Ban On Ibn Arabi Works in Egypt 1970S

Ibn Arabi in the People's Assembly: Religion, Press, and Politics in Sadat's Egypt Author(s): Th.
Emil Homerin Source: Middle East Journal, Vol. 40, No. 3 (Summer, 1986), pp. 462-477 Published by: Middle East Institute Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4327368 . Accessed: 30/08/2013 14:38
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IBN ARABI IN THE PEOPLE'S ASSEMBLY: RELIGION,PRESS, AND POLITICSIN SADAT'S EGYPT Th. Emil Homerin
ThursdayFebruary 15, 1979, was a long day for many delegates of the Egyptian People's Assembly. Debate raged for 15 hours over a report on the Amriya spinning and weaving project, but when the recommendations were finally accepted, many of the delegates had left the floor. The opposition,representedby the Socialist Labor Party and a few independerts, had walked out in protest duringmotions intendedto exclude them from voting, while the presidentof the Assembly, Dr. Sufi Abu Talib, and a numberof other officialshad left in order to attend the funeral of the respectedjournalist, Fikri Abaza. The secretary of the Assembly, Dr. al-SayyidAli al-Sayyid,was left in charge, and it was probablydue to his efforts that yet anotherissue was introducedat the end of this excruciating session. This was the recommendation by the Committeefor Social and Religious Affairsand Endowments, which Dr. al-Sayyidchaired, to ban the writingsof the Islamic mystic Muhyi al-Din Ibn Arabi (d. 1240), especially his al-Futuhat al-Makkiya(The Meccan Revelations). Further, all future publications dealing with Islam were to be submittedto the Academy of Islamic Research (Majma' al-Buhuthal-Islamiya), for certification.Few, if any, of the exhausted delegates remaining on the floor gave much consideration to the proposal which was approvedwithout discussion.'
1. For details of the marathon session see al-Akhbar, Feb. 16, 1979, pp. 1, 4, and 9, and Jammal al-Utayfi, "al-Nuqat fawqa al-huruf fi kitab al-Futuhat al-Makkiya," al-Ahram, Mar. 4, 1979, p. 11.
Th. Emil Homerinis a graduatestudentin Arabicand Islamic mysticismat the Universityof Chicago.At present, he is completinghis dissertationon the Sufipoet Ibn al-Farid.Theauthorwishes to thankDar al-Kutubal-Misriyaand Dr. RudolphPeters and TheNetherlandsInstitutein Cairofor graciouslypermittinguse of their newspaperand periodicalcollections. He would also like to thank Dr. AhmadHaridi,and especially,Dr. William Cleveland,whoproofreadthe originaland made some very useful criticisms.
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THE MIDDLEEAST JOURNAL,VOLUME40, NO. 3, SUMMER1986.
On the next day, the newspaper al-Akhbar mentioned the proposed ban under the heading, "Prohibiting the Circulation of al-Futuhat al-Makkiya." The account reads as follows:2 The People's Assembly agreed during yesterday's session to discontinue and prohibitthe publicationof the remainingsections of the book al-Futuhatal-Makkiya of those by Ibn Arabi, as well as the rest of his works, and to prohibitthe distribution sections already publishedand to collect the publishedmaterialfrom the markets. This is due to his extremism(tatarruJ), which spreadsconfusion among Muslims. It also agreedto form a committeeof religiousscholars(ulama)from the Academy of IslamicResearchto preparea thoroughreportconcerningthe writingsof Ibn Arabi and to present it to the Assembly. This came after the Assembly's decision that the author was an extremist Sufi relying heavily on specific expressions used by other extremist Sufis, as technical terms whose meaningsdifferedfrom those well-known amongthe people of religiousknowledge(ahl al-ilm).Therefore,the distribution of his books causes confusion among the Muslimmasses, casting them into bewilderment and doubt, and it beguiles the people concerningtheir religion. The Committeesaid in its decision that silence in battlingthe likes of such books was a matterwhich contradictedthe obligationsof the faith. The Assembly also decided not to distributeany book involving Islamic religious positions without the consent of the Academy of IslamicResearch, in its capacity as the committee specializingin such matters. Ahmad Fuad Abd al-Aziz, the parliamentary secretary, announcedthat the governmentof the NationalDemocraticPartybelievedin the importance of protectingthe Islamic religion, and so it had carefullystudiedthe decision of the Committeebefore presentingit to the Assembly. In fact, the day before yesterday (i.e., Feb. 13), the resolution of the Ministryof Culturehad alreadybeen issued, containingall of the Committee'srecommendations which the Assembly had affirmed. Dr. al-Sayyid Ali al-Sayyid, presidentof the session, conveyed his thanks to the governmentfor their promptresponse to these recommendations. The assembly's recommendations, then, were clearly supported by the government, and perhaps this too diverted attention from this extraordinary proposal. The recommendations appeared so routine that al-Ahram, the major government paper, did not bother to mention them. The matter seemed concluded until February 19, when al-Ahram published the editorial, "Why Did We Ban This Book?" by Dr. Ibrahim Madkur, president of the Linguistic Academy.3 Dr. Madkur was directly involved with the new edition of the Futuhat edited by Uthman Ismail Yahya, having proofread each volume and written their prefaces.4 He began his editorial by asserting that the People's Assembly had no
2. "Man' tadwil al-Futuhat al-Makkiya," al-Akhbar, Feb. 16, 1979, pp. 1 and 9. Also see Feb. 16, 1979,p. 11, for anothernotice on the resolution. al-Jumhuriyah, 3. IbrahimMadkur,"Li-madhanusadirhadhaal-kitab?"al-Ahram,Feb. 19, 1979, p. 11. 4. Muhyi al-Din Ibn al-Arabi, al-Futuhat al-Makkiya,ed. Uthman Ismail Yahya (Cairo, 1972-).
