Mathematics as a Science of Patterns: Ontology and Reference Author(s): Michael D. Resnik Reviewed work(s): Source: Nos, Vol.

15, No. 4, Special Issue on Philosophy of Mathematics (Nov., 1981), pp. 529550 Published by: Blackwell Publishing Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2214851 . Accessed: 12/01/2012 11:28
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Mathematics as A ScienceofPatterns: and Reference Ontology

MICHAEL D. RESNIK UNiVERSITYOF NORTH CAROLINA

1. INTRODUCTION

I seek an account of mathematics in whichthe logical formsof mathematicalstatements are taken at face value and theirsemanticsis standwithfairly ardlyreferential, say,in the mannerof Tarski. This together uncontested assumptions entails that mathematics is a science of abstract entities, thatis,immaterial and nonmentalthingswhichdo not exist in space and time. So I am a platonist.1 Many philosophersof mathematics who would like to be platonists are bothered by two rather deep problems. The firstis that since platonic mathematicalobjects do not exist in space or time the very possibility of our acquiring knowledge and beliefsabout them comes into question. The second arises fromthe fact that no mathematical theorycan do more than determine its objects up to isomorphism. Thus the platonistseems to be in the paradoxical positionof claiming that a given mathematicaltheoryis about certain things and yet be unable to make any definitive statementof what these thingsare.2 I thinkthatthese problemsarise in partbecause of a fundamental misconceptionof what mathematicsis about. If we conceive of the numbers,say,as objectseach one of whichcan be givento us in isolation from the others as we thinkof, say, chairs or automobiles,then it is difficult to.avoid conceivingof knowledge of a number as dependent betweenus and thatnumber. The same upon some sortof interaction line of thoughtleads us to thinkthatthe identity of a numbervisa vis any other object should be completelydetermined. For some time have emphasized thatmathematics mathematicians is concerned with structures involvingmathematicalobjects and not withthe "internal" natureof the objectsthemselves. They have recognizedthatwe are not givenmathematical objectsin isolationbutratherin structures. That 13 is a prime number is not determinedby some internalpropertyof 13 but ratherby its place in the structure of the natural numbers. Some
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philosophershave already taken note of thismovementin mathematical thought.3 But I propose to take thisidea more seriouslythan they have. In mathematics, I claim,we do not have objectswithan "internal" compositon arranged in structures,we have only structures.The objects of mathematics,that is, the entitieswhich our mathematical constantsand quantifiersdenote, are structureless pointsor positions in structures. As positionsin structures, theyhave no identity or featuresoutside of a structure. Furthermore, the various resultsof mathematics which seem to show that mathematicalobjects such as the numbersdo have internalstructures, e.g., theiridentification withsets, are in fact interstructural relationships. I findit more suggestiveforepistemologicalpurposes to speak of mathematicalpatternsand theirpositionsratherthan of structures. I viewpatternsand theirpositionsas abstract entities.Most of thispaper willbe devoted to developingan extensionalaccount of patternsand to explaining how viewingmathematicalobjects as positionsin patterns leads to a reconception of mathematicalobjects which defuses the objection to platonismbased upon our inability to completelyfixtheir identity. I also think that viewing mathematicsas a science of patterns promises to solve the platonist'sepistemologicalproblems as well-or at least to make them less urgent-by showing that mathematical knowledge has a fairlycentral place in our general epistemological picture. I expect to develop a more detailed epistemologyelsewhere, but before proceeding to the main tasksof the paper I want to sketch my currentview.4 When we are exposed to several instancesof a patternof certain kinds(and are in the rightpsychological set and have the approrpriate purposes) we are bynaturestruck of theinstances-we bythesimilarity see that theyfita pattern.5Thus the detectivesees several strangulationsin a month'stimeand thinks "thereis a patternto this".Of course, thisis not to knowwhatthe patternis nor to be able to make any use of it. However, after furtherexposure to instances of the pattern (or further thoughton the previous instances)we are likelyto attemptto describe the patternitself. This is oftendone via role talkor positional talk. For example, the detectivewill say: the victimis strangledwitha scarf,the murderer approaches the victimfrombehind, the crime is committedon a Wednesday,etc. (Reflectionon thismay lead us to an accountof how reference in mathematics is possible.) Such descriptions of a patterncan then be checked against the data whichgenerated the descriptionand which are supposed to fitthe pattern. Describing a patternis thus closelyakin to developing a theoryof it and of the data it. Once we have a partial descriptionof a patternwe can also fitting inferotherfeaturesof it.Thus thedetective deduces thatthemurderer

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has the size and strength to stranglethe victim witha scarf.Moreover, once we have representeda patternto ourselveswe can easilythinkof variationson it. Thus murder on Fridayratherthan Wednesday, two victims simultaneously strangledwithone long scarf,etc. This route to the knowledgeof new patternsis not onlyquite familiarto mathematiciansbut absolutelycrucialto myaccount of mathematical knowledge. For it is not implausible to thinkof our coming to know small finite patternsthroughexposure to concreteinstancesof them,but one has to strain quite hard to believe that we arrive at our knowledge of infinite or complicated patternsin thisway. Infinitepatternsare first thoughtof, I would suggest,by thinkingof finitepatternsas indefinitelyextended. There is more than this to knowledge of an infinite pattern,of course; our representationof the infinite patternmust be consistent;it mustrelate to the finitepatternsit extends in the appropriatewayand so on. But I thinkthatalong theselines an epistemology for number theoryand the higher branches of mathematicscan be developed. If so, this would place the epistemologyof mathematics along side epistemologiesforlinguistic and musicalknowledge.For no doubt we performanalogous operationsin those fields.We internalize patternsof linguistic utterancesor muscial performances;we are able to generate new patternswhich have never before been uttered or performed,and we are able to classify and recognize general features of these patterns.If we could not, we could not writenew novels and songs or recognize nonsense and dissonance. Knowing thatadding is commutativemay be like knowingthatthe active-passivetransformation generallypreservescognitivemeaning; knowingthat there is no greatest natural number may be like knowing that given a song in which a measure is repeated, say, twice,there is (could be) another in which it is repeated three times. Much more needs to be said about an epistemology of mathematics based upon our knowledge of patterns.But I hope that my sketch makes it plausible thatthe epistemology of mathematics is no more (or not much more) mysterious than the epistemologiesof linguistics and music. Like mathematics theybegin withexperience, abstractfromit and arriveat the unexperienced (and, perhaps, like mathematics, even the unexperientable).
2. PATTERNS

Although I know of no developed philosophicalaccount of patternsI have encountered several suggestionsas to what theymightbe.6 They all take offfromthe relationshipbetweena patternand itsinstances.I focus instead upon how patternsare related to each other and get instantiation as a special case. The approach seems quite naturalto me,

