Article 6 Sections 1-5

Constitution I Atty.
Maita Chan-Gonzaga Book Notes: Legislative Department (Article VI, Sections 1-5) Sources: Case Book + Comprehensive Reviewer of Father Joaquin Bernas
Legend: CODAL | Reviewer | Case Book | Cases Section 1. The legislative power shall be vested in the Congress of the Philippines which shall consist of a Senate and a House of Representatives, except to the extent reserved to the people by the provision on initiative and referendum. LEGISLATIVE POWER: Legislative Power: o It is the authority to make laws and to alter or repeal them. o Power is vested in the Congress of the Philippines consisting of a Senate and House of Representatives and as reserved by the people via initiative and referendum. What are the advantages of a bicameral legislature? o It allows for a body with national perspective to check the parochial tendency of representatives. o More careful study of the legislation o Makes the legislature less susceptible to control by the Executive o Serves as training ground for national leaders What are the advantages of unicameralism? o Simplicity of organization (Economy and Efficiency) o Facility in pinpointing responsibility for legislation o Avoidance of duplication Republican System: Two Kinds of Legislative Power: o Original: Possessed by the sovereign people o Derivative: Power delegated by the people to the legislative bodiesas vested in Congress Legislative Power: o Constituent: Power to amend or revise the constitution o Ordinary: Power to pass ordinary laws What are the limits to legislative power? o Substantive: Limits/Curtail the contents of a law o Procedural: Limits/Curtails the manner of passing laws. Congress may legislate on any subject matter provided it does not go against the Constitution. Compared to the US Congress which can only legislate on subject matters enumerated in the Constitution. Congress may not pass irrepealable laws. Congresss power is plenary.
INITIATIVE AND REFERENDUM:
1|Borja Kristine C /1E/ ALS
Constitution I Atty. Maita Chan-Gonzaga Book Notes: Legislative Department (Article VI, Sections 1-5) Sources: Case Book + Comprehensive Reviewer of Father Joaquin Bernas
The power of Congress to legislate is not exclusive. Section 1 of this Article and Section 32 provides for the possibility of an initiative and referendum in passing laws by the people. The power of initiative and referendum is thus the power of the people directly to propose and enact laws or approve or reject any act or law or part thereof passed by Congress or local legislative bodies.
CASE: Garcia v. Commission on Elections, 1994 This case is an issue of first impression. FACTS: In its Pambayang Kapasyahan 10, 1993: Sangguniang Bayan ng Morong, Bataan agreed to the inclusion of the municipality of Morong as part of the Subic Special Economic Zone. On May 24, 1993, petitioners filed a petition with the Sangguniang Bayan ng Morong to annul the resolution. The group solicited the required number of signatures needed to repeal the said resolution. Unknown to the group, the Vice Mayor of the City and the Presiding Officer of the SB wrote to COMLEC to deny the petition for a local initiative because the exercise merely promotes divisiveness. It is counter-productive and futile. The COMELEC en banc resolved to deny the petition on the grounds that initiatives do not apply to mere resolutions. ISSUE: Whether a resolution is the proper subject of an initiative. o Respondents: Under the Local Government Code, only an ordinance can be the subject of an initiative. HELD/RATIO: The petition was granted. o History: In the earlier versions of the Constitution, the article merely provided for Legislative Power to be vested in the legislative body of the time. Implicit in the set-up was the trust of the people in Congress to enact laws for their benefit. After the Martial Law, however, the people decided to change this having less trust in their public officials thus including the provision for the referendum/initiative. It was the ultimate weapon of the people to negate government malfeasance and misfeasance. Initially, it was COMELEC who administered the initiative and referendum pending the passage of RA 6735 (1989) by Congress which provided for the system of initiative and referendums. o Basis of the Decision: Art VI, Sec. 32: Congressprovide for a system of referendum...whereby the people can directly approve or reject any act.passed by Congress or a legislative body. An act includes a resolution. (Black Law Dictionary) RA 6735 also provides the same in Section 3 where it defines systems of initiative to include: Initiative on the Constitutions, statutes, and local legislation which includes resolutions. The COMELEC in its IRR also recognized resolutions as being covered by initiatives. Consider the people of Morong and the enduring effect it will have on their welfare.
NON-DELEGABILITY OF LEGISLATIVE POWER: Distinct ideas that legislative power cannot be delegated: o Doctrine of Separation of Powers: Why go to the trouble of separating the powers if they can remerge on their own motion? o Concept of Due Process of Law: This precludes the transfer of regulatory functions to private persons o Maxim of Agency: Delegata potestas non potest delegari A delegate cannot delegate/A delegated power cannot be further delegated. In practice though, it is common knowledge that numerous statutes have been passed creating administrative agencies and authorizing them to exercise vast regulatory powers with rules and regulations passed have the force of law. JUSTIFICATION? (As provided by CJ Marshall) o Non-Legislative Body may be authorized to fill-up the details of the statute o Congress may pass contingent legislations which leaves to another body the business of ascertaining the facts necessary to bring the law into actual operation. In this sense, the function performed by the administrative agency is not lawmaking but law-execution. To ensure that this is law execution, a statute must be: Complete in itself/Completeness Fix a standard/Sufficiency (to determine if the delegate has acted within or beyond the scope of his authority)
