Jesusa Santiago vs. Judge Eduardo Jovellanos Margarita Sanchez vs. Judge Eduardo Jovellanos A.M. No. MTJ-00-1289.

August 1, 2000 Judge on Issuance of an Order of Release

Facts: Jesusa Santiago and Margarita Sanchez were complainants in two different criminal cases before the MTC of San Ildefonso, Bulacan and the RTC of Rosales, Pampanga, respectively. The suspects in each of the criminal cases were caught by authorities and detained. However, both suspects were released by order of Judge Eduardo Jovellanos, presiding judge of the MCTC of Alcala-Bautista, Pangasinan. The complainants questioned both Orders for Release issued by Judge Jovellanos, alleging that the requirements for the bailbond had not been fulfilled and that the said judge had no jurisdiction to order the release. Held: GUILTY. There are two defects in the Orders for Release signed by Judge Jovellanos. First, in both cases, the detainees had not registered the bailbond in accordance with the Rules of Criminal Procedure. One may not be given provisional liberty if the bailbond is not registered with the proper office. Secondly, Judge Jovellanos did not have jurisdiction to order the release of the detainees. The Rules of Criminal Procedure provide that when a suspect is arrested outside of the province, city or municipality where his case is pending, he may either apply for bail with the court where his case is pending or with any RTC in the province, city or municipality where he was arrested. If a RTC judge is not available, he may apply for bail with any MTC or MCTC in the place where he was arrested. In this case, Judge Jovellanos entertained motions for bail and ordered release for suspects whose cases were not pending in his court nor were they arrested within his jurisdiction. As an advocate of justice and a visible representation of the law, a judge is expected to keep abreast with and be proficient in the interpretation of our laws. A judge should be acquainted with legal norms and precepts as well as with statutes and procedural rules. Unfamiliarity with the Rules of Court is a sign of incompetence which goes against Canon 3, specifically Rule 3.01, of the Code of Judicial Conduct. Having accepted the exalted position of a judge, Judge Jovellanos owes the public and the court he sits in proficiency in the law. He must have the basic rules at the palm of his hands as he is expected to maintain professional competence at all times. Judge Jovellanos was suspended for 1 year without pay issued the warning that similar conduct in the future shall be dealt with more severely.

Daniel & Suprema Dumo v. Judge Romeo V. Perez A.M. No. MTJ-00-1242 January 20, 2000
Facts: Spouses Dumo filed this administrative complaint against respondent Judge Perez for gross ignorance of the law, grave abuse of discretion and patent partiality. Respondent MTC Judge issued a Writ of Execution to enforce the decision of a case involving quieting of title and recovery of ownership of real property. However, said writ was returned unsatisfied because the herein complainants was the actual owners and occupants of the questioned property without being impleaded in the original case. Subsequently, respondent Judge issued an order stating that complainants shall not be affected by said writ because they were not made parties to the case. Despite such order, he moved on to issue a Writ of Possession in favor of the original plaintiff (Espinas). As a consequence, Espinas used such Writ of Possession against the herein complainants in order to eject them from their property and deprived them from the enjoyment of the same. The crux of this controversy therefore is the issuance of respondent Judge of conflicting orders, which according to complainants, showed patent partiality over Espinas, the original plaintiff in the case for quieting of title. Held: GUILTY. First of all, respondent Judge is guilty of ignorance of the law. As a municipal trial court judge, he obviously had no jurisdiction over the action for quieting of title and recovery of ownership filed by Espinas against the original defendants. It must be stressed that the case was NOT for ejectment over which MTCs have original jurisdiction, but for quieting of title and/or ownership falling within the exclusive jurisdiction of regional trial courts. The question of jurisdiction if so basic and elementary a matter that a judges ignorance of it is simply inexcusable. Secondly, the judges act of issuing conflicting orders is likewise inexcusable. After declaring that the Writ of Execution cannot be made enforceable against herein complainants as they were not made parties to the case, he reversed himself nevertheless by issuing the Writ of Possession. Under said writ of possession, it was patent that he was contradicting his previous ruling by ordering therein to eject all adverse occupants, which of course, was so broad to affect all persons including herein complainants. The issuance of said writ gave rise to the suspicion of partiality or bias in favor of Espinas. The presumptions of regularity and good faith in the performance of judicial functions on respondents part are negated by the circumstances of record. While a judge cannot be made liable for any criminal, civil, or administrative charge for an erroneous decision rendered in good faith and in the absence of fraud, it is imperative that he should have basic knowledge of the law. Judges must keep abreast of the laws and jurisprudence to be able to render justice and maintain public confidence in our legal system.

