People of the Philippines vs. Suarez, et al.

Facts: Upon the permission of her mother, Jenalyn Montales, minor of 14 years of age, attended the party of Santiago Villones at the latters house in Marikina City. The party lasted until the early morning of September 16, 2001. At around 2:00 am of the same date, accused-appellant Wilson Villones pulled down Jenalyn and forcibly raped her twice together with Santiago and Ricarte who both held her hands, sucked her breasts and kissed her body. When her mother learned of her ordeal, they immediately reported the incident to the police. Upon medical examination of Jenalyn, the doctor found a deep, healed, hymenal lacerations about 5-11 days old. Accused- Appellant denied having carnal knowledge with Jenalyn. He claimed that Salome, the victims mother harboured illfeelings against his family and that she only wanted to extort money from them. Likewise, Jeffery, Jocelyn and Jomel Papillara, who attended the party of Santiago denied the incident. They claimed that they did notice any rape incident during their time on the latters house. However, the Regional Trial Court rendered a decision adverse to the accused-appellant. On appeal, Wilson assails Jenalyns credibility as a witness, and that during the trial, her testimony are full of inconsistencies. Furthermore, the accused-appellant raised the testimonies of Jeffery and Jocelyn to his defense. Issue: Whether the testimonies of Jeffrey Olaya and Jocelyn Teraza should be given full credit? Held: NO, with regard to the testimonies of Jeffery and Jocelyn that no rape occurred, suffice it to say that Jeffery is a relative of the accused-appellant, hence his testimony should be received with caution. Significantly, Jefferys and Jocelyns testimony were negative averments visvis complainants affirmative testimony. The familiar rule on evidence is that an affirmative testimony is far more weightier than the negative one, especially when the former comes from on a credible witness. Jenalyn positively identifies the accused-appellant as the perpetrator of the crime. It is well settled that a categorical and positive identification of an accused, without any showing of ill-motive on the part of the eyewitnesses testifying on the matter prevails over an alibi and denial, which are negative and self-serving evidence undeserving of real weight in law unless substantiated by clear and convincing evidence. The defense never imputed ill-imputed motive on the part of the complainant. Lastly, the fact that the victims corroborated the medical findings earlier given, sufficiently conclude that sexual intercourse did take place. Judgment affirmed. Guilty beyond reasonable doubt.

Judge Alden Cervantes vs. Edwin D. Cardeno

Facts: In the Letter-Report1, Judge Alden V. Cervantes alleged that at around 10:55 A.M. of 24 November 2004, while he was at his chambers, he was disturbed by a commotion in the adjacent room. To satisfy his curiosity, he stepped out of the room and saw respondent Edwin Cardeo (Cardeo) and Sherwin Hermano (Hermano) engaging in a fistfight, while the Acting Clerk of Court, ArlynAlcantara (Alcantara), was trying to pacify them. It appears that Hermano, a municipal government employee, accompany a friend who was then applying for a clerical position. After he handed his friends application to the Acting Clerk of Court, Cardeo, a utility worker of the court, snatched the same and handed it back to the applicant telling the latter not to apply as the judge had already recommended someone for the position. At this juncture, Alcantara admonished and advised Cardeo not to interfere with the official acts of the Clerk of Court.Cardeno responded sarcastically and then picked up the tape dispenser and hit Hermano. The latter fought back and punched Cardeo in the mouth. Judge Cervantes recommended the dismissal of Cardeno but the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) suggested that he (Cardeno) be fine in the amount of P1000.00 and the matter be re-docketted as a regular administrative case. Issue: Whether or not Cardeno should be dismissed from his employment? Held: NO.We take this opportunity to remind, not only the respondent, but all court personnel as well, that the image of the judiciary is mirrored in the kind of conduct, official or otherwise, which the personnel within its employ display, from the judge to the lowest clerk. Any fighting or misunderstanding becomes a disgraceful sight reflecting adversely on the good image of the judiciary. Professionalism, respect for the rights of others, good manners and right conduct are expected of all judicial officers and employees. Thus, all employees are required to preserve the judiciarys good name and standing as a true temple of justice. Judge Cervantes found that the misdeeds of respondent warranted the penalty of dismissal. However, the OCA recommended a light penalty of a fine of One Thousand Pesos (P1,000.00), to which we agree. In the cases ofJudge Aquino v. Israel, et al.,14 Baloloy v. Flores,15 and Quiroz v. Orfila,16 respondents thereat, who fought with co-employees in the court premises, were fined P1,000.00 and reprimanded. Considering that respondent had served the trial court for nine (9) years and that this is his first offense, it is deemed too harsh to sanction him with a stiffer penalty. Thus, a fine of One Thousand Pesos is justified.

Benares vs Pancho Pancho and the other respondents worked as sugar farm workers. Benares on the otherhand owns and manages Hda Maasin II a sugar cane plantation in Negros Occidental. The respondents wrote the DOLE for intercession as wages and benefits mandated by law. The Bacolod District office of the DOLE conducted a routine inspection and subsequently made a report and recommendation. Respondents were then alleged to have been terminated without being paid termination benefits in retaliation to their reporting to the DOLE tier working conditions/wages/mandatory benefits which eventually led to a complaint for illegal dismissal with money claims. The LA dismissed the comlaint. The NLRC then ruled in favor of the respondents.(the respondents attained regular status) The CA affirmed the NLRC's decision. Issue: Are the respondents regular employees of Hacienda Maasin entitled to their monetary claims? Were they illegally terminated? The probative value of Benares' evidence have been passed upon by the LA/NLRC and the CA. Although the LA dsimissed the respondent's complaint, the ground for dismissal of the complaint implies a finding that the respondents are regular employees. The NLRC chose not to remand the case tp the LA and instead decided the case on the basis of evidence then available to it. Such a judgment call shall not be interfered with absent any showing of abuse of discretion. In quasi judicial proceedings, the quantum of evidence required to support the findings of the NLRCis only substantial evidence. The labor arbiter, the NLRC and the Court of Appeals have similarly held that respondents were regular employees of petitioner. Since it is a settled rule that the factual findings of quasi-judicial agencies which have acquired expertise in the matters entrusted to their jurisdiction are accorded by this Court not only respect but even finality, we shall no longer disturb this finding.

PAL vs CA and De Leon Cesar Villanueva purchased a roundtrip ticket from PAL for an Iloilo-Manila-Iloilo flight. He took the Iloilo-Manila flight. He sought a refund of the unused ticket for the Manila-Iloilo flight. His ticket did not appear in the passenger boarding manifest and another individual collected the refund of his ticket. Villanueva then filed a complaint with the Director of the National Bureau of Investigation and PAL subsequently received a copy of the complaint which triggered an investigation with in PAL through its internal audit. It was discovered that Villanuevas ticket surrendered his Manila-Iloilo ticket at PALs check in counter. The check in clerks on duty were Dinglasa and Corpuz while the load control clerk was Garrido. A check in clerk is tasked upon receipt of the ticket to put thereon the boarding sequence number, seat number, baggage info and to indicate his initials on the ticket. The ticket is then turned over to the load control clerk who logs the passengers name on the manifest and subsequently invalidates the ticket by perforating two holes on it. The procedure mentioned above were not followed with respect to Villanuevas ticket. His ticket was later cancelled and a new one issued in his name for Bacolod-Manila by the Ticket freight clerk Dinson. Ticket freight clerk Deleon then received it and affixed a revalidation sticker on it and later payment for the refund was made by Dinson. PALs investigation led to contacting other passengers who purportedly refunded their tickets. Subsequently it was deduced that the anomalous transactions were made by 8 of PALs own employees who were check in clerks/ a load control clerk, ticket freight clerks. Administrative charges were filed against them for Fraud against the company/ falsification of company documents/ failure on the job. The 8 were eventually found guilty for all charges. 7 of the 8 filed illegal dismissal charges to which the labor arbiter ruled in favor of PAL and that it established that there was a valid cause to terminate the 8. The 7 elevated the case to the NLRC which affirmed the ruling of the labor arbiter. Only de leon appealed. The CA reversed the decision of the NLRC. PAL then sought its recourse with the SC. Issue: Did the CA err in setting aside the NLRCs decision? (Was there substantial evidence as to the validity of the Respondents dismissal?) The CA erred. The dismissal of De Leon and his cohorts was supported by substantial evidence. De Leons involvement in the anomalous transactions is shown particularly in the fraudulent refund of tickets of the passengers. The affidavits of several passengers were properly given weight even if they did not testify before the hearing with the labor arbiter. In administrative bodies like the LA/NLRC, the rules of evidence are not strictly followed; decisions maybe reached thru position papers. The affidavits along with the tickets confirm the respondents participation in the scheme where in the tickets were fraudulently refunded. As to the question of direct proof concerning conspiracy, PAL was able to meet the requisite burden of proof. In administrative proceedings what is required is substantive evidence and not proof beyond

reasonable doubt. Direct proof is not necessary to show conspiracy. It may be deduced from the mode/method/manner by which the offense was perpetrated. In this case, in several instances, the tickets were fraudulently refunded processed by de leon along with the other dismissed employees in connection with their functions and collusion which resulted in the said anomalies.

