Public Officers Cases

1 CASES ON LAW ON PUBLIC OFFICERS
PCGG VS. SANDIGANBAYAN, February 23, 2000 Facts: World Universal Trading & Investment (WUTIC) was a societal anonema registered in Panama, but was not registered/ licensed to do business in the Philippine. It is represented by its attorney-in-fact, W.M. Lazaro & associates. Construction Development Corp. of the Philippines now known as Philippine National Construction Corp. (CDCP/PNCC) is a corporation duly organized & existing under the laws of the Philippines. It was under Sequestration by the PCGG. July 24, 1987, PCGG filed with the Sandiganbayan a complaint against Rodolfo M. Cuenca for the sequestration of the PNCC for acquiring in an illegal manner assets in the Cuenca-owned Corporation. To wit: CDCP/PNCC, Asia International Hardwood Limited, Hong Kong based Co., and construction Development Corporation International Ltd., Hong Kong, a wholly-owned subsidiary/alterego of CDCP/PNCC. The case is still pending in Sandiganbayan. AHL had claims against CDCPI, amounting to US $2,994,513.65 plus 12% interest per annum & other costs, and assigned the same to WUTIC. Eventually WUTIC obtained a favorable judgment in a Hong Kong court CDCPI. Due to the closure of CDCPI in Hong Kong, WUTIC filed a case with RTC against PNCC/CDCP to enforce a foreign judgment obtained against CDCPI. RTC rendered judgment in favor of WUTIC. Writ of execution was issued against CDCP/PNCC. October 1977, PCGG Commissioner Herminio Mendoza, a board member of PNCC, attended a PNCC board meeting & discovered the writ of execution and notice of garnishment. PCGG noted that substantial stockholdings/equity in CDCP/PNCC, CDCPI, AHL & the shareholdings of Rodolfo Cuenca in CDCP/PNCC were under sequestration pending with Sandiganbayan. However, PCGG did not participate in the action before the trial court to enforce the foreign judgment. Additionally, PCGG claimed that the RTC had no jurisdiction to entertain the complaint to enforce a foreign judgment considering that the case involved a sequestered corporation. It contended that the Sandiganbayan has original & exclusive jurisdiction over cases involving sequestered assets. The Sandiganbayan motu propio dismissed PCGGs petition for certiorari. Issue: Whether or not the Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion in summarily dismissing the petition with out motion to dismiss filed by any of the parties. Held: The Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction to annul the judgment of the RTC in a sequestration-related case. RA 7975 provides that the Sandiganbayan has original jurisdiction over all civil & criminal cases filed pursuant to and in connection with EO nos. 1,2,14 and 14-A or the so called ill-gotten wealth cases. Since we have ruled that the civil case before the RTC is considered as arising from, incidental to, or related to the recovery of ill-gotten wealth, then the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction to annul the decision of the RTC in such case. Thus, the Sandiganbayan has original & exclusive jurisdiction not only over principal causes of action involving recovery of ill-gotten Facts:
POLITICAL LAW REVIEWER

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY BAR OPERATIONS
wealth, but also over all incidents arising from, incidental to, or related to such cases.
BALUYOT VS. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN February 9, 2000
During a spot audit conducted by a team of auditors from Philippine National Red Cross headquarters, a cash shortage of P154, 350.13 was discovered in the funds of its Bohol chapter. The chapter administrator, petitioner Baluyot whos held accountable for the shortage. Affidavit-complaint before the office of the Ombudsman was filed charging petitioner of malversation under article 217 if the RPC and upon recommendation of respondent Militante, Graft Investigation Officer I, an administrative docket for dishonesty was also opened against petitioner. Petitioner filed her counter-affidavit raising principally the defense that public respondent had no jurisdiction over the controversy. She argued that the ombudsman had authority only over government-owned/ controlled corporation, which the PNRC was not. She states that the PNRC falls under the International Federation of Red Cross, a Switzerland-based organization, & that the power to discipline employees accused of misconduct, malfeasance of immortality belongs to the PNRC Secretary General by virtue of Section G article IX of its by-laws. Issue: Whether or not the ombudsman has jurisdiction over the Philippine National Red Cross (PNRC). Held: PNRC is a government owned & controlled corporation, with an original charter under RA no. 95, as amended. Those with special charters are government corporations subject to its provisions, and its employees are under the jurisdiction of CSC and are compulsory members of GSIS. The PNRC was not impliedly converted to a private corporation simply because its charter was amended to vest in it the authority to secure loans, be exempted from payment of all duties, and taxes fees & other services & in its benefits and fund raising drives, and be allotted one lottery draw a year by the PCSO for the support of its disaster relief operation in addition to its existing lottery draws for blood program. Clearly then, Public respondent has jurisdiction over the matter pursuant to section 13, RA 6770, otherwise known as The ombudsman Act of 1989, to wit: The ombudsman & his deputies, as protectors of the people, shall act promptly on complaints filed in any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporation, & enforce their administrative, civil, criminal liability in every case where the evidence warrants in order promoting efficient service by the government of the people. DORENTE VS. SANDIGANBAYAN January 19, 2000 Facts: The case before the court is a special civil action for certiorari assailing the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan over
Prepared by the POLITICAL LAW SECTION Chief MARILOU LINDA Assistant Chief CATHY AQUINO Members MAY AQUINO, ERRIZA BUCU, MARICAR DELA CRUZ, KATHREEN GUNAYON, GRACIELA LEYGO, MARY GRACE MANZANO, RUTCHIE MARANON, and DINAH MARTINEZ. All Rights Reserved by the SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY COLLEGE OF LAW BAR OPERATIONS 2003.
2
the criminal cases against municipal Mayor Crescente Dorente Jr. of Sandiganbayan, Zamboanga Del Norte for violations of RA no. 3019 otherwise known as the anti-graft & corrupt Practices Act. The trial of the 2 criminal cases before the Sandiganbayan has not begun. May 16, 1995, Congress enacted RA no. 7975 amending Section 4 of PD no. 1606, providing the original jurisdiction of Sandiganbayan. It was provided herein that in cases where none of the principal accused are occupying positions corresponding to salary grade 27 or higher or PNP officers occupying the rank of superintendent or higher, or their equivalent, exclusive jurisdiction thereof shall be vested in the proper Regional Trial court, MTC, Metropolitan Trial Court, & MCTC, as the case may be, pursuant to their respective jurisdiction as provided by Bp 129. Petitioner filed with the Sandiganbayn a motion to dismiss or transfer the 2 criminal cases to the RTC, Sandiganbayan, Zamboanga contending that RA 7975 divested the Sandiganbayan of its jurisdiction over criminal cases against municipal mayors for violations of RA no. 3019, as amended, who receive salary less than that corresponding to Grade 27, pursuant to Index Occupational Services prepared by DBM. Issue: Whether or not RA 7975 divested the Sandiganbayan of its jurisdiction over violations of RA no. 3019, as amended, against municipal mayors. Held: Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over violations of RA no. 3019, as amended, against municipal mayors. There is no merit to petitioners averment that the salary received by a public official dictates his salary grade. On the contrary, it is the officials grade that determines his/her salary, not the other way around. To determine whether the official is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, therefore, reference should be made to RA no. 6758 & the Index of Occupational Services, Position Title, and Salary Grades. An officials grade is not a matter of proof, but a matter of law which the court must take judicial notice. Section 444 (d) of the LGC provides that the municipal mayor shall receive a minimum monthly compensation corresponding to salary grade 27 as prescribed under RA 6758 & the implementing guidelines issued pursuant thereto. Additionally, both the 1989 & 1997 versions of the Index of Occupational Services, Position Titles and salary grades list the municipal mayor under salary grade 27. Consequently, the cases against petitioner as municipal mayor for violations of RA no. 3019, as amended, are within the exclusive jurisdiction to the Sandiganbayan.