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varyconsiderablyon these but myexperience has been thatintuitions matters.It may help you understandmyapproach ifyou bear in mind theoriesof on twomathematical thatithas been generatedbyreflecting and model theory.My view makes model namely,geometry structure, theoryinto a geometry. of one or more consisting On myview,a patternis a complex entity standing in various relationships(and objects, which I call positions, having various characteristics,distinguished positions and operations.)7A positionis like a geometricalpoint in that it has no distinposition guishingfeaturesotherthan those ithas in virtueof beingthat in the pattern to which it belongs. Thus relative to the equilateral but triangle ABC the three points A, B, C can be differentiated, fromeach otherand considered in isolationtheyare indistinguishable the verticies of any trianglecongruentto ABC. Indeed, considered as from any other an isolatedtriangle, ABC cannot be differentiated equilateral triangle. In geometry structuralrelationships-such as congruence and similarity-are paramount while claims of identity of points,lines, planes, etc. are reserved forcontexts and distinctness where these entitiesare related to several other geometricalobjects. I studied by transfer this geometricalanalogy to the various structures or patternpositionsmaybe identified mathematics. Withina structure or patterncontainingthem proor distinguished,since the structure vides the contextforso doing. However, the paramount relationships (congruence and among patterns are those of structuralsimilarity equivalence introduced below) and structuralcontainment (occurrence and subpattern).Let us apply the analogy to the naturalnumber sequence (N, S). I take thisto be a patternwitha singlebinaryrelation (successor) and the natural numbers to be its positions.Viewed thus in the factthatthe naturalnumbershave no thereis no more perplexity featuresbeyond those definable in terms of the pattern identifying than there is to the corresponding fact about the points in triangle ABC. or structurally are relatedto each otherbybeingcongruent Patterns isomorphic.Congruence is an equivalence relationwhose fieldI taketo and arrangementsof concreteobjects. abstractstructures include both itis the relationship Thinkingof patternsas models of formalsystems, of formalsystems. Consider, for whichholds betweenisomorphic models order system S witha single two-placepredicate "R" example, a first and axioms statingthat R is a total ordering. This systemhas many models-all the totalorderings-but theyare not all congruentto each are. The set other.Onlythosewhose domains have thesame cardinality of numbers from one to ten taken in their natural order and ten taken in order of theirbirthare isomorphicmodels puppies in a litter of the systemS; so I count the abstractnumerical structureand the arrangementof puppies as congruent.

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When a patternand an arrangementof so-called concreteobjects such as the puppies are congruent then I say that the arrangement the pattern.Instantiationthen is a special case of congruinstantiates ence in whichthe objects "occupyingthe positions"of a patternhave identifyingfeatures over and above those conferred by the arrangementsto which theybelong. The puppies thus instantiatethe one-to-tenpattern. The occurrence of patternswithineach other has played a more If you thinkof than has instantiation. fundamentalrole in mythinking the sentence "A cat bit the cat who ate the cat" as a linguisticpattern, then the word "cat" is a patternwhich occurs three times in it. The natural number sequence occurs withinthe patternof the real numbers taken in their natural order; it also occurs withinthe iterative occur Five pointedsolid starpatterns itself. of setsand within hierarchy in both the patternsof the United States flag and the Californiaflag. The fieldof the occurrencerelationis the same as thatof congruence; hence concretearrangementscan occur withinpatternsor other concrete arrangements. My interest,however, is mainly with patterns and occurrenceis a reflexive occurringwithinpatterns.More formally, P and Q when P is relation which holds between structures transitive definablein Q. Thus (N, S) occurs within(N, isomorphicto a structure models of varioussettheories.The rationalnumbersqua <) and within field(Rat, +, ) contain an occurrenceof (N, S) but the rationalnumbers qua countable dense ordering (Rat, <) do not because 0 and successor are not definable in such structures. A special case of patternoccurrence is the subpatternrelation. of B just in case everypositionof A is a position PatternA is a subpattern of B and A occurs in B. It followsthatpatternA occursin patternB just in case A is congruentto a subpatternof B. Take note thatthe subpatternrelationis more complicated than althoughit includes an analog the submodel relationof model theory, to that relation in its special cases. My reasons for the more complex about patternsand myaim to approach turnupon both myintuitions give an account of reduction in mathematics. considerationsnow and leave the disI will take up the intuitive cussion-of reduction for later. Suppose that we are given a charpositionsa, b, c, d, e, f,g, of a patternas havingninedistinct acterization h, i, and tworelationsA and L such thata L b, b L c, d L e, e L f,g L h, h L to geta bettergrasp of the i, a A d, d A g, b A e, e A h, c A f,fA i. To try patternwe draw the followingdiagram where we let L correspond to ofand A correspondto therelationoneunit left therelationoneunitofthe above:

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O d

b 0

c 0

g ,00

o ~~~0-(a%
h

,' ,e

%% "i

? ---------lo---------1?o

Now givenmyunderstandingof thediagram(and I admitthatyou may not see thingsas I do) the rectangleof dots containsa triangleof dots gbi. (It containsotherdot triangles as well,of course.) Thinkingnow of my drawingas also a representation of a spatial pattern(one whichis rathermore complicate'd thantheoriginalpattern),I conclude thatthe spatialtriangleis a subpattern of thewhole spatialarray.I thentakethis as evidence thatcorrespondingto the dot triangleare subpatternsof the original patterninvolvingthe positionsg, b, and i. These patterns can be characterizedby relationsdefinablein termsof A and Ljust as the spatial dot trianglecan be describedin termsof relationsdefinable in termsofaboveand left. Indeed the formerdefinitions can be read off thelatterquite straightforwardly. Nevertheless, therelationsof neither the spatial nor the non-spatialsubpatternare simplerestrictions of the relationsof the original pattern.Thus if we count the spatial triangle and itscorrespondentas subpatterns of theoriginalpattern-as I think we should-then the subpatternrelation must be defined along the lines which I have suggested. Myvisual intuitions withrespectto subpatterns and patternoccurrences can be transferred to some of the model theoretic cases as well. Let us thinkof the natural number sequence as representedby means of an unending linear sequence of dots. 000000000000000 .... Clearly a sequence of dots which we obtain from this sequence by startingwiththe nth dot fromthe leftis a subpatternof the original pattern.These correspond to all those progressionswhichare obtainable from(N, S) byrestricing S to a subsetof N. But thereare infinitely many models of number theoryobtainable from(N, S) whichare left out bec'ause their relations of succession are not subrelationsof the successorrelation.The even numbersequence is one, the odd number sequence is another,and the primenumbersequence a third.These all correspond to selectingsome progression of dots from the original sequence of dots. These sequences occur within the original sequence-at least as I see it-and to account forthatboth the subpatternand patternoccurrencerelationsmustbe characterizedin termsof definability.

