GLORIA SANTOS DUEAS, petitioner, vs.

SANTOS SUBDIVISION HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION, respondent Article 4 of the Civil Code provides that laws shall have no retroactive effect, unless the contrary is provided. Thus, it is necessary that an express provision for its retroactive application must be made in the law. There being no such provision in both P.D. Nos. 957 and 1344, these decrees cannot be applied to a situation that occurred years before their promulgation text of P.D. No. 1216 and nowhere do we find any clause or provision expressly providing for its retroactive application. Basic is the rule that no statute, decree, ordinance, rule or regulation shall be given retrospective effect unless explicitly stated. 31 Hence, there is no legal basis to hold that P.D. No. 1216 should apply retroactively. The records of the present case are bare of any showing by SSHA that it is an association duly organized under Philippine law. It was thus an error for the HLURB-NCR Office to give due course to the complaint in HLURB Case No. REM-070297-9821, given the SSHA's lack of capacity to sue in its own name. Nor was it proper for said agency to treat the complaint as a suit by all the parties who signed and verified the complaint. The members cannot represent their association in any suit without valid and legal authority. Neither can their signatures confer on the association any legal capacity to sue. Nor will the fact that SSHA belongs to the Federation of Valenzuela Homeowners Association, Inc., suffice to endow SSHA with the personality and capacity to sue. Mere allegations of membership in a federation are insufficient and inconsequential. The federation itself has a separate juridical personality and was not impleaded as a party in HLURB Case No. REM-070297-9821 nor in this case. Neither was it shown that the federation was authorized to represent SSHA. Facts showing the capacity of a party to sue or be sued or the authority of a party to sue or be sued in a representative capacity or the legal existence of an organized association of persons that is made a party, must be averred. 27 Hence, for failing to show that it is a juridical entity, endowed by law with capacity to bring suits in its own name, SSHA is devoid of any legal capacity, whatsoever, to institute any action. ERNESTINA BERNABE, petitioner, vs. CAROLINA ALEJO as guardian ad litem for the minor ADRIAN BERNABE, respondent. Adrian's right to an action for recognition, which was granted by Article 285 of the Civil Code, had already vested prior to the enactment of the Family Code. This vested right was not impaired or taken away by the passage of the Family Code. He has up to four years from attaining majority age within which to file an action for recognition. The Court's over-riding consideration is to protect the vested rights of minors who could not have filed suit, on their own, during the lifetime of their putative parents. Adrian was only seven years old when the Family Code took effect and

only twelve when his alleged father died in 1993. The minor must be given his day in court. SHOULD NOT IMPAIR VESTED OR ACQUIRED RIGHTS; CASE AT BAR. [T]he Family Code provides the caveat that rights that have already vested prior to its enactment should not be prejudiced or impaired as follows: "ART. 255. This Code shall have retroactive effect insofar as it does not prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws." . . . Article 285 of the Civil Code is a substantive law, as it gives Adrian the right to file his petition for recognition within four years from attaining majority age. Therefore, the Family Code cannot impair or take Adrian's right to file an action for recognition, because that right had already vested prior to its enactment. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. CLAUDE A. MILLER and JUMRUS S. MILLER, respondents. On July 29, 1988, spouses Claude A. Miller and Jumrus S. Miller, both American Citizens, filed with the R T C of Angeles City a verified petition to adopt the minor Michael Madayag. The D S W D recommended approval of the petition on the basis of its evaluation that respondents were morally, emotionally and financially fit to be adoptive parents and that the adoption would be to the minors best interest and welfare. On May 12, 1989, the trial court rendered decision granting the petition for adoption. In due time, the Solicitor General, in behalf of the Republic, interposed an appeal to the CA which certified the case to the Supreme Court on pure questions of law. The issue raised is whether the court may allow aliens to adopt a Filipino child despite the prohibition under the family code, effective August 3, 1988 when the petition for adoption was filed on July 29, 1988, under the provision of the Child and Youth Welfare Code which allowed aliens to adopt. The Supreme Court held that an alien qualified to adopt under the Child and Youth Welfare Code, which was in force at the time of the filing of the petition, acquired a vested right which could not be affected by the subsequent enactment of a new law disqualifying him. The enactment of the Family Code will not impair the right of the respondents who are aliens to adopt a Filipino child because the right has become vested at the time of filing of the petition for adoption and shall be governed by the law then in force. SYLLABUS 1. CIVIL LAW; ADOPTION; AN ALIEN QUALIFIED TO ADOPT UNDER CHILD AND YOUTH WELFARE CODE IN FORCE AT TIME OF PETITION ACQUIRED VESTED RIGHT AND CAN NOT BE AFFECTED BY SUBSEQUENT ENACTMENT OF A NEW LAW DISQUALIFYING HIM. -- An alien qualified to adopt under the Child and Youth Welfare Code, which was in force at the time of the filing of the petition, acquired a vested right which could not be affected by the subsequent enactment of a new law disqualifying him. Consequently, the enactment of the Family Code, effective August 3, 1988, will not impair the right of respondents who are aliens to adopt a Filipino child because the right has become vested at the time of filing of the petition for adoption and shall be governed by the law then in force.

ATIENZA, complainant, vs. JUDGE FRANCISCO F. BRILLANTES, JR., CIVIL LAW; FAMILY CODE; NULLITY OF PREVIOUS MARRIAGE MAY BE INVOKED FOR PURPOSES OF REMARRIAGE; REMARRIAGE MUST BE ENTERED ON OR AFTER AUGUST 3, 1988. Article 40 is applicable to remarriages entered into after the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988 regardless of the date of the first marriage. 2. ID.; ID.; APPLICATION OF LAWS; MAY BE GIVEN RETROACTIVE APPLICATION WHERE IT DOES NOT PREJUDICE OR IMPAIR VESTED RIGHTS. Under Article 256 of the Family Code, said Article is given "retroactive effect insofar as it does not prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws." This is particularly true with Article 40, which is a rule of procedure. Respondent has not shown any vested right that was impaired by the application of Article 40 to his case. 3. ID.; ID.; ID.; NOT PRECLUDED BY MERE ADVERSE EFFECT ON LITIGANTS' RIGHT; REASON. The fact that procedural statutes may somehow affect the litigants' rights may not preclude their retroactive application to pending actions. The retroactive application of procedural laws is not violative of any right of a person who may feel that he is adversely affected (Gregorio v. Court of Appeals, 26 SCRA 229 [1968]). The reason is that as a general rule no vested right may attach to, nor arise from, procedural laws (Billones v. Court of Industrial Relations, 14 SCRA 674 [1965]). LUPO ALMODIEL ATIENZA, complainant, vs. JUDGE FRANCISCO F. BRILLANTES, JR., Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 20, Manila, respondent. SYLLABUS 1. CIVIL LAW; FAMILY CODE; NULLITY OF PREVIOUS MARRIAGE MAY BE INVOKED FOR PURPOSES OF REMARRIAGE; REMARRIAGE MUST BE ENTERED ON OR AFTER AUGUST 3, 1988. Article 40 is applicable to remarriages entered into after the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988 regardless of the date of the first marriage. 2. ID.; ID.; APPLICATION OF LAWS; MAY BE GIVEN RETROACTIVE APPLICATION WHERE IT DOES NOT PREJUDICE OR IMPAIR VESTED RIGHTS. Under Article 256 of the Family Code, said Article is given "retroactive effect insofar as it does not prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws." This is particularly true with Article 40, which is a rule of procedure. Respondent has not shown any vested right that was impaired by the application of Article 40 to his case. 3. ID.; ID.; ID.; NOT PRECLUDED BY MERE ADVERSE EFFECT ON LITIGANTS' RIGHT; REASON. The fact that procedural statutes may somehow affect the litigants' rights may not