Lagon vs CA & Lapuz Facts: Lapuz entered into a contract of lease with Bai Sepi over 3 parcels of land since 1964. It was agreed that Lapuz put up commercial buildings to be leased to new tenants. Rentals paidf by tenants would answer for the rent lapuz ewas obligated to pay. In 1974, the contract ended and was renewed. Bai Sepi died and lapuz started paying rent to the administrator. Later the administrator advised Lapuz to stop collecting rentals. Lagon, representing himself to be the new owner of the property which led lapuz to file a case alleging that his leasehold rights over the property were violated since lagon allegedly induced Bai Sepis heirs to sell him the property. Issue: Is the purchase of Lagon of the subject property during the existence of the contract of lease of tortuous interference? Held: There is no tortuous interference in this case. (Elements of tortuous interference) - Existence of a valid contract - Knowledge on the part of a 3rd person of its existence - Interference by the 3rd person w/o legal justification Lagon had no knowledge of the lease contract. Her even conducted his own investigation and found no suspicious circumstance as to any claim over the property. The title bore no indication of leasehold interest. Even the registry of property had no record of such leasehold interest. There was no interference with out legal justification. In tortuous interference, the defendant must have acted in bad faith. To induce refers to causing a person to choose a course of conduct through persuasion/intimidation. The decision of the heirs was completely of their own volition and Lagon did nothing to influence their judgment. Lapuz failed to prove bad faith.

Turadio Domingo vs Domingo Bruno Domingo is a registered owner of a house and lot in Project 4 ,QC. In 1970 he needed money for his med expenses so he sold the said properties. He signed a deed of absolute sale conveying properties to his children Leonora, N8uncia, Abella and Jose for 10,000 as witnessed by Ibanez and Linda and notarized by Rosario. Jose, one of the children brought the deed to the reg of deeds of QC and gad a new TCT issued in the name of the vendees. Bruno Domingo died in 1975. In 1981 Turadio residing on the property received a note from the QC hall declaring him a squatter and directing him to demolish his shanty. The demolition was at trhe instance of his siblings, Jose and Leonora. An ejectment suit was filed against him and so he had the PC-INP crime labn compare the signaturwe on the deed against specimen signatures of his father. 2 question document reports were made stating that the signatures were written by 2 different persons. Turadio filed a complaint for forgery, falsification by a Notary Public and falsification by private individuals against his siblings and atty Rosario. After examination, the NBI concluded that the signatures were written by one and the same person. The criminal complaint was then dismissed. Issue: Was the court correct in disregarding the PC-INP and NBI question document reports? Yes the TC was correct in disregarding the PC-INP report. As standards of comparison 2 documents were used (a letter to the bureau of treasury and a republic bank check) w/c preceded the questioned deed by more than 8 years . Such a circumstance makes the report questionable. The passage in time and a persons increase in age may have a decisive influence in his handwriting characteristics. To have an accurate comparison, the standards of comparison must be as close as possible in point of time to the suspected signature. The PC-INP report did not conform to such standard. The testimonies of Clerma, Leonora, and Jose in seeing Bruno affix his signature on the questioned deed were unrebutted. Genuineness of handwriting maybe proved by - A witness who actually saw the person writing the instrument - A witness familiar with such handwriting and who can give his opinion thereon )( exception to opinion rule) A comparison by the court of the questioned handwriting and admitted genuine specimen thereof Expert evidence The law makes no preference or distinction as to the different means stated. Courts are not bound to give probative value to opinions of handwriting experts as resort to these handwriting experts is not mandatory.

People vs Ortiz Lauro and Marilyn Santos w/ theior children went to Cabanatuan to attend a reunion of Lauros family. Also present were Lauro's sister, Corazon Santos, her husband Augusto Quiambao and one Solita Subaran. At the Santos family house, a jeep driven by Mendoza [assed by. Moments later a stone was thrown on their roof which was subsequently followed by a second one. Lauro wnet out of the house and exclaimed sino ba yang mga putang inang yang matatapang lang sa dilim at hindi magsilabas!? Shortly after, Mendoza, w/ an armalite, accompanied by Ramon, Antonio and Marionito. Marionito and Antonio held Lauro and went to the direction of the Brgy Hall while Ramon fired his armalite towards the ground to prevent others from coming to Lauros aid. While inside the house, Marilyn and her companions heard a burst of gunfire from the direction of the Brgy Hall. They then found the dead body of Lauro on the ground with his brain exposed. Marionito, Ramon, and Antonio were charged w/ murder qualified by treachery while Mnedoza died before the institution of the case. The 3 were convicted and ordered to indemnify the victims heirs. Issue: On appeal, the 3 argued that the TC erred in convicting them based on circumstantial evidence regarding the qualifying and aggravating circumstance w/ respect to conspiracy. (3 requisites to sustain a conviction based on circumstantial evidence) - there is more than one circumstance - the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and - the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt. The foregoing elements concur in the case at bar. More specifically, these circumstances are: 1. after the deceased hurled a challenge for the stone thrower to come out, the four accused suddenly emerged from the dark; 2. hall; two of them immediately held the victim by the arms and dragged him towards the barangay

3. in the process of dragging the deceased, two of the appellants fired their rifles to the ground to dissuade witnesses from coming to his aid; 4. moments later, bursts of gunfire were heard coming from the direction of the barangay hall;

5. soldiers responded and the lifeless body of the deceased was found near the barangay hall with his skull riddled with rifle shots A combination of these circumstances clearly shows that appellants were the culprits. These constitute an unbroken chain of events w/c leads to a fair and reasonable conclusion pinpointing appellants to the exclusion of all others as perpetrators of the crime.

G.R. No. 123137 October 17, 2001 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. PO2 ALBERT ABRIOL, MACARIO ASTELLERO, and JANUARIO DOSDOS, accusedappellants. FACTS: This is an appeal questioning the decision of the RTC of Cebu City on finding the accused-appellants, Abriol, Astellero and Dosdos, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of murder and illegal possession of firearms. Abriol, a policeman previously detailed as a jailguard at the Bagong Buhay Rehabilitation Center (BBRC) in Cebu City, was himself a detention prisoner in BBRC. He was charged with murder, a nonbailable offense while Astellero was a former prisoner at BBRC, who had served time for grave threats.4 The warden then, Chief Inspector Navales, 5 employed him as his personal driver and general factotum. Dosdos had been convicted of highway robbery. Abriol and Dosdos enjoyed special privileges at BBRC as the warden's errand boys 8 or "trustees." The victim, Alejandro Flores alias "Alex," was a former policeman. He was dismissed from the PNP in August 1992 after testing positive for prohibited drugs. At around 11:50 P.M., June 5, 1993, Romeo Sta. Cruz, Jr., a radio news reporter heard a couple of gunshots. He looked around and saw a man running unsteadily and shouting for help. Then came a red "Jiffy" that nearly ran over the man and came back and stopped beside the fallen figure and a tall, thin man alighted. The man fired several shots at the prostrate figure and then boarded the "Jiffy" which sped away. Police who also heard gunshots responded to the radioed for assistance, they pursued the Jiffy and caught the appellants, seized their .38 caliber revolver with six (6) empty shells in its cylinder. Also found a .45 caliber pistol with nine (9) live rounds in its magazine and another .45 caliber pistol loaded with five (5) unfired bullets. In the crime scene, another police team proceeded rushed the victim to the Cebu City Medical Center, where he was pronounced dead on arrival. Meanwhile, PO3 Celso Seville, Jr., a homicide investigator of Police Station No. 3 found four (4) .45 caliber shells some four (4) feet away from the victim's body, and two (2) deformed slugs where the victim had lain, and submitted them to the Region 7 PNP Crime Laboratory for ballistics testing. Dr. Ladislao Diola, Jr., Chief of the PNP Region 7 Crime Laboratory autopsied the victim's body. He found that the cause of the victim's death was "cardiorespiratory arrest due to shock and hemorrhage secondary to multiple gunshot wounds to the trunk and head.'' 14 Dr. Diola recovered a .38 caliber slug from the corpse, which he later submitted for ballistics examination. SPO4 Lemuel Caser, ballistician of the PNP Crime Laboratory, reported that fired cartridges possessed similar individual characteristics markings with the test cartridge cases fired from cal .45 pistols. Appellants underwent a paraffin test and were found positive for gunpowder residues. A chemistry test on the firearms showed that the three handguns were also positive. Inspector Myrna Areola, Chief of the Chemistry Section of the PNP Region 7 Crime Laboratory, stated in her testimony that the firearms had been fired,16 and that appellants had fired the guns within a period of seventy-two (72) hours prior to the examination. The trial court found appellants' version of the incident neither convincing and credible so petitioners' were convicted of the offenses charged, hence this appeal.