letter by the President of NIACOWSULT, petitioner failed to remit the said amount prompting to file an administrative case by one respondent Ombudsman for serious misconduct and/or fraud or willful breach of trust. For failure of the petitioner to file his counter affidavit, Ombudsman issued the resolution discharging the petitioner from service with special perpetual disqualification to hold office in the government. Petitioner moved for reconsideration & for re-opening of the case which the court gave due course. While the case is pending, petitioner filed a Manifestation stating that criminal complaint for estafa & falsification filed against him based on the same facts or incidents which gave rise to the administrative case was dismissed by the RTC. Issue: (1) Whether or not the dismissal of the criminal case will give rise to the dismissal of the Administrative case; (2) Whether or not petitioner was denied the opportunity to be heard. Held: (1) The dismissal of the criminal case will note foreclose the administrative action filed against petitioner or give him a clean bill of health in all aspects. The RTC in dismissing the criminal complaint was simply saying that the prosecution was unable to prove the guilt of petitioner beyond reasonable doubt, a condition sine qua non for convictions. The lack or absence of proof beyond reasonable doubt does not mean an absence of any evidence whatsoever for there is another class of evidence in civil cases, this is preponderance of evidence. Then too, there is the substantial evidence rule in administrative proceedings which merely requires such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support conclusion. (2) The essence of due process is an opportunity to be heard. One may be heard, not solely by verbal presentation but also, & perhaps even many times more creditably & practicable than oral argument, through pleadings. In Administrative proceedings, technical rules of procedure & evidence are not strictly applied. Administrative due process cannot be fully equated to due process in its strict judicial sense. Petitioners failure to present evidence is solely of his own making & cannot escape his own remission by paring the blame on the graft investigator. A party who chooses not to avail of the opportunity to answer the charges cannot complain of a denial or due process. AFIADO VS. COMELEC September 18, 2000
OCAMPO VS. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN January 18, 2000 Facts: Petitioner is the Training Coordinator of NIACOWSULT, Inc., a subsidiary of the National Irrigation Authority. NIACOWSULT conducted the training program for six Nepalese Junior Engineers from February 06 to March 07, 1989. Agricultural Development Bank of Nepal (ADBN) thru its representatives GTZ GmbH Technical Cooperation of the Federal Republic of Germany paid to the petitioner the agreed training fee in 2 installments. Despite receipt of the demand
Facts: By virtue of the ruling of SC entitled Joel Miranda vs. Antonio Abaya & COMELEC? In that decision, we ruled that since the certificate of candidacy of Jose Miranda was not valid, he could not be validly substituted by his son Joel Miranda as a mayoralty candidate in Santiago city. Hence, Joel Miranda could not be validly proclaimed as the winner in the mayoralty elections, thus, Vice-Mayor Amelita Navarro became the new Mayor of Santiago City by virtue of the law on succession. Navarro took her oath of office & assumed her position as Mayor of Santiago City on October 11, 1999. Meanwhile, on July 12, 1999, while the said care was still pending in the SC,
3
petitioners Afiado, Quemado & Tangonan convened the Barangay officials of Santiago city who compose the Preparatory Recall Assembly (PRA). On the same date, the PRA passed & adopted PRA res. No. 1 for the recall of Vice Mayor Amelita S. Navarro. Issue: Whether or not an elective official who became City Mayor by legal succession can be the subject of a recall election by virtues of a Preparatory Recall Assembly Resolution which was passed or adopted when the said elective official was still the vice Mayor. Held: We deny the petition. The petition becomes moot & academic. The assumption by legal succession of the petitioner as the new Mayor of Santiago City is a surprising event which rendered the recall proceeding against her moot & academic. A perusal is a specific elective official in relation to her specific office. The said resolution is replete with statements, which leave no doubt that the purpose of the assembly was to recall petitioner as Vice Mayor for her official acts as vice Mayor. The title itself suggests that the recall is intended for the incumbent Vice Mayor of Santiago City. Clearly, the intent of the PRA is to remove the petitioner as Vice Mayor for they already lost their confidence in her by reason of her official acts as such. To recall, then the petitioner when she is already the incumbent city Mayor is to deviate from the expressed will of the PRA. Furthermore, even if the PRA were to reconvene to adopt resolution for the recall of Amelita Navarro, this time as Mayor of Santiago City the same would still not prosper in view of Section 74(b) of Local Government code of 1991 which provides that No recall shall take place within 1 year from the date of officials assumption of office 1 year immediately proceedings a regular election. There is no more allowable time in the light of that law within which to hold recalls elections for that purpose. The then Vice Mayor Navarro assumed office as Mayor on October 11, 1999. One year after her assumption will be October 11, 2000 which is already within the one year prohibited period immediately preceding the next regular election in May 2001. Held:

With respect to the charges against Garcia, Judge Jacob found sufficient evidence to hold him liable. As regards the fact that respondent Garcia asked from complainant P1, 000 to be given to assisting sheriff Tonga, the evidence showed that complainant refused to give the amount demanded. Such ask of asking complainant for money intended for assisting sheriff Tonga was virtually extortion. The sheriff assigned by the court was not authorized, on his own appoint as assisting sheriff or a technical adviser. The court agrees with the finding of irregularity in the manner of enforcement of the writ of execution. Instead of following the terms of the writ, respondent Garcia accepted a promissory note executed by the judgment debtor & allowed the materials levied upon to remain in the hardware store of judgment debtor. When a writ is placed in the hands of a sheriff, it is his duty, in the absence of any instructions to the contrary, he proceed with reasonable celerity & promptness to execute it according to its mandate a sheriff is not required be guilty judgment debtor sometime to raise cash. Furthermore, the proceed of the writ should be remitted to he clerk of court instead of turning them over directly to the judgment creditor. The conduct & behavior of every person connected with an office charged with dispensation of justice, from the presiding judge to the lowest clerks is circumscribed with a heavy burden of responsibility. His conduct at all times, must not only be characterized by propriety & decorum, but also, & above all else, be above suspicion. Thus, respondent Garcia was dismissed from service with forfeiture of retirement rights while sheriff Tonga is found guilty of serious misconduct & fine of P 5000 and is given a stern warning that a similar conduct in the future will be dealt with more severely.
Subject Matter: Execution Pending Appeal LAPID VS. CA June 29, 2000 Facts: A complaint was filed in the office of the Ombudsman charging Petitioner, Governor Manuel M. Lapid with alleged Dishonesty, Grave Misconduct and Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the service for having collected fees from various quarrying operators in Pampanga with out a duly enacted provincial ordinance. Ombudsman rendered a decision finding petitioner for misconduct for which he meted out the penalty of 1 year suspension with out pay pursuant to Section 25 of RA 6770 (Ombudsman Act of 1989). A motion for reconsideration was denied by the office of the Ombudsman. Petitioner then filed a petition for review with the CZ praying for the issuance of a TRO to enjoin the Ombudsman from enforcing the questioned decision but to no avail. The DILG implemented the assailed decision of the Ombudsman and the highest ranking took her oath of office as OIC-Governor of the province of Pampanga. Petitioner filed a Motion for Leave to file supplement to the petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus and the supplement to the petition itself were filed in view of the resolution of the CA denying petitioners prayer for preliminary injunction. He argued that the respondent court executed the bounds of is jurisdiction, proceeding form the promise that the decision of the Ombudsman had not yet become final. The Solicitor General and the office of the
ARAZA VS. SHERIFFS GARCIA & TONGA February 08, 2000 Facts: The administrative case arose from a letter-complaint dated July 02, 1997 filed by Wilfredo Araza charging sheriffs Garcia & Tonga with grave misconduct, violation of the Anti-graft & corrupt practices act, gross ignorance of the law, gross neglect of duty, grave abuse of authority, oppression, conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service, gross inefficiency & incompetence, relative to the implementation of the writ of execution in civil case no. 4256 of MTC, Legaspi City entitled Salvacion Araza & Wilfredo Araza vs. Lilia Itgu for sum of money. Issue: Whether or not Respondent Marlon Garcia & Nicolas Tonga are guilty of the charges against them.
4
Ombudsman filed their comments to the petition praying for the dismissal thereof and the Solicitor General maintains that said decision is governed by Section 12 Rule 43 of the Rules of Court and is therefore immediately executory. The office of the Ombudsman on its part maintains that the Ombudsman Law and its implementary Rules are silent to the execution of decisions rendered by the Ombudsman considering that the portion of the said law cited by the petitioner pertains to the finality of the decision but not to its reinforcement pending appeal. It is of the opinion of the Ombudsman that since the Ombudsman Law is silent it has uniformly adopted the provision of the LGC and Administrative Code that decisions in administrative disciplinary cases are immediately executory.

