The Journal of Value Inquiry 34: 409426, 2000.

POPPERS ANTI-UTOPIANISM AND THE CONCEPT OF AN OPEN SOCIETY 2000 Kluwer Academic Publishers. Printed in the Netherlands.

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Poppers Anti-utopianism and the Concept of an Open Society

ROGER PADEN
Department of Philosophy and Religious Studies, George Mason University, Fairfax, VA 22030, USA

Utopianism is the use of a concrete and detailed conception of an ideal society as a foundation for political thought. Since its beginning in the works of Hippodamus and Plato, it has played a central role in political philosophy. During the modern period, however, utopianism has been attacked on a number of fronts.1 Most of the attacks have come from opponents of utopian liberalism. Oddly enough, however, this century has also seen utopianism come under attack from within the Liberal camp itself.2 Of particular interest, a number of liberal philosophers, economists, and political theorists, including Karl Popper, Friedrich Hayek, and J. L. Talmon, have attacked utopianism, not simply on the grounds that utopian political movements often produce disastrous results, but in addition, on the grounds that it is flawed in principle and that, despite its earlier close association with liberalism, the two theories are if fact incompatible. The attacks of liberal critics are unfortunate. First, despite their intentions, attacks on utopianism undercut core elements of liberalism that are indispensable to any adequate defense of liberalism: liberalism requires utopianism. Second, any adequate political philosophy must contain a utopian moment, as it is impossible to engage in political philosophy without engaging in at least a bit of utopian speculation: political philosophy requires utopianism. It is important, therefore, to defend utopianism as an essential part of political philosophy. One of the most influential of the liberal attacks on utopianism, the philosophical argument developed by Karl Popper in The Poverty of Historicism and The Open Society and Its Enemies, is unsound. Poppers argument, however, is worth studying because it possesses two connected virtues. His strategy, an epistemological defense of liberalism, and his attempt to reconceptualize liberal society as a kind of open society are both sound. Indeed, his argument is less a flawed liberal argument against utopianism, than it is a sound epistemological and utopian defense of liberalism understood in terms of his theory of an open society. 1. Poppers Argument Against Utopianism Unfortunately, Poppers exposition of his anti-utopian argument is not very clear. Part of the problem is that he chose to develop his argument in terms of

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a distinction between two forms of social engineering, utopian engineering and piecemeal engineering. Popper draws his distinction in three different but overlapping ways and makes three often conflicting sets of arguments based on different versions of his distinction. Popper first draws a distinction between utopian and piecemeal engineering in the following passage: Whatever his ends, [the piecemeal engineer] tries to achieve them by small adjustments and readjustments which can be continually improved upon . . . Accordingly, he will make his way, step by step, carefully comparing the results achieved, and always on the lookout for the unavoidable unwanted consequences of any reform; and he will avoid undertaking reforms of a complexity and scope which make it impossible for him to disentangle causes and effects, and to know what he is really doing. [In contrast to this,] . . . utopian engineering . . . aims at remodelling the whole of society in accordance with a definite plan or blueprint.3 Popper draws his distinction on the basis of a difference in the scope of the reforms proposed by these two forms of engineering. Utopian engineers advocate changing the whole of society at one time, while piecemeal engineers advocate making only much more limited changes. Thus, on this view, the two forms of engineering differ on the extent of the changes they seek to make. Utopian engineers attempt radical social changes, while piecemeal engineers are content with only limited changes. However, this distinction between the two forms of engineering is not completely clear, for there are at least two ways of interpreting the distinction between radical and limited change. As Grol Irzik has pointed out, radical change can be brought about either by introducing many small changes or by introducing one large change, while limited change can be brought about by introducing only one change or by introducing a set of small changes.4 Moreover, as Patrick Shaw has pointed out, Poppers distinction is further obscured by the fact that there is some residual ambiguity in the idea of social engineering. While all social engineers make changes in society, social reformers make social changes in order to improve society, and social scientists make changes as part of experiments designed to produce knowledge about the workings of society.5 Given these two orthogonal distinctions, it is possible to understand Poppers distinction between utopian and piecemeal engineering in four different ways, and, as a result, it is possible to construct four separate arguments against utopian engineering. Thus, Popper could be arguing that utopian engineering is a poor method of social reform because, by initiating either one large change or many small simultaneous changes, it risks unintended, unwanted, and ultimately morally unjustifiable consequences. Alternatively, he could be arguing that utopian engineering makes for bad