ISSUE: Whether or not the lower court erred in convicting the accused despite the flimsy and unreliable evidence presented by the prosecutions ballistic expert. HELD: No. The court found no merit with the appellants allegation that the testimony of P/Inspector Lemuel Caser, the prosecution's ballistics expert, clearly shows that: (1) He is ignorant about such ballistics instruments such as the micrometer, goniometer, and pressure barrel. 35 (2) He is not conversant with "the required references concerning ballistics," particularly books on the subject by foreign authorities.36 (3) He could not "scientifically determine the caliber of a bullet." 37 Since P/Inspector Caser lacked adequate training and expertise in ballistics, they claim that his opinion that the test bullets and cartridges matched the slugs and cartridges recovered from the scene of the crime was not reliable. Appellants also assail Caser's failure to take the necessary photographs to support his findings. An expert witness is "one who belongs to the profession or calling to which the subject matter of the inquiry relates and who possesses special knowledge on questions on which he proposes to express an opinion." 38 There is no definite standard of determining the degree of skill or knowledge that a witness must possess in order to testify as an expert. It is sufficient that the following factors be present: (1) training and education; (2) particular, first-hand familiarity with the facts of the case; and (3) presentation of authorities or standards upon which his opinion is based. 39 The question of whether a witness is properly qualified to give an expert opinion on ballistics rests with the discretion of the trial court. 40 In giving credence to Caser's expert testimony, the trial court explained: The defense downgraded the capability of Caser in forensics ballistics and identifying firearms. Much stress is given to the absence of photographs of his examination. Nonetheless, the Court is satisfied (with) Caser's examination, findings and conclusions with the use of a microscope. Caser's conclusion based on his examination deserves credit. He found the impressions on the primer of the fired cartridges that were test-fired to have the same characteristics with those recovered at the scene of the crime. Whenever a triggerman pumps a bullet (into) the body of his victim, he releases a chunk of concrete evidence that binds him inseparably to his act. Every gun barrel deeply imprints on every bullet its characteristic marking peculiar to that gun and that gun alone. These marking might be microscopic but they are terribly vocal in announcing their origin. And they are as infallible for purposes of identification, as the print left by the human finger.41 The higher court agrees with the trial court that P/Inspector Caser qualifies as a ballistics expert. He is a licensed criminologist, trained at the Ballistics Command and Laboratory Center in Fort Bonifacio, in the PNP Crime Laboratory in Camp Crame, and in the National Bureau of Investigation. He had previously testified as an expert witness in at least twenty-seven (27) murder and homicide cases all over the country.42 An expert witness need not present comparative microphotographs of test bullets and cartridges to support his findings.43 Examination under a comparison microscope showing that the test bullet and the evidence bullet both came from the same gun is sufficient.44 Moreover, the ballistician conclusively found similar characteristic markings in the evidence, test cartridges and slugs.

WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City is hereby affirmed with some modifications.

G.R. No. 158015

August 11, 2004

LAURA and ERIBERTO BAUTISTA, petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS and FERNANDO MORELOS, respondents. FACTS: This is an appeal by Petition for Review on Certiorari of the decision of the Court of Appeals reversing and setting aside the judgment of RTC of Manila and entering a new one declaring the April 5, 1982 Deed of Absolute Sale between the late Cesar Morelos and Laura Bautista null and void. The dispute involves a parcel of land situated in Sampaloc, Manila, which was previously owned and registered in the name of the late Cesar Morelos. Cesar is the uncle of petitioner Laura Morelos Bautista, being the brother of her mother, Rosario Morelos. Cesar, who was married to Rosario Duran, did not have any children. Rosario died in 1972 but during his lifetime, Cesar sold and conveyed the above-mentioned parcel of land in favor of petitioner Laura Morelos Bautista, as evidenced by a "Deed of Absolute Sale" notarized by Luis M. de Guzman. Accordingly, Transfer Certificate of Title was issued in the name of petitioner Laura Bautista. Respondent Fernando Morelos, claiming to be the illegitimate child of Cesar Morelos with Angelina Lim-Gue, instituted a complaint for the declaration of nullity of sale and title with damages. At the trial, he presented testimonies of expert witnesses who claimed that the signature of Cesar Morelos on the Deed of Absolute Sale and the fingerprint appearing on his Residence Certificate were not his. Petitioners countered that the Deed of Absolute Sale was valid. The witness to the Deed, Carmelita Marcelino, testified that she saw Cesar Morelos and petitioner Laura Bautista sign the same. 6 After hearing, the court a quo rendered judgment declaring the Deed of Sale dated April 5, 1982 executed between the late Cesar Morelos in favor of Laura Bautista valid, and dismissed for insufficient evidence the claims and counterclaims for damages of the parties.Respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals, which reversed and set aside the judgment of the trial court.Petitioners' motion for reconsideration was denied hence, this petition. ISSUE: Whether or not the testimonies of expert witnesses are conclusive to be a strong basis to nullify a duly executed and notarized deed of absolute sale. HELD: No. The presumption of validity and regularity prevails over allegations of forgery and fraud. As against direct evidence consisting of the testimony of a witness who was physically present at the signing of the contract and who had personal knowledge thereof, the testimony of an expert witness constitutes indirect or circumstantial evidence at best. Carmelita Marcelino, the witness to the Deed of Absolute Sale, confirmed the genuineness, authenticity and due execution thereof. 15 Having been physically present to see the decedent Cesar Morelos and petitioner Laura Bautista affix their signatures on the document, the weight of evidence preponderates in favor of petitioners. It is well-settled that a duly notarized contract enjoys the prima facie presumption of authenticity and due execution as well as the full faith and credence attached to a public instrument. 11 To overturn this

legal presumption, evidence must be clear, convincing and more than merely preponderant to establish that there was forgery that gave rise to a spurious contract. F orgery cannot be presumed and must be proved by clear, positive and convincing evidence. The burden of proof lies on the party alleging forgery. In Heirs of Severa P. Gregorio v. Court of Appeals ,12 we held that due to the technicality of the procedure involved in the examination of the forged documents, the expertise of questioned document examiners is usually helpful; however, resort to questioned document examiners is not mandatory and while probably useful, they are not indispensable in examining or comparing handwriting. Hence, a finding of forgery does not depend entirely on the testimony of handwriting experts. Although such testimony may be useful, the judge still exercises independent judgment on the issue of authenticity of the signatures under scrutiny; he cannot rely on the mere testimony of the handwriting expert.13 The authenticity of signatures is not a highly technical issue in the same sense that questions concerning, e.g., quantum physics or topology or molecular biology, would constitute matters of a highly technical nature. The opinion of a handwriting expert on the genuineness of a questioned signature is certainly much less compelling upon a judge than an opinion rendered by a specialist on a highly technical issue.14 Witness Francisco Cruz, Jr. failed to establish the fact that the signature on the Deed of Absolute Sale was not that of Cesar Morelos. He merely concluded that the document was a forgery without citing any factual basis for arriving at that conclusion. Cruz did not point out distinguishing marks, characteristics and discrepancies in and between genuine and false specimens of writing, which would ordinarily escape detection by an ordinary lay person.16 Besides, a notarial document is evidence of the facts in the clear unequivocal manner therein expressed and has in its favor the presumption of regularity. 19 The authenticity and due execution of the Deed of Absolute Sale must therefore be upheld. WHEREFORE, petition is granted. The decision of CA is reversed and set aside.