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The natural number sequence (N, S) occurs withinthe natural numbers ordered under less than, (N, <), since Sxy x < y. (3z) (x < z . z < y);

the converse and, allowing second order or set theoreticdefinability, since: too relation holds
X _ y(Z)(XEZ.. (U)(V)(UZ . Suv D VEZ)DyEz).8

Most mathematicians and logicians would regard number theory as developed in a language in whichthe successor symbolis primitive as than less the symbol taking a development as the same essentially a certain of science the as theory number viewing I am Since primitive. patternor patterns,thiswould suggest that (N, S) and (N, <) should the same pattern.The problemthen is count as the same or essentially of thisrelation.Patterncongrucharacterization a to find satisfactory are not isomortwo structures these since condition a too strict ence is non-isomorphic of examples isolated not are they Moreover, phic. the same: we have view as essentially whichmathematicians structures Boolean Algebras in the formof rings,but also in the formof lattices, of groups and topologies, and so on. alternativedefinitions While itis true thatin these cases we have theorieswhose patterns occur withineach other, mutual patternoccurrence seems to be too weak a conditionforpatternequivalence. One reason is that(N, S) and (Rat, +, ) occur withineach other although theyare not regarded as essentiallythe same.9 A second reason is that the patternoccurrence of theories(by relationcorresponds to the notion of theinterpretability and thereare theorieswhichare mutuallyintermeans of definitions) pretable but not essentiallythe same fromthe mathematicalpoint of view.I0 If we look at well known examples of "essentiallythe same" conditionthan thatof mutual theorieswe see thattheymeeta stronger This means thatthere equivalent. definitionally are They interpretability. yieldsboth T and + DTS S that + such DTS DST of definitions is a set the theories words, In other DTS. and both S + DST yields T and DST but also other each not only definitons yield interpreting with together as axioms of Think of definitions definitions. each other'sinterpreting a special kind and thinkof the language of a theoryas includingthe symbols introduced by definition. Then definitionallyequivalent of the same set theoriesare a special kindof equivalentaxiomatizations of theorems." the same To capture the notion of patternswhich are essentially We can definitional equivalence. of like that relationship a we need model from techniques of using theories patterns move to complete

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theory but thiswillhelp onlywhen we can forma categoricaltheory of a patternas well. For patternsare specificmodels of theories-specific at least up to isomrorphism, and complete theories withnonisomorphic models abound. Despite this,the conception of definitionally equivalent theories as distinctencapsulations of a common set of theorems suggestsa similarapproach for patterns. Intuitively, twopatternsare like "essentially the same" iftheyboth encapsulate some "bigger"patternfromwhichtheycan be obtained by deletingsome of itsrelationships.More formally, let us call a patternP a truncation of a patternQ ifeveryposition,characteristic and relation of P is also one of Q. Then a patternP willbe said to be equivalent to a patternQjust in case thereis a patternR whichis a subpattern of bothP and Q and of which P and Q are respectivetruncations.To illustrate thisconcept let us returnto (N, S) and (N, <). These are truncations of (N, S, <) and it occurs withinboth of them. So they are equivalent according to the definition.On the other hand, although (N, S) and (Rat, +, ) occur withineach other they cannot be obtained from a common extension by means of truncationsince paring (Rat, S, +, ) down to (N, S) requires deleting some of its positions as well as its relations. Of theequivalence relationships whichcan occur betweenpatterns congruence is the strongest, equivalence the next and mutual occurence the weakest. I will not pursue the mathematics of these relationships furtherhere. I have discussed several equivalence relationsbetween patternscongruence, mutual occurrence,equivalence-but have failed to propose any identity conditionsfor patterns.12 I willnot; and thatbrings me to whatI findthe mostdifficult pointin mytheory-the restriction of identity to withinpatterns.Recall thatpatternsare like geometrical pointsand have no identifying featuresbeyond those theyacquire by being in a pattern.Now suppose thatwe considera pointA in a triangle and a point A' in a rectangleusing the diagram given below: A A

B.LI

B.

Are A and A' the same? One might respond that they cannot be because theybelong to separate figures.Well, how do we know that theyare separate? Because theyare drawn as being spatiallydistinct.

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Suppose then that we ignore thisaspect of the drawing and consider supplied as to theirspatial themas isolatedfigureswithno information separate, or they be spatially could figures the Then relationships. the be case ifthe line would A'-as be A could and could be contiguous no reason to is this Of course, are identical. segmentsAB and A'B' here matter the of fact no concerningtheidentity conclude thatthereis and have adequate in after space all, points of A and A'. They are, We simplydo not lines. the on same being as conditions-such identity this example. in facts the to determine have enough information This is quite true. But it is part and parcel of our developmentof geometryas a theoryof space. Had geometrydeveloped instead as a or shapes,then points might theoryor collectionof theoriesoffigures playing within figureswithout locations of role marking their onlyplay would This space. in the containing locations marking role of their the above (with presented rectangle and triangle the to view require us composite as a single the by drawing) indicated as relationships spatial figureand to take a similarview of other complexes of geometrical much of figures,but I see no obstacle to doing thisor to interpreting elementarygeometryalong these lines. Geometrydeveloped in this way would attributeno being to points independent of the figures containingthem. Identitymightbe relativizedto elementsof the same figure or each figure (figure kind) mightbe treated by means of a predicate rangingover separate theorywithan unrelativizedidentity all elementsof its universe. The latter alternativeis the one which mathematicstakes with respect to the structuresstudied by its theories. Natural number theory,for example, deals witha certainpattern;it has the means to of variousnumbers, raise and answerquestionsconcerningtheidentity as to whetherthe numberone is iT. the question evenformulate butitcannot is absolute: "(x)(y)(x numbertheoryidentity On the otherhand, within = y V x / y)" is one of its theorems.Similarremarkshold for the real functionsand analysis,sets and set numbersand real number theory, theory.In each case the theoryspeaks only of elements of a certain structureand has no means to identifyor distinguishthese from Like the variantof geometrywithdifelementsof another structure. of is a conglomeration shapes, mathematics theoriesof different ferent or patternand each foregotheorieseach dealing withitsown structure ing identitiesleading outside of its pattern. involvingpositionsof different However, if we exclude identities patterns(thisexclusion does not apply to subpatterns)then we cannot use any of the equivalence relations introduced earlier as identity conditionsforpatterns.To see whyconsidercongruence.Since itis the strongestof these relations,we can restrictour attentionto it. The natural number sequence is congruentto the even number sequence.