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social science because, by designing social experiments that involve either one large change or many small simultaneous changes, it fails to produce any scientifically useful information. There is some evidence that Popper makes each of these arguments, although he is unaware of his own virtuosity.6 It might seem that utopianism is in a bad spot. However, Irzik presents a number of sound arguments to the effect that only one of Poppers arguments is sufficiently strong to cast doubt, in principle, on utopian engineering.7 His argument is that it is difficult to gain any valuable knowledge from a social experiment in which a number of variables are changed simultaneously. But the argument is weak. As Irzik notes, it is possible to gain valuable knowledge from non-interventionist observational studies of the effects of a number of factors on some outcome. For example, most epidemiological studies are based on this method. In addition, it can be argued that advances in multivariate analysis make it possible to isolate the effects that one variable has a social system, even when many variables are changed simultaneously, thereby allowing scientists to gain valuable knowledge even from utopian experiments. More important, however, even if this anti-utopian argument is sound, its scope is so limited that it seems incapable of supporting Poppers broad condemnation of utopianism. In any case, it does not address Poppers objections to utopian engineering as a form of social reform. Poppers objection to utopianism is more fundamental than Irzik imagines. To understand it, however, it will be necessary to discuss another interpretation of the distinction between utopian and piecemeal engineering. In The Open Society and Its Enemies, Popper writes: The Utopian approach may be described as follows. Any rational action must have a certain aim. It is rational in the same degree as it pursues its aim consciously and consistently, and as it determines its means according to its end. . . . [We] must be careful to determine our real or ultimate ends, from which we must distinguish clearly those intermediate or partial ends which actually are only means. . . . If we neglect this distinction, then we must also neglect to ask whether these partial ends are likely to promote the ultimate end, and accordingly, we must fail to act rationally. These principles, if applied to the realm of political activity, demand that we must determine our ultimate political aim, or the Ideal State, before taking any political action. Only when this ultimate aim is determined, . . . only when we are in possession of something like a blueprint of the society at which we aim . . . can we begin to consider the best ways and means for its realization, and to draw up a plan for practical action. . . . [In contrast, the] piecemeal engineer will . . . adopt the method of searching for, and fighting against, the greatest and most urgent evils of society, rather than searching for, fighting for, its greatest good.8

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Popper distinguishes utopian engineering from its piecemeal counterpart on the basis of their orientation to social reform. On this view, utopian engineers are oriented toward a future good. Beginning with some conception of a possible ideal society, they try to move the existing society toward that ideal. Piecemeal engineers, in contrast, are oriented toward some present evil. Beginning with an examination of existing society with the aim of discovering its worst problem, they attempt to move us away from that evil. What separates these two positions is a matter of procedure. Utopians begin with an ultimate end, a vision of the future, while piecemeal engineers begin with an assessment of the present situation. Understood in this way, the distinction between utopian and piecemeal engineering has little to do with the scope of the reforms their advocates propose. Therefore, this distinction cannot be drawn in terms of radical versus limited change, since the relationship between both forms of engineering and the size of the change they advocate is purely contingent. It is a function of the size and nature of the gap between a particular existing society and a particular ideal society in the case of utopian engineering, or of the number and severity of the problems that exist in the existing society in the case of piecemeal engineering. Finally, on this interpretation, the distinction between these two kinds of engineering is a distinction between two approaches to social reform, and has little to do with social science. Given this interpretation, a number of attacks on utopian engineering could be mounted, and Popper mounts several of them: we lack the knowledge of society that any effective utopian action would require; we lack the long-term political will to reliably carry a utopian project to a successful conclusion; such a long-term project would put unfair burdens on many people, including all intermediate generations; and, since utopian social reforms are not motivated by specific existing discontents, they can only succeed through the use of violence and oppression, which would be immoral.9 The argument that appears most often in Poppers writings is the last. Popper first connects utopianism with violence in the following passage: Every attempt at planning on a very large scale is an undertaking which must cause considerable inconvenience to many people [who benefit from the status quo]. . . . Accordingly there will always be a tendency to oppose the plan, and to complain about it. To many of these complaints the Utopian engineer will have to turn a deaf ear if he wishes to get anywhere at all; in fact, it will be part of his business to suppress unreasonable objections. But with them he must invariably suppress reasonable criticism too.10 However, this argument seems overdrawn. After all, it would be a mistake to suspect someone of violent tendencies just because his or her goals are distant or grand. Thus, while many attempts at utopian engineering may have involved

