Laws- in its jural and generic sense refers to the whole body or system of law.

(rule of conduct formulated and made obligatory by the legitimate power of the state. Statute is an act of the legislature as an organized body expressed in the form, and passed according to the procedure, required to constitue it as part of the law of the land. Lidasan vs. Comelec GR NO. L-280892 Petioner: BARA LIDASAN Respondent: COMELEC FACTS: The Chief Executive signed the House Bill 1247 which is now known to be Republic Act 4790, An Act Creating the Municipality of Dianaton in the Province of Lanao del Sur. Such new Municipality includes 21 barrios, 9 of which are from Lanao del Sur, and the other 12 are from Cotabato. (From Lanao: Kapatagan, Bongabong, Aipang,Dagowan,Bakikis, Bungabung, Losain, Matimos, and Magolatung and From Cotabato: Togaig, Madalum, Bayanga, Langkong, Sarakan, Kat-bo, Digakapan, Magabo,Tangabao,Tiongko, Colodan, and Kabamawakan). The Comelec, prompted by the coming election adopted the resolution which provides for the barrios that will be included in Lanao del Sur. Apprised by this happening, the Office of the President, through the Assistant Executive Secretary, recommended to the Comelec that the said resolution be suspended until clarified by the correcting legislation. But the Comelec stood by its own interpretation, and declared that the RA 4790 should be implemented unless declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court. This events triggered the original action for certiorari and prohibition filed by Bara Lidasan, a resident and taxpayer of the detached portion of Parang Cotabato, and a qualified voter for the 1967 elections. Affected by the implementation of RA 4790, Lidasan now questions the constitutionality of the said Act. ISSUE: Is Republic Act 4790 valid considering that such Act creates a Municipality which includes barrios from another province. HELD: RA 4790 is declared NULL and VOID. 1. Constitutional requirement no bill which may be enacted into law shall embrace more than one subject which shall be expressed in the title of the bill. This provision imposes limitations upon the legislative power.

G.R. No. L-24110

February 18, 1967

LEONIO BARRAMEDA, petitioner, vs. CARMEN GONTANG, RODOLFO GENERAL and the HONORABLE JUDGE RAFAEL CRUZ (Presiding Judge, Branch III, Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur), respondents. Eutiquio V. Guevara for petitioner. Augusto A. Pardalis for respondents. CASTRO, J.: This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction filed by Leoncio Barrameda against Judge Rafael de la Cruz of the Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur, Carmen Gontang and Rodolfo General. Leoncio Barrameda was the registered owner of three parcels of land in Camarines Sur, covered by TCT 1414, which he mortgaged to the Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP) to secure the payment of an agricultural loan of P22,000. Because of his failure to pay the indebtedness when it became due, the DBP extrajudicially foreclosed the mortgage. In the auction sale conducted on April 23, 1962, the DBP was the highest bidder. Barrameda failed to redeem the land. The DBP then consolidated its ownership thereon, and obtained TCT 5003. Soon thereafter the DBP sold the property to Carmen Gontang and Rodolfo General, which sale was annotated on TCT 5003. In the meanwhile, Gontang and General, requested the DBP to deliver to them the possession of the land. Pursuant to this request, the DBP filed an ex parte petition in the Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur (Special Proceeding 1917), alleging that it acquired the land as mortgagee and highest bidder at the auction sale; that the period of one year from the date of the sale had expired; that the mortgagor had failed to redeem the property; and that it has already executed an affidavit of consolidation of ownership over the land. It, therefore, prayed for a writ of possession. A writ of possession was issued to install the DBP in possession of the property and to eject therefrom all adverse occupants, including Leoncio Barrameda and Fidela Terrero. The writ was not served for failure of the DBP to pay the sheriff's fee. An alias writ was subsequently issued and by virtue of this alias writ, the DBP, represented by its successors-in-interest, Gontang and General, took possession of the land. But because of the repeated attempts of Leoncio Barrameda, through his armed men, to re-enter the land and get the landowner's share of the harvest, Gontang and General asked for the issuance of a preliminary injunction (Civil Case 5700 of the Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur) to enjoin Barrameda and his men from disturbing them in their possession of the land. After due hearing, the court issued a preliminary injunction against Barrameda. The latter's motion for reconsideration was subsequently denied. Hence, this petition.
1wph1.t

The petitioner maintains that the respondent Judge acted without or in excess of his jurisdiction in issuing the order complained of, upon the theory that it was predicated upon a writ of possession and an alias writ regarding which he was not made a party. This contention is without merit. When the DBP filed the ex parte petition for a writ of possession it was admittedly the owner of the property in question by virtue of the extrajudicial foreclosure sale of April 23, 1962. As the purchaser thereof, it wise entitled, upon confirmation of the sale, to the possession of the premises, and to the aid of the court in effecting its delivery, the reason being that upon confirmation of the sale, the ownership of the property is transferred to the purchaser. In a foreclosure suit, where no third person not a party thereto intervenes and the debtor continues in the possession of the real property mortgaged, a writ of possession is a necessary remedy to put an end to the litigation, inasmuch as section 257 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides that the confirmation of the sale by a judicial decree operates to divest all the parties to the action of their respective right and vests them in the purchaser. According to this legal provision, it is the duty of the competent court to issue

a writ so that the purchaser may be placed in the possession of the property which he purchased at the public auction sale and became his by virtue of the final decree confirming the sale. For the foregoing considerations, we are of the opinion and so hold that the court ... also has jurisdiction to issue a writ of possession in favor of the purchaser at public auction of the property mortgaged without the necessity of an independent action when the mortgagor continues in the possession thereof after confirmation of the sale by final decree. (Rivera vs. Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija, et al., 61 Phil. 201). Moreover, the ex parte petition filed in this case actually included the petitioner as a party who is referred to in the petition as the one in possession of the land sought to be delivered to the DBP. And the alias writ states: NOW, THEREFORE, you are hereby commanded to place said petitioner in possession of the property hereinbefore described, and to eject therefrom all adverse occupants, including the following persons, to wit: LEONCIO BARRAMEDA and FIDELA TERRERO. And in point of fact, according to the sheriff's return, the alias writ was served on the petitioner. In contemplation of law, the DBP, represented by the respondents herein, was placed in complete possession of the property. The petitioner's argument, resting on the DBP's failure to include him as party, is therefore untenable. Anent the issuance of the order complained of, the petition below for preliminary injunction filed by Gontang and General (Civil Case 5700 of the Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur) alleges that despite their possession, the petitioner herein has repeatedly attempted to intrude into the premises; that through the aid of armed men he forcibly took the owner's share of the harvest; that he threatened to re-enter the property and get the landowner's share of the coming harvest; and that the continuance of such illegal acts would work grave and irreparable damage and prejudice to the rights of the landowner. The trial court found these allegations well-founded, and, upon the filing of a written obligation by Gontang and General, issued the preliminary injunction in question. This action of the court is perfectly proper. In Rustia vs. Franco, 41 Phil. 280, this Court declared: In the American system of procedure, from which provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, relative to injunction are taken, the injunction is recognized as a perfectly legitimate remedy to protect the owner of the land, being in possession, from illegitimate acts of repeated intrusion by a stranger, as where a person who has no right to enter from time to time, cut wood, or carry other products. The intermittent nature of such acts, and the probability, not to say certainty, of repetition in the future, makes the legal remedy by an independent action to try title inadequate and justifies the granting of the equitable remedy. (Pomeroy, Equity Jurisprudence, 3d ed. Vol. 4, sec. 135). Accordingly, the instant petition is dismissed, at petitioner's cost.

