allowed to notarize documents and charge fees therefor due to the fact that there has been no Notary Public in the town of Manukan, this defense is not sufficient to justify his otherwise corrupt and illegal acts.

Section 252 of the Notarial Law expressly provides thus: SECTION 252. Compensation of Notaries Public. No fee, compensation, or reward of any sort, except such as is expressly prescribed and allowed by law, shall be collected or received for any service rendered by a notary public. Such money collected by notaries public proper shall belong to them personally. Officers acting as notaries public ex-officio shall charge for their services the fees prescribed by law and account therefor as for Government funds. (Notarial Law, Revised Administrative Code of the Philippines, p. 202.) LLcd Respondent's failure to properly account and turn over the fees collected by him as Ex-Officio notary to the municipal government as required by law raises the presumption that he had put such fund to his personal use. With respect to the charge that respondent prepared an Affidavit of Desistance in a rape case filed before his sala for which he collected the amount of P500.00 from the complainant therein, respondent merely denied the said imputation but failed to offer any evidence to support such denial. Denial, if unsubstantiated by clear and convincing evidence, is a negative and self-serving evidence which deserves no weight in law and cannot be given greater evidentiary value over the testimony of credible witnesses who testify on affirmative matters (People v. Amaguin, 229 SCRA 166). It is unfortunate that respondent had failed to adhere to, and let this remind him once again of Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, to wit: Canon 2 A judge should avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all activities. WHEREFORE, the Court finds respondent Judge Jose C. Tabiliran, Jr. guilty of gross immorality, deceitful conduct and corruption and, consequently, orders his dismissal from the service. Such dismissal shall carry with it cancellation of eligibility, forfeiture of leave credits and retirement benefits, and disqualification from re-employment in the government-service, all without prejudice to criminal or civil liability.

SO ORDERED. Llibris

[G.R. No. 155800. March 10, 2006.] LEONILO ANTONIO, petitioner, vs. MARIE IVONNE F. REYES, respondent. DECISION TINGA, J p: Statistics never lie, but lovers often do, quipped a sage. This sad truth has unsettled many a love transformed into matrimony. Any sort of deception between spouses, no matter the gravity, is always disquieting. Deceit to the depth and breadth unveiled in the following pages, dark and irrational as in the modern noir tale, dims any trace of certitude on the guilty spouse's capability to fulfill the marital obligations even more. CTEaDc The Petition for Review on Certiorari assails the Decision 1 and Resolution 2 of the Court of Appeals dated 29 November 2001 and 24 October 2002. The Court of Appeals had reversed the judgment 3 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati declaring the marriage of Leonilo N. Antonio (petitioner) and Marie Ivonne F. Reyes (respondent), null and void. After careful consideration, we reverse and affirm instead the trial court. Antecedent Facts Petitioner and respondent met in August 1989 when petitioner was 26 years old and respondent was 36 years of age. Barely a year after their first meeting, they got married before a minister of the Gospel 4 at the Manila City Hall, and through a subsequent church wedding 5 at the Sta. Rosa de Lima Parish, Bagong Ilog, Pasig, Metro Manila on 6 December 1990. 6 Out of their union, a child was born on 19 April 1991, who sadly died five (5) months later. On 8 March 1993, 7 petitioner filed a petition to have his marriage to respondent declared null and void. He anchored his petition for nullity on

Article 36 of the Family Code alleging that respondent was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential obligations of marriage. He asserted that respondent's incapacity existed at the time their marriage was celebrated and still subsists up to the present. 8 As manifestations of respondent's alleged psychological incapacity, petitioner claimed that respondent persistently lied about herself, the people around her, her occupation, income, educational attainment and other events or things, 9 to wit: (1) She concealed the fact that she previously gave birth to an illegitimate son, 10 and instead introduced the boy to petitioner as the adopted child of her family. She only confessed the truth about the boy's parentage when petitioner learned about it from other sources after their marriage. 11 (2) She fabricated a story that her brother-in-law, Edwin David, attempted to rape and kill her when in fact, no such incident occurred. 12 (3) She misrepresented herself as a psychiatrist to her obstetrician, Dr. Consuelo Gardiner, and told some of her friends that she graduated with a degree in psychology, when she was neither. 13 (4) She claimed to be a singer or a free-lance voice talent affiliated with Blackgold Recording Company (Blackgold); yet, not a single member of her family ever witnessed her alleged singing activities with the group. In the same vein, she postulated that a luncheon show was held at the Philippine Village Hotel in her honor and even presented an invitation to that effect 14 but petitioner discovered per certification by the Director of Sales of said hotel that no such occasion had taken place. 15 (5) She invented friends named Babes Santos and Via Marquez, and under those names, sent lengthy letters to petitioner claiming to be from Blackgold and touting her as the "number one moneymaker" in the commercial industry worth P2 million. 16 Petitioner later found out that respondent herself was the one who wrote and sent the letters to him when she admitted the truth in one of their quarrels. 17 He likewise realized that

Babes Santos and Via Marquez were only figments of her imagination when he discovered they were not known in or connected with Blackgold. 18 (6) She represented herself as a person of greater means, thus, she altered her payslip to make it appear that she earned a higher income. She bought a sala set from a public market but told petitioner that she acquired it from a famous furniture dealer. 19 She spent lavishly on unnecessary items and ended up borrowing money from other people on false pretexts. 20 (7) She exhibited insecurities and jealousies over him to the extent of calling up his officemates to monitor his whereabouts. When he could no longer take her unusual behavior, he separated from her in August 1991. He tried to attempt a reconciliation but since her behavior did not change, he finally left her for good in November 1991. 21 In support of his petition, petitioner presented Dr. Dante Herrera Abcede (Dr. Abcede), a psychiatrist, and Dr. Arnulfo V. Lopez (Dr. Lopez), a clinical psychologist, who stated, based on the tests they conducted, that petitioner was essentially a normal, introspective, shy and conservative type of person. On the other hand, they observed that respondent's persistent and constant lying to petitioner was abnormal or pathological. It undermined the basic relationship that should be based on love, trust and respect. 22 They further asserted that respondent's extreme jealousy was also pathological. It reached the point of paranoia since there was no actual basis for her to suspect that petitioner was having an affair with another woman. They concluded based on the foregoing that respondent was psychologically incapacitated to perform her essential marital obligations. 23 In opposing the petition, respondent claimed that she performed her marital obligations by attending to all the needs of her husband. She asserted that there was no truth to the allegation that she fabricated stories, told lies and invented personalities. 24 She presented her version, thus: ASHaDT

