GALLAR vs. HUSAIN, et al.

, FACTS:

G.R. No. L-20954

May 24, 1967

On January 9, 1919, Teodoro Husain, the owner, sold this land to Serapio Chichirita for P30, reserving for himself the right to repurchase it within six years. Teodoro Husain did not redeem the land, although shortly after the execution of the deed of sale, that is, on January 28, 1919, the vendee a retro, Chichirita, transferred his right to Graciana Husain, sister of the vendor aretro, in what purports to be a resale of the land. Graciana Husain subsequently transferred her rights to the land to appellee Elias Gallar in exchange for one cow. Possession of the land, together with the owner's duplicate of the certificate of title of Teodoro Husain, was delivered on the same occasion to appellee who since then has been in possession of the land. In an affidavit dated March 6, 1928, Chichirita confirmed the "redemption" of the land by Graciana Husain. In another affidavit of the same date, Graciana Husain for her part confirmed having subsequently sold the land to the appellee. In 1960, appellee asked the Cadastral Court for the issuance to him of a transfer certificate of title but the court dismissed his petition for lack of jurisdiction. (The court, however, granted appellee's request for the amendment of the certificate of title by changing the surname of "Osaen" to "Husain.") He, therefore, filed this suit in the CFI to compel Hermenegilda and Bonifacio Husain, as heirs of Teodoro Husain, to execute a deed of conveyance in his favor so that he could get a transfer certificate of title. The heirs denied the sale and contended that the agreement between their father and Chichirita was that of a mortgage to secure a loan of P30. They claimed that the mortgage had been discharged on January 28, 1919 when Graciana Husain paid Teodoro Husain's debt to Chichirita. The trial court found that after acquiring the land from Teodoro Husain, Serapio Chichirita sold it to Graciana Husain who in turn sold it to the appellee. It ordered the appellants to execute a deed of conveyance of the land in favor of the appellee. From this judgment, Bonifacio Husain brought this appeal to this Court contending that no action can be brought on the basis of the deed of sale with a right of repurchase because the land in question was redeemed a few days after it had been sold. ISSUE: Whether or not plaintiffs action for reconveyance prosper. HELD: While it is indeed true that the first note written on the reverse side of the deed of sale speaks of the "redemption" of the land, there is no evidence to show that the vendee, Graciana Husain, was acting in behalf of her brother Teodoro Husain, in the exercise the latter's right of redemption. Now, unlike a debt which a third party may satisfy even against the debtor's will the right of repurchase may be exercised only by the vendor in whom the right 3 is recognized by contract or by any person to whom the right may will

have been transferred. Graciana Husain must, therefore, be deemed to have acquired the land in her own right, subject only to Teodoro Husain's right of redemption. As the new owner she had a perfect right to dispose of the land as she in fact did when she exchanged it for a cattle with the appellee. Now, when Teodoro Husain failed to redeem the land within the stipulated period, i.e., January 9, 1925, its ownership became consolidated in the appellee. True the successive sales are in a private instrument, but they are valid just the same. By the delivery of possession of the land on April 2, 1919 the sale was consummated and title was transferred to the appellee. Indeed, this action is not for specific performance; all it seeks is to quiet title, to remove the cloud cast on appellee's ownership as a result of appellant's refusal to recognize the sale made by their predecessor. And, as plaintiff-appellee is in possession of the land, the action is imprescriptible. Appellant's argument that the action has prescribed would be correct if they were in possession as the action to quiet title would then be an action for recovery of real property which must be brought within the statutory period of limitation governing such actions. Wherefore, the decision appealed from is affirmed. __________________________________________________ CORONEL vs. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and ELIAS MERLAN, et al. G.R. No. 70191 October 29, 1987 FACTS: Petitioner Rodolfo Coronel filed a complaint for recovery of possession of a parcel of land registered under his name. The complaint was filed against the private respondents Elias Merlan, Brigido Merlan, Jose Merlan, Teodorico Nostrates, Severo Jeciel Santiago Fernan and Fortunato Ocampo before the then CFI of Cavite. Coronel alleged in his complaint that at the time he purchased the subject parcel of land, the defendants (private respondents herein) were already occupying a portion thereof as "tenants at will" and that despite demands to vacate the premises, the defendants failed and refused to move out from the land. The defendants denied that Coronel was the owner of the whole parcel of land and alleged that the lots occupied by them form part of a 1/3 undivided share of brothers Brigido Merlan and Jose Merlan which they inherited from their deceased father Gabriel Merlan, one of the three heirs of Bernabela Lontoc, the original owner of Lot No. 1950-A of the Naic Estate; that the Merlan brothers together with their two brothers and a sister never sold their undivided 1/3 share of the lot to anybody; that it was actually their other co-heirs who sold their undivided portions and that the plaintiff's claim of ownership of the whole parcel of land, if ever it has basis, is fraudulent, void, and without effect; that the Merlans have always been in open and peaceful possession of their undivided share of the lot throughout the years from the first sale by their co-heirs of Lot No. 1950-A in 1950; and that the other defendants were legitimate tenants. In their Third-Party Complaint, the defendants charged that the third-party defendants, owners of the remaining portion of Lot No. 1950-A, defrauded them when they sold the entire parcel.