More importantly, judges should not only be impartial but should also appear impartial. Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct provides that: a judge should also avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all activities. A judge should so behave at all times as to promote public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary. (Rule 2.01, Canon 2).

In Re: Procedure adopted by Judge Daniel Liangco (A.M. No. 99-11-158-MTC. August 1, 2000)
Facts: RTC Judge Pedro Sunga of San Fernando, Pampanga received information about irregularities in the disposition of jueteng cases before the MTCs of the said region. Upon investigation, Judge Sunga discovered that of the 55 jueteng cases filed in July 1999, 53 were assigned to Branch 1 of the MTC of San Fernando presided by Judge Daniel Liangco. Noting that statistical improbability that 53 out of 55 jueteng cases should be assigned to only 1 Branch, Judge Sunga demanded a written explanation as to how such a situation had come about. In his letter, Judge Liangco explained that it has been his practice to automatically take over all jueteng cases without the need for raffling. The reason he cited is that the accused in such cases are deprived of their liberty and that by automatically assigning these cases to his branch, the accused can file motions for bail and the same can be entertained immediately without waiting for the raffle. In short, because of the need for provisional liberty, all jueteng cases are considered to be automatically raffled to his branch so that he may entertain motions for bail and the accused can be immediately released upon filing of the bond. The Supreme Court ordered further investigation of the case and placed Judge Liangco on preventive suspension. Held: GUILTY. Judge Liangco clearly violated Supreme Court Circular No. 7 which provides: All cases filed with the Court in stations or groupings where there are two or more branches shall be assigned or distributed to the different branches by raffle. No case may be assigned to any branch without being raffled. There is no connection at all between respondents alleged desire to facilitate the release of such accused on bail and his questionable act of retaining the records of the cases for direct assignment to his own sala. For after granting bail to the accused, his alleged purpose of immediately extending provisional liberty to the accused shall already have been served. There is thus no need or justification to retain the records of the cases and consider them raffled off to his own sala. The questioned acts of respondent Judge Liangco constitute a clear breach of his duty as a judge. The Code of Judicial Conduct mandates that: A judge should so behave at all times as to promote public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary. Respondent judges manner of automatically assigning jueteng cases to its own branch

without the benefit of raffle, casts doubt on his integrity as a judge and erodes the confidence of the people in the judicial system. A judges official conduct and his behavior in the performance of judicial duties should be free from the appearance of impropriety and must be beyond reproach. Judge Liangco was suspended from service for 6 months without pay and issued the warning that similar conduct in the future shall be dealt with more severely.

Rolando Sulla v. Hon. Rodolfo C. Ramos A.M No. MTJ-00-1319. September 27, 2000
Facts: Dr. Rolando A. Sulla charging respondent Judge Rodolfo C. Ramos, presiding judge of the Municipal Trial Court of Jaro, Leyte, with unreasonable delay or refusal to render a decision in criminal Case No. 8121. The case was submitted for decision in April 1997. But as of May 21, 1999, date of complainants letter, and despite constant r equests for its early resolution, respondent Judge Ramos has not rendered any decision in the said case. Held: GUILTY. This Court has consistently impressed upon judges the need to decide cases promptly and expeditiously pursuant to Rule 3.05, Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct and Section 15(1) and (2), Article VIII of the Constitution. Judges are presumed to be aware of Rule 3.01 of the Code of Judicial Conduct which calls for a judge to be faithful to the law and maintain professional competence. Rule 3.05 admonishes all judges to dispose of the courts business promptly and decide cases within the period fixed by law.

Cob C. Dela Cruz v. Judge Rodolfo M. Serrano A.M. No. RTJ-00-1582. September 4, 2000
Facts: Complainant contends, among others, that it took one (1) year and five (5) months instead of three months to render a decision in civil case. The civil case was submitted for decision on April 1996, but the decision thereon was only promulgated on October 8, 1997. Held: GUILTY. It is not disputed that it took respondent Judge one (1) year and five (5) months, after Civil Case No. 908 was submitted for decision, to decide it which is way beyond the three-month period mandated by the Constitution. Section 15 (1) of Article VIII of the Constitution provides that all cases filed before the lower courts must be decided or resolved within three (3) months from date of submission. The Code of Judicial Conduct likewise provides that a judge should administer justice impartially and without delay [Rule 1.02.] and directs a judge to dispose of the courts business promptly and decide cases within the required periods. [Rule 3.05.] It is an oft-repeated maxim that justice delayed is often justice denied. Thus, any delay in the administration of justice may result in depriving the litigant of his right to a speedy

disposition of his case and will ultimately affect the image of the judiciary. A delay in the disposition of cases amounts to a denial of justice, brings the court into disrepute and ultimately erodes public faith and confidence in the judiciary.