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Small Farms Negative

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***Impact Statement CP***

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1NC HR-E-IS Counter-Plan

The President of the United States federal government should issue an executive order requiring a global assessment of the human rights and environmental impact of free trade agreements, including a periodic assessment of trade agreements already in place. The United States federal government should require a release of this information to the public during and before the finalization of the negotiation process. The Counter-Plan solves the AFF
+Increases accountability in FTAs +Assesses INTERNATIONAL environmental and human rights impacts +Guarantees public participation in free trade negotiations

Gonzalez 11 Carmen G. Gonzalez. Associate Professor, Seattle University School of Law. AN

ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE CRITIQUE OF COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE: INDIGENOUS PEOPLES, TRADE POLICY, AND THE MEXICAN NEOLIBERAL ECONOMIC REFORMS. University of Pennsylvania Journal of International Law. 32 U. Pa. J. Int'l L. 723. Spring, 2011. Accessed Via L.N. As the NAFTA case study illustrates, trade liberalization based on comparative advantage often results in serious hu-man rights violations and environmental harm because market prices fail to [*790] reflect environmental and social externalities and because the communities most affected by trade reforms are not consulted. One legal reform that would facilitate the early identification and mitigation of such externalities is legislation requiring ex ante environmen-tal and human rights impact assessment of all trade agreements. This assessment should take place as early as possible in the negotiation process, and should be conducted in a transparent manner that involves extensive public participation and consultation. Environmental impact assessment emerged as a
regulatory tool in the United States with the passage of the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, n319 and has since been adopted by most countries and by international organizations. n320 The

objectives of the assessment process are two-fold: to ensure that the possible impacts of a

proposed project are assessed before a final decision is made; and to inform the public and solicit meaningful public input on the costs and benefits of proceeding with the project . n321

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2NCSolvency ExtNAFTA Specific

The Counter-Plan leads to the reforms necessary to solve EVERY impact NAFTA has on rural populations INCLUDING the environmental damage of industrial corn production Gonzalez 11 Carmen G. Gonzalez. Associate Professor, Seattle University School of Law. AN
ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE CRITIQUE OF COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE: INDIGENOUS PEOPLES, TRADE POLICY, AND THE MEXICAN NEOLIBERAL ECONOMIC REFORMS. University of Pennsylvania Journal of International Law. 32 U. Pa. J. Int'l L. 723. Spring, 2011. Accessed Via L.N. In the case of NAFTA, for example, analysis and public disclosure of the negative externalities associated with in-dustrial [*793] corn production in the United States and of the positive externalities associated with traditional corn cultivation in Mexico might generate public pressure for regulatory reform or some form of financial compensation . Industrial corn production in the
United States contributes

to a wide range of environmental and human health prob-lems, including water pollution, water scarcity, biodiversity loss, climate change, pesticide poisoning, and a growing epidemic of obesity and Type II diabetes due to the presence of high fructose corn syrup in numerous food products. n336 In Mexico, by contrast, the biodiverse cultivation techniques of indigenous and rural communities provide positive environmental and social externalities. If these issues are discussed in public hearings in Mexico and the United States, it may be possible to create the interest convergence necessary to overcome the economic power of agribusiness and to achieve genuine reform.Regulatory reform in the United States could involve amending the statutes that currently exempt all but the largest farms from the nation's environmental laws or redirecting subsidies away from industrial agriculture and toward healthier and more sustainable farming practices. n337 Regulatory reform in Mexico might involve rewarding small farmers for the positive social and environmental contributions of traditional corn production by providing payments for ecosystem services. These payments could be funded by tariffs on
U.S. corn or by direct payments from the United States for the protection of rural livelihoods and for the conservation of a public good of global significance - Mexico's genetic diversity. n338

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2NCSolvency ExtLaundry List

Status quo EIS is insufficientReforming the past executive order on this issue is key to assess international impacts on human rights, poverty, the environment, and minority populations Gonzalez 11 Carmen G. Gonzalez. Associate Professor, Seattle University School of Law. AN
ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE CRITIQUE OF COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE: INDIGENOUS PEOPLES, TRADE POLICY, AND THE MEXICAN NEOLIBERAL ECONOMIC REFORMS. University of Pennsylvania Journal of International Law. 32 U. Pa. J. Int'l L. 723. Spring, 2011. Accessed Via L.N. In the United States, Executive Order 13,141 (1999) already requires the environmental review of trade agreements. n322 However, the executive order falls short of achieving environmental justice in numerous respects. First, while review of environmental impacts in the United States is mandatory, review of global and transboundary impacts is discretionary. n323 Second, the executive order does not require the review of the human rights impact of trade agreements. n324 Third, the executive order does not provide for the periodic assessment of trade agreements already in place.
n325 Fourth, the executive order fails to prescribe the timing of the environmental review and

does not

require the [*791] release of information to the public beyond the draft environmental review and the scope of the negotiation. n326 Without access to draft negotiating texts, meaningful public participation is difficult to achieve. Moreover, in the absence of specific guidance on the timing of the review, there is a danger that the review will be performed too late in the process to permit significant public input and consideration of alternatives, including the no-action alternative. n327 Fifth, while the executive order
does require that environmental reviews be "made available in draft form for public comment," n328 there is no mechanism to ensure that public comments are taken into account - such as requiring agency response to public comments. n329 Sixth, the

executive order does not require the disaggregation of impacts according to race, gender, ethnic origin, geographic region, or other variables. In order to determine whether trade agreements will impose a disproportionate burden on specific segments of the population, disaggregation of data is essential.
Seventh, the executive order does not create a private right of action in case its terms are violated. n330 Finally, the executive order does not make reference to Executive Order 12,898, issued five years earlier, which requires all federal agencies to make environmental justice part of their missions. n331 Executive Order 12,898 inexplicably excludes the United States Trade Representative and the State Department from the interagency working group charged with its implementation. n332 In

order to foster environmental justice at the international level, it [*792] is essential to include environmental justice in the mission of these government agencies and to involve them in the interagency dialogue over the implementation of this mission.

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2NCSolvency ExtPublic Participations Key

Public participation is key to ensure the most affected populations have a voice in the negotiation process Gonzalez 11 Carmen G. Gonzalez. Associate Professor, Seattle University School of Law. AN
ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE CRITIQUE OF COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE: INDIGENOUS PEOPLES, TRADE POLICY, AND THE MEXICAN NEOLIBERAL ECONOMIC REFORMS. University of Pennsylvania Journal of International Law. 32 U. Pa. J. Int'l L. 723. Spring, 2011. Accessed Via L.N. Despite the limitations of Executive Order 13,141, ex ante environmental and human rights impact assessments, if properly designed, have the potential to provide decision-makers and the public with valuable information about the environmental and human rights impacts of trade agreements, to prevent the "capture" of the negotiation process by commercial interests, to enhance government accountability, to create a forum for public input, and to democratize trade policy by fostering informed and reasoned debate. n333 The participation of rural and indigenous communities in the impact assessment process is vitally important so that the assessment will be informed by the knowledge and experience of those most affected by agricultural trade policy . Such participation also yields trade agreements that are perceived as more legitimate because they are the product of an inclusive political process.

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2NCSolvency ExtPeriodic Assessment Key

Requiring a periodic assessment of FTAs ensures long-term impact of agreements arent ignored Gonzalez 11 Carmen G. Gonzalez. Associate Professor, Seattle University School of Law. AN
ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE CRITIQUE OF COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE: INDIGENOUS PEOPLES, TRADE POLICY, AND THE MEXICAN NEOLIBERAL ECONOMIC REFORMS. University of Pennsylvania Journal of International Law. 32 U. Pa. J. Int'l L. 723. Spring, 2011. Accessed Via L.N. In addition, it would be advisable to require periodic ex post environmental and human rights impact assessments of trade agreements several years after their entry into force and to include "sunset clauses" in trade agreements akin to Article 20 of the WTO Agreement on Agriculture n334 so as to require renegotiation of trade agreements in light of these ex post impact assessments. n335 The periodic assessment and revision of trade agreements will enable decision-makers and the public to identify the long-term and indirect impacts of trade agreements and to make sure that these agreements are continuously revised and improved in order to promote human rights and environmental protection.

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2NCXO Doesnt Link to Politics

Executive orders solve for the case and avoid Congressional backlash to the policy Fleishman , Prof of Law and Policy Sciences and Director of the Institute of Policy Sciences and Public Affairs @ Duke ,1976, (Joel L., and Arthur H. Aufses, Research Associate @ Institute of Public Sciences @ Duke, Law and
Orders: The problem of presidential legislation, Law and Contemporary Problems, Vo. 40, No. 3, pg. 38) Several related factors, in particular, make executive orders especially attractive policymaking tools for a President. First is speed. Even if a President is reasonably confident of securing desired legislation from Congress, he must wait for congressional deliberations to run their course. Invariably, he can achieve far faster, if not immediate, results by issuing an executive order. Moreover, when a President acts through an order, he avoids having to subject his policy to public scrutiny and debate. Second is flexibility. Executive orders have the force of law. Yet they differ from congressional legislation in that a President can alter any executive order simply with the stroke of his pen merely by issuing another executive order. As noted earlier, Presidents have developed the system of classifying national security documents in precisely this manner.209 Finally, executive orders allow the President, not only to evade hardened congressional opposition, but also to preempt potential or growing oppositionto throw Congress off balance, to reduce its ability to formulate a powerful opposing position.

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***Movements Turns***

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1NC Movements Disad

Allowing current bottom up movements to take shape is key to eliminating neoliberalisms hold on the regionThe plan is counter-productive and pacifying. Roberts 9. Kenneth Roberts. Professor of Government @ Cornell. Beyond Neoliberalism in Latin America? 2009 pg
1-7 In recent years voters in Latin America have elected a series of left-of-center presidents, starting with Venezuela in 1998 and continuing (to date) with Chile,
Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay, Bolivia, Nicaragua, Ecuador, and Paraguay. Although this political "left turn" has bypassed a number of countries, and the new governments that are part of it comprise a remarkably heterogeneous lot, there seems little doubt that the political winds have shifted in the region. The turn to the left has followed a decade-and-a-half of free market or "neoliberal" reform, when technocrats throughout the region-with staunch support from the U.S. government and international financial institutions-forged a powerful policymaking consensus around the virtues of free trade, deregulated markets, and private entrepreneurship. Since it is not clear whether the region's new leftist governments have identified, much less consolidated, viable alternatives to market liberalism, it is far too early to claim that Latin America has entered a post-neoliberal era of development. What is clear, however, is that the

shift to the left signals a "repoliticization" of development issues in Latin America-that is, a demise of the "Washington Consensus" (Williamson 1990) for free market capitalism and the onset of a highly contested search for alternatives that lie " beyond neoliberalism ." In
short, Latin America is no longer (if it ever was) suspended at "the end of politics" (Colburn 2002), where technocratic consensus is complemented (or secured) by a combination of social demobilization, political resignation, and mass consumerism. The

repoliticization of development has both policy and process dimensions. On the policy front, it signifies that neoliberalism is no longer the only game in town; although predefined socialist alternatives to capitalism have long since evaporated, vigorous debates have emerged around non-neoliberal "varieties of capitalism" that envision a more active role for state power in asserting national autonomy, shaping investment priorities, ameliorating inequalities, and providing social services and other public goods. In terms of process, repoliticization entails the emergence or revival of popular subjectivities that are
contesting the technocratic monopolization of policymaking space-in some cases at the ballot box, in others on the streets. Repoliticization, therefore, involves a reciprocal interaction between the rise of new actors and an expansion of the issue agenda to include a broader range of alternatives. This book tries to make sense of these new subjectivities-that is, to identify some of Latin America's new social and political actors and to explain the origins, inspirations, and interests that lie behind their activation. In contrast to much of the emerging work on Latin America's left turn, we look beyond the rise of left-leaning governments and their policy choices to focus attention on the socioeconomic and cultural terrain in which new political options are being forged. Individual chapters thus explore how neoliberalism has shaped and constrained popular subjects by breaking down some traditional actors, transforming others, and providing a stimulus for the emergence of new ones-at least some of which bear the seeds of potential social orders beyond neoliberalism. Our approach starts with the recognition that neoliberal "structural adjustment" programs represented much more than a simple change in development policies. By

slashing tariffs and other trade barriers, privatizing state-owned enterprises and social services, and deregulating markets to encourage the free flow of capital, neoliberal reforms realigned existing relationships among states, markets, and societies in fundamental ways (Garret6n 2003a). As such, they transformed
the social, political, and cultural landscapes that had developed during the mid-twentieth-century era of state-led import-substitution industrialization (ISI). Initially, this meant breaking down the popular collective subjects of the lSI era-in particular, organized labor and labor-based parties-and imposing market discipline over everlarger swaths of social life. As

labor unions weakened, however, new popular subjects, such as community-based organizations and indigenous movements, that rejected the insecurities of market individualism and its commodification of social relationships began to emerge. Their
diverse attempts to reweave the social fabric are the primary focus of this volume. The essays included here trace many of the contours of this rapidly evolving, neoliberal social and political landscape. Collectively, the essays explore three basic sets of questions. First, what are the new patterns of social interaction generated by the process of market restructuring, and how do these reshape the ways in which societal interests and identities are articulated, organized, and represented in the political arena? Interests and identities are often redefined as market reforms create new economic niches (or destroy old ones), commodify social relationships, alter traditional uses of land, water, or natural resources, and shift the scale or locus of public policymaking. Second, what new social and political actors have emerged, and how do they respond to the multifaceted changes associated with market restructuring? Traditional actors may enter into decline, but new ones invariably arise; we must ask, then, how these new actors are constituted, how they adapt to market opportunities and insecurities, and what strategies they follow when they try to enter the political arena, redefine the policy agenda, and contest public authority. Third, and finally, to what extent do these actors and their responses provide the building blocks for new paths of social, economic, and political development that might be more equitable and inclusive than those that have characterized the neoliberal era? What

lies "beyond neoliberalism" is unlikely to be determined by grand ideological visions or political blueprints ; instead, it will be constructed piece by piece, from below, through the grassroots participation and decentralized experimentation of new popular subjects. This volume offers no simple answers to these complex questions, much less a new theory of neoliberal politics. Instead, it offers a series