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the use of violence, this moral argument does not show that there is anything wrong, in principle, with utopian engineering, and the same could be said of the other arguments.There is some reason to believe that Popper himself does not put a great deal of faith in these moral arguments that connect utopian engineering with violence. While there can be no doubt that he believes that the use of violence to suppress dissent would be immoral, instead of emphasizing this ethical point, he goes on to argue that the mere fact that expressions of dissatisfaction will have to be curbed reduces even the most enthusiastic expression of satisfaction to insignificance. Thus it will be difficult to ascertain the facts, i.e., the repercussions of the plan on the individual citizen; and without these facts scientific criticism is impossible.11 Popper is arguing that utopian violence makes the scientific criticism of utopian social reforms impossible. In connecting utopianism to violence, Popper is attempting to condemn utopianism on two independent grounds, moral and epistemological, of which the epistemological is the more important. Poppers principled condemnation of utopian engineering rests on his belief that utopianism and reason are incompatible. Global incompatibility should not be confused with the specific technical difficulties inherent in utopian experimental social science emphasized by Irzik. Moreover, global incompatibility lies at the heart of Poppers philosophical criticism of utopianism. The importance of this criticism is made clear by Poppers repeated allusions to the irredeemably irrational nature of utopianism. Despite the scientific pretensions of a number of utopian authors, according to Popper, utopianism is, at best, a form of pseudo-rationalism which belongs to a pre-scientific state.12 More strongly, he argues that utopian thinking is necessarily a priori and violates the principles of scientific method.13 Moreover, he argues that irrationalism . . .is inherent in [all forms of] radicalism, including utopianism.14 Finally, and perhaps most revealingly, he compares utopianism with magical, religious, and metaphysical thinking.15 Popper first outlines the argument for the claim that utopianism is globally incompatible with science in The Poverty of Historicism : [The] problems connected with the uncertainty of the human factor must force the Utopianist, whether he likes it or not, to try to control the human factor by institutional means, and to extend his program so as to embrace not only the transformation of society, according to plan, but also the transformation of man. . . . It seems to escape the well-meaning Utopianist that this program implies an admission of failure, even before he launches it. For it substitutes for his demand that we build a new society, fit for men

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and women to live in, the demand that we mould these men and women to fit into his new society. This, clearly, removes any possibility of testing the success or failure of the new society. For those who do not like living in it only admit thereby that they are not yet fit to live in it: that their human impulses need further organizing. But without the possibility of tests, any claim that a scientific method is being employed evaporates. . . . [This] approach is incompatible with a truly scientific attitude.16 Popper makes this argument repeatedly. Throughout his several discussions of utopian thinking, he emphasizes the importance of testing practical theories.17 He connects this to scientific methodology and he notes that utopian engineering does not allow for such testing.18 He concludes that utopian engineering is essentially unscientific and misguided. Popper is not a positivist. He does not argue that all practical theories are either meaningless or mere expressions of emotions. While Popper does admit that there is no scientific way to choose between two ends, he stresses that he does not want to create the impression that there is a realm such as the realm of ends which goes altogether beyond the power of rational criticism (even though . . . the realm of ends goes largely beyond the power of scientific argument).19 Indeed, he has even sketched out a method for the rational criticism of practical theories: The rational . . . analysis of . . . a moral theory has a certain analogy in scientific method. For in science, too, we do not accept an abstract theory because it is convincing in itself; we rather decide to accept or reject it after we have investigated those concrete and practical consequences which can be more directly tested by experiment. But there is a fundamental difference. In the case of a scientific theory, our decision depends upon the results of experiments. If these confirm a theory, we may accept it until we find a better one. If they contradict the theory we must reject it. But in the case of a moral theory, we can only confront its consequences with our conscience.20 On Poppers view, while it is, strictly speaking, impossible to apply the scientific method to practical and moral theories, there is a method that makes possible the rational evaluation of practical theories. Moreover, this method is very similar to the falsificationist methodology that Popper argues should be used to critically evaluate scientific theories. If that is the case, then, just as this method supports Poppers criterion of demarcation in science, it should also support a similar criterion in practical thinking.21 According to such a criterion, science requires us to formulate and hold theories that encourage potentially falsifying experiments, while pseudo-science permits us to formulate and hold theories that avoid falsification, and rational approaches to social reform require us to formulate and hold practical theories that permit

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critical evaluation through potentially falsifying tests, while irrational approaches do not. To develop his epistemological argument, Popper draws the distinction between utopian and piecemeal engineering in yet a third way. With it, he does not focus on the scope or orientation of the reforms proposed by the two forms of social engineering, but on the different methodologies used to justify proposed reforms, making it methodological in character. On this interpretation, Popper understands piecemeal engineering to allow for testing of proposed reforms, whereas utopian engineering does not. Putting these definitions together with Poppers criterion of demarcation, his central criticisms of utopian engineering is that it is incompatible with a truly scientific attitude and violates the principles of scientific method. Like religious, magical, and metaphysical thought, it is a form of pseudo-rationalism. The problem with utopianism, on this view, is a result of its flawed methodology, which guarantees that is an irrational approach to social reform. Popper tries to establish two additional points. To support his distinction between piecemeal and utopian engineering, he tries to explain in more detail how it is possible for piecemeal engineers to test their theories. To support his rejection of utopianism, he tries to explain why utopian theories cannot be tested. Although Popper does not fully articulate a theory of practical reasoning, given the analogy he draws between the critical analysis of practical and scientific theories, it is possible to guess the direction of his thought. According to his philosophy of science, in order for a theory to count as scientific, it must be possible to test it against experience. The theory must have a logical structure that leads to predictions. The predictions must be formulated in terms of basic statements, the truth value of which must be determinable through observation. If a basic statement which was logically derived from a theory is shown by experience to be false, the theory must be rejected. In addition, attempts to protect a theory from falsification must be prohibited. If Poppers analogy holds, then, for an approach to social reform to be rational, it must be possible to test proposals made from it against experience. This is to be done by implementing the reform it suggests and investigating its concrete and practical repercussions on individual citizens. Popper suggests that the basic statements used to test practical theories are statements expressing the judgments made by individual citizens concerning the effect of the reforms on their lives.22 As the reformer would expect that the judgments would be positive, a negative judgment would falsify the theory.23 On this view, the judgments must be taken as final and no attempt to protect the theory from them can be allowed. It is clear that piecemeal engineering, as described by Popper, adheres to these methodological strictures. Given this account of the testing process, it is fairly easy to see how an argument against utopianism could be constructed. Popper need only argue

