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Folder Title: Moving Forward on Monograph


Document Date: 03-25-2004
Document Type: Handwritten Notes
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Subject: notes on Team 1 progress and leads to follow

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Withdrawn: 04-23-2008 by:

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f
PM03V
GOVERNMENT
EXHIBIT
KRA/2097-l TRANSLATION
(ID) I
Oh, people of Abs.

SNY014-0043
KRA/2097-2 to 19 TRANSLATION
In the Name of God, Most Merciful, Most Gracious
*The departure
*(3/13/97) We departed at 2:30 on Thursday from Gatwick Airport with the CNN team. We were
very wary of each other, because I think that they considered us (Dlegible), and we considered
them an (intelligence unit.)
*(3/14/97) We arrived in Islamabad at dawn, 6:00 am, on Friday. We stayed at the airport for an
hour because one of the team's suitcases was lost. Entering was easy, Praise God.
-At 8:00, we took a private [flancoach] along with a journalist and his wife, to Peshawar. During
the trip there was a long talk between Mus'ab and the woman about Afghanistan.
-We arrived at the (CONTINENTAL]...) Hotel at twelve noon. We took a bath, ate, and then left.
We called the family, then we looked for Abu Firas, but we didn't find him. We rested till 6:00
p.m., then we ate and prayed and went to Abu Firasf's home]. We stayed at his place till one in
the morning discussing the developments in Peshawar and Afghanistan with him.
*(3/15/97) Saturday morning - We agreed with Peter to leave on the first flight, or by land. He
said that there was no flight, so we told him we should rely on God [and wait till] tomorrow.
Then, he left and obtained a [U/TJ permit from the Political Bureau (Intelligence).
-We went to Abu Firas['s home] and resumed the discussion. Abu Firas explained Abu
Abdullah's situation (because he had visited him three days ago), and he finished explaining the
situation in Peshawar as well as his opinion of the Taliban.
-We went to the Sader Market and purchased what we needed for the trip. After the sunset prayer
we returned to Abu Firas['s home], and Mus'ab explained the purpose of the visit and Abu
Firas's future activities.
-We returned at midnight, and Peter was waiting. He said that we would depart for Afghanistan
tomorrow after dawn.
*(3/16/97): Sunday morning, (8) o'clock. We departed by bus with the team, plus a special escort
from the Political Bureau.
We arrived in Turkham at 10:00 am. They took our passports and stamped them with an entry
[visa]. We then rented an Afghan bus and loaded the equipment.
We departed in the Afghan bus from in front of the Arab Martyrs Cemetery, and we said a prayer
for their souls. The bus went on the road toward Jalalabad, passing by beautiful locations which
brought back memories of the Mujahedin's positions before the city fell.
-We arrived in Jalabad at 12 noon. We left the team at the hotel and went to make an
appointment with the Shiekh. We had no idea how long we would be gone, because it depended
on seeing the go-between.
-We arrived at the Jihad camp at 2:00 p.m., and the brothers very warmly welcomed us,
especially [seeing] that most of the brothers were veterans. I didn't feel like a stranger among
them; on the contrary, I felt at home.

As far as they were concerned, we were the first generation [of Mujahedin], and praise to God in
any case.
-We were surprised that the Sheikh had gone to Kabul with Walid and Jaafar in the morning to
meet with the Taliban, and we decided to follow them. We prayed and ate.
-We departed in the private bus at 4:00 p.m. for Kabul. I don't want to talk about the ruggedness
of the road. Suffice it to say that it takes eight or nine hours to go 167 kilometers.