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legal basis to recommendbanning a book, since all books belong to the public sector. Further, the right to marketand distributea book belongs to individuals and institutions, and not to the government,as establishedby existing laws. He went on to say that while the contents of the Futuhat were not suitable for treatment in a daily paper due to their specialized nature, one could consider formal aspects of the situation. For example, the new edition of the work was sponsoredby the SupremeCouncilfor Supportof the Arts, Letters, and the Social Sciences, a qualifiedofficialorganization,togetherwith The Sorbonne's Institute for Advanced Studies. Did the Assembly consider the Council's opinion or this important example of cultural cooperation before accepting the recommendations? Further,Dr. Madkurasked, did the Assembly believe that banningthis book would eradicate its existence in Egyptian libraries or in those throughoutthe world, not to mention the numerous copies of the work published in three previous editions? This work had been sought, studied, and cherished for over seven hundred years, and it was undeniablya part of Islam's heritage, so how could Muslims ban it now, when their forefathersin a less enlightenedage had not? Dr. Madkurasserted that the past opponents of Ibn Arabi did not burn his books or suppress their circulation,ratherthey discussed and debated his ideas with him and his supporters. As for the Futuhat, which had been translatedinto French and partiallyinto English, it was the focus of many scholarlystudies abroadand in Egypt. So, Dr. Madkurasked, will the Assembly close the departments of philosophy?While the the had to criticize and People's Assembly right debate, even suspect and oppose someone, it did not have the right to judge and execute him. Dr. Madkur concluded by referring to his 15 years of parliament service during the prerevolutionaryperiod in which, he said, he never suspected anyone's religionnor criticized the dead, nor did he believe that anyone would have allowed parliamentarycommittees to be turnedinto "tribunalsfor an inquisition(taftish)." Madkur's editorial was the first salvo against the resolution, which would undergoheavy fire from both religious scholarsand secularistsas they jumped to defend intellectual and religious freedoms against institutionalcontrol. Madkur raised many of the key issues that would be analyzedand debatedin the Egyptian press for the next month, questions concerning the Assembly's rights and expertise, censorship, authorityin religious affairsand the disseminationof the Islamic heritage, and finally, Ibn Arabi, his doctrines, and the relevance of banninga work over seven hundredyears old. In all, the Ibn Arabi controversy would reveal many of the complex relationshipsinvolving Egyptianpolitics, the press, intellectuals, and religious authorities. That Ibn Arabi and his work were involved with controversy was certainly nothingnew. The proponentof a monistictheosophy, Ibn Arabiis undeniablyone of the most interesting figures in Islamic mysticism, and his influence on his 464
contemporaries and later generations has been extensive.5 Yet, he was an abstrusewriter, relyingat times on free association more than on logical thought, Not surprisingly,a numberof his writings and this facilitated misunderstanding. became targets of polemics by Ibn Taymiya (d. 1328), al-Dhahabi(d. 1348), and of the world they others, who demandeda moral, if not legalistic, interpretation sought to reform.6 The Futuhat al-Makkiya,Ibn Arabi's magnum opus, is probably his most difficultand formidablewriting,and as such, the focus of intense criticism. Even Abduh (d. 1905)took exception to the work when he was the director Muhammad of publicationsin Egypt. He refused to publishthe Futuhat because, " works of this sort should not be looked at save by those who are qualified," since the astray.7Abduhalso maintained symbolismin the works would lead the uninitiated that Ibn Arabi's writings were, "filled with what contradicted the tenets of and a moderatetype of religion." AlthoughAbduhencouragedinteriorspirituality mysticism, he believed that theosophies like that of Ibn Arabi, neglected this world and one's duties in it by encouragingexcessive otherworldliness, thus weakening the basis of the communityand obstructingthe renovationof Islamic society.8 Disputes involving Ibn Arabi and his works prior to the 1979 controversy were largely confinedto the scholarlycommunity,and no matterwhat effect they had there, they rarely touched the general populace. Even this most recent controversy appears to have been born and raised among opposing factions of Egyptian ulama. Sometime after 1972, the then Shaykh al-Azhar, Dr. Abd al-HalimMahmud(d. 1978), requested an opinion from the Academy of Islamic Research regardingIbn Arabi's commentary on the Quran entitled Tafsir alHusayn al-Dhahabi Quranal-Karim.9The Academy's secretary,Dr. Muhammad that this contained matters which were far from ruled commentary (d. 1977),10 religion and therefore, the Shaykh al-Azhar should seek to ban the Tafsir and remove it from the marketplace. Anotheropinionwas offeredby a groupof ulama who opposed this, saying that the Tafsirwas a valuablework."'