(1) She concealed her child by another man from petitioner because she was afraid of losing her husband. 25 (2) She told petitioner about David's attempt to rape and kill her because she surmised such intent from David's act of touching her back and ogling her from head to foot. 26 (3) She was actually a BS Banking and Finance graduate and had been teaching psychology at the Pasig Catholic School for two (2) years. 27 (4) She was a free-lance voice talent of Aris de las Alas, an executive producer of Channel 9 and she had done three (3) commercials with McCann Erickson for the advertisement of Coca-cola, Johnson & Johnson, and Traders Royal Bank. She told petitioner she was a Blackgold recording artist although she was not under contract with the company, yet she reported to the Blackgold office after office hours. She claimed that a luncheon show was indeed held in her honor at the Philippine Village Hotel on 8 December 1979. 28 (5) She vowed that the letters sent to petitioner were not written by her and the writers thereof were not fictitious. Bea Marquez Recto of the Recto political clan was a resident of the United States while Babes Santos was employed with Saniwares. 29 (6) She admitted that she called up an officemate of her husband but averred that she merely asked the latter in a diplomatic matter if she was the one asking for chocolates from petitioner, and not to monitor her husband's whereabouts. 30 (7) She belied the allegation that she spent lavishly as she supported almost ten people from her monthly budget of P7,000.00. 31 In fine, respondent argued that apart from her non-disclosure of a child prior to their marriage, the other lies attributed to her by petitioner were mostly hearsay and unconvincing. Her stance was that the totality of the evidence presented is not sufficient for a finding of psychological incapacity on her part. 32

In addition, respondent presented Dr. Antonio Efren Reyes (Dr. Reyes), a psychiatrist, to refute the allegations anent her psychological condition. Dr. Reyes testified that the series of tests conducted by his assistant, 33 together with the screening procedures and the Comprehensive PsychoPathological Rating Scale (CPRS) he himself conducted, led him to conclude that respondent was not psychologically incapacitated to perform the essential marital obligations. He postulated that regressive behavior, gross neuroticism, psychotic tendencies, and poor control of impulses, which are signs that might point to the presence of disabling trends, were not elicited from respondent. 34 In rebuttal, Dr. Lopez asseverated that there were flaws in the evaluation conducted by Dr. Reyes as (i) he was not the one who administered and interpreted respondent's psychological evaluation, and (ii) he made use of only one instrument called CPRS which was not reliable because a good liar can fake the results of such test. 35 After trial, the lower court gave credence to petitioner's evidence and held that respondent's propensity to lying about almost anything-her occupation, state of health, singing abilities and her income, among others-had been duly established. According to the trial court, respondent's fantastic ability to invent and fabricate stories and personalities enabled her to live in a world of make-believe. This made her psychologically incapacitated as it rendered her incapable of giving meaning and significance to her marriage. 36 The trial court thus declared the marriage between petitioner and respondent null and void. cDCaTH Shortly before the trial court rendered its decision, the Metropolitan Tribunal of the Archdiocese of Manila annulled the Catholic marriage of the parties, on the ground of lack of due discretion on the part of the parties. 37 During the pendency of the appeal before the Court of Appeals, the Metropolitan Tribunal's ruling was affirmed with modification by both the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal, which held instead that only respondent was impaired by a lack of due discretion. 38 Subsequently, the decision of the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal was upheld by the Roman Rota of the Vatican. 39

Petitioner duly alerted the Court of Appeals of these rulings by the Catholic tribunals. Still, the appellate court reversed the RTC's judgment. While conceding that respondent may not have been completely honest with petitioner, the Court of Appeals nevertheless held that the totality of the evidence presented was insufficient to establish respondent's psychological incapacity. It declared that the requirements in the case of Republic v. Court of Appeals 40 governing the application and interpretation of psychological incapacity had not been satisfied. Taking exception to the appellate court's pronouncement, petitioner elevated the case to this Court. He contends herein that the evidence conclusively establish respondent's psychological incapacity. In considering the merit of this petition, the Court is heavily influenced by the credence accorded by the RTC to the factual allegations of petitioner. 41 It is a settled principle of civil procedure that the conclusions of the trial court regarding the credibility of witnesses are entitled to great respect from the appellate courts because the trial court had an opportunity to observe the demeanor of witnesses while giving testimony which may indicate their candor or lack thereof. 42 The Court is likewise guided by the fact that the Court of Appeals did not dispute the veracity of the evidence presented by petitioner. Instead, the appellate court concluded that such evidence was not sufficient to establish the psychological incapacity of respondent. 43 Thus, the Court is impelled to accept the factual version of petitioner as the operative facts. Still, the crucial question remains as to whether the state of facts as presented by petitioner sufficiently meets the standards set for the declaration of nullity of a marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code. These standards were definitively laid down in the Court's 1997 ruling in Republic v. Court of Appeals 44 (also known as the Molina case 45 ), and indeed the Court of Appeals cited the Molina guidelines in reversing the RTC in the case at bar. 46 Since Molina was decided in 1997, the Supreme Court has yet to squarely affirm the declaration of nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code. 47 In fact, even before Molina was handed down, there was only one case, Chi Ming Tsoi v. Court of Appeals, 48 wherein the

Court definitively concluded that a spouse was psychologically incapacitated under Article 36. This state of jurisprudential affairs may have led to the misperception that the remedy afforded by Article 36 of the Family Code is hollow, insofar as the Supreme Court is concerned. 49 Yet what Molina and the succeeding cases did ordain was a set of guidelines which, while undoubtedly onerous on the petitioner seeking the declaration of nullity, still leave room for a decree of nullity under the proper circumstances. Molina did not foreclose the grant of a decree of nullity under Article 36, even as it raised the bar for its allowance. HSEcTC Legal Guides to Understanding Article 36 Article 36 of the Family Code states that "[a] marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization." 50 The concept of psychological incapacity as a ground for nullity of marriage is novel in our body of laws, although mental incapacity has long been recognized as a ground for the dissolution of a marriage. The Spanish Civil Code of 1889 prohibited from contracting marriage persons "who are not in the full enjoyment of their reason at the time of contracting marriage." 51 Marriages with such persons were ordained as void, 52 in the same class as marriages with underage parties and persons already married, among others. A party's mental capacity was not a ground for divorce under the Divorce Law of 1917, 53 but a marriage where "either party was of unsound mind" at the time of its celebration was cited as an "annullable marriage" under the Marriage Law of 1929. 54 Divorce on the ground of a spouse's incurable insanity was permitted under the divorce law enacted during the Japanese occupation. 55 Upon the enactment of the Civil Code in 1950, a marriage contracted by a party of "unsound mind" was classified under Article 85 of the Civil Code as a voidable marriage. 56 The mental capacity, or lack thereof, of the marrying spouse was not among the grounds for declaring a marriage void ab initio. 57 Similarly, among the