SNY014-0044
Anyway, we arrived in Kabul at 11:00 p.m., and we were surprised [to find] the group in an
ongoing meeting that could last till the morning.
My friend and I went to sleep with the brothers at the entrance of the house. We fell asleep out of
sheer exhaustion, despite the severe cold.
*Monday, 3/17/97, after the dawn prayer:
-Abu Mus'ab went to see the group, and they met with^heikh Disanallahj they returned at 8:00
am. We had breakfast with the Sheikh and jhejest ofjhejroup<
to go back to Islamabad; God is the Helper.
We took off at 10:00 and arrived at 7:00 p.m. We then ate and slept.
3/18/97, Tuesday after dawn:
We met with the secretary; the bottom line from the meeting with the Taliban was that the
Sheikh should stop [seeing] the media. He told them: "God willing, I will stop [meeting with
them as of] 3/20, because I [already] have an appointment [for an interview]." They grudgingly
agreed; God is Omniscient. During the meeting, there was a discussion about preparations for
the meeting with Robert Fisk, which would take place at night on a mountain three hours away
from our camp.
The conversation revolved around the anticipated questions and the appropriate answers to them.
Most of the conversation took place between Mus'ab and the Sheikh.
-Walid declined to attend.. He considered the meeting with the press an insult to and a
belittlement of the Taliban, and he absolutely refused to attend.
-That was [Walid's] turning point with regard to the Sheikh.
-We proceeded at 4:00 p.m. along with the Sheikh to the rugged mountains, and we arrived to the
specified location at 8;00 p.m. It was raining and very cold, and there were no heaters or
blankets.
-The meeting began at 9:30 p.m. under kerosene lamps in a small tent. Robert was very happy to
meet the Sheikh.
-Mus'ab interpreted and facilitated the conversation very well, except occasional lapses.
-The meeting ended at midnight. My friend seized the opportunity to strengthen his relationship
with Robert Fisk and he achieved what he wanted. Praise God.
My friend and I slept in a tent with Robert Fisk. We hoped to wake up at 4:00, before dawn, so
Robert would not be able to recognize the location. We did return to Jalalabad.
*(3/ 19/97) Wednesday morning
- We arrived to the Jihad camp at almost 7: 10. While we were drinking milk, we heard a huge
explosion and got scared. All the brothers were frightened and thought about the Sheikh, because
he was still at the site. Furthermore, we heard news that the security post of the Taliban, which
was by the ammunition warehouse, had been completely destroyed. Glory be to the Creator,
because we had passed by there 55 minutes earlier.
Late afternoon, we went with the Sheikh to visit Younes Khales, and he [Khales] said things that
brought tears to our eyes.
When we went to visit the post, I felt that God had given us a second chance at life.
I saw frightening scenes caused by the massive destruction [explosion] of buildings and cars,
which covered a least a 500-meter-radius circle. God is the Helper. It was said that it was an
accident, and God is Omniscient.
-The Sheikh came at noon. We slept, and we then had lunch. We then slept again. At 4:00 we
went to see the CNN crew and told them to prepare themselves for tomorrow afternoon, because
we would stop by them. They were very happy that we had gotten permission to meet them so
quickly.

SNY014-0045
(3/20/97) Thursday morning.
The group gathered to meet the CNN [team], and Hafas Al-Saghir arrived at that time.. Mus'ab
suggested that we review the questions before the meeting, so we could come up with the
appropriate answers, especially [since] the interview would be recorded for TV.
-We quickly went to CNN and told them two things.
1-We want the questions.
2-The meeting should be postponed until tomorrow, because the Sheikh was sick (laryngitis).
They brought us the questions, and we made an appointment with them for tomorrow afternoon.
-We went to Abu Walid to inform him of a few things:
A- The meeting with Robert Fisk and its outcome.
B- [U/I] come and meet with CNN and interpret.
C- Exploring the general situation: 1- Abu Abdullah
2- The Taliban
D- Mus'ab's future activities
E- How to work with him outside the sphere of Abu Abdullah..
The meeting with Abu Walid lasted till sunset, and we concluded the following:
-That he was extremely disturbed about the meetings that outcome would be disastrous with the
Taliban, and that the Sheikh's behavior was becoming irrational.
Because of that, Abu Walid started to severely criticize the Sheikh's methods of conducting
business.
-It's impossible to go and meet with CNN, even if the [U/I] is completely canceled.
-His view of the Taliban was very optimistic, but [he was] pessimistic about the way the Sheikh
had been dealing with the Taliban recently, fearing the consequences because of the Afghan
mentality.
-His opinion of Abu Abdullah was that he has not changed since 1989. On God we depend, and
there is none else.
The session was adjourned till tomorrow morning due to lack of time.
-We went back to the Jihad camp, and we asked the Sheikh the questions. Mus'ab discussed the
answers with him. We stayed up all night discussing the issue.
*(3/21/97) Friday at dawn.
-The meeting resumed once again to discuss the questions and answers. It lasted for four hours.
-At 10:00, we went to Abu Walidf's place] and resumed yesterday's conversation.
Mus'ab had a long discussion with him about the projects, future goals and... and...
We went back at two in the afternoon to get ready for the meeting.
-We went to CNN with Saif to confirm the time of the meeting and inspect the suitcases.
-The Sheikh, along with the special guard [detail] departed at three for the meeting site.