Third-Party Defendants Marcelo Novelo, Paz Anuat Daniel Anuat and Rosario Cailao the defendants' co-owners of Lot No. 1950-A denied that they had something to do with the fraudulent acts or illegal machinations which deprived the defendants of their share in the subject parcel of land, and that what they sold was only their 2/3 undivided shares in said parcel. The lower court ruled in favor of the defendants and on appeal, the lower court's decision was affirmed.

ISSUES: 1. Whether or not the claim of private respondents to the land has been barred by the Statutes of Limitation or by estoppels by laches. Whether or not the petitioner as purchaser in good faith and for value is entitled to the whole lot subject matter of the present petition.

2.

HELD: In dispute in the instant case is the 2/8 share of Bernabela Lontoc of the Naic Estate designated as Lot 1950-A. When Lontoc died in 1945, she was survived by three sets of heirs: 1) Bernardino Merlan, a grandson by her son Enrique Merlan who died in 1918; 2) Jose Merlan and Brigido Merlan, defendants in the case below and private respondents herein, Graciano Merlan, Agapito Merlan and Corazon Merlan, children of her son Gabriel who died in 1937; and 3) Daniel Anuat and Paz Anuat children of her daughter Francisca Merlan. In 1950, Bernardino Merlan, Daniel Anuat and Paz Anuat sold their 2/3 undivided portion of the lot to spouses Ignacio Manalo and Marcela Nobelo. In 1960, TCT No. T-3116 RT-5010 was cancelled by TCT No. T-1444 but carried the same afore-specified registered co-owners with an annotation carried from the former Transfer Certificate of Title. Sometime in 1970, Ignacio Manalo sold his interest in Lot 1950-A to Mariano Manalo. The deed of sale was and thereafter, TCT No. T-1444 was cancelled and TCT No. T-41175 was issued for Lot No. 1950-A of the Naic Estate in the name of Mariano Manalo. The certificate of title issued in the name of spouses Manalo covered the whole Lot No. 1950-A without any mention of the 1/3 share of the private respondents in the parcel of land which was not sold to them. Relying on the transfer certificate of title of the spouses Mariano Manalo and Jorga Lagos, petitioner Rodolfo Coronel then bought Lot No. 1950-A of the Naic Estate from the former. The deed of sale was registered on December 19, 1974 causing the cancellation of TCT No. T-41175 and the issuance of TCT No. T-75543 in the name of petitioner Rodolfo Coronel. In the instant petition, petitioner contends that the claim of the private respondents over their 1/3 undivided portion of Lot No. 1950-A 25 years after the registration of the deed of sale in favor of Ignacio Manalo in 1950 and more than five (5) years after the registration of the deed of sale in favor of Mariano Manalo is barred by prescription or laches. According to him, there was undue delay on the part of the private respondents to claim their 1/3 portion of Lot No. 1950-A of the Naic Estate and that the action for annulment should have been brought within four (4) years (Art. 1391, New Civil Code) counted from the date of the registration of the instrument. The petitioner likewise insists that he is a purchaser in good faith. Thus, he argues that TCT No. T-41175 in the name of his successor-in-interest Mariano Manalo was very clear to the effect that there is no lien or encumbrance stated therein which could have been seen by his parents who represented him in the sale as he was then in the United States and by the lawyer contracted by him to execute or prepare the corresponding deed of sale. 1. It is evident that the private respondents never sold their 1/3 share over Lot No. 1950-A of the Naic Estate; that what their coowners sold to Ignacio Manalo was their 2/3 share of the same lot; and that Ignacio Manalo sold only the 2/3 share to third-party defendant Mariano Manalo, the predecessor-in-interest of petitioner Rodolfo Coronel. Consequently, there was a mistake when Transfer Certificate of Title No. 41175 was issued to Mariano Manalo covering the whole area of Lot No. 1950-A. Moreover, private respondents Brigido Merlan and Jose Merlan were in open, peaceful and adverse possession of their 1/3 share over the lot even after 1950 when the first sale of the lot took place. The first time they knew about Coronel's claim over the whole lot was when they were served a copy of his complaint in 1975. The counterclaim of the private respondents which was in effect a reconveyance to them of their 1/3 undivided share over lot No. 1950-A has not prescribed. As lawful possessors and owners of the lot in question their cause of action falls within the settled jurisprudence that an action to quiet title to property-in one's possession is imprescriptible, Their undisturbed possession over a period of more than 25 years gave them a continuing right to seek the aid of a court of equity to determine the nature of the adverse claim of a third party and the effect of his own title. If at all, the private respondents' right, to quiet title, to seek reconveyance and to annul TCT No. T-75543 accrued only in 1975 when they were made aware of a claim adverse to their own. It was only at that time that, the statutory period of prescription may be said to have commenced to run against them. In the same manner, there is no bar based on laches to assert their right over 1/3 of the disputed property. The facts of the case show that the private respondents have always been in peaceful possession of the 1/3 portion of the subject lot, exercising ownership thereto for more than 25 years disrupted only in 1975 when the petitioner tried to remove them by virtue of his torrens title covering the entire Lot 1950-A of the Naic Estate. It was only at this point that private respondents knew about the supposed sale of their 1/3 portion of Lot 1950-A of the Naic Estate and they immediately resisted. 2. Notwithstanding the good faith of petitioner when he purchased the land from Mariano Manalo, we cannot close our eyes to the fact that neither the private respondents nor their co-owners of the subject parcel of land sold the former's share of the lot. Furthermore, even Ignacio Manalo to whom the third-party defendants sold their share resold only the 2/3 shares to Mariano Manalo, the successor-in-interest of the petitioner. Whether or not there was fraud or just a mistake or oversight of an employee of the Register of Deeds of Cavite is not clear from the records. The point is that the 1/3 undivided portion of the private respondents over Lot No. 1950-A was mistakenly included in the transfer certificate of title of Mariano Manalo.