marriages classified as voidable under Article 45 (2) of the Family Code is one contracted by a party of unsound mind. 58 Such cause for the annulment of marriage is recognized as a vice of consent, just like insanity impinges on consent freely given which is one of the essential requisites of a contract. 59 The initial common consensus on psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code was that it did not constitute a specie of vice of consent. Justices Sempio-Diy and Caguioa, both members of the Family Code revision committee that drafted the Code, have opined that psychological incapacity is not a vice of consent, and conceded that the spouse may have given free and voluntary consent to a marriage but was nonetheless incapable of fulfilling such rights and obligations. 60 Dr. Tolentino likewise stated in the 1990 edition of his commentaries on the Family Code that this "psychological incapacity to comply with the essential marital obligations does not affect the consent to the marriage." 61 There were initial criticisms of this original understanding of Article 36 as phrased by the Family Code committee. Tolentino opined that "psychologically incapacity to comply would not be juridically different from physical incapacity of consummating the marriage, which makes the marriage only voidable under Article 45 (5) of the Civil Code . . . [and thus] should have been a cause for annulment of the marriage only." 62 At the same time, Tolentino noted "[it] would be different if it were psychological incapacity to understand the essential marital obligations, because then this would amount to lack of consent to the marriage." 63 These concerns though were answered, beginning with Santos v. Court of Appeals, 64 wherein the Court, through Justice Vitug, acknowledged that "psychological incapacity should refer to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage." 65 The notion that psychological incapacity pertains to the inability to understand the obligations of marriage, as opposed to a mere inability to comply with them, was further affirmed in the Molina 66 case. Therein, the

Court, through then Justice (now Chief Justice) Panganiban observed that "[t]he evidence [to establish psychological incapacity] must convince the court that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or psychically ill to such extent that the person could not have known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid assumption thereto." 67 Jurisprudence since then has recognized that psychological incapacity "is a malady so grave and permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is about to assume." 68 It might seem that this present understanding of psychological incapacity deviates from the literal wording of Article 36, with its central phase reading "psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage." 69 At the same time, it has been consistently recognized by this Court that the intent of the Family Code committee was to design the law as to allow some resiliency in its application, by avoiding specific examples that would limit the applicability of the provision under the principle of ejusdem generis. Rather, the preference of the revision committee was for "the judge to interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis, guided by experience, in the findings of experts and researchers in psychological disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals which, although not binding on the civil courts, may be given persuasive effect since the provision was taken from Canon Law." 70 We likewise observed in Republic v. Dagdag: 71 Whether or not psychological incapacity exists in a given case calling for annulment of a marriage, depends crucially, more than in any field of the law, on the facts of the case. Each case must be judged, not on the basis of a priori assumptions, predilections or generalizations but according to its own facts. In regard to psychological incapacity as a ground for annulment of marriage, it is trite to say that no case is on "all fours" with another case. The trial judge must take pains in examining the factual milieu and the appellate court must, as much as possible, avoid substituting its own judgment for that of the trial court. 72

The Court thus acknowledges that the definition of psychological incapacity, as intended by the revision committee, was not cast in intractable specifics. Judicial understanding of psychological incapacity may be informed by evolving standards, taking into account the particulars of each case, current trends in psychological and even canonical thought, and experience. It is under the auspices of the deliberate ambiguity of the framers that the Court has developed the Molina rules, which have been consistently applied since 1997. Molina has proven indubitably useful in providing a unitary framework that guides courts in adjudicating petitions for declaration of nullity under Article 36. At the same time, the Molina guidelines are not set in stone, the clear legislative intent mandating a case-to-case perception of each situation, and Molina itself arising from this evolutionary understanding of Article 36. There is no cause to disavow Molina at present, and indeed the disposition of this case shall rely primarily on that precedent. There is need though to emphasize other perspectives as well which should govern the disposition of petitions for declaration of nullity under Article 36. CSTHca Of particular notice has been the citation of the Court, first in Santos then in Molina, of the considered opinion of canon law experts in the interpretation of psychological incapacity. This is but unavoidable, considering that the Family Code committee had bluntly acknowledged that the concept of psychological incapacity was derived from canon law, 73 and as one member admitted, enacted as a solution to the problem of marriages already annulled by the Catholic Church but still existent under civil law. 74 It would be disingenuous to disregard the influence of Catholic Church doctrine in the formulation and subsequent understanding of Article 36, and the Court has expressly acknowledged that interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the local Church, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts. 75 Still, it must be emphasized that the Catholic Church is hardly the sole source of influence in the interpretation of Article 36. Even though the concept may have been derived from canon law, its incorporation into the Family Code and subsequent judicial interpretation occurred in wholly secular progression. Indeed, while Church thought on psychological incapacity is

merely persuasive on the trial courts, judicial decisions of this Court interpreting psychological incapacity are binding on lower courts. 76 Now is also opportune time to comment on another common legal guide utilized in the adjudication of petitions for declaration of nullity under Article 36. All too frequently, this Court and lower courts, in denying petitions of the kind, have favorably cited Sections 1 and 2, Article XV of the Constitution, which respectively state that "[t]he State recognizes the Filipino family as the foundation of the nation. Accordingly, it shall strengthen its solidarity and actively promote its total developmen[t]," and that "[m]arriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the family and shall be protected by the State." These provisions highlight the importance of the family and the constitutional protection accorded to the institution of marriage. But the Constitution itself does not establish the parameters of state protection to marriage as a social institution and the foundation of the family. It remains the province of the legislature to define all legal aspects of marriage and prescribe the strategy and the modalities to protect it, based on whatever socio-political influences it deems proper, and subject of course to the qualification that such legislative enactment itself adheres to the Constitution and the Bill of Rights. This being the case, it also falls on the legislature to put into operation the constitutional provisions that protect marriage and the family. This has been accomplished at present through the enactment of the Family Code, which defines marriage and the family, spells out the corresponding legal effects, imposes the limitations that affect married and family life, as well as prescribes the grounds for declaration of nullity and those for legal separation. While it may appear that the judicial denial of a petition for declaration of nullity is reflective of the constitutional mandate to protect marriage, such action in fact merely enforces a statutory definition of marriage, not a constitutionally ordained decree of what marriage is. Indeed, if circumstances warrant, Sections 1 and 2 of Article XV need not be the only constitutional considerations to be taken into account in resolving a petition for declaration of nullity.

