G.R. No.

L-23828

February 28, 1966

PAULINA SANTOS and AURORA SANTOS, petitioners, vs. GREGORIA ARANZANSO and DEMETRIA VENTURA, respondents. A petition for adoption of Paulina Santos and Aurora Santos was filed by Simplicio Santos and Juliana 1 Reyes in the Court of First Instance of Manila on June 4, 1949. Paulina Santos was then 17 years old and Aurora Santos, 8 years old. The petition, which was under oath, alleged inter alia, that the whereabouts of the minors' nearest of kin, particularly their parents, were unknown; that since the outbreak of the war said minors have been abandoned by their respective parents; and that for years, since their infancy, said children have continuously been in petitioners' care and custody. A guardian ad litem Crisanto de Mesa, was thereafter appointed for the minors. Said guardian ad litem forthwith gave his written consent to the adoption. Paulina Santos, being over fourteen years of age, likewise gave her 2 written consent thereto. After due publication and hearing, the adoption court (CFI) rendered on August 25, 1949 a decision, hereunder quoted in full: This is a petition for the adoption of the minors Paulina Santos Reyes and Aurora Santos Reyes by the spouses Simplicio Santos and Juliana R. Santos. After due publication in the "National Weekly", a newspaper of general circulation in the City of Manila, once a week for three consecutive weeks, the case was then set for trial. The office of the Solicitor General was duly notified of the petition and at the hearing did not offer any objection. 1wph1.t From the evidence presented at the hearing, it appears that the petitioners have been married for the past twenty-seven years and have no children of their own. They desire to adopt the minors Paulina Santos Reyes and Aurora Santos Reyes, both of whom are and for years have been living under their care and custody; that the former, since she was barely three months old has already been taken care of by them up to the present time, and the latter has been cared for since she was only fifteen days old. Paulina Santos Reyes is now seventeen years old and has given her consent to the adoption as shown by her signature at the foot of the petition. She ratified the same in open Court. Both parents of the minors have long been unheard from and in spite of diligent efforts of the petitioners to locate them, they could not be found. The consent to the adoption has been given by the guardian ad litem appointed by the Court. The petitioners are both proprietors and have substantial income, more than enough to support and educate the minors. The Court is of the opinion that this adoption will be for the best interest and welfare of the minors. WHEREFORE, the Court hereby grants the petition of the spouses Simplicio Santos and Juliana R. Santos to adopt the minors Paulina Santos Reyes and Aurora Santos Reyes and in accordance with Rule 100 of the Rules of Court in the Philippines, hence forth, the minors are freed from all legal obligations to their natural parents and are, to all legal intents and purposes the children of the petitioners. NOW, ORDERED. Manila, Philippines, August 25, 1949. No appeal was taken from the aforesaid decision. Subsequently eight years later on October 21, 1957, Juliana Reyes died, in Manila, without testament. On November 25, 1957 Simplicio Santos filed in the Court of First Instance of Manila a petition 3 for the settlement of the intestate estate of Juliana Reyes. In said petition he stated among other things that the surviving heirs of the deceased are: he, as surviving spouse, Paulina Santos and Aurora Santos, 27 and 17 years of age, respectively. In the same petition, he asked that he be appointed administrator of the estate.

Gregoria Aranzanso, alleging that she is first cousin to the deceased, filed on January 2, 1958 an opposition to the petition for appointment of administrator. For her grounds she asserted that Simplicio Santos" marriage to the late Juliana Reyes was bigamous and thus void: and that the adoption of Paulina Santos and Aurora Santos was likewise void ab initio for want of the written consent of their parents, who were then living and had not abandoned them. An answer to the opposition was filed by Simplicio Santos on March 7, 1958 and oppositor Aranzanso filed a reply thereto on March 17, 1958. Demetria Ventura, alleging likewise that she is the first cousin of the deceased Juliana Reyes and adding that she is the mother of the child Paulina Santos, filed on March 19, 1959 an opposition to the petition of Simplicio Santos to be named administrator, and, moreover, thereunder adopted, as her own, the pleadings filed by Gregoria Aranzanso. By order of April 6, 1959, the Court of First Instance decided the point in dispute, ruling that the validity of the adoption in question could not be assailed collaterally in the intestate proceedings (Sp. Proc. No. 34354). From the order Gregoria Aranzanso and Demetria Ventura appealed to the Court of Appeals. In its decision, promulgated on September 14, 1964, the Court of Appeals reversed the appealed order, finding instead that the adoption was null and void ab initio due to the absence of consent thereto by the natural parents of the minor children, which it deemed a jurisdictional defect still open to collateral attack. After denial of their motion for reconsideration by the Court of Appeals, Paulina Santos and Aurora Santos appealed to this Court by way of petition for review, filed on November 18, 1964, to which due course was given. Five months after submission of this case for decision or on October 14, 1965 petitioners herein filed a petition for preliminary injunction, and later, on October 26, 1965, a supplemental petition therefor, to stop the trial court from allowing Gregorio Aranzanso and Demetria Ventura, as well as of two other persons, namely, Consuelo and Pacita Pasion, to intervene in the settlement proceedings or to withdraw cash advances from the estate. It was alleged in the petition and supplemental petition for preliminary injunction that on September 22, 1965 the probate court issued an order allowing Gregoria Aranzanso and Demetria Ventura to intervene in the settlement proceedings of Juliana Reyes' estate (Sp. Proc. No. 34354); that on October 2, 1965 said court issued an order allowing, on previous motions therefor, withdrawal of the sum of P7,000 each, under bond, to all the parties,including Gregoria Aranzanso and Demetria Ventura ; that on October 7, 1965 two strangers to the proceedings the aforesaid sisters Consuelo and Pacita Pasion filed a motion, stating that they are also first cousins of the decedent and praying that an order be issued allowing them to withdraw the sum of P7,000 each under bond; that on October 13, 1965 the same Pasion sisters filed a supplemental motion in the same proceedings praying that their motion of October 7 be treated as a motion to intervene; that on October 18, 1965 the probate court issued an order allowing the Pasion sisters to intervene in the settlement proceedings and allowing them to withdraw under bond the sum of P7,000 each from the funds of the estate. On November 4, 1965 respondents, together with Consuelo and Pacita Pasion who thereby submitted themselves to this Court's jurisdiction and stated that they, "for purposes of expediency, are also denominated respondents" filed their "Comment", as required by this Court, opposing the aforesaid petition for preliminary injunction. On November 15, 1965 this Court granted the prayer for preliminary injunction and the writ was issued upon posting of a bond of P5,000 on November 20, 1965. Respondents however moved for reconsideration or modification thereof on November 23, 1965, stating inter alia that they would now be precluded from taking part in the scheduled hearing for settlement of the accounts of the special administratrix (Araceli A. Pilapil). On November 26, 1965 we ordered modification of the preliminary injunction, so that on November 29, the writ was modified so as to enjoin the probate court, until further orders: (1) from hearing and/or approving the settlement of special administratrix's accounts; (2) from allowing any sale, disposition or disbursement of the estate except when essential for strictly maintenance purposes; and (3) from allowing respondents, Gregoria Aranzanso and Demetria Ventura, or Consuelo and Pacita Pasion, or any of them, to receive any advance, cash or otherwise, from the funds of the intestate estate. The principal issue on the merits in this appeal is whether respondents-oppositors Aranzanso and Ventura, could assail in the settlement proceedings the adoption decree in favor of Paulina and Aurora Santos. In sustaining their right to make such a collateral attack, the respondent Court of Appeals rested