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of portraits written from a variety of disciplinary perspectives about how people adapt and respond-both individually and collectively-when their economic moorings shift and the social fabric is torn asunder. These portraits are hardly comprehensive; they do not cover every country in Latin America, much less all the stations in the region's heterogeneous and fragmented sociocultural landscape. The editors do not claim that the particular set of actors and issues included in this volume is the best or the only one that could have been chosen. Nevertheless, we have selected topics based on their importance and the quality of research they have generated, and we believe our portraits jointly illuminate the diverse experiences of social actors during the neoliberal era. These portraits provide compelling evidence that capitalism is, as Schumpeter (1950) aptly characterized it, a force of "creative destruction" that simultaneously breaks down and reconfigures various fields of social interaction. Our chapters are replete with examples of the dialectical interplay between capitalism's advance and the social, cultural, and political responses it elicits-though not, as will become evident, in the manner classically envisioned by Marx. These

responses, whether deliberate or reactive, bear the seeds of what may in fact lie beyond neoliberalism, a horizon that remains opaque but is increasingly being sketched by a diverse array of popular movements in the region. As explained later, the various dimensions of this dialectical interplay lie beyond the scope of any single academic discipline,
making an interdisciplinary approach vital to a more comprehensive understanding. An Integral Approach to Economic Reform, Social Change, and Political Response Social and political changes in Latin America have long been conditioned by patterns of economic development. This can be seen, for example, in

the nineteenthcentury association between oligarchic politics and agro-export development models, or in the rise of populist social and political mobilization during the early stages of industrialization in the middle of the twentieth lower class groups . These
demands were typically funneled through the corporatist intermediary channels of mass party and union organizations, which brokered exchanges between states and organized societal interests. In short, lSI encouraged groups-defined primarily in terms of class categories-to self-organize in order to advance their interests in a policymaking environment where states increasingly penetrated and regulated social and economic relationships, including labor markets and land tenure arrangements. Together, these two processes encouraged strong labor and, in some cases, peasant movements to develop, which in turn provided a social foundation for Latin America's first mass party organizations. The

social, cultural, and political construction of popular subjects during the lSI era was

thus anchored in the favorable combination of rapid industrialization , state interventionism, and social reform. These linkages between state-led industrialization and grassroots organization were frayed, however, by economic pressures and political polarization in the 1960s and 1970s (O'Donnell 1973), and they were largely severed by the debt crisis of the 1980s. While neoliberal structural adjustment policies helped restore economic stability in the aftermath of the debt crisis, they exacerbated-indeed, they often institutionalized-the social dislocations wrought by the crisis itself. Changes in labor
markets-in particular growing informalization, a greater reliance on subcontracting and temporary labor, and flexible rules for hiring and firing-made collective action in the workplace increasingly difficult to sustain, leading to a sharp decline in trade union density in most of the region. Likewise, the parcelization of landholdings and the penetration of market relations in the countryside undermined historic patterns of peasant mobilization for land reform in much of the region (Kurtz 2004). The retreat of the state subjected new sectors of the economy and society to market discipline, undermining the rationale and effectiveness of collective action aimed at eliciting state redress . Historic labor-based parties entered into decline or adapted in part by distancing themselves from labor and other organized mass constituencies.

This trend that was propelled both by the structural conditions of neoliberal capitalism and by technological advances in political communication (most prominently, television) that rendered mass party organizations increasingly dispensable for electoral mobilization. Following the restoration of democratic rule in most of Latin America in the 1980s, U.S.-style media-based advertising and
campaign tactics diffused rapidly across the region, allowing candidates to appeal directly to voters without the mediation of mass membership party organizations. Latin America entered the new millennium, then, largely devoid of the mass social and party organizations that dominated the landscape during the populist/lSI era. Labor movements had been downsized and politically marginalized, and they were less capable of representing the diverse interests and identities of a precarious and in formalized workforce. Likewise, where they survived at all, mass parties were transformed into professionalized or patronage-based electoral machines (see, e.g., Levitsky 2003); elsewhere, they were displaced by independent personalities and populist outsiders. The dominant trends pointed toward a fragmentation and pluralization of civil society-with a multitude of interests, identities, and decentralized groups struggling to make their voices heard (Ox horn 1998a)-and a deinstitutionalization of political representation, as evidenced by extreme levels of electoral volatility and the rise of personality-based, antiparty candidates. A

bottom-up perspective is thus essential to understand how the demise of lSI and the transition to neoliberalism realigned the social landscape in ways that disarticulated the class-based popular subjects of the lSI era. Such a perspective is also essential, however, for
explaining popular responses to market liberalization and the openings that eventually emerged for the construction of new types of collective subjects that bear the seeds of what may lie beyond neoliberalism. Neoliberal

reforms are directed-indeed, often imposed-by state officials in collaboration with (or under the pressure of) transnational power centers, but civil society and grassroots actors are hardly passive bystanders
(Arce 2005). These actors invariably seek to exploit, resist, evade, or cope with state initiatives, and their responses often produce outcomes that are quite different from those envisioned by policymakers and economic elites. In particular, grassroots actors employ a variety of measures to alleviate material hardships and reduce exposure to market insecurities; as Karl Polanyi (1944) argues, there are social and political limits to the commodification of social relationships, and these limits may be quickly breached in contexts of egregious inequalities such as those prevailing in contemporary Latin America. Popular responses thus attempt to reweave a social fabric torn by economic crisis and market dislocation. These

responses are often local, decentralized, and territorially based, building on traditions of communitybased organizing, or focused on ethnic and cultural claims rather than the class/corporatist

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patterns of interest representation that were hallmarks of the lSI era. Although new popular subjects may not initially target public authorities or policymaking arenas, grassroots activism often becomes politicized over time, posing the formidable challenge analyzed by Benjamin Goldfrank in chapter three-that of translating local initiatives into nationallevel political alternatives. This challenge highlights the importance of a bottom-up perspective in the construction of new popular subjects in the neoliberal era. The primary
objectives of this volume, then, are to develop an interdisciplinary perspective on the multiple forms of societal responses to market liberalization and to assess their effects. We do this in four principal fields where neoliberalism has altered the social landscape: electoral politics, ethnic mobilization, environmental governance, transnational migration. In each area we explore new patterns of social interaction, identify various responses, and analyze the potential impact of emerging popular subjects.

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2NC Link ExtensionsMexico

Government intervention pacifies movements Fox & Hernndez 92 Jonathan Fox and Luis Hernndez. Mexico's Difficult Democracy: Grassroots Movements,
NGOs, and Local Government. Global, Local, Political , Vol. 17, No. 2 (Spring 1992), pp. 165-208 Published by: Sage Publications, Inc. http://www.jstor.org/stable/40644738. [KY]
Most social organizations, such as trade unions, peasant organizations, or business associations, have long been controlled by the government. Membership is often

Many different social groups have challenged this official monopoly on representation over the last few decades with mixed results. The central state's capacity to control local political and social life has always been uneven, but the Mexican state has retained near-total control over the channels that linked it to civil society at the national level
obligatory, and the leadership is chosen from above. - even in the late 1980s. Among the many diverse groups that make up Mexican society, only the Catholic church succeeded in sustaining a powerful, autonomous national organization.4 The secret of the

Mexican state's "success" is its skillful combination of "carrots and sticks." Government responses to popular movements for social reform and democracy have typically combined partial concessions with repression, conditioning access to material gains on political subordination. The state does not always wait to be pressured; its remarkable capacity for preemptive measures continues to surprise seasoned observers. One cannot understand Mexico's long-standing relative political stability without looking at both sides of the coin. The state occasionally does give in to some people, some of the time, and usually with strings attached. Some of Mexico's rulers specialize in such bargaining, but they operate in the shadow of their colleagues' capacity for fierce
repression in case the negotiations break down. This camouflage is a key component of what noted writer Mario Vargas Llosa called "the perfect dictatorship."5

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2NC Link ExtensionsLatin America

US Aid stops reform movements Empirics prove Dillon 89 Sam Dillon. (Mr. Dillon attended the University of Chicago and received a B.A. degree in history from the
University of Minnesota in 1979. He received an M.S. degree in journalism from the Columbia University Graduate School of Journalism in 1981.) Dateline El Salvador: Crisis Renewed. Foreign Policy , No. 73 (Winter, 1988-1989), pp. 153-170. Published by: Washingtonpost.Newsweek Interactive, LLC. http://www.jstor.org/stable/1148882 [KY] The Reagan administration used the com- mission's report to fashion an emergency aid package; and when Jos6 Napole6n Duarte was elected El Salvador's president in 1984, a previously reluctant Congress approved it. The report recommended more than doubling military aid from the 1983 level; Congress complied with $343 million for 1984 and 1985. The report suggested that economic aid be doubled as well. Congress did
not double economic aid, but it did allocate $1.8 billion for the years 1984 through 1988, for a 35 per cent average annual increase over 1983. It has added up to a torrent of dollars averaging some $1.1 million per day since 1984. Wash-

ington now finances more than one-half of the Salvadoran national budget. Because El Salvador was a society in general crisis, the Kissinger commission policy aimed not only at counterinsurgency victory but also at social reform, economic revival, and democ- ratization. Although several initiatives ap- peared in conflict--reforming society, liberalizing the economy, and empowering civilians while strengthening the military, and building democracy while waging war-the commis- sion sought to reconcile these contradictions with a call to maintain equilibrium among them. For example, the commission wrote:
"Vigorous, concurrent policies on both the military and human rights fronts are need- ed.... Policies of increased aid and increased pressure to safeguard human rights would improve both security and justice. A slacken- ing on one front would undermine our objec- tive on the other." 154. In

El Salvador, however, the Reagan admin- istration made the war its unhesitating priori- ty. The administration's slackening on other fronts has undermined the overall policy, just as the commission predicted. The guerrillas have been contained militarily, but the insur- gency's causes have gone largely unaddressed. Despite the impressive amount of aid, human misery has increased. American diplomats in El Salvador have urged an end to human rights abuses, but Washington has backed their message only feebly. Political killings, which have declined from the early 1980s, are again on the rise. In addition, American officials since 1985 have
routinely criticized the 1980 land and banking reforms as econom- ically unsound, even though the commission's report supported such reforms as necessary moves toward social justice. This is not to say that U.S. policy has borne no fruit. Since

1982 El Salvador has conducted five relatively honest national elections after more than a decade of frauds. The military has resisted numerous right-wing calls for coups, and the power of the civilian presidency, though still circumscribed by the military, has grown. Duarte has opened space for leftist political opposition.

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***NEG Environmental Justice Answers**

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Risk Assessment Sound

Commodification arguments are wrong---Economic analysis is the only way to prevent extinction Wagner 11 Gernot, economist at EDF, where he works in the office of economic policy and analysis, But Will the
Planet Notice? How Smart Economics Can Save the World. Hill and Wang Press, p. 11-12 The fundamental forces guiding the behavior of billions are much larger than any one of us. It's about changing our system, creating a new business as usual. And to do that we need to think about what makes our system run. In the end, it comes down to markets, and the rules of the game that govern what we chase and how we chase it. Scientists can tell us how bad it will get. Activists can make us pay attention to the ensuing instabilities
and make politicians take note.

When the task comes to formulating policy, only economists can help guide us

out of this morass

and

save the planet . In an earlier time with simpler problems, environmentalists took direct action against the market's brutal forces by It might even work for an entire industry when the task is to ban a particular chemical or scrub a pollutant out of smokestacks. But that model breaks down when the opposing force is ourselves: each and every one of us demanding that the globalized market provide us with cheaper and better food, clothes, and vacations. There is no blocking the full, collective desires of the billions who are now part of the market economy and the billions more who want toand
erecting roadblocks or chaining themselves to trees. That works if the opposing force is a lumberjack with a chain saw. ought tobe part of it. The

only solution is to guide all-powerful market forces in the right direction and create incentives for

each of us to make choices that work for all of us. The guideposts we have today for market forces evolved helter- skelter from a historical process that gave almost no weight to the survival of the planet, largely because the survival of the planet was not at stake . Now it is . Since we can't live without market forces, we need to guide them to help us keep the human adventure going in workable ways , rather than continue on the present path right off the edge of a cliff.

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Forecasting Good
The inherent unpredictability of social events is all the more reason for creating optimal resiliency through scenario planning Cochrane 11 John H. Cochrane is a Professor of finance at the University of Chicago Booth School of Business and a
contributor to Business Class "IN DEFENSE OF THE HEDGEHOGS" July 15 www.cato-unbound.org/2011/07/15/johnh-cochrane/in-defense-of-the-hedgehogs/ Risk Management Rather than Forecast-and-Plan The answer is to change the question, to focus on risk management , as Gardner and Tetlock suggest. There is a set of events that could happen tomorrowChicago could have an earthquake, there could be a run on Greek debt, the Administration could decide Heavens, DoddFrank and Obamacare were huge mistakes, lets fix them (Okay, not the last one.) Attached to each event, there is some probability that it could happen. Now forecasting as Gardner and Tetlock characterize it, is an attempt to figure out which event really will happen, whether the coin will land on heads or tails, and then make a plan based on that knowledge. Its a fools game. Once we recognize that uncertainty will always remain, risk management rather than forecasting is much wiser. Just the step of naming the events that could happen is useful . Then, ask yourself, if this event happens, lets make sure we have a contingency plan so were not really screwed. Suppose youre counting on diesel generators to keep cooling water flowing through a reactor. What if someone forgets to fill the tank? The good use of forecasting is to get a better handle on probabilities , so we focus our risk management resources on the most important events. But we must still pay attention to events, and buy insurance against them, based as much on the painfulness of the event as on its probability. (Note to economics techies: what matters is the risk-neutral probability, probability weighted by marginal utility.) So its not really the forecast thats wrong, its what people do with it. If we all understood the essential unpredictability of the world, especially of rare and very costly events, if we got rid of the habit of mind that asks for a forecast and then makes plans as if that were the only state of the world that could o ccur; if we instead focused on laying out all the bad things that could happen and made sure we had insurance or contingency plans, both personal and public policies might be a lot better.