CASE: Eastern Shipping Lines v. Philippine Overseas Employment Administration, 1988 FACTS: The respondent was awarded a sum of money by the POEA for the death of her husband. Petitioner challenges payment on the ground that the POEA had no jurisdiction over the case as the husband was not an overseas worker. The award given by the POEA is pursuant to its Memorandum Circular No. 2 which prescribed a standard contract to be adopted by both foreign and domestic shipping companies in the hiring of Filipino seamen for overseas employment. The petitioner questions the validity of said Memorandum as violative of the power of non-delegation of legislative power. No authority had been given to POEA. ISSUE: Whether Memorandum Circular No. 2 is violative of the power of non-delegation of legislative power and is thus, void. HELD: No. MC No. 2 is an administrative regulation. RATIO: There are two accepted tests to determine whether or not there is valid delegation: Completeness Test and Sufficient Standard Test. There is a need for delegation with the legislative to administrative bodies given the proliferation of specialized activities and their peculiar problems. The POWER OF SUBORDINATE LEGISLATION is entrusted to the administrative agencies to carry out the general provisions of the statute by FILLING-IN the details.
CASE: Tablarin v. Gutierrez, 1987
FACTS: Petitioners question the undue delegation of legislative power by failing to establish the necessary standard to be followed by the delegate, the Board of Medical Education. ISSUE: Whether or not Section 5a and 5f of RA 2382 as amended which delegates legislative power to the Board of Medical Education is unconstitutional as it violates the non-delegability of legislative power. HELD: No, said sections are not unconstitutional. RATIO: The standards set for subordinate legislation in the exercise of rule-making authority by an administrative agency like the Board of Medical Education are necessarily broad and abstract. A standard may be either expressed or impliedthese are sufficient compliance with the requirements of non-delegation principle.
CASE: Free Telephone Workers Union v. Minister of Labor, 1981 FACTS: Petitioners question the authority conferred to the Minister of Labor where he was given legislative power ISSUE: Whether such delegation is unconstitutional HELD: No. RATIO: A rigid application of non-delegation doctrine would be an obstacle to national efforts at development and progress. There is accordingly more receptivity to laws leaving to administrative and executive agencies the adoption of such means as may be necessary to effectuate a valid legislative purpose. Power must be delegated where there is agreement that a task must be performed and it cannot be effectively performed by the legislature without the assistance of a delegate.
CASE: Cebu Oxygen and Acetylene Co, Inc. v. Secretary Drilon, 1989 FACTS: RA 6640 was passed increasing the minimum wage. The Secretary of Labour issued the pertinent rules implementing the provisions of the said RA. Specifically though, it provided that Such increases shall not include anniversary wage increase provided on collective agreements. The IRR, in effect, prohibited the employer crediting anniversary wage increases negotiated under a collective bargaining agreement against such wage increases mandated by said RA> ISSUE: Whether or not an Implementing Order of the DOLE can provide for a prohibition not contemplated by the law it seeks to implement. HELD: It cannot. RATIO: o Procedural: The petitioner should have first appealed to DOLE. Understandably though, since the questions raised are questions of law, the failure to exhaust administrative remedies cannot be considered fatal to this petition. o The IRR cannot provide for such a prohibition not contemplated by the law. o Administrative Regulations adopted under legislative authority by a particular department must be in harmony with the provisions of the law and should be for the
sole purpose of carrying into effect its general provisions. An administrative agency cannot expand the law and amend the act of congress. CASE: Tatad v. Secretary of Energy, 1997 FACTS: Petitioners challenge the constitutionality of RA 8180: Oil Deregulation Act ending 26 years of government regulation of oil industry. The deregulation phase has two phases: Transition phase and the Deregulation phase. ISSUE: o Whether Section 15 RA 8180 which fixes the time frame for the full deregulation of the downstream, is unconstitutional in terms of insufficient standards for delegation. (Questioning specifically the lines: As far as practicable, the DOE shall time the full deregulation when the prices of crude oil and petroleum products in the world market are declining and when the exchange rate of the peso in relation to eh US dollar is stable) o Whether EO 372 is constitutional HELD/RATIO: o Yes. Similar to past cases, the legal engineering of mens relationship became more difficult thus delegation becomes necessary as Congress needs to rely more on the practice of delegating the execution of laws to the executive and other administrative agencies. The section passed the test of delegation. (To add, on the question of the definition of the provision, the words in question as declining, practicable, stable are simple dictionary words) o No. It constitutes a misapplication of RA 8180 with regard to its inclusion of the depletion of the OPSF fund as a factor to be given weight by the Executive before ordering full deregulation
