[Classification]

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

Event: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) New York Air Route Center
Type of event: Interview
Date: Tuesday, September , 2003
Special Access Issues: None
Prepared by: Geoffrey Brown
Team Number: 8
Location: FAA New York Air Route Center, Rokonkomo, New York
Participants - Non-Commission: Alfred , FAA General Consul
Participants - Commission: John Azzarello, Miles Kara, Geoffrey Brown

NOTE: Unless otherwise noted, the following paraphrases the response and opinion of
the interviewee. Please refer to the interview transcript for a complete account.

KEVIN DELANEY
1710EDT

Area a for about 21.5 years. On November 11 2000 asked to take over QA office. Did so
12.17. Stayed as supervisor in name.

Was in building on 9/11. Went out to cafeteria to check on CNN. One of few who noticed
second impact, questioned ATCs if they knew of info. Went to floor to let mike know.
Bruce Barrett had watch. Mulligan had STMC, rob falser MOS, Evonna in area b as CIC.
Paul Thumser went to pull tape.

Procedure was for sup to pull tape. Have conflict alert machine. Call it snitch machine.
Alarm goes off when within 5 miles. Run NTap to get printed picture of data. That part
was unrelated to 9/11. That's why there was a CIC in charge at time. Evonna was doing
an excellent job and was keeping a log at the time.

Went to check on information from watch desk. Went upstairs and started checking tapes.

Was in cafeteria after first hit per mike McCormack. Coming back from something.

Only two or three frames and noticed smoke on other WTC tower. Cafeteria room was
filled. Other controllers didn't immediately notice second hit. Had to be first 5 minutes
until CNN verifies second impact. Went to find mike and tell him major problem on
hand. Saw slow motion replay but was unable to tell exactly what aircraft it was. Could
tell it was a large aircraft.

Doesn't quite remember when whole set of information regarding AA11 was given out.

Went right to watch desk and then went to mike at area b. Telcon hadn't started yet. No
information on what was going on the Telcon.

Not sure of AA11 timeline on trying to identify aircraft. Sitting back thought there was a
good amount of confusion on what hit where. Hadn't heard from mike on first impact.
Goes to mike to tell him second hit not mistake. Just starting to form Telcon. More of a
military type situation than an FAA situation with prepared procedures.

Started to get info from Boston on what they were missing, and what was heard on the
Boston frequency.

Twin engine jet being missing - views from people on the ground remember seeing it go
overhead. Information on aircraft easily confused.

Doesn't recall helicopter report. Reports to ZNY came mostly at first from observers.

Not until after talon started that AA11 recognized as plane hitting WTC.

Very hard to tell altitude from another plane.

On primary only high altitudes don't normally register. Usually if transponder failure will
tell a cooperative airplane to turn to identify.

Pick out based on controllers going back and forth was accurate.

NEADS and alt primary - had no knowledge. Even with experience for 6 or 8 months
never heard of that. Matter of giving out airspace. But no knowledge of NEADS or
Customs capability. No scramble experience.

Going back in hijack scenario. If he thought they were going to put it in building he
would have attacked the hijackers. Pre 9/11 everyone, including ATCs, would have
cooperated. Now, everyone would react differently.

Controllers and supervisors were told to ask and verify 7500. Now that's easily known. In
past hijackers were not as prepared or as informed.

Prior to 9/11 Nordo, transponder fail - so think total electrical failure - then sudden turn
to south (course deviation) at 30k feet, flying blind - so still part of total electrical failure
- pilot doesn't necessarily know where he's going. So the drastic deviation doesn't
necessarily immediately mean hijack. Hijack would eventually "creep" back into thought
process. Then unusual cockpit com that ZBW knew about, and UAL 175 communicates
something strange on AA11, so two communications regarding unusual com. Not sure if
spoke to c or b first. Area c gets involved through Boston call, but not in area c space, in
area b space. B has problem, c knows of problem. So information coming over was
important, but didn't really "ring the bell". Boston does pass on that they're treating it as
a hijack at fl 290. That's when sector 56 sends aircraft to check. That aircraft sees
nothing.

Last known good info: f!290. Mindset of landing at Kennedy or Cuba. Nobody from
radar would know on AA11 that it was going down. He never slowed up hitting building
at 400knots. Not going to know about descent. Now radar switched and looking for
primary. Only see x. if he had slowed to 250 he'd look like a normal aircraft.

Right after UAL 175 informs ZNY, losses contact. NEADS in air. Wouldn't shoot down
airplane over ZNY. Would have been more of a fatality. Wouldn't get order. At that point
nothing was going to happen. Average person pre 9/11 doesn't believe shoot down will
happen over a major urban area.

Different scenario than engaging. Thinks we did shoot down 93. Thinks also shot down
twaSOO.

Code changes - UAL 175 never went to an active code. Not sure if controllers caught it
off the beginning. Knew about last change but not sure if controllers picked up on first
change. Two clicks on first change, but at second change knew.