I departed with Mus'ab at 4:30 with the CNN crew on a private bus to a location agreed upon
with Saif. It was like a beautiful and funny police story, but it was successful. Praise God.
We arrived at the post at 9:00. After preparing the equipment and eating fruit, the Sheikh came
in at 10:30, following special security procedures.
In brief, the meeting was not bad; however, I can say that most of the prepared answers were not
used. The meeting revolved around the [U/I].
The meeting and the session ended at 12:45 am. We agreed to depart at 3:30 before dawn, which
we did..
*(3/22/97) Saturday morning.
-We arrived at the Jihad camp at 6:30 am. We slept until 12:00.

SNY014-0046
-We went in the afternoon to CNN to ask their opinion of the meeting. They thanked us for the
effort, and they were happy that it was all done so quickly.
-We went to Abu Walid to give him a summary of the meeting. He was still very fearful about
what happened, especially since there was an agreement not to have any meetings with the press
after 3/20, and this one took place on 3/21, which made the situation worse.
-[At last] we were able to call by phone. We were very happy.
-We started thinking seriously about having a separate meeting with the Sheikh in order to start
the work.
*(3/23/97) Sunday morning, [some illegible words]
We went to see the crew, and Mus'ab gave them a letter for his wife. We agreed with Peter on
settling the account. We took two commemorative pictures with the crew and bid them farewell,
because they were traveling at noon the same day.
-We went to see Abu Walid, and had long discussions with in-depth analysis about Abu
Abdullah's situation, his future work, the Taliban's situation, the future of the region, Tajikistan,
Uzbekistan, America, the Jews, Saudi Arabia, the Moon, and Mars.
After analysis and study, we concluded that the Mujahideen were in a bitter and unpleasant state
of affairs. On God we depend, no one else,
-The first mission for which we came was accomplished, and two are left:
1- Study the situation with Abu Abdullah.
2- Write a study on Abu Abdullah, The Taliban, the Afghan Arabs.
We started to think about where and how to begin amidst what we felt was chaos, waste, and
crises.
*(3/24/97) Monday.
-We asked Abu Abdalla [if we could] meet with him, and he agreed and said: "today at around
11:00, God willing."
-We prepared a draft and some items we wanted to discuss with Abu Abdullah, summarized as
follows:
I-Ad vice on his situation.
2-It is not safe to form a leadership [U/TJ.
3-What he thinks of us.
4-A detailed explanation about Samir and the situation in England.
-We started the meeting at the specified time.
Abu Abdullah wanted us to start with items one and four and tackle the rest later.
The meeting was friendly and straightened, especially from Abu Abdullah's end toward Mus'ab.
Here are some points from his conversation.
A-Abu Mus'ab should stop talking with individuals about the bad situation they are in, and Abu
Abdullah revealed that he was disturbed about this.
B-Our way and method are clear [U/I]... Leave us alone and don't sabotage our work. We have
enough experience, and we have leadership and advisors other than what you see.
C-I don't want to brief you on anything, especially on the details of matters, because you are in
the hands of the enemy. However, we'll cross that bridge when we come to it.
D-Regarding the debt: Take your time, it depends on your ability to pay.
-We left the meeting, and I was very uncomfortable. Mus'ab was more optimistic than I was.
-A meeting took place with the brothers in Turkmenistan. They got acquainted with Abu Masaab
and asked him for advice. He met with them for approximately two hours and explained to them
how to evaluate the state of affairs to carry on a battle, whether military or political.