We apply equitable considerations. The acceptance accorded the Torrens system of registration would certainly be impaired if it could be utilized to perpetrate fraud and chicanery. Deceit is not to be countenanced; duplicity is not to be rewarded. Witness the favor with which jurisprudence has looked on the action for reconveyance as well as the recognition of the constructive trust. Moreover, the simple possession of a certificate of title, under the Torrens System, does not necessarily make the possessor a true owner of all the property described therein. If a person obtains a title, under the Torrens system, which includes by mistake or oversight land which cannot be registered under the Torrens systems, he does not, by virtue of said certificate alone, become the owner of the lands illegally included. We find no reversible error on the part of the lower courts in recognizing the ownership of the private respondents over 1/3 of Lot No. 1950-A of the Naic Estate. The petitioner is bound to recognize the lien in favor of the private respondents which was mistakenly excluded and therefore not inscribed in the torrens title of the land of his predecessors-in-interest. WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED. _____________________________________________________ CARAGAY-LAYNO vs. HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and SALVADOR ESTRADA G.R. No. L-52064 December 26, 1984 FACTS: The Disputed Portion is a 3,732 square-meter-area of a bigger parcel of land denominated as Lot No. 1 with a total area of 8,752 square meters. The entire parcel is covered by OCT No. 63, issued on 11 September 1947 in the name of Mariano M. DE VERA, who died in 1951 without issue. His intestate estate was administered first by his widow and later by her nephew, respondent Salvador Estrada. Petitioner, JULIANA Caragay, and the decedent, Mariano DE VERA, were first cousins. As Administratrix, DE VERA's widow filed in a special proceeding, an Inventory of all properties of the deceased which included the disputed portion. Because of the discrepancy in area mentioned in the Inventory as 5,147 square meters (as filed by the widow), and that in the title as 8,752 square meters, ESTRADA repaired to the Disputed Property and found that the northwestern portion, subsequently surveyed to be 3,732 square meters, was occupied by petitioner-spouses Juliana Caragay Layno and Benito Layno. ESTRADA demanded that they vacate the Disputed Portion since it was titled in the name of the deceased DE VERA, but petitioners refused claiming that the land belonged to them and, before them, to JULIANA's father Juan Caragay. ESTRADA then instituted suit against JULIANA for the recovery of the Disputed Portion which she resisted, mainly on the ground that the Disputed Portion had been fraudulently or mistakenly included in OCT No. 63, so that an implied or constructive trust existed in her