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Pesticide Defense
Pesticide Studies are Unscientific, Overblown, and Unproven Prefer the ev because its from a toxicologist
Solomon 01 (Dr. Keith, Professor of Environmental Biology at the University of Guelph and a Director for the Centre of
Toxicology, writing in the Parry Sound Beacon Star, Pesticides are Safe: Proving the Improbable http://www.24d.org/newsarticles/Solomon-Parry-Sound-2001.pdf)
As a scientist who practices the scientific method, I am, in part, to blame. As a scientist, I cannot offer absolute and irrefutable proof that pesticides are safe. All that science can do is say that one thing is more likely to happen and another, much more or much less likely, but never 100 percent for certain. No

matter how well designed an experiment, no matter how many mice or fish are used, the scientist will always report the result with some uncertainty. This means that, even if there is no real effect of the substance on the liver, in some experiments a very small adverse effect will be seen, while in others, a non-adverse effect will occur. This is because of natural variability and random events. The average of all these is close to zero but for those who believe that an adverse effect should exist, the positive studies will be absolute proof. The scientific method, the test of the null hypothesis, is designed to keep scientists honest and detached from whatever their beliefs may be.
No scientist is pleased to find that nothing is happening; it is much more exciting and satisfying to find interesting responses and effects. As was pointed out nearly four centuries ago by Francis Bacon, the father of the scientific method ,

it is human nature to diminish negative evidence and exaggerate the significance of positive evidence. Because of this, we tend to ignore the negative evidence and focus on the positive, evidence
that is, in the analogy described above, essentially anecdotal. Some people believe in ghosts, the paranormal and in visitations of aliens, despite the countless years of study that have failed to show any evidence in support of these phenomena. They do so because they choose to believe in anecdotal evidence. The

media are of little help because the possibility that some facet of our daily life may cause injury or worse is the substance of headlines and increased circulation. This is a likely reason for the common misperception that pesticides cause all types of diseases in humans. As discussed above, a study may report an association (link) between pesticide use and a disease such as cancer in humans. However, one positive study does not prove a cause-and-effect between the pesticide use and disease. Only if most studies consistently show this linkage and other lines of evidence also support the conclusion would this association be accepted as showing causality. Pesticides are one of many tools in pest
management toolbox. They may be more efficient than other methods, but they are not absolutely necessary. As someone who does not live in Halifax, or in other towns where bans have been proposed, I do not care one way or the other if they choose not to use pesticides. However, I do care when this is done in the name of science and concern for health effects when, realistically, these do not exist. If the town councils and the citizens do not want pesticides used in their homes and gardens, then all I ask is that they have the courage to admit that they do this for reasons of belief or politics, not on the basis of science.

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Endocrine Distruption Defense

Endocrine disruption is a myth it came from one study that had no evidence and was only believed because of media hype Gordon 97 (Peter, contributor to the Cato Institute, Endocrine Disruptors, Politics, Pesticides,
http://www.ohiopma.org/pdfs/insight/ed/pub_id=6844.pdf )
And find it, she did. She

collected every paper that described any abnormality in wildlife that live on or around the Great Lakes, and concluded that synthetic chemicals were mimicking the effects of hormones. They were causing every problem in the literature, whether it was homosexual behavior among gulls, crossed bills in other birds, cancer in fish, or increases or decreases in any wildlife population. The chemicals that have those activities were called "environmental estrogens" or "endocrine disrupters." There was no more evidence to link them to every abnormality in wildlife than there had been in the 1960s to link every human cancer to chemicals. The absence of evidence wasn't much of a problem. Colborn and her colleagues believed that chemicals were the culprit, and the press and much of the public, nutured on the idea that chemicals were bad, didn't require evidence. Even so, Colborn had a problem that EPA faced in its early days. Soon after EPA was
established, the agency leaders realized that protecting wildlife and the environment might be a good thing, but that Congress might not decide to lavish funds on such activities. They

were sure, however, that Congress would throw money at programs that were going to protect human health from environmental risks.(3) Whether Colborn knew that history or not, she apparently realized that any real splash for endocrine
disrupters depended on tying them to human health effects. Using the same techniques she'd used to catalogue the adverse effects of endocrine disrupters on wildlife, she reviewed the literature about human health effects that someway or another might be related to disruption of hormone activity. The list was long, including cancers, birth defects, and learning disabilities, but the big hitter on the list was decreased sperm counts. According to Colborn and other's analyses of sperm counts made in different parts of the world under different conditions of nutrition and stress and at different time periods, sperm counts had decreased by 50 percent in the post-World War II period. If

there's anything that catches the attention of Congress, it's risks to males. Congress banned leaded gasoline after EPA released a report that said atmospheric lead was a cause of heart attacks in middle-aged men. The reported decrease in sperm counts leaped up for attention, and attention it got. Congressional hearings were held, magazine articles were written, experts opined about endocrine disrupters and sexual dysfunctions. And then it fell apart. Scientists found large geographical variations in sperm counts that have not changed over time. Those geographical variations and poor study designs accounted for the reported decrease. That scare went away, but endocrine disrupters were here to stay.

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Monoculture Defense
Monoculture isnt more susceptible to disease wheat proves 4ICSC, 2004
(Fourth International Crop Science Congress, Wheat monoculture is sustainable, September 27, http://www.cropscience.org.au/icsc2004/a/media/cs040927_mono.htm) Cultivation of the same crop in the same field year after year a practice called monoculture has long been regarded as unsustainable because of declines in yields after about three years. The yield loss is generally attributed to soil-borne pathogens that infect the roots of that crop, but that die out while the field is planted to a different crop. However, recent researchat Washington State University (WSU) has documenteda remarkable and apparently widespread microbiological control of a root disease in wheat and barley when these crops are grown continuously in the same location. The root-associated microbes are responsible for the well-documented decline of the diseasetake-all and a corresponding
increase in yields following one or more outbreaks of the disease, said R. James Cook, interim dean of WSUs College of Agri cultural, Human, and Natural Resource Sciences. Dr Cook is a strong advocate for crop rotation for many reasons, but points out that crop monoculture also has advantages and can be achieved sustainably with the help of soil microbes. Cook and his colleague David M. Weller studied the pathogens responsible for four major root diseases of wheat and barley grown in the inland Pacific Northwest. Breeding for host plant resistance has provided only useful tolerance for management of one of the se, Fusarium crown rot, and no useful

Considering the fact that the forebears of modern wheat evolved as a virtual monoculture, the lack of genes for resistanceto root diseases implies that some other defence mechanism exists. Such protection develops against take-all with wheat monoculture. He said that wheat and barley selectively stimulate and support populations of antagonistic microorganisms in the root zone. Often four to six consecutive crops are required before the onset of take-all decline, but the exact number of consecutive crops may vary.
resistance or tolerance to take-all, Rhizoctinia root rot and Pythium root rot, Cook said.

Even if diversity loss occurs, seed banks solve the impact Rissing, 2008
(Steve, Biology professor at Ohio State University, Seed banks protect crops from growing list of threats, March 11, http://www.dispatch.com/live/content/science/stories/2008/03/11/sci_rissing11_ART_03-1108_B5_A99I7L6.html?type=rss&cat=&sid=101) The first several million seeds for the long-planned Global Seed Vaultarrived last month. Their new home, in the frozen side of a mountain 700 miles from the North Pole, cost $8 million to build. The vault joins 1,400 other banks of various kinds that preserve seeds and other tissues of crop plants. Indeed, the vault exists partly to restockany of those banks after disastersthat might befall them. Civil unrest in Afghanistan and Iraq, for example, resulted in destruction of seed banks there, according to a recent report in The New York Times. The world depends on a shrinking group of crop plants attacked by a growing number of parasites, predators and pathogens.In the 1970s, a previously unknown variety of grassy stunt virus appeared in rice crops around the world. A variety of insect, also previously unknown, spread the virus. A search for plants resistant to the virus found a single, wild rice relative in a seed bank operated by the International Rice Research Institute. Botanists bredthat resistance intoa line of rice just in time to avert a global collapse in rice production. A similar situation occurred in the summerof 1970 whena previously unknown variety of Southern corn leaf blight destroyed 15 percent of the U.S. corn crop. Genetic uniformity of the corn permitted the fungus to spread through the Corn Belt like wildfire, according to later studies.

Monoculture is both natural and sustainable Avery, 2003

(Dennis T., Mimicking Nature to Eat Well, April 30, http://www.hudson.org/index.cfm?fuseaction=publication_details&id=2841)

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Dr. Michael Altieri of the University of California at Berkeley claims that monocultures are ecologically unstable. He says they provide optimal conditions for unhampered growth of weeds, insects, and diseases because many ecological niches are not filled by other organisms. But why use tropical biodiversity as a model? Evolutionist Charles Darwin

praised the huge kelp beds of the southern Atlantic, a natural monoculture. Darwin said, The number of living creatures of all Orders whose existence intimately depends on the kelp is wonderful. Another virtual species monopoly, blue grama grass, used to cover thousands of square miles of the central United States, supporting a rich web of wildlife ranging from huge
bison and mammoths to prairie dogs, birds, and grasshoppers.Dr. Donald Wood, a plant resource expert who has worked in India, Kenya, and the West Indies, says Mother Nature offers other plant growth models that had more to do with the evolution of todays farming than tropical forests, including natural grasslands and the flood plains of river valleys.He says the

common belief that cereals arose as weeds on the fringes of human campsites is not valid. As recently as a century ago, wild rice dominated the riverbanks in what is now Bangladesh. African wild rice was historically harvested on a massive scale across Africa from southern Sudan to the Atlantic Ocean. Dr. Wood says these monodominant stands of plant species led to wet rice cultivation, the single most important cropping system in the developing world.Perhaps the
strongest evidence of the natural mono-dominant pattern is wheat. Dr. Wood says that plant explorers have found wheat throughout t he Near East in massive stands covering many square kilometers, with up to three hundred plants per square meter. Sorghum

can be found in mono-dominant stands on the extensive tall-grass savannas of Sudan and Chad.Dr. Woods says that environmentally buffeted areas such as flood-prone river valleys, salt marshes,
fire-prone prairies, and regions with highly seasonal rainfall usually have few species. Cereal grasses have grown wild there for millennia, defying Altieris claim that monocultures are unstable.Man

simply extended the area of natural mono-dominant ecosystems to support more people on less land. Instead of waiting for floods to fertilize crops, modern farmers mimic nature by adding industrial fertilizer to the soil; instead of waiting for huge prairie
fires to renew cereal stands, they plow.

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Genetic Diversity Defense

Big ag increases plant variety Holmen, 2006
(Hans, Associate professor in Social and Economic Geography, working as Senior Lecturer in Geography at the Tema Institute, Linkoping University, Sweden, Mytsh about Agriculture, Obstacles to Solving the African Food Crisis, European Journal of Development Researche, Sept., Vol. 18, Issue 3) Also the claim that modern or scientific agriculture offers only a handful of uniform varieties (de Grassi and Rosset, 2003: 33), or even a few varieties of afew crops (Shiva, quoted in Pringle, 2003: 37), does not stand the test of closer scrutiny. Transnational agri-business corporations may have an interest in limiting the number of varieties released, since this could enhance profit.However, such restrictions do not apply topublicly owned crop research.Maredia et al. (1998) report that, in Africa alone, public maize researchprogrammes released nearly 300 new varieties between 1966 and 1990. This equals more than a handful of new varieties per year. Evenson and Gollin (2003:3) found that from public crop research programmesin Latin America, Asia andAfrica, by 2000, . . . more than 8000 modern varieties had been released in 11 crops studied. They also showed that both the diversity and the rate of releases increase over time. With more funding for public agricultural research, thesefigures could be substantially higher. Hence, neither externally nor withinagriculture is it inevitable that modernisation or scientisation of agriculturewill lead to genetic erosion.12

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Biodiversity Defense
Increased knowledge of big farms has decreased biodiversity loss Avery, 2003
(Dennis T., director of the Hudson Institute's Center for Global Food Issues, Species Extinction rate lowest in 500 Years, August 28, http://www.hudson.org/index.cfm?fuseaction=publication_details&id=3021) The world is losing wild species only half as rapidly as a hundred years ago, and the rate of extinctions is now the lowest in five hundred years. Moreover, mankind[humanity] now has enough knowledge of high-yield farming, and forest and wildlife management that we shouldn't have to suffer massive wild species losses in the future . This is the good news according to Dr. Mark Collins, a top expert at the UN Environmental Program. The number of extinctions (twenty) among birds, mammals and fish in the last third of the twentieth century was only half as great as in the extinctions (forty) in the last third of the nineteenth and no greater than the rate of extinctions in the sixteenth century, according to the UNEP's recently
published World Atlas of Biodiversity. The Atlas totals 675 known wild species lost in the last 400 years, though the count of 83 mammals and 128 fish and birds gone forever is more accurate than the estimate of extinct plants and insects.