SNY014-0047
*(3/25/97) Tuesday morning.
-Abu Hamza, the Palestinian, came and met with Abu Mus'ab till noon. He talked about old
stuff; I don't want to mention any of it.
Immediately following the mid-afternoon prayer, the Afghan Minister of the Interior arrived
along with the Governor of Jalalabad, and asked the Sheikh to go with them to meet
the Commander of the Faithful, because he was waiting for them.
[...jDuring this time there was some confusion, as it was unexpected, and the way it was
[handled] was inappropriate, however, there was no other option but to comply. The
Commander of the Faithful was waiting at the door. Anyway, the Sheikh went with his guards,
and no one from the group went with him.
-Everyone was obviously afraid. Everyone, without exception, acts in ways they think are
appropriate for our circumstances.
-We met with Hafas, anticipating what might happen, and whether we could save our own skin
if, God forbid, something were to happen to the Sheikh. It was very clear that [the answer] was
no.
-Here, or at this time, we started to get to know Abu Hafas, "Al-Saghir" ["the small one"], and he
began to say amazing and brilliant things. But my friend was appalled by the discussion, and the
matter became more significant. After he heard Abu Hafas "Al-Saghir" and some of his defeatist
or moderate ideas and views, Mus'ab then made Abu Abdullah's situation worse in the presence
of these individuals.
-We discussed how to better organize the situation with Abu Hafas. He complained to us about
the shortage of staff and the many responsibilities. They asked for 60 young men from Yemen
to guard Abu Abdullah and to cover some administrative matters.
-We made a phone call, and were able to send a letter by fax, but not receive anything.
*(3/25/97) Tuesday
-A second session with the brothers from Turkestan.
-Very calm discussions with Abu Hafas "Al-Saghir."
-Mus'ab and I studied the situation and the possibility of going to them.
-We went to see Younes Khales in the afternoon and we gave him ten questions: his personal
connection to the jihad, the apostate governments, the Arab Mujahideen, Abu Abdalla, the
Taliban, Turkmenistan
He informed us that he would study the questions and give us the answers in writing. Then we
said goodbye to him with utmost respect, after we'd introduced ourselves to him.
-Ongoing discussion about our current situation and what the best solution would be. This has
made us mentally exhausted, and we are in a state of gloom that is not clear to everyone [sic].
*(3/26/97) Wednesday
-Nothing new these days. The Sheikh is in Kandahar with the Commander of the Faithful. We
have no idea if he is all right or not.
-Everything has come to a halt because everything depends on the Sheikh, first, and how he will
be affected by a change in the Taliban, second.
-Ongoing meetings and very good discussions with Omar Al-Mukhtar, but they have been rather
sad because of our state of affairs. Even he is confused and perplexed, and described...
*(3/27/97) Thursday
-Meetings with the Sheikh's son and briefing him on the issue (The Islamic Armed Group and
Abu Qatada).
-A call from Saif that the Sheikh is all right.
-Meetings with Abu Idriss Al-Maghrabi

SNY014-0048
-The killing of brother Moustafa, of the Algerian Armed Islamic Group, in Peshawar by the
Takfeer Group in the town of Babi.
-Sharp and intensified attacks on the radio regarding Abu Abdalla's position on the Taliban.
-Pictures of the Sheikh appeared in the Pakistani newspapers, and the reaction of the Pakistani
public.
-We were able to make a phone call, and we could receive faxes but not send them, because of
the bad weather, as we had expected
*(3/28/97) Friday morning
-Arrival of the Sheikh, and met immediately with the group. The essence of the meeting was
that the Commander of the Faithful warmly welcomed the Sheikh, and the meeting there took
place right away at the airport, on the tarmac. The Commander of the Faithful informed Abu
Abdalla that:
a. We decided to stop talking until we can resolve our problems with Dustom.
b. You don't have to worry about our statements on the radio and in the press.
c. We have to move to Kandahar to ensure the security of the Sheikh and his group.
d. If you have any objection to that, tell us.
-Abu Abdalla mentioned his agricultural projects to the Taliban, and gave some opinions, and
they agreed with him.
-After the Friday prayer, the Sheikh gave the young men a summary of the meeting on the
success of his visit. The Taliban supporting us was considered a victory.
-Abu Abdullah has decided to move to Kandahar in about 25 days.
We received news about the start of clashes in Babi between the Takfeer Group, and that the
Arab and Pakistani brothers surrounded the area, and that Abu Mus'ab Al-Masri had been
detained.
-There's been an unusually large amount of news coverage and broadcasts on Abu Abdalla.
-Abu Firas called Abu Hafas and told him he would be coming tomorrow.
*(3/29/97) Saturday morning
-Arrival of Abu Firas
-"Organized chaos" is slowly spreading throughout the camp, but we don't know what's really
going on, or the reasons for any movement.
-New security procedures, and the appointment of a new brother in charge of security.
-Arrival of delegations from Pakistan, Tajikistan, and Afghanistan to meet with the Sheikh.
-We're increasingly confused in the midst of this uncontrollable gathering.
-We have self-doubts about making a decision on such positions, but we are tempted to have
some take part in offering their opinions.
-We received news that the Takfeer Group was completely wiped out by the Pakistanis.
*(3/30/97) Sunday morning.
-There are speculations here and there that Pakistan is backing some rebels to attack all the
Taliban from Jalalabad, but the speculation is being ignored, and there's nothing to substantiate
it.
-We met with the Sheikh in a private session to resume our previous conversation. It lasted for
two hours, and we concluded the following:
a. It's preferable to leave London and stay in Afghanistan, regardless of the circumstances.
b. In Afghanistan: I.We either work with him and be considered among those very close to
him, especially in the eyes of Mus'ab, without causing any confusion
2. Or we stay in Afghanistan and do our special work. Then would be a
geographic continuity that would put an end to the problems. We could