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that utopians, like other pseudo-scientists, somehow act to protect their theories from falsification. Poppers strongest argument is that while utopian social reformers understand their ideal society to be an ultimate aim, there is no rational method for testing ultimate aims.24 The reason is that since ultimate aims, by definition, provide the grounds for practical judgment and the criteria by which other aims are to be judged, they themselves cannot be assessed in terms of the other aims. Moreover, if some people judge an ultimate aim to be unsatisfactory, this indicates, not that the aim is unworthy, but that their powers of judgment are defective. For this reason, utopians can dismiss criticism of their ideals. Instead of calling the ideals into question, such criticism merely indicates that the critics are victims of some form of false consciousness which causes them to misunderstand their true aims, which makes them unfit for utopian society and its enemies. Thus, because they take their ideal society to be an ultimate end, utopians can dismiss the conflicting judgements. In doing so, however, they make their theories unfalsifiable, which, in Poppers view, shows their approach to social reform to be unscientific or, even irrational.

2. Utopianism and the Open Society If Poppers argument is sound, his criticism strikes at the heart of utopianism and attacks the logical structure of utopian thinking itself. If it works, it would show that utopianism is conceptually flawed. However, it is not clear that Poppers argument is sound. Inasmuch as Poppers attack on utopian engineering is based directly on his philosophy of science, if his philosophy of science is wrong, his attack on utopian engineering is likely to fail.25 But this may not be its only problem. Popper introduces the concept of an open society in a discussion of the political history of ancient Greece, which he sets out to support his much criticized attack on Plato. On Poppers view, the Greeks were the first Western people to make the transition from a tribal to an open society, and this transition can be dated from around the time of Pericles. On his view, tribal societies tend to share a number of characteristics, the most important of which is a magical attitude towards social custom . . . [which fails to distinguish] between the customary or conventional regularities of social life and the regularities found in nature.26 As a result, tribal societies tend to be unchanging traditional societies with an organic type of social structure. On Poppers view, tribal societies are organic in three ways. First, social relationships tend to be a function of familial position. Second, social positions, together with their associated duties and prerogatives, seem to be based on an unchanging natural order. Third, individuals appear to be less important than the groups to which they belong. Popper calls tribal societies and their modern counterparts closed societies.

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In contrast, open societies are not based on magical thinking. Understanding the conventional nature of social rules, members of open societies tend to reject the organic view of society. As a result, they tend to reject the view that all social positions must be distributed on the basis of family ties. This generally raises the status of individuals relative to the group and promotes individual freedom and responsibility, rendering these societies politically open. Perhaps even more important, the changes raise questions about the justification of social structures. In closed societies, social structures are thought to be natural in the sense of being unquestionable, with the result that social problems tend to be dismissed as part of the unchanging order of nature.27 But with the breakdown of the closed society this [explanation] disappears, and with it all feeling of security [it offers].28 The strain caused by the breakdown creates a need for a new understanding of social affairs, which should justify the various features of the social order. This need, on Poppers view, can only be satisfied when it is possible to question every assumption, as in the practice of philosophy. As Popper puts it: The rise of philosophy itself can be interpreted . . . as a response to the breakdown of the closed society and its magical beliefs. It is an attempt to replace the lost magical faith by a rational faith; it modifies the tradition of passing on a theory or a myth by founding a new tradition . . . of challenging theories and myths and of critically discussing them.29 Thus, these societies are philosophically open too. According to Popper, the Greeks started for us that great revolution which, it seems, is still in its beginning the transition from the closed to the open society.30 Modern Western liberal societies should be understood as being a type of open society and Poppers support for liberalism should be seen as arising from his more basic belief that open societies are to be preferred to closed societies. It should not be surprising, therefore, that Popper strongly endorses a number of liberal values which he believes modern societies share with earlier open societies. The most important of them are freedom of thought and discussion, as well as freedom to demand reasonable changes in governmental policies and, if necessary, in government itself.31 In addition to these liberal values, Popper also favors a number of liberal political and economic institutions, though he says little about how they should be constituted and arranged. Despite interpretive difficulties, Poppers support of liberalism and the open society puts his argument against utopianism in an interesting light. If we interpret Poppers distinction between utopian and piecemeal engineering to be based on an underlying distinction concerning the scope or orientation of social reform, then his support is easy, at first, to understand. His liberalism seems to be a kind of conservative liberalism which makes use of conservative arguments to defend existing liberal societies.32 Thus, if we interpret the