Indeed, Article 36 of the Family Code, in classifying marriages contracted by a psychologically incapacitated person as a nullity, should be deemed as an implement of this constitutional protection of marriage. Given the avowed State interest in promoting marriage as the foundation of the family, which in turn serves as the foundation of the nation, there is a corresponding interest for the State to defend against marriages ill-equipped to promote family life. Void ab initio marriages under Article 36 do not further the initiatives of the State concerning marriage and family, as they promote wedlock among persons who, for reasons independent of their will, are not capacitated to understand or comply with the essential obligations of marriage. SECHIA These are the legal premises that inform us as we decide the present petition. Molina Guidelines As Applied in This Case As stated earlier, Molina established the guidelines presently recognized in the judicial disposition of petitions for nullity under Article 36. The Court has consistently applied Molina since its promulgation in 1997, and the guidelines therein operate as the general rules. They warrant citation in full: 1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in the fact that both our Constitution and our laws cherish the validity of marriage and unity of the family. Thus, our Constitution devotes an entire Article on the Family, recognizing it "as the foundation of the nation." It decrees marriage as legally "inviolable," thereby protecting it from dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both the family and marriage are to be "protected"' by the state. The Family Code echoes this constitutional edict on marriage and the family and emphasizes their permanence, inviolability and solidarity. 2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be: (a) medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently

proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity must be psychologicalnot physical, although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. The evidence must convince the court that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or psychically ill to such an extent that the person could not have known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid assumption thereof. Although no example of such incapacity need be given here so as not to limit the application of the provision under the principle of ejusdem generis, nevertheless such root cause must be identified as a psychological illness and its incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert evidence may be given by qualified psychiatrists and clinical psychologists. 3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the celebration" of the marriage. The evidence must show that the illness was existing when the parties exchanged their "I do's." The manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable at such time, but the illness itself must have attached at such moment, or prior thereto. 4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to the assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to those not related to marriage, like the exercise of a profession or employment in a job. Hence, a pediatrician may be effective in diagnosing illnesses of children and prescribing medicine to cure them but not be psychologically capacitated to procreate, bear and raise his/her own children as an essential obligation of marriage. 5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential obligations of marriage. Thus, "mild characteriological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional outbursts" cannot be accepted as root causes. The illness must be shown as downright incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In other words, there is a natal or supervening disabling factor in

the person, an adverse integral element in the personality structure that effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting and thereby complying with the obligations essential to marriage. 6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven by evidence and included in the text of the decision. 7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts. It is clear that Article 36 was taken by the Family Code Revision Committee from Canon 1095 of the New Code of Canon Law, which became effective in 1983 and which provides: "The following are incapable of contracting marriage: Those who are unable to assume the essential obligations of marriage due to causes of psychological nature." HEcTAI Since the purpose of including such provision in our Family Code is to harmonize our civil laws with the religious faith of our people, it stands to reason that to achieve such harmonization, great persuasive weight should be given to decisions of such appellate tribunal. Ideallysubject to our law on evidencewhat is decreed as canonically invalid should also be decreed civilly void. 77 Molina had provided for an additional requirement that the Solicitor General issue a certification stating his reasons for his agreement or opposition to the petition. 78 This requirement however was dispensed with following the implementation of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, or the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages. 79 Still, Article 48 of the Family Code mandates that the appearance of the prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned be on behalf of the State to take steps to prevent collusion between the parties and to take

care that evidence is not fabricated or suppressed. Obviously, collusion is not an issue in this case, considering the consistent vigorous opposition of respondent to the petition for declaration of nullity. In any event, the fiscal's participation in the hearings before the trial court is extant from the records of this case. As earlier noted, the factual findings of the RTC are now deemed binding on this Court, owing to the great weight accorded to the opinion of the primary trier of facts, and the refusal of the Court of Appeals to dispute the veracity of these facts. As such, it must be considered that respondent had consistently lied about many material aspects as to her character and personality. The question remains whether her pattern of fabrication sufficiently establishes her psychological incapacity, consistent with Article 36 and generally, the Molina guidelines. We find that the present case sufficiently satisfies the guidelines in Molina. First. Petitioner had sufficiently overcome his burden in proving the psychological incapacity of his spouse. Apart from his own testimony, he presented witnesses who corroborated his allegations on his wife's behavior, and certifications from Blackgold Records and the Philippine Village Hotel Pavillon which disputed respondent's claims pertinent to her alleged singing career. He also presented two (2) expert witnesses from the field of psychology who testified that the aberrant behavior of respondent was tantamount to psychological incapacity. In any event, both courts below considered petitioner's evidence as credible enough. Even the appellate court acknowledged that respondent was not totally honest with petitioner. 80 As in all civil matters, the petitioner in an action for declaration of nullity under Article 36 must be able to establish the cause of action with a preponderance of evidence. However, since the action cannot be considered as a non-public matter between private parties, but is impressed with State interest, the Family Code likewise requires the participation of the State, through the prosecuting attorney, fiscal, or Solicitor General, to take steps to prevent collusion between the parties and to take care that

evidence is not fabricated or suppressed. Thus, even if the petitioner is able establish the psychological incapacity of respondent with preponderant evidence, any finding of collusion among the parties would necessarily negate such proofs. Second. The root cause of respondent's psychological incapacity has been medically or clinically identified, alleged in the complaint, sufficiently proven by experts, and clearly explained in the trial court's decision. The initiatory complaint alleged that respondent, from the start, had exhibited unusual and abnormal behavior "of peren[n]ially telling lies, fabricating ridiculous stories, and inventing personalities and situations," of writing letters to petitioner using fictitious names, and of lying about her actual occupation, income, educational attainment, and family background, among others. 81 These allegations, initially characterized in generalities, were further linked to medical or clinical causes by expert witnesses from the field of psychology. Petitioner presented two (2) such witnesses in particular. Dr. Abcede, a psychiatrist who had headed the department of psychiatry of at least two (2) major hospitals, 82 testified as follows: WITNESS: Given that as a fact, which is only based on the affidavit provided to me, I can say that there are a couple of things that [are] terribly wrong with the standards. There are a couple of things that seems (sic) to be repeated over and over again in the affidavit. One of which is the persistent, constant and repeated lying of the "respondent"; which, I think, based on assessment of normal behavior of an individual, is abnormal or pathological. . . . ATTY. RAZ: (Back to the witness) QWould you say then, Mr. witness, that because of these actuations of the respondent she is then incapable of performing the basic obligations of her marriage? AWell, persistent lying violates the respect that one owes towards another. The lack of concern, the lack of love towards the person, and it is

also something that endangers human relationship. You see, relationship is based on communication between individuals and what we generally communicate are our thoughts and feelings. But then when one talks and expresse[s] their feelings, [you] are expected to tell the truth. And therefore, if you constantly lie, what do you think is going to happen as far as this relationship is concerned. Therefore, it undermines that basic relationship that should be based on love, trust and respect. QWould you say then, Mr. witness, that due to the behavior of the respondent in constantly lying and fabricating stories, she is then incapable of performing the basic obligations of the marriage? xxx xxx xxx