SNY014-0049
exchange visits as the need arises.
c. He cannot reveal his military plans to us because we are "in the hands of the enemy."
-We exchanged some advice and views on media work. An agreement was made that no one
should force anyone else to take the media approach.
-Abu Abdalla refused to let Mus'ab write a book on him.
-To sum up the meeting, the man was more self-confident this time than before.
Whoever wants to work is welcome. Whoever doesn't, [we say to them] God's land is spacious.
But we should try hard to maintain ties with Mus'ab.
-Long discussions with Abu Hafas Al-Saghir that confirmed our belief that if, God forbid, there
were any trouble, he and those like him would be behind it.
-Brothers Abu Walid and Abu Jihad were upset, and we went to determine the nature of work
with the Sheikh.
-Everyone has agreed to help him.
"(3/31/97) Monday morning.
-Hafeezullah, the former Minister of Planning, came with his bodyguard to visit the Sheikh.
-We asked to accompany Hafeez to Kabul to study the possibility of a book on the Taliban, and
to be briefed on Hafeezullah's [U/TJ project. He agreed without hesitating.
-We departed with Abu Walid and our things at 12 noon, along with Hafeezullah.
-We arrived in Kabul at 8 p.m., and we made an appointment with Hafeezullah for tomorrow.
"(4/1/97) Tuesday morning.
-Long but pleasant discussions with Omar Al-Mukhtar, and mutual satisfaction with the study of
the issues.
-We met with Amir Khan Muttaqi, Minister of Information, for two and a half hours.
-We met with Mustas'ad, author of 'The History of the Taliban Movement." He is an official in
the Ministry of Higher Education.
-We had lunch, which was broth-soaked bread from breakfast, tea, and bread.
* (4/2/97) Wednesday at dawn.
-We went with Hafeezullah to the Midan region, which is one and a half hours from Kabul.
[...]to study the humanitarian association project.
-We took a quick tour of the area with Hafeez. It was very beautiful.
-We went back to Kabul at 12 noon, and toured the streets of Kabul with Hafeezullah.
-We went to the Ministry of Higher Education and met with Mustas'ad to finish the interview on
the history of the Taliban.
-The meeting ended after two hours because Mustas'ad was feeling ill. We were hoping we
could meet with him at his home the following Friday.
-We went back to Hafeezullah's guest quarters at sunset, and were surprised to see that As'adalla
had arrived. He said that the Sheikh and everyone in the group would be coming to Kabul after a
while.
There are predictions that the rebels will attack Jalalabad within the next few days.
-The sad-looking caravan arrived at quarter to eleven.
-We were put up in two houses to accommodate the large number of men, women and children.
*(4/3/97) Thursday morning.
-Everyone will move from Kabul to Kandahar, but the weather is bad, which doesn't help the
planes during take-off. The land route is not possible because it is very long, almost three days.
-We are confused again. Should we go to Kandahar, or stay behind and then follow them?
Should we follow up on our study of the Taliban and the book of Abu Abdalla, or...or...?
Abu Walid had the same problem, but apparently he realized that he had to leave with the group.