5. Ibn Arabi'sbiography and bibliography are extensive. See the Encyclopaediaof Islam, 2nd ed., 3: 707-711 (A. Ates). 6. Concerningthe moralstance of these "neo-Sufis"and their ideas on Sufismsee my "Ibn Taymiyah'sal-Sufiyahwa al-Fuqara,"Arabica 32(1985):219-224. 7. Al-Manar,7 (1904-1905):439. 8. ConcerningMuhammad Abduh and his views on Islam and Sufism see Albert Hourani, Arabic Thoughtin the LiberalAge, 1798-1939(London, 1970),pp. 130-160. 9. Muhyial-Din Ibn al-Arabi,Tafsiral-Quranal-Karim(Beirut, 1968). 10. While al-Dhahabi's religious positions could be termed conservative, he was not a fundamentalist. See Bruce M. Borthwick,"Religionand Politics in Israel and Egypt," MiddleEast Journal 33(1979):145-163,esp. 155-58, and below n. 12. 11. I could not find a precise account of the Tafsircase, but it must have occurredduringor after 1973, Abd al-Halim Mahmud'sfirst year as Shaykh al-Azhar. Because the Tafsirwas never banned, some ulamapersisted in callingfor the work's "rectification"(taqwim);al-Ahram,Mar. 4, did not oppose Ibn Arabior Sufismas 1979,p. 11. Despite his reservationsaboutthe Tafsir,Mahmud
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This incident was used as a precedent by the Assembly in 1979. After it received complaintsagainstthe Futuhat, the Committeefor Social and Religious Affairs and Endowments began its investigation, following a request from a delegate of the Assembly. The Committee was instructed to make temporary recommendations regarding the matter, pending an opinion from a special committee of the Academy of Islamic Researchwhich would study Ibn Arabiand his writings. The delegate who requestedthe investigationwas Abd al-Qadiral-Bahrawi, deputyfromTanta, and sponsorof the February15recommendations banningIbn Arabi's writings. In supportof his resolution,al-BahrawimentionedIbn Taymiya and other medieval critics of Ibn Arabi, but his justificationrested primarilyon two reports by Muhammad Husayn al-Dhahabi,clarificationsgiven by a Shaykh al-Fiqi, and perhaps most importantly,on articles entitled, "Errorsin the Book al-Futuhat"(Dilalatfi Kitab al-Futuhat), by the late ShaykhKamalAhmadAwn. As directorof the al-AzharTeachers' Institute,in Tanta, Awn had no doubt been an importantand influentialfigurein al-Bahrawi'sconstituency.12 Awn's critiqueof Ibn Arabi's doctrinewas traditionalif somewhat updated. In an open letter sent to the Ministryof Culturein 1975,Awn accused Ibn Arabi of polytheism. He believed that Ibn Arabi's depiction of God's divine names posited them as independentlyacting entities similarto the gods of Olympus. In the 1979controversy, other criticismswere added to Awn's charges, particularly accusations that Ibn Arabi had claimed for himself knowledge and powers that Whatmakes this case unusualhowever, were denied to the ProphetMuhammad. is not the accusations, but that opponents of Ibn Arabi took recourse to the People's Assembly, a non-religiousbody, in order to accomplish what they had been unable to do through al-Azhar itself, namely, to suppress religious ideas which they believed to be heretical.'3 Apparently,al-Bahrawi'srole in the affairwas to requestan investigationand to see that the properrecommendations were made. He clearly had the supportof the Committee's chairman, al-Sayyid Ali al-Sayyid, who maintainedthat even supporters of Ibn Arabi had forbade reading his books which would only lead
such. See his autobiography, al-Hamdulillahhadhahayati(Cairo,1976).His son Muni'statedthat his father approvedof Ibn Arabi's Futuhat; Muni' Abd al-HalimMahmud,"Ibn Arabi . . . wa Majlis al-Shaab,"al-Ahram,Feb. 25, 1979,p. 12. Also see MichaelGilsenan,RecognizingIslam (New York, 1983),pp. 230-231, 243. " al-Ahram, 12. Al-Utayfi,p. 11, and Abd al-Qadir al-Bahrawi,"La tazalimuMajlisal-Shaab, Mar. 4, 1979,p. 11. 13. See al-Ahram,Feb. 23, 1979, p. 13, and al-Akhbar, Mar. 2, p. 3; Mar. 16, p. 3, and Mar. 23, p. 3. Having writtenor edited nearlya dozen works on Sufismalone, the Shaykhal-Azhar,Abd al-HalimMahmud,was not aboutto let Ibn Arabi'santi-Sufi opponentshave theirway; see n. 11. One writernoted that underMahmud'sdirectorship,the Sufi program at al-Azharhad flourishedand that Sufiwritings-and particularly those of IbnArabi-were readilyavailable; Abdal-AzimAli, "Hurriyat al-fikrwa-al-saytara al-diniya,"al-Ahram,Mar. 1, 1979,p. 11. Dr. Mahmud died in Octoberof 1978, and perhapsthis encouragedopponentsof Ibn Arabito press their case in the Assembly.
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people astray. Al-Bahrawi'smotives and those of the Committeemay have been sincerely religious, but their comments on the issue reveal that they had only scant knowledge of Ibn Arabi and his doctrines, and most of that was based on hearsay. Interestingly, the reason supporters of the ban most often cited in defense of the resolutionwas the vague notion that the Futuhatconfused Muslims and caused them to doubt their religious beliefs. and anti-westernrhetoric Also importantwas the absence of anti-modernist characteristic of contemporary Islamic fundamentalism. One cannot accept therefore, the argument put forward by the New York Times that "Muslim
fundamentalists in Parliament pushed through the ban. .
.,"
which is simplistic if
This is not to deny that conservative-not fundamentalistnot sensationalist.14 religious thinkershad a hand in the matter,for as we have seen they did. But it is quite possible that the action taken by al-Bahrawiand the Committee derived from more political than religious designs. Religious issues have always been importantin politicalaffairsin Egypt, and in recent years there has been the perception,whethervalid or not, that religious conservatism is of increasing mass appeal. A politician desiring to maintainor strengthen his support may espouse conservative dogma, but he must do so carefullyfor fear of alienatingother conflictingelements. In this light, the banning of the Futuhat may have been an irresistibleinvitationto show one's supportof Islam while not offendinganyone, and at a glance, who would disagree?Most of the Christianminority would not care, and the vast majorityof Muslims knew little or nothingabout this mystic who had lived and written over seven hundred years ago. Finally, as if to insure that the controversy would be minimized, the recommendationscould be introducedat an opportunetime, at the end of a long and weary session after the opposition had gone. For the same reasons, the Sadat administration may have taken advantageof the situation, for the governmenthad alreadyforwardedthe Committee'srecommendationsto the Ministryof Culture.If this was the case, one could agree with the Times' descriptionof Ibn Arabias "a bizarrecasualty of such studiedpiety." Likewise, Sadat's calls for the promulgationof the sharia and higher wages for religiouspersonnelwere overturesto conservativeelements as he soughtreligious legitimation for his rule and policies. The Assembly had also supported these proposals.'5 While the precise motives for the banningresolutionmay never be known, it is clear that both the governmentand the Assembly were caughtoff guardby the cries of protest and indignation from religiousscholars, laymen, andjournalistsas
14. "EgyptiansFuriousabout a Ban of 12thCenturyMystic's Work," The New YorkTimes, Mar. 15, 1979, p. 16. The anonymousarticle containedinaccurateinformation and an abundanceof simplisticanalysis used for dramaticeffect. 15. Ibid. Also see al-Ahram,Feb. 9, 1979,p. 1, and Feb. 14, 1979,p. 2.