314 SCRA 207 Facts: Petitioner, in his capacity as Cebu City Mayor signed a contract with F. E. Zuellig for the supply of asphalt to the city for the period of 1998-2001. In March 1999, news report came out regarding the alleged anomalous purchases of asphalt by Cebu City thru the contract signed by petitioner. This prompted the Office of the Ombudsman to conduct an inquiry into the matter. On June 25, 1999, a preventive suspension order was issued by the Office of the Ombudsman in OMB-VIS-99-0453 against petitioner Cebu City Mayor Alvin B. Garcia and eight (8) other city officials. Under the said order petitioner was placed under preventive suspension without pay for the maximum period of 6 months and told to cease and desist from holding office immediately. A motion for reconsideration was denied. Hence, this petitioner for certiorari and prohibition which prayed for TRO and writ of PI. On July 19, 1999, the Supreme Court directed the parties to maintain the status quo until further orders from the court. Issue: 1. Whether or not respondent acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in assuming jurisdiction over OMB-VIS-ADM-99-0452 and issuing preventive suspension order. Assuming arguendo that the Office of the Ombudsman has jurisdiction over OMB-VIS-ADM-990452, the preventive suspension for six months was with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and in gross violation of the provisions of section 63 of the Local Government Code which mandates that the preventive suspension of Local Elective Officials be ordered only after the issues have been joined, and only for a period not in excess of sixty (60) days. What is the effect of petitioners re-election in the administrative case filed against him.
Issue: Whether or not the decision of the Office of the Ombudsman finding herein petitioner administratively liable for misconduct and imposing upon him a penalty of 1 year suspension with out pay is immediately executory pending appeal? Held: Petitioner was charged administratively before the Ombudsman and accordingly the provisions of the Ombudsman act should apply in his case. Section 68 of the Local Government Code only applies to administrative decisions rendered by the Office of the President or the appropriate Sanggunian against elective local government officials. Similarly, the provision in the administrative Code of 1987 mandating execution pending review applies specifically to administrative decision of the Civil Service Commission involving members of the Civil Service. There is no basis in law for the proposition that the provisions of the Administrative Code of 1987 and the Local Government Code on execution pending review should be applied suppletorily to the provisions of the Ombudsman Act as there is nothing in the Ombudsman act which provides for such suppletory application. Courts may not, in the guise of interpretation, enlarge the scope of a statute and include therein situations not provided or intended by the lawmakers. An omission at the time of enactment, whether careless or calculated cannot be judicially supplied however later wisdom may recommend the inclusion. A judgment becomes Final and Executory by operation of law. Section 27 of the Ombudsman Act provides that any order, directive or decision of the Office of the Ombudsman imposing a penalty of public censure or reprimand, or suspension of not more than one months salary shall be final and unappeasable. In all other cases, the respondent therein has the right to appeal to the Court of appeals within ten days from receipt of the written notice of the order, directive or decision. In all these other cases therefore, the judgment imposed therein will become final after the lapse of the reglementary period of appeal if no appeal is perfected or, an appeal there from having been taken, the judgment in the appellate tribunal becomes final. It is this final judgment which is then correctly categorized as a final and executory judgment in respect to which execution shall issue as a matter of right. In other appeal from its decisions should generally carry with it the say of these decisions pending appeal. Otherwise, the essential nature of these judgments as being appealable would be rendered nugatory.
2.
3. Held:
GARCIA VS. MOJICA
1. Worth stressing, to resolve the present controversy, we must recall that the authority of the Ombudsman to conduct administrative investigations is mandated by no less than the Constitution. Under Article XI, Section 13(1), the Ombudsman has the power to: investigate on its own, or on complain by any person, any act or omission of any public official, employee, and omission appear to be illegal, unjust, improper, or inefficient. The question of whether or not the Ombudsman may conduct an investigation over a particular act or omission is different from the question of whether or not petitioner, after investigation, may be held administratively liable. This distinction ought here to be kept in mind; even as we must also take note that the power to investigate is distinct from the power to suspend preventively an erring public officer. Likewise worthy of note, the power of the Office of the Ombudsman to preventively suspend and official subject to its administrative investigation is provided by specific provision of law. Under Section 24 of R.A. 6770, we have previously interpreted the phrase under his authority to mean that the
5
Ombudsman can preventively suspend all officials under investigation by his office, regardless of the branch of government in which they are employed, excepting of course those removable by impeachment, members of Congress and the Judiciary. 2. We reach the foregoing conclusion, however, without necessarily subscribing to petitioners claim that the Local Government code, which he averred should apply to this case of an elective local official, has been violated. True, under said code, preventive suspension may only be imposed after the issues are joined, and only for a maximum period of sixty days. Here, petitioner was suspended without having had the chance to refute first the charges against him, and for the maximum period of six months provided by the Ombudsman Law. But as respondents argue, administrative complaints commenced under the Ombudsman Law are distinct from those initiated under the Local Government Code. Respondents point out that the shorter period of suspension under the Local Government Code is intended to limit the period of suspension that may be imposed by a mayor, a governor, of the President, who may be motivated by partisan political considerations. In contrast the Ombudsman, who can impose a longer period of preventive suspension, is not likely to be similarly motivated because it is a constitutional body. The distinction is valid but not decisive, in our view, of whether there has been grave abuse of discretion in a specific case of preventive suspension. 3. However, in the present case, respondents point out that the contract entered into by petitioner with F.E. Zuelling was signed just four days before the date of the elections. It was not made an issue during the election, and so the electorate could not be said to have voted for petitioner with knowledge of this particular aspect of his life and character. For his part, petitioner contends that the only conclusive determining factor as regards the peoples thinking on the matter is an election. On this point, we agree with petitioner. That the people voted for an official with knowledge of his character is presumed, precisely to eliminate the need to determine, in factual terms, the extent of this knowledge. Such an undertaking will obviously be impossible. Our rulings on the matter do not distinguish the precise timing or period when the misconduct was committed, reckoned from the date of the officials reelection, except that it must be prior to said date. In a number of cases, we have repeatedly held that a reelected local official may not be held administratively accountable for misconduct committed during his prior term of office. The rationale for this holding is that when the electorate put him back into office, it is presumed that it did so with full knowledge of his life and character, including his past misconduct. If, armed with such knowledge, it still reelects him, and then such reelection is considered a condonation of his past misdeeds. While petitioner can no longer be held administratively liable for signing the contract with F.E. Zuellig, however, this should not prejudice the filing of any case other than administrative against petitioner. Our ruling in this case, may not be taken to mean the total exoneration of petitioner for whatever wrong doing, if any, might have been committed in signing the subject contract.