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distinction to be based on scope, Popper seems to be an advocate of social reforms which involve small changes. If we interpret the distinction to be based on orientation, Popper seems to be an advocate of social reforms which are necessary to relieve the most pressing problems. Either way, Popper seems to be arguing that, in all cases, society should be left essentially as it is. On this reading, what makes Popper a conservative liberal is that he happened to live in a liberal society. The connection between this argument and liberalism is purely contingent, as the argument could be deployed to defend any existing society, whatever its social structure. In particular, it could be used to defend a non-liberal society against the kind of radical change needed to transform it into a liberal society, as Edmund Burke was interested to do. Unlike Burke, however, Popper is strongly committed to the values and institutions of open and liberal societies. He does not simply believe that liberal values and institutions are good for existing liberal societies but they are good for all societies, whatever their current social structure. This is evident in his remark that Liberalism is an evolutionary rather than a revolutionary creed (unless it is confronted by a tyrannical regime), and in his support for the revolutionary changes that transformed some Greek tribal societies into the first open societies.33 Thus, Popper opposes radical change in open societies, but he would favor radical change in closed societies in order to make them into open societies. Therefore, it would be a mistake to understand Popper to be a conservative liberal. He is a liberal who wants both to conserve his own liberal society and to extend liberalism to other societies, even if this requires radical change. If Popper is an advocate of radical change in some circumstances, then, given his opposition to utopian engineering, it would seem to be a mistake to interpret his distinction between utopian and piecemeal engineering to be based on scope, since his opposition to utopian engineering would imply falsely that he would always oppose radical change. Moreover, it is difficult to square Poppers whole-hearted advocacy of liberal societies with his condemnation of utopian engineering if the distinction between the two forms of social engineering is based on orientation, since he believes that an open society should serve as a positive ideal toward which all closed societies should move. Unfortunately, however, it would also seem difficult, at least at first, to read Poppers distinction to be based on the methodological considerations we have considered, given that he would be unwilling to reject liberalism even if it were rejected by most citizens in a liberal society: We are democrats, not because the majority is always right, but because democratic traditions are the least evil ones of which we know. If the majority (or public opinion) decides in favor of tyranny, a democrat need not therefore suppose that some fatal inconsistency in his views has been revealed. He will realize, rather, that the democratic tradition in his country is not strong enough.34

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Thus, it would seem that either Poppers attack on utopian engineering is inconsistent with his support of an open society or that all three interpretations of Poppers distinction are wrong. But it is possible to give a consistent reading of these two aspects of Poppers political theory, as long as his distinction between the two forms of social engineering is given a methodological interpretation. Poppers political theory can be saved only if another distinction that he never explicitly draws is made. It concerns a fixed framework of liberal society and various social policies that a liberal government might choose to adopt from time to time. The framework consists of a number of institutions and values that give liberal societies their particular structure. A liberal framework institution, for example, is one of the many social institutions directly associated with constitutional democracy and free markets, while a liberal framework value is a core liberal value, such as equality before the law or the equal protection of certain rights and freedoms. A social policy in a liberal society is a policy developed to provide support for framework institutions and values, to insure that the society is efficiently run, or to insure that each citizen has a fair opportunity to pursue a life he or she judges to be worthy or productive of happiness. Such policies might include social insurance and welfare programs; tax programs; business, economic, and environmental regulations; research and educational programs; programs aimed at insuring an adequate level of national defense; and programs aimed at developing and maintaining a high quality physical, social, and cultural infrastructure. To give a coherent reading to his political thought, Poppers argument against utopian engineering should be understood to apply only to the selection of social policies within the general framework of liberal societies. For Popper, the central characteristic that distinguishes open from closed societies is that open societies eschew magical or naturalistic thinking. Since open societies must take a rational approach to policy-making and to the development of institutional structures, they must, when they are fully developed, make use of piecemeal engineering to make decisions concerning social policy. Piecemeal engineering is an essential element of an open society that is to be justified by an epistemological argument that shows that it is a necessary precondition for rational political decision-making. Open societies must also adopt something very much like the framework institutions and values of liberalism. In order for piecemeal engineering to be used successfully at a policy level, people must be allowed to make public judgments about the merits of social policies that are treated as authoritative; proposals for new policies and new tests must be widely encouraged; and it must be possible to try out new policy solutions on a small scale. Therefore, in order to encourage piecemeal engineering, certain liberal framework institutions necessary to insure freedoms of democratic government, federalism, and relatively free markets need to be in place. But the members of a society must also share