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this religious dispute became a public political debate. With surprisingboldness, critics of the resolution took the Assembly to task for violating the freedoms of thoughtand speech, for exceeding its authorityand expertise, and for meddlingin strictly religious affairsand obstructingthe transmissionof the Islamic heritage. The Egyptiandailies too, exhibitingmarkedindependencefrom the government's line, regularlyprintededitorialsand letters which severely criticized the Assembly and its resolution particularlyover the issue of censorship. Many opponents of the February 15 resolution believed that the People's Assembly had encroachedon the basic humanrightsthat it was sworn to uphold. to those who had experiencedmarshal This was an alarmingsituation,particularly law and censorship. Perhapsthe most thoroughanalysis of the evils of censorship was the editorial, "A Word of Caution on a Serious Issue," written by Dr. Husayn Nassar, a noted literarycritic and professorof Arabicat the University of Cairo.16 Leaving the contents of the Futuhatto be arguedby religiousexperts, Dr. Nassar concentrated on the "greed and irresponsibility" of censorship. He recalled the situationduring 1973, when censorship was imposed because of the October War. At first, only militarymatterswere censored, but then censorship extended its grasp to include morals and the intellectual legacy left by past generations. Another line of attack on the banning resolution involving censorship and freedom of expression, was well represented by the opinions of al-Ahram and the editorialpositions of al-Akhbar'sreligionpage columnistFaruqJuwaydal7 18 Jaridat al-Jum'a. Theireditorialsemphasizedthe need for an open dialogueand exchange of ideas to promote a healthy and creative intellectual environment. They viewed extremismand dogmatismas diseases infectingtoday's world with the unwholesome belief that one's own opinion or position was alone right. This dogmatism,and not the specializedwritingsof a thirteenthcenturySufi, posed the greatest dangerto younger generations. "Open dialogue" and "intellectualconfrontation"were the answers offered by a majority of the resolution's critics-religious and nonreligious alike-to problems involving differingideas and viewpoints. Censorship and suppression would only obscure the issues and hinder constructive problem solving. In fact banninga work could have an opposite effect. One critic broughtattentionto this irony by pointingout that prior to the controversy, the Futuhat was known only to a minisculefew, but afterthe publicdebate over the ban, the book had become famous. He wrote that a friend of his was ovejoyed by the resolution since it
16. Husayn Nassar, "Kalimahhadiahfi qadiyaazima," al-Ahram,Feb. 26, 1979, p. 13. 17. FaruqJuwayda,"Musadirat al-afkar,"al-Ahram,Feb. 25, 1979,p. 12; "Kalimaakhira," al-Ahram,Mar. 1, 1979, p. 11, and "Sawt al-aql," al-Ahram,Mar. 6, 1979,p. 11. 18. al-Akhbar, Mar.2, 1979,p. 3; "Bi al-hiwar ... wa laysa bi tayy al-kutub,"al-Akhbar, Mar. 16, 1979, p. 3, and "Bi al-iqna'wa laysa bi al-ikhda',"al-Akhbar,Mar. 23, 1979,p. 3.
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would radicallyincrease Ibn Arabi's popularityin Egypt and abroad.'9 Still another criticism of censoring this book and of censorship in general, focused on the question of expertise and authority. The Assembly and its resolution were blasted on this point. Dr. Nassar wondered how the Assembly, half of whose delegates by law were fellahin and workers, could possibly be qualifiedto rule on a thirteenthcentury mystical work, or for that matter, on any specialized religious topic. Many critics asked if any delegate had read the Futuhat, not to mentionunderstoodit or its voluminouscommentaries.Al-Ahram artist Salah Jahin, drew a cartoon depicting a delegate burning the Futuhat because it was based on zandaqa (heresy), althoughthe delegate did not know what zandaqa meant. Othercritics stressed that the Assembly had no authorityto ban a book, this being an executive, not a legislative priority.20 Al-Bahrawi, Sufi Abu Talib, and some other delegates, answered these chargesby claimingthat the resolutionwas advisoryand in no way bindingon, the Sadat government. Further, they pointed out that the ban would only be temporaryuntil a decision was reached by the qualifiedinvestigatingcommittee. One delegate, however, bemoanedthe sluggishnessof such investigationswhich often became mired in trivialities, and another delegate protested that the recommendationswere phrasedin such a way as to appearas finalizeddecrees. Supportersof the resolutiontried to divert criticismby placingblame on the (al-Haya al-Amma1ial Kitab al-Misriya), Egyptian National Book Organization for publishingthe new editionof the Futuhatwithoutal-Azhar'sconsent, and with the tax-payers' money. The resolution's sponsor, al-Bahrawi, proclaimed alAzhar, and not the SupremeCouncilfor Supportof the Arts, Letters, and Social Sciences, which had approvedthe publicationof the new edition, to be the expert for distribution andjudge in this matter. But Dr. Saad Darwish, director-general at the Egyptian National Book Organization,was quick to point out that the organizationhad never been requiredto consult al-Azhar.21 Bahrawi's defense of his resolution crumbleddue to a fundamentalcontradiction in the Committee's recommendations.For while he and the Committee declared al-Azharthe authorityin religiousaffairs,they made their decision on a religious work and had taken action without first consulting that institution themselves. It was not surprising,therefore, that religious scholars and officials reacted against this threat to their influenceand authority.