SNY014-0050
God is the helper.
-We moved to another house that's more secure and a little further from the offices of the cross .
-Abu Walid has come to the conclusion that he wants to keep on working with Abu Abdalla for
the time being.
*(4/4/97) Friday morning.
-After consulting with Abu Abdullah, we decided not to accompany them to Kandahar.
-We finalized the last points with Abu Abdalla in preparation for departure. He agreed on the
idea of the book, with reservation.
-The anticipated attack on Jalalabad was canceled because of the bad weather.
-Abu Abdalla's sudden withdrawal before the attack was not helpful. God is All-knowing.
-We received news from the airport that the weather was favorable for flying. We said goodbye
to the Sheikh and the group.
-We stayed with the rest of the brothers who had decided to travel by land, waiting for
Hafeezullah so he could take us to Mustas'ad's house for our scheduled appointment.
-One hour later, we were surprised by the return of the cairavan. It was too difficult to fly,
because of the weather's fluctuation, and because the pilot objected to flying the children in such
run-down airplanes.
It was a terrible thing, especially for the women and children. It was a very sad sight. God damn
the infidel rulers!
-We made the last call to our families and told them that we were on our way back.
-We decided to go back quickly in anticipation of any security procedures in the area around
Jalalabad, which would make it difficult for us to pass through the border checkpoints.
-We went to the house of Mustas'ad, but we didn't see him because we were late for the
appointment.
-We went to the Presidential Palace and met with Sheikh Ihsan, the speaker for the Taliban; the
meeting went well.
-We happened to meet Peter, the English photographer, at noon when the convoy began to move.
"(4/5/97) Saturday.
-The weather was beautiful in Kabul. We visited Ihsanallah along with the Sheikh and the group,
and we had iftar with him.
-The convoy left by plane at 10 am.
-Abu Abdullah and Abu Walid left on land at 12 noon.
-We left for Jalalabad in a private bus at 1 p.m. after saying goodbye to Hafizullah at the Ministry
of Foreign Affairs building.
-We arrived at the jihad camp at 10 p.m. We went to sleep as soon as we arrived as we were
extremely tired.
-We passed by the Doumata camp at 9 p.m. to see about the possibility of training there, but
found out that takes time.
*(4/6/97) Sunday morning.
-We left for Turkham in a private bus; the time was 11:30 am.
-We passed by the Arab martyrs [cemetery] and said a prayer for their souls.
-We left Turkham for Peshawar under special guard and in a private bus, which was paid for by
the Political Bureau because we were journalists.
-At 1 p.m. were at the house of Abu Firas. We washed, had something to eat, finished our
discussions with him, and then went to bed after listening to a poetry recital that lasted until one
[am].

SNY014-0051
*(4/7/97) Monday morning.
-There were demonstrations in Peshawar for flour, and the roads were closed.
-We decided to travel to Islamabad for fear that things might get more complicated.
-At 7:15 we left for Islamabad on the bus.
-At twelve thirty we met Abu Firas at the home of the Taliban.
*(4/8/97) Tuesday morning.
-We went to the [travel] office and confirmed our reservation for tomorrow morning.
-We went to the Sadr market and bought a few presents.
-After the sunset prayer we went to Abu Mohamed's house and stayed there till midnight.
*(4/9/97) Wednesday dawn.
-We were at the airport at 8 o'clock.
-At nine thirty, in first-class seats, we started reminiscing about the past days. The trip was very
comfortable, but we were stuffed because there was so much food.
-We arrived at four thirty at London Gatwick airport. We entered [the airport] very easily.
-We took the train at five thirty.
-We arrived in London at six o'clock.
-We arrived home at around 7:30, praise to God.

completed, praise to God


4/9/97

SNY014-0052
Page 1 of 1

Yoel Tobin

From: Nicole Grandrimo


Sent: Friday, March 26, 2004 2:25 PM
To: Doug MacEachin; Yoel Tobin; Sarah Linden; Tom Dowling
Subject: Tasks

Per this morning's meeting, here are the taskings that must be accomplished:

1. Tom - Mine our notes for "Iraq"


2. Niki - Read March updates for "Iraq" & "Iran"
3. Sarah - Read FBI docs for "Iraq" & "Iran"
4. Sarah - Write document request for TD's referenced in Feith Memo
5. Doug - Read Mike S' binder

We will meet again on April 2nd to discuss the status of the tasks.

All My Best - Nlki

Niki Grandrimo
Professional Staff
National Commission on Terrorist Attacks
Upon the United States
202-331-4702

3/26/2004
WITH DRAWAL NOTICE

RG: 148
Box: 00010 Folder: 0027 Document: 25
Series: Team 1 Files

Copies: 1 Pages: 6

ACCESS RESTRICTED

The item identified below has been withdrawn from this file:

Folder Title: Moving Forward on Monograph


Document Date: 07-03-2003
Document Type: Letter
From.
To:

Subject: DCI Document Request #8

In the review of this file this item was removed because access to it is
restricted. Restrictions on records in the National Archives are stated in
general and specific record group restriction statements which are available
for examination.