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***NEG Movements Answers***

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No Movements
No political crises
Stelzer 9 Irwin Stelzer is a business adviser and director of economic policy studies at the Hudson Institute, Death of capitalism exaggerated, http://www.theaustralian.news.com.au/story/0,25197,26174260-5013479,00.html A FUNNY thing happened on the way to the collapse of market capitalism in the face of the worst economic crisis since the Great Depression. It didn't. Indeed, in Germany voters relieved Chancellor Angela Merkel of the necessity of cohabiting with a left-wing party, allowing her to form a coalition with a party favouring lower taxes and free markets. And in Pittsburgh leaders representing more than 90 per cent of the world's GDP convened to figure out how to make markets work better , rather than to hoist the red flag . The workers are to be relieved, not of their chains but of credit-card terms that are excessively onerous, and helped to retain their private property - their homes. All of this is contrary to expectations. The communist spectre that Karl Marx confidently predicted would be haunting Europe is instead haunting Europe's left-wing parties, with even Vladimir Putin seeking to attract investment by re-privatising the firms he snatched. Which raises an interesting question: why haven't the economic turmoil and rising unemployment led workers to the barricades, instead of to their bankers to renegotiate their mortgages? It might be because Spain's leftish government has proved less able to cope with economic collapse than countries with more centrist governments. Or because Britain, with a leftish government, is now the sick man of Europe, its financial sector in intensive care, its recovery likely to be the slowest in Europe, its prime credit rating threatened. Or it might be because left-wing trade unions, greedily demanding their public-sector members be exempted from the pain they want others to share, have lost their credibility and ability to lead a leftward lurch. All of those factors contribute to the unexpected strength of the Right
in a world in which a record number of families are being tossed out of their homes, and jobs have been disappearing by the million. But

even

more important in promoting reform over revolution are three factors: the existence of democratic institutions; the condition of the unemployed; and the set of policies developed to cope with the recession. Democratic institutions give the aggrieved
an outlet for their discontent, and hope they can change conditions they deem unsatisfactory. Don't like the way George W. Bush has skewed income distribution? Toss the Republicans out and elect a man who promises to tax the rich more heavily. Don't like Gordon Brown's tax increases? Toss him out and hope the Tories mean it when they promise at least to try to lower taxes. Result: angry voters but no rioters, unless one counts the nutters who break windows at McDonald's or storm banks in the City. Contrast that with China, where the disaffected have no choice but to take to the streets. Result: an estimated 10,000 riots this year protesting against job losses, arbitrary taxes and corruption. A

second factor explaining the Left's inability to profit from economic suffering is

capitalism's ability to adapt , demonstrated in the Great Depression of the 1930s . While a gaggle of bankers and fiscal
conservatives held out for the status quo, Franklin D. Roosevelt and his experimenters began to weave a social safety net. In Britain, William Beveridge produced a report setting the stage for a similar, indeed stronger, net. Continental countries recovering from World War II did the same. So unemployment no longer dooms a worker to close-to-starvation. Yes, civic institutions were able to soften the blow for the unemployed before the safety net was put in place, but they could not cope with pervasive protracted lay-offs. Also,

during this and other recessions, when prices for many items are coming down, the real living standard of those in work actually improves. In the US, somewhere between 85 per cent and 90 per cent of workers have kept their jobs, and now see their living costs declining as rents and other prices come down. So the impetus to take to the streets is limited. Then there are the steps taken by capitalist governments to limit the depth and duration of the downturn. As the economies of most of the big industrial countries imploded,
policy went through two phases. The first was triage - do what is necessary to prevent the financial system from collapse. Spend. Guarantee deposits to prevent runs on banks and money funds, bail out big banks, force relatively healthier institutions to take over sicker ones, mix all of this with rhetorical attacks on greedy bankers - the populist spoonful of sugar that made the bailouts go down with the voters - and stop the rot. Meanwhile, have the central banks dust off their dog-eared copies of Bagehot and inject lots of liquidity by whatever means comes to mind. John Maynard Keynes, meet Milton Friedman for a cordial handshake. Then

came more permanent reform, another round of adapting capitalism to new realities, in this case the malfunctioning of the financial markets. Even Barack Obama's left-wing administration decided not to scupper the markets but instead to develop rules to relate bankers' pay more closely to long-term performance; to reduce the chance of implosions by increasing the capital banks must hold, cutting their profits and dividends, but leaving them in private hands; and to channel most stimulus spending through private-sector companies. This leaves the anti-market crowd little room for manoeuvre as voters seem satisfied with the changes to make

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capitalism and markets work better and more equitably. At least so far. There are exceptions. Australia moved a bit to the left in the last election, but more out of unhappiness with a tired incumbent's environmental and foreign policy. Americans chose Obama, but he had promised to govern from the centre before swinging left. And for all his rhetorical attacks on greedy bankers and other malefactors of great wealth, he sticks to reform of markets rather than their replacement, with healthcare a possible exception. Even in these countries, so far, so good for reformed capitalism. No substitutes accepted.

Movements are getting smothered out of existenceno alternative economic system Jones 11Owen, Masters at Oxford, named one of the Daily Telegraph's 'Top 100 Most Influential People on the Left'
for 2011, author of "Chavs: The Demonization of the Working Class", The Independent, UK, "Owen Jones: Protest without politics will change nothing", 2011, www.independent.co.uk/opinion/commentators/owen-jones-protest-withoutpolitics-will-change-nothing-2373612.html My first experience of police kettling was aged 16. It was May Day 2001, and the anti-globalisation movement was at its peak. The turn-of-the-century anti-capitalist movement feels largely forgotten today, but it was a big deal at the time. To a left-wing teenager growing up in an age of unchallenged neo-liberal triumphalism, just to have "anti-capitalism" flash up in the headlines was thrilling. Thousands of apparently unstoppable protesters chased the world's rulers from IMF to World Bank summits from Seattle to Prague to Genoa and the authorities were rattled. Today, as protesters in nearly a thousand cities across the world follow the example set by the Occupy Wall Street protests, it's worth pondering what happened to the anti-globalisation movement. Its activists did not lack passion or determination. But they did lack a coherent alternative to the neo-liberal project. With no clear political direction, the movement was easily swept away by the jingoism and turmoil that followed 9/11, just two months after Genoa. Don't get me wrong: the Occupy movement is a glimmer of sanity amid today's economic madness. By descending on the West's financial epicentres, it reminds us of how a crisis caused by the banks (a sentence that needs to be repeated until it becomes a clich) has been cynically transformed into a crisis of public spending. The founding statement of Occupy London puts it succinctly: "We refuse to pay for the banks' crisis." The Occupiers direct their fire at the top 1 per cent, and rightly so as US billionaire Warren Buffett confessed: "There's class warfare, all right, but it's my class, the rich class, that's making war, and we're winning."
The Occupy movement has provoked fury from senior US Republicans such as Presidential contender Herman Cain who predictably labelled it "anti-American". They're right to be worried: those camping outside banks threaten to refocus attention on the real villains, and to act as a catalyst for wider dissent. But

a coherent alternative to the tottering global economic order remains, it seems, as distant as ever. Neo-liberalism crashes around, half-dead, with no-one to administer the killer blow.
There's always a presumption that a crisis of capitalism is good news for the left. Yet in the Great Depression, fascism consumed much of Europe. The economic crisis of the 1970s did lead to a resurgence of radicalism on both left and right. But, spearheaded by Thatcherism and Reaganism, the New Right definitively crushed its opposition in the 1980s.This

time round, there doesn't even seem to be an alternative for the right to defeat. That's not the fault of the protesters. In truth, the left has never recovered from being virtually smothered out of existence . It was the victim of a perfect storm: the rise of the New Right; neo-liberal globalisation; and the repeated defeats suffered by the trade union movement. But, above all, it was the aftermath of the collapse of Communism that did for the left . As US neo-conservative Midge Decter triumphantly put it: "It's time to say: We've won. Goodbye." From the British Labour Party to the African National Congress, left-wing movements across the world hurtled to the right in an almost synchronised fashion. It was as though the left wing of the global political spectrum had been sliced off. That's why, although we live in an age of revolt, there remains no left to give it direction and purpose.

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Market Key
Market incentives are keyThe affs movements alone wont solve Barnhizer 6 -- Professor of Law, Cleveland State University. (David, Waking from Sustainability's "Impossible
Dream": The Decisionmaking Realities of Business and Government, 18 Geo. Int'l Envtl. L. Rev. 595, Lexis)
Medieval alchemists sought unsuccessfully to discover the process that would enable them to turn base metal into gold--assigning the name "Philosopher's Stone" to what they sought. The quest was doomed to failure. Just as a "sow's ear" cannot become a "silk purse," a

Sustainability is impossible for the same reasons. It asks us to be something we are not, both individually and as a political and economic community. It is impossible to convert humans into the wise, selfless, and nearly omniscient creatures required to build and operate a system that incorporates sustainability. Even if it were ultimately possible (and it is not), it would take many generations to achieve and we are running out of time. There is an enormous gap among what we claim we want to do, what we actually want to do, and our ability to achieve our professed goals. I admit to an absolute distrust of cheap and easy proclamations of lofty ideals and commitments to voluntary or unenforceable codes of practice. The only thing that counts is the actor's actual behavior. For most people, that behavior is shaped by self-interest determined by the opportunity to benefit or to avoid harm. In the economic arena this means that if a substantial return can be had without a high risk of significant negative consequences, the decision will be made to seek the benefit . It is the reinvention of Hardin's Tragedy of the Commons. n1 This essay explores the nature of human
base metal cannot become gold. decisionmaking and motivation within critical systems. These systems include business and governmental decisionmaking with a focus on environmental and social areas of emerging crisis where the consequence of acting unwisely or failing to act wisely produces

nothing humans create is "sustainable." Change is inevitable and [*597] irresistible whether styled as systemic entropy, Joseph Schumpeter's idea of a regenerative "creative destruction," or Nikolai Kondratieff's "waves" of economic and social transformation. n2 Business entities and governmental decisionmakers play critical roles in both causing environmental and social harms and avoiding those consequences. Some have thought that the path to avoiding harm and achieving positive benefits is to develop codes of practice that by their language promise that decisionmakers will behave in ways consistent with the principles that have come to be referred to as " sustainability." That belief is a delusion--an "impossible dream." Daniel Boorstin once asked: "Have we been doomed to make our dreams into illusions?" n3 He adds: "An illusion . . . is an image we have mistaken for reality. . . . [W]e cannot see it is not fact." n4 Albert Camus warns of the inevitability of failing to achieve unrealistic goals and the need to become more aware of the limited extent of our power to effect fundamental change. He urges that we concentrate on devising realistic strategies and behaviors that allow us to be effective in our actions. n5 As companies are expected to implement global codes of conduct such as the U.N. Global Compact and the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development's (OECD) Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, n6 and governments [*598] and multilateral institutions supposedly become more concerned about limiting the environmental and social impacts of business decisionmaking, it may be useful to consider actual behavior related to corporate and governmental responses to codes of practice, treaties, and even national laws. Unfortunately, business, government, and multilateral institutions have poor track records vis-a-vis conformity to such codes of practice and treaties. Despite good intentions, empty dreams and platitudes may be counterproductive. This essay argues that the ideal of sustainability as introduced in the 1987 report of the Brundtland Commission and institutionalized in the form of Agenda 21 at the 1992 Rio Earth Summit is false and counterproductive. The ideal of sustainability assumes that we are almost god-like, capable of perceiving, integrating, monitoring, organizing, and controlling our world. These assumptions create an "impossible" character to the "dream" of sustainability in business and governmental decisionmaking. Sustainability of the Agenda 21 kind is a utopian vision that is the enemy of the possible and the good. The problem is that while on paper we can always sketch elegant solutions that appear to have the ability to achieve a desired utopia, such solutions work "if only" everyone will come together and behave in the way laid out in the "blueprint." n7 Humans should have learned from such grand misperceptions as the French Enlightenment's failure to accurately comprehend the quality and limits of human nature or Marxism's flawed view of altruistic human motivation that the "if only" is an impossibly utopian reordering of human nature we will never achieve. n8 [*599] A critical defect in the idea of sustainable development is that it continues the flawed assumptions
large-scale harms for both human and natural systems. The analysis begins by suggesting that about human nature and motivation that provided the foundational premises of Marxist collectivism and centralized planning authorities. n9 Such perspectives inject rigidity and bureaucracy into a system that requires monitoring, flexibility, adaptation, and

greed and self limited human capacity, inordinate systemic complexity, and the power of large-scale driving forces beyond our ability to control lead to the unsustainability of human systems. Human self-interest is an insurmountable barrier that can be affected to a degree only by effective laws, the promise of significant financial or career returns, or fear of consequences. The only way to change the behavior of business and governmental decisionmakers is through the use of the "carrot" and the "stick ." n10 Yet
accountability. But, in criticizing the failed Marxist-Leninist form of organization, my argument should not be seen as a defense of supposed free market capitalism. Like Marxism, a true free market capitalism does not really exist. The factors of interest, even this approach can only be achieved incrementally with limited positive effects.

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You should prefer pragmatic solutionsThe affs movements are impossible and ensure mass suffering Barnhizer 6David R. Emeritus Professor at Cleveland State Universitys Cleveland-Marshall College of Law;
Waking from Sustainability's "Impossible Dream": The Decisionmaking Realities of Business and Government. 2006 Georgetown International Environmental Law Review. 18 Geo. Int'l Envtl. L. Rev. 595 L/N
We face a combination of ecological, social, and economic crises. These crises involve the ability to fund potentially conflicting obligations for the provision of social benefits, health care, education, pensions, and poverty alleviation. They also include the need for massive expenditures to "fix" what we have already broken. n59 Part

We also have vast economic needs for [*620] continuing wealth generation as a precondition for achieving social equity on national and global levels. Figuring out how to
of the challenge is that in the United States and Europe we have made fiscal promises that we cannot keep. reduce some of those obligations, eliminate others, and rebuild the core and vitality of our system must become a part of any honest social discourse. Even Pollyanna would be overwhelmed by the choices we face. There will be significant pain and sacrifice in any action we take. But failing to take prompt and effective action will produce even more catastrophic consequences.

The scale of social needs, including the need for expanded productive activity, has grown so large that it cannot be shut off at all, and certainly not abruptly. It cannot even be ratcheted down in any significant fashion without producing serious harms to human societies and hundreds of millions of people. Even if it were possible to shift back to systems of local self-sufficiency, the consequences of the transition process would be catastrophic for many people and even deadly to the point of continual conflict, resource wars, increased poverty , and strife. What are needed are concrete, workable, and pragmatic strategies that produce effective and intelligently designed economic activity in specific contexts and, while seeking efficiency and conservation, place economic and social justice high on a list of priorities.
n60 The imperative of economic growth applies not only to the needs and expectations of people in economically developed societies but also to people living in nations that are currently economically underdeveloped. Opportunities must be created, jobs must be generated in huge numbers, and economic resources expanded to address the tragedies of poverty and inequality. Unfortunately, natural systems must be exploited to achieve this; we cannot return to Eden. The question is not how to achieve a static state but how to achieve what is needed to advance social justice while avoiding and mitigating the most destructive consequences of our behavior. Many developing country groups involved in efforts to protect the environment and resist the impacts of free trade on their communities have been concerned with the harmful effects of economic change. Part of the concern is the increased scale of economic activity. Some concerns relate to who benefits and who loses in the changing context imposed by globalization. These concerns are legitimate and understandable. So are the other deep currents running beneath their political positions, including those of resistance to change of any kind and a [*621] rejection of the market approach to economic activities. In the system described inaccurately as free market capitalism, economic

activity not only breaks down existing systems, it creates new systems and--as Joseph Schumpeter observed-continually repeats the process through cycles of "creative destruction." n61 This pattern of creative destruction unfolds as necessarily and relentlessly as does the birth-maturation-death-rebirth cycle of the natural environment. This occurs even in a self-sufficient or autarkic market system capable of managing all variables within its closed dominion. But when the system breaks out of its closed environment, the ability of a single national actor to control the system's dynamics erodes and ultimately disappears in the face of differential conditions, needs, priorities, and agendas.
Globalization's ability to produce wealth for a particular group simultaneously produces harms to different people and interests and generates unfair resource redistribution within existing cultures. This is an unavoidable consequence of globalization. n62 The problem is that globalization

has altered the rules of operation of political, economic, and social activities, and in doing so multiplied greatly our ability to create benefit and harm. n63 While some understandably want the unsettling and often chaotic effects of globalization to go away, it can only be dealt with, not reversed. The system in which we live and work is no longer closed. There are few contexts not connected to the dynamics of some aspect of the extended economic and social systems resulting from globalization. This means the wide ranging and incompatible variables of a global economic, human rights, and social fairness system are resulting in conflicts and unanticipated interpenetrations that no one fully understands, anticipates, or controls. n64 Local [*622] self-sufficiency is the loser in this process. It can remain a nostalgic dream but rarely a reality . Except for isolated cultures and niche activities, there is very little chance that anyone will be unaffected by this
transformational process. Change is the constant, and it will take several generations before we return to a period of relative stasis. Even then it will only be a respite before the pattern once again intensifies.