service for an offense which is not work-related or which is not connected with the performance of his official duty. Remolona insists that his dismissal is a violation of his right to due process under Sec. 2 (3), Art. XI-B of the Constitution which provides that no officer or employee in the civil service shall be removed or suspended except for cause. Although the offense of dishonesty is punishable under the Civil Service Law, Remolona opines that such act must have been committed in the performance of his function and duty as postmaster. Considering that the charge of dishonesty involves the falsification of the certificate of rating of his wife Nery Remolona, the same has no bearing on his office and hence, he is deemed not to have been dismissed for cause. This proposition is untenable. It cannot be denied that dishonesty is considered a grave offense punishable by dismissal for the first offense under Sec. 23, Rule XIV of the Rules implementing Book V of E.O. No. 292. And the rule is that dishonesty, in the course of the performance of duty by the person charged. The rationale for is dishonest or is guilty of oppression or grave misconduct, even if said defects of character are not connected with his office, defects of character are not connected with his office, they affect his right to continue in office. The government cannot tolerate in its service a dishonest official, even if he performs his duties correctly and well, because by reason of his government position, he is given more and ample opportunity to commit acts of dishonesty against his fellowmen, even against offices and entities of the government other than the office where he is employed; and by reason of his office, he enjoys and possesses a certain influence and power which renders the victims of his grave misconduct, oppression and dishonesty less disposed and prepared to resist and to counteract his evil acts and actuations. The private life of an employee cannot be segregated from his public life. Dishonesty inevitably reflects on the fitness of the officer or employee to continue in office and the discipline and morale of the service. The principle is that when an officer or employee is disciplined, the object sought out the improvement of the public service and the preservation of the publics faith and confidence in the government. We likewise find no merit in the contention of Remolona that the penalty of dismissal is too harsh considering that the penalty of dismissal is too harsh considering that there was no damage caused to the government since the certificate of rating was never used to get an appointment for his wife. Although no pecuniary damage was incurred by the government; there was still falsification of an official document that there was still falsification of an official document that constitutes gross dishonesty whish cannot be countenanced, considering that he was an accountable officer and occupied a sensitive position. The code of conduct and Ethical standards for public officials and employees enunciates the state policy of promoting a high standard of ethics and utmost responsibility in the public service.
PEOPLE VS. TOLEDANO GR NO. 110220, MAY 18, 2000 REMOLONA VS. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION GR No. 137473 August 2, 2001 The main issue posed for resolution is whether a civil service employee can be dismissed from the government In this petition for certiorari and mandamus, petitioner seeks to (1) annul and set aside the orders of the RTC of Zambales in criminal case No. RTC 1274-I, entitled People of the Philippines vs. Rolando Bunao, dated February 26, 1993 and April 12, 1993, which dismissed the information filed against private respondent Bunao and denied petitioners motion for
6
reconsideration of the dismissal order, respectively; and (2) prevent respondent judge from hearing the case in the vent of reinstatement of the information. The pertinent provision of the old Local Government code or BP Blg. 337 that was allegedly violated provides that It shall be unlawful for any lawful government official, directly or indirectly, individually or as a member of a firm: to engage in any business transaction with the Local Government Unit of which he is an official or over whish he has the power of supervision, or with any of its authorized official, boards, agents, or attorneys, whereby money is to be paid, or property or any other thing of value is to be transferred, directly or any other thing of value resources of the LGU to such person or firm. Sec 221 of the same code provides for the penal sanctions for such violation. Before arraignment, private respondent moved to dismiss the information on the ground that the charge had already become moot and academic and that any criminal liability he may have incurred has been extinguished. In an order dated February 26, 1993 respondent court dismissed the information. The petition is meritorious. As indicated above, respondent judge dismissed the information on the ground that the administrative case filed against private respondent Bunao with the office of the Ombudsman had been dismissed. In the memorandum filed by the Solicitor General dated January 11, 1995, said order of dismissal on the ground of extinction of criminal liability is assailed for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting for having been issued with on the part of respondent judge, thus: The respondent court anchored its disposition in the case and against private respondent Rolando Bunao. But Art. 89 of the Revised Penal Code enumerated the grounds for extinction of criminal liability; and, dismissal of them. Administrative charge against accused is not one of them. The law is clear and unequivocal, there is nothing in it which stakes that exoneration from an administrative charge extinguishes criminal liability. It is indeed a fundamental principle of administrative law that administrative cases are independent from criminal actions for the same act or omission. Besides, the reliance made by respondent judge on the reelection of private respondent as Kagawad in the May 1992 election so as to warrant the dismissal of the information filed against him, citing Aguinaldo vs. Santos (212 SCRA 768), is misplaced. The ruling in said case which forbids the removal from office of a public official for administrative misconduct committed during a prior term, finds no application to criminal cases pending against said public officer. Finally, R.A. 7160 otherwise known as the LGC of 1991, which repeated provision BP Blg. 337 re enacted in its Sec. 89 the legal provision of Sec. 41 of BP Blg. 337 under which private respondent Bunao was charged and penalized the same act previously penalizes under the repealed law, such that the act committed before reenactment continuous to be a crime. Hence, prosecution will proceed under the provisions of Sec. 89 in relation to Sec. 514 of R.A. 7160. DECS SECRETARY VS. MARIA LUISA C. MORAL JANUARY 19, 2000 Facts:

In 1994 former DECS Secretary Ricardo T. Gloria filed a complaint against Maria Luisa C. Moral, then Chief Librarian, Catalog Division, of the National Library for dishonesty, grave misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service. The complaint charged respondent Moral with the pilferage of some historical documents. The DECS Investigating Committee conducted several hearings on the complaint. On September 25, 1996, Sec. Gloria issued a resolution finding respondent guilty. She was ordered dismissed from the government service with prejudice to reinstatement and forfeiture of all her retirement benefits and other remunerations. On September 30, 1996 respondent received a copy of the resolution. She did not appeal the judgment. On October 2, 1996, respondent filed a petition for the production of the DECS Investigation Committee report purporting to guide her on whatever action would be most appropriate to take under the circumstances. Her petition was however denied. Unfazed, she filed a reiteration for DECS committee Report and DECS Resolution dated Sept. 25, 1996 which Sec. Gloria similarly denied. Moral moved for reconsideration but the emotion was merely note in for the production of the Investigation Committee Report was final. As earlier stated respondent did not appeal was final. As earlier stated, respondent did not appeal the resolution dated 39 September 1996 dismissing her from the service. Instead, she instituted an action for mandamus and injunction before the regular courts against Sec. Gloria praying that she be furnished a copy of the DECS Investigation Committee Report and that the DECS Secretary be enjoined from enforcing the order of dismissal until she received a copy of the said report. Sec. Gloria moved to dismiss the mandamus case principally for lack of cause of action, but the trial court denied his motion. Thus, he elevated the case to the CA on certiorari imputing grave abuse of discretion of the trial court. In its assailed decision of 24 November 1997 the appellate court sustained the trial court & dismissed Sec. Glorias petition for lack of merit. The CA held that petitioner Gloria acted prematurely, not having filed any motion for reconsideration of the assailed order with the respondent judge before filing the instant petition to the Court of Appeals.
Issues: Whether the CA erred in dismissing the petition for certiorari for failure of petitioner to file a motion for reconsideration of the order denying the motion to dismiss, and in holding that the trial court did not commit grave abuse of trial court did not commit grave abuse of discretion in denying the motion to dismiss. Held: Ordinarily, certiorari will not lie unless the lower court, through a motion for reconsideration, has given an opportunity to correct the imputed errors on its act or order. However, this rule is not absolute and is subject to well-recognized exception. Thus when the act or order of the lower court is a patent nullity for failure to comply with a mandatory provision of the rules, as in this case, a motion for reconsideration may be dispensed with and the aggrieved party may assail the act or order of the lower court directly on certiorari. There is no law or rule which imposes a legal duty on petitioner to furnish respondent with a copy of the investigation report. On the contrary, we unequivocally held in Ruiz vs. Drilon
7
that a respondent in an administrative case is not entitled to be informed of the findings & recommendations of any investigating committee created to inquire into charges filed against him. He is entitled only to the administrative decision based on substantial evidence made of record, and a reasonable opportunity to meet the charges and the evidence presented against her during the hearings of the investigation committee. Respondent no doubt had been accorded these rights. Respondents assertion that the investigation report would be sued to guide (her) on what action would be appropriate to take under the circumstances hardly merits consideration. It must be stressed that the disputed investigation report is an internal communication between the DECS Sec. & the Investigation Committee, and it is not generally intended for that matter, except the DECS secretary. More importantly, the DECS resolution is complete in itself for purposes of appeal to the civil service commission, that is, it contains sufficient findings of fact and conclusion of law upon which the respondents removal from office was grounded. This resolution, and not the investigation report, should be the basis of nay further remedies respondent might wish to pursue, and we cannot see how she would be prejudiced by denying her access to the investigation report.