Perfecto v Meer 85 Phil 552

GREGORIO PERFECTO vs. BIBIANO L. MEER [G.R. No. L-2348. February 27, 1950.] Facts: In April, 1947 the Collector of Internal Revenue required Mr. Justice Gregorio Perfecto to pay income

tax upon his salary as member of this Court during the year 1946. After paying the amount (P802), he instituted this action in the Manila Court of First Instance contending that the assessment was illegal, his salary not being taxable for the reason that imposition of taxes thereon would reduce it in violation of the Constitution. Issue: Does the imposition of an income tax upon this salary amount to a diminution thereof? Held: Yes. As in the United States during the second period, we must hold that salaries of judges are not included in the word "income" taxed by the Income Tax Law. Two paramount circumstances may additionally be indicated, to wit: First, when the Income Tax Law was first applied to the Philippines 1913, taxable "income" did not include salaries of judicial officers when these are protected from diminution. That was the prevailing official belief in the United States, which must be deemed to have been transplanted here ; and second, when the Philippine Constitutional Convention approved (in 1935) the prohibition against diminution of the judges' compensation, the Federal principle was known that income tax on judicial salaries really impairs them. This is not proclaiming a general tax immunity for men on the bench. These pay taxes. Upon buying gasoline, or cars or other commodities, they pay the corresponding duties. Owning real property, they pay taxes thereon. And on incomes other than their judicial salary, assessments are levied. It is only when the tax is charged directly on their salary and the effect of the tax is to diminish their official stipend that the taxation must be resisted as an infringement of the fundamental charter. Judges would indeed be hapless guardians of the Constitution if they did not perceive and block encroachments upon their prerogatives in whatever form. The undiminishable character of judicial salaries is not a mere privilege of judges personal and therefore waivable but a basic limitation upon legislative or executive action imposed in the public interest (Evans vs. Gore).

ndencia vs David Case Digest 93 Phil 696 , August 31, 1953

Facts: Saturnino David was the Internal Revenue Collector who ordered Judges Endencio and Jugos salaries. A case was filed. However, upon construing Article VIII Section 9 of the constitution, it shows that judicial officers are exempt from paying tax from their salaries and thus considered that the deduction of salaries from the said judges as a violation from the compensation received by judicial officers. Due to this, the judgment given by Court of First Instance has declared the section 13 of Republic Act 590 unconstitutional. Case was appealed. Issue: Whether or not Section 13 of RA 590 is constitutional Ruling: No, the Section 13 of RA 590 is unconstitutional. The collection of income taxes in judicial officers is considered as against the provisions given by the Article VIII Sec 9 of the Philippine constitution. According to the constitution, the compensation shall not be diminished during their continuance of their service. Section 13 of RA 590 stated that no salary

received by any public officer of the republic shall be exempted from paying its taxes. This specific part of RA 590 is in contrary with what is Article VIII Sec 9 has provided. The Legislative body cannot lawfully declare that no judicial officer can be exempted from paying tax. The legislative may create laws, however, the judicial department of the government has the responsibility of interpreting laws and has dutifully interpreted the said part of the constitution. The tax exemption was not created to benefit the judicial officers but to attract good and competent men.

Aisporna v CA (1982)
Aisporna v CA (1982) Facts Mapalad Aisporna, the wife of one Rodolfo Aisporna, an insurance agent, solicited the applicationof Eugenio Isidro in behalf of Perla Compana de Seguros without the certificate of authority to act from the insurance commissioner. Isidro passed away while his wife was issued Php 5000 fromthe insurance policy. After the death, the fiscal instigated criminal action against Mapalad for violating sec 189 of the Insurance code for feloniously acting as agent when she solicited theapplication form. In the trial court, she claimed that she helped Rodolfo as clerk and that she solicited a renewal, not a new policy from Isidro through the phone. She did this because her husband was absent when he called. She only left a note on top of her husbands desk to inform him of what transpired. (She did not accept compensation from Isidro for her services) Aisporna was sentenced to pay Php 500 with subsidiary costs in case of insolvency in 1971 in the Cabanatuan city court. In the appellate court, she was found guilty of having violating par 1 of sec 189 of the insurance code. The OSG kept on repeating that she didnt violate sec 189 of the insurance code. In seeking reversal of the judgment, Aisporna assigned errors of the appellate court: 1. the receipt of compensation was not a necessary element of the crime in par 1 of sec 189 of the insurance code 2. CA erred in giving due weight to exhibits F, F1, F17 inclusive sufficient to establish petitioners guilt beyond reasonable doubt. 3. The CA erred in not acquitting the petitioner Issues: Won a person can be convicted of having violated the 1st par of the sec 189 of the IC without reference to the 2nd paragraph of the said section. Or Is it necessary to determine WON the agent mentioned in the 1st paragraph of the aforesaid section is governed by the definition of an insurance agent found on its second paragraph Decision: Aisporna acquitted Ruling: Sect 189 of the I.C., par 1 states that No insurance company doing business with the Philippine Islands nor l any agent thereof shall pay any commission or other compensation to any person for services in obtaining new insurance unless such person shall have first procured from the Insurance Commissioner a certificate of authority to act as an agent of such company as herein after provided.