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certain political values. Therefore, in order to encourage piecemeal engineering at the policy level, certain liberal framework values must be widely shared and socially supported. The liberal framework institutions and values are essential elements of an open society that are to be justified by an epistemological argument that shows that they are necessary preconditions of piecemeal engineering. Poppers central argument against utopian engineering can be understood in the following way: he begins with an argument designed to justify the use of piecemeal engineering on methodological grounds; he assumes that there are only two possible approaches to rational social reform and argues that, while piecemeal engineering is rational, utopian engineering is, at best, a form of pseudo-rationalism, similar in many ways to the various pseudo-sciences that Popper discussed in his epistemological works; and then he concludes that piecemeal engineering should be used to make policy decisions, because it is the more rational method. He then goes on to argue that piecemeal engineering can work as intended only in a society characterized by a number of liberal framework institutions and values. Thus, Popper justifies liberal framework institutions and values on the basis of an argument that they are essential to the continued success of piecemeal engineering, and he justifies piecemeal engineering on the basis of an argument that it is essential to rational decision-making at the policy level. If this is correct, it shows not only that Poppers support for liberal institutions and values does not conflict with his preference for piecemeal engineering, but that both are essential elements of an open society. However, on this interpretation, liberal institutions and values are preconditions of piecemeal engineering, not its product. Although Popper would probably accept the claim that the institutions might be marginally improved through the judicious use of piecemeal engineering, he exempts them from the necessity of such testing. Thus, Poppers argument for piecemeal engineering and against utopian engineering, and his support for liberalism can be reconciled on the assumption that piecemeal engineering is to be limited to the justification of social policies and that it should not be applied to determine which framework elements should be adopted. If Poppers argument is to be consistent, the attack on utopian engineering must be understood to be a carefully circumscribed part of a larger effort, in which the larger effort can succeed only if the attack on utopian engineering is so limited. While this reconstruction shows that Poppers argument against utopian engineering and his support for liberalism can be reconciled, the consistency is purchased at some apparent cost. On the reconstruction, his central argument is not a moral argument, although he clearly believes that an open society is morally justifiable and he is willing to use a number of moral arguments to attack utopian engineering when it is applied to issues of social policy. Moreover, his central argument is not practical, in the sense that he bases his

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support for open societies on the claim that such societies are more efficient or more conducive to happiness than are closed societies, although he clearly believes that they are. Finally, Popper does not argue that the institutions, values, and political methodology of an open society are justified because they have been tested by piecemeal engineering, but he carefully exempts these elements from such testing. Instead, Poppers central argument for piecemeal engineering and for the liberal framework is epistemological and a priori.35 Thus, he claims that piecemeal engineering is to be used at the level of social policy because it is the only rational form of social engineering and that framework liberal institutions and values are required if society is to be rational: Ultimately, . . .rationalism is linked up with the recognition of the necessity of [certain] social institutions to protect freedom of criticism, freedom of thought, and thus the freedom of man. And it establishes something like a moral obligation towards the support of these institutions. This is why rationalism is closely linked up with the demand for social engineering piecemeal engineering, of course.36 Finally, Popper defends liberal values on the same grounds: Freedom of thought, and free discussion, are ultimate Liberal [political] values which do not really need any further [moral] justification. Nevertheless, they can also be justified pragmatically in terms of the part they play in the search for truth. 37 On this reconstruction of Poppers central argument, it is thoroughly utopian. Not only has he developed a conception of an ideal society, which he describes as an open society, he has argued that the institutions and methodologies of such a society can be uniquely justified on rational grounds and has used this conception of an ideal society to criticize existing and proposed societies. Therefore, while it is possible to reconcile Poppers argument against utopian engineering with his support for liberal or open societies, this can be done only if Poppers clearly held view that his argument is fundamentally anti-utopian is rejected. Popper has not produced a general argument against utopianism. Instead, he has produced a utopian argument attacking the use of utopian engineering at the policy level, and a utopian argument justifying the framework institutions and values of liberal society. Poppers argument can be saved only at the cost of the claim that he did not fully understand it. 3. Empirical and Critical Liberalism Popper has developed a complex epistemological, utopian argument to the effect that all societies should adopt the framework institutions and values of an open society. He believes they will resemble the elements of a liberal society. However, there are many forms of liberalism, ranging from social