A-

Yes, Ma'am. 83

The other witness, Dr. Lopez, was presented to establish not only the psychological incapacity of respondent, but also the psychological capacity of petitioner. He concluded that respondent "is [a] pathological liar, that [she continues] to lie [and] she loves to fabricate about herself." 84 These two witnesses based their conclusions of psychological incapacity on the case record, particularly the trial transcripts of respondent's testimony, as well as the supporting affidavits of petitioner. While these witnesses did not personally examine respondent, the Court had already held in Marcos v. Marcos 85 that personal examination of the subject by the physician is not required for the spouse to be declared psychologically incapacitated. 86 We deem the methodology utilized by petitioner's witnesses as sufficient basis for their medical conclusions. Admittedly, Drs. Abcede and Lopez's common conclusion of respondent's psychological incapacity hinged heavily on their own acceptance of petitioner's version as the true set of facts. However, since the trial court itself accepted the veracity of petitioner's factual premises, there is no cause to dispute the conclusion of psychological incapacity drawn therefrom by petitioner's expert witnesses. Also, with the totality of the evidence presented as basis, the trial court explicated its finding of psychological incapacity in its decision in this wise: To the mind of the Court, all of the above are indications that respondent is psychologically incapacitated to perform the essential obligations of marriage. It has been shown clearly from her actuations that respondent has that propensity for telling lies about almost anything, be it her occupation, her state of health, her singing abilities, her income, etc. She has this fantastic ability to invent and fabricate stories and personalities. She practically lived in a world of make believe making her therefore not in a position to give meaning and significance to her marriage to petitioner. In persistently and constantly lying to petitioner, respondent undermined the basic tenets of relationship between spouses that is based on love, trust and respect. As concluded by the psychiatrist presented by petitioner, such

ATTY. RAZ: (Back to the witness) QMr. witness, based on the testimony of Mr. Levy Mendoza, who is the third witness for the petitioner, testified that the respondent has been calling up the petitioner's officemates and ask him (sic) on the activities of the petitioner and ask him on the behavior of the petitioner. And this is specifically stated on page six (6) of the transcript of stenographic notes, what can you say about this, Mr. witness? AIf an individual is jealous enough to the point that he is paranoid, which means that there is no actual basis on her suspect (sic) that her husband is having an affair with a woman, if carried on to the extreme, then that is pathological. That is not abnormal. We all feel jealous, in the same way as we also lie every now and then; but everything that is carried out in extreme is abnormal or pathological. If there is no basis in reality to the fact that the husband is having an affair with another woman and if she persistently believes that the husband is having an affair with different women, then that is pathological and we call that paranoid jealousy. QNow, if a person is in paranoid jealousy, would she be considered psychologically incapacitated to perform the basic obligations of the marriage? IDcTEA

repeated lying is abnormal and pathological and amounts to psychological incapacity. 87 Third. Respondent's psychological incapacity was established to have clearly existed at the time of and even before the celebration of marriage. She fabricated friends and made up letters from fictitious characters well before she married petitioner. Likewise, she kept petitioner in the dark about her natural child's real parentage as she only confessed when the latter had found out the truth after their marriage. Fourth. The gravity of respondent's psychological incapacity is sufficient to prove her disability to assume the essential obligations of marriage. It is immediately discernible that the parties had shared only a little over a year of cohabitation before the exasperated petitioner left his wife. Whatever such circumstance speaks of the degree of tolerance of petitioner, it likewise supports the belief that respondent's psychological incapacity, as borne by the record, was so grave in extent that any prolonged marital life was dubitable. It should be noted that the lies attributed to respondent were not adopted as false pretenses in order to induce petitioner into marriage. More disturbingly, they indicate a failure on the part of respondent to distinguish truth from fiction, or at least abide by the truth. Petitioner's witnesses and the trial court were emphatic on respondent's inveterate proclivity to telling lies and the pathologic nature of her mistruths, which according to them, were revelatory of respondent's inability to understand and perform the essential obligations of marriage. Indeed, a person unable to distinguish between fantasy and reality would similarly be unable to comprehend the legal nature of the marital bond, much less its psychic meaning, and the corresponding obligations attached to marriage, including parenting. One unable to adhere to reality cannot be expected to adhere as well to any legal or emotional commitments. The Court of Appeals somehow concluded that since respondent allegedly tried her best to effect a reconciliation, she had amply exhibited her ability to perform her marital obligations. We are not convinced. Given the nature

of her psychological condition, her willingness to remain in the marriage hardly banishes nay extenuates her lack of capacity to fulfill the essential marital obligations. Respondent's ability to even comprehend what the essential marital obligations are is impaired at best. Considering that the evidence convincingly disputes respondent's ability to adhere to the truth, her avowals as to her commitment to the marriage cannot be accorded much credence. At this point, it is worth considering Article 45(3) of the Family Code which states that a marriage may be annulled if the consent of either party was obtained by fraud, and Article 46 which enumerates the circumstances constituting fraud under the previous article, clarifies that "no other misrepresentation or deceit as to character, health, rank, fortune or chastity shall constitute such fraud as will give grounds for action for the annulment of marriage." It would be improper to draw linkages between misrepresentations made by respondent and the misrepresentations under Articles 45 (3) and 46. The fraud under Article 45(3) vitiates the consent of the spouse who is lied to, and does not allude to vitiated consent of the lying spouse. In this case, the misrepresentations of respondent point to her own inadequacy to cope with her marital obligations, kindred to psychological incapacity under Article 36. Fifth. Respondent is evidently unable to comply with the essential marital obligations as embraced by Articles 68 to 71 of the Family Code. Article 68, in particular, enjoins the spouses to live together, observe mutual love, respect and fidelity, and render mutual help and support. As noted by the trial court, it is difficult to see how an inveterate pathological liar would be able to commit to the basic tenets of relationship between spouses based on love, trust and respect. Sixth. The Court of Appeals clearly erred when it failed to take into consideration the fact that the marriage of the parties was annulled by the Catholic Church. The appellate court apparently deemed this detail totally inconsequential as no reference was made to it anywhere in the assailed decision despite petitioner's efforts to bring the matter to its attention. 88 Such deliberate ignorance is in contravention of Molina, which held that

interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts. DTISaH As noted earlier, the Metropolitan Tribunal of the Archdiocese of Manila decreed the invalidity of the marriage in question in a Conclusion 89 dated 30 March 1995, citing the "lack of due discretion" on the part of respondent. 90 Such decree of nullity was affirmed by both the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal, 91 and the Roman Rota of the Vatican. 92 In fact, respondent's psychological incapacity was considered so grave that a restrictive clause 93 was appended to the sentence of nullity prohibiting respondent from contracting another marriage without the Tribunal's consent. In its Decision dated 4 June 1995, the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal pronounced: The JURISPRUDENCE in the Case maintains that matrimonial consent is considered ontologically defective and wherefore judicially ineffective when elicited by a Part Contractant in possession and employ of a discretionary judgment faculty with a perceptive vigor markedly inadequate for the practical understanding of the conjugal Covenant or serious impaired from the correct appreciation of the integral significance and implications of the marriage vows. The FACTS in the Case sufficiently prove with the certitude required by law that based on the depositions of the Partes in Causa and premised on the testimonies of the Common and Expert Witnesse[s], the Respondent made the marriage option in tenure of adverse personality constracts that were markedly antithetical to the substantive content and implications of the Marriage Covenant, and that seriously undermined the integrality of her matrimonial consent in terms of its deliberative component. In other words, afflicted with a discretionary faculty impaired in its practico-concrete judgment formation on account of an adverse action and reaction pattern, the Respondent was impaired from eliciting a judicially binding matrimonial