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then their for theiridentity, If we take theircongruence as sufficent But then 1 too. as identical count should positions corresponding on one's being the to avoid thisbycapitalizing would be 2! We mighttry second natural number and two'sbeing the second even number and 2 =E1. The troubleis that predicateslike this:2 7NW1, relativizeidentity 4 is the even number correspondingto the natural number 2 but qua so we would have: 4 =E2, 4 #E2. I know even numberstheyare distinct, distinctcongruent,equivalent or no other for identifying means of co-occurringpatternswhich will not fall prey to similardifficulties. just in case theyhave the patterns This suggeststhat we identify same positions,the same relations,etc. We could (and I would) use if we conditionsfor relations and characteristics extensional identity took thisroute. But even thisis not open to me. For it would require somethinglike: P1 = P2 (x) (x is a position of P1 x is a position of P2) & etc. patternsintoa positionsof different and thatwould require admitting to myprevious moves. So neither singleuniverseof discoursecontrary patterns is nor betweenpositionsof different identity betweenpatterns (everywhere)defined. is The exclusion of patternsthemselvesfromthe fieldof identity consistentwith the practice of mathematicsitself. Number theory quantifiesover just the numbers but not over the number theoretic set theoryquantifiesover sets but not over the set theoretic structure, hierarchy.Even model theory,which purports to treat of arbitrary does so by positionalizingthem, that is, by mathematicalstructures, withsets or ordered n-tuples.Nonetheless,the structures identifying of identityto positions reasoning which began with the restriction withinthe same patternis now in danger of underminingmy entire theory.For it appears that even the various equivalences among patternsmustbe abandoned ifwe cannotspeak of positionsfromthe same or model patternwithinthe same breath. I began by takingstructural theoreticisomorphismas criterialfor pattern congruence, but such fromthe positionsof one patternto those isomorphismsare functions of another. This seems to require a universewhichcontains positions fromdifferent patterns. we mustevolvea among variouspatterns To speak of relationships patternscan comprehensivetheoryin which positionsfromdifferent be dealt within the same breath. There are several options for such a theorywith comprehensivetheory.First,one could use a many-sorted between separate universesforeach patternand unreduced functions This would be closestto the these universesto serve as isomorphisms. spiritof my informalexposition. A second (ontologicallycleaner) approach would constructpatterntheoryalong the lines of geometry bypositinga space of positions

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wouldestablish This theory fromwhichpatternscould be constructed. facts of the matterfor identitiesinvolvingpositions of its different would apply to all positionsin itsspace. Howpatternssince identity we would not expect the theoryto have theorems ever, like geometry, dealing with particularpositions.A thirdapproach would refinethe to setsof positionsjustas byreducingpatterns second one step further model theoryconstruesmodels as setsbuiltup fromthe domain of the and construeposimodel. One could push thiseven one step further reducingso-calledpatterntheory as pure sets,thereby tionsthemselves to set theory. The lastthreemoves do not do awaywithpatterns.Instead forthe motleyof patternsdealt withby the various branches of mathematics one big pattern and by myinitialapproach to patternstheysubstitute to make do withit. For on my and its positionsand ask mathematics for instance,is a patternalong with view,the set theoretichierarchy, others.Pure setsare positionsin it whose apparent internalstructures to other positionsin the hierarof theirrelationships are a fabrication chy. Moving to one big patternin which all positions and "internal" (patternsbecome sets on the patternsfall withinthe scope of identity to involve a retractionof my and fourth seems third approaches) I earlier claims about identity. think,however,thatI can explain why thisis not so. I did not mean to suggestin discussingthe second, third are and fourthapproaches that the various patternsof mathematics within one of the comprehensive withthe patternsdeveloped identical accounts; I only meant to suggestthattheycould be reduced to them. To appreciate the differencewe must turn now to the subject of reduction in mathematics.
3. REDUCTIONS

According to the definitionsI have given, the natural number sequence has multipleoccurrenceswithina patternwhichI willreferto It follows that even categorical hierarchy. as the iterative set theoretic can be versionsof number theory interpretedas dealing withany of and the set of its true sentenceswillremainintact.This is these patterns If I completelydescribethe of when we it be speak patterns. as should in a figure,thatdescription of a set of geometrical points relationships in a largerone. I as embedded if think of that to hold continues figure will not cover the relationships that my description The differenceis willfailto and new of the have to containing figure points these points be demanded of the that But should characterizethat figure. why original description? byvirtueof itscontainingoccurrences hierarchy, The settheoretic number of the natural sequence, can be viewed as an extentionof the

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latterpattern.This interplaybetween occurrence and extentionhas been usefulin guidingthe developmentof set theoryitself. Borrowing the notationand axioms of numbertheory to describea portionof the set theoreticpatternwillintroduceno falsehoodsinto set theoryand it willcall attention to the occurrenceof the naturalnumbersequence in question. That there is such an occurrence is surely as interesting mathematically as it is philosophically.Bringing number theory in suggests developments in set theory itself too-transfinite generalizationsof number theory.Thus the practicenow standard in set of usingthe numeralsto designatecertainsetsisjustifiedfroma theory pragmaticpoint of view. Although only one of the many occurrences of the natural sequence is referredto in the developmentof number theorywithinset theory,there is no embarrassmentfor mathematicsin this. Choosing one occurrence, rather than another, will certainlyaffectwhich set theoretictheorems get reported in our monographs but it does not change the set of theoremsof set theoryitself.It is importantto show thatnumbertheory can be done within settheory.Given thatthereare severalwaysin whichitcan be done, the simplest, mostelegantor most novel ways are what deserve attention.Doing mathematicswell requires selectivity. within is knownas a The developmentof numbertheory settheory reduction of number theoryto set theory.More generallywhen the patternor patternsof one theoryoccur withinthe patternor patterns of another theory,the formeris reducible to that of the latter. Although the existenceof reductionsis mathematically interesting, they have had little on the practiceof general mathematics effect itself. Most books on set theorydevelop the natural numbersin termsof sets,but books on numbertheory, topology,algebra or analysisbegin withboth numbers and sets. Nor do set theoristshave an atypical interestin ontological economy, although probably some has rubbed off from their philosophical colleagues. Instead we find numbers reduced to sets in set theorybecause, as mentionedearlier,doing so promotesset theoryitself. There is another phenomenon whichhas greatlychanged mathematicsand whichcould be called a reduction.This is the settheorizing I have in mind the use of the language of settheoryas of mathematics. the background language of workingmathematicsand the attendant objectification(or, in my terms, positionalization)of mathematical structures.This is reflected in the differentemphases of pre-set theoreticand post-settheoreticmathematics.Courant and Robbins' famous book, What is Mathematics?, illustratesthe pre-set theoretic approach to mathematics (althoughitdoes containdiscussionsof sets). The discussionin the book is almostexclusively about the elementsof