as abovementioned on the premise that failure to obtain the consent of the natural parents was a jurisdictional defect rendering the adoption void ab initio. In its view, said consent was not properly dispensed with, not only because the evidence adduced in the adoption proceedings was insufficient to support a finding that the parents had abandoned the children, but also since the adoption court fatally omitted to expressly and specifically find that such abandonment in fact occurred. In this regard it should be stated that the Court of Appeals completely relied on American jurisprudence and authorities to the effect that parental consent to the adoption is a jurisdictional requisite (E.g., 2 C.J.S., Adoption of Children, Section 45[a] p. 435; Whetmore vs. Fratello, 282 P2d 667, 670). The point to remember, however, is that under our law on the matter, consent by the parents to the adoption is not an absolute requisite: SEC. 3. Consent to adoption.There shall be filed with the petition a written consent to the adoption signed by the child if over fourteen years of age and not incompetent, and by each of its known living parents who is not insane or hopelessly intemperate or has not abandoned such child, or if there are no such parents by the general guardian or guardian ad litem of the child, or if the child is in the custody of an orphan asylum, children's home, or benevolent society or person, by the proper officer or officers of such asylum, home, or society, or by such person; but if the child is illegitimate and has not been recognized, the consent of its father to the adoption shall not 4 be required. (Rule 100, Old Rules of Court.) Stated otherwise, if the natural parents have abandoned their children, consent to the adoption by the guardianad litem suffices. This brings as to the question whether in the proceedings at bar the Court of Appeals can still review the evidence in the adoption case and conclude that it was not sufficiently established therein that the parents of Paulina and Aurora Santos had abandoned them. First of all, it is not quite accurate to say that the adoption court made no determination of the fact of abandonment. As quoted earlier, it is stated in the decision of the adoption court, that: From the evidence presented at the hearing it appears that the petitioners have been married for the past twenty-seven years and have no children of their own. They desire to adopt the minors Paulina Santos [y] Reyes and Aurora Santos [y] Reyes, both of whom are and for years have been living under their care and custody; that the former, since she was barely three months old has already been taken care of by them up to the present time, and the latter has been cared for since she was only fifteen days old. Paulina Santos [y] Reyes is now seventeen years old. . . . Both parents of the minors have long been unheard from and in spite of diligent efforts of the petitioners to locate them, they could not be found. The consent to the adoption has been given by the guardian ad litem appointed by the Court. . . . . (Emphasis supplied.) Abandonment under persuasive American rulings imports "any conduct on the part of the parent which evinces a settled purpose to forgo all parental duties and relinquish all parental claims to the child". It means "neglect or refusal to perform the natural and legal obligations of care and support which parents owe to their children." (2 Am. Jur. 2d, Adoption, Sec. 32, pp. 886-887.) It can thus readily be seen that altho the CFI judgment approving the adoption does not use the word "abandoned", its findings sufficiently contain a set of facts and circumstances which truly constitutes a finding of abandonment. Coming now to the power of the Court of Appeals to review in this case the finding of abandonment made by the adoption court, we find that even under American jurisprudence relied upon, as stated, by said Court the settled rule is that even when the jurisdiction of an inferior or special tribunal depends upon the existence of a fact to be established before it, the determination of that fact by the tribunal cannot be questioned in a collateral attack upon its order (In re McKaeg's Estate, 141 Cal. 403, 74 Pac. 1039, 1040; In re Camp's Estate, 131 Cal. 469, 63 Pac. 736). Anent this point the rulings are summed up in 2 American Jurisprudence, 2nd Series, Adoption, Sec. 75, p. 922, thus: An adoption order implies the finding of the necessary facts and the burden of proof is on the party attacking it; it cannot be considered void merely because the fact needed to show statutory

compliance is obscure. While a judicial determination of some particular fact, such as the abandonment of his next of kin to the adoption, may be essential to the exercise of jurisdiction to enter the order of adoption, this does not make it essential to the jurisdictional validity of the decree that the fact be determined upon proper evidence, or necessarily in accordance with the truth; a mere error cannot affect the jurisdiction, and the determination must stand until reversed on appeal, and hence cannot be collaterally attacked. If this were not the rule, the status of adopted children would always be uncertain, since the evidence might not be the same at all investigations, and might be regarded with different effect by different tribunals, and the adoption might be held by one court to have been valid, while another court would hold it to have been of no avail. Freeman on Judgments says the same thing: In general, therefore, where the right of the court to assume jurisdiction of a cause and proceed to judgment depends upon the ascertainment of facts in pais and the court retains jurisdiction it thereby impliedly adjudges that the requisite jurisdictional facts exist and having found such facts in favor of jurisdiction, its decision in this respect, whether erroneous or not, cannot be questioned in a collateral proceedings, for a presumption arises in such cases, when the validity of the judgment is attacked, that the necessary jurisdictional facts were proven. . . . . (Vol. I, Sec. 350, pp. 719-720.) The Supreme Court of Wisconsin, construing a statute akin to our law in this regard, said in Parsons vs. Parsons, 101 Wis. 76, 77 N.W. 147, 148: The statute to be considered is section 4022, Rev. St. 1878, which reads as follows: "No such adoption shall be made without the written consent of the living parents of such child unless the court shall find that one of the parents has abandoned the child or gone to parts unknown." Thus it will be seen that upon the fact being established that the living parent has abandoned his child, he is deemed by the statute to have thereby relinquished all parental right to be consulted in respect to the child's welfare, and his consent to the adoption is therefore dispensed with. The term "abandon" obviously means no more than neglect or refusal to perform the natural and legal obligations of care and support which parents owe to their children. The fact of abandonment, judicially determined, was essential to the jurisdiction; not essential that it should be determined on proper evidence, necessarily, or in accordance with the truth, because mere error in that regard does not affect jurisdicition. If jurisdiction be obtained to determine a fact, its determination wrong or on insufficient or improper evidence is immaterial oh the question of legal right to proceed judicially to the next step. That is deemed to be elementary... A judicial determination may be contrary to conclusive evidence, or legal evidence, or without any evidence, yet cannot be impeached for want of jurisdiction. Van Fleet, Coll. Attack, Secs. 663, 665. That rule applies to all judicial proceedings. . . . . It follows, therefore, that the Court of Appeals erred in reviewing, under a collateral attack, the determination of the adoption court that the parents of Paulina and Aurora Santos had abandoned them. This is so even if such fact of abandonment is deemed jurisdictional, a point which we need not and do not rule upon in this case. For the same reason, it is not in point to argue here that Simplicio Santos in fact concealed the adoption proceedings from the natural parents, thereby rendering the judgment obtained therein null and void or being secured by extrinsic fraud. The rule is well recognized that a judgment can be set aside on the ground of extrinsic fraud only in a separate action brought for that purpose; not by way of collateral attack (Gomez vs. Concepcion, 47 Phil. 717; Ramos vs. Maalac, 89 Phil. 270). Anent the alleged lack of notice of the adoption proceedings on the natural parents, suffice it to mark that 5 adoption is a proceeding in rem and that constructive notice, such as the publication duly made as aforesaid, is enough where the residence of the parents is unknown (2 Am. Jur., 2d, Adoption, Sec. 56, p. 906). Notice, moreover, is not required in adoption cases in regard to the abandoning parent (Parsons vs. Parsons, supra).