No person shall act as agent, sub-agent, or broker in the solicitation of procurement of applications for insurance without obtaining a certificate from the Insurance Commissioner. Par2 Any person who for COMPENSATION solicits or obtains insurance for any for any insurance compna or offers or assumes to act in the negotiating of such insurance shall be an insurance agent in the intent of this section and shall thereby become liable to all liabilities to which an insurance agent is subject. Par 3 500 pseo fine for person or company violating the provisions of the section. The court held that the 1st par prohibited a person to act as agent without certificate of authorityfrom the commissioner In the 2nd par, the definition of an insurance agent is stipulated The third paragraph provided the penalty for violating the 1st 2 rules The appellate court said that the petitioner was penalized under the1st paragraph and not the 1nd. The fact that she didnt receive compensation wasnt an excuse for her acquittal because she was actually punished separately under sec 1 because she did not have a certificate of authority as under par 1. The SC held that the definition of an insurance agent was made by CA to be limited to paragraph 2 and not applicable to the 1st paragraph. The appellate court said that a person was an insurance agent under par 2 if she solicits insurance for compensation, but in the 1st paragraph, there was no necessity that a person solicits an insurance compensation in order to be called an agent. The SC said that this was a reversible error. The CA said that Aisporna didnt receive compensation. The SC said that the definition of an insurance agent was found in the 2nd par of Sec 189 (check the law) The definition in the 2nd paragraph qualified the definition of an agent used in the 1st and third paragraphs. DOCTRINE: The court held that legislative intent must be ascertained from the consideration of the statute as a whole. The words shouldnt be studied in isolated explanations but the whole and every part of the statute must be considered in fixing the meaning of any of its parts in order to pronounce the harmonious whole. Noscitur a sociis provides that where a particular word or phrase in a statement is ambiguous in itself, the true meaning may be made clear in the company it is fixed in. In applying this, the court held that the definition of an insurance agent in the 2nd paragraph was applicable in the 1stparagraph. To receive compensation be the agent is an essential element for violation of the 1st paragraph. The appellate court said that she didnt receive compensation by the receipt of compensation wasnt an essential element for violation of the 1st paragraph. The SC said that this view wasnt correct owing to the American insurance laws which qualified compensation as a qualifying factor in penalizing unauthorized persons who solicited insurance (Texas code and snyders law) Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC G.R. No. L-7747 November 29, 1955

NIEVES TINIO, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellants, vs. GREGORIO FRANCES, ET AL., defendants and appellees. Pedro D. Maldia for appellants. Godofredo V. Salamanca for appellees. LABRADOR, J.: This action was brought by the heirs of the deceased Sergio Nicolas to annul the sale of a homestead which had been inherited by them from said decedent. Sergio Nicolas applied for a parcel of land containing an area of 10.0709 hectares, more or less, in San Fabian, Santo Domingo, Nueva Ecija in the year 1917. His application was approved on June 22, 1917. He filed the corresponding final proof papers in relation to the homestead and on June 15, 1943 the said final proof was approved by the Director of Lands, who thereupon ordered the issuance of a patent in his favor. (Exhibit A.) At the time of the issuance of the above order, Sergio Nicolas had already died, so the order directs the issuance of the patent to his heirs, represented by his widow. In or about the year 1947 the heirs transferred their rights to the homestead to the defendants. The above transfers were approved by the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce on March 9, 1948 and thereafter the defendants secured the issuance of a homestead patent in their favor. Original Certificate of Title No. P-558 has been issued also in their favor, covering the said parcel of land. The present action was commenced on April 27, 1953 to annul the conveyances executed by plaintiffs to defendants and to recover the land, together with the fruits of the land received by the defendants, as damages. The defendants alleged the execution of the sales in their favor. After the issues had been joined the parties presented an agreed statement of facts, the most pertinent parts of which have already been set forth above. The trial court held that the transfer or conveyance of the homestead made by the heirs of the original homesteader was a mere transfer of the rights of the original homesteader to the land authorized under the provisions of Section 20 of the Public Land Act (A. A. 141); therefore, as it was approved by the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce, the conveyance was valid. It held that section 118 of the Public Land Act is not applicable; that both Section 20 and Section 118 being apparently conflicting, they should be reconciled subh that the prohibition contained in section 118 should be made to apply only if the patent had already been issued, otherwise section 20 would be absolutely useless. Against this judgment the appeal was prosecuted in this Court.The provisions which affect the conveyance sought to be annulled are as follows: SEC. 20. If at any time after the approval of the application and before patent is issued the applicant shall prove to the satisfaction of the Director of Lands that he has complied with all the requirements of the law, but cannot continue with his homestead, through no fault of his own, and there is a bona fide purchaser for the rights and improvements of the applicant on the land, and that the conveyance is not made for purposes of speculation, then the applicant, with the previous approval of the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce, may transfer his rights to the land and improvements to any person legally qualified to apply for a homestead, and immediately after such transfer, the purchaser shall file a homestead application to the land so acquired and shall succeed the original homesteader in his rights and obligations beginning with the date of the approval of said application of the purchaser. Any person who has so transferred his rights may not agan apply for a new homestead. Every transfer made without the previous approval of the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce shall be null and void and shall result in the cancellation of the entry and the refusal of the patent. (C. A. 141). SEC. 118. Except in favor of the Government or any of its branches, units, or institutions, lands acquired under free patentor homestead provisions shall not be subject to encumbrance or alienation from the date of the approval of the application and for a term

of five years from and after the date of the issuance of the patent or grant, nor shall they become liable to the satisfaction of any debt contracted prior to the expiration of said period, but the improvements or crop on the land may be mortgaged or pledged to qualified persons, associations, or corporations. No alienation, transfer, or conveyance of any homestead after five years and before twenty-five years after issuance of title shall be valid without the approval of the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce, which approval shall not be denied except on constitutional and legal grounds. (Id.). The legislative policy or intent is to conserve the land which a homesteader has acquired under the Public Land Law, as above stated, for him and his heirs. The legislative policy is so strone and consistent that the original period of five years from the issuance of the patent, within which period conveyance or sale thereof by the homesteader or his heirs was prohibited (section 116 of Act No. 2874) is now extended to 25 years if no approval of the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce is secured. (Sec. 118, par. 2, C. a. No. 141, as amended by C. A. No. 456.) Provision has also been inserted authorizing the repurchase of the homestead when properly sold by the homesteader within five years from the date of the sale. (Sec. 119, C. A. No. 141.) This legislative intent and policy is also sought to be carried out in Section 20, as may be seen from the fact that transfer of homestead rights from a homesteader can only be justified upon proof satisfactory to the Director of Lands that the homesteader cannot continue with his homestead through no fault of his own. This is not the only requirement; a previous permission of the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce should first be obtained, as it is also expressly provided that any transfer made without such previous approval is null and void and shall result in the cancellation of the entry and the refusal of the patent." (C. A. 141). As the conveyances now in question are claimed to have been and were evidently made under the provisions of section 20 of the Public Land Act, the important question to be determined is whether said conveyances satisfy requirements of said section 20 of the Act. The stipulation of facts on this point is as follows: That the heirs of Sergio Nicolas executed in or about 1947 a transfer of homestead rights over the land in question in favor of the defendants, which transfer was approved by the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce on March 9, 1948; that with the approval of said transger of homestead rights, the defendants caused the issuance of a homestead patent in their favor, the title being evidenced by Original Certificate of Title No. P-558 of the land records of Nueva Ecija. The above stipulation does not state expressly that the Director of Lands had, after investigation, been satisfied that the applicant or homesteader "has complied with all the requirements of the law, but cannot continue with the homestead through no fault of his own." Furthermore, according to the stipulation, the transfer was made in 1947 and approved by the Secretary of Agriculture in 1948 so that the conveyances were not made with with previous approval of the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce. So neither of the requirements of section 20 has been complied with. But it is suggested that in accordance with the presumption of regularity of official acts the Director of Lands must have recommended the approval of the transfer. Admitting arguendo that such is the case, the conveyances still suffer from at least one fatal defect in that it does not appear that they had to be made because the homesteadercould not continue with his homestead through no fault of his own. We may not and cannot indulge in presumptions on this necessary requirements, because the order for the issuance of the patent states just the opposite. The order for the issuance of the patent states expressly that the homesteader had already complied with all the requirements of the law with respect to cultivation, possession and otherwise, thus:

(5) That an investigation for the purpose of verifying the statements contained in the final proof papers was conducted by a representative of the Bureau of Lands, who found that the applicant has fully complied with the residence and cultivation requirements of the law; and xxx xxx xxx

. . ., the undersigned is of the opinion that the applicant has complied with the requirements of law preliminary to the issuance of patent to the land applied for and already surveyed." (Exhibit A.). The order for the issuance of a patent as well as the statements of fact therein contained, as above-quoted, conclusively disprove the existence of the requirement that the homesteader could not continue with the homestead through no fault of his own. In a legal sense, furthermore, when the Director of Lands issues the order for the issuance of a patent, after the approval of the final proof, the right of the homesteader to the patent becomes absolute and then it becomes the ministerial duty of the corresponding officials of the Government to issue said patent. To all intents and purposes the order for the issuance of a patent is the same in effect as the issuance of a patent itself (Balboa vs. Farrales, 51 Phil., 499). And if the law (section 118, C. A. No. 114) prohibits the sale or conveyance of a homestead after the issuance of a patent, the prohibition should be extended, in view of the apparent policy of the law, to the date on which the order for the issuance of the patent is issued, which in this case is June 13, 1943. Resuming what we have stated above, we find that the conveyances made by the heirs of the homesteader to the defendants heren in the year 1947 do not comply with the first requirements of section 20 of the Public Land Act that the Director of Lands is satisfied from proofs submitted by the homesteader that he (homesteader) could not continue with his homestead through no fault of his own, and with the second that a conveyance must be made with the prior or previous approval of the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce; that from the date of an order for the issuance of a patent for a homestead the homesteader to all intents and purposes is considered as having the patent actually issued to himself, in so far as the prohibition contained in section 118 of the Public Land Act, otherwise the intent and policy of the law may be avoided by the homesteader by postponing the getting of his patent. In accordance herewith the conveyances executed by the plaintiffs to the defendants are hereby declared null and void, the transfer certificate of title issued in the name of the defendants (P-558 of the Office of the Register of Deeds of Nueva Ecija) ordered cancelled, and the possession of the land returned to the plaintiffs upon return to the defendants of the amounts received as price for the sale. No damages or costs. So ordered.

G.R. No. L-30061 February 27, 1974 THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellees, vs. JOSE JABINAL Y CARMEN, defendant-appellant. Office of the Solicitor General Felix V. Makasiar and Solicitor Antonio M. Martinez for plaintiffappellee. Pedro Panganiban y Tolentino for defendant-appellant.

ANTONIO, J.:p Appeal from the judgment of the Municipal Court of Batangas (provincial capital), Batangas, in Criminal Case No. 889, finding the accused guilty of the crime of Illegal Possession of Firearm and Ammunition and sentencing him to suffer an indeterminate penalty ranging from one (1) year and one (1) day to two (2) years imprisonment, with the accessories provided by law, which raises in issue the validity of his conviction based on a retroactive application of Our ruling in People v. Mapa. 1 The complaint filed against the accused reads: That on or about 9:00 o'clock, p.m., the 5th day of September, 1964, in the poblacion, Municipality of Batangas, Province of Batangas, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, a person not authorized by law, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously keep in his possession, custody and direct control a revolver Cal. .22, RG8 German Made with one (1) live ammunition and four (4) empty shells without first securing the necessary permit or license to possess the same. At the arraignment on September 11, 1964, the accused entered a plea of not guilty, after which trial was accordingly held. The accused admitted that on September 5, 1964, he was in possession of the revolver and the ammunition described in the complaint, without the requisite license or permit. He, however, claimed to be entitled to exoneration because, although he had no license or permit, he had an appointment as Secret Agent from the Provincial Governor of Batangas and an appointment as Confidential Agent from the PC Provincial Commander, and the said appointments expressly carried with them the authority to possess and carry the firearm in question. Indeed, the accused had appointments from the above-mentioned officials as claimed by him. His appointment from Governor Feliciano Leviste, dated December 10, 1962, reads: Reposing special trust and confidence in your civic spirit, and trusting that you will be an effective agent in the detection of crimes and in the preservation of peace and order in the province of Batangas, especially with respect to the suppression of trafficking in explosives, jueteng, illegal cockfighting, cattle rustling, robbery and the detection of unlicensed firearms, you are hereby appointed a SECRET AGENT of the undersigned, the appointment to take effect immediately, or as soon as you have qualified for the position. As such Secret Agent, your duties shall be those generally of a peace officer and particularly to help in the preservation of peace and order in this province and to make reports thereon to me once or twice a month. It should be clearly understood that any abuse of authority on your part shall be considered sufficient ground for the automatic cancellation of your appointment and immediate separation from the service. In accordance with the decision of the Supreme Court in G.R. No. L-12088 dated December 23, 1959, you will have the right to bear a firearm, particularly described below, for use in connection with the performance of your duties. By virtue hereof, you may qualify and enter upon the performance of your duties by taking your oath of office and filing the original thereof with us. V e r

y t r u l y y o u r s , ( S g d . ) F E L I C I A N O L E V I S T E P r o v i n c i a l G o v e r n