preclude their retroactive application to pending actions. The retroactive application of procedural laws is not violative of any right of a person who may feel that he is adversely affected (Gregorio v. Court of Appeals, 26 SCRA 229 [1968]). The reason is that as a general rule no vested right may attach to, nor arise from, procedural laws (Billones v. Court of Industrial Relations, 14 SCRA 674 [1965]). Article 40 is applicable to remarriages entered into after the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988 regardless of the date of the first marriage. Besides, under Article 256 of the Family Code, said Article is given "retroactive effect insofar as it does not prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws." This is particularly true with Article 40, which is a rule of procedure. Respondent has not shown any vested right that was impaired by the application of Article 40 to his case. Cdpr The fact that procedural statutes may somehow affect the litigants' rights may not preclude their retroactive application to pending actions. The retroactive application of procedural laws is not violative of any right of a person who may feel that he is adversely affected (Gregorio v. Court of Appeals, 26 SCRA 229 [1968]). The reason is that as a general rule no vested right may attach to, nor arise from, procedural laws (Billones v. Court of Industrial Relations, 14 SCRA 674 [1965]). OFELIA P. TY, petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS, and EDGARDO M. REYES, respondents. The principal issue is whether the decree of nullity of the first marriage is required before a subsequent marriage can be entered into validly the first marriage of private respondent being void for lack of license and consent, there was no need for judicial declaration of its nullity before he could contract a second marriage. The Court concluded that private respondent's second marriage to petitioner was valid. CIVIL LAW; CIVIL CODE; MARRIAGE; JUDICIAL DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF A VOID MARRIAGE; ABSENCE OF EXPRESS PROVISION THEREON RESULTED IN CONFLICTING JURISPRUDENCE. At the outset, we must note that private respondent's first and second marriages contracted in 1977 and 1979, respectively, are governed by the provisions of the Civil Code. The present case differs significantly from the recent cases of Bobis v. Bobis and Mercado v. Tan, both involving a criminal case for bigamy where the bigamous marriage was contracted during the effectivity of the Family Code, under which a judicial declaration of nullity of marriage is clearly required. As to whether a judicial declaration of nullity of a void marriage is necessary, the Civil Code contains no express provision to that effect. Jurisprudence on the matter, however, appears to be conflicting. Originally, in People v. Mendoza, and People v. Aragon, this Court held that no judicial

decree is necessary to establish the nullity of a void marriage. Both cases involved the same factual milieu. Accused contracted a second marriage during the subsistence of his first marriage. After the death of his first wife, accused contracted a third marriage during the subsistence of the second marriage. The second wife initiated a complaint for bigamy. The Court acquitted accused on the ground that the second marriage is void, having been contracted during the existence of the first marriage. There is no need for a judicial declaration that said second marriage is void. Since the second marriage is void, and the first one terminated by the death of his wife, there are no two subsisting valid marriages. Hence, there can be no bigamy. Justice Alex Reyes dissented in both cases, saying that it is not for the spouses but the court to judge whether a marriage is void or not. In Gomez v. Lipana, and Consuegra v. Consuegra, however, we recognized the right of the second wife who entered into the marriage in good faith, to share in their acquired estate and in proceeds of the retirement insurance of the husband. The Court observed that although the second marriage can be presumed to be void ab initio as it was celebrated while the first marriage was still subsisting, still there was a need for judicial declaration of such nullity (of the second marriage). And since the death of the husband supervened before such declaration, we upheld the right of the second wife to share in the estate they acquired, on grounds of justice and equity. But in Odayat v. Amante (1977), the Court adverted to Aragon and Mendoza as precedents. We exonerated a clerk of court of the charge of immorality on the ground that his marriage to Filomena Abella in October of 1948 was void, since she was already previously married to one Eliseo Portales in February of the same year. The Court held that no judicial decree is necessary to establish the invalidity of void marriages. This ruling was affirmed in Tolentino v. Paras. Yet again in Wiegel v. Sempio-Diy (1986), the Court held that there is a need for a judicial declaration of nullity of a void marriage. In Wiegel, Lilia married Maxion in 1972. In 1978, she married another man, Wiegel. Wiegel filed a petition with the Juvenile Domestic Relations Court to declare his marriage to Lilia as void on the ground of her previous valid marriage. The Court, expressly relying on Consuegra, concluded that: There is likewise no need of introducing evidence about the existing prior marriage of her first husband at the time they married each other, for then such a marriage though void still needs according to this Court a judicial declaration (citing Consuegra) of such fact and for all legal intents and purposes she would still be regarded as a married woman at the time she contracted her marriage with respondent Karl Heinz Wiegel; accordingly, the marriage of petitioner and respondent would be regarded VOID under the law. In Yap v. Court of Appeals, however, the Court found the second marriage void without need of judicial declaration, thus reverting to the Odayat, Mendoza and Aragon rulings. DTcACa 2. ID.; FAMILY CODE; MARRIAGE; JUDICIAL DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF MARRIAGE, EXPRESSLY REQUIRED; APPLICATION THEREOF. At any rate, the confusion under the Civil Code was put to rest under the Family Code. Our rulings in, Gomez,

Consuegra, and Wiegel were eventually embodied in Article 40 of the Family Code. Article 40 of said Code expressly required a judicial declaration of nullity of marriage. See Art. 40: The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void. In Terre v. Terre (1992) the Court, applying Gomez, Consuegra and Wiegel, categorically stated that a judicial declaration of nullity of a void marriage is necessary. Thus, we disbarred a lawyer for contracting a bigamous marriage during the subsistence of his first marriage. He claimed that his first marriage in 1977 was void since his first wife was already married in 1968. We held that Atty. Terre should have known that the prevailing case law is that "for purposes of determining whether a person is legally free to contract a second marriage, a judicial declaration that the first marriage was null and void ab initio is essential." The Court applied this ruling in subsequent cases. In Domingo v. Court of Appeals (1993), the Court held: Came the Family Code which settled once and for all the conflicting jurisprudence on the matter. A declaration of absolute nullity of marriage is now explicitly required either as a cause of action or a ground for defense. (Art. 39 of the Family Code). Where the absolute nullity of a previous marriage is sought to be invoked for purposes of contracting a second marriage, the sole basis acceptable in law for said projected marriage to be free from legal infirmity is a final judgment declaring the previous marriage void. 3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; WHEN NOT APPLICABLE; CASE AT BAR. However, a recent case applied the old rule because of the peculiar circumstances of the case. In Apiag v. Cantero, (1997) the first wife charged a municipal trial judge of immorality for entering into a second marriage. The judge claimed that his first marriage was void since he was merely forced into marrying his first wife whom he got pregnant. On the issue of nullity of the first marriage, we applied Odayat, Mendoza and Aragon. We held that since the second marriage took place and all the children thereunder were born before the promulgation of Wiegel and the effectivity of the Family Code, there is no need for a judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage pursuant to prevailing jurisprudence at that time. Similarly, in the present case, the second marriage of private respondent was entered into in 1979, before Wiegel. At that time, the prevailing rule was found in Odayat, Mendoza and Aragon. The first marriage of private respondent being void for lack of license and consent, there was no need for judicial declaration of its nullity before he could contract a second marriage. In this case, therefore, we conclude that private respondent's second marriage to petitioner is valid. TAacCE 4. ID.; ID.; ID.; PROVISIONS THEREOF HAS RETROACTIVE EFFECT; EXCEPTION; APPLICATION IN CASE AT BAR. Moreover, we find that the provisions of the Family Code cannot be retroactively applied to the present case, for to do so would prejudice the vested rights of petitioner and of her children. As

held in Jison v. Court of Appeals, the Family Code has retroactive effect unless there be impairment of vested rights. In the present case, that impairment of vested rights of petitioner and the children is patent. Additionally, we are not quite prepared to give assent to the appellate court's finding that despite private respondent's "deceit and perfidy" in contracting marriage with petitioner, he could benefit from her silence on the issue. ISIDRO ABLAZA, petitioner, vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent. Whether a person may bring an action for the declaration of the absolute nullity of the marriage of his deceased brother solemnized under the regime of the old Civil Code The petitioner alleged that the marriage between Cresenciano and Leonila had been celebrated without a marriage license, due to such license being issued only on January 9, 1950, thereby rendering the marriage void ab initio for having been solemnized without a marriage license to whether the petitioner is a real party in interest in the action to seek the declaration of nullity of the marriage of his deceased brother. , the validity of a marriage is tested according to the law in force at the time the marriage is contracted. 6 As a general rule, the nature of the marriage already celebrated cannot be changed by a subsequent amendment of the governing law To illustrate, a marriage between a stepbrother and a stepsister was void under the Civil Code, but is not anymore prohibited under the Family Code; yet, the intervening effectivity of the Family Code does not affect the void nature of a marriage between a stepbrother and a stepsister solemnized under the regime of the Civil Code. The Civil Code marriage remains void, considering that the validity of a marriage is governed by the law in force at the time of the marriage ceremony. 8 CTSAaH Before anything more, the Court has to clarify the impact to the issue posed herein of Administrative Matter (A.M.) No. 02-11-10SC (Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages), which took effect on March 15, 2003. Section 2, paragraph (a), of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC explicitly provides the limitation that a petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed solely by the husband or wife. Such limitation demarcates a line to distinguish between marriages covered by the Family Code and those solemnized under the regime of the Civil Code. 9 Specifically, A.M. No. 02-1110-SC extends only to marriages covered by the Family Code, which took effect on August 3, 1988, but, being a procedural rule that is prospective in application, is confined only to proceedings commenced after March 15, 2003. 10