Assuming that Simplicio Santos was not validly married to Juliana Reyes, it will not make any difference as far as the right of respondents to intervene in the intestate proceedings is concerned. Juliana Reyes should then be deemed to have filed the petition for adoption as a person whose status is single, not married. The defect would then lie only as to Simplicio Santos, who, as allegedly married to another person (a point that we do not decide in this case), could not adopt without joining his wife in the 6 petition. It being the estate of Juliana Reyes that is the subject matter of the settlement proceedings, the flaw, if any, would not affect the consideration of the right of Paulina and Aurora Santos to succeed as adopted children of Juliana Reyes, to the exclusion of respondents. It must not be forgotten that the philosophy behind adoption statutes is to promote the welfare of the child. Accordingly, the modern trend is to encourage adoption (Prasnik vs. Republic, 5 O.G. 1942) and every reasonable intendment should be sustained to promote that objective. From 2 Corpus Juris Secundum 375-376 we quote: Accordingly, as the main purpose of adoption statutes is the promotion of the welfare of children, bereft of the benefits of the home and care of their real parents, wherever possible without doing violence to the terms of the statute, such a construction should be given adoption laws as will sustain, rather than defeat, this purpose. Although, as against the interests of the child, the proceedings must be strictly in accordance with the statute, there is a tendency on the part of the courts, however, where the adoption has been fully consummated, to construe the statute with a reasonable degree of liberality, to the end that the assumed relationship and the intention of the parties be upheld, particularly as against strangers to the proceedings collaterally attacking them . . . . From all the foregoing it follows that respondents-oppositors Aranzanso and Ventura and those who, like them (Pasion sisters), claim an interest in the estate of Juliana Reyes as alleged first cousins, cannot intervene, as such, in the settlement proceedings, in view of the fact that in the order of intestate succession adopted children exclude first cousins (Articles 979 and 1003, New Civil Code). The same holds true as long as the adoption must be as in the instant case considered valid. Wherefore, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is hereby reversed and the order of the probate court a quosustaining the adoption, dated April 6, 1959, is affirmed. Respondents Gregoria Aranzanso and Demetria Ventura as well as Consuelo and Pacita Pasion are declared without right to intervene as heirs in the settlement of the intestate estate of Juliana Reyes. The preliminary injunction heretofore issued is dissolved, except insofar as it enjoins the intervention or allowance of withdrawals of properly from the estate by Gregoria Aranzanso, Demetria Ventura, Consuelo and Pacita Pasion, in the concept of heirs, as to which it is hereby made permanent. No costs. So ordered

G.R. No. 77867 February 6, 1990 ISABEL DE LA PUERTA, Petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and CARMELITA DE LA PUERTA, Respondents. The basic issue involved in this case is the filiation of private respondent Carmelita de la Puerta, who claims successional lights to the estate of her alleged grandmother.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library Dominga Revuelta died on July 3, 1966, at the age of 92, with a will leaving her properties to her three surviving children, namely, Alfredo, Vicente and Isabel, all surnamed de la Puerta. Isabel was given the free portion in addition to her legitime and was appointed executrix of the will. 1chanrobles virtual law library The petition for the probate of the will filed by Isabel was opposed by her brothers, who averred that their mother was already senile at the time of the execution of the will and did not fully comprehend its meaning. Moreover, some of the properties listed in the inventory of her estate belonged to them exclusively. 2chanrobles virtual law library Meantime, Isabel was appointed special administratrix by the probate court. 3 Alfredo subsequently died, leaving Vicente the lone oppositor. 4chanrobles virtual law library On August 1, 1974, Vicente de la Puerta filed with the Court of First Instance of Quezon a petition to adopt Carmelita de la Puerta. After hearing, the petition was granted. 5However, the decision was appealed by Isabel to the Court of Appeals. During the pendency of the appeal, Vicente died, prompting her to move for the dismissal of the case 6chanrobles virtual law library On November 20, 1981, Carmelita, having been allowed to intervene in the probate proceedings, filed a motion for the payment to her of a monthly allowance as the acknowledged natural child of Vicente de la Puerta. 7 At the hearing on her motion, Carmelita presented evidence to prove her claimed status to which Isabel was allowed to submit counter-evidence.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library On November 12,1982, the probate court granted the motion, declaring that it was satisfied from the evidence at hand that Carmelita was a natural child of Vicente de la Puerta and was entitled to the amounts claimed for her support. The court added that "the evidence presented by the petitioner against it (was) too weak to discredit the same. 8chanrobles virtual law library On appeal, the order of the lower court was affirmed by the respondent court, 9 which is now in turn being challenged in this petition before us.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library The petitioner's main argument is that Carmelita was not the natural child of Vicente de la Puerta, who was married to Genoveva de la Puerta in 1938 and remained his wife until his death in 1978. Carmelita's real parents are Juanita Austrial and Gloria Jordan.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library Invoking the presumption of legitimacy, she argues that Carmelita was the legitimate child of Juanita Austrial and Gloria Jordan, who were legally or presumably married. Moreover, Carmelita could not have been a natural child of Vicente de la Puerta because he was already married at the time of her birth in 1962.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

To prove her point, Isabel presented Amado Magpantay, who testified that he was a neighbor of Austrial and Jordan. According to him, the two were living as husband and wife and had three children, including a girl named "Puti," presumably Carmelita. He said though that he was not sure if the couple was legally married. 10chanrobles virtual law library Another witness, Genoveva de la Puerta, Identified herself as Vicente de la Puerta's wife but said they separated two years after their marriage in 1938 and were never reconciled. In 1962, Gloria Jordan started living with Vicente de la Puerta in his house, which was only five or six houses away from where she herself was staying. Genoveva said that the relationship between her husband and Gloria was well known in the community. 11chanrobles virtual law library In finding for Carmelita, the lower court declared that: . . . By her evidence, it was shown to the satisfaction of the Court that she was born on December 18, 1962 per her birth certificate (Exh. A); that her father was Vicente de la Puerta and her mother is Gloria Jordan who were living as common law husband and wife until his death on June 14, 1978; that Vicente de la Puerta was married to, but was separated from, his legal wife Genoveva de la Puerta; that upon the death of Vicente de la Puerta on June 14, 1978 without leaving a last will and testament, she was the only child who survived him together with his spouse Genoveva de la Puerta with whom he did not beget any child; that she was treated by Vicente de la Puerta as a true child from the time of her birth until his father died; that the fact that she was treated as a child of Vicente de la Puerta is shown by the family pictures showing movant with Vicente de la Puerta (Exhs. D, D-1 and D-2) and school records wherein he signed the report cards as her parent (Exh. E and E-1); that during the hearing of her adoption case in Special Proceeding No. 0041 in Branch V of this Court at Mauban, Quezon, Vicente de la Puerta categorically stated in court that Carmelita de la Puerta is his daughter with Gloria Jordan (Exhs. B and B-1); that it was Vicente de la Puerta during his lifetime who spent for her subsistence, support and education; . . . 12chanrobles virtual law library This is a factual finding that we do not see fit to disturb, absent any of those circumstances we have laid down in a long line of decisions that will justify reversal. 13Among these circumstances are: (1) the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation, surmise and conjecture; (2) the inference made is manifestly mistaken; (3) there is grave abuse of discretion; (4) the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; (5) the findings of fact are conflicting; (6) the Court of Appeals went beyond the issues of the case and its findings are contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellees; (7) the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the trial court; (8) said findings of facts are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based; (9) the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioner's main and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondents; and (10) the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are premised on the supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library The petitioner insists on the application of the following provisions of the Civil Code to support her thesis that Carmelita is not the natural child of Vicente de la Puerta but the legitimate child of Juanito Austrial and Gloria Jordan: Art. 255. Children born after one hundred and eighty days following the celebration of the marriage, and before three hundred days following its dissolution or the separation of the spouses shall be presumed to be legitimate.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library Against this presumption no evidence shall be admitted other than that of the physical impossibility of the husband's having access to his wife within the first one hundred and

twenty days of the three hundred which preceded the birth of the child.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library This physical impossibility may be caused:chanrobles virtual law library (1) By the impotence of the husband;chanrobles virtual law library (2) By the fact that the husband and wife were living separately in such a way that access was not possible;chanrobles virtual law library (3) By the serious illness of the husband.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library Art. 256. The child shall be presumed legitimate, although the mother may have declared against its legitimacy or may have been sentenced as an adulteress. These rules are in turn based on the presumption that Juanito and Gloria were married at the time of Carmelita's birth in 1962, pursuant to Rule 131, Sec. 5(bb) of the Rules of Court, providing that: Sec. 5. Disputable presumptions.-The following presumptions are satisfactory if uncontradicted, but may be contradicted and overcome by other evidence: (bb) That a man and woman deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of marriage; But this last-quoted presumption is merely disputable and may be refuted with evidence to the contrary. As the Court sees it, such evidence has been sufficiently established in the case at bar. The cases 14 cited by the petitioner are not exactly in point because they involve situations where the couples lived continuously as husband and wife and so could be reasonably presumed to be married. In the case before us, there was testimony from Vicente's own wife that her husband and Gloria lived together as a married couple, thereby rebutting the presumption that Gloria was herself the lawful wife of Juanita Austrial.cs virtual law library Such testimony would for one thing show that Juanito and Gloria did not continuously live together as a married couple. Moreover, it is not explained why, if he was really married to her, Juanito did not object when Gloria left the conjugal home and started openly consorting with Vicente, and in the same neighborhood at that. That was unnatural, to say the least. It was different with Genoveva for she herself swore that she had separated from Vicente two years after their marriage and had long lost interest in her husband. In fact, she even renounced in open court any claim to Vicente's estate.15chanrobles virtual law library The presumption of marriage between Juanito and Gloria having been destroyed, it became necessary for the petitioner to submit additional proof to show that the two were legally married. She did not. Turning now to the evidence required to prove the private respondent's filiation, we reject the petitioner's contention that Article 278 of the Civil Code is not available to Carmelita. It is error to contend that as she is not a natural child but a spurious child (if at all) she cannot prove her status by the record of birth, a will, a statement before a court of record, or any authentic writing. On the contrary, it has long been settled that:

The so-called spurious children or illegitimate children other than natural children, commonly known as bastards, include adulterous children or those born out of wedlock to a married woman cohabiting with a man other than her husband or to a married man cohabiting with a woman other than his wife. They are entitled to support and successional rights (Art. 287, CC). But their filiation must be duly proven.(Ibid, Art. 887)chanrobles virtual law library How should their filiation be proven? Article 289 of the Civil Code allows the investigation of the paternity or maternity of spurious children under the circumstances specified in Articles 283 and 284 of the Civil Code. The implication is that the rules on compulsory recognition of natural children are applicable to spurious children. virtual law library Spurious children should not be in a better position than natural children. The rules on proof of filiation of natural children or the rule on voluntary and compulsory acknowledgment for natural children may be applied to spurious children. 16chanrobles virtual law library This being so, we need not rule now on the admissibility of the private respondent's certificate of birth as proof of her filiation. That status was sufficiently established by the sworn testimony of Vicente de la Puerta at the hearing of the petition for adoption on September 6, 1976, where he categorically declared as follows: Q What relation if any do you have with Carmelita de la Puerta?chanrobles virtual law library A She is my daughter.
17

Finally, we move to the most crucial question, to wit: May Carmelita de la Puerta claim support and successional rights to the estate of Dominga Revuelta? According to Article 970 of the Civil Code: Art. 970. Representation is a right created by fiction of law, by virtue of which the representative is raised to the place and the degree of the person represented, and acquires the rights which the latter would have if he were living or if he could have inherited. The answer to the question posed must be in the negative. The first reason is that Vicente de la Puerta did not predecease his mother; and the second is that Carmelita is a spurious child. It is settled that In testamentary succession, the right of representation can take place only in the following cases: first, when the person represented dies before the testator; second, when the person represented is incapable of succeeding the testator; and third, when the person represented is disinherited by the testator. In all of these cases, since there is a vacancy in the inheritance, the law calls the children or descendants of the person represented to succeed by right of representation. 18 The law is clear that there is representation only when relatives of a deceased person try to succeed him in his rights which he would have had if still living. In the present case, however, said deceased had already succeeded his aunt, the testatrix herein. . . . It is a fact that at the time of the death of the testatrix, Reynaldo Cuison was still alive. He died two months after her (testatrix's) death. And upon his death, he transmitted to his heirs, the petitioners herein Elisa Cuison et al., the legacy or the right to succeed to the legacy. . . . In other words, the herein petitioners-appellants are not trying to succeed to the right to the

property of the testatrix, but rather to the right of the legatee Reynaldo Cuison in said property. 19chanrobles virtual law library Not having predeceased Dominga Revuelta, her son Vicente had the right to inherit from her directly or in his own right. No right of representation was involved, nor could it be invoked by Carmelita upon her father's death, which came after his own mother's death. It would have been different if Vicente was already dead when Dominga Revuelta died. Carmelita could then have inherited from her in representation of her father Vicente, assuming the private respondent was a lawful heir. library But herein lies the crux, for she is not. As a spurious child of Vicente, Carmelita is barred from inheriting from Dominga because of Article 992 of the Civil Code, which lays down the barrier between the legitimate and illegitimate families. This article provides quite clearly: Art. 992. An illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestato from the legitimate children and relatives of his father or mother; nor shall such children or relatives inherit in the same manner from the illegitimate child. Applying this rule in Leonardo v. Court of Appeals,
20

this Court declared:

. . . even if it is true that petitioner is the child of Sotero Leonardo, still he cannot, by right of representation, claim a share of the estate left by the deceased Francisca Reyes considering that, as found again by the Court of Appeals, he was born outside wedlock as shown by the fact that when he was born, his alleged putative father and mother were not yet married, and what is more, his alleged father's first marriage was still subsisting. At most, petitioner would be an illegitimate child who has no right to inherit ab intestato from the legitimate children and relatives of his father, like the deceased Francisca Reyes. The reason for this rule was explained in the recent case of Diaz v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 21 thus: Article 992 of the New Civil Code provides a barrier or iron curtain in that it prohibits absolutely a succession ab intestato between the illegitimate child and the legitimate children and relatives of the father or mother of said legitimate child. They may have a natural tie of blood, but this is not recognized by law for the purpose of Article 992. Between the legitimate family and the illegitimate family there is presumed to be an intervening antagonism and incompatibility. The illegitimate child is disgracefully looked down upon by the legitimate family; the family is in turn, hated by the illegitimate child the latter considers the privileged condition of the former, and the resources of which it is thereby deprived; the former in turn sees in the illegitimate child nothing but the product of sin, palpable evidence of a blemish broken in life; the law does no more than recognize this truth, by avoiding further ground of resentment. 22chanrobles virtual law library Indeed, even as an adopted child, Carmelita would still be barred from inheriting from Dominga Revuelta for there would be no natural kindred ties between them and consequently, no legal ties to bind them either. As aptly pointed out by Dr. Arturo M. Tolentino: If the adopting parent should die before the adopted child, the latter cannot represent the former in the inheritance from the parents or ascendants of the adopter. The adopted child is not related to the deceased in that case, because the filiation created by fiction of law is exclusively between the adopter and the adopted. "By adoption, the adopters can make for themselves an heir, but they cannot thus make one for their kindred. 23