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traditional mathematicalstructures-the various numbers, geometrical objects and functions.Most of its theoremscan be formalizedin the first order theoryof these objects.Compare thiswithrecentbooks on topologyor algebra. Here the emphasis is upon the various structures themselves,what their substructures are, how they can be extended, and to whattheyare isomorphic.To formalizesuch theorems we must use theories in which structures themselvescan be taken as individuals,and thishas been greatlyfacilitated by the introduction of set theoreticmethods. Nonetheless,every mathematicaltheorydeals with one or more structureswhich it describes by showing how the elementsof each are internally related.Post-set theoretic mathematics is no exception.It speaks of structures onlybytakingthemas elementsof a "larger" structure-the hierarchyof sets. We now have two kinds of reduction. With the firsta pattern occurs in another and the theoryof the formeris reiteratedin the of the latter.Withthe second patterns theory themselves are identified withelementsof anotherpattern, thereby enablingus to achieveresults about these patterns whichwere not even stateablepreviously. It is the second sort of reduction which has had a genuine effectupon the practiceof mathematics. Philosophershave been fascinatedby the first kind of reduction. They wanted to knowwhethersome of theseestablishedthatnumbers are sets. Now we see thattheymightalso wonder whetherthe natural number sequence is a set. Both questions are ambiguous. Taken one way they simplyask whethercertainsetsare sets.To be interesting theyshould be taken as asking whethercertain things known to us before the advent of set are sets.Since,on myview,setsare positionsin a certainpattern, theory thequestionsask whetherthings whichare notknownto be positionsof that patternare positions in it. The question make prima facie sense since it appears that the entitiesin question might be positionsof the patternin question. But how could we findout? Not by mathematical means. No new theoremswillsettlethem,nor willnew axioms. These questions are not like the question of the generalized continuumhypothesis,"Is each aleph the cardinality of the power set of itspredecessor?", despite their grammaticalsimilarity. Taken in the non-trivial sense they are not in the language of a single mathematicaltheory. They can, to be sure, be "resolved" by extending the notion of set theoryand adding new identities or non-identities to thislanguage as axioms.13 However,even theseresolutionscannotbe decided by mathematicalevidence, since it makes no difference to the contentof mathematicswhetherwe do settheorywithnumbertheoryon top of it,so to speak, or whetherwe do it withnumber theoryreduced to it.

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Of course, it does make a difference to the elegance of our mathematical theories. Elegance is highlyprized in mathematicsbut it has nothingto do withmathematicaltruth;after we have settleda given mathematicalquestion it is fitting to ask whetherwe can do it more elegantly.From the mathematicalpoint of view the questions about numbers, the natural number sequence and sets are not questions about factsbut ratherquestions about how we should presentmathematical theories.14 This, in my opinion, is the only non-trivial sense whichcan be givento thesequestions.The viewthatthereis a factofthe matterhere is equivalent to assuming that given any object x and a positionof in a patternyeitherx = yor x 7 y This assumptionfailswith respect to my conception of patterns. Mathematicalreductionscannot tell us what numbers,functions, sets,etc. are in any factualse'nse,but theycan lead us froma defective conception or theoryof mathematicalobjects of a given kind to more adequate ones. For example, to someone who objects to functions on the grounds that they involve intensional notions such as rules, we mightrespond that functionsare nothingbut sets of ordered pairs. There is nothingwrongwiththissortof response,so long as we realize thatwe are not claimingthatfunctions conceived as rules are the same as functions conceivedas sets.Whatwe are doing is pointingout thatwe of functionsby using an can discard worriesabout the intensionality extensionaltheorywhichcan serve the mathematical ends of the original one. Something like this can be said about my proposals for pattern theory-although I do not thinkof myviewas a mathematicaltheory. Those who findpatterns and positionsmysterious mightfindreducing themto pure setsreassuring.Of course, givenmyviewthatmathematical objects are positionsin patterns, thiswould be another face to the reductionof mathematics to set theory.In both cases we would switch theorieswiththerebeing no factof the matter as to whethertheold and new theorieshave the same ontology.On the other hand, I would still maintainthatthereductionof patterns to pure setsis bothunnecessary and undesirable. Unnecessary, because myconceptionof positionsand is clear enough as is; undesirable,because thereductionto one patterns and "big'"patternwould tend to push therelationships among patterns theirpositionsout of focus. And the discomforting interpattern quesbecause we tionscannotbe avoided bythe move to one patternanyway, willstillwonder how itrelatesto the old patternsor how itwillrelate to patternsdiscovered in the future.If I am rightabout patterns,these worries are misguided. If I rightabout mathematicalobject's being positionsin patterns,then so too are worriesabout whethernumbers are really sets.

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We describe patternsin a numberof ways.One wayconsistsin stating how manypositionsa patternhas and how theyare related. Anotheris to presentan instanceof a patternand add thatthe patterninstantiated is the patternwe have in mind.A thirdconsists in introducing labels for how the positionsare relatedin termsof these. No positionsand stating descriptionof a pattern-not even one by means of a categoricalset of differentiate axioms--will the patternfromitsoccurrenceswithin other patternsor itsotheroccurrencesin isolation;Similarly a descriptionof it from other squares to which it is a square will not differentiate in accord withmypointof view.For itis not congruent.This is entirely a question of whether one pattern or many patterns are being described, although we cannot tell which. There is just one factof the matterconcerning how many patternsare there.15 *Mathematicaltheories describe various mathematicalpatterns.16 Their truthconsistsin doing so accurately.But if patternsand their identifiedhow is a correspondence sufficient positionscannot be fully for truthestablished between a theoryand its pattern?17 To fix our ideas let us ask how number theory describes the natural number sequence. The standard approach to referenceand truthassumes that it is possible to assign exactlyone position (number) to each numeral and do so withoutqualification.Truth is then characterizedrecursively in the manner of Tarski. This approach failsforpatterns,forit presupof positionswhile I poses thatwe can make unqualified identifications claim that identifications can only be made withina pattern. Nicholas White in [13] developed a view which in effecttreats numerals as functionaltermswithargument places for progressions. Instead of "3" we have "3(P)" which denotes the fourth object in whatever progression is chosen as a value of P. The view can be extended to otherkindsof structures as well withthe result,forexample, that there are progressionsP and set theoretichierarchiesS for which 1 (P) = { 0 } (S) whileforother P and S thisfails.This approach requires a common universe for all mathematicalstructures-or at leastrequiresa universeof all progressions-and functions definedon it. It thus sees factsof the matterwhere I see none. HartryField's [4] comes much closer to myview. He allows numerals to refer multiplyby using the notion of partial predicate. The numeral "0", forexample, partially refersto 0, to 0, to { 0 }, and to the first elementof everyprogression.The other numerals partially refer to the correspondingelementsof progressionswithitsbeing required thattheybe linkedin theirpartialreferenceassignments so thatdistinct numeralspartially referto different elementsof the same progression.