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Squo Structurally Improving

The squo is structurally improving Goklany 9Worked with federal and state governments, think tanks, and the private sector for over 35 years. Worked
with IPCC before its inception as an author, delegate and reviewer. Negotiated UN Framework Convention on Climate Change. Managed the emissions trading program for the EPA. Julian Simon Fellow at the Property and Environment Research Center, visiting fellow at AEI, winner of the Julian Simon Prize and Award. PhD, MS, electrical engineering, MSU. B.Tech in electrical engineering, Indian Institute of Tech. (Indur, Have increases in population, affluence and technology worsened human and environmental well-being? 2009, http://www.ejsd.org/docs/HAVE_INCREASES_IN_POPULATION_AFFLUENCE_AND_TECHNOLOGY_WORSENE D_HUMAN_AND_ENVIRONMENTAL_WELL-BEING.pdf) Although global population is no longer growing exponentially, it has quadrupled since 1900. Concurrently, affluence (or GDP per capita) has sextupled,
global economic product (a measure of aggregate consumption) has increased 23-fold and carbon dioxide has increased over 15-fold (Maddison 2003; GGDC 2008; World Bank 2008a; Marland et al. 2007).4 But

contrary to Neo- Malthusian fears, average human well-being, measured by any objective indicator, has never been higher. Food supplies, Malthus original concern, are up worldwide. Global food supplies per capita increased from 2,254 Cals/day in 1961 to 2,810 in 2003 (FAOSTAT 2008). This helped reduce hunger and malnutrition worldwide. The proportion of the population in the developing world, suffering from chronic hunger declined from 37 percent to 17 percent between 196971 and 20012003 despite an 87 percent population increase (Goklany 2007a; FAO 2006). The reduction in hunger and malnutrition, along with improvements in basic hygiene, improved access to safer water and sanitation, broad adoption of vaccinations, antibiotics, pasteurization and other public health measures, helped reduce mortality and increase life expectancies. These improvements first became evident in todays developed countries in the mid - to late-1800s and started to spread in earnest to developing countries from the 1950s. The infant mortality rate in developing countries was 180 per 1,000 live births in the early 1950s; today it is 57. Consequently, global life expectancy, perhaps the single most important measure of human well-being, increased from 31 years in 1900 to 47 years in the early 1950s to 67 years today (Goklany 2007a). Globally, average annual per capita incomes tripled since 1950. The proportion of the worlds population outside of high-income OECD countries living in absolute poverty (average consumption of less than $1 per day in 1985 International dollars adjusted for purchasing power parity), fell from 84 percent in 1820 to 40 percent in 1981 to 20 percent in 2007 (Goklany 2007a; WRI 2008; World Bank 2007). Equally important, the world is more literate and better educated. Child labor in low income countries declined from 30 to 18 percent between 1960 and 2003. In most countries, people are freer politically, economically and socially to pursue their goals as they see fit. More people choose their own rulers, and have freedom of expression. They are more likely to live under rule of law, and less likely to be arbitrarily deprived of life, limb and property. Social and professional mobility has never been greater. It is easier to transcend the bonds of caste, place, gender, and other accidents of birth in the lottery of life. People work fewer hours, and have more money and better health to enjoy their leisure time (Goklany 2007a). Figure 3 summarizes the U.S. experience over the 20th century
with respect to growth of population, affluence, material, fossil fuel energy and chemical consumption, and life expectancy. It indicates that population has multiplied 3.7-fold; income, 6.9-fold; carbon dioxide emissions, 8.5-fold; material use, 26.5-fold; and organic chemical use, 101-fold. Yet its life

expectancy increased from 47 years to 77 years and infant mortality (not shown) declined from over 100 per 1,000 live births to 7 per 1,000. It is also important to note that not only are people living longer, they are healthier. The disability rate for seniors declined 28 percent between 1982 and 2004/2005 and, despite better diagnostic tools, major diseases (e.g., cancer, and heart and respiratory diseases) occur 811 years later now than a
century ago (Fogel 2003; Manton et al. 2006). If similar figures could be constructed for other countries, most would indicate qualitatively similar trends, especially after 1950, except Sub-Saharan Africa and the erstwhile members of the Soviet Union. In the latter two cases, life expectancy, which had increased following World War II, declined after the late 1980s to the early 2000s, possibly due poor economic performance compounded, especially in Sub-Saharan Africa, by AIDS, resurgence of malaria, and tuberculosis due mainly to poor governance (breakdown of public health services) and other manmade causes (Goklany 2007a, pp.6669, pp.178181, and references therein). However, there are signs of a turnaround, perhaps related to increased economic growth since the early 2000s, although this could, of course, be a temporary blip (Goklany 2007a; World Bank 2008a). Notably, in most areas of the world, the healthadjusted life expectancy (HALE), that is, life expectancy adjusted downward for the severity and length of time spent by the average individual in a less-than-healthy condition, is greater now

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than the unadjusted life expectancy was 30 years ago. HALE for the China and India in 2002, for instance, were 64.1 and 53.5 years, which exceeded their unadjusted life expectancy of 63.2 and 50.7 years in 19701975 (WRI 2008). Figure 4, based on cross country data, indicates that contrary to Neo-Malthusian fears, both

life expectancy and infant mortality improve with the level of affluence (economic development) and time, a surrogate for technological change (Goklany 2007a). Other indicators of human well-being that improve over time and as affluence rises are: access to safe water and sanitation
(see below), literacy, level of education, food supplies per capita, and the prevalence of malnutrition (Goklany 2007a, 2007b).

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***NEG Solvency Answers***

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US AID Fails
No solvency wont listen to experts only people of similar social location Wainer, immigration policy analyst for Bread for the World Institute, in 11 [Andrew, Development and Migration In Rural Mexico, Bread for the World Institute, Brief No. 11, January]
The apple growers were inclined to grow as many apples as they could with little regard for quality. This would give them enough money to survive, but little more. The 2008 World Development Report describes the challenges in providing pathways out of rural poverty for risk-averse small farmers, The inability [of small producers] to cope with shocks induces households to adopt low-risk, low-return activities. 47 Thus, the first stage of the For a Just Market project trained the smallholder apple farmers how to access the apple market on better terms while also transmitting new techniques for producing higher-quality apples. In order to train the apple farmers how to most profitably work with the apple market, CRS hired a Washington state agronomist who visited the farmers in Chihuahua and trained them how to monitor the Mexican apple markets on the Internet. With better knowledge of the market, the small
farmers could increase the income generated by their orchards by selling the apples when their price was peaking. In addition to the market analysis training, CRS facilitated the transmission of state-of-the-art apple orchardist techniques. Beginning in 2005, an exchange program was created between the Chihuahua apple farmers and Broetje Orchards Mexican immigrant agricultural laborers. After decades of working on the cutting edge of apple farming in the United States,

the immigrants

knew how to produce the most valuable apples for market. The techniques they introduced to the Chihuahua farmers included tree pruning and trimming, drip-irrigation, tree spacing strategies, and
how to use anti-hail netting. In January 2006 a group of Chihuahua apple farmers visited Broetje Orchards to learn from the Mexican immigrant workers. The first delegation of Broetje Orchard apple workers and managers visited the Chihuahua farmers in July, 2006 to impart their orchardist expertise. One of the primary techniques introduced to the Chihuahua farmers was limiting the amount of apples grown on each tree branch so that a smaller number of higher-quality apples are produced. [It] totally changed my

Chihuahua farmers appreciated learning the techniques from compatriots who share a common language and culture. [The immigrant technical advisors] are people who know things, who have a big mentality, but who are modest, Chihuahua farmer Isidro Molinar said. Barrett also emphasized the differences between traditional technical assistance and immigrant trainers. If a bunch of gringos were doing that, it would just reinforce the idea that these gringos have all the knowledge, Barrett said. While USAID facilitates farmer-to-farmer programs that bring U.S. agricultural volunteers to the developing world to provide technical assistance to farmers, it does not draw upon the United States agricultural workforcea majority of whom are immigrants and who are intensely interested in helping their homelandsto provide culturally relevant agricultural technical assistance overseas.4
mentality, Chihuahua apple farmer Daniel Delgado said.

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Cant Solve NAFTA

The Plan is a drop in the bucket
Gonzalez, Associate Professor, Seattle University School of Law, 11 [Carmen G., AN ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE CRITIQUE OF COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE: INDIGENOUS PEOPLES, TRADE POLICY, AND THE MEXICAN NEOLIBERAL ECONOMIC REFORMS, University of Pennsylvania Journal of International Law, 32 U. Pa. J. Int'l L. 723, Spring]
An environmental justice approach to trade policy seeks to reduce the structural inequities in global economic relations that impose a disproportionate share of the burdens of globalization on developing countries and on vulnerable populations within those countries. n339 As the NAFTA case study illustrates, trade liberalization based on comparative advantage has often relegated developing countries to poverty by locking them into economically and ecologically disadvantageous specialization in agro-export production or low-wage, low-skill assembly plants and by precluding them from creating comparative advantage in more dynamic economic sectors.

Even if small farmers in Mexico are compensated for providing ecosystem services and if the most egregious inequities in the agricultural chapter of NAFTA and in the WTO Agreement on Agriculture are moderated, the current WTO framework constrains the ability of developing countries to utilize many of the protectionist development strategies historically deployed by wealthy countries to achieve a stable, prosperous and diversified economic base. n340 An environmental justice approach to trade policy must recognize and give effect to the right to development articulated by the U.N. General Assembly in its 1986 Declaration on the Right to Development n341 and subsequently reaffirmed in Principle 3 of the Rio Declaration. n342 The Declaration on the Right to Development proclaims the right to development as an "inalienable human right," and imposes on states "the duty to co-operate with each [*795] other in ensuring development and eliminating obstacles to development" as well as "the duty to take steps, individually and collectively, to formulate international development policies with a view to facilitating the full realization of the right to development." n343 As Professors Ruth Gordon and Jon Sylvester
point out, acknowledging a right to development implies conceding the obligation to provide financial assistance to effectuate this right - an obligation that wealthy countries have consistently rejected. n344 Despite the Global North's disavowal of an explicit financial obligation, development has always been and continues to be the central objective of the Global South in the international trade regime. n345 The 1947 GATT was widely perceived to favor wealthy countries over poor ones because it required reduction of tariffs on manufactured goods while permitting industrialized countries to limit or exclude textiles, clothing, and agricultural products from developing countries. n346 In response to these inequities, developing countries banded together to demand trade preferences in favor of Third World nations, including preferential market access and non-reciprocal tariff concessions, most of which proved ineffective because they were voluntary and could be withdrawn [*796] at whim by developed countries. n347 Despite several attempts to make the GATT more development-friendly by imposing asymmetrical obligations on developed and developing countries pursuant to the principle of special and differential treatment, the GATT failed to open up industrialized country markets to developing country products (clothing, textiles, and agricultural products) or to give developing countries sufficient flexibility to promote industrialization. n348 The WTO, which succeeded the 1947 GATT, did not improve matters. In exchange for enhanced market access for developing country textiles and agricultural products, developing countries agreed to the curtailment of asymmetrical obligations and undertook new obligations in a variety of areas that were of particular interest to industrialized countries (including intellectual property, services, and investment). n349 Like its predecessor, the WTO did not eliminate the trade barriers that excluded developing country products from industrialized country markets. n350 However, the WTO did succeed in restricting the ability of developing countries to use tariffs and subsidies to promote potentially dynamic industries and to protect these industries from more technologically advanced foreign competitors; n351 it also imposed a host of new and costly obligations on developing countries in the areas of intellectual property, services, and [*797] investment. n352 At the end of the day, most developing countries came to regard the WTO as a bad bargain. n353 In response to developing countries' dissatisfaction with the WTO, the ministerial declaration that launched the Doha Round of WTO negotiations re-affirmed the commitment to special and differential treatment, and called for the review and strengthening of these provisions in order to make them "more precise, effective, and operational." n354 Multilateral and bilateral trade agreements must expressly adopt and reinvigorate the principle of special and differential treatment by giving developing countries the "policy space" to utilize a variety of protectionist mechanisms to facilitate the transition from agro-export specialization and export processing to a more diversified economic base capable of generating reliable revenue streams. n355 Only an asymmetrical set of trading rules that require relative market openness in wealthy countries while permitting certain forms of protectionism in poor countries can begin to alter the inequitable patterns of trade and production that foster environmental injustice in the Global South.