CASE: People v. Dacuycuy, 1989 FACTS: An alternative penal section of imprisonment was imposed by law but without specification as to the term or duration thereof. (Fine or by imprisonment in the discretion of the court). Petitioners assert that a judicial determination of what Congress intended to be the duration of the penalty of imprisonment would be violative of the constitution (undue delegation). Respondent judge asserts that such is not the case because the exercise of judicial discretion is not an attempt to use legislative power but is an instance of justice administration. ISSUE: Whether or not the lack of specification violates the constitution and gives undue delegation to the judiciary HELD/RATIO: Yes. It is not for the courts to fix the term of imprisonment where NO POINTS OF REFERENCE have been provided by the legislature. The discretion to fixt the length of service must be encompassed within specific or designated limits provided by the law.
CASE: Employee Confederation v. National Wages Commission 5|Borja Kristine C /1E/ ALS
FACTS: The Employers Confederation of Philippine is questioning the validity of Wage Order No. NCR-01-A where the Regional Board of the National Capital Region decreed an across-the-board hike. ISSUE: Whether or not this is an unlawful act of legislation. HELD/RATIO: No. It is true that wage-fixing, like rate fixing, constitutes an act of Congress; it is also true, however, that Congress may delegate the power to fix rates provided that, as in all delegations cases, Congress leaves sufficient standards. The quoted standards in Art. 124 of RA 6727 which is the Wage Rationalization Act are sufficient. The Court believes that the Commission correctly upheld the Regional Board of the NCR. o The court noted that the ECOP might be under the impression that the government should be out of the industry thus leaving labour and management to decide wages alone. The Court does not think that the law intended to deregulate the relation between labour and capital for several reasons (Check declaration of principles)
RECENT CASES: Same decision has been applied. PENAL RULES: o Rules and regulations may have the force of law. SEPARATION OF POWERS IN LOCAL GOVERNMENT: o Separation of powers in the local level does not apply strictly between the executive and the law-making body.
Section 2. The Senate shall be composed of twenty-four Senators who shall be elected at large by the qualified voters of the Philippines, as may be provided by law. Section 3. No person shall be a Senator unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines and, on the day of the election, is at least thirty-five years of age, able to read and write, a registered voter, and a resident of the Philippines for not less than two years immediately preceding the day of the election. CASE: Social Justice Society v. Dangerous Drugs Board FACTS: Petitioners question the constitutionality of Section 36 RA 9165 otherwise known as the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002 as it requires mandatory drug testing of candidates for public office whereas it is not part of the requirements laid down in the Constitution (Citizenship, Voters Registration, Literacy, Age, and Residency) ISSUE: Whether or not said section is unconstitutional HELD/RATIO: Yes. It is basic that if a law or an administrative rule violates any norm of the Constitution, that issuance is null and void and has no effect.
Section 4. The term of office of the Senators shall be six years and shall commence, unless otherwise provided by law, at noon on the thirtieth day of June next following their election. No Senator shall serve for more than two consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term of which he was elected. Section 5. (1) The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred and fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected from legislative districts apportioned among the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio, and those who, as provided by law, shall be elected through a party-list system of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations. (2) The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty per centum of the total number of representatives including those under the party list. For three consecutive terms after the ratification of this Constitution, one-half of the seats allocated to party-list representatives shall be filled, as provided by law, by selection or election from the labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, women, youth, and such other sectors as may be provided by law, except the religious sector. (3) Each legislative district shall comprise, as far as practicable, contiguous, compact, and adjacent territory. Each city with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand, or each province, shall have at least one representative. (4) Within three years following the return of