consent. There is no sufficient evidence in the Case however to prove as well the fact of grave lack of due discretion on the part of the Petitioner. 94 Evidently, the conclusion of psychological incapacity was arrived at not only by the trial court, but also by canonical bodies. Yet, we must clarify the proper import of the Church rulings annulling the marriage in this case. They hold sway since they are drawn from a similar recognition, as the trial court, of the veracity of petitioner's allegations. Had the trial court instead appreciated respondent's version as correct, and the appellate court affirmed such conclusion, the rulings of the Catholic Church on this matter would have diminished persuasive value. After all, it is the factual findings of the judicial trier of facts, and not that of the canonical courts, that are accorded significant recognition by this Court. Seventh. The final point of contention is the requirement in Molina that such psychological incapacity be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. It was on this score that the Court of Appeals reversed the judgment of the trial court, the appellate court noting that it did not appear certain that respondent's condition was incurable and that Dr. Abcede did not testify to such effect. 95 Petitioner points out that one month after he and his wife initially separated, he returned to her, desiring to make their marriage work. However, respondent's aberrant behavior remained unchanged, as she continued to lie, fabricate stories, and maintained her excessive jealousy. From this fact, he draws the conclusion that respondent's condition is incurable. From the totality of the evidence, can it be definitively concluded that respondent's condition is incurable? It would seem, at least, that respondent's psychosis is quite grave, and a cure thereof a remarkable feat. Certainly, it would have been easier had petitioner's expert witnesses characterized respondent's condition as incurable. Instead, they remained silent on whether the psychological incapacity was curable or incurable.

But on careful examination, there was good reason for the experts' taciturnity on this point. The petitioner's expert witnesses testified in 1994 and 1995, and the trial court rendered its decision on 10 August 1995. These events transpired well before Molina was promulgated in 1997 and made explicit the requirement that the psychological incapacity must be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. Such requirement was not expressly stated in Article 36 or any other provision of the Family Code. DTAIaH On the other hand, the Court in Santos, which was decided in January 1995, began its discussion by first citing the deliberations of the Family Code committee, 96 then the opinion of canonical scholars, 97 before arriving at its formulation of the doctrinal definition of psychological incapacity. 98 Santos did refer to Justice Caguioa's opinion expressed during the deliberations that "psychological incapacity is incurable," 99 and the view of a former presiding judge of the Metropolitan Marriage Tribunal of the Archdiocese of Manila that psychological incapacity must be characterized "by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability." 100 However, in formulating the doctrinal rule on psychological incapacity, the Court in Santos omitted any reference to incurability as a characteristic of psychological incapacity. 101 This disquisition is material as Santos was decided months before the trial court came out with its own ruling that remained silent on whether respondent's psychological incapacity was incurable. Certainly, Santos did not clearly mandate that the incurability of the psychological incapacity be established in an action for declaration of nullity. At least, there was no jurisprudential clarity at the time of the trial of this case and the subsequent promulgation of the trial court's decision that required a medical finding of incurability. Such requisite arose only with Molina in 1997, at a time when this case was on appellate review, or after the reception of evidence. We are aware that in Pesca v. Pesca, 102 the Court countered an argument that Molina and Santos should not apply retroactively with the observation that the interpretation or construction placed by the courts of a law

constitutes a part of that law as of the date the statute in enacted. 103 Yet we approach this present case from utterly practical considerations. The requirement that psychological incapacity must be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable is one that necessarily cannot be divined without expert opinion. Clearly in this case, there was no categorical averment from the expert witnesses that respondent's psychological incapacity was curable or incurable simply because there was no legal necessity yet to elicit such a declaration and the appropriate question was not accordingly propounded to him. If we apply Pesca without deep reflection, there would be undue prejudice to those cases tried before Molina or Santos, especially those presently on appellate review, where presumably the respective petitioners and their expert witnesses would not have seen the need to adduce a diagnosis of incurability. It may hold in those cases, as in this case, that the psychological incapacity of a spouse is actually incurable, even if not pronounced as such at the trial court level. We stated earlier that Molina is not set in stone, and that the interpretation of Article 36 relies heavily on a case-to-case perception. It would be insensate to reason to mandate in this case an expert medical or clinical diagnosis of incurability, since the parties would have had no impelling cause to present evidence to that effect at the time this case was tried by the RTC more than ten (10) years ago. From the totality of the evidence, we are sufficiently convinced that the incurability of respondent's psychological incapacity has been established by the petitioner. Any lingering doubts are further dispelled by the fact that the Catholic Church tribunals, which indubitably consider incurability as an integral requisite of psychological incapacity, were sufficiently convinced that respondent was so incapacitated to contract marriage to the degree that annulment was warranted. All told, we conclude that petitioner has established his cause of action for declaration of nullity under Article 36 of the Family Code. The RTC correctly ruled, and the Court of Appeals erred in reversing the trial court. There is little relish in deciding this present petition, pronouncing as it does the marital bond as having been inexistent in the first place. It is possible

that respondent, despite her psychological state, remains in love with petitioner, as exhibited by her persistent challenge to the petition for nullity. In fact, the appellate court placed undue emphasis on respondent's avowed commitment to remain in the marriage. Yet the Court decides these cases on legal reasons and not vapid sentimentality. Marriage, in legal contemplation, is more than the legitimatization of a desire of people in love to live together. WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the RTC dated 10 August 1995, declaring the marriage between petitioner and respondent NULL and VOID under Article 36 of the Family Code, is REINSTATED. No costs. TAcSCH SO ORDERED.

of the will in the presence of the testatrix and of each other. Said will was acknowledged before Notary Public Niceforo S. Agaton by the testatrix and her witnesses. In said will the testatrix made the following preliminary statement: that she was possessed of the full use of her mental faculties; that she was free from illegal pressure or influence of any kind from the beneficiaries of the will and from any influence of fear or threat; that she freely and spontaneously executed said will and that she had neither ascendants nor descendants of any kind such that she could dispose of all her estate. Among the many legacies and devises made in the will was one of P20,000.00 to Rene A. Teotico, married to the testatrix's niece named Josefina Mortera. To said spouses the testatrix left the usufruct of her interest in the Calvo building, while the naked ownership thereof she left in equal parts to her grandchildren who are the legitimate children of said spouses. The testatrix also instituted Josefina Mortera as her sole and universal heir to all the remainder of her properties not otherwise disposed of in the will. On July 17, 1955, Vicente B. Teotico filed a petition for the probate of the will before the Court of First Instance of Manila which was set for hearing on September 3, 1955 after the requisite publication and service to all parties concerned. Ana del Val Chan, claiming to be an adopted child of Francisca Mortera, a deceased sister of the testatrix, as well as an acknowledged natural child of Jose Mortera, a deceased brother of the same testatrix, filed on September 2, 1955 an opposition to the probate of the will alleging the following grounds: (1) said will was not executed as required by law; (2) the testatrix was physically and mentally incapable to execute the will at the time of its execution; and (3) the will was executed under duress, threat or influence of fear. Vicente B. Teotico filed a motion to dismiss the opposition alleging that the oppositor had no legal personality to intervene. The probate court, after