Whether or not respondent is considered on AWOL for more than thirty (30) days and hence his separation from service is legal. Resolution: NO. While the granting or approval of leaves depends upon the needs of the service and is discretionary upon the head of the department or agency which find that such discretion was not exercised properly in this case. We note that petitioner disapproved respondents leave application only on September 15, 1993, or almost 2 months from the time he filed the same on July 21, 1993. Such unexplained inaction by petitioner for an unreasonable length of time apparently gave the respondent the impression that there was no impediment to his leave application. Indeed there is no basis to conclude outright that he went on leave on July 28, 1993 without an approved application. Thus, respondent cannot be considered on AWOL for more than 30 days. Hence, his separation from service is illegal.
PRINCIPE VS. FACT-FINDING AND INTELLIGENCE BUREAU PHILIPPINE COCONUT AUTHORITY VS. BIENVENIDO GARRIDO Facts: Sometime in July, 1993, Garrido then employed as Deputy administrator of PCA for Corporate services Branch, verbally sought for permission from PCA Administrator Virgilio M. David to take more or less, five-month vacation leave in connection with his intention to accept a job offer in Sierra Leone, West Africa, as consultant of a private firm. And on July 21, 1993, petitioner filed his application for leave for 98 days, or from July 28, 19993 to December 17, 1993, with the Human Resources Development Department (HRDD). However, two months thereafter, the PCA Administrator issued a Memorandum to Garrido disapproving the latters application for leave. On December 18, 1993, Garrido arrived in the Philippines. And on December 20, 1993, he reported back to his office and found the said letter of disapproval. On December 21, 1993, petitioner was rushed and confined at the Philippine Heart Center until his discharge on January 2, 1994. Thereafter, Garrido re-filed another vacation leave covering the period from July 28, 1993-December 17, 1993 and incorporating therewith his sick leave application for December 20, 1993-February 28, 1994. On February 4, 1994, Garrido received a letter dated January 27, 1994 from David informing him that he has been dropped from the rolls effective December 26, 1993 for being absent without official leave for more than 30 days pursuant to Civil Service Memorandum no. 38, Series of 1993. Thus, Garrido appealed from Davids act of dropping him from the rolls with the respondent CSC, however the CSC dismissed the appeal. On appeal with the CA, it reversed the resolutions of the CSC. Issue: Facts: City Mayor Garcia endorsed to the HLURB the proposed Cherry Hills Subdivision. Based on the favorable recommendation of Mayor Garcia, respondent Tan, issued the preliminary approval and locational clearance for the development of CHS. On July 28, 1991, Jasareno allowed the leveling/earth-moving operations of the development project of the area subject to certain conditions. Eventually, Pollisco issued Small Scale Mining Permit to Philjas to extract and to remove 10,000 cu. Meters of filling materials from the area where the CHS is located. Respondent Magno also informed Rodriguez of Philjas that CHS is within the EIS System and as such must secure ECC from the DENR. Consequently, upon recommendation of respondent Tolentino, Philjas application for ECC was approved by respondent Principe, then Regional Executive Director of DENR. And on September 24, 1994, Gov. Ynares approved the SSMP applied for by Philjas, allowing Philjas to extract and remove 50,000 metric tons of filling materials from the area. On November 15, 1990, the Ombudsman rendered a decision finding petitioner Principe administratively liable for gross neglect of duty in connection with the collapse of the housing project at the Cherry Hills Subdivision and imposing upon him the penalty of dismissal from office. Issue: Whether the Ombudsman may dismiss petitioner from the service on an administrative charge for gross neglect of duty, initiated, investigated and decided by the Ombudsman himself without substantial evidence to support his finding of gross neglect of duty because the duty to monitor and inspect the project was not vested in the petitioner. Resolution: NO. Administrative liability could not be based on the fact that petitioner was the person who signed and approved the
8
ECC, without proof of actual act or omission constituting neglect of duty. In the absence of substantial evidence of gross neglect of petitioner, administrative liability could not be based on the principle of command responsibility. The negligence of petitioners subordinates is not tantamount to his own negligence. It was not within the mandated responsibilities of petitioner to conduct actual monitoring of projects. The principles governing public officers under the Revised Administrative Code of 1987 clearly provide that a head of a department or a superior officer shall not be civilly liable for the wrongful acts, omissions of duty, negligence or misfeasance of his subordinates, unless he has actually authorized by written order the specific act or misconduct complained of. As heretofore stated, the responsibility of monitoring housing and land development projects is not lodged with the office of the petitioner, but with the Regional Technical Director. DELA CRUZ VS. COMMISSION ON AUDIT Facts: Petitioners were members of the Board of Directors of the National Housing Authority from 1991-1996. On September 19, 1997, the COA issued Memorandum No. 97-038 directing all unit heads/auditors/team leaders of the national government agencies and GOCCs which have effected payment of any form of additional compensation or remuneration to cabinet secretaries, their deputies and assistants, or their representatives, in violation of the rule on multiple positions, to (a) immediately cause the disallowance of such additional compensation or remuneration given to and received by the concerned officials, and (b) effect the refund of the same from the time of the finality of the SC En Banc Decision in the consolidated cases of Civil Liberties Union vs. Executive Secretary and Anti-Graft League of the Phils. vs. Sec. of Agrarian Reform. The COA Memorandum further stated that the SC decision declared E.O. No. 284 unconstitutional insofar as it allows Cabinet members, their deputies and assistants to hold other offices, in addition to their primary offices, and to receive compensation therefor. Accordingly the NHA Resident Auditor Salvador J. Vasquez issued a Notice of Disallowance, disallowing in audit the payment of representation allowances and per diems of Cabinet Members who were the ex-officio members of the NHA Board of Directors and/or their respective alternates who actually received the payments. Issue: Whether or not the petitioners as appointive officials with equivalent rank or those lower than the position of Assistant Secretary are covered by the constitutional ban against dual or multiple positions. Resolution: YES. It bears stressing that under PD 757, the law creating the National Housing Authority, the persons mandated by law to sit as members of the NHA Board are the following: (1) the Secretary of Public Works, Transportation and Communications, (2) the Director-General of the National Economic and Development Authority, (3) the Secretary of Finance, (4) the Secretary of Labor, (5) the Secretary of Industry, (6) the Executive Secretary, and (7) the General Manager of NHA. While petitioners are not among those

officers, however, they are alternates of the said officers, whose acts shall be considered the acts of their principals. Since the Executive Department Secretaries, as exofficio members of the NHA Board, are prohibited from receiving extra compensation, whether be it in the form of a per diem or an honorarium or an allowance, or some other such euphemism, it follows that petitioners who sit as their alternates cannot likewise be entitled to receive such compensation. A contrary rule would give petitioners a better right than their principals.
DE LEON VS. C.A 350 S 1 Facts: Private Atty. Jacob Montesa who is not a Career Executive Officer (CE SO) or a member of the Career Executive was appointed as a legal Ministry Legal Counsel -CESO IV in the necessity of Local Government (Law department of Interior and Local Government) by then Minister Aquilino Pimentel Jr. Private respondents appointment was approved as permanent by the Civil Service Commission. On July 25, 1987, then President Aquino promulgated E.O. 262, reorganizing the Department on April 8, 1988, then Secretary Luis T. Santos, who succeeded Minister Pimentel, designated Nicanor M. Patricio as chief, legal service in place of private respondents who, in turn, was divided to report to the office of the secretary to perform special assignments. Consequently, private respondents filed before this court a petition for quo warrants, against then Secretary Luis T. Santos and Nicanor Patricio. Ruling was rendered in favor of private respondent Montesa and ordered his reinstatement to his former position. Meanwhile, R.A. No. 6758 (otherwise known as the Salary Standardization Law) took effect on July 1, 1989. Pursuant thereto, the position of Department Service Chiefs which include the department Legal Counsel was reclassified and ranked with Assistant Bureau Directors under the generic position title of Director III. Hence , respondent was reinstated to the position: Department Legal Counsel and|/ director III. On July 6, 199, then secretary Rafael Alunan III issued Department Order No. 94-0370 relieving private respondents of his duties and responsibilities reassigning him as Director III (Assistant Regional Director), Region XI. private respondent did not report to his new assigned position. Instead he filed a 90- day sick leave, and upon expiration thereof, he submitted a memorandum signifying his intention to re-assume his position as Department Legal Counsel / Chief Legal Services. Private respondent was advised however to report to region IX immediately. Private respondent wrote a memorandum requesting for consideration to no avail. He later appealed to the CSC which sustained his reassignment to Region IX. In view thereof, the Department directed private respondent to report to his new assigned post otherwise he shall be considered to be on absence on Absence Without Leave (AWOL) as a consequence will be dropped from the rolls of Public Service. Private respondents instead of complying therewith, filed with the CA a petition for Review with a prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and / or preliminary injunction. The CA ruled in favor of the respondent. Issue: Whether or not private respondent is reassignment is valid.
9
Issues: Held:

1) Private respondents appointment did not attain permanently. Not having taken the necessary career executive Service examination to attain the requisite eligibility, he did not at the time of his appointment and up to the present, posses the needed eligibility for a position in the career executive service. Consequently, his appointment as a Ministry legal Counsel CESO IV/ Department Legal Counsel and or Director III, was merely temporary. Such being the case, he could be transferred without violating the constitutionality guaranteed right to security of tenure. Wherefore Resolution of the CA are reversed and set aside. MATIBAG VS. BENIPAYO 380 S 49 Facts: February 2, 1999, the COMELEC en banc appointed petitioner as Acting director Director IV of the IED. Subsequently, then Chairperson Harriet O. Demetriou reviewed petitioners appointment as Director IV of the EID in a temporary capacity. Again on February 15, 2001, Commissioner Rufino S.B. Javeiro received again the appointment of petitioner to the same position in a temporary capacity. On March 22, 2001, President Macapagal Arroyo appointed, ad interim, Benipayo as COMELEC Commissioner, each for a time of seven years and all expiring on February 2, 2008. Benipayo took his oath of office and assumed the position of COMELEC Chairman. Borra and Tuason likewise took their oaths of office and assume their positions as COMELEC Commissioners. The office of the President. Submitted to the Commissioner on the Appointments the ad interim appointment of Benipayo, Borra and Tuason per confirmation. The Commission, however, did not act on the said appointments. On June 21, 2001, respondents Arroyo renewed the aforementioned as interim appointments to the same position and with the same conditions. Before the Commission could act upon the confirmation of the renewed appointments after receipt of such Congress adjourned. The ad interim appointments were again renewed upon which they took their oath anew. Benipayo as the Comelec Chairman issued a memorandum addressed to petitioners as director IV of the EID director and to Cinco as Director III also of the EID. Cinco Officer-in- Charge of the EID and reassigns petitioners to the law department. COMELEC EID Commissioner-charge objected to petitioners reassignment in a memorandum addressed to the Comelec en banc. Specifically, Commissioner Sadain questioned Benipayo failure to consult the Commissioner-incharge of the EID in the reassignment of the petitioners. Petitioners requested to reconsider her relief which was however denied by Benipayo. She moved to appeal the denial of her request for reconsideration to the Comelec en banc. She ruled an administrative and criminal complaint with the law dept against Benipayo. Denying the pendency of the complaint, petitioners filed the instant petition questioning the appointment and the right to remain in office of Benipayo, Borra and Tuason. In the meantime, President Arroyo rescued once again the ad interim appointments. 2) Held:
Whether or not the ad interim appointments of Benipayo, Borra and Tuason are expressly allowed in the Constitution. Whether or not subsequent renewals of such ad interim appointments invalid.
In the instant case, the President did in fact appoint permanent Commissioners to fill the vacancies in the COMELEC, subject only to the confirmation by the Commissioner on Appointments. Benipayo, Borra and Tuason were extended permanent appointments during the recess of congress. They were no opposite and or designated in a temporary or acting capacity, unlike Commissioner Haydee Yorac in Brillantes vs. Yorac. The ad interim appointments of Benipayo, Borra and Tuason are expressly allowed by the Constitution, which authorizes the president, during the recess of Congress to make appointments that take effect immediately. The Constitution imposes no condition on the affectivity of an ad interim appointment, and thus an ad interim appointment takes effect immediately. The Constitution imposes no condition o the effectivity of an ad interim appointment, and thus an ad interim appointments takes effect immediately. In the language of the constitution the appointment is effective until disapproved by Commission on Appointments or until the next adjournment of Congress. In the ad interim appointments and subsequent renewal of the appointments of Benipayo, Borra and Tuason do not violate the prohibition on reappointments because there were no previous appointments that were confirmed by the Commission of Appointments. A reappointment presupposes previous confirmed appointments. The same ad interim appointments will not also breach the 7- year limit because all the appointments and renewal of appointments of Benipayo, Borra, and Tuason are for a fixed term expiring on February 2, 2008. Any delay in their confirmation will not extend the expiry date of their terms of office. Consequently, there is no danger whatsoever that the renewal of the ad interim appointments of these three respondents will result in any of the evils intended to be exorcised by the twin prohibitions in the Constitution. The certainly renewal of the ad interim appointments of these three respondents, for so long as their terms of office expires on February 2, 2008 does not violate the prohibition on reappointment in the Sec. 1(2) article IX-C of the Constitution.
PABU-AYA VS. CA 356 S 651 Facts Petitioner Pabu-aya was an employee of the Provincial Board of Negros Occidental. She started as a casual laborer on July 1, 1973. On November 14, 1986, she was appointed as Utility Worker on a permanent status. She was later appointed as Bookbinder II in a temporary status. On October 16, 1992, Vice Governor of Negros Occidental issued a Memorandum informing her that her temporary appointment as Bookbinder II had already expired on September 16, 1992, and that consequently, she could no longer continue in the service.
10

She wrote the provincial board and acknowledged therein her failure to perform her duties and made a promise to improve her performance should her appointment be renewed. Her letter was indorsed by the Provincial Governor under specified conditions. Petitioner appealed the memorandum terminating her employment which was however dismissed by the commission Issues: Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that petitioners subsequent acceptance of a temporary appointment (Bookbinder II) was an indication of her relinquishment of her position (Utility Worker) as a permanent employee and thus foreclosed her right to contest her reinstatement. Held: In the case at bar the Court of Appeals acted properly when it gave scant consideration to petitioner Pabu-ayas claim that had she known of the demotion in status from that of a utility worker, in a permanent status, to that of Bookbinder II in a temporary status she would have stuck to her old permanent position of utility worker rather than put to naught her long years of service in the government. The temporary appointment of petitioner as Bookbinder II was validly terminated. Petitioners contention that she should be reinstated to her former position as utility worker is untenable. Petitioner Pabu-aya, by having accepted the temporary appointment of Bookbinder II she had abandoned or given up her former position of utility worker. Her appointment as Bookbinder II being terminable in character was terminable at the pleasure of the appointing power with or without cause. The letter of petitioner expressing regret over her own less than satisfactory performance and promising to improve her work should her appointment be renewed, also implies that there were valid reasons for the proper authorities not to renew her temporary appointment. Besides, pursuant to Section 13 (b) of the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of the Administrative Code of 1987, a temporary appointment shall not exceed twelve months.
appeal. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied by the Civil Service Commission. Issue: Whether employees in the public service regardless of their status of employment are protected by the tenurial security right embodied in the Constitution. Held: It is undisputed that petitioners employment with the CCPAP is contractual and co-terminus in nature. Such coterminus employment fall under the non-career service classification of positions in the Civil Service. A perusal of petitioners employment contract will reveal that his employment with CCPAP is qualified by the phrase unless terminated sooner. Thus, while such employment is co-terminus with the PAPS project, petitioner nevertheless serves at the pleasure of the appointing authority as this is clearly stipulated in his employment contract. We agree with the appellate courts interpretation of the phrase unless terminated sooner to mean that his contractual job as project manager IV from March 11, 1996 to January 30, 2000 could end anytime before January 30, 2000 of terminated by the other contracting partyemployer CCPAP. SOCRATES VS. SANDIGANBAYAN 253 SCRA 773 Facts: Socrates was the incumbent governor of Palawan who was first elected governor of the said province in 1969 and reelected in both 1971 and 1980 elections. After the EDSA Revolution in 1986 ,he was replaced by Victoriano Rodriguez. At the time Rodriguez was still the OIC Governor, the Provincial Government of Palawan represented by Rodriguez and the Provincial Board Members of Palawan filed before the Office of the Tanodbayan Complaints against Socrates for violation of Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. The Sandiganbayan ordered the suspension of petitioner pendent elite as governor of Palawan. Issue: Who may impose preventive suspension on an erring
ORCULLO VS. CSC 358 S 115 Facts: Petitioner Norberto Orcullo, Jr. was hired as Project Manager IV by the Coordinating Council of the Philippine Assistance Program (CCPAP)BOT Center effective March 11, 1996. His employment was contractual and co-terminous with the said project which was to end in January 30, 2000. On September 23, 1996, or six months from his assumption of office, petitioner issued a memorandum from one Jorge Briones, terminating petitioners contractual employment with the said agency effective September 30, 1996. In a letter petitioners termination as project manager of CCPAP was confirmed by the undersecretary, Francisco F. del Rosario. Aggrieved by the dismissal, petitioner appealed the same to the Civil Service Commission (CSC). The respondent CSC dismissed petitioners
officer? Held: Upon a proper determination of the validity of the information, it becomes mandatory for the court to immediately issue the suspension order. The Court has no discretion to hold in abeyance the suspension of the accused in the pretext that an order denying the motion to quash is pending review before the appellate courts.
PANDI VS. COURT OF APPEALS 380 SCRA 36 Facts:
11
On August 9, 1993, petitioner Dr. Jarmena B. Macacua, the regional director and Secretary of DOH of ARMM issued a memorandum designating Dr. Lampa I. Pandi as OIC of Integrated Provincial Health Office- Amai Pakpak General Hospital (IPHO-APGH) Lanao del Sur,. On September 15, 1993, Provincial Governor Mahid Mutilan of Lanao del Sur, issued order no. 07 designating respondent Dr. Amer Saber asa OIC of IPHO-APGH. Dr. Saber filed in CA, a petitioner for quo warrant w/ prayer for injunction questioning the designation of DR. Pandi as OIC in IPHO-APGH Lanao del Sur, because he claims that he is the lawfully designated OIC of said government entity. On October 29, 1993, then President Ramos issued E.O No. 133 transferring powers and functions of the DOH in the region to the Regional Government of ARMM. On November 6, 1993, Dr. Macacera issued another memorandum reiterating Dr. Pandis designation. The Court of Appeals rendered a judgment in favor of Dr. Saber, holding that the powers and authority to appoint the provincial health officer is vested don the governor of Lanao del Sur under the LGC of 1991, section 478. Hence the appeal. Issue: Who is empowered to appoint the Provincial Health Officer of Lanao del Sur, the Provincial Governor, the Regional Governor of the ARMM Secretary of Health? Held: The power to appoint or designate an officer-in-charge for this position is determined by the law in force at the time of such appointment or designation. Macacua as regional director and Regional Secretary of Health designated Pandi Officer-in-charge of the IPHOAPGH, Lanao del Sur on August 9, 1993 and again on November 6, 1993. The designation date of August 9, 1993 is void since the Regional Secretary at that time did not exercise supervision and control over the Provincial Health Offices of the ARMM. However, the designation on November 6, 1993 is valid since at the time E.O No.133 had already been issued vesting in the Regional Secretary of Health Supervision and control over the functions and activities of DOH in the ARMM. The designation of Pandi, however, while valid is only temporary in nature, good until a new designation or permanent appointment is made.