19. Abd al-Azim Ramadan,"Hurriyatal-fikrbayn al-ibahawa al-musadira,"al-Jumhuriya, Mar. 17, 1979, p. 5, and MahmudKamal, "Letters," al-Ahram,Mar. 12, 1979,p. 7. 20. al-Ahram,Mar. 3, 1979,and Feb. 25, p. 12;Feb. 26, p. 13; Feb. 27, p. 11;Feb. 28, p. 11; Mar. 9, p. 11, and al-Akhbar,Mar. 7, 1979,p. 12. 21. Al-Bahrawi,p. 11; al-Utayfi, p. 11; "Majlisal-Shaabyuqarrir. . .," al-Ahram,Mar. 6, 1979, p. 11, and Ahmad al-Baathi, "al-Kitab alladhi man' Majlis al-Shaab tadwilahu:al-Futuhat al-Makkiya,"al-Ahram,Feb. 23, 1979,p. 13.
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Dr. Muni Abd al-HalimMahmud,an al-AzharUniversity professor and son of the former Shaykh al-Azhar, criticized the Assembly for rulingon matters of which it was ignorant.He noted that the Assembly was unawarethat al-Azharhad approved and sponsored publication of studies on Ibn Arabi and his thought. Mahmudalso claimedthat resolutionslike that of February15 would only spread confusion among the scholarlycommunity,for if this was the Assembly's stance vis-a-vis one of the great works of the Islamic heritage, what would it do with lesser works? Did the Assembly think it could treat the scholarlycommunityand professors of philosophy in particular,like children and ban a work which the former Shaykh al-Azhar, Abd al-Halim Mahmud, had approved? Further, Dr. Mahmudasked if the Assembly was awareof the position of al-Azhar'sfaculty on this book, and not just that of al-Azhar'sadministration.22 Anotherreligious scholar, HasanaynMuhammad Makhluf,a formermufti of Egypt and presidentof the Society for the Advancementof the Islamic Mission, (Jamiyat al-Nuhud bi al-Daawa al-Islamiya), took a more traditionallegalistic approach to the resolution. Since the Assembly had not presented substantial evidence to justify their action, nor even a clear explanation,the resolutionwas, therefore, "a great danger and a hazardous precedent." In the former mufti's view, the only correct course of action would be to form a learned committee of senior scholars from al-Azharwhich would then properlyresolve the issue.23 In another critic's opinion, the flippancy with which the Assembly had ignored the religious scholars was greater than that of the absolutist Mamluk sultans. The writerAbd al-Mun'imShumayssuggestedthat an incident involving the mystical poet Ibn al-Farid (d. 1235) paralleledthe Ibn Arabi situation. Ibn al-Faridwas accused afterhis deathof heresies similarto those leveled againstIbn Arabi. The charges were brought before the sultan Qaitbay (d. 1495), who requesteda decision froma mufti.The muftiexoneratedthe poet and censuredhis critics. If an absolutistmonarchneeded a learnedopinion in orderto decide such an issue, then how could the People's Assembly, a democraticinstitution,not do the same? Like Shumays, a numberof religious scholars, includingsome critical of Ibn Arabi, deploredthe censure or suppressionof any religious work. They declared censorship to be un-Islamic, since at its zenith Islamic civilization had always tolerated multipleviews and opinions in accordance with the Quran.The Quran had established a clear precedent by refutingthe polytheists' claims with sound evidence and irrefutableproofs. The Quranhad not suppressed the disgraceful charges leveled against the Prophet Muhammad which claimed him to be
22. Muni'Abd al-HalimMahmud,"Ibn Arabi," p. 12. 23. HasanynMuhammad Makhluf,"Ta'qibala kitabIbn Arabi," al-Ahram,Mar. 13, 1979,p. 14.