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avoided. The relation symbols of number theory are assigned the correspondingrelationsin a progressionas theirpartialdenotations.A structurefor which this obtains is said to partiallyaccord with the semanticsof number theory. A sentenceof numbertheoryis said to be true (respectively, false) ifand onlyifit is true (false) in every structure whichpartially accords withthe semanticsof numbertheory.Truth in a structure is understood in the Tarski sense. It thusturnsout thatthe truthsof the language of number theoryare exactlythose whichhold in everyprogression.Furthermore, in a mixed number theoretic-set theoretic language, thesemantics willcountsentencessuch as "1 = {0}" as neithertruenor false-so long as both the numbertheoretic and the set theoretic termsare taken as primitive. Thus Field sees truth, falsity and lack of truth-value exactlywhere I do. Despite this Field sees factsof the matterwhere I see none. The partial reference relation is one which holds absolutely between a numeral and elementsof progressions.Now suppose that"2" partially denotes an elementx of a progressionP1while"3" partially denotes an element y of a progression P2. Field's semantics requires that x be distinct from6 if P1 and P2 are the same progression.It thus requires thattherebe a factto the matterconcerningwhetherx = y even when P1and P2are notincluded in one and thesame structure. In thisrespect our views differ.'8 The onlyalternative leftthatI knowof is some versionof referential relativity. I thinka variantof Quine's viewsfitswell withmine,but before I explain how I wantto address the question of whya theoryof referenceis needed to complete my account. The answer, I thinkis fairly I espouse realism,thusI believe thatmathematstraightforward. ical statements are trueor falsein virtueof the featuresof an objective reality.So far I have presented an account of what that realityis. A "theory"of reference is needed to explain the connection between mathematicalstatements and that reality.'9 Let us suppose that we have fixed an occurrence of the natural number sequence. Then, relativeto takingthisoccurrence as fixed,a standard Tarskian approach to truthand referenceis possible. The symbol"O" is assigned the first positionin the sequence, the successor symbolis assigned the successorrelation,the quantifiersassigned the of the positionsin the sequence as theirrange,and so on. Truth totality is defined recursively in the familiarway.The set of numbertheoretic statements verified willbe the same no matter thereby whatoccurrence of the natural number sequence is fixed. Thus determiningnumber theoretictruthvia one occurrencedeterminesit forall occurrencesexcept thereis no factof the matter concerningwhetherthereare one or many natural number sequences in question.

and {I{{0} } } of({ 0}, { {0}}, I{ {0} } },.

Thus although "2" partially denotes both { {0}} of (0, {0}, {{ 0}}, . . )
.

contraditions are .),theobvious

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Next consider a language in which number theoreticlanguage is embedded. To be specificlet thisbe the language of set theory.There In the first the number theoreticsymbols are two cases to distinguish. are primitivesymbolsof the larger language. Then we must fix an occurrence of a set theoretichierarchyin which the natural number sequence occurs "at the bottom" so that the natural numbers can be taken as ur-elements.We then assign these positionsto numerals and othersto set symbolsand proceed as usual. This givesrise to combined such as "34EI2,3, 4}" but creates and settheory of numbertheory truths no new ones denotingthe numbersalone such as "2E3". No one has any complaintsabout this. symbolsare defined. The In the second case the numbertheoretic numerals thus come to referto a particularoccurrence of the natural numbersequence within(not "at the bottom")of the occurrenceof the just Some truthsapparentlyinvolving set theoretichierarchyfixed.20 created. My positionhere is the numbers-such as "2E3"-are thereby that this is an edifice of a reduction of number theoryto set theory. Thus, we should not conclude thatthese are new truthsinvolvingthe numbers alone. They are rather truthsabout positions in an occurrence of the natural number sequence in an occurrence of the set truthsabout sets. theoretichierarchyand thus ultimately about carrying Until now I have spoken ratherstraightforwardly out a semanticsfornumber theoryonce an occurrence of the natural number sequence has been fixed. But no matterhow thorough our to fixan occurrenceof a pattern,thereis, in general,no factof efforts concerningwhethertheoccurrencesupposedlyfixedis or is the matter not the same as some otheroccurrence. If we fixan occurrenceof the it as a certain subpatternof natural number sequence by identifying some more inclusivepattern,then we will be able to distinguishthis occurrence from many others withinthe larger pattern.That is why giving a formal semantics for number theorywithina set theoretic appears to make the numerals referabsolutely.We must framework not forgetthat this is relativeto takinga fixed occurrence of the set theoretichierarchyfor granted. We attemptto fix an occurrence of a patternby using a repreor theory-to pick it out. sentationalscheme-a diagram,description, We may even point to instancesof the patternas well. But referential do not forestall entersat thispoint,foreven our best efforts relativity questionsconcerningwhethertheoccurrencefixedis the same as other occurrence (in a perhaps more inclusivepattern).2'Thus referenceis . This simplymeans that asfixed ofa pattern an occurrence relative totaking of a patternis predicatedupon takingat face our semanticsfora theory scheme throughwhich we have attempted value the representational The demand that we achieve to fix an occurrence of the pattern.22

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absolute referenceby fixingoccurrencesof patternsmore fully misses mypoint thatthereis no more to do. For thereis no factof the matter whetheran occurrence of a patternis or is not the same as another except when theyare both subpatternsof the same pattern.23 Since part of the "theory"of reference for a language involves fixingthe range of itsquantifiers, a corollaryof referential relativity is In my case thiscomes to the doctrinethat only ontological relativity. relativeto takingan occurrenceof a patternas fixeddoes itmake sense to speak of the ontology (positions) of a theoryof a pattern.Where Quine proclaimsthatwhatmakes sense are statements concerninghow in anotherI have the parallel claim that one theorymaybe interpreted what makes sense are statements thatone patternoccurs in another.24 It mayseem I have done away withthe worldor withthe viewthat truthis a matterof the way in the world is. But I do not deny the existence of patterns,nor do I claim that how a pattern is fails to determinewhat is true in itstheories.My claim is thatthereis enough slippage betweenour theoriesof patternsand the patternsthemselves to affect reference.But itdoes notaffect truth:thetruths of a theory of in patternscona pattern are invariantunder all reinterpretations gruent in it.
5. CONCLUSION