also dismissed petitioners allegation that these were midnight appointments pointing out that the Constitutional provision relied upon by the petitioner prohibits only those appointments made by the president and cannot be made to apply to local elective officials. The court of Appeals, upon petition for review held that there was no abuse of power of the appointment on the part of outgoing mayor. Issue: Whether or not these are midnight appointments which maybe recalled. Held: Section 20 of the Rule VI of the Omnibus Implementing Regulations of the Revised Administrative Code provides: Section 20: Notwithstanding the initial approval of the appointments, the same maybe recalled on any of the following grounds: a) non-compliance with the procedures/ criteria provided in the agencys merit promotion; b) failure to pass through the agencys selection/ promotional board c) violation of the existing collective agreement between managements and employees relative to promotion; or d) violation of other existing civil service laws, rules and regulations. Accordingly, the appointments of the private respondents may only be recalled on the above cited grounds. The CSC correctly ruled that the CONSTITUTIONAL PROHIBITION ON SO CALLED MIDNIGHT APPOINTMENTS, SPECIFICALLY THOSE MADE WITHIN TWO (2) MONTHS IMMEDIATELY PRIOR TO THE NEXT PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS, APPLIES ONLY TO THE PRESIDENT OR ACTING PRESIDENT.
ALQUEIZOLA VS. OCOI August 27, 1999 Facts: Petitioner Ramon Alquizola has, won the post of Punong Barangay of Barangay Lubod, Iligan City. Respondents Gallardo Ocoi, Camilo Penaco, Saturnino Mendoza, Rafael Ardiente, Vicente Cazeres, Ricardo Zosa III and Sirad Umpa were appointees of the former Punong Barangay. Said respondents occupied the positions of Barangay treasurer, Barangay secretary respectively with the rest being barangay utility workers. After the election, petitioner terminated the services of the respondents and appointed hi co-petitioners, Marissa Doromal and Adeco Seco as barangay treasurer and as barangay secretary. In consonance with section 394 and section 395 of the LGC, he submitted both appointments to the Sanguniang Barangay. For approval. The Sangunian rejected the appointments. Respondents filed a complaint for quo warrant, mandamus and prohibition with the RTC of Lanao del Norte to enjoin petitioner from termination their services. The
DE RAMA VS. COURT OF APPEALS 353 SCRA 94 Facts: Petitioner Conrado L. De Rama, mayor of Pagbilao, Quezon, wrote a letter to the CSC seeking the recall of the appointment of the 14 Municipal employees on the allegation that the appointments of the said employees were midnight appointments of the former mayor in violation of Article VII, Section 15 of the 1987 Constitution. The CSC denied the petitioners request for recall and declared said appointments of the said employees were issued in accordance with pertinent laws. Thus, the same were effective immediately, and cannot be reviewed or revoked by the appointing authority until disapproved by the CSC. The CSC
12
RTC ruled in favor of the respondents. A motion for reconsideration was denied Hence this petition. Issue: Whether or not the dismissal is valid. Held: The questioned dismissal from office of the barangay officials by the Punong barangay without concurrence of the majority of all the members of the Sanguniang Barangay cannot be legally justified.

Only Presidential appointments belonging to the first group requires confirmation by the Commission on Appointments. The Philippine National Police is separate and distinct from the Armed Forces of the Philippines. Positions in the former need not be confirmed by the Commission on Appointments. Consequently, Section s6 and 31 of the R.A 6975, which empowered the Commission on Appointments to confirm the appointment of public officials whose appointments are not required by the Constitution to be confirmed, are unconstitutional. LAUREL VS. DESIERTO
MANALO VS. SISTOZA 312 SCRA 239 Facts: On December 13, 1990, R.A. 6975 creating the DILG was signed into law by the President Aquino. Pertinent provisions of the Act reads: The Chief of the PNP shall be appointed by the President from among the senior officers down to the rank of the Chief Superintendent, subject to confirmation by the Commission on Appointments. Sec. 31.Senior Superintendents to Deputy Director General-appointed by the President upon recommendation of the Chief of PNP with the proper endorsement by the Chairman of the CSC and subject to confirmation by the Commission on Appointments; and e) Director General- appointed by the President from among the senior officers down to the rank of Chief Superintendent in the service, subject to confirmation by the Commission on Appointments. In accordance therewith, the Presidents of the Philippines, promoted the fifteen (15) respondents police officers to the ranks of Chief Superintendent and Director without their appointments submitted to the Commission on Appointments for confirmation. Hence, this petitioner questioned the constitutionality and legality of the Appointments. Issue: Whether or not the PNP Chief is subject to the confirmation of the Commission on Appointments. Held: Under section 16, Article VII of the Constitution, there are four groups of officers of the government to be appointed by the President. First, the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, and other public ministers and consuls, officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captains and other officers whose appointments are vested in him in this Constitution. Second, all other officers of the government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by the law. Third, Those whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint.. Fourth, officers of the lower rank whose appointments the Congress may by law vest in the president alone.
Facts: President Fidel Ramos have issued E.O No. 128 creating the National Commission to take charge of the nationwide preparation for the celebration of the Philippine Centennial of the declaration of the Philippine Independence. Vice-President was appointment chairman of the NCL. In the Senate, Senator Coseteng delivered a privilege speech denouncing alleged anomalies in the construction and operation of the of the centennial of the Centennial Exposition Project at the Clark Special Economic Zone. Then, President Estrada created an independent citizens committee to investigate all the facts and circumstances, surroundings the centennial projects. The Evaluation and Preliminary Investigation Bureau of the Office of the Ombudsman issued a resolution finding probable cause to inflict petitioner before the Sandiganbayan for the violation of RA 3019 in relation to RA 1594. Petitioner assailed the jurisdiction of the Ombudsman on the ground that he is not a public officer. Issue: Whether or not petitioner is a public officer. Held: Jurisprudence defines public office as the right, authority and duty, created and conferred by law, by which, for a given period, either fixed by law or enduring at the pleasure of the creative power, an individual is invested with some portion of the sovereign functions of the government, to be exercised by him for the benefit of the public. The most important characteristic of a public office is the creation and conferring of an office involves a delegation to the individual of some of the sovereign functions of government, to be exercised by him for the benefit of the public. The Court held that the NCC perform executive function. The Court did not agree with the petitioners argument that the centennial celebration may be likened to a national fiesta which is proprietary rather that a government function. A town cannot compare to the National Centennial Celebration. The centennial celebration was meant to commemorate the birth of our nation after centuries of struggle against the former colonial master. Clearly, the NCC performs sovereign functions. It is, therefore, a public office, and petitioner, as its chair, is a public officer.
MACALINO VS. SANDIGANBAYAN