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possessed or a soothsayer. Rather, it disproved them with ample evidence and reasonable arguments.24 Some critics, perhapssensitive to conservativeforces at work, stated that the religious committees at al-Azhar too, should refrain from denouncing a work. They argued that the idea of an Islamic consensus (ijma'), was fictional, Islam being divided into numerousschools and sects. All too often, the suppressionof certainbeliefs and the endorsementof others were based on politics, not wisdom. These critics cited examplesfromthe early years of Islamto demonstratethat had religious conservative trends had their way, the Quran might never have been collected, while many of the existing traditionsof the Prophetwould surely have been lost. The Islamic heritagethen, of which the Futuhatal-Makkiyawas a part, must be preserved and spread, and not suppressed, if futuregenerationswere to discover their religious heritageand Islamic civilization survive and flourish.25 In addition to protesting censorship, those religious scholars and laymen interested in Ibn Arabi and his work, also defended his beliefs, particularlyhis doctrine of the "unity of being" (wahdat al-wujud). Dr. Muni Abd al-Halim Mahmudin his article entitled, "Concerningthe Issue of the Unity of Being," unequivocallystated that Ibn Arabi never embracedpantheism,which maintains that God and creation are one. Nevertheless, he noted, narrow-mindedcritics have been content with false allegations and deceptions since they are bent on destroying the adversaryand not on findingthe truth. Being ignorantof mystical experience and its doctrines, Ibn Arabi's critics have confused Sufi thoughtwith theology and philosophy, doing a disservice to all. Anotherdefenderof Ibn Arabi ably refuted the charge that Ibn Arabi's doctrine of the divine names was polytheism, by stressing Ibn Arabi's allegoricalintent. Still others defended Ibn Arabi's personal religious integrityand his scrupulousconduct.26 Questions of humanrights, state and religiousauthority,and interpreting the past, cast doubts on the soundness of the Assembly's resolution, but a simpler, though no less devastatingissue also took its toll, relevancy. The thoughtthat the People's Assembly was debating the merits of a specialized thirteenth century mystical work was startlingto some and infuriating to others. Muhammad Fahmi Abd al-Latif stated the matter:
24. MustafaMahmud,al-Ahram,Mar. 27, 1979,p. 11. Muhammad FahmiAbd al-Latif, "Ibn Arabifi Majlisal-Shaab,"al-Akhbar,Mar. 7, 1979,p. 12, and "Bi al-Iqma',"p. 3. 25. Ali, "Hurriyat," p. 11; Nassar, p. 13; MuhammadBayyumi al-Gharib, "Letters," al-Ahram,Mar. 5, 1979,p. 11. Also see Juwayda'sarticlescited in n. 17 and Abd al-Ghafur Ahmad Bakhit, "al-Islamwa al-turath,"al-Ahram,Mar. 1, 1979,p. 11. 26. Muni'Abd al-HalimMahmud,"Hawlaqadiyatwahdatal-wujud,"al-Ahram,Mar. 1, 1979, p. 11. and Ahmadal-Baathi,ed., "Ibn Arabi ... fi mizanal-din," al-Ahram,Mar.9, 1979,p. 15. As these defenses and their authorsdemonstrate,some EgyptianMuslimsof the educatedstrataare still attractedto a theosophicalSufismwhich may providea meaningful interpretation of life compatible with a modem intellectualworld view.
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does nothavethe duty Assembly thingis firstof all, thatthePeople's Theamazing knowsnothing thattheAssembly andsecondly, orinfidelity, Islam tojudgea person's andstudyof the ulama,andthirdly, aboutthis bookwhichtaxesthe understanding a issue noris his bookal-Futuhat al-Makkiya thatIbnArabiis not a contemporary and censure of be anobject today, legalcase, suchthatthemanshould contemporary andbanned.27 be censored thathis booksshould Even those individualswho believed the Futuhat to be important,wondered why the Assembly would ban it instead of the many volumes of Lenin or pornographicworks which were widely disseminatedand easily had in Cairo.28 In the opinion of the majorityof the critics, the Assembly was squandering valuable time and resources on the Ibn Arabi controversy, creating an embarrassment at home and abroad. Dr. Nimat Ahmad Fuad, former professor of literatureat Ain Shams University, asked, "Has the People's Assembly brought an end to the country's problems so that it can devote itself to banningbooks?" After listing a numberof problemsstill plaguingEgypt, from stolen antiquitiesto homelessness and starvation,Dr. Fuad concluded that any society in which the individualis oppressed, is backwardeven if that society possess great wealth and the latest technology. But if this is so, what of Egypt, which has neither?29 The most succinct statementon the questionof relevance appearedin a letter to al-Akhbar.Deploringthe utter waste of time in debatingIbn Arabi's books in the Assembly, the writerrecalled a proverb:al-fadi yaamal qadi, "The idle man acts as judge." 30 Finally, the absurdityof the entire controversywas humorously depicted in a cartoon publishedin al-Akhbar.A groupof delegates is gatheredin front of the Assembly buildingdiscussingIbn Arabi. In the foreground,a harried delegate says, "Whatare the allocationof housingand food suppliesthat you talk to me about them now? Wake up people! Now we are involved in a most importantcrisis about Ibn Arabi's books!" In the background,many delegates mumble Ibn Arabi's name while others say, "It is said that they will remove subsidies from Ibn Arabi!" and, "Some want to remove his immunity!"Then a naive person asks, "Will brotherIbn Arabi attend the next session?"'31 By March5, 1979, 18 editorialshad been publishedon the controversy, and three of these were translatedin the English languagenewspaper, The Egyptian Gazette. Pressurewas quicklybuildingagainstthe resolution,and many delegates of the Assembly were uneasy. On that day in the Assembly's morningsession, some delegates voiced theirdisapprovalof the February15resolution,contending that it had been improperly introduced to the Assembly by al-Sayyid Ali al-Sayyid, who had overseen the resolutionboth in committee and in the session
27. 28. 29. 30. 31. Abd al-Latif,p. 12. MustafaMahmud,p. 11. Nimat AhmadFuad, "Ja'a dawr al-fikrbaadaal-turath!"al-Ahram,Feb. 28, 1979,p. 11. Usama Sayyid Ahmad, "Letters," al-Akhbar,Mar. 10, 1979, p. 8. Al-Akhbar,Mar. 7, 1979, p. 12.