When Frege-and Dedekind too-asked what numbers were, matheof the naturalnumber maticshad neitheran adequate characterization Their questionwas sequence nor an axiomaticbasis fornumbertheory. in facta demand thatmathematics develop an adequate conceptionof the foundationsof number thenumbers.One wayto do thisis to clarify was a direct result of their work. theoryitself,and that clarification numberswithentitiesforwhichwe already Anotherway is to identify them have an adequate conception. Frege triedthistoo by identifying withsets,but enough doubt has been cast upon our conceptionof sets in thatsuch an identification is not regarded as conceptuallyclarifying itself. This paper has takenyetanotherapproach to the questionof what mathematicalobjects are. The problem is no longer one of clarifying our mathematicalconceptions. Rather it is a problem of finding a of them. My suggestionis thatmathematphilosophicalinterpretation ical objects are positionsin a patternis not intended as an ontological reduction.(It could lead to one, of course, but ifwe reduce patternsto sets it would be the old one with a detour added.) My intentionwas instead to offeranother way of viewingnumbers and number theory whichwould put the phenomena of multiplereductionsand ontologiin a clearerlight.Myhope is thatwhenthey cal and referential relativity

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then obvious way withrespectto patterns, are seen to arise in a fairly to mathematical with regard comprehensible more they will seem
structures.25 REFERENCES [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [1-1] [12] [13] [14] Review,74(1965): Benacerraf, P., "What Numbers Could Not Be", Philosophical 47-73. , "Mathematical Truth",JournalofPhilosophy, 70(1973): 661-79. and PhiCorcoran,J., "On DefinitionalEquivalence and Related Topics", History losophy ofLogic, 1(1980): 231-34. Field, H., "Quine and the Correspondence Theory", PhilosophicalReview, 84(1975): 23-50. Jubien, M., "Ontology and MathematicalTruth", Noius,11(1977): 133-50. Noius,12(1978): 119-36. Kitcher,P., "The Plightof the Platonist", Philosophical Review,80(1971): 151-76. Parsons,C., "Ontologyand Mathematics", inOntological and OtherEssays (New Relativity Quine, W. V., "OntologicalRelativity" Press, 1969). York: Columbia University Resnik, M., "More on Skolem's Paradox", Noius,3(1969): 185-96. "Mathematical Knowledge and PatternCognition",CanadianJournalof Philosophy, 5(1975): 25-39. , Fregeand thePhilosophy Press, of Mathematics (Ithaca: Cornell University 1980). (Ithaca: Cornell University Pres, 1975). Steiner, M., Mathematical Knowledge 27(1974): 111-24. White, N., "What Numbers Are", Synthese, forthcoming Studies, Wilson,M., "The Double Standard in Ontology",Philosophical in 1981. NOTES 'I am using the term"platonist"as it is commonlyused today in the philosophyof objects; I do not mathematics to stand forrealismwithrespectto abstractmathematical mean to commit myselftherebyto Plato's theoryof ideas. My reasons for espousing platonismare varied and complicated; some of them are found in Resnik [9], [10], and [11]. In [2] Paul Benacerrafpresentsa strongargumentforgivinga uniformsemantics termshave one kindof semantics formathematics and therestof science: ifmathematical be required for whileotherscientific termshave anotherthena special semanticswillstill sentences containing both kinds of term. This argument can be strengthened,as I observed in discussionwithBenacerrafand othersat the Greensboro conference.For a uniformsemanticsformathematics and science willbe required to obtain an account of sentences. In [11] p. 62 I inferencesinvolvingboth mathematicaland other scientific trace thisto Frege. Once the need fora uniformsemanticsand a face-valueaccount of logical form is granted, the weight of the Tarski approach quickly carries one to platonism. 2Benacerraf [2] and [1] contain statementsof the firstand second problems, respectively. Steinerdiscusses the formerat lengthin [ 12] whileJubien[5] and Kitcher [6] elaborate on the latter.See also Maddy's paper in this issue. 3Cf.Jubien [5], Kitcher[6], Parsons [7], Benacerraf [1], Steiner [12]. for a 4A fullerand perhaps differing account willappear in a paper I am writing on mathematical 1982 AmericanPhilosophicalAssociationWesternDivisionsymposium knowledge.It willappear in Nous XV, 1 (March 1982). A previousattemptappeared in my [10]. 5Not all patternsare knownthroughexposure to theirinstances-thus the qualifications. 6One of these was given by GilbertHarman in his commentson the Greensboro Conference version of this paper.

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7I have added the parenthetical clause to parallel the model theoretic definition of structure. Strictly speaking,distinguished positions, operationsand characteristics which cannot be picked out using the relationsof the patternitselfmust be viewed as distinguished byseeing the patternas embedded in anotherpattern.Thus (N, S, 0) containsa distinguishedposition,viz. 0, which can be picked out using the successor relation S. However, distinguished0 in (Rat, <, 0) is dependent upon viewingthat patternin a background patternin which 0 can be distinguished"lnternally". 81f second order or set theoretic definability is used, thena theoryof typesmustbe observedso thatno settheoretic or higherorder entities are added to theoriginalpattern as new positions.Otherwise,as Mark Wilson has pointed out to me, infinite structures would occur withinfiniteones. 91n (Rat, +, ) we can define 0 and 1 by (y)(O = y
(y)(l
=

y + y = Y)
y * y = y),

and then define N and S. To obtain (Rat, +, ) within (N, S) we use second order definitions to define addition,multiplication and exponentiationover the naturalnumbers and defineordered pairs (a, b) as 2a. 3b. The rationalscan thenbe developed in the usual way as ordered pairs of natural numbers. ' ?A theory in a theory T withthe same underlying S is interpretable logicjust in case thereis a setof definitions of the primitives ofS in T call this, DST, whichwhenadded toT yieldsthetheoremsofS (as theoremsofT + DST). Consider twosecond order theoriesN' and N + whose primitives are respectively "0", ""' and "19,9 "+". The axioms of N' are:
(x)(x' W

(F) [FO . (x) (Fx D Fx') D (x) Fx], whilethose of N + are exactlythe same except ""' is replaced everywhere by "+ 1". N' is in N+ via the definition:x' = x + 1. N+ is interpretablein N' via the interpretable definitions: 1) 1 = 0' 2) x + y = z (F) [(x) FxOx . (u)(v)(w)(FuvwDFuv'w'DFxyz].