Based on Carlos v. Sandoval, 11 the following actions for declaration of absolute nullity of a marriage are excepted from the limitation, to wit: 1. Those commenced before March 15, 2003, the effectivity date of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC; and 2. Those filed vis--vis marriages celebrated during the effectivity of the Civil Code and, those celebrated under the regime of the Family Code prior to March 15, 2003. Considering that the marriage between Cresenciano and Leonila was contracted on December 26, 1949, the applicable law was the old Civil Code, the law in effect at the time of the celebration of the marriage. Hence, the rule on the exclusivity of the parties to the marriage as having the right to initiate the action for declaration of nullity of the marriage under A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC had absolutely no application to the petitioner. SHCaDA The old and new Civil Codes contain no provision on who can file a petition to declare the nullity of a marriage, and when Here, the petitioner alleged himself to be the late Cresenciano's brother and surviving heir. Assuming that the petitioner was as he claimed himself to be, then he has a material interest in the estate of Cresenciano that will be adversely affected by any judgment in the suit. Indeed, a brother like the petitioner, albeit not a compulsory heir under the laws of succession, has the right to succeed to the estate of a deceased brother under the conditions stated in Article 1001 and Article 1003 of the Civil Code, as follows: Article 1001. Should brothers and sisters or their children survive with the widow or widower, the latter shall be entitled to one half of the inheritance and the brothers and sisters or their children to the other half. Article 1003. If there are no descendants, ascendants, illegitimate children, or a surviving spouse, the collateral relatives shall succeed to the entire estate of the deceased in accordance with the following articles. BENJAMIN G. TING, petitioner, vs. CARMEN M. VELEZ-TING, respondent. On the issue of stare decisis. The principle of stare decisis enjoins adherence by lower courts to doctrinal rules established by this Court in its final decisions. It is based on the principle that once a question of law has been examined and decided, it should be deemed settled and closed to further argument. 49 Basically, it is a bar to any attempt to relitigate the same issues, 50 necessary for two simple reasons: economy and stability. In our jurisdiction, the principle is entrenched in Article 8 of the Civil Code. 51

The latin phrase stare decisis et non quieta movere means "stand by the thing and do not disturb the calm." In general, courts follow the stare decisis rule for an ensemble of reasons, viz.: (1) it legitimizes judicial institutions; (2) it promotes judicial economy; and, (3) it allows for predictability. Contrariwise, courts refuse to be bound by the stare decisis rule where (1) its application perpetuates illegitimate and unconstitutional holdings; (2) it cannot accommodate changing social and political understandings; (3) it leaves the power to overturn bad constitutional law solely in the hands of Congress; and, (4) activist judges can dictate the policy for future courts while judges that respect stare decisis are stuck agreeing with them. To be forthright, respondent's argument that the doctrinal guidelines prescribed in Santos and Molina should not be applied retroactively for being contrary to the principle of stare decisis is no longer new. The same argument was also raised but was struck down in Pesca v. Pesca, 54 and again in Antonio v. Reyes. 55 In these cases, we explained that the interpretation or construction of a law by courts constitutes a part of the law as of the date the statute is enacted. It is only when a prior ruling of this Court is overruled, and a different view is adopted, that the new doctrine may have to be applied prospectively in favor of parties who have relied on the old doctrine and have acted in good faith, in accordance therewith under the familiar rule of "lex prospicit, non respicit". ASJ CORPORATION and ANTONIO SAN JUAN, petitioners, vs. SPS. EFREN & MAURA EVANGELISTA THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT PETITIONERS HAVE VIOLATED THE PRINCIPLES ENUNCIATED IN ART. 19 OF THE NEW CIVIL CODE AND CONSEQUENTLY IN AWARDING MORAL DAMAGES, EXEMPLARY DAMAGES AND ATTORNEY'S FEES. Nonetheless, San Juan's subsequent acts of threatening respondents should not remain among those treated with impunity. Under Article 19 31 of the Civil Code, an act constitutes an abuse of right if the following elements are present: (a) the existence of a legal right or duty; (b) which is exercised in bad faith; and (c) for the sole intent of prejudicing or injuring another. 32 Here, while petitioners had the right to withhold delivery, the high-handed and oppressive acts of petitioners, as aptly found by the two courts below, had no legal leg to stand on. We need not weigh the corresponding pieces of evidence all over again because factual findings of the trial court, when adopted and confirmed by the appellate court, are binding and conclusive and will not be disturbed on appeal. 33 EcSCAD Since it was established that respondents suffered some pecuniary loss anchored on petitioners' abuse of rights, although the exact amount of actual damages cannot be ascertained, temperate damages are recoverable

As enshrined in civil law jurisprudence: Honeste vivere, non alterum laedere et jus suum cuique tribuere. To live virtuously, not to injure others and to give everyone his due. 35 Since exemplary damages are awarded, attorney's fees are also proper. UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. PHILAB INDUSTRIES, INC., respondent. Supreme Court ruled that an implied-in-fact contract of sale was entered into between the respondent and FEMF. A contract implied in fact is one implied from facts and circumstances showing a mutual intention to contract. In this case, the respondent was aware from the start that the FEMF was to pay for the laboratory furniture. The respondent knew that the petitioner was merely the donee-beneficiary of the laboratory furniture and not the buyer; nor was it liable for the payment of the purchase price thereof. From the inception, the FEMF paid for the bills and statement of accounts of the respondent, for which the latter unconditionally issued receipts to and under the name of FEMF. Thus, the respondent is not entitled to its claim against the petitioner. The Court, however, ruled that respondent has a remedy against FEMF via an action based on an implied-in-fact contract with the FEMF for the payment of its claim. UNJUST ENRICHMENT CLAIMS; WHEN TO PROSPER. Unjust enrichment claims do not lie simply because one party benefits from the efforts or obligations of others, but instead it must be shown that a party was unjustly enriched in the sense that the term unjustly could mean illegally or unlawfully. Moreover, to substantiate a claim for unjust enrichment, the claimant must unequivocally prove that another party knowingly received something of value to which he was not entitled and that the state of affairs are such that it would be unjust for the person to keep the benefit. Unjust enrichment is a term used to depict result or effect of failure to make remuneration of or for property or benefits received under circumstances that give rise to legal or equitable obligation to account for them; to be entitled to remuneration, one must confer benefit by mistake, fraud, coercion, or request. Unjust enrichment is not itself a theory of reconvey. Rather, it is a prerequisite for the enforcement of the doctrine of restitution. LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. ALFREDO ONG, respondent. We rule that Land Bank is still liable for the return of the PhP750,000 based on the principle of unjust enrichment. Land Bank is correct in arguing that it has no obligation as creditor to recognize Alfredo as a person with interest in the fulfillment of the obligation. But while Land Bank is not bound to accept the substitution of debtors in the subject real estate mortgage, it is estopped by its action of accepting Alfredo's payment from arguing that it does not have to recognize Alfredo as the new debtor

We turn then on the principle upon which Land Bank must return Alfredo's payment. Unjust enrichment exists "when a person unjustly retains a benefit to the loss of another, or when a person retains money or property of another against the fundamental principles of justice, equity and good conscience." 18 There is unjust enrichment under Art. 22 of the Civil Code when (1) a person is unjustly benefited, and (2) such benefit is derived at the expense of or with damages to another. 19 Additionally, unjust enrichment has been applied to actions called accion in rem verso. In order that the accion in rem verso may prosper, the following conditions must concur: (1) that the defendant has been enriched; (2) that the plaintiff has suffered a loss; (3) that the enrichment of the defendant is without just or legal ground; and (4) that the plaintiff has no other action based on contract, quasi-contract, crime, or quasi-delict. 20 The principle of unjust enrichment essentially contemplates payment when there is no duty to pay, and the person who receives the payment has no right to receive it. ERLINDA K. ILUSORIO, petitioner, vs. ERLINDA I. BILDNER and SYLVIA K. ILUSORIO This Court ruled that the evidence showed that there was no actual and effective detention or deprivation of lawyer Potenciano Ilusorio's liberty that would justify the issuance of the writ. The fact that lawyer Potenciano Ilusorio is about 86 years of age, or under medication, does not necessarily render him mentally incapacitated. Soundness of mind does not hinge on age or medical condition but on the capacity of the individual to discern his actions. Being of sound mind, he is thus possessed with the capacity to make choices. In this case, the crucial choices revolve on his residence and the people he opts to see or live with. With his full mental capacity coupled with the right of choice, Potenciano Ilusorio may not be the subject of visitation rights against his free choice. Otherwise, he will be deprived of his right to privacy. Needless to say, this will run against his fundamental constitutional right. Finally, no court is empowered as a judicial authority to compel a husband to live with his wife. Coverture cannot be enforced by compulsion of a writ of habeas corpus carried out by sheriffs or by any other mesne process. That is a matter beyond judicial authority and is best left to the man and woman's free choice. CIVIL LAW; FAMILY CODE; MARITAL RIGHTS; AWARD OF VISITATION RIGHTS TO A WIFE IS A VIOLATION OF RIGHT TO PRIVACY OF A SANE HUSBAND. With his full mental capacity coupled with the right of choice, Potenciano Ilusorio may not be the subject of visitation rights against his free choice. Otherwise, we will deprive him of his right to privacy. Needless to say, this will run against his fundamental constitutional right. The Court of Appeals exceeded its authority when it awarded visitation rights in a petition for habeas corpus where Erlinda never even prayed for such right. The ruling is not consistent with the finding of subject's sanity.