every census, the Congress shall make a reapportionment of legislative districts based on the standards provided in this section. SECTORAL REPRESENTATION Discussion: o Commissioner Villacorta: Meaningful representation to the interest of groups which are not adequately attended to in normal legislative deliberations particularly farmers and workers. o Sectoral Representation: Provides mechanisms which would enhance the chances of marginalized sectors in electing their Representatives to the National Assembly and keep their hopes alive in the principle of peaceful change. o It also seeks to address the apprehension of the Upper House being monopolized by the moneyed sectors. PARTY-LIST REPRESENTATION Discussion: o Commissioner Monsod: The Party list system was an alternative proposal of Commissioner Monsod to avoid the dilemma of choice of sectors and who constitute the sectors. Under this system, there will be no reserved seats for the sectors. o MECHANICS:
Every voter has two votes: One vote for the legislative district and the other vote for the party or organization that he/she wished to be represented in the Congress. A party may be regional, sectoral, or national. One need not be a member of the sector to vote for the sector. Any citizen can vote for any party. FINAL COMMISSION DECISION: o For three consecutive terms after the ratification of the Constitution, one-half of the seats allocated to party-list representatives will be reserved for sectoral representatives who will be chosen as provided by law. --- The three-consecutive term ends on 1998 afterwhich the sectors would have to compete in the 1998 party-list system elections (Thus, the provision was seen to motivate them to strengthen their organization). o The initial list of sectors includes: Labor, Peasant, Urban Poor, and Youth. Indigenous and Women were eventually added. Others to be added as provided by law. o It was clarified that a religious sector is an exception. A religious leader may represent another sector except the religious sector. APPOINTMENT POWER OF THE PRESIDENT in SECTORAL REPRESENTATION: o Originally, the power of choosing representatives is to be left with the legislature but a supplemental alternative was provided stating that until a law is passed, the President MAY fill by appointment FROM A LIST OF NOMINEES BY THE RESPECTIVE SECTORS the seats reserved for sectoral representation. o As per Quntos-Delex v. Commission on Appointments, it was noted that the appointed sectoral representative must be confirmed by the Commission on Appointments (Art. XVIII, Sec. 7) THE TWO REGIMES: o Sectoral Repsentatives for 3 terms o Permanent Party-list or proportional representation regime
CASE: Veterans Federation Party v. COMELEC, 2000To note from this case: How should the COMELEC determine the winners in a Philippine-style party list election? 4 Inviolable Parameters o Twenty Per cent Allocation: The combined number of all party-list congressmen shall not exceed twenty percent of the total membership of the House of Representatives including those elected under the party list. o Two Per cent Threshold: Only those parties garnering a minimum of two percent of the total valid votes cast for the party list system are qualified to have a set in the House. o The Three Seat Limit: Each party, regardless of the number of votes is entitled to a maximum three seatsone qualifying, two additional seats o Proportional Representation: The additional seats which a qualified party is entitled to shall be computed in proportion to their total number of votes.
ISSUE: Whether the COMELEC violated the legal parameters provided for in RA 7491 in determining the winners in a Philippine style party-list election. o Is the 20% allocation for party-list representatives mentioned in Section 5 (2), Article VI of the Constitution, mandatory or is it merely a ceiling? Should the 20% allocation for party-list solons be filled-up completely and all the time. o Are the 2% threshold requirement and the three-seat limit provided in Section 11 (b) of RA 7941 constitutional? o If the answer to Issue 2 is in the affirmative, how should the additional seats of a qualified party be determined?
HELD: Is the 20% allocation for party-list representative mandatory or is it merely a ceiling? Should the 20% allocation for party-list be filled up completely and all the time? o The Constitution makes the number of district representatives the determinant in arriving at the number of seats allocated for party-list lawmakers. This means that any increase in the number of district representatives will necessarily result in an increase in the number of party-list seats. o It does not have to be filled up all the time and under all circumstance. o This percentage is the ceiling. The process by which it is to be filled-up is up to Congress. Are the 2% threshold requirement and the 3-seat limit provided in Section 11 of RA 7941 constitutional? o Rationale behind the 2% -- Congress wanted to ensure that only those parties, organizations, and coalitions having a sufficient number of constituents deserving of representation are actually represented in Congress. o Note: The concept ore representation. o The Three-Seat-Per-Party-Limit Rationale: Adopt a multi-party system of representation thus to ensure that everyone is given a chance in a pluralistic society, the seats have been limited. To ensure that no single group, no matter how large its membership would dominate the party list seats if not the entire House. Qualification means having hurdled the two per cent vote threshold. If the 2% threshold is constitutional, how should the additional seats of a qualified party be determined? (Method of Allocating Additional Seats) o PROPOSAL: One Additional Seat per 2% incrementThis was not applied because it is not proportional given the maximum number of seat rule. Since proportional representation will be contravened, this was discarded by the court. o STEP 01: Rank all the participating parties from the highest to the lowest number of votes. The ratio for each party is computed by dividing its votes by the total votes cast for all parties participating in the system. All parties with at least two percent of the