o r FIREARM AUTHORIZED TO CARRY: Kind: ROHM-Revolver Make: German SN: 64 Cal: .22 On March 15, 1964, the accused was also appointed by the PC Provincial Commander of Batangas as Confidential Agent with duties to furnish information regarding smuggling activities, wanted persons, loose firearms, subversives and other similar subjects that might affect the peace and order condition in Batangas province, and in connection with these duties he was temporarily authorized to possess a ROHM revolver, Cal. .22 RG-8 SN-64, for his personal protection while in the performance of his duties. The accused contended before the court a quo that in view of his above-mentioned appointments as Secret Agent and Confidential Agent, with authority to possess the firearm subject matter of the prosecution, he was entitled to acquittal on the basis of the Supreme Court's decision in People vs. Macarandang 2 and People vs. Lucero. 3 The trial court, while conceding on the basis of the evidence of record the accused had really been appointed Secret Agent and Confidential Agent by the Provincial Governor and the PC Provincial Commander of Batangas, respectively, with authority to possess and carry the firearm described in the complaint, nevertheless held the accused in its decision dated December 27, 1968, criminally liable for illegal possession of a firearm and ammunition on the ground that the rulings of the Supreme Court in the cases of Macarandang and Lucero were reversed and abandoned in People vs. Mapa, supra. The court considered as mitigating circumstances the appointments of the accused as Secret Agent and Confidential Agent. Let us advert to Our decisions in People v. Macarandang, supra, People v. Lucero, supra, and People v. Mapa, supra. In Macarandang, We reversed the trial court's judgment of conviction against the accused because it was shown that at the time he was found to possess a certain firearm and ammunition without license or permit, he had an appointment from the Provincial Governor as Secret Agent to assist in the maintenance of peace and order and in the detection of crimes, with authority to hold and carry the said firearm and ammunition. We therefore held that while it is true that the Governor has no authority to issue any firearm license or permit, nevertheless, section 879 of the Revised Administrative Code provides that "peace officers" are exempted from the requirements relating to the issuance of license to possess firearms; and Macarandang's appointment as Secret Agent to assist in the maintenance of peace and order and detection of crimes, sufficiently placed him in the category of a "peace officer" equivalent even to a member of the municipal police who under section 879 of the Revised Administrative Code are exempted from the requirements relating to the issuance of license to possess firearms. In Lucero, We held that under the circumstances of the case, the granting of the temporary use of the firearm to the accused was a necessary means to carry out the lawful purpose of the batallion commander to effect the capture of a Huk leader. In Mapa, expressly abandoning the doctrine in Macarandang, and by implication, that in Lucero, We sustained the judgment of conviction on the following ground: The law is explicit that except as thereafter specifically allowed, "it shall be unlawful for any person to ... possess any firearm, detached parts of firearms or ammunition therefor, or any instrument or implement used or intended to be used in the manufacture of firearms, parts of firearms, or ammunition." (Sec. 878, as

amended by Republic Act No. 4, Revised Administrative Code.) The next section provides that "firearms and ammunition regularly and lawfully issued to officers, soldiers, sailors, or marines [of the Armed Forces of the Philippines], the Philippine Constabulary, guards in the employment of the Bureau of Prisons, municipal police, provincial governors, lieutenant governors, provincial treasurers, municipal treasurers, municipal mayors, and guards of provincial prisoners and jails," are not covered "when such firearms are in possession of such officials and public servants for use in the performance of their official duties." (Sec. 879, Revised Administrative Code.) The law cannot be any clearer. No provision is made for a secret agent. As such he is not exempt. ... . It will be noted that when appellant was appointed Secret Agent by the Provincial Government in 1962, and Confidential Agent by the Provincial Commander in 1964, the prevailing doctrine on the matter was that laid down by Us in People v. Macarandang (1959) and People v. Lucero (1958). Our decision in People v. Mapa reversing the aforesaid doctrine came only in 1967. The sole question in this appeal is: Should appellant be acquitted on the basis of Our rulings in Macarandang and Lucero, or should his conviction stand in view of the complete reversal of the Macarandang and Lucero doctrine in Mapa? The Solicitor General is of the first view, and he accordingly recommends reversal of the appealed judgment. Decisions of this Court, although in themselves not laws, are nevertheless evidence of what the laws mean, and this is the reason why under Article 8 of the New Civil Code "Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall form a part of the legal system ... ." The interpretation upon a law by this Court constitutes, in a way, a part of the law as of the date that law originally passed, since this Court's construction merely establishes the contemporaneous legislative intent that law thus construed intends to effectuate. The settled rule supported by numerous authorities is a restatement of legal maxim "legis interpretatio legis vim obtinet" the interpretation placed upon the written law by a competent court has the force of law. The doctrine laid down in Lucero andMacarandang was part of the jurisprudence, hence of the law, of the land, at the time appellant was found in possession of the firearm in question and when he arraigned by the trial court. It is true that the doctrine was overruled in the Mapa case in 1967, but when a doctrine of this Court is overruled and a different view is adopted, the new doctrine should be applied prospectively, and should not apply to parties who had relied on the old doctrine and acted on the faith thereof. This is especially true in the construction and application of criminal laws, where it is necessary that the punishability of an act be reasonably foreseen for the guidance of society. It follows, therefore, that considering that appellant conferred his appointments as Secret Agent and Confidential Agent and authorized to possess a firearm pursuant to the prevailing doctrine enunciated in Macarandang andLucero, under which no criminal liability would attach to his possession of said firearm in spite of the absence of a license and permit therefor, appellant must be absolved. Certainly, appellant may not be punished for an act which at the time it was done was held not to be punishable. WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is hereby reversed, and appellant is acquitted, with costs de oficio. Zaldivar (Chairman), Barredo, Fernandez and Aquino, JJ., concur. Fernando, J., took no part.

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC

G.R. No. 96779 November 10, 1993 PINE CITY EDUCATIONAL CENTER and EUGENIO BALTAO, petitioners, vs. THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION (THIRD DIVISION) and DANGWA BENTREZ, ROLAND PICART, APOLLO RIBAYA, SR., RUPERTA RIBAYA, VIRGINIA BOADO, CECILIA EMOCLING, JANE BENTREZ, LEILA DOMINGUEZ, ROSE ANN BERMUDEZ and LUCIA CHAN, respondents. Tenefrancia, Agranzamendez, Liceralde & Associates for petitioners. Reynaldo B. Cajucom for private respondents.