CIVIL LAW; FAMILY CODE; MARRIAGE; MARITAL OBLIGATIONS. The law provides that the husband and the wife are obliged to live together, observe mutual love, respect and fidelity. The sanction therefor is the "spontaneous, mutual affection between husband and wife and not any legal mandate or court order" to enforce consortium. 3. ID.; ID.; ID.; MARITAL UNION IS A TWO-WAY PROCESS. Obviously, there was absence of empathy between spouses Erlinda and Potenciano, having separated from bed and board since 1972. We defined empathy as a shared feeling between husband and wife experienced not only by having spontaneous sexual intimacy but a deep sense of spiritual communion. Marital union is a two-way process. Marriage is definitely for two loving adults who view the relationship with "amor gignit amorem" respect, sacrifice and a continuing commitment to togetherness, conscious of its value as a sublime social institution. MARIA REBECCA MAKAPUGAY BAYOT, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and VICENTE MADRIGAL BAYOT Three legal premises need to be underscored at the outset. First, a divorce obtained abroad by an alien married to a Philippine national may be recognized in the Philippines, provided the decree of divorce is valid according to the national law of the foreigner. 31 Second, the reckoning point is not the citizenship of the divorcing parties at birth or at the time of marriage, but their citizenship at the time a valid divorce is obtained abroad. And third, an absolute divorce secured by a Filipino married to another Filipino is contrary to our concept of public policy and morality and shall not be recognized in this jurisdiction. 32 Given the foregoing perspective, the determinative issue tendered in G.R. No. 155635, i.e., the propriety of the granting of the motion to dismiss by the appellate court, resolves itself into the questions of: first, whether petitioner Rebecca was a Filipino citizen at the time the divorce judgment was rendered in the Dominican Republic on February 22, 1996; and second, whether the judgment of divorce is valid and, if so, what are its consequent legal effects? Rebecca an American Citizen in the Purview of This Case There can be no serious dispute that Rebecca, at the time she applied for and obtained her divorce from Vicente, was an American citizen and remains to be one, absent proof of an effective repudiation of such citizenship. The following are compelling circumstances indicative of her American citizenship: (1) she was born in Agaa, Guam, USA; (2) the principle of jus soli is followed in this American territory granting American citizenship to those who are born there; and (3) she was, and may still be, a holder of an American passport. LUCIO MORIGO y CACHO, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent

CRIMINAL LAW; BIGAMY; ELEMENTS. In Marbella-Bobis v. Bobis, we laid down the elements of bigamy thus: (1) the offender has been legally married; (2) the first marriage has not been legally dissolved, or in case his or her spouse is absent, the absent spouse has not been judicially declared presumptively dead; (3) he contracts a subsequent marriage; and (4) the subsequent marriage would have been valid had it not been for the existence of the first. HCTAEc 2. ID.; ID.; ID.; THAT ACCUSED MUST HAVE BEEN LEGALLY MARRIED, NOT PRESENT IN CASE AT BAR. The first element of bigamy as a crime requires that the accused must have been legally married. But in this case, legally speaking, the petitioner was never married to Lucia Barrete. Thus, there is no first marriage to speak of. Under the principle of retroactivity of a marriage being declared void ab initio, the two were never married "from the beginning". The contract of marriage is null; it bears no legal effect. Taking this argument to its logical conclusion, for legal purposes, petitioner was not married to Lucia at the time he contracted the marriage with Maria Jececha. The existence and the validity of the first marriage being an essential element of the crime of bigamy, it is but logical that a conviction for said offense cannot be sustained where there is no first marriage to speak of. The petitioner, must, perforce be acquitted of the instant charge. RESTITUTO M. ALCANTARA, petitioner, vs. ROSITA A. ALCANTARA and HON. COURT OF APPEALS, respondents. to be considered void on the ground of absence of a marriage license, the law requires that the absence of such marriage license must be apparent on the marriage contract, or at the very least, supported by a certification from the local civil registrar that no such marriage license was issued to the parties. In this case, the marriage contract between the petitioner and respondent reflects a marriage license number. A certification to this effect was also issued by the local civil registrar of Carmona, Cavite. 25 The certification moreover is precise in that it specifically identified the parties to whom the marriage license was issued, namely Restituto Alcantara and Rosita Almario, further validating the fact that a license was in fact issued to the parties herein. The certification of Municipal Civil Registrar Macrino L. Diaz of Carmona, Cavite, reads: This is to certify that as per the registry Records of Marriage filed in this office, Marriage License No. 7054133 was issued in favor of Mr. Restituto Alcantara and Miss Rosita Almario on December 8, 1982. This Certification is being issued upon the request of Mrs. Rosita A. Alcantara for whatever legal purpose or intents it may serve. 26 SACTIH This certification enjoys the presumption that official duty has been regularly performed and the issuance of the marriage

license was done in the regular conduct of official business. 27 The presumption of regularity of official acts may be rebutted by affirmative evidence of irregularity or failure to perform a duty. However, the presumption prevails until it is overcome by no less than clear and convincing evidence to the contrary. Thus, unless the presumption is rebutted, it becomes conclusive. Every reasonable intendment will be made in support of the presumption and, in case of doubt as to an officer's act being lawful or unlawful, construction should be in favor of its lawfulness. 28 Significantly, apart from these, petitioner, by counsel, admitted that a marriage license was, indeed, issued in Carmona, Cavite. The logical conclusion is that petitioner was amenable and a willing participant to all that took place at that time. Obviously, the church ceremony was confirmatory of their civil marriage, thereby cleansing whatever irregularity or defect attended the civil wedding. solemnizing officer is not duty-bound to investigate whether or not a marriage license has been duly and regularly issued by the local civil registrar. All the solemnizing officer needs to know is that the license has been issued by the competent official, and it may be presumed from the issuance of the license that said official has fulfilled the duty to ascertain whether the contracting parties had fulfilled the requirements of law. 38 DcITHE Semper praesumitur pro matrimonio. The presumption is always in favor of the validity of the marriage. 39 Every intendment of the law or fact leans toward the validity of the marriage bonds. The Courts look upon this presumption with great favor. It is not to be lightly repelled; on the contrary, the presumption is of great weight. FILIPINA Y. SY, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, THE HONORABLE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, SAN FERNANDO, PAMPANGA, BRANCH XLI, and FERNANDO SY, respondents. Filipina Sy filed a petition for legal separation. The action was later amended to a petition for separation of property on the ground that her husband, Fernando Sy, abandoned her without just cause. Judgment was rendered dissolving the conjugal partnership of gains and the court approved a regime of separation of properties based on the Memorandum of Agreement executed by the spouses In 1992, Filipina filed a petition for the declaration of absolute nullity of her marriage to her husband Fernando on the ground of psychological incapacity. The Regional Trial Court denied the petition. It stated that the alleged acts of the respondent as cited by petitioner do not constitute psychological incapacity A marriage license is a formal requirement, the absence of which renders the marriage void ab initio. Hence, the Court concluded

that the marriage between the petitioner and private respondent was void from the beginning. The issue on psychological incapacity of private respondent was mooted by the conclusion that the marriage was void ab initio for lack of marriage license at the time the marriage was solemnized. CIVIL LAW; MARRIAGE; CONTRACTED WITHOUT A MARRIAGE LICENSE; DEEMED VOID FROM THE BEGINNING; CASE AT BAR. Carefully reviewing the documents and the pleadings on record, the Court finds that indeed petitioner did not expressly state in her petition before the trial court that there was incongruity between the date of the actual celebration of their marriage and the date of the issuance of their marriage license. From the documents she presented, the marriage license was issued on September 17, 1974, almost one year after the ceremony took place on November 15, 1973. The ineluctable conclusion is that the marriage was indeed contracted without a marriage license. Article 80 of the Civil Code is clearly applicable in this case. There being no claim of an exceptional character, the purported marriage between petitioner and private respondent could not be classified among those enumerated in Articles 72-79 of the Civil Code. The Court thus concludes that under Article 80 of the Civil Code, the marriage between petitioner and private respondent is void from the beginning. SUSAN NICDAO CARIO, petitioner, vs. SUSAN YEE CARIO, respondent. Article 148 of the Civil Code governs the property regime of bigamous marriages. Only the properties acquired by the parties through their actual joint contribution of money, property, or industry shall be owned by them in common in proportion to their respective contributions. While union of parties who are legally capacitated and not barred by any impediment to contract marriage is governed by co-ownership under Article 147 of the Civil Code. Thus, the P146,000 from MBAI, PCCUI, commutation, NAPOLCOM and Pag-Ibig earned by the deceased, in the absence of evidence that respondent contributed money, property or industry in the acquisition of these monetary benefits, is owned by the deceased alone and respondent has no right whatsoever to claim the same. However, petitioner is entitled to one-half of the subject "death benefits" as her share in the property regime and the other half shall pass by to petitioner's children as the decedent's legal heirs. CIVIL LAW; FAMILY CODE; MARRIAGE; FINAL JUDGMENT DECLARING PREVIOUS MARRIAGE VOID, NECESSARY FOR PURPOSES OF SECOND MARRIAGE. Under Article 40 of the Family Code, the absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void. Meaning, where the absolute nullity of a previous marriage is sought to be invoked for purposes of contracting a second marriage, the sole basis acceptable in law, for said projected marriage to be free from legal infirmity, is a final judgment declaring the previous marriage