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democracy to libertarianism, and he does little to identify which form actually follows from his argument. Instead, writing against the backdrop of Stalinism and World War II, he is content to point out that the framework institutions of the open society must promote a certain number of vaguely defined freedoms making totalitarian institutions and values unacceptable. Beyond this, he is almost entirely silent and, as a result, he has produced only a fragment of a political philosophy. In order to complete it, it would be necessary to develop a more detailed account of the framework elements of the open society and to justify it by demonstrating that the elements could be grounded on assumptions that are consistent with his epistemology. It is possible, however, to interpret Poppers falsificationist epistemology in at least two different ways that can be used to justify two radically different sets of framework elements. For both versions of falsificationism, the best way to criticize a theory is to attempt to refute it, and it is only rational to hold a theory if it can survive continued testing. However, whereas for strict falsificationism it is possible to falsify a scientific theory once-and-for-all by observationally verifying one basic statement which is logically inconsistent with the theory, for sophisticated falsificationism a theory can only be provisionally rejected, and this only when it is shown to conflict with a number of well-corroborated hypotheses which themselves have been only provisionally accepted by a community of scholars working within a successful critical research tradition. While Popper advanced strict falsificationist views in his early writings, especially The Logic of Scientific Discovery, there is some evidence that he eventually came to adopt a more sophisticated falsificationist position. For example, in Conjectures and Refutations, Popper criticizes the authoritarian epistemologies of Plato, Descartes, and Francis Bacon and argues for the importance of critical traditions to scientific research.38Moreover, even in The Logic of Scientific Discovery there are some passages that lend themselves to a more sophisticated form of falsificationism. For example, at one point, Popper argues that from a logical point of view, the testing of a theory depends upon basic statements whose acceptance of rejection, in its turn, depends on our decisions. Thus it is decisions which settle the fate of theories.39 The ambiguity in Poppers account of rational method in science reflects a parallel ambiguity in his account of a rational society. When he discusses social engineering, his focus is fixed on developing a mechanical methodology for selecting among proposed social policies, a methodology that will allow us to make good choices despite our all too human propensity for making mistakes. However, when he discusses the rationality of an open society, Popper argues that it should be understood as an attitude of readiness to listen to critical arguments and to learn from experience. It is fundamentally an attitude of admitting that I may be wrong and you may be right, and by an effort, we may get nearer the truth.

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It is an attitude which does not lightly give up hope that by such means as argument and careful observation, people may reach some kind of agreement on many problems of importance; and that, even where their demands and their interests clash, it is often possible to argue about the various demands and proposals, and to reach . . . a compromise which . . . is acceptable to most, if not all. In short, the rationalist attitude, or, if I may perhaps label it, the attitude of reasonableness, is very similar to the scientific attitude, to the belief that, with the help of argument, we can in time attain something like objectivity.40 Elsewhere, Popper connects reason to a social process of critical discussion and debate, a type of critical rationalism, which he associates with the development of a tradition of criticism and discussion by the Greeks and specifically with the development of their democratic traditions. He contrasts this concept of reason with the comprehensive or pseudo-rationalism of Plato.41 In his later work, Popper associates rationality with agreement, compromise, and widespread acceptability, and implies a goal of objectivity. He connects rationality, or reasonableness, to the struggle to attain consensus in a community of individuals who are participants in a shared critical tradition. His emphasis on community is driven home by the comment: Reason, like language, can be said to be the product of [a particular kind of] social life.42 If Poppers concepts of reason and rationality are ambiguous, the ambiguities in his methodological writings run parallel to the ambiguities in his social philosophy. Thus, the concept of rationality implicit in strict falsificationism is related to the concept of authoritative reason in Poppers social theory, while the concept of rationality implicit in sophisticated falsificationism is similar to the concept of reason Popper developed to support his idea of a tradition of critical rationality. This systematic ambiguity has important political consequences. On Poppers view, the framework institutions and values of an open society are to be arranged to promote rationality in that society. Given the ambiguities in his conception of rationality, it should be possible to justify two different sets of framework elements. One set, associated with strict falsificationism and authoritative rationality is comprised of the framework elements of what might be called an empiricist liberalism. The other, associated with sophisticated falsificationism and critical rationalism, is comprised of what might be called a critical liberalism.43 These two forms of liberalism are not entirely dissimilar. For example, both take the various political freedoms associated with liberalism very seriously. Moreover, the various institutions associated with constitutional democracy play a central role in both. However, there are important difference between the two types of societies. In empiricist liberalism, social policies must be tested against the judgments of the people if they are to be rationally selected. Voting is to be understood

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as a means for eliciting and aggregating their judgments. On this version of liberalism, democracy is a means for gaining knowledge of the publics opinion or the will of the people in which each vote plays a role similar to the role played by a basic statement in science, in that it is against unquestionable empirical claims that policies are to be tested. What is important about democracy then is the act of voting itself, understood as an expressive act. It is important that there should be no obstacles to voting, but there is no reason to encourage people to vote, for not voting is also a meaningful act. Voting procedures need to be designed to produce as accurate an assessment of the popular will as possible. Thus, on this view, direct democracy might be thought preferable to representative democracy, because a vote for a candidate or a party is an essentially ambiguous expression. Moreover, it does not matter who rules or what form the government takes as long as the usual liberal protections of speech are in place and policy questions are decided by the expressed will of the people. Oddly enough, voting is not essential to this form of liberal democracy. All that is needed, is a reliable mechanism of determining public opinion, and opinion polling might be able to accomplish this result more efficiently and sometimes more accurately. Indeed, if the honesty of the rulers could be guaranteed, empiricist liberalism could be consistent with a form of technocratic rule by policy experts and pollsters. Similar considerations have led some empiricist liberals, such as Hayek, to argue that where possible, political decisions should be left to the marketplace, as the market responds more quickly and efficiently to public opinion than political bureaucracies. For critical liberalism democracy should be understood as a means to stimulate critical discussion and to draw forth arguments aimed at reaching a critical consensus. On this view, the act of voting is not as central to democracy as is the public debate that proceeds the vote. Democracy is not simply a way of determining policies, but a way of identifying important issues and of forming a community. Its function is to create a community of consensus out of a diversity of opinion. Therefore, although the act of voting is not itself of great importance, ways should be sought to bring people into the political process. Moreover, it is also important to insure that all opinions are heard and subjected to criticism, that communication remains undistorted, that obstacles to critical discourse are diminished, and that no one group or person can dominate public discussion. With all the ambiguities in Poppers work, it would be impossible to settle the question of whether Popper was an empiricist or a critical liberal. Poppers scattered comments on democracy and his discussion of ancient Greek politics can be used to support the claim that he leaned in the direction of critical liberalism, but his discussion of piecemeal engineering points in the opposite direction. In the end, the fact that Popper himself did not distinguish between the two forms of liberalism, makes this issue moot. However, it is possible to