G.R. No. 134074-75 January 16, 2001 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. EMILIANO DURANAN, a.k.a "Kalbo,", accused-appellant. FACTS: This is an appeal from the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, finding accusedappellant Emiliano Duranan, a.k.a. "Kalbo," guilty beyond reasonable doubt of two counts of rape and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua for each count of rape. Complainant Nympha Lozada, who was 25 years old at the time of the incidents in question, is considered to be retarded and finished up to the sixth grade only. She is unemployed and simply does household chores for her family. Accused-appellant lived with the complainant's family in the same apartment where he rented a room that he shared with several other people. Two instances of rape has already happened and on another incident, the accused stopped molesting Nympha when he heard somebody coming. Virginia, Nymphas mother saw her leave the bathroom, quickly followed by accused-appellant. She noticed that her daughter's lower lip was bruised. When she confronted her daughter about it, the latter revealed for the first time what had happened to her. Thus, they filed affidavits and two informations. The prosecution presented three witnesses, the complainant, the complainant's mother Virginia and the attending medico-legal officer at Camp Crame, Dr. Rosalina O. Cosidon. The court found the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt. ISSUE: Whether or not the trial court gravely erred in holding that the private offended party is "deprived of reason" despite the absence of testimony by a competent medical expert to that effect and despite strong evidence on the record to the contrary. HELD: No. The Court agrees with the lower court in finding the accused convicted of rape even the victims mental age was not proven by psychiatric evaluation and was only evidenced by the testimony of ordinary witnesses. Rule 130, Sec 50 of the Revised Rules on Evidence provides: Opinion of Ordinary witnesses. -- The opinion of a witness for which proper basis is given may be received in evidence regarding --a. the identify of a person about whom he has adequate knowledge; b. a handwriting with which he has sufficient familiarity; and c. the mental sanity of a person with whom he is sufficiently acquainted. Discussing this provision of the Rule on Evidence, Sen. Vicente J. Francisco writes in his treatise: The mother of an offended party in case of rate, though not a psychiatrist, if she knows the physical and mental condition of the party, how she was born, what she is suffering from, and what her attainments are, is competent to testify on the matter. . It is competent for the ordinary witness to give his opinion as to the sanity or mental condition of a person, provided the witness has had sufficient opportunity to observe the speech, manner, habits, and conduct of the person in question. Generally, it is required that the witness details the factors and reasons upon which he bases his opinion before he can testify as to what it is.

As the Supreme Court of Vermont said: "A non-expert witness may give his opinion as to the sanity or insanity of another, when based upon conversations or dealings which he has had with such person, or upon his appearance, or upon any fact bearing upon his mental condition, with the witness' own knowledge and observation, he having first testified to such conversations, dealings, appearance or other observed facts, as the basis for his opinion. Thus, the trial court itself found in dealing with complainant that she was mentally deficient. The rule that findings of fact of the trial court should not be disturbed since the trial court is in the best position to determine the findings of facts32 cannot be more apt than in this case. The accused allegation that complainant could not be a competent witness if she is a retardate is likewise without merit. Under Rule 130, Sec 20, any person who can perceive and make known his/her perception is qualified to be a witness. In this case, although complainant is a retardate, she was nevertheless able to tell the court what accused-appellant had done to her and to answer the questions of both the prosecutor and the defense counsel and it was found clear in her testimony. In sum, the mental retardation of the complainant is proven by the testimony of her mother, 40 the trial court's observations during the trial of her demeanor, behavior, and her intelligence, 41 while the fact of sexual intercourse is proven by the medico-legal certificate. WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Cour of Quezon City, finding accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape is AFFIRMED.

[G.R. No. 130601. December 4, 2000] PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. RAFAEL DIOPITA y GUZMAN, accused-appellant. Facts: At about 9:00 o'clock in the evening of 16 April 1995 complaining witness Dominga Pikitpikit, 24 years old, was walking towards Emiville Subdivision, Diversion Road, Sasa, Davao City, on her way home from work. Suddenly, a man appeared from behind, looped his arm around her neck and warned her not to shout or else she would die. The man then dragged her through the banana plantation towards the cornfields where the plants were a meter high and far apart, robbed her of her belongings and raped her without her consent. Thereafter, Dominga was brought to Precinct No. 4 of Sasa, Davao City, where SPO1 Stephen Batacan entered her complaint in the police blotter. During the police-line up, herein Dominga positively identified herein appellant as the accused. However, accused-appellant raised defense of alibi. Issue: Whether or not the defense of alibi cannot prevail over the positive identification of the accused by the victim. Held: YES. It is an elementary rule that alibi cannot prevail over the clear and positive identification of the accused as the very person who committed the crime. Moreover, in order to justify an acquittal based on this defense, the accused must establish by clear and convincing evidence that (a) he was in another place at the time of the commission of the offense; and, (b) it was physically impossible for him to be at the scene of the crime at the time it was committed. This, accused-appellant miserably failed to do. In sum, we find that all the elements of robbery with rape are present in this case. There was asportation of the jewelry and cash of the victim by means of force and violence on her person, showing the initial animus lucrandi of accused-appellant and then his lecherous intent when he raped his victim.

G.R. No. 123817 December 17, 1999 IBAAN RURAL BANK INC., petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS and MR. and MRS. RAMON TARNATE, respondents.

FACTS: Spouses Cesar and Leonila Reyes were the owners of three lots covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) Nos. 33206, 33207 and 33208 of the Register of Deeds of Lipa City. On March 21, 1976, the spouses mortgaged these lots to Ibaan Rural Bank, Inc. [herein petitioner]. On June 11, 1976, with the knowledge and consent of the petitioner, the spouses as sellers, and Mr. and Mrs. Ramon Tarnate [herein private respondents] as buyers, entered into a Deed of Absolute Sale with Assumption of Mortgage of the lots in question. Private respondents failed to pay the loan and the bank extrajudicially foreclosed on the mortgaged lots. The Provincial Sheriff conducted a public auction of the lots and awarded the lots to the bank, the sole bidder. On December 13, 1978, the Provincial Sheriff issued a Certificate of Sale which was registered on October 16, 1979. The certificate stated that the redemption period expires two (2) years from the registration of the sale. No notice of the extrajudicial foreclosure was given to the private respondents. On September 23, 1981, private respondents offered to redeem the foreclosed lots and tendered the redemption amount of P77,737.45. However, petitioner Bank refused the redemption on the ground that it had consolidated its titles over the lots. The Provincial Sheriff also denied the redemption on the ground that private respondents did not appear on the title to be the owners of the lots. Private respondents filed a complaint to compel the bank to allow their redemption of the foreclosed lots. After trial on the merits, the lower court ruled in favor of herein private respondents and against the petitioner, thus: On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed with modification the decision of the lower court. A timely Motion for Reconsideration was filed by the petitioner but the same was denied in a Resolution dated February 14, 1996. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: What was the period of redemption: two years as unilaterally fixed by the sheriff in the contract, or one year as fixed by law?

RULING: When petitioner received a copy of the Certificate of Sale registered in the Office of the Register of Deeds of Lipa City, it had actual and constructive knowledge of the certificate and its contents. 5 For two years, it did not object to the two-year redemption period provided in the certificate. Thus, it could be said that petitioner consented to the two-year redemption period especially since it had time

to object and did not. When circumstances imply a duty to speak on the part of the person for whom an obligation is proposed, his silence can be construed as consent. 6 By its silence and inaction, petitioner misled private respondents to believe that they had two years within which to redeem the mortgage. After the lapse of two years, petitioner is estopped from asserting that the period for redemption was only one year and that the period had already lapsed. Estoppel in pais arises when one, by his acts, representations or admissions, or by his own silence when he ought to speak out, intentionally or through culpable negligence, induces another to believe certain facts to exist and such other rightfully relies and acts on such belief, so that he will be prejudiced if the former is permitted to deny the existence of such facts. 7 In affirming the decision of the trial court, the Court of Appeals relied on Lazo vs. Republic Surety and Insurance Co., Inc., 8 where the court held that the one year period of redemption provided in Act No. 3135 is only directory and can be extended by agreement of the parties. True, but it bears noting that in Lazo the parties voluntarily agreed to extend the redemption period. Thus, the concept of legal redemption was converted by the parties in Lazo into conventional redemption. This is not so in the instant case. There was no voluntary agreement. In fact, the sheriff unilaterally and arbitrarily extended the period of redemption to two (2) years in the Certificate of Sale. The parties were not even privy to the extension made by the sheriff. Nonetheless, as above discussed, the bank can not after the lapse of two years insist that the redemption period was one year only.