favor. She then counterclaimed for reconveyance of property in the sense that title be issued in her favor. After hearing, the Trial Court rendered judgment ordering JULIANA to vacate the Disputed Portion. On appeal respondent Appellate Court affirmed the Decision in toto. ISSUES: 1. Whether or not petitioner can seek reconveyance of the disputed portion on the ground that it was fraudulently included in OCT No. 63. 2. Whether or not petitioners action for reconveyance is barred by prescription. HELD: 1. Tacking the previous possession of her father to her own, they had been in actual open, continuous and uninterrupted possession in the concept of owner for about forty five (45) years, declaring the land for taxation purposes and paying realty taxes thereon from 1938 to 1972 until said possession was disturbed in 1966 when ESTRADA informed JULIANA that the Disputed Portion was registered in Mariano DE VERA's name. Further, De Vera, borrowed from petitioner the Tax Declaration of her land to be used as collateral for his loan and sugar quota application and that relying on his assurances, she acceded to his request and was made to sign documents the contents she did not know because of her ignorance. She discovered the fraudulent inclusion of the Disputed Portion in OCT No. 63 only in 1966 when ESTRADA so informed her and sought to eject them. For twenty (20) years from the date of registration of title in 1947 up to 1967 when this suit for recovery of possession was instituted, neither the deceased DE VERA up to the time of his death in 1951, nor his successors-in-interest, had taken steps to possess or lay adverse claim to the Disputed Portion. They may, therefore be said to be guilty of laches as would effectively derail their cause of action. Administrator ESTRADA took interest in recovering the said portion only when he noticed the discrepancy in areas in the Inventory of Property and in the title. Inasmuch as DE VERA had failed to assert any rights over the Disputed Portion during his lifetime, nor did he nor his successors-in-interest possess it for a single moment: but that, JULIANA had been in actual, continuous and open possession thereof to the exclusion of all and sundry, the inescapable inference is, fraud having been unsubstantiated, that it had been erroneously included in OCT No. 63. The mistake is confirmed by the fact of the substantial difference in the area declared in the Inventory and the area declared in the certificate of title. In fact, the widow by limiting the area in said Inventory in effect, recognized and admitted that the Disputed Portion did not form part of the decedent's estate. Mere possession of a certificate of title under the Torrens System is not conclusive as to the holder's true ownership of all the property described therein for he does not by virtue of said certificate alone become the owner of the land illegally included. A Land Registration Court has no jurisdiction to decree a lot to persons who have never asserted any right of ownership