total votes . Only these parties shall be considered in the computation of additional seats. The party receiving highest number of votes shall thenceforth be referred to as the FIRST PARTY. Step 02: Determine the number of seats the first party is entitled to in order to be able to compute that for the other parties. Since the distribution is based on proportional representation, the number of seats to be allotted to the other parties cannot possibly exceed that to which the first party is entitled by virtue of its obtaining the most number of votes. Guidelines: The ratio between said parties and the first party will always be less than 1:1 The formula does not admit of mathematical rounding off, because there is no such thing as a fraction of seat. The six percent bench mark is allotted Step 03: FORMULA FOR ADDITIONAL SEATS OF OTHER PARTIES: Additional Seats of concerned party = (No. of votes of concerned party / No. of votes of the first party) x No. of additional seats allocated to first party (Sample used: APEC- 1st party and ABA)
Case Example: If the first party is not entitled to any additional seat, then the ratio of the number of votes for the otherparty to that for the first one is multiplied by zero which means that there would be no additional seat for each of the other qualified parties as well. DISSENT: Justice Mendoza criticized the methodology for being too strict. The formula merely translated the legal parameters into a mathematical question.
CASE: Ang Bagong Bayani v. COMELEC, 2001 Facts: Two petitions under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court was filed challenging Omnibus Resolution No. 3785 issued by the COMELEC on March 26, 2001. This resolution approved the participation of 154 organizations and parties, including those herein impleaded in the 2001 party-list elections. Petitioners seek the disqualification of private respondents arguing mainly that the partylist system was intended to benefit the marginalized and underrepresented not the mainstream political parties, the non-marginalized or over represented. Issues: o WON the political parties may participate in the party-list elections o WON the party-list system is exclusive to marginalized and underrepresented sectors and organizations o WON the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in promulgating omnibus resolution 3785. Held:
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On the participation of political parties: Bagong Bayani/Bayan Muna objects to the participation of major political parties. OSG: allow political parties to participate in the party-list elections. The partylist system is open to all registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations COURT: Under RA 7941, private respondents cannot be disqualified from the party-list elections merely on the ground that they are political parties since Sec. 5 noted: registered national, regional, and sectoral parties. The constitution also allows for political parties to be registered under the party-list system. Commissioner Monsod noted that the purpose of the party-list provision was to open up the system , in order to give a chance to parties that consistently place third or fourth in congressional district elections to win a seat in Congress. Sec. 3 of RA 7941 defines party as either a political party or a sectoral party or a coalition of parties and a political party is defined as an organized group of citizens advocating an ideology or platform, principles and policies for the general conduct of government and which regularly nominates and supports certain of its leaders and members as candidates for public office. Maginalized and Underrepresented Issue: This requisite notes that not all parties can participate in the party-list elections. Parties must be consistent with the purpose of the party-list system as laid down in the Constitution and RA 7941. The purpose: To give genuine power to our people: Who belong to marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations, and parties; Who lack well defined constituencies; but Who would contribute to the formulation and enactment of appropriate legislation that will benefit the nation as a whole. As noted above, proportional representation here does not refer to the number of people in a particular district, it refers to the representation of the marginalized and underrepresented: Labor, Peasant, Fisherfolk, Urban, Poor, Indigenous Cultural Communities, Elderly, Handicapped, Women, Youth, Veterans, Overseas Workers, and Professionals. Even if this list is not inclusive, it gives the feel that not all sectors can be represented under the party-list system. The decision of the court also corrected the OSG contentions that the party-list system does not limit the participation in the party-list system to the marginalized and underrepresented sectors of society which even purported that the super rich of Forbes Park may join the party-list system. GUIDELINES FOR SCREENING PARTY-LIST PARTICIPANTS:
Political party must represent the marginalized and underrepresented groupd identified in Section 5 of RA 7941 (Indicators of representation: Constitution, Articles of incorporation by laws, History, Platform of government and track records, membership) Major political parties must comply with the policy of enabling Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized and underrepresented sectors to be elected to the House Non-disqualification for the following: Religious sect or denomination Advocates violence or unlawful means to seek its goal Foreign party or organization Receiving support from foreign government Fails to comply with laws relating to elections Declares untruthful statements in the petition It has ceased to exist for at least 1 year It failed to participate in the last 2 preceding election or failed to obtain at least 2% votes The party/organization must not be an adjunct of ora project organized or an entity funded/assisted by government. The party and ITS NOMINEES must comply with the requirements of the law.
CASE: Ang Bagong Bayani- OFW Labor Party, et al v. COMELEC, 2003 FACTS: o Legal Effect of the Disqualifications on the Total Votes Cast: Disqualifications of many party-list organization has reduced the total number of votes cast for the party-list elections. Because of this, the 2% benchmark required by law has not been attained by movants who now request their proclamation as winners in the last party-list elections ISSUE: Aside from those already validly proclaimed pursuant to Earlier Resolutions of this Court, are there other party-list candidates that should be proclaimed winners. o Whether Labo v. Comelec and Grego v. Comelec and related cases should be deemed applicable to the determination of winners in the party-list elections (Should the votes tallied for the disqualified candidates be deducted?) o Whether the votes cast for parties/organizations that were subsequently discqualified for having failed to meet the eight point guideline should be deducted from the total votes cast for the party-list system HELD: o Pre-Decision: Buhay and COCOFED should be reconsidered and deemed qualified. o Labo and Grego were not applicable: BACKGROUND:
Labo: The court declared that the ineligibility of a candidate receiving majority votes does not entitle the eligible candidate receiving the next highest number of votes to be declared elected. (Once a loser, always a loser) | Should a voter vote for a disqualified candidate, the voter waived the validity of the vote. Grego also had the same situation: The one who obtained the highest number of votes is disqualified. The electorate is aware of the candidates disqualification. Why is Labo and Grego not applicable? The cases of Labo and Grego referred to elections for local offices. They were not meant to cover party-list elections. The cases of Labo and Grego refer to single elective posts while the present controversy pertains to the acquisition of a number of congressional seats depending on the total election results such that even those garnering 2nd---place can be proclaimed winners. RA 7941 is the statute governing party-lists. RA 6646 is the one used for Labo and Grego. COURT: The votes obtained by disqualified party-list candidates are not to be counted in determining the total votes cast for the party-list system. The votes they obtained should be deducted from the total number of votes cast during the May 2014 elections. Bayan Muna contends that the deduction of votes obtained by party-list candidates disqualified after the holding of the party-list elections will result in the instability of the system since the other parties will seek the disqualification of other candidates to attain the needed percentage of the votes cast.
CASE: Banat v. COMELEC, 2009 FACTS: o Barangay Association for National Advancement and Transparency assailed the Resolution by the COMELEC which approved the recommendation of Atty. Alioden D. Dalaig to deny the petition of BANAT for being moot. ISSUE: o Is the 20% allocation for partylist representatives mandatory or is it merely a ceiling? o Is the 3-seat limit provide in Section 11 (b) of RA 7941 constitutional? o Is the 2% threshold and qualified voters prescribed by the same Section constitutional? o How shall the party-list representatives be allocated. o Does the Constitution prohibit major political parties from participating in the party-list elections? Can the major political parties be barred from participating in the party-list
elections? HELD: The court held that the formula in Veterans has flaws in its mathematical interpretation thus the court revisits the formula for the allocation of additional seats to party-list organizations. ISSUE 01: The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than 250 members. The party-list representatives shall constitute 20% of the total number of representatives including those under the partylist. The computation of the number of seats available to party representatives follows the Veterans formula:
(Number of seats available to legislative districts / .80) * .20 = Number of seats available to party-list representatives. This formula allows for the corresponding increase in the number of seats available for party-list representatives whenever a legislative district is created by law. In the case there are 220 district representatives == 55 seats are available for the partylist representatives. Note: The constitution left the manner of allocating the seats available to party-list representative to the wisdom of the legislature. o ISSUE 2 and 3: 2% Threshold and 3-Seat Cap The Veterans proposed the First Party-Rule BANATs Interpretation resulted to 44 party list seats being awarded following Section 11if and when 2% allocation is constitutional. If 2% allocation is unconstitutional a different formula was used. 34 seats will be allocated. BANAT used 2 formulas to obtain the same results: one is based on the proportional percentage of the votes received by each party as against the total nationwide party-list votes and the other is by making the votes of a party-list with a median percentage of votes as the divisor in computing the allocation of seats. Partylist issue with COMELEC: COMELEC prevents all the party-list seats from being filled-up as the formulas being used do not factor in the total number of seats allotted for the entire Party-List System COURT (Check party-list table): Rank the parties according to the number of votes received. The percentage of votes garnered by each party is arrived at by dividing the number of votes garnered by each party by 15,950,900 (total number of votes cast)Using this formula, only 17 parties passed the 2% requirement.
Those garnering more than 2% of the total votes shall be entitled to additional seats in proportion to their total number of votes. (Note: In veterans what was used is: IN PROPORTION TO THE VOTES OF THE FIRST PARTY) The Court held that the two percent threshold makes it mathematically impossible to achieve the maximum number of available party-list seats when the number of available party-list seats exceed 50. It frustrates the attainment of the permissive ceiling of 20% of the members of the HOR shall consist of the Party-list representatives. (Example: more than the allotted seats get the 2% threshold votes, what then?) Thus, the court stroked down the 2% threshold in relation to the distribution of additional seats as found in the second clause. In computing the additional seats, the guaranteed seats shall no longer be included because they have already been allocated at one seat each to every two-percenter. The remaining seats then = maximum seats guaranteed seats. Since the 2% threshold has been held unconstitutional, the allocation of additional seats will be as follows: o Percentage is multiplied by the remaining available seats (55 party list seats 17 seats taken.). The whole integer of the product of the percentage and of the remaining seats corresponds to a partys share in the remaining available seats. o Assign one party-list seat to each of the parties next in rank until all available seats are completely distributed. (In this case, even those below the 2% of votes garnered will be given seats following the courts decision to disregard the 2% threshold in relation to the distribution of additional seats but not of guaranteed seats) CHECK TABLES!!!
ISSUE 04: Participation of the Major Political Parties in Party-List Elections: The Constitutional Commission adopted a multi-party system that allowed al political parties to participate in the party-list elections. APPORTIONMENT: o The underlying principle behind the rule for apportionment is the concept of equality of representation which is a basic principle of republicanism. o Each province, regardless of population = 1 representative o Each city with a population of 250,000 = 1 representative o Gerrymandering: Formation of one legislative district out of separate territories for the purpose of favouring a candidate or a party is not allowed.
CASE: Tobias v. Abalos: Facts: o Invoking their rights as taxpayers and as residents of Mandaluyong, petitioners assail the constitutionality of RA 7675 converting the municipality of Mandaluyong into a highly urbanized City to be known as the City of Mandaluyong. o Prior to the enactment of this, the municipalities of Mandaluyong and San Juan belonged to one legislative district. o A plebiscite was held on April 10, 1994 where the people of MAndaluyong were asked whther they approved of the conversion of the municipality into a highly urbanzed city. The turnout: 14.41% with a majority vote of yes thus ratifying the Act. o The petitioners assert that said act is unconstitutional on the basis of the following: RA 7675 contravenes the one subject-one bill rule as the bill has two subjects: The conversion of Mandaluyong into a highly urbanized city and the division of the congressional district of San Juan/Mandaluyong into two separate districts. The conversion of Mandalayung has resulted in an increase in the composition of the House which is beyond that provided in the Constitution. Further, the division was not made pursuant to any census showing that the subject municipalities have attained the minimum population requirements. Petitioners contend that the people of San Juan should have been made to participate in the plebiscite as the same involved a change in their legislative district. The law is gerrymandering. Held: The contentions are devoid of merit. o The creation of a separate congressional district is not a subject separate and distinct from the subject of its conversion into a highly urbanized city. It is a natural and logical consequence of conversion. One-subject one rule is also liberally construed by the court. o The 250 limit is not absolute. The clause: unless otherwise provided by law recognizes the inescapable import that the present composition of COngres may be increased if Congress itself mandates through a legislative enactment. o It is assumed that Congress studied the population etc before passing the law. o The plebiscite was on the conversion of Mandaluyong into a highly urbanized city. San Juan should have been excluded. o OSG: Rep. Zamora is the author of the assailed law. He is the incumbent representative of the San Juan Mandaluyong. Rep. Zamoras constituency has in fact be diminished which could be considered as favourable to him.