void. However, for purposes other than remarriage, no judicial action is necessary to declare a marriage an absolute nullity. For other purposes, such as but not limited to the determination of heirship, legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child, settlement of estate, dissolution of property regime, or a criminal case for that matter, the court may pass upon the validity of marriage even after the death of the parties thereto, and even in a suit not directly instituted to question the validity of said marriage, so long as it is essential to the determination of the case. In such instances, evidence must be adduced, testimonial or documentary, to prove the existence of grounds rendering such a previous marriage an absolute nullity. These need not be limited solely to an earlier final judgment of a court declaring such previous marriage void. DaAETS 2. ID.; PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS; MARRIAGE; LICENSE, REQUIRED; CASE AT BAR. Under the Civil Code, which was the law in force when the marriage of petitioner Susan Nicdao and the deceased was solemnized in 1969, a valid marriage license is a requisite of marriage, and the absence thereof, subject to certain exceptions, renders the marriage void ab initio. In the case at bar, there is no question that the marriage of petitioner and the deceased does not fall within the marriages exempt from the license requirement. A marriage license, therefore, was indispensable to the validity of their marriage. This notwithstanding, the records reveal that the marriage contract of petitioner and the deceased bears no marriage license number and, as certified by the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan, Metro Manila, their office has no record of such marriage license. It is beyond cavil, therefore, that the marriage between petitioner Susan Nicdao and the deceased, having been solemnized without the necessary marriage license, and not being one of the marriages exempt from the marriage license requirement, is undoubtedly void ab initio. 3. ID.; FAMILY CODE; FINAL JUDGMENT DECLARING PREVIOUS MARRIAGE VOID, NECESSARY FOR PURPOSES OF SECOND MARRIAGE; WITHOUT SUCH DECLARATION, SECOND MARRIAGE IS ALSO VOID. Accordingly, the declaration in the instant case of nullity of the previous marriage of the deceased and petitioner Susan Nicdao does not validate the second marriage of the deceased with respondent Susan Yee. The fact remains that their marriage was solemnized without first obtaining a judicial decree declaring the marriage of petitioner Susan Nicdao and the deceased void. Hence, the marriage of respondent Susan Yee and the deceased is, likewise, void ab initio. SCaITA 4. ID.; ID.; BIGAMOUS MARRIAGE; WAGES AND SALARIES EARNED BY EACH PARTY BELONG TO HIM OR HER EXCLUSIVELY. Under Article 148 of the Family Code, which refers to the property regime of bigamous marriages, adulterous relationships, relationships in a state of concubine, relationships where both man and woman are married to other persons, multiple alliances

of the same married man, the properties acquired by the parties through their actual joint contribution shall belong to the coownership. Wages and salaries earned by each party belong to him or her exclusively. Then too, contributions in the form of care of the home, children and household, or spiritual or moral inspiration, are excluded in this regime. 5. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; CASE AT BAR. Considering that the marriage of respondent Susan Yee and the deceased is a bigamous marriage, having been solemnized during the subsistence of a previous marriage then presumed to be valid (between petitioner and the deceased), the application of Article 148 is therefore in order. The disputed P146,000.00 from MBAI [AFP Mutual Benefit Association, Inc.], NAPOLCOM, Commutation, Pag-ibig, and PCCUI, are clearly remunerations, incentives and benefits from governmental agencies earned by the deceased as a police officer. Unless respondent Susan Yee presents proof to the contrary, it could not be said that she contributed money, property or industry in the acquisition of these monetary benefits. Hence, they are not owned in common by respondent and the deceased, but belong to the deceased alone and respondent has no right whatsoever to claim the same. By intestate succession, the said "death benefits" of the deceased shall pass to his legal heirs. And, respondent, not being the legal wife of the deceased is not one of them. 6. ID.; ID.; VOID MARRIAGES OF PARTIES LEGALLY CAPACITATED AND NOT BARRED BY ANY IMPEDIMENT; PROPERTY RELATIONSHIP GOVERNED BY CO-OWNERSHIP; CASE AT BAR. As to the property regime of petitioner Susan Nicdao and the deceased, Article 147 of the Family Code governs. This article applies to unions of parties who are legally capacitated and not barred by any impediment to contract marriage, but whose marriage is nonetheless void for other reasons, like the absence of a marriage license. In contrast to Article 148, under the foregoing article, wages and salaries earned by either party during the cohabitation shall be owned by the parties in equal shares and will be divided equally between them, even if only one party earned the wages and the other did not contribute thereto. Conformably, even if the disputed "death benefits" were earned by the deceased alone as a government employee, Article 147 creates a co-ownership in respect thereto, entitling the petitioner to share one-half thereof. As there is no allegation of bad faith in the present case, both parties of the first marriage are presumed to be in good faith. Thus, one-half of the subject "death benefits" under scrutiny shall go to the petitioner as her share in the property regime, and the other half pertaining to the deceased shall pass by, intestate succession, to his legal heirs, namely, his children with Susan Nicdao.

SULTAN PANDAGARANAO A. ILUPA- versus -MACALINOG S. ABDULLAH, Evidently, respondent Clerk of Court merely performed his ministerial duty in accordance with the foregoing provisions. The alleged erroneous entries on the Certificate of Divorce cannot be attributed to respondent Clerk of Court considering that it is only his duty to receive, file and register the certificate of divorce presented to him for registration. Further, even if there were indeed erroneous entries on the certificate of divorce, such errors cannot be corrected nor cancelled through [his] administrative complaint.

Anent the legality of the divorce of the complainant and Dr. Nella Rocaya Mikunug-Ilupa, this Office is bereft of any authority to rule on the matter. The issue is judicial in nature which cannot be assailed through this administrative proceeding. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. CIPRIANO ORBECIDO III, respondent. CIVIL LAW; FAMILY CODE; PARAGRAPH 2, ARTICLE 26; APPLICATION; FILIPINO SPOUSE SHOULD ALSO BE ALLOWED TO REMARRY IF ALIEN SPOUSE OBTAINS A DIVORCE. Taking into consideration the legislative intent and applying the rule of reason, we hold that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 should be interpreted to include cases involving parties who, at the time of the celebration of the marriage were Filipino citizens, but later on, one of them becomes naturalized as a foreign citizen and obtains as divorce decree. The Filipino spouse should likewise be allowed to remarry as if the other party were a foreigner at the time of the solemnization of the marriage. To rule otherwise would be to sanction absurdity and injustice. DaIAcC 3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ELEMENTS. We state the twin elements for the application of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 as follows: 1. There is a valid marriage that has been celebrated between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner, and 2. A valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry. 4. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; RECKONING POINT IS THE CITIZENSHIP OF THE PARTIES WHEN DIVORCE IS OBTAINED ABROAD BY ALIEN SPOUSE CAPACITATING THE LATTER TO REMARRY; CASE AT BAR. The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at the time of the celebration of the marriage, but their citizenship at the time a valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating the latter to remarry. In this case, when Cipriano's wife was naturalized as an American citizen, there was still a valid marriage that has been celebrated between her and Cipriano. As fate would have it, the naturalized alien wife subsequently obtained a valid divorce capacitating her to remarry. Clearly, the twin requisites for the application of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 are

both present in this case. Thus Cipriano, the "divorced" Filipino spouse, should be allowed to remarry. we hold that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 should be interpreted to include cases involving parties who, at the time of the celebration of the marriage were Filipino citizens, but later on, one of them becomes naturalized as a foreign citizen and obtains a divorce decree. The Filipino spouse should likewise be allowed to remarry as if the other party were a foreigner at the time of the solemnization of the marriage. To rule otherwise would be to sanction absurdity and injustice In view of the foregoing, we state the twin elements for the application of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 as follows: 1. There is a valid marriage that has been celebrated between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner; and 2. A valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry. The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at the time of the celebration of the marriage, but their citizenship at the time a valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating the latter to remarry. However, we note that the records are bereft of competent evidence duly submitted by respondent concerning the divorce decree and the naturalization of respondent's wife. It is settled rule that one who alleges a fact has the burden of proving it and mere allegation is not evidence. 13 Accordingly, for his plea to prosper, respondent herein must prove his allegation that his wife was naturalized as an American citizen. Likewise, before a foreign divorce decree can be recognized by our own courts, the party pleading it must prove the divorce as a fact and demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law allowing it considering that in the present petition there is no sufficient evidence submitted and on record, we are unable to declare, based on respondent's bare allegations that his wife, who was naturalized as an American citizen, had obtained a divorce decree and had remarried an American, that respondent is now capacitated to remarry. Such declaration could only be made properly upon respondent's submission of the aforecited evidence in his favor. GERBERT R. CORPUZ, Petitioner, vs. DAISYLYN TIROL STO. TOMAS and The SOLICITOR GENERAL, Respondents. Petitioner Gerbert R. Corpuz was a former Filipino citizen who acquired Canadian citizenship through naturalization on