over it. JULIANA, whose property had been wrongfully registered in the name of another, but which had not yet passed into the hands of third parties, can properly seek its reconveyance. 2. Prescription cannot be invoked against JULIANA for the reason that as lawful possessor and owner of the Disputed Portion, her cause of action for reconveyance which, in effect, seeks to quiet title to the property, falls within settled jurisprudence that an action to quiet title to property in one's possession is imprescriptible. Her undisturbed possession over a period of fifty two (52) years gave her a continuing right to seek the aid of a Court of equity to determine the nature of the adverse claim of a third party and the effect on her own title. Besides, under the circumstances, JULIANA's right to quiet title, to seek reconveyance, and to annul OCT. No. 63 accrued only in 1966 when she was made aware of a claim adverse to her own. It was only then that the statutory period of prescription may be said to have commenced to run against her. WHEREFORE, the judgment under review is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. ______________________________________________________ ANASTACIA VDA. DE AVILES, ET ALCOU vs. COURT OF APPEALS and CAMILO AVILES G.R. No. 95748 November 21, 1996 FACTS: PLAINTIFFS aver that they are the actual possessors of a parcel of land situated in Malawa, Lingayen, Pangasinan. This property is the share of their father, Eduardo Aviles and brother of the defendant, in the estate of their deceased parents, Ireneo Aviles and Anastacia Salazar. SINCE 1957, Eduardo Aviles was in actual possession of the afore-described property. In fact, the latter mortgaged the same with the Rural Bank and Philippine National Bank branch in Lingayen. When the property was inspected by a bank representative, Eduardo Aviles, in the presence of the boundary owners, namely, defendant Camilo Aviles, Anastacio Aviles and Juana and Apolonio Joaquin(,) pointed to the inspector the existing earthen dikes as the boundary limits of the property and nobody objected. When the real estate mortgage was foreclosed, the property was sold at public auction but this was redeemed by plaintiffs' mother and the land was subsequently transferred and declared in her name. ON March 23, 1983, defendant Camilo Aviles asserted a color of title over the northern portion of the property with an area of approximately 1,200 square meters by constructing a bamboo fence (thereon) and moving the earthen dikes, thereby molesting and disturbing the peaceful possession of the plaintiffs over said portion. UPON the other hand, defendant Camilo Aviles admitted the Agreement of Partition executed by him and his brothers, Anastacio and Eduardo. In accordance therewith, the total area of the property of their parents which they divided is 46,795 square

meters and the area alloted to Eduardo is 16,111 square meters, to Anastacio is 16,214 square meters while the area alloted to defendant Camilo is 14,470 square meters more or less. The respective area(s) alloted to them was agreed and measured before the execution of the agreement but he was not present when the measurement was made. Defendant agreed to have a smaller area because his brother Eduardo asked him that he wanted a bigger share because he has several children to support. The portion in litigation however is part of the share given to him in the agreement of partition. At present, he is only occupying an area of 12,686 square meters which is smaller than his actual share of 14,470 square meters. Tax Declarations covering his property from 1958 show that the area of his property is 14,470 square meters. The trial court dismissed the complaint for lack of basis and merits. The Court of Appeals affirmed in part the decision of the trial court, reasoning that a special civil action for quieting of title is not the proper remedy for settling a boundary dispute, and that petitioners should have instituted an ejectment suit instead. ISSUES: 1. 2. Whether or not a complaint for quieting of is the proper remedy for settling of a boundary dispute. Whether or not the Court of Appeals is correct in rendering a decision without fully determining the respective rights of the herein parties.

HELD: 1. The facts presented unmistakably constitute a clear case of boundary dispute, which is not cognizable in a special civil action to quiet title. Quieting of title is a common law remedy for the removal of any cloud upon or doubt or uncertainty with respect to title to real property. Pursuant to Article 476 of the Civil Code, to avail of the remedy of quieting of title, a plaintiff must show that there is an instrument, record, claim, encumbrance or proceeding which constitutes or casts a cloud, doubt, question or shadow upon the owner's title to or interest in real property. Thus, petitioners have wholly misapprehended the import of the foregoing rule by claiming that respondent Court erred in holding that there was "no . . . evidence of any muniment of title, proceeding, written contract, . . .", and that there were, as a matter of fact, two such contracts, viz., (i) the Agreement of Partition executed by private respondent and his brothers (including the petitioners' father and predecessor-ininterest), in which their respective shares in the inherited property were agreed upon, and (ii) the Deed of Sale evidencing the redemption by petitioner Anastacia Vda. de Aviles of the subject property in a foreclosure sale. However, these documents in no way constitute a cloud or cast a doubt upon the title of petitioners. Rather, the uncertainty arises from the parties' failure to situate and fix the boundary between their respective properties. As correctly held by the respondent Court, "(i)n fact, both plaintiffs and defendant admitted the existence of the agreement of partition dated June 8, 1957 and in accordance therewith, a fixed area was allotted (sic) to them and that the only controversy is whether these lands were properly measured. There is no adverse claim by the defendant "which is apparently valid, but is, in truth and in fact, invalid, ineffective, voidable, or unenforceable" and which constitutes a cloud thereon.