NOCON, J.: The is a petition for certiorari seeking the reversal of the resolution of public respondent National Labor Relations Commission dated November 29, 1990, in NLRC Case No. 01-04-0056-89, which affirmed in toto the decision of the Labor Arbiter dated February 28,1990. The antecedent facts are, a follows: Private respondents Dangwa Bentrez, Roland Picart, Apollo Ribaya, Sr., Ruperta Ribaya, Virginia Boado, Cecilia Emocling, Jane Bentrez, Leila Dominguez, Rose Ann Bermudez and Lucia Chan were all employed as teachers on probationary basis by petitioner Pines City Educational Center, represented in this proceedings by its President, Eugenio Baltao. With the exception of Jane Bentrez who was hired as a grade school teacher, the remaining private respondents were hired as college instructors. All the private respondents, except Roland Picart and Lucia Chan, signed contracts of employment with petitioner for a fixed duration. On March 31, 1989, due to the expiration of private respondents' contracts and their poor performance as teachers, they were notified of petitioners' decision not to renew their contracts anymore. On April 10, 1989, private respondents filed a complaint for illegal dismissal before the Labor Arbiter, alleging that their dismissals were without cause and in violation of due process. Except for private respondent Leila Dominguez who worked with petitioners for one semester, all other private respondents were employed for one to two years. They were never informed in writing by petitioners regarding the standards or criteria of evaluation so as to enable them to meet the requirements for appointment as regular employees. They were merely notified in writing by petitioners, through its chancellor, Dra. Nimia R. Concepcion, of the termination of their respective services as on March 31, 1989, on account of their below-par performance as teachers. For their part, petitioners contended that private respondents' separation from employment, apart from their poor performance, was due to the expiration of the periods stipulated in their respective contracts. In the case of private respondent Dangwa Bentrez, the duration of his employment contract was for one year, or beginning June, 1988 to March 1989 whereas in the

case of the other private respondents, the duration of their employment contracts was for one semester, or beginning November, 1988 to March 1989. These stipulations were the laws that governed their relationships, and there was nothing in said contracts which was contrary to law, morals, good customs and public policy. They argued further that they cannot be compelled o enter into new contracts with private respondents. they concluded that the separation of private respondents from the service was justified. On February 28, 1990, the Labor Arbiter rendered judgment in favor of private respondents, the dispositive portion of which reads: WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing considerations, judgment is hereby rendered ORDERING the respondents to reinstate the complainants immediately to their former positions and to pay their full backwages and other benefits and privileges without qualification and deduction from the time they were dismissed up to their actual reinstatement. Thus respondents should pay complainants the following: BACKWAGES NOTE: Computation covers only the period complainants were terminated up to January 31, 1990 or 10 months and does not include backwages from January 31, 1990 up to their actual reinstatement. 1) ROLAND PICART a) Latest salary per month P2,136.00 b) Multiplied by period covered (March 31, 1989 to January 31, 1990) x 10 months c) Equals backwages due P21,360.00 2) LUCIA CHAN a) Latest salary per month P1,600.00 b) Multiplied by period covered x 10 months c) Equals backwages due P16,000.00 3) LEILA DOMINGUEZ a) Latest salary per month P1,648.24 b) Multiplied by period covered x 10 months c) Equals backwages due P16,482.40 4) RUPERTA RIBAYA a) Latest salary per month P1,856.00 b) Multiplied by period covered x 10 months c) Equals backwages due P18,560.00 5) CECILIA EMOCLING

a) Latest salary per month P1,648.00 b) Multiplied by period covered x 10 months c) Equals backwages due P16,480.00 6) ROSE ANN BERMUDEZ a) Latest salary per month P2,600.00 b) Multiplied by period covered x 10 months c) Equals backwages due P26,000.00 7) DANGWA BENTREZ a) Latest salary per month P1,700.00 b) Multiplied by period covered x 10 months c) Equals backwages due P17,000.00 8) JANE BENTREZ a) Latest salary per month P1,315.44 b) ultiplied by period covered x 10 months c) Equals backwages due P13,154.40 9) APOLLO RIBAYA a) Latest salary per month P1,875.00 b) Multiplied by period covered x 10 months c) Equals backwages due P18,7500.00 10) VIRGINIA BOADO a) Latest salary per month P1,648.24 b) Multiplied by period covered x 10 months c) Equals backwages due P16,482.40 SUMMARY 1) Roland Picart 21,360.00 2) Lucia Chan 16,000.00 3) Leila Dominguez 16,482.40 4) Ruperta Ribaya 18,560.00 5) Cecilia Emocling 16,480.00 6) Rose Ann Bermudez 26,000.00 7) Dangwa Bentrez 17,000.00 8) Jane Bentrez 13,154.40 9) Apollo Ribaya 18,750.00 10) Virginia Boado 16,482.40 GRAND TOTAL (Backwages) P180,269.20

Complainants claims for indemnity pay, premium pay for holidays and rest days, illegal deduction, 13th month pay and underpayment are hereby DENIED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED. 1

In support of this decision, the Labor Arbiter rationalized that the teacher's contracts 2 are vague and do not include the specific description of duties and assignments of private respondents. They do not categorically state that there will be no renewal because their appointments automatically terminate at the end of the semester. Petitioners did not present any written evidence to substantiate their allegation that the Academic Committee has evaluated private respondents' performance during their one semester employment. On the contrary, they were hastily dismissed. On appeal to the National Labor Relations Commission, the decision was affirmed in toto in its resolution dated November 29, 1990, with the additional reasoning that "the stipulation in the contract providing for a definite period in the employment of complainant is obviously null and void, as such stipulation directly assails the safeguards laid down in Article 280 (of the Labor Code), 3 which explicitly abhors the consideration of written or oral agreements pertaining to definite period in regular employments. 4 Hence, the present petition for certiorari with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order. As prayed for, this Court issued a temporary restraining order on March 11, 1991, enjoining respondents from enforcing the questioned resolution. 5 Petitioners raise this sole issue: "THAT THERE IS PRIMA FACIE EVIDENCE OF GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION ON THE PART OF THE LABOR ARBITER BY WANTONLY, CAPRICIOUSLY AND MALICIOUSLY DISREGARDING PROVISIONS OF THE LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE LAID DOWN IN DECISIONS OF THE HONORABLE SUPREME COURT." 6 Petitioners reiterate their previous arguments, relying heavily in the case of Brent School, Inc. et al., v. Zamora, et al. 7 It is quite easy to resolve the present controversy because the Brent case, which is a product of extensive research, already provides the answer. We were categorical therein that: Accordingly, and since the entire purpose behind the development of legislation culminating in the present Article 280 of the Labor Code clearly appears to have been, as already observed, to prevent circumvention of the employee's right to be secure in his tenure, the clause in said article indiscriminately and completely ruling out all written and oral agreements conflicting with the concept of regular employment as defined therein should be construed to refer to the substantive evil that the Code itself has singled out: agreements entered into precisely to prevent security of tenure. It should have no application to instances where a fixed period of employment was agreed upon knowingly and voluntarily by the parties, without any force, duress or improper pressure brought to bear upon the employee and absent any other circumstances vitiating his consent, or where it satisfactorily appears that the employer or employee dealt with each other on more or less equal terms with no moral dominance whatever being exercised by the former over the latter. Unless thus limited in its purview, the law would be made to apply to purposes other than those expressly stated by its framers; it thus becomes pointless and arbitrary, unjust in its effects and apt to lead to absurd and unintended consequences. (Emphasis supplied.) The ruling was reiterated in Pakistan International Airlines Corporation v. Ople, etc., et al. 8 and La Sallete of Santiago, Inc. v. NLRC, et al. 9