G.R. No. 128568

April 9, 2003

SPOUSES REYNALDO ALCARAZ and ESMERALDA ALCARAZ, petitioners, vs. PEDRO M. TANGGA-AN, MENAS R. TANGGA-AN, VIRGINIA III YVETTE R. TANGGAAN, CECIL T. VILLAFLOR, HERMES R. TANGGA-AN, VENUS R. TANGGA-AN, JUPITER R. TANGGA-AN, YVONNE T. FRI, VIVIEN R. TANGGA-AN and HON. JUDGE P. BURGOS and THE COURT OF APPEALS, respondents. CORONA, J.: FACTS: The late Virginia Tangga-an (the spouse of respondent Pedro Tangaa-an and mother of the rest of the respondents) leased a residential building located at Premier Street, Hipodromo, Cebu City to the petitioner spouses. The lease contract was limited to the use and occupancy of the said residential building and did not include the lot on which it was constructed because the said lot was then owned by the National Housing Authority (NHA). Under the contract, the petitioner spouses bound themselves for five years to pay Virginia monthly rentals beginning November 22, 1991. However, since November 1993, they failed to pay rent and despite repeated demands by respondents to pay the rentals and to surrender the possession of the residential building, the petitioner spouses refused to vacate the same. Respondents then filed a complaint for unlawful detainer, with damages against petitioner spouses Reynaldo Alcaraz and Esmeralda Alcaraz. The petitioner spouses contended that the subsequent change in ownership, on 1993, of the lot and the house from NHA to Virgilio (the son of the late Virgilia Tangga-an and respondent Pedro Tanggaan, and the brother of the other respondents) and Angelita D. Tangga-an resulted in the cancellation of the contract of lease between respondents and petitioner spouses. Thereafter, they paid the rent to the new owners of the lot (Virgilio and Angelita) and not to respondents since the latter supposedly no longer had the legal right to collect rentals. The MTC ruled in favor of the respondents. On appeal, the RTC affirmed the decision of the MTC. The CA denied the petition for review and affirming the judgments of the courts a quo Hence, this petition on the following assignments of error:

ISSUE: WON the petitioner spouse is estopped from raising the argument that house necessarily became Virgilios property as a result of the acquisition of the lot on which the same was built pursuant to the principle of accession that the accessory follows the principle

RULING: Affirmative.

Both parties knew that their contract pertained only to the lease of the house, without including the land. The contract states: "1. That the lessor is the owner of a building of mixed materials situated at Premier St., Mabolo, Hipodromo, Cebu City."16 At the time of the perfection of the contract, the petitioner spouses, as lessees, were aware that the NHA, and not Virginia, the lessor, owned the land on which the rented house stood yet they signed the same, obliged themselves to comply with the terms thereof for five years and performed their obligations as lessees for two years. Now they assume a completely different legal position. They claim that the lease contract ceased to be effective because Virgilios assumption of ownership of the land stripped the respondents of ownership of the building. They argue that, under Article 440 of the Civil Code, Virgilios title over the lot necessarily included the house on the said lot, thus automatically canceling the contract. Section 2, Rule 131 of the Rules of Court provides as a conclusive presumption that: Sec. 2. Conclusive presumptions. The following are instances of conclusive presumptions: (a) Whenever a party has, by his own declaration, act, or omission, intentionally and deliberately led another to believe a particular thing true, and to act upon such belief, he cannot, in any litigation arising out of such declaration, act or omission, be permitted to falsify it; xxx xxx xxx

After recognizing the validity of the lease contract for two years, the petitioner spouses are barred from alleging the automatic cancellation of the contract on the ground that the respondents lost ownership of the house after Virgilio acquired title over the lot. Hence, for violating of the terms of the lease contract, i.e., payment of rent, respondents can legally demand the ejectment of the petitioner spouses.

People v Padrigone 382 scra 74 Facts: Pedrigone assails the procedural irregularities committed by the prosecution and by the trial court. He claims that the prosecution SUPPRESSED EVIDENCE by not presenting Rowena, the rape victim, when the latter should have had her sane moments. As a consequence, the trial court deprived Pedrigone of the opportunity to cross-examine her when she was allegedly declared before the Chief of Police that it was only Pedrigone who raped her which declaration became the basis for the latter's conviction. Issue: WON there was a suppression of evidence RULING: The non-presentation of Rowena on the witness stand cannot be considered as SUPPRESSION OF EVIDENCE. Under Rule 131, Section 3(e) of the Rules of Court, the rule that evidence willfully suppressed would be adverse if produced does not apply if:

1. 2. 3. 4.

the evidence is at the disposal of both parties; the suppression was not willful; it is merely corroborative or cumulative; and the suppression is an exercise of a privilege.

Plainly, there was no suppression of evidence in this case. FIRST: The defense had the opportunity to subpoena Rowena even if the prosecutor did not present her as a witness. Instead, the defense failed to call her to the witness stand. SECOND: Rowena was certified to be suffering from Acute Psychotic Depressive Condition and thus, cannot stand judicial proceedings yet. The non-presentation therefore, of Rowena was not willful. THIRD: In any case, while Rowena was the victim, Nimfa was also present and in fact witnessed the violation committed on her sister.

G.R. No. 122899

June 8, 2000

METROPOLITAN BANK & TRUST COMPANY, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and G.T.P. DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, respondents. BUENA, J. FACTS: The subject property is a parcel of land originally owned by businessman Tomas Chia. Saddled with debts and business reverses, Mr. Chia offered the subject property for sale to private respondent G.T.P. Development Corporation (GTP), with assumption of the mortgage indebtedness in favor of petitioner METROBANK secured by the subject property. Pending negotiations for the proposed sale, Atty. Atienza, acting in behalf of respondent GTP, went to the METROBANK to inquire on Mr. Chia's remaining balance on the real estate mortgage. METROBANK obliged with a statement of account of Mr. Chia amounting to about P115,000.00. The deed of sale 2 and the memorandum of agreement 3 between Mr. Chia and respondent GTP were eventually executed. Atty. Atienza then went to METROBANK and paid P116,416.71, for which METROBANK issued an official receipt acknowledging payment. This notwithstanding, petitioner METROBANK refused to release the real estate mortgage on the subject property despite repeated requests from Atty. Atienza, thus prompting respondent GTP to file an action for specific performance against petitioner METROBANK and Mr. Chia. In answer to the complaint, Mr. Chia denied having executed any deed of sale in favor of respondent GTP involving the subject property. Petitioner for its part justified its non-release of the real estate mortgage (1) upon the advise of Mr. Chia that he never executed any sales agreement with respondent GTP, and (2) by the fact that there are other loans incurred by Mr. Chia which are also secured by the subject property. The regional trial court granted the reliefs prayed for by respondent GTP and the CA affirmed the decision of the trial court. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: WON the METROBANK is justified from refusing the discharge of the real estate mortgage.

RULING: Petitioner METROBANK is estopped from refusing the discharge of the real estate mortgage on the claim that the subject property still secures "other unliquidated past due loans." In Maneclang vs. Baun, 14 this Court enumerated the requisites for estoppel by conduct to operate, to wit:

1. there must have been a representation or concealment of material facts; 2. the representation must have been with knowledge of the facts; 3. the party to whom it was made must have been ignorant of the truth of the matter; and 4. it must have been with the intention that the other party would act upon it.

Respondent GTP, thru Atty. Atienza, requested from METROBANK that he be furnished a copy of the full indebtedness secured by the real estate mortgage. 15 In response thereto, petitioner METROBANK issued a statement of account which amount was immediately settled and paid the next. Petitioner METROBANK is thus barred from taking a stand inconsistent with its representation upon which respondent GTP, as an innocent third person to the real mortgage agreement, placed exclusive reliance. Respondent GTP had the reasonable right to rely upon such representations as true, considering that it had no participation whatsoever in the mortgage agreement and the preparation of the statement of account, coupled with the expectation that a reputable banking institution such as petitioner METROBANK do conduct their business concerns in the highest standards of efficiency and professionalism. For an admission or representation is rendered conclusive upon the person making it, and cannot be denied or disproved as against a person relying thereon. A party may not go back on his own acts and representations to the prejudice of the other party who relied upon them. In the law of evidence, whenever a party has, by his own declaration, act or omission, intentionally and deliberately led another to believe a particular thing true, and to act upon such belief, he cannot, in any litigation arising out of such declaration, act, or omission, be permitted to falsify it. Just as decisive is petitioner METROBANK's failure to bring before respondent Court of Appeals the current statement evidencing what it claims as "other unliquidated past due loans" at the scheduled hearing of 8 March 1995. It was a golden opportunity, so to speak, lost for petitioner METROBANK to defend its non-release of the real estate mortgage. No rule of law is better settled than that a party having it in his power to prove a fact, if it exists, which, if proved, would benefit him, his failure to prove it must be taken as conclusive that the fact does not exist. Petitioner METROBANK's omission to present its evidence only created an adverse inference against its cause. Therefore, it cannot now be heard to complain since respondent Court extended a reasonable opportunity to petitioner METROBANK that it did not avail.