CASE: Mariano, Jr. v. COMELEC
Facts: Two petitions were filed assailing certain provisions of RA 7854 which converts the municipality of Makati into a highly urbanized city known to be the City of Makati. Suing as taxpayers, thepetitioners assail the as unconstitutional sections 2, 51 and 52 of the said act. o Section 2 for not properly identifying the land area of Makati. o Section 51 was seen as an attempt to alter or restart the three-consecutive term limit for local elective officials. o Section 52 is unconstitutional because: The increase in the legislative district was only by special law. The increase in legislative district was not specified in the title of the bill. The addition of another legislative district in Makati is not in accord with the latest survey as the population stands at 450,000 Held: There is no merit to the petition. o Section 2: The importance of drawing territorial boundaries is such that a local governments legitimate exercise of power be limited within its territory. Section 2 does not cause any confusion with regard to Makatis boundary. Petitioners have not demonstrated that the delineation of the land area will cause confusion even if not defined in terms of metes and bounds. During the time of the passage of the bill, Makati and Taguig are having a territorial dispute over Fort Bonifacio. Out of a becoming sense of respect to a co-equal department of government, legislature left it for the court to decide. o Section 52: These issues have been laid to rest in the case of Tobias v. Abalos.
CASE: Montejo v. COMELEC Facts: Petitioner Cirilo Roy G. Montejo representing the first district of Leyte pleads for the annulment of Section 1of Resolution 2736 of COMELEC redistricting certain municipalities in Leyte on the ground that it violates the principle of equality of representation. Petitioner moved to transfer the municipality of TOLOSA from his district to the second district. Intervenor Apostol, representative of the second district opposed the inclusion of Tolosa in his district. Issue: Whether or not the COMELECs exercise of legislative power of redistricting and reapportionment is valid. Held: o Section 2 of Article IX of the Constititon: The COMELEC is hereby empowered to make minor adjustments. | Section 3: Any province whose population may increase to more than 250,000 shall be entitled in the immediately following election to at least one Member as correspondingly adjusted by the COMELEC. The adjustment should not be made within 120 days before the election. Minor adjustments as defined by the Constitutional Commission: Minor, meaning, that there should be no change in the allocations per district. Example:
A municipality in between which is still in the territory of one assigned district Error in the correct name of a particular municipality No assignment was given to municipality. Following the definition of minor adjustments: the COMELEC has no authority to transfer municipalities from one legislative district to another. The power given to COMELEC is to adjust the number of members (not municipalities) apportioned to the province out which such new province was created. The COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in transferring the municipality of Capoocan to the Second District and the Palompon to the 3rd District of Leyte.
CASE: Bagabuyo v. COMELEC Facts: Petitioner insists that RA 9371 converts and divides the City of Cagayan de Oro as a local government unit and does not merely provide for the Citys legislative apportionment. Held: The petitioner misunderstands the concepts of legilslative districts and division of local government units. o Legislative apportionment is defined as the determination of the number of representatives which a State country or other subdivision may send to a legislative body. It is the allocation of seats in a legislative body in proportion to the population. o Reapportionment- realignment or change in legislative districts brought aboutby changes in population and mandated by the constitutional requirement of equality of representation. o Note: Pronounced distinction between Article VI Section 5 and Articl X, Section 10 on the requirement of the plebiscite. The Constitution and LGC requires a plebiscite to carry out any creation, division, merger, abolition, or alteration of boundary of a local government unit. In contrast, no plebiscite requirement exists under the apportionment or reapportionment provision.

Article 6 Sections 1-5

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Article 6 Sections 1-5

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Constitution I Atty.

INITIATIVE AND REFERENDUM:

1|Borja Kristine C /1E/ ALS

2|Borja Kristine C /1E/ ALS

CASE: Tablarin v. Gutierrez, 1987

3|Borja Kristine C /1E/ ALS

4|Borja Kristine C /1E/ ALS

6|Borja Kristine C /1E/ ALS

7|Borja Kristine C /1E/ ALS

8|Borja Kristine C /1E/ ALS

9|Borja Kristine C /1E/ ALS

CASE: Mariano, Jr. v. COMELEC

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