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***Aid Kritik***

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1NC Shell
First, The discourse of Aid and development is just the liberal alternative to eugenics the demarcation between biopolitically valuable forms of life, those worth saving and those merely important for the operations of capital, produce a relationship of disposability toward those the aff targets. This forms the basis for an unending war Duffield, Professor Emeritus and former Director of the Global Insecurities Centre, University of Bristol, 7 [Mark, Development, Security and Unending War Governing the World of People, pg. 216-218]
liberalism is concerned with the security of people, their well-being, freedom and rights (Dean 1999). While different from liberalism, development is intimately connected with it. Development emerges with the advent of the modern world as a practical technology for the protection and betterment of life through harnessing its powers of becoming. The abolition of slavery, the rise of industrial capitalism and imperial expansion called forth developments referent object, that is, modernitys predilection constantly to produce life that is e ither politically or economically surplus to requirements. As a way of redeeming and making safe surplus population, development constitutes a liberal problematic of security. Surplus life is a potentially dangerous life in need of constant rescue and reintegration as a necessary part of constituting liberal political order itself (Agamben 1998). Embracing freed slaves, Europes industrial reserve army and the indigenous peoples of Empire, development appears as a technology of security that brackets together and works across national and international boundaries. Cowen and Shenton (1996) have argued that development emerges during the nineteenth century as a means of reconciling the need for order with the necessity of progress. Its key institution is the exercise of an educative and empowering trusteeship over the surplus life that modernity constantly creates. It is thus a liberal alternative to extermination or eugenics, modernitys other answers to the problem of surplus population. Development shares with liberalism an experience of life that is culturally different as always being somehow incomplete or lacking. As
As a design of power, Mehta (1999) has argued, this impoverished experience of life, and its accompanying will to exercise moral tutelage, is an enduring feature of liberal imperialism. It characterizes nineteenth-century British attitudes towards India, for example, just as it shapes todays post -interventionary terrain in Iraq, Afghanistan and beyond. Since the nineteenth century liberal notions of development have been based on securing or redeeming

is a concern to maintain the authenticity of local organization and community in the face of the disruptive and anarchic effects of progress. Then, as now, the foundation of an authentic community-based political voice is the small-scale ownership of land or property. Apart from experiments involving former slaves, development as community-based self-reliance emerged in nineteenth-century Europe in response to the underdevelopment of capitalism (Cowen and Shenton 1996). Underpinned by radical and liberal demands to break up large estates and redistribute land, selfreliance offered a future for the dangerous masses of unemployed and destitute that were a feature of the new industrial towns and cities. Until the end of the nineteenth century development was an important part of domestic welfare discourse. By this time, however, a different and more effective liberal
surplus life through strengthening its powers of self-reliance and self-management. A recurrent theme of development, well reflected in contemporary notions of sustainable development, approach to the problem of surplus population began to emerge in Europe that is, social insurance based on the principle of members making regular payments into a centrally managed fund that can be drawn on at times of need. Extended and deepened by the societal effects of two world wars, this principle would eventually expand to shape the European welfare state, where social protection became a right of citizenship (Rose 2000).

In presenting development as a technology of security, development and underdevelopment are distinguished biopolitically, that is, as connected but separate assemblages of institutions, techniques and interventions by which life is supported and distinguished internationally. In this respect biopolitics is not a single strategization of power in the sense of a globalizing or universal disposition for acting on and promoting life at the level of world population. Reflecting its organic ties with racism, development embodies the biopolitical division and separation of the human species into developed and underdeveloped species-life. With the advent of social insurance, earlier developmental approaches to the problem of surplus population based on community self-reliance
were eclipsed in Europe. While not disappearing completely, by the beginning of the twentieth century development as a liberal technology of security based on self-reliance migrated and consolidated its association with the protectorates and colonies. Drawing on Enlightenment views on the self-sufficient nature of natural man, example,

development as decentralized self-management emerged, for

in the liberal colonial practice of indirect rule or Native Administration (Cooke 2003). Following the inability of indirect rule to curb the growth of nationalism, however, by During the contested process of decolonization, development became an interstate means of differentiating and governing the new world of peoples that
the 1940s it had vectored into the colonial practice of community development and the encouragement of producer cooperatives (Kelemen 2006).

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nationalism had called forth. The struggle for independence, however, did not expose the connection between liberalism and imperialism thus subjecting it to critique. Decolonization was experienced as revealing a threatening world of poverty that, once again, demanded Western tutelage and trusteeship. In these momentous events, the global biopolitical divide between a developed or insured life versus an underdeveloped or non-insured life expected to be self-reliant life was sealed. The effect of development as a technology of security has been to deepen this divide until today it forms the basis of unending war.

The alternative is solidarity of the governed. Duffield, Professor Emeritus and former Director of the Global Insecurities Centre, University of Bristol, 7 [Mark, Development, Security and Unending War Governing the World of People, Pg. 232-234]
In June 1984 Michel Foucault released a statement on behalf of several NGOs to mark the formation of the International Commission Against Piracy and to protest against the interdiction at sea and summary return of Vietnamese boat people. In his statement Foucault stressed that all were present as private individuals, with no grounds for speaking other than 'a certain shared difficulty in enduring what is taking place' (Foucault [1984]: 474). In setting out the aims of the group he listed several principles, including the existence of an 'international citizenship' with rights, duties and obligations to speak out against the abuse of power, whoever the author. After all, 'we

are all of the community of the governed, and thereby obliged to show mutual solidarity' (ibid.). The sentiment that 'we are all governed and therefore in solidarity is present in different ways and degrees in today's antiglobalization campaigns, such as global justice movements, the World Social Forum, the Zapatistas in Mexico or the international peasant farmers' movement Via Campesina . It disturbs and questions earlier forms of Third World solidarity coalescing around politics, rights and aid (Olesen 2004). Rights and aid solidarity in particular, including humanitarian and development assistance, imply a one-way process between the provider and beneficiary of solidarity. It is a process that emphasizes differences in power and distance, with providers in places of safety and beneficiaries in zones of crisis. It is also apolitical and does 'not fundamentally challenge the underlying causes of grievances that inspire the solidarity effort' (ibid.: 258). In contrast, global solidarity emphasizes mutuality and reciprocity between provider and beneficiary while blurring the differences between them. It involves a 'more extensive global consciousness that constructs the grievances of physically, socially and culturally distant people as deeply intertwined' (ibid.: 259). While difference is acknowledged, it is the similarities that are important. Global solidarity is also political: distant struggles are common points of departure that collectively problematize the overarching, anti-democratic and marginalizing effects of global neoliberalism, whether as struggles against hospital closures in mass consumer society or the ruination of pastoralist livelihoods beyond its borders . In this respect, it minimizes attempts to divide and striate humankind either according to measures of development and underdevelopment or those of culture. Today the fear of radical interconnection, with its ability to threaten the stability of mass consumer society, dominates Western political imagination. For an international citizenship, however, it offers possibilities for new encounters, mutual recognition, reciprocity and hope: it represents the magic of life itself. The principles of mutuality and interconnectedness provide a chance to rediscover politics as a practical interrogation of power. If biopolitics and its technologies of security have absorbed the political, the task is not so much to reinvent it as to reclaim it. It involves questioning the assumptions and practices that support life while at the same time disallowing it to the point of death. Called into question are those acts of administrative or petty sovereignty that, acting through the lens of race, class and gender, order the way we live and dictate how we develop the rest of the world in our own interests. We are all governed by these practices - providers and beneficiaries alike - which themselves are directly or indirectly the result of states. Through interconnectedness, mutuality and conversations among the governed, they can be compared, reconnected and interrogated. Such mutuality, however, demands a change of comportment. In a reversal

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of educating the poor and marginalized, it is more a question of learning from their struggles for existence, identity and dignity and together challenging the world we live in. As a precondition, the liberal inclination to prejudge those who are culturally different as somehow incomplete and requiring external betterment has to be abandoned. It requires a willingness to engage in unscripted conversations and accept the risks involved, including the inability to predict or control outcomes - a situation that a security mentality continually tries to avoid. Through a practical politics based on the solidarity of the governed we can aspire to opening ourselves to the spontaneity of unpredictable encounters. It also entails a willingness to help without expecting anything in return, that is, abandoning the security prescription which argues that in helping others we should also help ourselves. While mandatory for donor and NGO
assistance, offers of support from and between international citizens would not insist that beneficiaries change their beliefs, attitudes or forms of social organization.

If development encloses an emancipatory urge, it does not lie in the formulation of endless 'new and improved' technologies of betterment nor the search for more authentic forms of community - it is found in the solidarity of the governed made possible by a radically interconnected world and the insatiable will to life that flows and circulates through it.

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Small Farms links

The fantasy of returning to a small farm utopia keeps surplus populations marginalized, barred from the securities of wealthy society Li, Department of Anthropology, University of Toronto, Canada, 10 [Tania Murray, To Make Live or Let Die? Rural Dispossession and the Protection of Surplus Populations, Antipode, Vol. 42 No.S1, Jan]
Although I began this essay with a critique of the linear narrative of agrarian transition, I want to stress that I do not counterpose transition to a rural utopia, in which people reject newproducts and labour regimes in favour of locally oriented production on small family farms. As my own field research in Sulawesi demonstrates very clearly, and other studies confirm, the transition narrative corresponds closely to a popular desire to leave behind the insecurities of subsistence production, and enjoy the fuller life that better food, housing, education and health care can offer (Ferguson 2005; Rigg 2006). Yet the sad truth is that this desire is frustrated, especially for the poorest people, who are routinely dispossessed through the very processes that enable other people to prosper. Far too many of them cannot even access a living wage, because their labour is surplus to capitals requirements.

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AID Links
Aid is global biopolitical regime it is only to make lives live in order to prevent catastrophe in the first world Kelly, Lecturer in Philosophy at Middlesex University, in 10 [M.G.E., International Biopolitics Foucault, Globalisation and Imperialism, Theoria, June]
One might argue that there is a countervailing phenomenon to the accumulation of human capital through our selectively permeable borders in the deployment of medical and technical personnel from the rich countries to poor countries in aid programs, and indeed as volunteers. Of course, as we have seen, the general trend of such migration of personnel is overwhelmingly in the opposite direction, and those from rich countries who work in poor countries do not typically stay in the latter long term, thus do not enrich the population in the same way that economic migrants to the rich countries do. However, the flow of aid from the rich to poor countries is increasing, which would seem prima facie to be a contrary tendency to any parasitism. Yet, the

overall effect of aid is, like that of migration controls, in the self-interest of the richer countries. One should be wary indeed in this regard of what is called aid, since loans, including World Bank loans, that shackle recipients, are sometimes categorised as aid, and even less conditional aid is typically given in situations
where there is an obvious strategic interest to the donor;13 the largest aid recipients by far today are the oil producers Iraq and Nigeria, for example. Certainly, there is no question of any serious sacrifice being made by the First World to help the Third in aid donation. The UN has set a benchmark for aid of 0.7 per cent of donor countries GDP and it is not being met.14 Private donations pale in comparison to the still ultimately insufficient donations of states. There

is moreover a tactical logic to aid. Aid has the general function of security for the donor country: it keeps the stability of recipient countries within a range of tolerances necessary for geopolitical security, prevents famine and disorder, which in turn prevents the problems of one area spilling over into other areas, as well as greasing the wheels of trade (particularly in the case of aid to middle income countries), and serving a propaganda function. There is no hidden conspiracy here: these functions are all quite explicit, government spending on aid being justified explicitly on the basis of selfinterest that aid is necessary to geopolitical stability, good for trade, that it will help our friends and enhance our reputation abroad. Aid is not an optional extra to the security of the donor populations. It is rather an external projection of domestic policy, like the use of thanatopolitics. The clearest
example of this is aid targeted at (preventing) pandemics: disease can cross borders, so global efforts to combat such diseases are protective to any given population. In principle, it might

be possible simply to quarantine ones population, but of course this would have far-reaching negative consequences, particularly economic. AIDS is the prime example of a pandemic today which the rich countries try to control: USAID spent $2.8 billion on fighting AIDS in 2006. Compare this with the $100 million expenditure fighting malaria in 2005; malaria kills more people,
but will not spread to the rich biopolities. Indeed, one of the main claims now made by campaigners seeking funding for anti-malaria campaigns is that malaria is catalysing the spread of HIV; this might explain recent increases in funding to anti-malaria programs. There is no question that in the case of AIDS, calls for funding to fight it in the Third World are routinely couched in terms of securityalthough some have also conversely argued that the AIDS pandemic has positive security outcomes by controlling population growth, which licenses some level of indifference on the part of governments (Elbe, 2005). Now, humanitarian

and development aid neither kills people nor lets them liverather it makes them live, which makes it a case of biopolitics. It is an inferior biopolitics, however, applied only to protect the core population, as Mark Duffield has argued: International development, with its avowed aim of reducing poverty and strengthening social resilience is a biopolitical technology. It is a biopolitics, however, that is different from that associated with the massified insurance-based safety-nets of developed society (Duffield, 2006). The inferior biopolitics of the outside resembles the biopolitics of the inside insofar as it involves monitoring and intervention. Aid may look like a global biopolitics, then, as Dillon and Reid have claimed: biopolitical global development and aid policies constitute a complex population that one might call the global poor; since where there is a
population, there is a biopolitics, this implies that there is a form of global biopolitics (Dillon and Reid, 2001: 48). However, the inferior biopolitics is so haphazard that it barely counts as biopolitics, providing no guaranteed minimum: there is of course no world state, hence no world population; some people in the world are left entirely outside this inferior biopolitics, and the coverage of billions varies wildly across time and space. International organisations, such as the World Health Organisation (WHO) and the Joint United Nations Program on HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS) play a critical role in the inferior biopolitics, particularly in data collection (Elbe, 2005), and also in coordination of responses to biological problems in the Third World, but they are responsible for a small proportion of aid dispersal; most aid still comes directly from First World national treasuries, as does most of the budget of these organisations. Aid

is not only self-interested, moreover, but, like the migration regime, tends actively to undermine biopower in the Third World. Here we are taking a position similar to that of dependency theory in international relations. The difference is our basis: we do not argue on the basis of a relationship between economies

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interferes crucially and specifically with biopolitics in a way that harms aid recipients quite autonomously from any economic dependency; in this way, our argument is immune to the empirical objections that have largely discredited dependency theory. Criticisms of aid as unhelpful are made by libertarian economists such as James Shikwati, though the
direction of our conclusions is entirely opposite to theirs: while the libertarian-influenced critique of aid is of a piece with a critique of government intervention, a biopolitical perspective tells us that government

is a necessary element of a social system, and it is the development of the whole, including of government itself, that is retarded by intervention from outside. Our position has more in common with that of Yash Tandons critique of aid dependence (2008). The aid system involves flows from without, which has certain corrupting effects, which vary according to the distribution conduits for aid. Aid distribution can be either through local agents, or directly by the donor organisation. In the former case, distribution can either be delegated to the state or to civil society organisations. There is a tendency for donors to try to avoid distribution through official, state channels because of concerns about corruption. The concerns are well placed: aid is a powerfully corrupting influence, but on anyone who touches it, not just the state; aids value itself constitutes an incentive to misdirect it.