G.R. No. 137348

June 21, 2004

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. WILLIAM ONG y LI and CHING DE MING @ ROBERT TIU, appellants.

Based on prosecution through the testimony of SPO1 Rodolfo S. Gonzales, in the afternoon of July 23, 1998, a confidential informant (CI) of the Special Operations Division (SOD), PNP Narcotics Group, reported to Chief Inspector Albert Ignatius D. Ferro about the alleged illicit drug activities of accused William Ong and Ching De Ming @ Robert Tiu. As per order of Chief Inspector Ferro, a team of eight decided to conduct a buy-bust operation. Once, CI confirmed the meeting time and venue with the drug dealer, and exchanges of gift-wrapped packages rendered of one (1) sealed plastic bag with a white crystalline substance by the accused Ong and boodle money placed in a W. Brown plastic bag by SPO1 Gonzales, thereafter, the latter arrested Ong while the CI and the back-up agents arrested co-accused De Ming. The two (2) accused were brought to the police office where the corresponding booking sheets and arrest report were prepared. The plastic bag containing the illegal drug substance, was referred to the Philippine National Police (PNP) Crime Laboratory for examination, positive for methyl amphetamine hydrochloride or shabu, a regulated drug. However, the appellants denied the story of the prosecution. Accused William Ong, a Chinese citizen from the Peoples Republic of China (PRC), claimed that he came to the Philippines in 1997 to look for a job. Initially, he worked in a pancit factory in Quezon City, but later hunted for another job, was referred by his friend Kian Ling to Ong Sin for a possible job as a technician in a bihon factory owned by Sin. Subsequently, without any knowledge of his new job, William Ong was later taken to the police station and there he met the other accused Ching De Ming for the first time. He maintained innocence to the crime charged. On his part, accused Ching De Ming testified that he is a legitimate businessman engaged in the RTW business. On that same date of the commission of the crime, while waiting for his girlfriend and her mother, whose mother Avenlina Cardoz, testified in De Mings favor and corroborated with his story, that he was approached by persons unknown to him. He was misidentified as one of the accused and dragged him out of his car and brought to the other car, took his clutch bag, then after a few hours, at Camp Crame, they removed his blindfold. He denied knowing Ong and the charge of conspiring with him to deliver shabu in New Manila, Quezon City. On November 18, 1998 the trial court convicted appellants as charged and imposed on them the penalty of death. It likewise ordered each of them to pay a fine of P1 million pesos. However, the case was on automatic review. Appellants insist on their innocence. They claim that their guilt was not proven beyond reasonable doubt. Issue:

Whether or not the their guilt was proven beyond reasonable doubt. Held: The buy-bust operation is a form of entrapment, which in recent years has been accepted as a valid means of arresting violators of the Dangerous Drugs Law. However, to determine whether there was valid entrapment or whether proper procedures were undertaken by the police officers, in effecting the buy-bust operation, it is incumbent upon the courts to make sure that the details of the operation are clearly and adequately laid out through relevant, material and competent evidence. In the case at bar, the prosecution evidence about the buy-bust operation is incomplete. The confidential information who had sole knowledge of how the alleged illegal sale of shabu started and how it was perfected was not presented as a witness. His testimony was given instead by SPO1 Gonzales who had no personal knowledge of the same and not part of the buy-bust operation. His testimony therefore on material points of the sale of shabu is hearsay and standing alone cannot be the basis of the conviction of the appellants Although, the court is sharply aware of the compelling considerations why confidential informants are usually not presented by the prosecution. Likewise, once the identity of the informer has been disclosed to those who would have cause to resent the communication, the privilege is no longer applicable. In sum, there is no fixed rule with respect to disclosure of the identity of an informer. The problem has to be resolved on a case to case basis and calls for balancing the state interest in protecting the people from crimes against the individuals right to prepare his defense. The balance must be adjusted by giving due weight to the following factors, among others: (1) the crime charged, (2) the possible defenses, (3) the possible significance of the informers testimony, and (4) other relevant factors. In the present case, the crime charged against the appellants is capital in character and can result in the imposition of the death penalty. The prosecution has to prove all the material elements of the alleged sale of shabu and the resulting buy-bust operation. Where the testimony of the informer is indispensable. It should be disclosed. The liberty and the life of a person enjoy high importance in our scale of values. It cannot be diminished except by a value of higher significance. Moreover, the mishandling and transfer of custody of the alleged confiscated methyl amphetamine hydrochloride further shattered the case of the prosecution. There is no crime of illegal sale of regulated drug when there is a nagging doubt on whether the substance confiscated was the same specimen examined and established to be regulated drug. The court decided to reverse and set aside its former decision. Appellants Ong and De Ming @ Tiu are acquitted of the crime of the violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as amended, and are ordered immediately released from custody unless held for some other lawful cause.

[G.R. No. 127489. July 11, 2003] THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. ALFREDO GALLEGO, SAMUEL DELLONA, LEOBERT GAJETO, ERWIN VILLAROS, ROBERTO APINAN, TINGTING GAJETO, ERNESTO AROLLADO, JOHN DOE @ JUN and RICHARD DOE @ DIMAS, accused. ALFREDO GALLEGO, SAMUEL DELLONA, LEOBERT GAJETO and ERWIN VILLAROS, appellants. Facts: On December 2, 1992, in the evening thereof while on board the fishing boat F/B EVER IV and anchored at Panguiranan River, Balud, Masbate, Philippines, the above-named accused, taking advantage of nighttime, with intent to kill, evident premeditation, treachery and abuse of superior strength, armed with pieces of wood and knives, struck and stabbed one Alexander Adrias with pieces of wood and deadly weapons, hitting the latter and thereby inflicting fatal wounds that caused his instantaneous death. Appellant Alfredo Gallego admitted stabbing and killing the victim but claimed that he acted in self-defense. The other appellants denied involvement in the killing. The RTC of Masbate charged herein appellants guilty of the crime of homicide. The Court of Appeals ruled that all the appellants are criminally liable as principals by direct participation for the killing of Alexander and that the crime was qualified by abuse of superior strength; hence, the appellants are guilty of murder, and sentenced the appellants, except Alfredo to reclusion perpetua.

Issue: Whether or not Alfredo Gallego acted in self-defense thereby exculpating him with its criminal liability as ruled by the court against all the other appellants.

Held: NO. In this case, the trial court and the Court of Appeals debunked appellant Alfredos defense and gave credence with full probative weight to the testimony of Elpidio Suarez. It seemed that the appellant would have the court to believe that the victim merely placed his hand on the appellants shoulder, thus enabling him to stab the victim several times. The appellants testimony is altogether unconvincing, contrary to human nature and the natural course of things. Indeed, the court did not doubt the truthfulness of Elpidio Suarezs testimony. No proof of ulterior motive for him to implicate all the accused has been offered. Where there is no evidence, and nothing to indicate that a witness for the prosecution was actuated by improper motive, the presumption is that he was not so actuated and his testimony is entitled to full faith and credit. There is no substantial incongruency between the physical evidence on record and Elpidios testimony. Hence, all the appellants are found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder.

G.R. No. 119072 April 11, 1997 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appelee, vs. JESUS EDUALINO, accused-appellant.