Corollarily, and equally as clear, the construction of the bamboo fence enclosing the disputed property and the moving of earthen dikes are not the "clouds" or "doubts" which can be removed in an action for quieting of title. An action to quiet title or to remove cloud may not be brought for the purpose of settling a boundary dispute. 2. Petitioners also chide the respondent Court (and the trial court) for not declaring the respective rights of the parties with respect to the land in question, arguing that "when one is disturbed in any form in his rights of property over an immovable by the unfounded claims of others, he has the right to ask from the competent courts: . . . that their respective rights be determined . . . Rule 64 of the Rules of Court, dealing with actions for declaratory relief, specifies in Section 1 thereof the grounds, conditions precedent or requisites for bringing such petitions. Under this rule, only a person who is interested "under a deed, will, contract or other written instrument, and whose rights are affected by a statute or ordinance, may bring an action to determine any question of construction or validity arising under the instrument or statute and for a declaration of his rights or duties thereunder." This means that the subject matter must refer to a deed, will, contract or other written instrument, or to a statute or ordinance, to warrant declaratory relief. Any other matter not mentioned therein is deemed excluded. Even assuming arguendo that the action to quiet title had been brought under Rule 64, the same would still not have prospered, the subject matter thereof not referring to "a deed, will, contract or other written instrument, or to a statute or ordinance," but to a boundary dispute, and therefore not warranting the grant of declaratory relief. From another perspective, we hold that the trial court (and likewise the respondent Court) cannot, in an action for quieting of title, order the determination of the boundaries of the claimed property, as that would be tantamount to awarding to one or some of the parties the disputed property in an action where the sole issue is limited to whether the instrument, record, claim, encumbrance or proceeding involved constitutes a cloud upon the petitioners' interest or title in and to said property. Such determination of boundaries is appropriate in adversarial proceedings where possession or ownership may properly be considered and where evidence aliunde, other than the "instrument, record, claim, encumbrance or proceeding" itself, may be introduced. An action for forcible entry, whenever warranted by the period prescribed in Rule 70, or for recovery of possession de facto, also within the prescribed period, may be availed of by the petitioners, in which proceeding the boundary dispute may be fully threshed out. WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing considerations, the instant petition is hereby DENIED and the Decision appealed from is AFFIRMED.

AZNAR BROTHERS REALTY COMPANY vs. COURT OF APPEALS [G.R. No. 128102. March 7, 2000] FACTS: Lot No. 4399 was acquired by AZNAR from the heirs of Crisanta Maloloy-on by virtue of an Extrajudicial Partition of Real Estate with Deed of Absolute Sale dated 3 March 1964 which was registered with the Register of Deeds of Lapu-Lapu City on 6 March 1964. After the sale, petitioner AZNAR declared this property under its name for taxation purposes and regularly paid the taxes thereon. Herein private respondents were allegedly allowed to occupy portions of Lot No. 4399 by mere tolerance provided that they leave the land in the event that the company would use the property for its purposes. Later, AZNAR entered into a joint venture with Sta. Lucia Realty Development Corporation for the development of the subject lot into a multi-million peso housing subdivision and beach resort. When its demands for the private respondents to vacate the land failed, AZNAR filed with the Municipal Trial Court (MTCC) of Lapu-Lapu City a case for unlawful detainer and damages. On the other hand, the private respondents alleged that they are the successors and descendants of the eight children of the late Crisanta Maloloy-on, whose names appear as the registered owners in the Original Certificate of Title No. RC-2856. They had been residing and occupying the subject portion of the land in the concept of owner since the time of their parents and grandparents. Private respondents claimed that the Extrajudicial Partition of Real Estate with Deed of Absolute Sale is void ab initio for being simulated and fraudulent, and they came to know of the fraud only when AZNAR entered into the land in the last quarter of 1991 and destroyed its vegetation. They then filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Lapu-Lapu City a complaint seeking to declare the subject document null and void. The MTCC rendered a decision ordering the private respondents to vacate the land in question upon the finality of the judgment. The MTCC delved into the issue of ownership in order to resolve the issue of possession. Aggrieved by the decision of the MTCC, private respondents appealed to the RTC. During the pendency of the appeal, a writ of execution was issued by the RTC upon motion of petitioner. AZNAR filed an omnibus motion for the issuance of a writ of demolition, which was likewise issued. Per Sheriffs Report, private respondents houses were demolished on 3 August 1994, except for two houses. On appeal by the private respondents, the Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the decision of the RTC; declared the private respondents as the rightful possessors de facto of the land in question; and permanently enjoined Sheriff from effectuating the demolition of the houses of the private respondents. AZNAR then elevated the case to this Court, via this petition for review on certiorari. ISSUES: 1. Whether or not prior physical possession over the land by the petitioner is required to effect an action of unlawful detainer.