The result is that Carmelita, as the spurious daughter of Vicente de la Puerta, has successional rights to the intestate estate of her father but not to the estate of Dominga Revuelta. Her claims for support and inheritance should therefore be filed in the proceedings for the settlement of her own father's estate 24 and cannot be considered in the probate of Dominga Revuelta's Will. WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the appealed decision is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE, with costs against the private respondent. It is so ordered. G.R. No. L-22469 October 23, 1978 TOMAS CORPUS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. ADMINISTRATOR and/or EXECUTOR of the Estate of Teodoro R. Yangco, RAFAEL CORPUS, AMALIA CORPUS, JOSE A. V. CORPUS, RAMON L. CORPUS, ENRIQUE J. CORPUS, S. W. STAGG, SOLEDAD ASPRER and CIPRIANO NAVARRO, defendants-appellees. Teodoro R. Yangco died in Manila on April 20, 1939 at the age of seventy-seven years. His will dated August 29, 1934 was probated in the Court of First Instance of Manila in Special Proceeding No. 54863. The decree of probate was affirmed in this Court's 1941 decision in Corpus vs. Yangco, 73 Phil. 527. The complete text of the will is quoted in that decision. Yangco had no forced heirs. At the time of his death, his nearest relatives were (1) his half brother, Luis R. Yangco, (2) his half sister, Paz Yangco, the wife of Miguel Ossorio (3) Amalia Corpus, Jose A. V. Corpus, and Ramon L. Corpus, the children of his half brother, Pablo Corpus, and (4) Juana (Juanita) Corpus, the daughter of his half brother Jose Corpus . Juanita died in October, 1944 at Palauig, Zambales. Teodoro R. Yangco was the son of Luis Rafael Yangco and Ramona Arguelles, the widow of Tomas Corpus. Before her union with Luis Rafael Yangco, Ramona had begotten five children with Tomas Corpus, two of whom were the aforenamed Pablo Corpus and Jose Corpus. Pursuant to the order of the probate court, a project of partition dated November 26, 1945 was submitted by the administrator and the legatees named in the will. That project of partition was opposed by the estate of Luis R. Yangco whose counsel contended that an intestacy should be declared Because the will does not contain an institution of heir. It was also opposed by Atty. Roman A. Cruz, who represented Juanita Corpus, Pedro Martinez and Juliana de Castro. Juanita Corpus was already dead when Atty. Cruz appeared as her counsel. law library Atty. Cruz alleged in his opposition that the proposed partion was not in conformity with the will because the testator intended that the estate. should be "conserved" and not physically partitioned. Atty. Cruz prayed "que declare que el finado no dispuso en su testamento de sus bienes y negocios y que ha lugar a sucession intestado con respecio a los raismos y que same un dia en esta causa para la recepcion de pruebas previa a la declaracion de quienes son los herederos legales o abintestato del difunto." The Probate court in its order of December 26, 1946 approved the project of partition. It held that in certain clauses of the will the testator intended to conserve his properties not in the sense of disposing of them after his death but for the purpose of Preventing that "tales bienes fuesen malgastados o desfilpar radios por los legatarios" and that if the testator intended a Perpetual prohibition against alienation, that conch tion would be regarded "como no puesta o no existents". it concluded that "no hay motives legales o morales para que la sucession de Don Teodoro R. Yangco sea declarada intestada (See Barretto vs. Tuason, 50 Phil. 888, which cites article 785 of the Spanish Civil Code as prohibiting

perpetual entails, and Rodriguez vs. Court of Appeals, L-28734, March 28, 1969, 27 SCRA 546.) From that order, Pedro Martinez, Juliana de Castro , Juanita Corpus (deceased) and the estate of Luis R. Yangco aped to this Court (L-1476). Those appeals were dismissed in tills Court's resolutions of October 10 and 31, 1947 after the legatees and the appellants entered into compromise agreements. In the compromise dated October 7, 1947 the legatees agreed to pay P35,000 to Pedro Martinez, the heirs of Pio V. Corpus, the heirs of Isabel Corpus and the heir of Juanita Corpus. Herein appellant Tomas Corpus signed that compromise settlement as the sole heir of Juanita Corpus. The estate of Luis R. Yangco entered into a similar compromise a ment A the resolution dismissing the appeal became, final and executory on October 14 and November 4, 1947, entries of judgment were made on those dates. Pursuant to the compromise agreement, Tomas Corpus Signed a receipt dated October 24, 1947 wherein he acknowledge that he received from the Yangco estate the sum of two thousand pesos (P2,000) "as settlement in full of my share of the compromise agreement as per understanding with Judge Roman Cruz, our attorney in this case" (Exh. D or 17). On September 20, 1949, the legatees executed an agreement for the settlement and physical partition of the Yangco estate. The probate court approved that agreement and noted that the 1945 project of partition was pro tanto modified. That did not set at rest the controvery over the Yangco's estate. law library On October 5, 1951, Tomas Corpus, as the sole heir of Juanita corpus, filed an action in the Court of First Instance of Manila to recover her supposed share in Yangco intestate estate. He alleged in his complaint that the dispositions in his Yangcos will sing perpetual prohibitions upon alienation rendered it void under article 785 of the old Civil Code and that the 1949 partition is invalid and, therefore, the decedent's estate should be distributed according to the rules on intestacy. library The trial court in its decision of July 2, 1956 dismissed the action on the grounds of res judicata and laches. It held that the intrinsic validity of Yangco's will was passed upon in its order dated December 26, 1946 in Special Proceeding No. 54863 approving the project of partition for the testator's estate. Tomas Corpus appealed to the Court of Appeals which in its resolution dated January 23, 1964 in CA-G. R. No. 18720-R certified the appeal to this Court because it involves real property valued at more than fifty thousand pesos (Sec. 17151 Judiciary Law before it was amended by Republic Act No. 2613). Appellant Corpus contends in this appeal that the trial court erred in holding (1) that Teodoro R. Yangco was a natural child, (2) that his will had been duly legalized and (3) that plaintiff's action is barred by res judicata and laches. In the disposition of this appeal it is not necessary to resolve whether Yangco's will had been duly legalized and whether the action of Tomas Corpus is barred by res judicata and laches. The appeal may be resolved by de whether Juanita Corpus, the mother of apt Tomas Corpus was a legal heir of Yangco. Has Tomas Corpus a cause of action to recover his mother's supposed intestate share in Yangco's estate? library To answer that question, it is necessary to ascertain Yangco's filiation The trial court found that Yangco "a su muerte tambien le sbrevivieron Luis y Paz appellidados Yangco, hermanos naturales reconocidos por su padre natural Luis R. Yangco". The basis of the trial court's conclusion that Teodoro R. Yangco was an acknowledged natural child and not a legitimate child was the statement in the will of his father, Luis Rafael Yangco, dated June 14, 1907,

that Teodoro and his three other children were his acknowledged natural children. His exact words are: Primera. Declaro que tengo cuatro hijos naturales reconocidos, HamadosTeodoro, Paz, Luisa y Luis, los cuales son mis unicos herederos forzosos (Exh. 1 in Testate Estate of Teodoro Yangco). That will was attested by Rafael del Pan Francisco Ortigas, Manuel Camus and Florencio Gonzales Diez chanrobles virtual law library Appellant Corpus assails the probative value of the will of Luis R. Yangco, Identified as Exhibit 1 herein, which he says is a mere copy of Exhibit 20, as found in the record on appeal in Special Proceeding No. 54863. He contends that it should not prevail over the presumption of legitimacy found in section 69, Rule 123 of the old Rules of Court and over the statement of Samuel W. Stagg in his biography of Teodoro R. Yangco, that Luis Rafael Yangco made a second marital venture with Victoria Obin implying that he had a first marital venture with Ramona Arguelles, the mother of Teodoro. These contentions have no merit. The authenticity of the will of Luis Rafael Yangco, as reproduced in Exhibit I herein and as copied from Exhibit 20 in the proceeding for the probate of Teodoro R. Yangco's wilt in incontestable. The said will is part of a public or official judicial record. On the other hand, the children of Ramona Arguelles and Tomas Corpus are presumed to be legitimate. A marriage is presumed to have taken place between Ramona and Tomas.Semper praesumitur pro matrimonio. It is disputably presumption "That a man and a woman deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of marriage"; "that a child born in lawful wedlock, there being no divorce, absolute or from bed and board, is legitimate", and "that things have happened according to the ordinary course of nature and the ordinary habits of life" (Sec. 5[z], [bb] and cc Rule 131, Rules of Court). Since Teodoro R. Yangco was an acknowledged natural child or was illegitimate and since Juanita Corpus was the legitimate child of Jose Corpus, himself a legitimate child, we hold that appellant Tomas Corpus has no cause of action for the recovery of the supposed hereditary share of his mother, Juanita Corpus, as a legal heir, in Yangco's estate. Juanita Corpus was not a legal heir of Yangco because there is no reciprocal succession between legitimate and illegitimate relatives. The trial court did not err in dismissing the complaint of Tomas Corpus. Article 943 of the old Civil code provides that "el hijo natural y el legitimado no tienen derecho a suceder abintestato a los hijos y parientes legitimos del padre o madre que to haya reconocido, ni ellos al hijo natural ni al legitimado". Article 943 "prohibits all successory reciprocity mortis causa between legitimate and illegitimate relatives" 16 Sanchez Roman, Civil Code, pp. 996-997 cited in Director of Lands vs. Aguas, 63 Phil. 279, 287. See 16 Scaevola Codigo Civil, 4th Ed., 455-6). Appellant Corpus concedes that if 'Teodoro R. Yangco was a natural child, he (Tomas Corpus) would have no legal personality to intervene in the distribution of Yangco's estate (p. 8, appellant's brief). The rule in article 943 is now found in article 992 of the Civil Code which provides that "an illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestato from the legitimate children and relatives of his father or mother; nor shall such children or relatives inherit in the same manner from the illegitimate child".