NND: 281
Withdrawn: 04-23-2008 by:

RETRIEVAL #: 281 00010 0027 25


Page 1 of 1

Yoel Tobin

From: Nicole Grandrimo


Sent: Tuesday, January 06, 2004 3:03 PM
To: Doug MacEachin; Yoel Tobin; Tom Dowling; Sarah Linden; Melissa Coffey
Subject: Taskings and AOR's

Hello All

Pursuant to yesterday's meetings, here are the electronic copies of each of our taskings and our areas of
responsibility for the monograph. The latter is a working document, which I'm sure will change, and I will change
it accordingly. Please feel free to send edits, questions, and concerns.

All My Best - Niki

Niki Grandrimo
Professional Staff
National Commission on Terrorist Attacks
Upon the United States
202-331-4702

1/6/2004
Current: 1/6/2004, 3:11 PM

TEAM 1 AREAS OF RESPONSIBILITY

BY TEAM MEMBER

TEAM MEMBER TOPIC


Tom Bowling AQ & Iraq
AQ & Pakistan (coordinate w/Team 3)
AQ & Saudi Arabia (coordinate w/Teams
1A,3,&4)
AQ & Iran w/Yoel
Niki Grandrimo January 2000 - Current Threat
AQ & WMD
Recruitment & Public Diplomacy
Doug MacEachin 1988 - 1996 Departure from Sudan
East Africa Bombings
Kuala Lumpur
AQ & Other Groups (JI, IMCA)
Yoel Tobin 1996 Arrival in Afghanistan - January 2000
AQ & Taliban
AQ & Iran w/Tom
KSM in Qatar
Sarah Webb Linden Millennium Plot
Embassy Paris Plot

BY TOPIC (alphabetically)

TOPIC TEAM MEMBER


1988 - 1996 Departure from Sudan Doug MacEachin
1996 Arrival in Afghanistan - January 2000 Yoel Tobin
2000 (January) - Current Threat Niki Grandrimo
East Africa Bombings Doug MacEachin
Embassy Paris Plot Sarah Webb Linden
Iran & AQ Tom Dowling & Yoel Tobin
Iraq & AQ Tom Dowling
KSM in Qatar Yoel Tobin
Kuala Lumpur Doug MacEachin
Millennium Plot Sarah Webb Linden
Other Groups & AQ (JI, IMCA) Doug MacEachin
Pakistan & AQ Tom Dowling
Recruitment & Public Diplomacy Niki Grandrimo
Saudi Arabia & AQ Tom Dowling
Taliban & AQ Yoel Tobin
Tradecraft TBD
Training Camps & Bases TBD yr <^Au~
WMD & AQ Niki Grandrimo f
3
Doug,

Tom, Niki, and I talked today about getting organized for the next push. Of
course, all of this is subject to your approval, and, in any case, tentative and
subject to change as we proceed. (Note to Tom: Niki and I refined this
slightly after your left, so let us know if you are ok with it.)

With regard to the rolling text, we suggest that I do a first draft of the first
part of the Afghan period, i.e., mid-96 till the attack on the Sullivans in early
Jan. 2000. Niki will pick up with KL, and take us thru 9/11 and up to the
present. (Of course, contributions from others, in distinctive inks, are more
than welcome.)

We also thought it would be helpful if we had separate folders for cross-


cutting topics such as WMD. We created a new "Subjects" folder in the
shared drive under Team 1 which includes the following:

"Players" (this includes information on individuals, on groups,


e "big ^1"-set-ferth%etewr- also, we have moved
"Players" into the "Subjects" folder, so you won't find it anywhere
else);

"Iran" A.

"Iraq"

"Saudi Arabia"

"Pakistan"

"AQ & WMD"

"Tradecraft"

"Training camps and bases"

"Facilitation"

'Recruitment/PR"
• "AQ& Taliban"

The idea is to put relevant information into these subject matter categories
as well as into the rolling text, and perhaps to ultimately include some of
them as separate chapters or appendices. At any rate, they should be a
handy guide for us and perhaps for other teams, as well.