In the present case, however, We have to make a distinction. Insofar as the private respondents who knowingly and voluntarily agreed upon fixed periods of employment are concerned, their services were lawfully terminated by reason of the expiration of the periods of their respective contracts. These are Dangwa Bentrez, Apollo Ribaya, Sr., Ruperta Ribaya, Virginia Boado, Cecilia Emocling, Jose Bentrez, Leila Dominguez and Rose Ann Bermudez. Thus, public respondent committed grave abuse of discretion in affirming the decision of the Labor Arbiter ordering the reinstatement and payment of full backwages and other benefits and privileges. With respect to private respondents Roland Picart and Lucia Chan, both of whom did not sign any contract fixing the periods of their employment nor to have knowingly and voluntarily agreed upon fixed periods of employment, petitioners had the burden of proving that the termination of their services was legal. As probationary employees, they are likewise protected by the security of tenure provision of the Constitution. Consequently, they cannot be removed from their positions unless for cause. 10 On the other hand, petitioner contended that base don the evaluation of the Academic Committee their performance as teachers was poor. The Labor Arbiter, however, was not convinced. Thus he found as follows:
Respondents likewise aver that the Academic Committee has evaluated their performance during their one semester employment (see Annexes "M" to "X" of complainants' position paper). However, they did not present any written proofs or evidence to support their allegation. 11

xxx xxx xxx

There is absolutely nothing in the record which will show that the complainants were afforded even an iota of chance to refute respondents' allegations that the complainants did not meet the reasonable standards and criteria set by the school. . . . 12

We concur with these factual findings, there being no showing that they were resolved arbitrarily. 13 Thus, the order for their reinstatement and payment of full backwages and other benefits and privileges from the time they were dismissed up to their actual reinstatement is proper, conformably with Article 279 of the Labor Code, as amended by Section 34 of Republic Act No. 6715, 14 which took effect on March 21, 1989. 15 It should be noted that private respondents Roland Picart and Lucia Chan were dismissed illegally on March 31, 1989, or after the effectivity of said amendatory law. However, in ascertaining the total amount of backwages payable to them, we go back to the rule prior to the mercury drug rule 16 that the total amount derived from employment elsewhere by the employee from the date of dismissal up to the date of reinstatement, if any, should be deducted therefrom. 17 We restate the underlying reason that employees should not be permitted to enrich themselves at the expense of their employer. 18 In addition, the law abhors double compensation. 19 to this extent, our ruling in Alex Ferrer, et al., v. NLRC, et al., G.R. No. 100898, promulgated on July 5, 1993, is hereby modified. Public respondent cannot claim not knowing the ruling in the Brent case because in its questioned resolution, it is stated that one of the cases invoked by petitioners in their appeal is said case. 20 This notwithstanding, it disregarded Our ruling therein without any reason at all and expressed the erroneous view that:
The agreement of the parties fixing a definite date for the termination of the employment relations is contrary to the specific provision of Article 280. being contrary to law, the agreement cannot be legitimized. . . . 21

Stare decisis et no quieta movere. Once a case ha been decided one way, then another case, involving exactly the same point at issue, should be decided in the same manner. Public

respondent had no choice on the matter. It could not have ruled in any other way. This Tribunal having spoken in the Brent case, its duty was to obey. 22 Let it be warned that to defy its decisions is to court contempt. 23 WHEREFORE, the resolution of public respondent National Labor Relations Commission dated November 29, 1990 is hereby MODIFIED. private respondents Roland Picart and Lucia Chan are ordered reinstated without loss of seniority rights and other privileges and their backwages paid in full inclusive of allowances, and to their other benefits or their monetary equivalent pursuant to Article 279 of the Labor Code, as amended by Section 34 of Republic Act No. 6715, subject to deduction of income earned elsewhere during the period of dismissal, if any, to be computed from the time they were dismissed up to the time of their actual reinstatement. the rest of the Labor Arbiter's decision dated February 28, 1990, as affirmed by the NLRC is set aside. The temporary restraining order issued on March 11, 1991 is made permanent. SO ORDERED. Narvasa, C.J., Cruz, Feliciano, Bidin, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Quiason and Vitug, JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions

PADILLA, J., concurring: I concur in the Court's decision penned by Mr. justice Nocon except that I cannot see my way clear to allowing deductions from the full backwages prescribed by law, given the language and evident intention of Rep. Act No. 6715. 1. Art. 279 of the Labor Code as amended by Rep. Act No. 6715 states: "Security of Tenure In cases of regular employment, the employer shall not terminate the services of an employee except for a just cause or when authorized by this Title. An employee who is unjustly dismissed from work shall be entitled to reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and other privileges and to his full backwages, inclusive of allowances, and to his other benefits of their monetary equivalent computed from the time his compensation was withheld from him up to the time of his actual reinstatement. (Emphasis supplied) The amendment to Art. 279 of the Labor Code introduced by Rep. Act. No. 6715 inserted the qualification "full" to the word "backwages". The intent of the law seems to be clear. The plain words of the statute provide that an employee who is unjustly dismissed is entitled to FULL backwages from the time of his dismissal to actual reinstatement. The law provides no qualification nor does it state that income earned by the employee during the period between his unjust dismissal and reinstatement should be deducted from such backwages. When the law does not provide, the court should not improvise. It is further my view that the principle of unjust enrichment (if no deduction is allowed from backwages) does not apply in this case, for the following reasons:

1. The applicable provision of the law should be construed in favor of labor. 2. The Labor Code is a special law which should prevail over the Civil Code provisions on unjust enrichment. 3. The language employed by the statute and, therefore, its intent are clear. Where the unjust dismissal occurs after Rep. Act No. 6715 too effect, backwages must be awarded from the time the employee is unlawfully dismissed until the time he is actually reinstated. There is no provision authorizing deduction of any income earned by the employee during that period. The statutory formula was evidently crafted by the legislature not only for convenience and expediency in executing the monetary judgments in favor of the employees but also to prevent the employer from resorting to delaying tactics when the judgment is executed by pleading income earned by the employee before reinstatement as proper deductions from backwages. It is true that the dismissed employee may also resort to the same delaying tactics but when we consider the by and large inherent inequality of resources between employer and employee, the legislative formula would seem to be equitable. Besides and this we cannot over-stress given the language of the law, the court appears to have no alternative but to award such full backwages without deduction or qualification. Any other interpretation opens the Court to the charge of indulging in judicial legislation. I therefore vote to award private respondents Roland Picart and Lucia Chan full backwages from the time of their unjust dismissal to their actual reinstatement, without deduction or qualification in accordance with the mandate of the law (Rep. Act No, 6715).