Facts: This is a review of the conviction of a rape case filed against Jesus Edualino by the complainant Rowena Nantiza a married and pregnant woman at the time of the incident. The complainant version of fact states that she was invited to drink one bottle of beer by then a drunk Edualino. When she was semi-conscious she was dragged in a place where the evil acts were consummated. The accused arguments rely on alternative defenses and alibi, to wit; 1) that there was foreplay and orgasm that occurred in the alleged consummation and that according to the defense bear the earmarks of a voluntary and mutual coition of a consensual intercourse 2) that the character of the complainant is of ill-refute on the basis that no responsible and decent pregnant married woman, would be out at two (2) o'clock in the morning getting drunk much less would a decent Filipina ask a man to accompany her to drink beer 3) that the complainant merely concocted the charge of rape to save her marriage since her husband had found out that she was using drugs and drinking alcohol and even made a spectacle of herself when she tried to seduce accused-appellant on May 1994 while she was under the influence of drug and alcohol.

Issue: Whether or not the crime of rape was established.

Ruling: The crime of rape was established beyond reasonable doubt. The court held that the victim Rowena Nantiza's testimony was sufficient to manifest that the carnal knowledge was without her consent and with due force and intimidation. The court further provides that a person accused of rape can be convicted solely on the testimony of the victim provided the testimony is credible, natural, convincing and otherwise consistent with human nature and the course of things.

On the issue of morality of the complainant, the court pointed out that the moral character of a rape victim is immaterial in the prosecution and conviction of the accused. The allegation of drunkenness and being a drug user will not per se preclude a finding that a woman was raped. The Court ruled that even prostitutes can be the victims of rape. On the Accused-appellant argument that the charge of rape was concocted by the victim to save her marriage; the Court did not believe that a married woman would invent a story that she was raped in an attempt to conceal addiction to drugs or alcohol, in order to save her marriage. The court cannot understand how a false rape story can save a marriage under the circumstances.

G.R. No. 146697 July 23, 2002 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. LEONARDO FABRE y VICENTE, accused-appellant. Facts: That on or about 4:00 o'clock in the afternoon of April 26, 1995 in the house of the accused located at Manat, Trento, Agusan del Sur, Philippines, the above-named accused by force, threats and intimidation, with lewd design, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously succeed in having sexual intercourse with his own daughter MARILOU FABRE, a girl thirteen (13) years of age allegedly, of good reputation, against her will and consent. At the trial, the prosecution presented the testimony of Marilou, that of Adela Fabre, her mother and the wife of the accused, and that of Dr. Reinerio Jalalon, the doctor who examined Marilou, along with the medico-legal certificate issued by Dr. Jalalon, the sworn statement of Adela, and the criminal complaint signed by both Marilou and Adela. The defense, during its turn in the presentation of evidence, countered with the testimony of the accused himself contending that the allegation as to the age of herein victim-daughter was never presented and proven to qualify the crime and be sentenced to death penalty. Issue: Whether or not herein accused-appellant is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape as per the presentation of evidence of the prosecution convicting the latter of death penalty. Held: While the father-daughter relationship between appellant and private complainant has been sufficiently established, the fact of minority of the victim, although specifically averred in the information, has not been equally shown in evidence. These qualifying circumstances of relationship and minority are twin requirements that should be both alleged in the information and established beyond reasonable doubt during trial in order to sustain an imposition of the death penalty. 14 Neither an obvious minority of the victim nor the failure of the defense to contest her real age always excuse the prosecution from the desired proof required by law. In the case at bar, the complainant claimed that she was 13 years old at the time of the incident. 18 Her mother stated, however, that she was 14.19 The birth certificate of the victim, at least already in her teens, was not presented to ascertain her true age on the bare allegation that the document was lost when their house burned down.20 No other document that could somehow help establish the real age of the victim was submitted. The Court, in sum, upholds the decision of the trial court convicting Leonardo Fabre of the crime of rape but must reduce, on account of insufficiency of proof on the qualifying circumstance of minority of the victim, the penalty of death to reclusion perpetua.

G.R. No. 109662 February 21, 1995 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. RIZALDY GUAMOS alias "POKS", accused-appellant.

FELICIANO, J.: Facts: Guamos was found guilty of raping Michele (then 8 years old). On appeal of the decision of the trial court, Guamos sought to discredit and exclude the testimony of the rape victim upon the ground that she had not answered the questions posed to her at cross-examination during trial (which were complicated to be answered for adults more so for a 9 year old). Issue: WON the testimony of Michele should be discredited. Held: NEGATIVE. It is the right of every party to cross-examine a witness with sufficient fullness and freedom to test his [or her] accuracy and truthfulness and freedom from interest or bias, or the reverse, and to elicit all important facts bearing upon the issue. It is also the duty of the witness to answer questions put to him or her, subject to certain exceptions.In the instant case, defense counsel did not ask the Court to enforce his right and to compel the witness (Michelle) to perform her duty. As noted, the trial judge had instructed defense counsel to simplify his questions. Defense counsel, for his part, neither complained about this directive nor complied with it. Counsel for appellant seeks to make much of the fact that Michelle Dolorical did not answer some of the questions of defense counsel on cross-examination. This failure does not detract from the admissibility or credibility of Michelles testimony. Firstly, this appears to the Court to be a case of failure of Michelle to answer some questions rather than an obstinate refusal to do so. In formulating those questions on cross-examination, defense counsel obviously did not take into account that he was cross-examining a child of tender age (Michelle was approximately nine [9] years of age at the time she gave her testimony in open court) susceptible to confusion and probably easily intimidated. It is clear, that defense counsel exercised no substantial effort to present intelligible questions to complaining witness Michelle Dolorical designed to elicit straightforward answers. The Court considered that she, in all probability, simply failed to grasp some of the questions put to her on cross-examinations. The defense had made it very difficult if not practically impossible for her to answer those questions intelligently and truthfully.

It is, of course, the right of every party to cross-examine a witness "with sufficient fullness and freedom to test his [or her] accuracy and truthfulness and freedom from interest or bias, or the reverse, and to elicit all important facts bearing upon the issue." 10 It is also the duty of the witness to answer questions put to him or her, subject to certain exceptions. 11 In the instant case, defense counsel did not ask the Court to enforce his right and to compel the witness (Michelle) to perform her duty. As noted earlier, the trial judge had instructed defense counsel to simplify his questions. Defense counsel, for his part, neither complained about this directive nor complied with it. It is also noteworthy that defense counsel did not object to the testimony on direct examination of Michelle Dolorical after it became apparent that Michelle did not or could not answer the long and meandering questions of defense counsel. When the prosecution made its offer of evidence, defense counsel contended that the testimony on direct examination of Michelle Dolorical should not have been admitted and prayed for leave of court to file a demurrer to evidence. 12 The trial court granted the defense counsel leave to do so and, at the same time, admitted the prosecution's offer of evidence. 13 Defense counsel, however, did not file a demurrer to evidence. Accordingly, in its order of 25 February 1992, the trial court ordered the defense to present its evidence, noting that no demurrer had been filed though leave to do so had been sought and granted. 14 the accused did not question this order of the trial court and commenced instead to present its own evidence. In the total circumstances of this case, accused Guamos had waived his right to object to the admissibility of Michelle Dolorical's testimony on direct examination upon the ground that she had not answered all of the questioned posed to her on cross-examination. The failure had not affected the credibility of Michelle Dolorical's direct testimony.

G.R. No. 142556 February 5, 2003 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. JESUS PEREZ y SEBUNGA, accused-appellant. Facts: That on or about the 17th day of January, 1997 at 12:00 noon at Sitio Baco, Brgy. Macarang, in the Municipality of Palauig, Province of Zambales, Philippines, the said accused, with lewd design and by means of coercion, inducement and other consideration, unlawfully have sexual intercourse with one Mayia P. Ponseca, a minor of 6 years old. That after the incident, the child was subjected to a medico-legal examination to which a medico-legal certificate was issued by Dr. Editha Divino. Herein victim, of tender age was subjected to interrogations in the form of legal questions which was contested to by herein accused being improper and against the procedural law. Issue: Whether or not the allowance of leading questions to a minor child in helping the latters testimony in court be given due credence and legality Held: YES. As a rule, leading questions are not allowed. However, the rules provide for exceptions when the witness is a child of tender years 13 as it is usually difficult for such child to state facts without prompting or suggestion.14 Leading questions are necessary to coax the truth out of their reluctant lips.15 In the case at bar, the trial court was justified in allowing leading questions to Mayia as she was evidently young and unlettered, making the recall of events difficult, if not uncertain. 16 As explained in People v. Rodito Dagamos. The trend in procedural law is to give wide latitude to the courts in exercising control over the questioning of a child witness. The reasons are spelled out in our Rule on Examination of a Child Witness, which took effect on December 15, 2000, namely, (1) to facilitate the ascertainment of the truth, (2) to ensure that questions are stated in a form appropriate to the developmental level of the child, (3) to protect children from harassment or undue embarrassment, and (4) avoid waste of time. Leading questions in all stages of examination of a child are allowed if the same will further the interests of justice. Hence, the Decision dated October 26, 1999 of the Regional Trial Court of Iba, Zambales, Branch 69, in Criminal Case No. RTC-2116-I, finding appellant Jesus S. Perez guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of qualified rape