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DECISION

BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:

Maria Mortera y Balsalobre Vda. de Aguirre died on July 14, 1955 in the City of Manila leaving properties worth P600,000.00. She left a will written in Spanish which she executed at her residence in No. 2 Legarda St., Quiapo, Manila. She affixed her signature at the bottom of the will and on the left margin of each and every page thereof in the presence of Pilar Borja, Pilar G. Sanchez, and Modesto Formilleza, who in turn affixed their signatures below the attestation clause and on the left margin of each and every page

due hearing, allowed the oppositor to intervene as an adopted child of Francisco Mortera, and on June 17, 1959, the oppositor amended her opposition by alleging the additional ground that the will is inoperative as to the share of Dr. Rene Teotico because the latter was the physician who took care of the testatrix during her last illness. After the parties had presented their evidence, the probate court rendered its decision on November 10, 1960 admitting the will to probate but declaring the disposition made in favor of Dr. Rene Teotico void with the statement that the portion to be vacated by the annulment should pass to the testatrix's heirs by way of intestate succession. Petitioner Teotico, together with the universal heir Josefina Mortera, filed a motion for reconsideration of that part of the decision which declares the portion of the estate to be vacated by the nullity of the legacy made to Dr. Rene Teotico as passing to the legal heirs, while the oppositor filed also a motion for reconsideration of the portion of the judgment which decrees the probate of the will. On his part, Dr. Rene Teotico requested leave to intervene and to file a motion for reconsideration with regard to that portion of the decision which nullified the legacy made in his favor. The motions for reconsideration above adverted to having been denied, both petitioner and oppositor appealed from the decision, the former from that portion which nullifies the legacy in favor of Dr. Rene Teotico and declares the vacated portion as subject of succession in favor of the legal heirs, and the latter from that portion which admits the will to probate. And in this instance both petitioner and oppositor assign several error which, stripped of non-essentials, may be boiled down to the following: (1) Has oppositor Ana del Val Chan the right to intervene in this proceeding?; (2) Has the will in question been duly admitted to probate?; and (3) Did the probate court commit an error in passing on the intrinsic validity of the provisions of the will and in determining who should inherit the portion to be vacated by the nullification of the legacy made in favor of Dr. Rene Teotico? These issues will be discussed separately.

1. It is a well-settled rule that in order that a person may be allowed to intervene in a probate proceeding he must have an interest in the estate, or in the will, or in the property to be affected by it either as executor or as a claimant of the estate (Ngo The Hua vs. Chung Kiat Hua, et al., L-17091, September 30, 1963); and an interested party has been defined as one who would be benefitted by the estate such as an heir or one who has a claim against the estate like a creditor (Idem.). On the other hand, in Saguinsin vs. Lindayag, et al., L-17750, December 17, 1962, this Court said: "According to Section 2, Rule 80 of the Rules of Court, a petition for letters of administration must be filed by an 'interested person.' An interested party has been defined in this connection as one who would be benefitted by the estate, such as an heir, or one who has a claim against the estate, such as a creditor (Intestate Estate of Julio Magbanwa 40 O.G., 1171). And it is well settled in this jurisdiction that in civil actions as well as special proceedings, the interest required in order that a person may be a party thereto must be material and direct, and not merely indirect or contingent. (Trillana vs. Crisostomo, G. R. No. L-3370, August 22, 1951; Rapinosa vs. Barrion, 70 Phil. 311)." The question now may be asked: Has oppositor any interest in any of the provisions of the will, and, in the negative, would she acquire any right to the estate in the event that the will is denied probate? Under the terms of the will, oppositor has no right to intervene because she has no interest in the estate either as heir, executor, or administrator, nor does she have any claim to any property affected by the will, because it nowhere appears therein any provision designating her as heir, legatee or devisee of any portion of the estate. She has also no interest in the will either as administratrix or executrix. Neither has she any claim against any portion of the estate because she is not a co-owner thereof, and while she previously had an interest in the Calvo building located in Escolta, she had already disposed of it long before the execution of the will. In the supposition that the will is denied probate, would the oppositor acquire any interest in any portion of the estate left by the testatrix? She

would acquire such right only if she were a legal heir of the deceased, but she is not under our Civil Code. It is true that oppositor claims to be an acknowledged natural child of Jose Mortera, a deceased brother of the deceased, and also an adopted daughter of Francisca Mortera, a deceased sister of the testatrix, but such claim cannot give her any comfort for, even if it be true, the law does not give her any right to succeed to the estate of the deceased sister of both Jose Mortera and Francisca Mortera. And this is so because being an illegitimate child she is prohibited by law from succeeding to the legitimate relatives of her natural father. Thus, Article 992 of our Civil Code provides: "An illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestato from the legitimate children and relatives of his father or mother; . . ." And the philosophy behind this provision is well expressed in Grey vs. Fabie, 68 Phil., 128, as follows: "'Between the natural child and the legitimate relatives of the father or mother who acknowledged it, the Code denies any right of succession. They cannot be called relatives and they have no right to inherit. Of course, there is a blood tie, but the law does not recognize it. In this, article 943 is based upon the reality of the facts and upon the presumptive will of the interested parties; the natural child is disgracefully looked down upon by the legitimate family; the legitimate family is, in turn, hated by the natural child; the latter considers the privileged condition of the former and the resources of which it is thereby deprived; the former, in turn, sees in the natural child nothing but the product of sin, a palpable evidence of a blemish upon the family. Every relation is ordinarily broken in life; the law does no more them recognize this truth, by avoiding further grounds of resentment.' (7 Manresa, 3d ed., p. 110.)" The oppositor cannot also derive comfort from the fact that she is an adopted child of Francisca Mortera because under our law the relationship established by adoption is limited solely to the adopter and the adopted does not extend to the relatives of the adopting parents or of the adopted child except only as expressly provided for by law. Hence, no relationship is created between the adopted and the collaterals of the adopting parents.