That rule is based on the theory that the illegitimate child is disgracefully looked upon by the legitimate family while the legitimate family is, in turn, hated by the illegitimate child. The law does not recognize the blood tie and seeks to avod further grounds of resentment (7 Manresa, Codigo Civil, 7th Ed., pp. 185- 6). Under articles 944 and 945 of the Spanish Civil Code, "if an acknowledged natural or legitimated child should die without issue, either legitimate or acknowledged, the father or mother who acknowledged such child shall succeed to its entire estate; and if both acknowledged it and are alive, they shall inherit from it share and share alike. In default of natural ascendants, natural and legitimated children shall be succeeded by theirnatural brothers and sisters in accordance with the rules established for legitimate brothers and sisters." Hence, Teodoro R. Yangco's half brothers on the Corpus side, who were legitimate, had no right to succeed to his estate under the rules of intestacy. Following the rule in article 992, formerly article 943, it was held that the legitimate relatives of the mother cannot succeed her illegitimate child (Cacho vs. Udan L- 19996, April 30, 1965, 13 SCRA 693. See De Guzman vs. Sevilla, 47 Phil. 991). Where the testatrix, Rosario Table was the legitimate daughter of Jose Table the two acknowledged natural children of her uncle, Ramon Table her father's brother, were held not to be her legal heirs (Grey vs. Table 88 Phil. 128). By reason of that same rule, the natural child cannot represent his natural father in the succession to the estate of the legitimate grandparent (Llorente vs. Rodriguez, 10 Phil. 585; Centeno vs. Centeno, 52 Phil. 322; Allarde vs. Abaya, 57 Phil. 909). virtual law library The natural daughter cannot succeed to the estate of her deceased uncle, a legitimate brother of her natural mother (Anuran vs. Aquino and Ortiz, 38 Phil. 29). virtual law library WHEREFORE the lower court's judgment is affirmed. No costs. SO ORDERED. G.R. No. L-19281 June 30, 1965 IN THE MATTER OF THE INTESTATE ESTATE OF PEDRO SANTILLON, CLARO SANTILLON, Petitioner-Appellant, vs. PERFECTA MIRANDA, BENITO U. MIRANDA and ROSARIO CORRALES, oppositors-appellees. This is an appeal from the order of the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, specifying the respective shares of the principal parties herein in the intestate estate of Pedro Santillon. law library On November 21, 1953, Santillon died without testament in Tayug, Pangasinan, his residence, leaving one son, Claro, and his wife, Perfecta Miranda. During his marriage, Pedro acquired several parcels of land located in that province. law library About four years after his death, Claro Santillon filed a petition for letters of administration. Opposition to said petition was entered by the widow Perfecta Miranda and the spouses Benito U. Miranda and Rosario Corrales on the following grounds: (a) that the properties enumerated in the petition were all conjugal, except three parcels which Perfecta Miranda claimed to be her exclusive properties; (b) that Perfecta Miranda by virtue of two documents had conveyed 3/4 of her undivided share in most of the properties enumerated in the petition to said spouses Benito and Rosario; (c) that administration of the estate was

not necessary, there being a case for partition pending; and (d) that if administration was necessary at all, the oppositor Perfecta Miranda and not the petitioner was better qualified for the post. It appears that subsequently, oppositor Perfecta Miranda was appointed administratrix of the estate. virtual law library On March 22, 1961, the court appointed commissioners to draft within sixty days, a project of partition and distribution of all the properties of the deceased Pedro Santillon. library On April 25, 1961, Claro filed a "Motion to Declare Share of Heirs" and to resolve the conflicting claims of the parties with respect to their respective rights in the estate. Invoking Art. 892 of the New Civil Code, he insisted that after deducting 1/2 from the conjugal properties is the conjugal share of Perfecta, the remaining 1/2 must be divided as follows: 1/4 for her and 3/4 for him. Oppositor Perfecta, on the other hand, claimed that besides her conjugal half, she was entitled under Art. 996 of the New Civil Code to another 1/2 of the remaining half. In other words, Claro claimed 3/4 of Pedro's inheritance, while Perfecta claimed 1/2.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library After due notice and hearing, the court, on June 28, 1961, issued an order, the dispositive portion of which reads: IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS it is hereby ruled and ordered that in the intestate succession of the deceased Pedro Santillon, the surviving spouse Perfecta Miranda shall inherit ONE-HALF (1/2) share and the remaining ONE-HALF (1/2) share for the only son, Atty. Claro Santillon. This is after deducting the share of the widow as co-owner of the conjugal properties. ... . From this order, petitioner Claro Santillon has appealed to this Court. Two questions of law are involved. The first, raised in Perfecta's Motion to Dismiss Appeal, is whether the order of the lower court is appealable. And the second, raised in appellant's lone assignment of error, is: How shall the estate of a person who dies intestate be divided when the only survivors are the spouse and one legitimate child? library The First Issue: - It is clear that the order of the lower court is final and, therefore, appealable to this Court. law library Under Rule 109, sec. 1, a person may appeal in special proceedings from an order of the Court of First Instance where such order "determines ... the distributive share of the estate to which such person is entitled." The Second Issue: - Petitioner rests his claim to 3/4 of his father's estate on Art. 892 of the New Civil Code which provides that: If only the legitimate child or descendant of the deceased survives the widow or widower shall be entitled to one-fourth of the hereditary estate. ... . As she gets one-fourth, therefore, I get 3/4, says Claro. Perfecta, on the other hand, cites Art. 996 which provides: If a widow or widower and legitimate children or descendants are left, the surviving spouse has in the succession the same share as that of each of the children. Replying to Perfecta's claim, Claro says the article is unjust and unequitable to the extent that it grants the widow the same share as that of the children in intestate succession, whereas in testate, she is given 1/4 and the only child 1/2.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

Oppositor Perfecta Miranda, on the other hand, contends that Art. 996 should control, regardless of its alleged inequity, being as it is, a provision on intestate succession involving a surviving spouse and a legitimate child, inasmuch as in statutory construction, the plural word "children" includes the singular "child.es virtual law library Art. 892 of the New Civil Code falls under the chapter on Testamentary Succession; whereas Art. 996 comes under the chapter on Legal or Intestate Succession. Such being the case, it is obvious that Claro cannot rely on Art. 892 to support his claim to 3/4 of his father's estate. Art 892 merely fixes the legitime of the surviving spouse and Art. 888 thereof, the legitime of children in testate succession. While it may indicate the intent of the law with respect to the ideal shares that a child and a spouse should get when they concur with each other, it does not fix the amount of shares that such child and spouse are entitled to when intestacy occurs. Because if the latter happens, the pertinent provision on intestate succession shall apply, i.e., Art. 996. tual law library Some commentators of our New Civil Code seem to support Claro's contention; at least, his objection to fifty-fifty sharing. But others confirm the half and half idea of the Pangasinan court. This is, remember, intestate proceedings. In the New Civil Code's chapter on legal or intestate succession, the only article applicable is Art. 996. Our colleague, Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes, professor of Civil Law, is quoted as having expressed the opinion that under this article, when the widow survives with only one legitimate child, they share the estate in equal parts. 1 Senator Tolentino in his commentaries writes as follows: One child Surviving. - If there is only one legitimate child surviving with the spouse, since they share equally, one-half of the estate goes to the child and the other half goes to the surviving spouse. Although the law refers to "children or descendants," the rule in statutory construction that the plural can be understood to include the singular is applicable in this case. (Tolentino, Civil Code of the Philippines, Vol. III, p. 436.) The theory of those holding otherwise seems to be premised on these propositions: (a) Art. 996 speaks of "Children," therefore it does not apply when there is only one "child"; consequently Art. 892 (and Art. 888) should be applied, thru a process of judicial construction and analogy; (b) Art. 996 is unjust or unfair because, whereas in testatesuccession, the widow is assigned one-fourth only (Art. 892), she would get 1/2 in intestate. A. Children. - It is a maxim of statutory construction that words in plural include the singular. 2 So Art. 996 could or should be read (and so applied) : "If the widow or widower and a legitimate child are left, the surviving spouse has the same share as that of the child." Indeed, if we refuse to apply the article to this case on the ground that "child" is not included in "children," the consequences would be tremendous, because "children" will not include "child" in the following articles: ART. 887. - The following are compulsory heirs: (1) legitimate children and descendants. ART. 888. - The legitime of legitimate children and descendants consists of one-half of the hereditary estate. ART. 896. - Illegitimate children who may survive ... are entitled to one-fourth of the hereditary estate ... . (See also Art. 901). In fact, those who say "children" in Art. 996 does not include "child" seem to be inconsistent when they argue from the premise that "in testate succession the only legitimate