(x)(y)(x'

= y'D x = y)

0)

This implies that every model of N' has a model of N+ occurringwithinit and conthe same: N' is complete as to conseversely.Yet these two theoriesare not essentially quences and categorical,N+ is neither;N' + DN + N' entails"0 + 0 = 0", but thisis a theoremof neitherN+ nor N+ + DN'N+. These points are due to John Corcoran. "Our two theories N' and N+ fail to be definitionally equivalent, by the way, because (2) cannot be proved as a theoremof N +. A counter model can be obtained by "x + y" as the functionf such thatf(x, 1) = x + 1, f(x,y) = 1 if y : 1. See interpreting Corcoran [3] for furtherdiscussion. 12Mark Wilsongrapples in [ 14] withthe problemof determining when twotheories have the same ontologyand proposes definitional equivalence as the solution.The line I willtake eschewsall but verygeneral intertheoretic comparisonsof ontology.For example, itmakes no sense to ask whetherthe positionsof twopatterns are thesame butitdoes make sense to ask whetherone or both contain infinitely many positions. 13Forexample, the question about the numberscan be "answered" affirmatively by adding "0" and "'" to the language of set theoryand the axioms "0 = Q,', "(x)(x' = x U { x and theaxiom "(x) (xEND-(3y) (yEx.xAL/i)" byadding thesame symbols })", or negatively where "N" is given its usual set theoreticdefinitionin termsof "0" and "'". '4Since there is no factof the matterhere, no factsare made by stipulation either. 150f course,within a largerpatternwe can pickout manydifferent occurrencesof a patternjust as we can pick out many stars in the American Flag Pattern. We do so, the larger pattern. however,by distinguishing positionswithin 16J have in mind "concrete"mathematical theoriessuch as number theory, analysis and settheory. "Abstract" theoriessuch as group theory, topologyand, perhaps modern

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do notattempt geometry to describea singlestructure but deal withclasses of structures. An "if . .. then" or deductivistapproach is appropriate for these theories. 17Non-categorical theories present a number of problems. First order number theory seemsto be a case wherewe had a clear idea of the patternand came to realize that the theorydid not completelydescribe it. We then used other devices to rule out the unintendedpatterns.In thecase of settheory we also knowthatwe lack a fulldescription of the set theoretichierarchybut remain unsure of which of the various structures describablebyset theoryis the "intended"one. Note thatbothintendedand unintended models of number theoryand set theorycontain congruent cores. I view our initial versionof numbertheory and our currentsettheoriesas attempts to describethesecores. That theyweresatisfied bydiverging extensionsofthecores initially escaped our notice. 18Both Field's and White'sapproach are criticizedin Kitcher [6]. 191have put scare quotes around "theory" because on myview thereare no factsof the matterconcerning the referencesof mathematicalterms. I will not address the epistemologicalquestionsabout reference-such as, "How is it possible forus to referto positionsin patterns."I hope to deal withthese in the paper mentioned in note 4. 20MarkWilsonin [ 14] countssettheory withthenaturalnumbersas ur-elements and pure set theory as ontologicallyequivalent. My view is that these are examples of equivalentbut noncongruentpatterns.As maybe evident,traditional questions about a theory'sontologydo not find a place in my account. ilIn Quinean terms,even a complete and categoricaltheoryis reinterpretable in other theories. 22CfQuine: "In practice of course we end the regress of coordinate systemsby like pointing.And in practicewe end the regressof backgroundlanguages, in something discussionsof reference, byacquiescingin our mothertongue and takingitswordsat face value" [8] p. 49. 23Hartry Field offersan objection to Quine's referentialrelativity which is predicated upon reading Quine's formulation"reference is relative to some background language" as meaningthatreferenceinsteadof being a dyadicrelation"x refersto y" is a triadic relation "x refers to y relative to BL". (Actually Field reads Quine as saying referencetakes the form"x refersto y relativeto translationmanual M". See [4] pp. I believe. Quine and I are 206-208.) The objection is based upon a misunderstanding, arguingthatreferencefailsto make sense when an occurrenceof a pattern(background language) is not accepted as fixed (taken at face value). This is like pointingout that a In eithercase one personwho is notof a certainage cannotbe legallybound bya contract. mightsay "relativeto . . . ", for example, "relativeto your being of age you are legally bound to pay Jones $100" or "relative to taking English at face value the French expression 'deux' refers to two". In neither case is an increase in the degree of the relationshipintended. Making explicita suppressed degree in a predicate such as " is president" can be clarifying, but it would be pointless to demand that Quine revise "'deux' refersto two" to read "'deux' refersto two in English". If you did not already understand the expression "'deux' refersto two" as an English sentence, adding the it for you. words "in English" would not clarify 24Whenone recalls that for Quine a theoryis already interpreted, the difference betweenour viewsis not as greatas mytalkof patternsmightlead one to believe. Indeed in conversationand commentson an earlier draftof this paper, Quine has noted that of my positionsin patternsto his objects of a theory.It is possible to adduce similarity considerations to show thatnon-mathematical objectsachieve theiridentity onlythrough theirrelationships to otherobjectsand thenargue thatthesetoo are positionsin patterns. This would lead to an extensionof myviewsto include a complete theoryof referential than Quine's. relativity, although the route to thisconclusion would be ratherdifferent For worriesabout referencesto rabbitsvs. referencesto rabbitstages are not worries about multipleoccurrencesof a pattern.Rabbitparts,rabbitstagesand rabbitsmightbe whichoccur within each otheror are equivalentand positionsin non-congruent patterns, therebyproduce relativity phenomena. 25Thispaper has developed in spurtsover a numberof years;thus,I owe a large debt of thanks.In oral commentson Benacerrafs [2] Oswaldo Chateaubriand remarkedthat we can perceivecertainabstract entities throughtheirinstances.AlthoughI was familiar

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is about structure througha number of sources, these withthe view that mathematics forplatonism.Benacerrafhad remarkssuggestedto me a footholdforan epistemology in discussingthe problem of mightbe about structure hintedhimselfthat mathematics approach to to propose a structuralist multiplereductions.I believe thatI was the first of platonismin [10]. Since then I both the epistemologicaland ontological difficulties have benefitedfromcomments,encouragementand discussionwithmanyindividuals: James Anderson, Catherine Anderson, Charles Chihara, James Fetzer,Jane Fleener, Nicholas Goodman, Richard E. Grandy, Gilbert Harman, Penelope Maddy, Vann LaVerne McGee, Richard Nunan, W. V. 0. Quine, JayF. Rosenberg,FrederickSchmitt, Mark Steiner,Mark Wilson,Paul Ziffand the membersof my Shelton, Brian Skyrms, National Endowmentforthe HumanitiesSummerSeminar.I wantto givespecial thanks and conversations have been of toJohn Corcoran and Philip Kitcherwhose manyletters thatI have crucialassistance.I should add that,to myknowledge,fewof thoselistedthink or right.Earlier versionsof theseideas have been presentedto the gottenthingsstraight following:The BuffaloLogic Colloquium, Davidson College, the NorthCarolina Philosophical Society,the Universitiesof North Carolina at Greensboro and Chapel Hill Conference in the Philosophy of Mathematics,and the philosophy colloquia of the Universitiesof North Carolina at Chapel Hill and California at San Diego.