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of its presentation. Further,the opposition had withdrawnearlier in the session and so, had not seen the recommendations.Althougha spokesmanfor the Sadat governmentprotestedfurtherdiscussion of the Ibn Arabiissue, he too, criticized the form of the Committee's report which others believed had been phrased in such a way as to appearadopted.32 Then Abd al-Munimal-Sawi of the National Democratic Party spoke up, calling the delegates to confrontthe test before them. They were sworn to uphold humanfreedoms, but now because of the resolution, many people perceived the Assembly as an oppressor. He was shocked when he returnedfrom business abroad, to read the recommendationto ban Ibn Arabi that the Assembly had passed in his absence. He declared such attemptsto disparagea person's faith to be doomed to failure; great care should be taken before suspecting anyone of the fact that the Futuhat had been previously heresy or atheism. After reiterating published in Egypt with the approval of Azharite scholars, and other experts, al-Sawi emphasizedthat the work had been intendedonly for an intellectualelite and so, posed no threat to the Muslim masses. The book should, therefore, be accepted and the resolution sent back to a committee of experts.33 On the heels of al-Sawi's eloquent presentation,the government's spokesman, Ahmad Fuad Abd al-Aziz, assured the Assembly the Sadat administration absolutely supportedthe freedomof opinionwhich he called, "the hallmark of the Sadat era." He added that the Futuhat issue which had stirredup opposition in the public opinion, had alreadybeen turnedover by the Ministryof Cultureto the appropriate authorities, foremost of which was the Academy of Islamic Research.34 Then, Sufi Abu Talib concluded the debate by stressingthat the controversy had touched upon the honor of the Assembly which, in spite of that, would persevere as "the protectorof freedomand thoughtand the guardianof society's values." Admittingthat the Assembly lacked the expertise in the Ibn Arabiaffair, the president of the Assembly defended its action as being only temporaryand advisory. Furthermore,the investigationhad stemmedfrom received complaints and a delegate's request which the Assembly had an obligation to consider. Although the Assembly had followed the precedent for investigation set by al-Azhar when dealing with Ibn Arabi's Quranic commentary, due to the conflictingopinions regardingthe Futuhat, the February15 resolution should be returnedto the committees on religious and culturalaffairsfor additionalstudy and a decision. The Assembly agreedto this proposal, bowingto public pressure, embarrassed,and perhaps, chastened by their hasty and ill-consideredaction.35
32. "Majlisal-Shaabyuqarrir . . .," p. 11, and TheEgyptianGazette, Feb. 28, 1976,p. 6, and Mar. 7, p. 3. 33. "Majlis . . .," p. 11. 34. Al-Akhbar,Mar. 6, 1979,pp. 1-2, and al-Jumhuriya, Mar. 6, 1979,p. 1. 35. "Majlis . . .," p. 11, and al-Jumhuriya, Mar. 6, 1979, p. 11.
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Ibn Arabi and his al-Futuhat al-Makkiyawere not discussed on the Assembly floor again, and in the next few weeks the Assembly would endeavor to show its concern for human rights by supportingPresidents Sadat and Carter in their efforts to promote peace in the Middle East. Four days after the March5 session, the Ibn Arabicontroversywas officially resolved. An al-Ahramarticle entitled, "Ibn Arabi on the Scales of Religion," featured the opinions of Dr. H. Hashim, secretary-generalof the Academy of Islamic Research, and those of the grandShaykhof the Sufi orders, Muhammad Mahmudal-Satuhi. The Academy had been asked by the Assembly to render a decision on Ibn Arabi and his writings, and Dr. Hashim promptlyanswered that all works, includingmystical ones, which were a partof the Islamicheritagemust not be censored or suppressed. Rather, a sound analysis should be appendedto them to distinguishthose ideas which conformto widely held Islamic teachings, from those which were debatableor unacceptable.Dr. Hashimdeclaredthis to be the Academy's policy vis-a-vis all classical Islamic writings, whether they were Quraniccommentaries, works on jurisprudence,or Sufi treatises. Although the secretary-general disagreedwith Ibn Arabion certaindoctrinalpoints, he saw no reason to ban his Futuhat or other writings.36 Al-Satuhi (d. 1983), who was also president of the Supreme Sufi Council, vigorously defended Ibn Arabi as the greatest mystical theorist in Islam. His difficultliterarystyle and expression had sometimescaused critics to brandhim a heretic, "but the truth is that ... Ibn Arabi was an Islamic scholar uniting the methods of the legists, theologians, and logicians, and there is no doubt that he was amongthe best monotheists." Anothermemberof the SupremeSufi Council, Dr. Abu al-Wafaal-Taftazani,professor of Islamic philosophy and Sufism at the Universityof Cairo, supportedal-Satuhi'sclaims and elaboratedon the sources of and criticismof Ibn Arabi'sdoctrines. Those who did not share misunderstanding the mystic's intuitive vision of the Absolute and Its manifestations,could never fully comprehend and appreciate Ibn Arabi's accomplishments. Although Ibn Arabimay have gone to extremes in a few places, "he nevertheless, remainsone of the high points of Islamic and humanthought.37 The two endorsementsof Ibn Arabiby membersof the SupremeSufi Council of the Academy of were probably as importantas that by the secretary-general Islamic Research. The Counciltoo, was an officialorganization,being established to oversee and regulate the activities of the in 1978 by the Sadat administration various Sufi brotherhoods,and to encourage proper Islamic doctrine and practice.38Their supportfor Ibn Arabi then, together with the acceptance of him by
36. Al-Baathi,ed., "Ibn Arabi ... fi mizanal-din," Mar. 9, 1979, p. 15. 37. Ibid. 38. The SupremeSufi Councilis regulatedby the rules listed in Law #118 (1976),concerning the Sufiorders;the executive decreefinalizing the Councilwas #45 (1978).See al-Tasawwuf al-Islami, I(May, 1979):26-27.