As a consequence, the adopted is an heir of the adopter but not of the relatives of the adopter. "The relationship established by the adoption, however, is limited to the adopting parent, and does not extend to his other relatives, except as expressly provided by law. Thus, the adopted child cannot be considered as a relative of the ascendants and collaterals of the adopting parents, nor of the legitimate children which they may have after the adoption, except that the law imposes certain impediments to marriage by reason of adoption. Neither are the children of the adopted considered as descendants of the adopter. The relationship created is exclusively between, the adopter and the adopted, and does not extend to the relatives of either." (Tolentino, Civil Code of the Philippines, Vol. 1, p. 652) "Relationship by adoption is limited to adopter and adopted, and does not extend to other members of the family of either; but the adopted is prohibited to marry the children of the adopter to avoid scandal." (An Outline of Philippines Civil law by Justice Jose B. L, Reyes and Ricardo C. Puno, Vol. 1, p. 313; See also Caguioa, Comments and Cases on Civil law, 1955, Vol. 1, pp. 312-313; Paras, Civil Code of the Philippines, 1959 ed., Vol. 1, p. 515) It thus appears that the oppositor has no right to intervene either as testamentary or as legal heir in this probate proceeding contrary to the ruling of the court a quo. 2. The next question to be determined is whether the will Exhibit A was duly admitted to probate. Oppositor claims that the same should not have been admitted not only because it was not properly attested to but also because it was procured thru pressure and influence and the testatrix affixed her signature by mistake believing that it contained her true intent. The claim that the will was not properly attested to is contradicted by the evidence of record. In this respect it is fit that we state briefly the declarations of the instrumental witnesses.

Pilar Borja testified that the testatrix was in perfect state of health at the time she executed the will for she carried her conversation with her intelligently; that the testatrix signed immediately above the attestation clause and on each and every page thereof at the left-hand margin in the presence of the three instrumental witnesses and the notary public; that it was the testatrix herself who asked her and the other witnesses to act as such; and that the testatrix was the first one to sign and later she gave the will to the witnesses who read and signed it. Pilar G. Sanchez also testified that she knew the testatrix since 1945; that it was the testatrix herself who asked her to be a witness to the will; that the testatrix was the first one to sign and she gave the will later to the witnesses to sign and afterwards she gave it to the notary public; that on the day of the execution of the will the testatrix was in the best of health. Modesto Formilleza also testified that he was asked by the testatrix to be one of the witnesses to the will; that he read and understood the attestation clause before he signed the document, and that all the witnesses spoke either in Spanish or in Tagalog. He finally said that the instrumental witnesses and the testatrix signed the will at the same time and place and identified their signatures. This evidence which has not been successfully refuted proves conclusively, that the will was duly executed because it was signed by the testatrix and her instrumental witnesses and the notary public in the manner provided for by law. The claim that the will was procured by improper pressure and influence is also belied by the evidence. On this point the court a quo made the following observation: "The circumstance that the testatrix was then living under the same roof with Dr. Rene Teotico is no proof adequate in law to sustain the conclusion that there was improper pressure and undue influence. Nor is the alleged fact of isolation of the testatrix from the oppositor and her witnesses, for their supposed failure to see personally the testatrix, attributable to the

vehemence of Dr. Rene Teotico to exclude visitors, took place years after the execution of the will on May 17, 1951. Although those facts may have some weight to support the theory of the oppositor, yet they must perforce yield to the weightier fact that nothing could have prevented the testatrix, had she really wanted to, from subsequently revoking her 1951 will if it did not in fact reflect and express her own testamentary dispositions. For, as testified to by the oppositor and her witnesses, the testatrix was often seen at the Escolta, in Quiapo and in Sta. Cruz, Manila, walking and accompanied by no one. In fact, on different occasions, each of them was able to talk with her." We have examined the evidence on the matter and we are fully in accord with the foregoing observation. Moreover, the mere claim that Josefina Mortera and her husband Rene Teotico had the opportunity to exert pressure on the testatrix simply because she lived in their house several years prior to the execution of the will and that she was old and suffering from hypertension in that she was virtually isolated from her friends for several years prior to her death is insufficient to disprove what the instrumental witnesses had testified that the testatrix freely and voluntarily and with full consciousness of the solemnity of the occasion executed the will under consideration. The exercise of improper pressure and undue influence must be supported by substantial evidence and must be of a kind that would overpower and subjugate the mind of the testatrix as to destroy her free agency and make her express the will of another rather than her own (Coso vs. Deza, 42 Phil., 596). The burden is on the person challenging the will that such influence was exerted at the time of its execution, a matter which here was not done, for the evidence presented not only is sufficient but was disproved by the testimony the instrumental witnesses. 3. The question of whether the probate court could determine the intrinsic validity of the provisions of a will has been decided by this Court in a long line of decisions among which the following may be cited: "Opposition to the intrinsic validity or legality of the provisions of the will cannot be entertained in probate proceeding because its only purpose is

merely to determine if the will has been executed in accordance with the requirements of the law." (Palacios vs. Palacios, 58 O.G. 220) ". . . The authentication of a will decides no other questions than such as touch upon the capacity of the testator and the compliance with those requisites or solemnities which the law prescribes for the validity of wills. It does not determine nor even by implication prejudge the validity or efficiency of the provisions; these may be impugned as being vicious or null, notwithstanding its authentication. The questions relating to these points remain entirely unaffected, and may be raised even after the will has been authenticated. . . . "From the fact that the legalization of a will does not validate the provisions therein contained, it does not follow that such provisions lack of efficiency, or fail to produce the effects which the law recognizes when they are not impugned by anyone. In the matter of wills it is a fundamental doctrine that the will of the testator is the law governing the interested parties, and must be punctually complied with in so far as it is not contrary to the law or to public morals." (Montaano vs. Suesa, 14 Phil., pp. 676, 679-680) "To establish conclusively as against everyone, and once for all, the facts that a will was executed with the formalities required by law and that the testator was in a condition to make a will, is the only purpose of the proceedings under the new code for the probate of a will. (Sec. 625.) The judgment in such proceedings determines and can determine nothing more. In them the court has no power to pass upon the validity of any provisions made in the will. It can not decide, for example, that a certain legacy is void and another one valid." Castaeda vs. Alemany, 3 Phil., 426, 428) Pursuant to the foregoing precedents the pronouncement made by the court a quo declaring invalid the legacy made to Dr. Rene Teotico in the will Exhibit A must be set aside as having been made in excess of its jurisdiction. Another reason why said pronouncement should be set aside is that the legatee was not given an opportunity to defend the validity of the legacy for he was not allowed to intervene in this proceeding. As a corollary, the other

pronouncements, touching on the disposition of the estate in favor of some relatives of the deceased should also be set aside for the same reason. WHEREFORE, with the exception of that portion of the decision which declares that the will in question has been duly executed and admitted the same to probate, the rest of the decision is hereby set aside. This case is ordered remanded to the court a quo for further proceedings. No pronouncement as to costs. Bengzon, C.J. Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Paredes, Regala, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., and Zaldivar, JJ., concur

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([1965V82E] VICENTE B. TEOTICO, petitioner-appellant, vs. ANA DEL VAL CHAN, ETC., oppositor-appellant., G.R. No. L-18753, 1965 Mar 26, En Banc)