2.

Whether or not the Extrajudicial Partition with Deed of Absolute Sale was null and void.

proved by clear and convincing evidence. Private respondents failed to discharge this burden of proof; hence, the presumption in favor of the questioned deed stands. Anent the non- annotation of the Extrajudicial Partition with Deed of Absolute Sale in the reconstituted Original Certificate of Title No. RO-2856, the same does not render the deed legally defective. It must be borne in mind that the act of registering a document is never necessary to give the conveyance legal effect as between the parties and the vendors heirs. As between the parties to a sale, registration is not indispensable to make it valid and effective. The purpose of registration is merely to notify and protect the interests of strangers to a given transaction, who may be ignorant thereof, and the non-registration of the deed evidencing said transaction does not relieve the parties thereto of their obligations thereunder. Here, no right of innocent third persons or subsequent transferees of the subject lot is involved; thus, the conveyance executed in favor of AZNAR by private respondents and their predecessors is valid and binding upon them, and is equally binding and effective against their heirs. The principle that registration is the operative act that gives validity to the transfer or creates a lien upon the land "refers to cases involving conflicting rights over registered property and those of innocent transferees who relied on the clean title of the properties." This principle has no bearing on the present case, as no subsequent transfer of the subject lot to other persons has been made either by private respondents or their predecessors-ininterest. It bears repeating that petitioners claim of possession over the subject lot is anchored on its claim of ownership on the basis of the Extrajudicial Partition with Deed of Absolute Sale. Our ruling on the issue of the validity of the questioned deed is solely for the purpose of resolving the issue of possession and is to be regarded merely as provisional, without prejudice, however, to the final determination of the issue in the other case for the annulment or cancellation of the Extrajudicial Partition with Deed of Absolute Sale. WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED.

HELD: 1. Contrary to the ruling of the Court of Appeals, prior physical possession by the plaintiff of the subject property is not an indispensable requirement in unlawful detainer cases, although it is indispensable in an action for forcible entry. The lack of prior physical possession on the part of AZNAR is therefore of no moment, as its cause of action in the unlawful detainer case is precisely to terminate private respondents possession of the property in question. 2. In an action for ejectment, the only issue involved is possession de facto. However, when the issue of possession cannot be decided without resolving the issue of ownership, the court may receive evidence upon the question of title to the property but [ solely for the purpose of determining the issue of possession. In the instant case, private respondents have set up the defense of ownership and questioned the title of AZNAR to the subject lot, alleging that the Extrajudicial Partition with Deed of Absolute Sale upon which petitioner bases its title is null and void for being simulated and fraudulently made. First, private respondents claim that not all the known heirs of Crisanta Maloloy-on participated in the extrajudicial partition, and that two persons who participated and were made parties thereto were not heirs of Crisanta. This claim, even if true, would not warrant rescission of the deed. Under Article 1104 of the Civil Code, "[a] partition made with preterition of any of the compulsory heirs shall not be rescinded, unless it be proved that there was bad faith or fraud on the part of the persons interested; but the latter shall be proportionately obliged to pay to the person omitted the share which belongs to him." In the present case, no evidence of bad faith or fraud is extant from the records. As to the two parties to the deed who were allegedly not heirs, Article 1105 is in point; it provides: "A partition which includes a person believed to be an heir, but who is not, shall be void only with respect to such person." In other words, the participation of non-heirs does not render the partition void in its entirety but only to the extent corresponding to them. Private respondents also allege that some of the persons who were made parties to the deed were already dead, while others were still minors. Moreover, the names of some parties thereto were misspelled, and others who knew how to read and write their names were made to appear to have affixed only their thumbmark in the questioned document. Likewise, the signatures of those who were made parties were forged. The foregoing are bare allegations with no leg to stand on. No birth or death certificates were presented before the MTCC to support the allegations that some of the parties to the deed were minors and others were already dead at the time of the execution of the deed. It is worthy to note that the Extrajudicial Partition with Deed of Absolute Sale is a notarized document. As such, it has in its favor the presumption of regularity, and it carries the evidentiary weight conferred upon it with respect to its due execution He who denies its due execution has the burden of proving the contrary. It must also be stressed that whoever alleges forgery has the burden of proving the same. Forgery cannot be presumed but should be