Code 3321 was best guess as being 175. Nothing factual until actual happens. Dave
Bittiglia tracked very well and could be reasonably confidant that it was 175. Mike
McCormack behind him said he thought it was headed back towards city. At this point
AA11 had been missing long enough that other pilots are giving information that there is
smoke from New York City. Not necessarily alarming. Could have been a regular fire.

That night started pulling tapes. Tried to decide how to handle operations, etc. As
information developed they pulled tapes. No one could have tampered with them. In
lockdown, signed in and out. ZNY early on took positive control of tapes. First role to
clear that procedure not accident. Accident packages get peoples names, but refused to
put names on package and considered it an incident. If going to put names in planes, then
going to have to put names of those in building. In accident package, would have had to
put names of all injured. So that clarification had to be made. Accident would give you
transcripts etc. that you wouldn't get with an incident package. So clarification was
needed. As act of war, didn't want to put names in transcripts. No third category. No
category to cover it now either. Could ZBW and ZDC to agree and did accident package
without victim list. Marty Fournier went out with appendicitis. Worked with Paul Falley
and mike Pomfrey to start transcripts. FBI sought information immediately. Too many
mistakes with other transcripts, so had to rework them. Started putting the timelines
together as well.

Tries to identify timelines. Documents Kevin would have dealt with only ZNY. Ron(b)
jerry was regional QA 5050. Timeline Kevin created sent into region. Created in an hour
from compiled notes of Bruce, mike and Kevin. Stated to region not sent to secure site.
Not secured for over a week. They didn't know how to secure it. R42 transcript pulled
from first email - since it had mistakes and hadn't been reviewed by Kevin, Ron Revelry
set up a website as a repository for FAA requested information. Website is a great tool, it
should have been secure. Had no problem with the speed of access but problem that the
information could be accessed from any party.

When a transcript is prepared there is a certain method. The flow of the information was
incorrect, so gives the wrong impression of which info was exchanged.

Could tell which draft was printed by New York times.

NTSB was not involved with investigation at same level at FBI.

ZNY first center to complete accident file/package. Believes it was complete by

December. For two weeks information got punched in, but the process until finalization is
longer due to FAA review and requests, and further refinement by QA. Everything
secured in safe as it is being prepared. Written out as the custodian of the document, so
you can always see who is reviewing info - chain of custody. Three boxes of info kept in
headquarters, but files on it exist here and at region.

That morning, 9/11, bob Ott and Marty in conference room that was taped. That tape
wasn't part of accident package. Was part of EAP (employee assistant package) - not
something that was proper to be put in package. Not an official fact gathering exercise. It
was for employee emotional well being. Not sure if anyone at center listened to it to
uncover if there were any hard facts on it. Had no fact finding. Everyone involved asked
to do an official FAA statement. If something was prepared by the individual separately,
it would have been asked for comparison purposes. Accident file had NTap info (written
paperwork of flight of aircraft with beacon code and shows flight path). Other
information can be put into NTap to get different measurements - shows info that
controller would see on screen at any time but for a specific period of time. Guard
information tells when handoffs are taken, who takes the handoffs, etc. Used to determine
which keyboard put in what information.

- h and RA same position-

Data dump - getting all information, SATORI, voice - out of machine so not lost. But
doesn't mean the computer analyzes or produces anything specific to be extrapolated
from.

Recommendations:

What's going on now 1000 better but still with many holes. Radio failure wait maybe 30
seconds, then NEADS called, same time STMCIC calling company. Goes directly to
TMU to call company before they even go to other planes.
Caps work. But doesn't believe a president will shoot down a plane over a city.

Evidence that 93 shot down. No evidence real evidence. But knows an airplane doesn't
roll for over 8 miles. Parts wouldn't be spread for that far. Won't rotate self over 8 miles
and drop pieces of itself. 8 miles picked up from chat. Trans 800 friends who saw it come
down don't believe it.

Incompetence - verified bomb that turned out to be a usual fed ex package. So that type
of rhetoric over DENS - doesn't feel necessary for it to be 24hours. Got transferred to a
local line. Doesn't need to be open at all times. Good to hear over background for the
sake of situational awareness. People today are too quick to act on bad information.

NEADS and Customs can see everything and FAA can not. It would be positive if OMIC
could verify information with more precision.

Systematically - could not take over Cleveland's airspace. Cannot even bring map up.
Would have to drop something they use every day. On paper supposed to take areas d and
c. on tabletop exercises there is no training. Can get planes out of the sky but not sending
any planes over there. But definitely can't land planes there is Cleveland is there.
McGuire can't see to ground. So communication is necessary. Can't work n90 even if
airspace is under ZNY.

FAA/military interaction seems to go pretty well. Was difficult at first. Ran the Hershey
block. Took over all of area a, part of d and part of b. Couldn't shut it down because it
would shut down all of northeast traffic.

Block is airspace used for military.

Commission Sensitive