child gets one-half and the widow, one-fourth." The inconsistency is clear, because the only legitimate child gets one-half under Art. 888, which speaks of "children," not "child." So if "children" in Art. 888 includes "child," the same meaning should be given to Art. 996. B. Unfairness of Art. 996. - Such position, more clearly stated, is this: In testate succession, where there is only one child of the marriage, the child gets one-half, and the widow or widower one-fourth. But in intestate , if Art. 996 is applied now, the child gets one-half, and the widow or widower one-half. Unfair or inequitable, they insist. On this point, it is not correct to assume that in testate succession the widow or widower "gets only one-fourth." She or he may get one-half - if the testator so wishes. So, the law virtually leaves it to each of the spouses to decide (by testament, whether his or her only child shall get more than his or her survivor). law library Our conclusion (equal shares) seems a logical inference from the circumstance that whereas Article 834 of the Spanish Civil Code, from which Art. 996 was taken, containedtwo paragraphs governing two contingencies, the first, where the widow or widower survives with legitimate children (general rule), and the second, where the widow or widower survives with only one child (exception), Art. 996 omitted to provide for the second situation, thereby indicating the legislator's desire to promulgate just one general rule applicable to both situations. The resultant division may be unfair as some writers explain - and this we are not called upon to discuss - but it is the clear mandate of the statute, which we are bound to enforce. es virtual law library The appealed decision is affirmed. No costs in this instance. G.R. No. L-22402 June 30, 1969

CLEMENTE ALVIAR, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. CESAREO ALVIAR, ET AL., DefendantsAppellants. Appeal from a decision of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, originally taken to the Court of Appeals, but subsequently certified by the latter to the Supreme Court, upon the ground that only questions of law are involved therein, the facts having been stipulated by the parties. law library Clemente Alviar, the original plaintiff herein, and Belen Alviar were legitimate children of Florentino Alviar and Bibiana Carillo. Sometime after the latter's death on January 30, 1901, Florentino Alviar married Flora Erasga, who begot him five (5) children, namely; Cesareo, Fabiana, Luisa, Zenaida and Castor, all surnamed Alviar. On September 6, 1951, Belen Alviar died intestate. She was single and had been survived by her brother Clemente Alviar, and five (5) half brothers and sisters, said Cesareo, Fabiana, Luisa, Zenaida and Castor Alviar. Belen's estate consisted of two (2) parcels of agricultural land situated in the Barrio of Sukol, Calamba, Laguna, with an area, respectively, of 17,199 and 6,422 square meters, more or less, otherwise known as lots 2 and 3 of subdivision plan Psu3720, and more particularly described in TCT No. 3033 of the Province of Laguna, and a residential lot in Pasay City, of about 237 square meters, otherwise known as Lot No. 223-D of subdivision plan Psd-18972, and more particularly described in TCT No. 1578 of the Province of Rizal. law library On June 28, 1955, these six (6) brothers and sisters executed a deed of extrajudicial partition adjudicating to Clemente Alviar the two (2) parcels of agricultural land in Calamba, Laguna, and to the five (5) half brothers and sisters of the deceased the residential lot in

Pasay City. In pursuance of said deed, the parties took possession of their respective shares. Moreover, Clemente Alviar secured TCT No. 15307 and 15308 to said Lots 2 and 3 of subdivision plan Psu-3720 in Calamba, Laguna. The residential land in Pasay City was, in turn, partitioned among his aforesaid half brothers and sisters and subdivided into lots Nos. 223-D-1 and 223-D-2. The first was allotted to Luisa and Zenaida Alviar, who secured thereto TCT No. 8495 in their names, whereas the second was covered by TCT No. 8496 in the name of Cesareo Alviar, his sister Fabiana having renounced her share therein in his favor. Their brother Castor had, likewise, waived his share in said residential land. Over five (5) years later, or on September 4, 1962, Clemente Alviar commenced the present action, against his half brother and sisters, Cesareo, Fabiana, Luisa and Zenaida Alviar, and their mother, and his step-mother, Flora Erasga, to annul the deed of extrajudicial partition above referred to and the aforementioned TCT Nos. 8495 and 8496, covering the residential lot in Pasay City, as well as to recover the possession thereof and the title thereto, upon the ground that, acting in bad faith and conspiring, confederating and conniving with each other, as well as "taking advantage of plaintiff's lack of education, illiteracy and ignorance, and knowing fully well that" the "children by second marriage of Florentino Alviar had no rights, participation and interest over" the three (3) lots left by Belen Alviar, the defendants had "misled" the plaintiff "into signing" said deed. Inasmuch as Clemente Alviar died soon thereafter, his widow, Paulina Pamulaklakin and their children, Ramon and Norma Alviar, substituted him as plaintiff in this case. The defendants having filled an answer denying specifically the allegations of the complaint regarding the irregularities allegedly attending the execution of the deed of extrajudicial partition, both parties later filed a stipulation of facts on the relationship between them, the civil status of Belen Alviar, the properties constituting her estate, the execution of the deed of extrajudicial partition and the steps taken to carry out its provisions, and submitted the case for the determination of only one question, namely: "who are the parties entitled to participate in the inheritance of Belen Alviar, and in what proportion?"s virtual law library Plaintiffs maintained that since Clemente Alviar was a full brother of Belen Alviar, whereas the main defendants herein are merely her half brothers and sisters, Clemente is a relative of Belen nearer in degree than said defendants, who are more distant to her, so that they (defendants) are excluded by Clemente, and he is entitled to succeed to the entire estate of Belen. The trial court in effect overruled this pretense and rendered a decision holding that both parties "are entitled to inherit from Belen Alviar, ... plaintiffs to receive two-seventh (2/7)" of the residential lot in Pasay City, and "each of the defendants" Cesareo Fabiana, Luisa, Castor and Zenaida Alviar - "one-seventh (1/7) thereof, with no pronouncement as to costs." The defendants moved for a reconsideration of this decision, upon the ground that the same should have ordered the redistribution, not only of the lot in Pasay City, but, also, of the two (2) parcels of agricultural land in Laguna. This motion having been denied, the defendants appealed to the Court of Appeals, which, as above pointed out, subsequently certified the case to the Supreme Court. The main issue raised by the parties in this case is whether or not, as a full brother of Belen Alviar, the degree of relationship to her of the deceased Clemente Alviar was nearer than that of their half brothers and sisters, the children of their father by second marriage, and he excluded them in the succession to her estate. The lower court decided this question in the negative and correctly. Indeed, "proximity of relationship is determined by the number of generations" and "each generation forms a degree." 1 In relation to Belen Alviar, her full brother, Clemente Alviar, is, therefore, in the same degree of relationship as their half brothers and sisters, the aforementioned defendants, for all of them constitute the first generation of descendants of their common father, Florentino Alviar. In fact, this rationalization is rendered superfluous, apart from being confirmed, by the explicit language of Arts. 1003, 1004 and 1006 of our Civil Code, reading:

ART. 1003. If there are no descendants, ascendants, illegitimate children, or a surviving spouse, the collateral relatives shall succeed to the entire estate of the deceased in accordance with the following articles. law library ART. 1004. Should the only survivors be brothers and sisters of the full blood, they shall inherit in equal shares. ART. 1006. Should brothers and sisters of the full blood survive together with brothers and sisters of the half blood, the former shall be entitled to a share double that of the latter. These provisions, particularly the last, leave no room for doubt that brothers and sisters of full blood do not exclude those of half blood, for, otherwise, there would be no occasion for the concurrence of both classes and the application of said Art. 1006. virtual law library More important than this, however, is the fact that Clemente Alviar had entered into a contract with his half brothers and sisters for the extrajudicial partition of the properties of the deceased Belen Alviar and that there is nothing in the stipulation of facts submitted by the parties to warrant the annulment or rescission of said agreement. The validity thereof thus being indubitable, there is absolutely no reason why the same should be disturbed.ces virtual law library WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from should be, as it is hereby reversed, and another one shall be entered absolving the defendants-appellants from the complaint, and dismissing the same, with costs against the plaintiffs-appellees. It is so ordered. G.R. No. L-25966 November 1, 1926 In the matter of the estate of Tomas Rodriguez, deceased. MANUEL TORRES, special administrator, and LUZ LOPEZ DE BUENO, heir, appellee, vs. MARGARITA LOPEZ, opponent-appellant. This appeal involves a controversy over one-half of the estate of Tomas Rodriguez, decedent. The appellant, Margarita Lopez, claims said half by the intestate succession as next of kin and nearest heir; while the appellee, Luz Lopez de Bueno, claims the same by accredition and in the character of universal heir the will of the decedent. The trial court decided the point of controversy in favor of Luz Lopez de Bueno, and Margariat Lopez appealed. law library The facts necessary to an understanding of the case are these: On January 3, 1924, Tomas Rodriguez executed his last will and testament, in the second clause of which he declared: I institute as the only and universal heirs to all my property, my cousin Vicente F. Lopez and his daughter Luz Lopez de Bueno. Prior to the time of the execution of this will the testator, Tomas Rodriguez, had been judicially declared incapable of taking care of himself and had been placed under the care of his cousin Vicente F. Lopez, as guardian. On January 7, 1924, or only four days after the will above-mentioned was made, Vicente F. Lopez died; and the testator, Tomas Rodriguez, died on February 25, 1924, thereafter. At the time the will was made Vicente F. Lopez had not presented his final accounts as guardian, and no such accounts had been presented by him at the time of his death. Margariat Lopez was a cousin and nearest relative of the decedent. The will referred to, and after having been contested, has been admitted to probate by judicial determination (Torres and Lopez de Bueno vs. Lopez, 48 Phil., 772).

Our discussion of the legal problem presented should begin with article 753 of the Civil Code which in effect declares that, with certain exceptions in favor of near relatives, no testamentary provision shall be valid when made by a ward in favor of his guardian before the final accounts of the latter have been approved. This provision is of undoubted application to the situation before us; and the provision made in the will of Tomas Rodriguez in favor of Vicente F. Lopez was not any general incapacity on his part, but a special incapacity due to the accidental relation of guardian and ward existing between the parties. We now pass to article 982 of the Civil Code, defining the right of accretion. It is there declared, in effect, that accretion take place in a testamentary succession, first when the two or more persons are called to the same inheritance or the same portion thereof without special designation of shares; and secondly, when one of the persons so called dies before the testator or renounces the inheritance or is disqualifying to receive it. In the case before us we have a will calling Vicente F. Lopez and his daughter, Luz Lopez de Bueno, to the same inheritance without special designation of shares. In addition to this, one of the persons named as heir has predeceased the testator, this person being also disqualified to receive the estate even if he had been alive at the time of the testator's death. This article (982) is therefore also of exact application to the case in hand; and its effect is to give to the survivor, Luz Lopez de Bueno, not only the undivided half which she would have received in conjunction with her father if he had been alive and qualified to take, but also the half which pertained to him. There was no error whatever, therefore, in the order of the trial court declaring Luz Lopez de Bueno entitled to the whole estate. library The argument in favor of the appellant supposes that there has supervened a partial intestacy with respect to the half of the estate which was intended for Vicente F. Lopez and that this half has descended to the appellant, Margarita Lopez, as next of kin and sole heir at law of the decedent. In this connection attention is directed to article 764 of the Civil Code wherein it is declared, among other things, that a will may be valid even though the person instituted as heir is disqualified to inherit. Our attention is next invited to article 912 wherein it is declared, among other things, that legal succession takes place if the heir dies before the testator and also when the heir instituted is disqualified to succeed. Upon these provisions an argument is planted conducting to the conclusion that the will of Tomas Rodriguez was valid, notwithstanding the fact that one of the individuals named as heirs in the will was disqualified to take, and that as a consequence Margarita Lopez s entitled to inherit the share of said disqualified heir. library We are the opinion that this contention is untenable and that the appellee clearly has the better right. In playing the provisions of the Code it is the duty of the court to harmonize its provisions as far as possible, giving due effect to all; and in case of conflict between two provisions the more general is to be considered as being limited by the more specific. As between articles 912 and 983, it is obvious that the former is the more general of the two, dealing, as it does, with the general topic of intestate succession while the latter is more specific, defining the particular conditions under which accretion takes place. In case of conflict, therefore, the provisions of the former article must be considered limited by the latter. Indeed, in subsection 3 of article 912 the provision with respect to intestate succession is expressly subordinated to article 983 by the expression "and (if) there is no right of accretion." It is true that the same express qualification is not found in subsection 4 of article 912, yet it must be so understood, in view of the rule of interpretation above referred to, by which the more specific is held to control the general. Besides, this interpretation supplies the only possible means of harmonizing the two provisions. In addition to this, article 986 of the Civil Code affords independent proof that intestate succession to a vacant portion can only occur when accretion is impossible. virtual law library The attorneys for the appellant direct attention to the fact that, under paragraph 4 of article 912, intestate succession occurs when the heir instituted is disqualified to succeed ( incapaz

de suceder), while, under the last provision in paragraph 2 of article 982, accretion occurs when one of the persons called to inherit under the will is disqualified to receive the inheritance ( incapaz de recibirla). A distinction is then drawn between incapacity to succeed and incapacity to take, and it is contended that the disability of Vicente F. Lopez was such as to bring the case under article 912 rather than 982. We are of the opinion that the case cannot be made to turn upon so refined an interpretation of the language of the Code, and at any rate the disability to which Vicente F. Lopez was subject was not a general disability to succeed but an accidental incapacity to receive the legacy, a consideration which makes a case for accretion rather than for intestate succession. library The opinions of the commentators, so far as they have expressed themselves on the subject, tend to the conclusion that the right of accretion with regard to portions of an inheritance left vacant by the death or disqualification of one of the heirs or his renunciation of the inheritance is governed by article 912, without being limited, to the extent supposed in appellant's brief, by provisions of the Code relative to intestate succession (Manresa, Comentarios al Codigo Civil Espaol, 4th ed., vol. VII, pp. 310, 311; id., 34; 13 Mucius Scaevola, pp. 372, 373, 285-287; 16 Mucius Scaevola, 186). Says Escriche: "It is to be understood that one of the coheirs or colegatees fails if nonexistent at the time of the making of the will, or he renounces the inheritance or legacy, if he dies before the testator, if the condition be not fulfilled, or if he becomes otherwise incapacitated. . . . ( Diccionario de Legislacion y Jurisprudencia, vol. I, p. 225.)chanrobles virtual law library In conclusion it may be worth observing that there has always existed both in the civil and in the common law a certain legal intendment, amounting to a mild presumption, against partial intestacy. In Roman law, as is well known, partial testacy systems a presumption against it, - a presumption which has its basis in the supposed intention of the testator. law library The judgment appealed from will be affirmed, and it is so ordered, with costs against the appellant.