# Separate Opinion PADILLA, J., concurring: I concur in the Court's decision penned by Mr. justice Nocon except that I cannot see my way clear to allowing deductions from the full backwages prescribed by law, given the language and evident intention of Rep. Act No. 6715. 1. Art. 279 of the Labor Code as amended by Rep. Act No. 6715 states: "Security of Tenure In cases of regular employment, the employer shall not terminate the services of an employee except for a just cause or when authorized by this Title. An employee who is unjustly dismissed from work shall be entitled to reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and other privileges and to his full backwages, inclusive of allowances, and to his other benefits of their monetary equivalent computed from the time his compensation was withheld from him up to the time of his actual reinstatement. (Emphasis supplied) The amendment to Art. 279 of the Labor Code introduced by Rep. Act. No. 6715 inserted the qualification "full" to the word "backwages". The intent of the law seems to be clear. The plain words of the statute provide that an employee who is unjustly dismissed is entitled to FULL backwages from the time of his dismissal to actual reinstatement. The law provides no qualification nor does it state that income earned by the employee during the period between his unjust dismissal and reinstatement should be deducted from such backwages. When the law does not provide, the court should not improvise. It is further my view that the principle of unjust enrichment (if no deduction is allowed from backwages) does not apply in this case, for the following reasons: 1. The applicable provision of the law should be construed in favor of labor.

2. The Labor Code is a special law which should prevail over the Civil Code provisions on unjust enrichment. 3. The language employed by the statute and, therefore, its intent are clear. Where the unjust dismissal occurs after Rep. Act No. 6715 too effect, backwages must be awarded from the time the employee is unlawfully dismissed until the time he is actually reinstated. There is no provision authorizing deduction of any income earned by the employee during that period. The statutory formula was evidently crafted by the legislature not only for convenience and expediency in executing the monetary judgments in favor of the employees but also to prevent the employer from resorting to delaying tactics when the judgment is executed by pleading income earned by the employee before reinstatement as proper deductions from backwages. It is true that the dismissed employee may also resort to the same delaying tactics but when we consider the by and large inherent inequality of resources between employer and employee, the legislative formula would seem to be equitable. Besides and this we cannot over-stress given the language of the law, the court appears to have no alternative but to award such full backwages without deduction or qualification. Any other interpretation opens the Court to the charge of indulging in judicial legislation. I therefore vote to award private respondents Roland Picart and Lucia Chan full backwages from the time of their unjust dismissal to their actual reinstatement, without deduction or qualification in accordance with the mandate of the law (Rep. Act No, 6715).

Footnotes 1 Rollo, pp. 79-80. 2 Annexes "1", "3," to "10" of private respondents' position paper. 3 Rollo, p. 98. 4 Art. 280. Regular and Casual Employment. The provisions of written agreement to the contrary notwithstanding and regardless of the oral agreement of the parties, an employment shall be deemed to be regular where the employee has been engaged to perform activities which are usually necessary or desirable in the usual business or trade of the employer, except where the employment has been fixed for a specific project or undertaking the completion or termination of which has been determined at the time of the engagement of the employee or where the work or services to be performed is seasonal in nature and the employment is for the duration of the season. An employment shall be deemed to be casual if it is not covered by the preceding paragraph:Provided, That, any employee who has rendered at least one year of service, whether such service is continuous or broken, shall be considered a regular employee with respect to the activity in which he is employed and his employment shall continue while such actually exists. 5 Rollo, pp. 107-108. 6 Rollo, p. 2. 7 G.R. No. L-48494, 181 SCRA 702 (1990). 8 G.R. No. 61594, 190 SCRA 90 (1990).

9 G.R. No. 82918, 195 SCRA 80 (1991). 10 Colegio San Agustin v. NLRC, et al., G.R. No. 87333, 201 SCRA 398 (1991). 11 Rollo, p. 74. 12 Rollo, p. 78. 13 De Vera, et al., v. NLRC, et al., G.R. No. 93212, 191 SCRA 632 (1990). 14 Section 34 of Republic Act No. 6715 provides: Article 279 of the Labor Code is hereby amended to read as follows: "Art. 279. Security of Tenure. In cases of regular employment, the employer shall not terminate the services of an employee except for just cause or when authorized by this Title. An employee who is unjustly dismissed from work shall be entitled to reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and other privileges and to his full backwages, inclusive of allowances, and to his other benefits or their monetary equivalent computed from the time his compensation was withheld from him up to the time of his actual reinstatement. (Emphasis supplied.) 15 Sealand Service, Inc. v. NLRC, G.R. No. 90500, 190 SCRA 347 (1990); Maranaw Hotels and Resorts Corporation v. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 103215, November 6, 1992; Arms Taxi and/or Dorothea Tanongon v. NLRC, et al., G.R. No. 104523, March 8, 1993. 16 In the case of Mercury Drug Co., Inc., et al., v. Court of Industrial Relations, et al., G.R. No. L-23357, 56 SCRA 694 (1974), this Court first found occasion to rule that an employee whose illegal termination had lasted some years was entitled to backwages for a fixed period without further qualifications, i.e., without need of taking into account whatever he might have earned during such period and deducting it from the amount to be recovered, in order to relieve the employee from proving his income during the period he was out of the service and the employer from submitting counter-proofs, which may delay the execution of the decision. The base period of three years was later considered just and reasonable and instituted in the case of Feati University Faculty Club (PAFLU) v. Feati University, et al., G.R. No. L-31503, 58 SCRA 395 (1974). 17 Itogon-Suyoc Mines, Inc. v. Sangilo-Itogon Workers' Union, et al., G.R. No. L24189, 24 SCRA 873 (1968). 18 Philippine Air Lines, Inc. v. Philippine Air Lines Employees Association, 108 Phil. 1129. 19 Itogon-Suyoc Mines, Inc. v. Sangilo-Itogon Workers' Union, et al., supra. 20 Rollo, p. 96. 21 Rollo, p. 99. 22 Ang Ping, et al. v. RTC of Manila, et al., G.R. No. 75860, 154 SCRA 77 (1987). 23 The Philippine Veterans Affairs Office v. Segundo, G.R. No. 51570, 164 SCRA 365 (1988).