G.R. No. 139412

April 2, 2003

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. JAIME CASTILLANO, SR. alias "Talino," RONALD CASTILLANO alias "Nono" and JAIME CASTILLANO, JR. alias "Junjun," accused, RONALD CASTILLANO alias "Nono" and JAIME CASTILLANO, JR. alias "Junjun," appellants. CALLEJO, SR., J.:

FACTS:

The trial court rendered a decision convicting Jaime, Jr. of the murder of Diosdado Volante qualified by evident premeditation and treachery meting the penalty of reclusion perpetua. The trial court exonerated Jaime, Sr. of the crime on reasonable doubt. Appellant Jaime, Jr. avers that the prosecution failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged. He asserts that the testimony of Luz Volante, the widow of Diosdado, was inconsistent with her testimony during the preliminary examination in the municipal trial court and her sworn statement before the police investigators as well as the testimonies of SPO1 Fornillos and SPO4 Jaime Favier, and the physical evidence on record. On the other hand, the Office of the Solicitor General asserts that the credibility of the testimony of Luz, the prosecutions principal witness, cannot be impeached via her testimony during the preliminary examination before the municipal trial court nor by her sworn statement given to the police investigators for the reason that the transcripts and sworn statement were neither marked and offered in evidence by the appellants nor admitted in evidence by the trial court. Moreover, the appellants did not confront Luz with her testimony during the preliminary examination and her sworn statement to the police investigators. Luz was not, therefore, accorded a chance to explain the purported inconsistencies, as mandated by Section 13, Rule 132 of the Revised Rules of Evidence which reads: How witness is impeached by evidence of inconsistent statement . - Before a witness can be impeached by evidence that he has made at other times statements inconsistent with his present testimony, the statements must be related to him, with the circumstances of the times and places and the persons present, and he must be asked whether he made such statements, and if so, allowed to explain them. If the statements be in writing they must be shown to the witness before any question is put to him concerning them.

ISSUES: WON the trial court committed reversible error in not acquitting appellant Jaime, Jr. of the crime charged for failure of the prosecution to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

RULING: The credibility of a witness and the truthfulness of his testimony can be impeached by evidence consisting of his prior statements which are inconsistent with his present testimony, the crossexaminer must lay the predicate or the foundation for impeachment and thereby prevent an injustice to the witness being cross-examined. The witness must be given a chance to recollect and to explain the apparent inconsistency between his two statements and state the circumstances under which they were made.51 This Court held in People v. Escosura52 that the statements of a witness prior to her present testimony cannot serve as basis for impeaching her credibility unless her attention was directed to the inconsistencies or discrepancies and she was given an opportunity to explain said inconsistencies. In this case, the appellants never confronted Luz with her testimony during the preliminary examination and her sworn statement. She was not afforded any chance to explain any discrepancies between her present testimony and her testimony during the preliminary examination and her sworn statement. The appellants did not even mark and offer in evidence the said transcript and sworn statement for the specific purpose of impeaching her credibility and her present testimony. Unless so marked and offered in evidence and accepted by the trial court, said transcript and sworn statement cannot be considered by the court.54 On the purported inconsistencies or discrepancies catalogued by the appellants relating to the testimony of Luz during the preliminary examination and her sworn statement, the Office of the Solicitor General posits that: Sixth, Volante indeed testified that when she returned to their house from the ricefield, after the three accused had left the premises, her husband was still alive (TSN, February 17, 1997, p. 19) as he was still able to ask for her assistance (Ibid, p. 20). But it is not inconsistent with the expert opinion of Dr. Consolacion that by the nature of the wounds sustained by the victim, the latter could have died thereof instantaneously (TSN, February 3, 1997, p. 35). It is clear that the said physician was merely stating a possibility and not what happened in the instant case because in the first place, she was not present at the scene right after the incident. Seventh, Volante was insistent in her testimony that at the time of the commission of the subject crime, it was bright inside their house because they had a "kerosene lamp" and a "bottle lamp" both lighted up, one placed on the wall and the other on the ceiling ( Ibid, pp. 33, 52-53). While it may appear contradictory to SPO1 Pornillos testimony that there was only a kerosene lamp at the time, he could not have been expected to notice all the things found inside the house, including the "bottle lamp", because he might not have been familiar with its interiors. Or, he could have focused his attention primarily on the body of the fallen victim and the objects that may be used later as evidence against the perpetrators of the crime.

Eight, it is admitted that the testimonies of Volante and SPO1 Pornillos as to who took pictures of the crime scene including the lifeless body of the victim are contradictory. But again, such contradiction, being only minor and irrelevant, does not affect the credibility of their testimonies. And ninth, the apparently inconsistent statements of the prosecution witnesses (SPO1 Pornillos and SPO4 Javier) as to the exact time the subject incident was reported to the police authorities are similarly irrelevant to the matters in issue. Of consequence here is the fact that on the night the crime was committed, it was reported to the authorities who later effected the arrest of the perpetrators thereof.55 The Court fully agrees with the foregoing ruminations of the Office of the Solicitor General. The inconsistencies adverted to by the appellants pertained only to minor and collateral matters and not to the elements of the crime charged; hence, they do not dilute the probative weight of the testimony. It bears stressing that even the most truthful witness can make mistakes but such innocent lapses do not necessarily affect his credibility. The testimonies of witnesses must be considered and calibrated in their entirety and not by their truncated portions or isolated passages. 56 And then again, minor contradictions among several witnesses of a particular incident and aspect thereof which do not relate to the gravamen of the crime charged are to be expected in view of their differences in impressions, memory, vantage points and other related factors.57

[G.R. No. 124135. September 15, 1997] THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. DANNY QUELIZA, accused-appellant. Facts: That on or about October 30, 1992, in the evening in Barangay Aporao, Municipality of Bani, province of Pangasinan, Philippines, the above-named accused with intent to kill, treachery and evident premeditation, unlawfully shoot one VICTORIANO CABANGON with a short firearm, inflicting him injuries which cause the instantaneous death of Victoriano Cabangon as a consequence, to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of the victim. The Regional Trial Court of the First Judicial Region in Alaminos, Pangasinan, found herein accused guilty of the crime of murder. Issue: Whether or not the court gravely erred in finding herein accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt. Held: NO. We agree with the finding of the court a quo that based on jurisprudence, affirmative testimony has greater value than a negative one (People v. Salazar, 248 SCRA 157 [1995]) since the defense of denial crumbles in the face of the complainants positive identification of the culprit (People v. Balsacao, 241 SCRA 309 [1995]). However, we rule that the distinction between affirmative and negative testimony is not applicable to the opposing contentions of Teresita Cabangon and Patrolman Dollaga. In Revilla v. Court of Appeals (217 SCRA 583 [1993]), negative and positive testimony were distinguished as follows: Evidence is negative when the witnesses states that he did not see or know the occurrence of a fact, and positive when the witness affirms that a fact did or did not occur (2 Moore on Facts, p. 1338) (p. 592) Based on the above distinction, it is plain that the declarations of Teresita Cabangon and Patrolman Dollaga are both positive in nature. Teresita said that she identified her killer when she was interrogated by Dollaga. Patrolman Dollaga, on the other hand, testified to something known to himself, namely, that Teresita did not divulge the identity of the assailant. However, taken in its totality, in contrast to the defense denial made by accused-appellant, which is indeed negative testimony, we give greater weight to Teresitas positive identification of the culprit and her testimony on the circumstances of the murder. This was corroborated by Loreta Cabangon that (a) she saw accused-appellant enter the balcony of the house of the deceased moments before the fatal gunshot was heard, and (b) immediately thereafter she saw accused-appellant with a gun in his right hand leaving the victims house. Even assuming that Teresita did delay in revealing the identity of her husbands assailant, this should not destroy the essence of her testimony, mainly, the positive identification of accusedappellant as the culprit. Hence, the decision appealed from is hereby affirmed.