November 29, 2000. On January 18, 2005, Gerbert married respondent Daisylyn whether the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code extends to aliens the right to petition a court of this jurisdiction for the recognition of a foreign divorce decree. The foreign divorce decree is presumptive evidence of a right that clothes the party with legal interest to petition for its recognition in this jurisdiction The foreign divorce decree itself, after its authenticity and conformity with the aliens national law have been duly proven according to our rules of evidence, serves as a presumptive evidence of right in favor of Gerber SEC. 48. Effect of foreign judgments or final orders.The effect of a judgment or final order of a tribunal of a foreign country, having jurisdiction to render the judgment or final order is as follows: (a) In case of a judgment or final order upon a specific thing, the judgment or final order is conclusive upon the title of the thing; and (b) In case of a judgment or final order against a person, the judgment or final order is presumptive evidence of a right as between the parties and their successors in interest by a subsequent title. divorce obtained by an alien abroad may be recognized in the Philippines, provided the divorce is valid according to his or her 27 national law. In Gerberts case, since both the foreign divorce decree and the national law of the alien, recognizing his or her capacity to obtain a divorce, purport to be official acts of a sovereign authority, Section 24, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court comes into play. This Section requires proof, either by (1) official publications or (2) copies attested by the officer having legal custody of the documents. If the copies of official records are not kept in the Philippines, these must be (a) accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine foreign service stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept and (b) authenticated by the seal of his office. ROSALINO L. MARABLE, Petitioner, vs. MYRNA F. MARABLE, Respondent. The appeal has no merit. The appellate court did not err when it reversed and set aside the findings of the RTC for lack of legal and factual bases. Article 36 of the Family Code, as amended, provides: Art. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void

even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization. The term "psychological incapacity" to be a ground for the nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code, refers to a serious psychological illness afflicting a party even before the 11 celebration of the marriage. These are the disorders that result in the utter insensitivity or inability of the afflicted party to give meaning and significance to the marriage he or she has 12 contracted. Psychological incapacity must refer to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly 13 must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage. In Republic v. Court of Appeals, the Court laid down the guidelines in the interpretation and application of Article 36. The Court held, (1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity. (2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be: (a) medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision. (3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the celebration" of the marriage. (4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. (5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential obligations of marriage.1avvphi1 (6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their children. (7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts. (8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a certification, which will be quoted in the decision, briefly stating therein his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to the petition. In the instant case, petitioner completely relied on the psychological examination conducted by Dr. Tayag on him to establish his psychological incapacity. The result of the
14

examination and the findings of Dr. Tayag however, are insufficient to establish petitioner's psychological incapacity. In cases of annulment of marriage based on Article 36 of the Family Code, as amended, the psychological illness and its root cause must be proven to exist from the inception of the marriage. Here, the appellate court correctly ruled that the report of Dr. Tayag failed to explain the root cause of petitioners alleged psychological incapacity. The evaluation of Dr. Tayag merely made a general conclusion that petitioner is suffering from an Antisocial Personality Disorder but there was no factual basis stated for the finding that petitioner is a socially deviant person, rebellious, impulsive, self-centered and deceitful. As held in the case of Suazo v. Suazo, the presentation of expert proof in cases for declaration of nullity of marriage based on psychological incapacity presupposes a thorough and an in-depth assessment of the parties by the psychologist or expert, for a conclusive diagnosis of a grave, severe and incurable presence of psychological incapacity. Here, the evaluation of Dr. Tayag falls short of the required proof which the Court can rely on as basis to declare as void petitioners marriage to respondent. JOSE REYNALDO B. OCHOSA, Petitioner,- versus BONA J. ALANO and REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES whether or not Bona should be deemed psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations. The petition is without merit. The petition for declaration of nullity of marriage which Jose filed in the trial court hinges on Article 36 of the Family Code, to wit: A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization. In the landmark case of Santos v. Court of Appeals, we observed that psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability. The incapacity must be grave or serious such that the party would be incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties required in marriage; it must be rooted in the history of the party antedating the marriage, although the overt manifestations may emerge only after marriage; and it must be incurable or, even if it were otherwise, the cure would be beyond the means of the party involved. Republic v. Court of Appeals and Molina the following guidelines in the interpretation and application of Article 36 of the Family Code:
[8] [7] 15

(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in the fact that both our Constitution and our laws cherish the validity of marriage and unity of the family. Thus, our Constitution devotes an entire Article on the Family, recognizing it as the foundation of the nation. It decrees marriage as legally inviolable, thereby protecting it from dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both the family and marriage are to be protected by the state. The Family Code echoes this constitutional edict on marriage and the family and emphasizes their permanence, inviolability and solidarity. (2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity must be psychological not physical, although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. The evidence must convince the court that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or physically ill to such an extent that the person could not have known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid assumption thereof. Although no example of such incapacity need be given here so as not to limit the application of the provision under the principle ofejusdem generis, nevertheless such root cause must be identified as a psychological illness and its incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert evidence may be given by qualified psychiatrists and clinical psychologists. (3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at the time of the celebration of the marriage. The evidence must show that the illness was existing when the parties exchanged their I dos. The manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable at such time, but the illness itself

must have attached at such moment, or prior thereto. (4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to the assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to those not related to marriage, like the exercise of a profession or employment in a job. Hence, a pediatrician may be effective in diagnosing illnesses of children and prescribing medicine to cure them but may not be psychologically capacitated to procreate, bear and raise his/her own children as an essential obligation of marriage. (5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential obligations of marriage. Thus, mild characteriological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional outburst cannot be accepted as root causes. The illness must be shown as downright incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In other words, there is a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral element in the personality structure that effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting and thereby complying with the obligations essential to marriage. (6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Article 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven by evidence and included in the text of the decision. (7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts. It is clear that Article 36 was taken by the Family Code Revision Committee from Canon 1095 of the New Code

of Canon Law, which became effective in 1983 and which provides: The following are incapable of contracting marriage: Those who are unable to assume the essential obligations of marriage due to causes of psychological nature. Since the purpose of including such provision in our Family Code is to harmonize our civil laws with the religious faith of our people, it stands to reason that to achieve such harmonization, great persuasive weight should be given to decisions of such appellate tribunal. Ideally subject to our law on evidence what is decreed as canonically invalid should also be decreed civilly void. This is one instance where, in view of the evident source and purpose of the Family Code provision, contemporaneous religious interpretation is to be given persuasive effect. Here, the State and the Church while remaining independent, separate and apart from each other shall walk together in synodal cadence towards the same goal of protecting and cherishing marriage and the family as the inviolable base of the nation. (8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a certification, which will be quoted in the decision, briefly stating therein his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to the petition. The Solicitor General, along with the prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the court such certification within fifteen (15) days from the date the case is deemed submitted for resolution of the court. The

Solicitor General shall discharge the equivalent function of the defensor vinculi contemplated under Canon [9] 1095. CYNTHIA E. YAMBAO, - versus REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES and PATRICIO E. YAMBAO, Article 36 contemplates incapacity or inability to take cognizance of and to assume basic marital obligations and not merely difficulty, refusal, or neglect in the [51] performance of marital obligations or ill will. This incapacity consists of the following: (a) a true inability to commit oneself to the essentials of marriage; (b) this inability to commit oneself must refer to the essential obligations of marriage: the conjugal act, the community of life and love, the rendering of mutual help, the procreation and education of offspring; and (c) the inability must be tantamount to a psychological [52] abnormality. It is not enough to prove that a spouse failed to meet his responsibility and duty as a married person; it is essential that he must be shown to be incapable of doing so due to some psychological illness DANILO A. AURELIO - versus -VIDA MA. CORAZON P. AURELIO In Republic v. Court of Appeals,[14] this Court created the Molina guidelines to aid the courts in the disposition of cases involving psychological incapacity, to wit:

(1) Burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. (2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be: (a) medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision. (3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at the time of the celebration of the marriage. (4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. (5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential obligations of marriage. (6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husband and wife, as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their children. Such non-complied marital

obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven by evidence and included in the text of the decision. (7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts. (8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a certification, which will be quoted in the decision, briefly stating therein his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to the petition.[15] This Court, pursuant to Supreme Court Administrative Matter No. 02-11-10, has modified the above pronouncements, particularly Section 2(d) thereof, stating that the certification of the Solicitor General required in the Molina case is dispensed with to avoid delay. Still, Article 48 of the Family Code mandates that the appearance of the prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned be on behalf of the State to take steps to prevent collusion between the parties and to take care that evidence is not fabricated or suppressed ANTONIO A. S. VALDEZ, petitioner, vs. REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 102, QUEZON CITY, and CONSUELO M. GOMEZ-VALDEZ, respondents. Art. 147. When a man and a woman who are capacitated to marry each other, live exclusively with each other as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage or under a void marriage, their wages and salaries shall be owned by them in equal shares and the property acquired by both of them through their work or industry shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership. In the absence of proof to the contrary, properties acquired while they lived together shall be presumed to have been obtained by their joint efforts, work or industry, and shall be owned by them in equal shares. For purposes of this Article, a party who did not participate in the acquisition by the other party of any property shall be deemed to have contributed jointly in the acquisition thereof in the former's efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the family and of the household. Neither party can encumber or dispose by acts inter vivos of his or her share in the property acquired during cohabitation and owned in common, without the consent of the other, until after the termination of their cohabitation. When only one of the parties to a void marriage is in good faith, the share of the party in bad faith in the ownership shall be forfeited in favor of their common

children. In case of default of or waiver by any or all of the common children or their descendants, each vacant share shall belong to the innocent party. In all cases, the forfeiture shall take place upon the termination of the cohabitation. When the common-law spouses suffer from a legal impediment to marry or when they do not live exclusively with each other (as husband and wife), only the property acquired by both of them through their actual joint contribution of money, property or industry shall be owned in common and in proportion to their respective contributions. Such contributions and corresponding shares, however, are prima facie presumed to be equal. The share of any party who is married to another shall accrue to the absolute community or conjugal partnership, as the case may be, if so existing under a valid marriage. If the party who has acted in bad faith is not validly married to another, his or her share shall 11 be forfeited in the manner already heretofore expressed. In deciding to take further cognizance of the issue on the settlement of the parties' common property, the trial court acted neither imprudently nor precipitately; a court which has jurisdiction to declare the marriage a nullity must be deemed likewise clothed in authority to resolve incidental and consequential matters. Nor did it commit a reversible error in ruling that petitioner and private respondent own the "family home" and all their common property in equal shares, as well as in concluding that, in the liquidation and partition of the property owned in common by them, the provisions on co-ownership under the Civil Code, not Articles 50, 51 and 52, in relation to 12 Articles 102 and 129, of the Family Code, should aptly prevail. The rules set up to govern the liquidation of either the absolute community or the conjugal partnership of gains, the property regimes recognized for valid and voidable marriages (in the latter case until the contract is annulled), are irrelevant to the liquidation of the co-ownership that exists between common-law spouses. The first paragraph of Articles 50 of the Family Code, 13 applying paragraphs (2), (3), (4) and 95) of Article 43, relates only, by its explicit terms, to voidable marriages and, exceptionally, 14 to void marriages under Article 40 of the Code, i.e., the declaration of nullity of a subsequent marriage contracted by a spouse of a prior void marriage before the latter is judicially declared void METROPOLITAN BANK AND TRUST CO., petitioner, vs. NICHOLSON PASCUAL a.k.a. NELSON PASCUAL, respondent. Termination of Conjugal Property Regime does not ipso facto End the Nature of Conjugal Ownership While the declared nullity of marriage of Nicholson and Florencia severed their marital bond and dissolved the conjugal partnership, the character of the properties acquired before such declaration continues to subsist as conjugal properties until and after the liquidation and partition of the partnership.

In this pre-liquidation scenario, Art. 493 of the Civil Code shall govern the property relationship between the former spouses, where: Each co-owner shall have the full ownership of his part and of the fruits and benefits pertaining thereto, and he may therefore alienate, assign or mortgage it, and even substitute another person in its enjoyment, except when personal rights are involved. But the effect of the alienation or the mortgage, with respect to the coowners, shall be limited to the portion which may be allotted to him in the division upon the termination of the co-ownership. (Emphasis supplied.) In the case at bar, Florencia constituted the mortgage on the disputed lot on April 30, 1997, or a little less than two years after the dissolution of the conjugal partnership on July 31, 1995, but before the liquidation of the partnership. Be that as it may, what governed the property relations of the former spouses when the mortgage was given is the aforequoted ALAIN M. DIO vs MA CARIDAD L. DINO a decree of absolute nullity of marriage shall only be issued after liquidation, partition, and distribution of the parties properties under Article 147 of the Family Code. It is clear from Article 50 of the Family Code that Section 19(1) of the Rule applies only to marriages which are declared void ab initio or annulled by final judgment under Articles 40 and 45 of the Family Code. In short, Article 50 of the Family Code does not apply to marriages which are declared void ab initio under Article 36 of the Family Code, which should be declared void without waiting for the liquidation of the properties of the parties. In this case, petitioners marriage to respondent was declared 15 void under Article 36 of the Family Code and not under Article 40 or 45. Thus, what governs the liquidation of properties owned in common by petitioner and respondent are the rules on coownership LUPO ALMODIEL ATIENZA, complainant, vs. JUDGE FRANCISCO F. BRILLANTES, JR., Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 20, Manila, respondent. SYLLABUS 1. CIVIL LAW; FAMILY CODE; NULLITY OF PREVIOUS MARRIAGE MAY BE INVOKED FOR PURPOSES OF REMARRIAGE; REMARRIAGE MUST BE ENTERED ON OR AFTER AUGUST 3, 1988. Article 40 is applicable to remarriages entered into after the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988 regardless of the date of the first marriage. 2. ID.; ID.; APPLICATION OF LAWS; MAY BE GIVEN RETROACTIVE APPLICATION WHERE IT DOES NOT PREJUDICE OR IMPAIR VESTED RIGHTS. Under Article 256 of the Family Code,

said Article is given "retroactive effect insofar as it does not prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws." This is particularly true with Article 40, which is a rule of procedure. Respondent has not shown any vested right that was impaired by the application of Article 40 to his case. 3. ID.; ID.; ID.; NOT PRECLUDED BY MERE ADVERSE EFFECT ON LITIGANTS' RIGHT; REASON. The fact that procedural statutes may somehow affect the litigants' rights may not preclude their retroactive application to pending actions. The retroactive application of procedural laws is not violative of any right of a person who may feel that he is adversely affected (Gregorio v. Court of Appeals, 26 SCRA 229 [1968]). The reason is that as a general rule no vested right may attach to, nor arise from, procedural laws (Billones v. Court of Industrial Relations, 14 SCRA 674 [1965]). LUCIO MORIGO y CACHO, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent. CRIMINAL LAW; BIGAMY; ELEMENTS. In Marbella-Bobis v. Bobis, we laid down the elements of bigamy thus: (1) the offender has been legally married; (2) the first marriage has not been legally dissolved, or in case his or her spouse is absent, the absent spouse has not been judicially declared presumptively dead; (3) he contracts a subsequent marriage; and (4) the subsequent marriage would have been valid had it not been for the existence of the first. HCTAEc 2. ID.; ID.; ID.; THAT ACCUSED MUST HAVE BEEN LEGALLY MARRIED, NOT PRESENT IN CASE AT BAR. The first element of bigamy as a crime requires that the accused must have been legally married. But in this case, legally speaking, the petitioner was never married to Lucia Barrete. Thus, there is no first marriage to speak of. Under the principle of retroactivity of a marriage being declared void ab initio, the two were never married "from the beginning". The contract of marriage is null; it bears no legal effect. Taking this argument to its logical conclusion, for legal purposes, petitioner was not married to Lucia at the time he contracted the marriage with Maria Jececha. The existence and the validity of the first marriage being an essential element of the crime of bigamy, it is but logical that a conviction for said offense cannot be sustained where there is no first marriage to speak of. The petitioner, must, perforce be acquitted of the instant charge. VERONICO TENEBRO, petitioner vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS except for a void marriage on account of the psychological incapacity of a party or both parties to the marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code (as so hereinafter explained), the answer must be in the affirmative. Void marriages are inexistent from the very beginning, and no judicial decree is required to establish