In terms of writing up these subject matter categories, Tom will write on


^audi Arabia, Pakistan, and Iraq, and he and I will jointly do Iran (I already
/have some text on this). Niki will write on WMD, and we will leave the
; others open for now. However, Niki and I will work on the chronological
rolling text first, since that has to be our highest priority.

Finally, we have to put the raw material into these subject matter categories
before they can be written up. To avoid duplication, Tom will mine my
notes and Niki's notes for references to Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, and Iraq, and
then write them up. He will also mine the data for important references to
other countries. Niki and/or I will do data dumps on most or all of the
remaining topics; however, it would be helpful if you, Doug, were to check
your notes separately and insert the relevant material into the appropriate
category. Alternatively, you could put all your relevant files on the share
drive and have us do it for you.

We will, of course, also need to keep reading the material that has not been
digested yet.

I hope this is clear and will facilitate our work!

Yoel
Page 1 of 1

Yoel Tobin

From: Yoel Tobin


Sent: Sunday, December 07, 2003 1:13 PM
To: Team 1
Subject: Brief Addendum to 11/25 memo

Doug advises that it will ease our (and especially Tom's) burden and promote greater efficiency if we coordinate
with Teams 1 A, 3, & 4 on Saudi Arabia, and with Team 3 on Pakistan.

12/8/2003
.^/
QJ
V
Page 1 of2

Yoel Tobin

From: Douglas and Olga MacEachin [djopm ©wanadoo.fr]


Sent: Wednesday, March 10,2004 6:25 AM
To: Yoel Tobin
Subject: Schedule

Yoel

Two points following up on our last phone discussion.

1) The schedule and deliverables you described as having been stated by Phil in your recent meeting
certainly sound much more achievable than what I thought from earlier sessions to be our guidelines. I
guess I could argue that this latest guidance it is somewhat different from what was being conveyed until
recently ~ including a lengthy Team leader meeting on declas and a schedule from Stephanie re the
PRO process. But let's seize what we have. Most importantly, to avoid future manifestations of what
are obviously misunderstandings stemming from my old age and inability to keep up with a fluid
situation, I thought it might be useful if you could save your notes from the conversation on the written
product schedule. When I get there, I thought I would write them up as a sort of "final stages work
plan," listing dates, product objectives, and classification thresholds for each product. After vetting it
with all of you to insure it fits the understandings of all team members, I could then forward it to the
front office (Phil in particular,) and ask for a response from each recipient. That would provide a written
record with which anyone could confront me in future instances of my misconception of what was said
from the front office re what our deliverables are.

2) I also want to insure there is no misunderstanding re the "when received" issue with regard to what
we now know. I simply believe that IN SOME CASES this becomes part of the "what we know"
itself. I.e., it only needs to highlighted when it relates to a POTENTIAL benchmark of new info. At
that point, if it does represent even only a POTENTIAL new order of magnitude in the evidential picture
of the dimensions and shape of a POTENTIAL threat, with POTENTIAL policy implications of
significant magnitude, the questions of "when was it received; how; what is the authority/access of the
source to the info; what is the source's record relating to reliability; what do we have in terms of
corroborating info; what was done with the info; to whom was it communicated and with what content;"
become as much a part of the information base as the substantive content itself, because these
questions relate to the questions of potential actions, and the costs and risks of such actions merited by
the information . I think this is mainly relevant with regard to information obtained BEFORE certain
event benchmarks. Thus I would think that after the events in the fall of 1998 such questions
are important mainly in relation to specific operational events, e.g. as Dieter is trying to dig up. The
1996-97 point is, I think, more of a strategic landmark. But you may have a different view and I leave
it to you and the rest of the team members to decide whether and where such questions are significant
for your drafting. Otherwise, the source footnotes/endnotes certainly are enough. Especially when we
are dealing with info obtained after the fact.

Indeed, as you are aware, I am, in the view of some, overly resistant to judgmental statements.
Whenever possible, I would greatly prefer to lay out the information and let the reader draw her/his own
conclusion. And sometimes, simply laying out the answers to the questions listed above makes its own
case, as I think we were able to demonstrate to the commission.

Again, I certainly did not mean to appear to be imposing additional burdens. My only purpose in

3/10/2004
Page 2 of2

/eferring to the "when did we know, how, what was done with the info" questions are for cases where
you think they are relevant. If none, then none it is.

See you soon. (Please share with your team colleagues.)

Doug.

3/10/2004

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