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What Drives Fiscal Multipliers? The Role of Private Debt and Wealth
Sebastian Gechert Rafael Mentges
Agenda
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Motivation
Methods to identify discretionary scal policy shocks may be incomplete and thus may lead to wrong identications and biased results. For example: Cyclically Adjusted Primary Budget (CAPB) (Romer and Romer, 2010; Guajardo et al., 2011). Our hypothesis: Using the CAPB and other identication methods to estimate scal multipliers lead to downward biased multipliers due to the ignored inuence of private debt and wealth.
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Question
Issue Literature Review Theoretical Background Estimations Conclusions References
Do scal multiplier estimations entail a signicant omitted variable bias concerning credit and asset price cycles?
Method
Test the dierence of multiplier estimations when controlling / not controlling for credit and asset cycles Dynamic OLS and VAR
Data
US quarterly 1950:1-2012:4 and subsamples Work in Progress: Expansion to OECD country panel.
Agenda
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Well-known problems when trying to estimate multiplier eects Endogeneity or Identication Problem
International spillovers (Beetsma et al., 2006) Monetary policy regime (Woodford, 2011) Exchange rate regime (Corsetti et al., 2012) Public debt (Corsetti et al., 2012)
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Lagged or instrumented variables (Afonso et al., 2010) Cyclically adjusted primary balance (CAPB) (Alesina and Ardagna, 2010) SVAR methodology (Blanchard and Perotti, 2002) Natural experiments (Acconcia et al., 2011) Narrative/Action-based approach (Guajardo et al., 2011)
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Both an identication problem for some approaches... ...and an omitted variable bias for others
Agenda
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()
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What you would measure as fiscal policy effect if you ignore the asset / debt downswing
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CAPB is cyclically adjusted for automatic stabilisers but not asset/credit swing adjusted CAPB changes thus not necessarily exogenous scal decisions They may reect revenue changes due to higher/lower wealth or a credit boom/bust
Omitted Variable Bias
During a credit bust: private sector is debt deating During an asset price crash: negative wealth + condence eects GDP growth partly reects private sector demand slowdown due to credit/asset bust
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Consequences
Previous literature would be underestimating scal multipliers, especially in credit / asset crunch Austerity during credit / asset crunch would be more harmful than expected from this literature Controlling for credit / asset cycles may increase the measured inuence of scal stimulus
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Agenda
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yt = +
i =1
yt i +
i =0
fshockt i +
i =0
ctrlt i + t
(1)
US quarterly 1950:1 - 2012:4 y = growth rate of GDP or Private Consumption fshock = CAPB ctrl = growth rate of Dow Jones, S&P500, House Price Index, Household Debt
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1.4 1.2 1 0.8 0.6 0.4 0.2 0 -0.2 -0.4 -0.6 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 +dow jones error-band baseline error-band
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2.5 2 1.5 1 0.5 0 -0.5 -1 -1.5 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 +dow jones error-band baseline error-band
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yt =
i =1
yt i +
i =0
fshockt i + dt +
i =0
dt fshockt i + t (2)
US quarterly 1950:1 - 2010:4 y = growth rate of GDP or Private Consumption fshock = CAPB d = Reinhart and Rogo nancial crisis dummy
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Azt =
i =1
Bi zt i yt ct lrt xrt
(3) (4)
zt = gt
(ctrlt )
US quarterly 1983:1 - 2007:4 g = Govt Consumption ctrl = Dow Jones, S&P500, House Price Index, Household Debt y = GDP c = Private Consumption lr = Long run real interest rate xr = real exchange rate
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lr
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20
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-1 -2 0 5 10 15 20 25 0 5 10 15 20 25
lr
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20
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lr
-0.4 0 5 10 15 20 25
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CAPB multipliers sensitive to nancial crisis dummy CAPB multipliers sensitive to inclusion of stock market swings More pronounced and signicant since 1982 (larger swings) Results insignicant when controlling for Household Debt
SVAR identication
Results less clear cut when comparing scenarios However, higher multipliers with control, and signicantly dierent from zero
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Agenda
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Preliminary Conclusions
Estimating multipliers with CAPB identication is downward biased SVAR identication more robust (?)
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Include an Asset Price Gap concept (Bornhorst et al., 2011) Test moving averages of control variables to better capture persistence Panel data approach for debt variables Test further identication methods for similar problems ...
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Thank You
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Acconcia, A., G. Corsetti and S. Simonelli (2011), Maa and Public Spending: Evidence on the Fiscal Multiplier from a Quasi-experiment, CSEF working paper 281. Afonso, A., H. P. Grner and C. Kolerus (2010), Fiscal policy and growth: do nancial crises make a dierence?, European Central Bank working paper series 1217. Alesina, A. and S. Ardagna (2010), Large changes in scal policy: taxes versus spending, NBER/Tax Policy & the Economy 24(1), 3568. Beetsma, R., M. Giuliodori and F. Klaassen (2006), Trade spill-overs of scal policy in the European Union: a panel analysis, Economic Policy 41(48), 639687. Blanchard, O. and R. Perotti (2002), An Empirical Characterization of the Dynamic Eects of Changes in Government Spending and Taxes on Output, Quarterly Journal of Economics 117(4), 13291368. Bornhorst, F., G. Dobrescu, A. Fedelino, J. Gottschalk and T. Nakata (2011), When and How to Adjust Beyond the Business Cycle? A Guide to Structural Fiscal Balances, IMF Technical Notes and Manuals 11/02. Corsetti, G., A. Meier and G. J. Mller (2012), What Determines Government Spending Multipliers?, IMF Working Paper WP/12/150.
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Guajardo, J., D. Leigh and A. Pescatori (2011), Expansionary Austerity: New International Evidence, IMF Working Paper WP/11/158. Ramey, V. A. (2011), Identifying Government Spending Shocks: Its All in the Timing, Quarterly Journal of Economics 126(1), 150. Romer, C. D. and D. H. Romer (2010), The macroeconomic eects of tax changes: estimates based on a new measure of scal shocks, American Economic Review 100(3), 763801. Woodford, M. (2011), Simple Analytics of the Government Expenditure Multiplier, American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics 3(1), 135.
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