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Capitalism Link
Poverty assistance to displaced rural farmers is just a new means of exploiting surplus populations. The plan is a reworking of development assistance in response to the latest rounds of neoliberal dispossession. The aff does nothing but lubricate the gears of capital. Duffield, Professor Emeritus and former Director of the Global Insecurities Centre, University of Bristol, 7 [Mark, Development, Security and Unending War Governing the World of People, pg. 10-12
Accumulation by dispossession embodies the idea that capitalism must perpetually have something outside of [sic] itself in order to stabilise itself (Harvey 2003: 140). One example is the continuing relevance of Marxs notion of an industrial reserve army, that is, a floa ting population of cheap, unskilled labour, lacking protection and entitlements, that can be hired and fired as business expands and contracts. For Harvey, such an outside can be either a pre-existing non-capitalist territory, such as still existed in many regions of the world at the end of the nineteenth century, or a sector or market within capitalism that has not been fully exploited or proletarianized . Additionally and importantly, however, capitalism can actually manufacture it (ibid.: 141). Through a combination of mechanisms, accumulation by dispossession continues to shape the violent bouts of predation on existing dispensations and accepted entitlements as a necessary requirement for renewed accumulation. Within the underdeveloped world, many forms of primitive accumulation that would be recognizable to Marx are still operating today: the dispossession of peasantries, the displacement of family farming by international agribusiness, forced migration, new waves of proletarianization and reproletarianization, the wholesale privatization of
common property such as water, the suppression of indigenous forms of production and consumption and so on. At the same time, however, and relating to the mass consumer societies of the developed world, certain aspects of primitive accumulation have been adapted and expanded. The credit system and finance capital, for example, have opened up new zones of predation. Stock promotions, mergers and asset stripping have accompanied the active promotion of high levels of debt peonage. Corporate fraud and dispossession through credit and stock manipulation, including the raiding and decimation of pension fund s by stock and corporate collapse are all central features of what contemporary capitalism is about (ibid. : 147). Indeed, the reversion to private hands of public entitlements won through political struggle, such as a state pension, social welfare and national health care has been the most egregious of all policies of dispossession pur sued in the name of neoliberal orthodoxy (ibid.: 148). New global mechanisms for dispossession have also opened up, for example regarding intellectual property rights, patenting and the licensing of genetic material such as seed plasma. Biopiracy by international pharmaceutical companies and the pillaging of the worlds genetic resources are rampant, creating means ofgovernance that can now be used against whole populations whosepractices had played a crucial role in the development of those materials (ibid.). The wholesale commodification of life, including its many natural and cultural forms, histories and intellectual creativity, is currently under way. When coupled with the deepening international privatization of common goods and entitlements such as land, water and public utilities, Harvey has argued that capitalism

has launched the world on a new wave of enclosing the commons (ibid.). From political economy one could argue that accumulation by dispossession, in continually evoking a surplus population, not only provides development with an object, it is one that is constantly being renewed. A superfluous and potentially dangerous waste-life is continuously thrown off as markets are relentlessly made and remade in the endless search for progress. This concern arising from political economy is recognized by policy makers. Politicians are fully aware, for example, that while globalization brings many benefits, if badly managed it can exacerbate inequality and instability (Biccum 2005). This contemporary ambivalence towards globalization returns development once more to its founding design of reconciling the need for order with the challenges of progress. Because surplus life is continuously produced, development also periodically reinvents itself. While the context, words and emphasis may change, the central meaning remains the same. In terms of basic tenets this process, since 1949at least, has been well documented by William Easterly (Easterly 2002). Following decolonization, when it vectored into an interstate relationship, development has regularly reinvented itself within a limited set of axioms. Like penal reform, the endless rediscovery of development has produced a a monotonous critique (Foucault [1975]: 266) which, in this case, invariably calls for an increase in aid spending, a renewed focus on poverty reduction, the delivery of more effective aid, the necessity of better coordination between donors, aid agencies and recipients, the importance of recipients being receptive to policy change and, not least, debt relief. The periodic repackaging of these aims over the past half-century has been helped by developments organizational preference for

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limited agency competition, low public accountability, institutional amnesia and a willingness to engage in obfuscation and spin control, allowing practitioners always to describe aid efforts as new and improved (Easterly 2002: 228).

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External Aid Link

Economic engagement by the state is subversive form of petty sovereignty, incorporating disparate populations into the Wests regulatory and biopolitical regimes through large-scale ordering operations of power. Duffield, Professor Emeritus and former Director of the Global Insecurities Centre, University of Bristol, 7 [Mark, Development, Security and Unending War Governing the World of People, pg. 222-3]
The international political architecture of the Cold War was based on respect for territorial integrity and sovereign competence or noninterference in domestic affairs. While territorial integrity remains central, sovereignty over life in ineffective states is now internationalized, negotiable and contingent (Elden 2006). On the basis of humanitarian emergency and peace activism, Western influence has increased in the biopolitical space of contingent sovereignty. It has expanded, however, on a terrain already staked out by the petty sovereigns of the NGO movement. Humanitarian emergency cleared away Cold War restrictions, allowing UN agencies and NGOs to work legitimately on all sides in unresolved internal wars . Fuelled by a marked increase in Western emergency funding, the end of the Cold War saw the emergence of system-wide relief operations drawing together donor governments, UN agencies, NGOs, private companies and defence establishments into new forms of interaction,
cooperation and competition (Duffield 2001). During the Cold War the recurrent move from relief to development had primarily functioned to establish the NGO movements sovereignty among the world of peoples; this time it was synonymous with the governmentalization of the movement itself. Through

such measures as the growth of donor funding, the creation of new working practices and more comprehensive contractual arrangements and auditing tools, the petty sovereignty of the NGO movement was reorchestrated within a thickening web of overlapping aims and mutual interests connecting donor states, recipient governments, UN agencies and militaries. The govemmentalization of the aid industry is an essential aspect of contingent sovereignty and the advent of a postinterventionary political terrain. While presented as a relation of mutual self-interest, this increased penetration is experienced as essential for the West's own security. Although territorial integrity is respected, populations within ineffective states are nonetheless being reterritorialized through multiagency programmes aimed at reconstructing weak and fragile states.
Effective states attempt to govern through these anarchic strategic complexes using technologies of coherence, that is, the search for methodologies, dispositions and administrative arrangements allowing

aid and politics to work together in the interests of peace and stability. While the search for coherence invokes the centralization of power, it also provokes new sites of resistance on the part of the independent administrative sovereigns on which aid as governance depends.

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State Link
Must abandon the state otherwise the regime of aid will be caught up in a biopolitical madness that nexeccitates endless wars in the maintinace of state security. Duffield, Professor Emeritus and former Director of the Global Insecurities Centre, University of Bristol, 7 [Mark, Development, Security and Unending War Governing the World of People, Pg. 230-232]
Humanitarian emergencies are, in some respects, not the result of the breakdown of self-reliance but of its essential success; that is, its ability to allow

noninsured people, groups and communities to forge livelihoods and survival strategies beyond and outside the state (Keen 1994 and 1998; Duffield 2001: 136-60). The increase in Western interventionism is occurring at a time when people are actively deserting the state. The vast literature on 'war economies', for example, is illustrative of an innovative and radical self-reliance. Transborder and shadow economies have expanded at the same time as a medley of actors - ranging from ethnic associations, clan leaders and religious groups to warlords, Mafiosi and terrorist organizations - have all learned the biopolitical art of enfranchising the dispossessed through alternative forms of protection, legitimacy and welfare as a necessary adjunct of their own political survival (Tishkov 1997; Goldenburg 2001; Kent et al. 2004). Such 'actually existing development' beyond and outside the state deepens the crisis of containment and gives urgency, for example, to Western efforts to reconstruct fragile states and reterritorialize the people living within them. Apart from highlighting the fact that such states have no established or centralized welfare function, the
difficulty is that even if successfully reconfigured as governance states, they can only promise the non-material salvation of sustainable development through social reorganization around basic needs and self-reliance. The

success of surplus life in forging patterns of actually existing development beyond states defines an important area of contestation and recapture within the framework of unending war. In one of the
few attempts to examine global development from a comparative welfare regime perspective, Wood and Gough (2006) identify three generic types: the welfare state, the informal security regime and the insecurity regime. The last two are systems where self-reliance, in terms of the familyzand community forms of reciprocity, provides the bulk of public welfare. The insecurity regime, however, corresponds to zones of crisis and state fragility where these reciprocities have broken down. Whereas welfare states are characterized by the de-commodification of life, for example, through protection from employment risks, within informal security regimes patron-client relations predominate. Reflecting the absence of a mass labour market rather than de-commodification, especially within insecure societies, generalizing welfare is argued to require a process of 'de-clientization' - that is, the practice 'of de-linking client dependants from their personalized, arbitrary and discretionary entrapment to persons with intimate power over them' (ibid.: 1708). In framing this argument, the authors have unwittingly rearticulated the global 'hearts and minds' role into which unending war has channelled development assistance (DAC 2003). When

nationalists and liberation movements sought to remake the state during the Cold War, such events were labelled as radical or even revolutionary. Today, as the West takes on this role directly, it finds itself embroiled in expansive and totalizing forms of counter-insurgency. The idea that an alternative development lies in the 'insuring' of the non-insured raises many difficulties. Given the widespread desertion of the borderland state by the dispossessed, such endeavours easily become means of recapturing and bolstering the West's own security; in other words, it would have to contend with the governance function of insurance-based technologies of biopower. This includes the importance of welfare rights as a means of excluding migrants and encoding racial identity and conflict in mass consumer society. At the same time, through the digitalization of life processes, insurance technologies are providing increasingly finely textured mechanisms for the monitoring and modulation of conduct more generally (Ericson and Doyle 2003). These difficulties suggest that, in attempting to rescue the emancipatory urge embedded in development, we should consider following the lead of the dispossessed and global justice movements and also desert the state
(Patel and McMichael 2004). Or at least, in the process, the

power of an already

monstrously powerful state should not be further extended or deepened. Freeing the impulse to protect and better should avoid measures that further privilege the state or, like human security, invoke the state as central to its own existence. This
concern underlines the tragedy of the N GO movement and its hopeless enmeshment. That a distancing is required is also suggested from a different but related quarter. During the course of the twentieth century, invoking a

state of emergency has become a normal and accepted paradigm of government (Agamben 2005). Following Foucault, Agamben has argued that security can be distinguished from disciplinary power in that

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the latter seeks to isolate and close territories in the pursuit of order, while security 'wants to regulate disorder' (Agamben 2001: 1). A dangerous contemporary development is the thought of security itself (Homqvist 2004). As security becomes the basic task of the state, politics is progressively neutralized. The thought of security 'bears with it an essential risk. A state which has security as its sole task and source of legitimacy is a fragile organism; it can always be provoked by terrorism to become itself terroristic' (Agamben 2001). Between terrorism and counter-terrorism a curious complicity exists in which each needs the other for its own existence, whether as a legitimation of its own violence or a justification for the draconian methods it requires in defending society. Both share a common ground in the acceptance of a design of war that privileges the state.
During the Cold War the geopolitical stand-off between nuclear-armed superpowers was underpinned by the threat of 'mutually assured destruction' or MAD.

Today we have acquired a sort of biopolitical MADness that interconnects the survival and various fundamentalisms of insurgents and counter-insurgents alike in the fateful and mutually conditioning embrace of unending war. In this encounter the inevitable victor is the state and the unavoidable victim is politics itself. Like actually existing development, the pursuit of emancipation involves working beyond and outside the state, ignoring rather than confronting it, as part of the rediscovery of politics in the practical solidarity of the governed.

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Development Links
Development assistance is new imperialism new liberal modes of control Duffield, Professor Emeritus and former Director of the Global Insecurities Centre, University of Bristol, 7 [Mark, Development, Security and Unending War Governing the World of People, pg. 7-8]
Once thought to be no longer applicable in a decolonized world, a liberal conception of trusteeship has once again entered the political foreground following the renewed wave of Western humanitarian and peace interventionism in the post-Cold War period. There has been a revival of interest in liberal imperialism indeed, an attempt to rehabilitate its self-proclaimed role of protecting and bettering the world (Ferguson 2003; Cooper 2002; Coker 2003). With the exception of Iraq, where mismanagement and horrendous violence
have damaged hopes of effective trusteeship, liberal opinion has widely supported the Wests renewed interventionism (Furedi 1994). Michael Ignatieffs (2003) book Empire Lite, for example, captures todays acceptance of the necessity of a period of illiberal rule abroad. Awakened

by the threat of world disorder and led by avowed anti-imperialists, todays interventionism constitutes a new form of ostensibly humanitarian empire in which Western powers led by the United States band together to rebuild state order and reconstruct war-torn societies for the sake of global stability and security (ibid.: 19). This new empire is being implemented by novel institutional arrangements and divisions of labour linking donor governments, UN agencies, militaries and NGOs. It promises self-rule, not in
some distant future but quickly and within an agreed framework. In dealing with elites, many of whom are the products of modern nationalism, the intention is that they should be empowered to succeed. Todays

Empire Liteis only legitimate if it results in the betterment of people and their early self management. It is imperialism in a hurry, to spend money, to get results, to turn the place back to locals and get out (ibid.).
For Ignatieff, if there is a problem with this new interventionism, it is that it does not practise the partnership and empowerment that it preaches and is dogged by shorttermism and promises betrayed. There

is also another and broader conception of trusteeship. Although connected, it lacks the spectacle and immediacy of Ignatieffs territorial laboratories of post-interventionary society (ibid.: 20). Since it is more pervasive and subtle, however, it is arguably more significant. While also having a liberal genealogy, it is about securing freedom by supporting households and community organizations, based on the small-scale ownership of land or property, in their search for economic autonomy and the possibilities for political existence that this affords. It is a trusteeship that encourages local level self-reliance and self-realization both through and against the state (Cowen and Shenton 1996: 5). Such a trusteeship operates today in the ideas and institutions of sustainable development. It can be seen in the moral, educative and financial tutelage that aid agencies exert over the attitudes and behaviour of those subject
to such development (Pupavac 2005). Although a relation of governance, it nonetheless speaks in terms of empowerment and partnership (Cooke and Kothari 2001). While Western politicians currently argue that enlightened self-interest interconnects development and security, for

those insecure humans living within ineffective states the reality of this virtuous circle is, once again, an educative trusteeship that aims to change behaviour and social organization according to a curriculum decided elsewhere.