13

Facts: The Office of the Ombudsman filed with the Sandiganbayan two informations against petitioners Felicito Macalino and his wife, Liwayway Tan charging them with Estafa through falsification of official documents and frustrated Estafa through falsification of mercantile document. Petitioner was then the Assistant Manager of the Treasury Division and the Head of the Loans Administration and Insurance Section of the Philippine National Construction Corporation (PNCC), a government controlled corporation. Issues: 1) 2) Held: Section 12 and 13, Article XI of the Constitution provided that the Ombudsman and his deputies, as protectors of the people, shall act promptly on complaints filed in any form or manner against public officials or employees of the government, or any subdivision, or any agency or instrumentality thereof , including government-owned or controlled corporation with original charter. Further, section 2 (1), article IX of the Constitution provides that the civil service embraces all branches, subdivision, instrumentalities and agencies of the government, including government-owned and controlled corporations with the original character. Inasmuch as the PNCC has no original charter as it was incorporated under the general law on corporation, it follows inevitably that petitioner is not a public officer within the coverage of RA 3019, as amended. Thus, the Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over him. MALALUAN VS. COMELEC Facts: Petitioner Luis Malaluan and private respondents Joseph Evangelista were both mayoralty candidate in Kidapawan , North Cotabato. Evangelista was proclaimed by the Municipal Board of Canvasser asa the duly elected Mayor. Upon filing of an election protest, the trial court declared the petitioner as the duly elected mayor. Petitioner filed a motion for execution pending appeal which was granted by the trial court. Petitioner assumed the office of the Municipal Mayor. Private respondent appealed the trial courts decision to the COMELEC. The COMELEC ordered petitioner to vacate the office and declared private respondent to be duly-elected Mayor. The COMELEC found petitioner liable for the actual damages consisting of the attorneys fees, actual expenses for Xerox copies and unearned salary and other emolument from March 1994 to April 1995. Issue: Whether or not the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in awarding actual damages in favor of private respondents. Held: Whether or not petitioner is a public officer. Whether or not Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over petitioner
The Supreme Court deemed the award of salaries and other emoluments to be improper and lacking legal sanction. The Court held that the petitioner was not a usurper because, while a usurper is one who undertakes to act to officially without any color of right, the petitioner exercised the duties of an elective under color of election thereto. It matters not that it was the trial court not the COMELEC that declared petitioner as the winner, because both, at different stages of the sectoral process have power to proclaim winners in electoral contests. The division of a judicial body is no less that the proclamation made by the COMELEC-convened Board of Canvassers for winning candidates right to assume office, for both are undisputedly legally sanctioned. The Court deemed petitioner to be de facto officers who, in good faith, has had possession of the office and had discharged the duties pertaining thereto and is thus entitled to the emolument of the office. On Abandonment/Incompatible Offices CANONIZADO, ET AL. V AGUIRRE GRN 13132 FACTS: Pursuant to a decision of the SC, Sec.8 of RA 8551 was declared to be violative of petitioners right to security of tenure, hence, their removal as Commissioners of the NAPOLCOM and the appointments of new Commissioners in their stead were nullities, Petitioners were ordered to be reinstated. Respondents however contend that Canonizado is deemed to have abandoned his claim for reinstatement because he has been appointed by President Estrada to the position of Inspector General of the Internal Affairs Service of the PNP and has in fact accepted and taken his oath to such position before the SC ordered his reinstatement. ISSUES: I. Whether Canonizado has abandoned his office; and II. Whether Canonizados acceptance of an office incompatible with his former position resulted to an abandonment of his claim for reinstatement to his former position. DECISION: I. NO. Abandonment of an office is a voluntary relinquishment of an office by the holder, with the intention of terminating his control and possession thereof. In order to constitute abandonment of office, it must be total and under such circumstances as clearly to indicate absolute relinquishment. There are 2 essential elements of abandonment: 1) an intention to abandon; and 2) an overt or external act by which the intention is carried into effect. Where the public officer vacates it in deference to the requirements of a statute which is afterwards declared as unconstitutional, such a surrender will not be deemed an abandonment and the officer may recover the office. II. No. It is a well-settled rule that he who, while occupying one office, accepts another incompatible with the first, ipso facto vacates the first office, and his title is thereby terminated without any other act or proceeding. However, the
14
rule on incompatibility of duties will not apply to the case at bar because at no point did Canonizado discharge the functions of the two offices simultaneously. He should not be faulted for seeking gainful employment during the pendency of the case for his reinstatement.

Whether or not a distinction should be made on the yardstick of morality between an ordinary employee and a judge or lawyer. DECISION: NO. Under the Administrative Code, disgraceful and immoral conduct is a ground for disciplinary action. The principle that public office is public trust must always be adhered to. Moreover, the image of the court of justice is necessarily mirrored in the conduct, official or otherwise, of the men and women who work thereat, from the judge to the least and lowest of its personnel- hence, it becomes the imperative sacred duty of each and everyone in the court to maintain its good name and standing as a true temple of justice.
On Abolition of Office BUKLOD NG KAWANING EIIB V EXEC. SEC. 360 SCRA 718 FACTS: Former President Aquino issued EO 1273 establishing the EIIB as part of the organizational structure of the Ministry of Finance. President Estrada thereafter issued EO 191, deactivating the EIIB, motivated by the fact that its functions are also being performed by other agencies. All the personnel as specified were deemed separated from the service pursuant to a bona fide reorganization. ISSUE: Whether or not the President has the power to abolish the Economic Intelligence and Investigation Bureau. DECISION: The general rule has always been that the power to abolish is lodged with the legislature. This proceeds from the precept that the power to create includes the power to destroy. The exception is that, as far as bureaus, agencies, or offices in the executive department are concerned, the presidents power of control may justify him to inactivate the functions of a particular office or certain laws may grant him the broad authority to carry out reorganization measures.
On Disciplinary Actions NAVARRO V NAVARRO September 6, 2000 FACTS: Julieta Navarro filed a complaint for gross immorality against her husband Ronaldo Navarro and Roberlyn Marinas, both working with the Office of the Deputy Court as Legal Researchers. The complaint alleged among others, that the respondents are living together as husband and wife, and that they begot a child whom Ronaldo recognized as his child evidenced by the childs Birth and Baptismal Certificates. Respondents admit that they had a past illicit relationsip and that they had a child. They however, deny living together and asked that the SC be lenient in the imposition of penalty in this administrative case considering that they are only ordinary employees upon whom the high standard of integrity and ethical conduct required of a judge and a lawyer should not be applied. ISSUE:

Public Officers Cases

Uploaded by

Document Information

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

Public Officers Cases

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

1 CASES ON LAW ON PUBLIC OFFICERS

POLITICAL LAW REVIEWER

BALUYOT VS. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN February 9, 2000

POLITICAL LAW REVIEWER

POLITICAL LAW REVIEWER

POLITICAL LAW REVIEWER

GARCIA VS. MOJICA

POLITICAL LAW REVIEWER

POLITICAL LAW REVIEWER

POLITICAL LAW REVIEWER

POLITICAL LAW REVIEWER

POLITICAL LAW REVIEWER

POLITICAL LAW REVIEWER

PANDI VS. COURT OF APPEALS 380 SCRA 36 Facts:

POLITICAL LAW REVIEWER

POLITICAL LAW REVIEWER

MACALINO VS. SANDIGANBAYAN

POLITICAL LAW REVIEWER

POLITICAL LAW REVIEWER

You might also like