their nullity. As early as the case of People vs. Aragon this Court has underscored the fact that the Revised Penal Code itself does not, unlike the rule then prevailing in Spain, require the judicial declaration of nullity of a prior void marriage before it can be raised by way of a defense in a criminal case for bigamy. Had the law contemplated otherwise, said the Court, " an express provision to that effect would or should have been inserted in the law, (but that in) its absence, (the courts) are bound by (the) rule of strict interpretation" of penal statutes. In contrast to a voidable marriage which legally exists until judicially annulled (and, therefore, not a defense in a bigamy charge if the second 4 marriage were contracted prior to the decree of annulment) the complete nullity, however, of a previously contracted marriage, being void ab initio and legally inexistent, can outrightly be defense in an indictment of bigamy. It has been held that, by virtue of Article 40 of the Family Code, a person may be convicted of bigamy although the first marriage is ultimately adjudged void ab initio if, at the time the second marriage is contracted, there has as yet no judicial declaration of 5 nullity of the prior marriage. I maintain strong reservations to this ruling. Article 40 of the Family Code reads: "Article 40. The absolute nullity of the previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of the final judgment declaring such previous marriage void." It is only "for purpose of remarriage" that the law has expressed that the absolute nullity of the previous marriage may be invoked "on the basis solely of the final judgment declaring such previous marriage void." It may not be amiss to state that under the regime of the Civil Code of 1950, the Supreme Court, in Wiegel vs. Judge 6 Sempio-Diy, has held that a subsequent marriage of one of the spouses of a prior void marriage is itself (the subsequent marriage) void if it were contracted before a judicial declaration of nullity of the previous marriage. Although this pronouncement has been abandoned in a later decision of the court in Yap vs. 7 Court of Appeals, the Family Code, however has seen it fit to adopt the Wiegel rule but only for purpose of remarriage which is just to say that the subsequent marriage shall itself be considered void. There is no clear indication to conclude that the Family Code has amended or intended to amend the Revised penal Code or to 8 abandon the settled and prevailing jurisprudence on the matter. A void marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code is a class by itself. The provision has been from Canon law primarily to reconcile the grounds for nullity of marriage under civil law with 9 those of church laws. The "psychological incapacity to comply" with the essential marital obligations of the spouses is completely distinct from other grounds for nullity which are confined to the essential or formal requisites of a marriage, such as lack of legal capacity or disqualification of the contracting parties, want of consent, absence of a marriage license, or the like.

The effects of a marriage attended by psychological incapacity of a party or the parties thereto may be said to have the earmarks of a voidable, more than a void, marriage, remaining to be valid until it is judicially decreed to be a nullity. Thus, Article 54 of the Family Code considers children conceived or born of such a void marriage before its judicial declaration of nullity to be legitimate similar to the rule on a voidable marriage. It is expected, even as I believe it safe to assume, that the spouses rights and obligations, property regime and successional rights would continue unaffected, as if it were a voidable marriage, unless and until the marriage is judicially declared void for basically two reasons: First, psychological incapacity, a newly-added ground for the nullity of a marriage under the Family Code, breaches neither the essential 10 nor the formal requisites of a valid marriages; and second, unlike the other grounds for nullity of marriage (i.e., relationship, minority of the parties, lack of license, mistake in the identity of the parties) which are capable of relatively easy demonstration, psychological incapacity, however, being a mental state, may not 11 so readily be as evident. It would have been logical for the Family Code to consider such a marriage explicitly voidable rather than void if it were not for apparent attempt to make it closely coincide with the Canon Law rules and nomenclature. Indeed, a void marriage due to psychological incapacity appears to merely differ from a voidable marriage in that, unlike the latter, it is not convalidated by either cohabitation or prescription. It might be recalled that prior to republic Act No. 8533, further amending the Family Code, an action or defense of absolute nullity of marriage falling under Article 36, celebrated before the effectivity of the Code, could prescribe in ten years following the effectivity of the Family Code. The initial provision of the ten-year period of prescription seems to betray a real consciousness by the framers that marriages falling under Article 36 are truly meant to be inexistent. Considerations, both logical and practical, would point to the fact that a "void" marriage due to psychological incapacity remains, for all intents and purposes, to be binding and efficacious until judicially declared otherwise. Without such marriage having first been declared a nullity (or otherwise dissolved), a subsequent marriage could constitute bigamy. Thus, a civil case questioning the validity of the first marriage would not be a prejudicial issue much in the same way that a civil case assailing a prior "voidable" marriage (being valid until annulled) would not be a prejudicial question to the prosecution of a criminal offense for bigamy. In cases where the second marriage is void on grounds other than the existence of the first marriage, this Court has declared in a line 12 of cases that no crime of bigamy is committed. The Court has explained that for a person to be held guilty of bigamy, it must, even as it needs only, be shown that the subsequent marriage has all the essential elements of a valid marriage, were it not for the subsisting first union. Hence, where it is established that the

second marriage has been contracted without the necessary 13 license and thus void, or that the accused is merely forced to 14 enter into the second (voidable) marriage, no criminal liability for the crime of bigamy can attach. In both and like instances, however, the lapses refers to the elements required for contracting a valid marriage. If, then, all the requisites for the perfection of the contract marriage, freely and voluntarily entered into, are shown to be extant, the criminal liability for bigamy can unassailably arise. Since psychological incapacity, upon the other hand, does not relate to an infirmity in the elements, either essential or formal, in contacting a valid marriage, the declaration of nullity subsequent to the bigamous marriage due to that ground, without more, would be inconsequential in a criminal charge for bigamy. The judicial declaration of nullity of a bigamous marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity merely nullifies the effects of the marriage but it does not negate the fact of perfection of the bigamous marriage. Its subsequent declaration of nullity dissolves the relationship of the spouses but, being alien to the requisite conditions for the perfection of the marriage, the judgment of the court is no defense on the part of the offender who had entered into it. Accordingly, I vote to dismiss the petition. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, vs. FERVENTINO U. TANGO, Respondent. whether respondent Ferventino has established a basis to form a well-founded belief that his absent spouse is already dead. The Republic, through the OSG, contests the appellate courts holding that the absence of respondents wife Maria for 14 years provides sufficient basis to entertain a well-founded belief that she is dead Article 238 of the Family Code, under Title XI: SUMMARY JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS IN THE FAMILY LAW, establishes the rules that govern summary court proceedings in the Family Code: ART. 238. Until modified by the Supreme Court, the procedural rules in this Title shall apply in all cases provided for in this Code requiring summary court proceedings. Such cases shall be decided in an expeditious manner without regard to technical rules. In turn, Article 253 of the Family Code specifies the cases covered by the rules in chapters two and three of the same title. It states: ART. 253. The foregoing rules in Chapters 2 and 3 hereof shall likewise govern summary proceedings filed under Articles 41, 51, 69, 73, 96, 124 and 217, insofar as they are applicable. (Emphasis supplied.) In plain text, Article 247 in Chapter 2 of the same title reads:

ART 247. The judgment of the court shall be immediately final and executory. By express provision of law, the judgment of the court in a summary proceeding shall be immediately final and executory. As a matter of course, it follows that no appeal can be had of the trial courts judgment in a summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death of an absent spouse under Article 41 of the Family Code. It goes without saying, however, that an aggrieved party may file a petition for certiorari to question abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. Such petition should be filed in the Court of Appeals in accordance with the Doctrine of Hierarchy of Courts. To be sure, even if the Courts original jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari is concurrent with the RTCs and the Court of Appeals in certain cases, such concurrence does not sanction an unrestricted freedom of choice of court 13 forum. From the decision of the Court of Appeals, the losing party may then file a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court with the Supreme Court. This is because the errors which the court may commit in the exercise of jurisdiction are merely errors of judgment which are the proper 14 subject of an appeal. 1avvphi1 In the case before us, petitioner committed a serious procedural lapse when it filed a notice of appeal in the Court of Appeals instead of a petition for certiorari. The RTC equally erred in giving due course to said appeal and ordering the transmittal of the records of the case to the appellate court. By no means did the Court of Appeals acquire jurisdiction to review the judgment of the RTC which, by express provision of law, was immediately final and executory. The doctrine of finality of judgment is grounded on the fundamental principle of public policy and sound practice that, at the risk of occasional error, the judgment of courts and the award of quasi-judicial agencies must become final on some definite date fixed by law. The only exceptions to the general rule are the correction of clerical errors, the so-called nunc pro tunc entries which cause no prejudice to any party, void judgments, and whenever circumstances transpire after the finality of the decision 17 which render its execution unjust and inequitable. None of the exceptions obtains here to merit the review sought.