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Development Impact
Development is just the alternative to extermination Duffield, Professor Emeritus and former Director of the Global Insecurities Centre, University of Bristol, 7 [Mark, Development, Security and Unending War Governing the World of People, pg. 9-10
Anticipated in Malthus, the unending search for progress constantly invokes a surplus population that is, a population whose skills, status or even existence are in excess of prevailing conditions and requirements. Hannah Arendt has called this by-product, produced at each successive crisis of capitalism, its human debris (Arendt [1951]: 150). This phenomenon was well known and feared during the nineteenth century and fuelled the European settlement of Canada, Australia and the United States. In a contemporary treatment, it is what Zygmunt Bauman (Bauman 2004) has called waste-life. It is a condition of existence that, but for the changes, adaptations or opportunities that progress either demands or presents, would otherwise remain effectively useless, irrelevant or dangerous. Through the practice of trusteeship, development emerged and has remained to this day a practice todeal with surplus population (Cowen and Shenton 1996: xi). Development embodies a trusteeship of surplus life, that is, an external and educative tutelage over an otherwise superfluous and possibly dangerous population that needs help in adapting to the potential that progress brings. In ensuring this transition, development as security is tasked with reconciling the moral, intellectual and material qualities of progress with social order (ibid.: 27). In this respect, development exists as a liberal alternative to modernitys other solutions to the problem of surplus life: extermination or eugenics.

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Potential For Death Impact

The designation of populations as surplus leads to the potential for death they become bare life in the declaration of emergency Duffield, Professor Emeritus and former Director of the Global Insecurities Centre, University of Bristol, 7 [Mark, Development, Security and Unending War Governing the World of People, pg.13-14]
From the perspective of political economy, the

surplus population created through accumulation by dispossession represents life belonging to capitalism. It is a malleable and disposable life that capitalism constantly produces in order to devour it as part of its own unending renewal. However, it is not a life that necessarily belongs to security. In order to connect development and security properly the idea of surplus population must also embrace life that is politically superfluous .
Although the rise of industrial capitalism is important, so in this respect is the related abolition of slavery (an appreciation of the abolition of slavery is absent from Cowen and Shentons otherwise path-breaking book (1996)). Emancipation created within modernity the possibility of life with an excess of freedom. Just as an economically surplus life is continually produced and consumed in the maintenance of capitalism, so a

politically surplus life is produced and consumed as a necessary adjunct of political order (Agamben 1998: 278). At the same time emancipation allows the liberal problematic of security to be understood as an essentially expansive and globalizing will to power. Surplus life can be both economically and politically charged, the one superfluous to requirements, the other a threat to order. These forms of exception easily move in and out of each other, sometimes one displacing the other, sometimes merging. During times of emergency, however, all surplus life can become the bare life of security existing beyond morality, religion and the law. It is a life that can be killed without murder being committed (ibid.: 1011). The abolition of slavery was an essential part of the founding and international expansion of industrial capitalism. The abolitionists not only argued against the horrors of a morally corrupt and non-sustainable
economy, they supported their case with enthusiastic descriptions of Africas vast potential for legitimate trade and busines s (Hochschild 2006: 146; 1545). This vision went beyond the slavers preoccupation with sugar to embrace the many legitimate products, services and riches that such a great con tinent possessed. Moreover, it was argued that this abundance could only be effectively realized by free people living under God and the rule of law. In many respects the abolition of slavery set the world

Freedom through emancipation, however, was never unconditional; it was always uncertain and once attained could be taken away. The struggle to outlaw slavery in the
on its modern trajectory through helping to initiate the still ongoing process of accumulation by dispossession. British Empire took fifty years, spanning the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. From the beginning, freed slaves began to appear within the contradictions and lacunae that the struggle exposed. An early development, for example, was the discovery that under English law slavery within England itself was illegal. Slaves availing themselves of this dispensation, however, constantly ran the risk of abduction and return to the slave colonies. Pockets of freed slaves also emerged in the interstices of the American and French revolutions, where they also existed as precarious anomalies. Although the French Revolution initially abolished slavery in French territories, this was quickly rescinded. As slave revolts spread and intensified, Haiti gained its independence from France in 1804. It was the second country after the United States to free itself from colonial rule; it remained, however, a country of free blacks in a world of slaves. While the trade was abolished by Britain in 1807, slavery in its colonies was not outlawed until over thirty years later. One can draw from this hesitant process a distinction between abolition and emancipation; while the trade in slaves might be abolished, actual emancipation was a gradual process in which widening privileges, keeping pace with a

Even after the outlawing of slavery by the major European powers, it remained common in much of the world well into the twentieth century. In conditions where slavery was the
deepening Christian enlightenment, were to be earned rather than granted outright (ibid.: 227, 232). norm, freed slaves had an excess of freedom; they were effectively politically superfluous. The abolitionists were confronted by an originatory problem: when such an ambivalent freedom had been won, what do you do with such free men and women? From the beginning the answer was development , an institution of trusteeship holding their freedom in trust until it could be prudent ly and safely exercised. The idea of development, for example, leaps out of the abolitionists extensive and idealized 1780s plans for the communal self-reliance and self-government of Sierra Leones founding colony of freed slaves (ibid.: 1467, 175, 202). Development trusteeship is also unmistakable in the Baptist missionary endeavours in the post-abolition Jamaica of the 1830s to create free villages (Hall 2002: 12039). By means of the ownership of land, spiritual guidance and careful instruction in farming, civic responsibly, hygiene and domestic economy, the missionary vision was of areborn Jamaica based on a new relationship between men and women, the former self-reliant and able to discharge their social responsibilities, the latter dependent and respectful within the bounds of home, marriage and church. In both Sierra Leone and Jamaica, the abolitionist aim was to prove to a sceptical audience that the fruits of freedom, through proper education and guidance, could be enjoyed by all, black as well as white. Life

that is politically surplus raises the issue of the relationship between emergency and the law. As a political phenomenon, emergency has been gaining ground as an object of critical study (Waever 1995). With the advent of an indefinite war on terrorism, however, it is now a pressing issue for us

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all (Agamben 2005). An emergency is a situation of danger threatening the state which allows it to suspend the normative rule of law. The notion of exceptional
powers is well established in the history of the law. What constitutes an emergency is elastic and can range from riots, invasions and constitutional crises to natural disasters, economic slump and terrorist threats. However, in all these situations, the law knows that it will not be suffici ent, that something else will be required (Hussain 2003: 19). Since it is the sovereign power that decides between the normal and the abnormal, emergency can be understood as a constitutive relation between modern law and sovereignty (ibid.: 17). This constitutive relationship, moreover, appears in a dramatic form in the instance of colonization. After losing its first empire in the West, based on America, by the late eighteenth century the British Empire passed largely from communities of free people of British origin tied by trade and naval power to an empire in the East of more numerous peoples who were not British in origin and who had been incorporated into the Empire by conquest and who were ruled without representation (ibid.: 25). This empir e was tied together not just by the Royal Navy but by the deployment of troops as well. By the nineteenth century, in the empire of India and later Africa and the Middle East, people were not slaves, but, because deemed utterly incapable of participating in their rule, were not quite free subjects either. This Empire required a new conception of sovereignty, one that was neither despotic nor democratic (ibid.: 25 (emphasis in original)). In the colonies, law in general, and the juxtaposition of the rule of law with emergency powers that could override it, historically assumed greater weight than in the domestic sphere. Impelled by emergency measures introduced during the first and second world wars, however, Georgio Agamben has argued that the state of exception or emergency, has progressively become the dominant paradigm of government in contemporary politics (Agamben 2005: 2). It is the juxtaposition of law and emergency, and the ability of a sovereign power to decide what threatens security and what does not, that has a special significance for the dangerous life that is politically surplus. Nasser Hussain suggests a bracketing together or basic coincidence between colonial expansion and domestic and constitutional change (Hussain 2003: 23). In this respect, in offering a liberal solution to the problem of surplus population, development embodies a will to power that also interconnects the borderland and the homeland. Development is simultaneously a technology of international betterment and security. While the connection between an internal development regime, based around culture, equal opportunity and social cohesion, and external or international development is examined in chapter 8, this book is mainly concerned with development and surplus life in todays former protectorates and colonies. Central to this analysis is that the biopower outlined by Foucault in relation to Europe and the nation-state is different from development as an international biopolitical regime. Drawing out this distinction is necessary, moreover, to establish the organic connection between development and emergency.

Duffield, Professor Emeritus and former Director of the Global Insecurities Centre, University of Bristol, 7 [Mark, Development, Security and Unending War Governing the World of People, pg.
The divergence of insured and non-insured life Regarding how the biopolitical divergence between development and underdevelopment emerged, Cowen and Shenton (1996) have argued that until the end of the nineteenth century, as a technology of trusteeship, development was usually regarded as a solution to the social problems associated with the underdevelopment of capitalism within Europe (ibid.: 5). Apart from experiments involving former slaves, it was not until the early part of the twentieth century and, especially, following decolonization, that development took on its present geographical and human focus, that is, as means of protection and betterment associated with former protectorates and colonies (see Escobar 1995). Having origins as a remedy for the problem of surplus population within Europe, development has now assumed a similar role in relation to an international surplus population. During the nineteenth century development within Britain emerged from a number of abolitionist, free-market radical, liberal and socialist strands. It combined, for example, Saint-Simonian and Comtian concerns with social breakdown and trusteeship, radical antipathy to landed interests and liberal anxieties over the negative consequences of industrial capitalism. Cowen and Shenton (1996) have argued that concerns over the surplus population, presented at the time as the agricultural question, were prominent between the 1870s and the First World War. Due to the increasing use of mechanization and growing livestock production, rural migrants were swelling the ranks of the urban unemployed, exacerbating unstable labour markets and exposing the limited amenities of the towns. With radicals well represented in Parliament, the developmental approach to this problem took the form of an attack on landed interests and large-scale land ownership. Not only was it inefficient, it degraded the agricultural labour force. Both liberals and radicals advocated land reform and its redistribution as a way of reabsorbing the surplus population. Land societies, for example, were formed for the purchase and redistribution of land in order to turn the surplus population into rentiers able to provide for their own welfare independently of the state. Liberal and Chartist land societies, for example, fed into the earlytwentieth-century campaigns for smallholdings (ibid.: 258). The small-scale ownership of land and property was argued to encourage community cohesion, local enterprise and, through the freedoms and responsibilities of self-reliance, political citizenship. At the same time, the induced labour shortage within the industrial areas would increase average wage rates, generating benefits for all workers. As Cowen and Shenton cogently argue, it was a palliative doctrine of development that promoted rural colonization as a way of connecting surplus land with surplus population and so eliminate the urban decay and destitution of British underdevelopment (ibid.: 260). Such pressures exerted through Parliament eventually resulted in the 1909 Development Act. It proposed help and financial assistance to agriculture, rural industries, land reclamation, forestry, roads, inland navigation, harbours and fisheries within Britain. With a rural bias, and not wishing to alarm industrial interests, the Act called for special attention to those sectors which had little expectation of profit (ibid.: 285). The 1909 Act eventually petered out, being overtaken by other and more effective liberal solutions to the problem of surplus population. As community-based development was moving overseas, in Britain it took a back seat. As argued in chapter 8, it would not come to the fore again until the 1960s. When it did so, this internal development regime was concerned with integrating communities of immigrant origin within British society. A number of factors help to explain developments geographical relocation at the beginning of the twentieth century. Mike Davis argues that the international development gap first emerged in the closing decades of the nineteenth century, when the great non-European peasantries were initially integrated within the world economy (Davis 2001: 1) Using the electric telegraph, railways, steamships and photography, and taking in the Americas, Africa and the East, this economy now interconnected the prairies of America with the steppes of Russia. In placing the acquired territory under the control of

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competing colonial powers, the New Imperialism tended to restrict this market. At the same time, from annexation flowed the responsibility of government. This responsibility gave the liberal problematic of security a new concern. As Hobson argued, almost the whole of the regions appropriated by the New Imperialism consisted of tropical or sub-tropical territories with large populations of savages or lower races; little of it is likely, even in the distant future, to increase the area of sound colonial life (Hobson [1902]: 124). At the same time, by its acts and deeds the British Empire had already shown itself to represent the very antithesis of the art of free government. As a consequence, imperial expansion has increased the area of British despotism, far outbalancing the progress in population and in practical freedom attained in our few democratic colonies (ibid.). The surplus population, initially internationalized in the scattered territories of freed slaves, and until now usually thought to be a problem of European underdevelopment, had been glimpsed as a global danger. In the wake of two world wars, liberal opinion nurtured this global vision, first in the League of Nations and then in the United Nations. Arising from a critique of the barbarity of the New Imperialism, Hobsons remedy for the lower races (which he always places within inverted commas) was that of educative trusteeship. In the years leading to the First World War, development found its way into a complex of Fabian, liberal, idealist and radical opinion that, from different perspectives, arrived at a common presumption that there was a natural African community of persons and producers, who had to be protected from the historical degradation of industrial capital (Cowen and Shenton 1996: 292). This Fabian nexus would grow to include liberal activists, Colonial Office officials, colonial governors and missionaries, and would eventually mature into the doctrine of Dual Mandate associated with indirect rule or, as Lord Lugard calls it, Native Administration. In discharging the responsibilities of the superior races to the backward races, indirect trusteeship favoured existing or natural rulers. It was based on the delegation of appropriate authority and administrative tasks to such leaders, including the establishment of free courts, the provision of appropriate education which will assist progress without creating false i deals; the institution of free labour and a just system of taxation; the protection of the

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AT Case Outweighs
Rather than extension of the population to be protected, the aff merely a way of securing American life against the chaos and insecurity of surplus populations in Mexico Duffield, Professor Emeritus and former Director of the Global Insecurities Centre, University of Bristol, 7 [Mark, Development, Security and Unending War Governing the World of People, pg. 24]
The biopolitics of insured and non-insured life are different but interconnected. They both act to address the contingencies of life and so maintain population equilibrium. However, one supports the dependent consumers of mass society through public/private technologies of insurance while the other attends to populations deemed to be selfreliant. Although different, to borrow a phrase from Nasser Hussain, they are also temporally bracketed together. Rather

than extending the level of social protection enjoyed by insured life to its non-insured counterpart, development is better understood as a liberal technology of security for containing and managing the effects of underdevelopment. Since decolonization, the security of the West has been increasingly predicated on establishing an effective developmental trusteeship over the surplus population of the developing world. In addressing the present conjuncture, this book offers a reflection on the significance of decolonization for the security of the West and its relationship to the advent of unending war. While decolonization provided an opportunity for the expansion of developmental technologies among an emergent world of peoples, it also constituted a threat in terms of the new possibilities for global circulation that it made possible.