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from religiousauthoritiesand proved the Academy, gave the Futuhatcertification government acquiescence on the matter. Not surprisingly,the last substantial statement on the Ibn Arabi affairappearedin the first issue (May, 1979), of the magazine al-Tasawwuf al-Islami, the official publication of the Supreme Sufi Council. The article was written by Dr. MuhammadKamal Jaafar, head of the Department of Philosophy at the University of Cairo. He had delayed in expressing his opinion, he said, until the controversy blew over as he knew it would when the press had tired of it. He was confident that the Assembly only desired the best interestsof the people and had not acted hypocritically.Then, no doubt echoing the concerns of the governmentand sponsors of the resolution,Dr. Jaafar launched into a discussion on the negative aspects of criticism. While criticism is a vital means for establishingthe truth and furtheringprogress,
... it can be turned into an incurabledisease which spreads throughoutintellectual and cultural life due to schisms, disparity, exhaustion, and disintegrationof that communityin which this disease has spread.39
Dr. Jaafar maintainedthat throughoutIslamic history, some Muslims had spent their lives in disputationand name-calling,and so had fallen into the hands of Islam's enemies, who cleverly aroused controversy to further weaken the Muslim community. In a cry for Islamic unity and tolerance, Dr. Jaafardeclared between people and cultures, as "openness" (infitah),and mutualunderstanding the properclimate for reason to flourishas it exposed the false and establishedthe truth. Turningto the Futuhat, Dr. Jaafarpraisedit as a definitivepartof the Islamic heritage, but as a work meant only for the greatest thinkers. If it was too dense, and misunderstoodby lesser minds, it was no fault of Ibn Arabi nor should the book be suppressed for that. Certainly, Ibn Arabi was not infallible but then, neitherwere his critics. Nevertheless, disagreementand controversyin this case, as in all others, should be resolved by Islam's truth and sound view point. With this vague but positive conclusion, Dr. Jaafarhoped to put an end to the Ibn Arabi controversy and re-establishcommunalharmony. The hostilities subsidedand peace was restored,but the battle for Ibn Arabi's al-Futuhat al-Makkiyaleft a numberof engagingconsiderations.First of all, the origins of the Committee's investigationand its recommendationsmay reveal a strategy by religious conservatives to enlist politicians in their ranks in order to manipulate the democratic political process and to suppress ideas they deem heretical. This plan was furtheredby the Sadatadministration and some members
39. Muhammad KamalJaafar,"Maghaliqal-Futuhat," al-Tasawwuf al-Islami, l(May 1979): 51. The tone and content of this articleprobablyinsuredthat it would be well received by the Sadat administration.
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of the Assembly who may have collaboratedin hopes of politicalprofitsfrom what they viewed as a harmless, but symbolic issue. The government, however, was able to protect itself from charges of usurpingreligious prerogativesby referring the matterto the "proper"authoritieswhen the controversyarose and before the March 5 congressional debate. Therefore, the People's Assembly and not the government, took the heat for the recommendations,and it is possible that the governmentscreened its activities and measuredpublicopinionat the Assembly's expense. Secondly, it is significant that the issue was debated in the press at all following Sadat's 1977crackdownon journalisticfreedom. From 1971until 1977, such confrontationsbetween the Assembly and the press were frequent, as each institution sought to speak for the people and guard their interests. Both sides carefullywatched the other lest someone overstep the limitsof his responsibilities and encroach on others. The press was broughtmore into line with the government's opinions after the riots of January1977,40but the Ibn Arabi controversy shows that public dissent was still possible. Most of the editorials were antiresolution, accusing the Assembly of censorship, oppression, ignorance, or incompetence, and as the controversygrew, the potentialfor political embarrasswas never named, not to mention ment increased. True, the Sadat administration criticized, in a single editorial, but it was known that the government had supported the resolution. But critics persisted, and the secular and religious scholars and laymen who expressed their opinionsin the press, were a key factor in the resolution's retraction and in maintainingreasonable guidelines for the publication,of recognized religious works. The critical editorials regularly appeared in the state-rundailies with no signs of interference,and so the Egyptian press retainedsome of the freedomof expressionthat it had brieflyenjoyed in the early 1970s.41 Thirdly,editorialsby religious scholars and laymen clearly demonstratethat a tolerant and liberal Islam is still alive and well, a fact that may surprisethose content with populardepictions of Islam as a monolithic, fundamentalistmovement bent on the suppressionof individualfreedoms. The numberof articles by Muslim scholars, officials, and religiouslaymen who opposed censoringreligious works and the legislation of a creed far exceeded those of their opponents. Even antagonists of Ibn Arabi argued against the ban, while other religious leaders soughtto distinguishbetween the positions of al-Azharthe institutionand those of its faculty.42What is more, many desired to maintain-not dissolve-the separa40. Concerningthe press duringthe Sadatadministration see MarkCooper, The Transformation of Egypt (Baltimore,MD: The Johns Hopkins UniversityPress, 1982),pp. 171-175. 41. Editorialsappearedso frequentlyin al-Ahramthatthey were often groupedtogetherunder the heading, "Ibn Arabifi Majlisal-Shaab,"("Ibn Arabiin the People's Assembly"). 42. Of the 39 articlesand editorialsprintedin the Egyptianpress on the Ibn Arabiissue, five were accountsof parliamentary proceedings,32 opposedthe ban, andof these 12 specificallydefended
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tion between political and religiousauthority.Perhapsthe resolution's supporters wanted to enforce doctrinal conformity and give the reigns of authority to an Islamicelite, but if so, they were firmlyresistedby others who believed in the laity of all believers. Finally, this controversy proves that Ibn Arabi and his thought are still volatile material over seven hundred years after the mystic's death. Spirited defenses of his moral character and mystical ideas by contemporaryEgyptian scholars representingal-Azharand governmentuniversities, together with letters from individualswho had read and appreciatedhis work, attest to Ibn Arabi's relevance to Muslims in Egypt today. Perhaps his creative mystical philosophy will help to revitalize a people and their culture, perhapsnot, but the importance of his ideas to others demands our attentioneven if mysticism seems strange to ouLr own world view, which is no less ephemeral.
Ibn Arabiand his work. Therewere six pieces criticalof him on at least some points, but only two of them supportedthe ban.
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Ban On Ibn Arabi Works in Egypt 1970S

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Ibn Arabi in the People's Assembly: Religion, Press, and Politics in Sadat's Egypt Author(s): Th.

THE MIDDLEEAST JOURNAL,VOLUME40, NO. 3, SUMMER1986.

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