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argue that he should have adopted critical liberalism, for there are simply too many convincing objections to the argument in favor of empiricist liberalism. The criticisms center around the problems with strict falsificationism. Given its well-known epistemological problems, any political theory based on it would face severe problems, since the basic statements that underlie empiricist liberalism are value judgments, which are even more inherently contestable and revisable than observation statements. Notes
1. See Krishan Kumar, Utopia and Anti-Utopia in Modern Times (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1987), p. 380; see also Frank Manuel and Fritzie Manuel, Utopian Thought in the Western World (Cambridge, Mass: The Belknap Press of Harvard University, 1979), pp. 759816. 2. See Barbara Goodwin and Keith Taylor, The Politics of Utopia: A Study in Theory and Practice (New York: St. Martins Press, 1982), pp. 92115; and Judith Shklar, After Utopia: The Decline of Political Faith (Princeton, N.D.: Princeton University Press, 1957), pp. 218269. 3. Karl Popper, The Poverty of Historicism (New York: Routledge, 1957), pp. 6667. 4. See Grol Irzik, Poppers Piecemeal Engineering: What is Good for Science is Not Always Good for Society, British Journal of the Philosophy of Science 36 (1985). 5. See P. D. Shaw, Popper, Historicism, and the Remaking of Society, Philosophy of Social Science, 1 (1971), p. 305. 6. See Popper, op. cit., pp. 6667 & 88; and Karl Popper, The Open Society and Its Enemies (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1962), v. 1, pp.159 & 163. 7. See Irzik, op. cit., pp. 28. Also see George Kateb, Utopianism and Its Enemies (London: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1963). 8. Popper, The Open Society and Its Enemies v. I, pp. 157158 9. See ibid., v. I, pp. 159161; and Karl Popper, Utopia and Violence in his Conjectures and Refutations: The Growth of Scientific Knowledge (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1963), pp. 355361. 10. Popper, The Poverty of Historicism, p. 89. 11. Ibid. 12. Popper, Utopia and Violence, p. 362, and Popper, The Poverty of Historicism, p. 76. 13. Ibid., p. 69. 14. Popper, The Open Society and Its Enemies, v. I, p. 167. 15. See Popper, The Poverty of Historicism, p.73; Popper, Utopia and Violence, in op. cit., p. 359360 & 362; Popper, The Open Society and Its Enemies, v. I, p. 233. 16. Popper, The Poverty of Historicism, pp. 6970. 17. See Popper, The Open Society and Its Enemies, v. p. 167. 18. See ibid., v. I, p. 163; Popper, The Poverty of Historicism, 6970 & 89. 19. Popper, Utopia and Violence, p. 359; see also, Popper, The Open Society and Its Enemies, v. II, p. 288. 20. Ibid., v. II, p. 233. 21. See Karl Popper, Remarks on the Problem of Demarcation and of Rationality, in Imre Lakatos and Alan Musgrave, eds., Problems in the Philosophy of Science (Amsterdam: North-Holland Publishing Company, 1968), pp. 88102. 22. See Popper, The Poverty of Historicism, pp. 70 and 89; and Popper, The Open Society and Its Enemies, v. II, p. 233.

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23. See Shaw, op. cit., p. 306. 24. Popper, The Open Society and Its Enemies, v. I, p. 161. 25. Karl Popper, On the Sources of Knowledge and Ignorance, in Conjectures and Refutations, p. 6; and Karl Popper, Autobiography, in The Philosophy of Karl Popper, edited by Paul Schilpp, (La Salle, Ill.: Open Court Press, 1974), v. I, p. 91. 26. Popper, The Open Society and Its Enemies, v. I, p. 172. 27. Ibid. 28. Ibid., v. I, pp. 176177. 29. Ibid., v. I, pp. 188. 30. Ibid., v. I, p. 175. 31. See Popper, Public Opinion and Liberal Principles, in Popper, Conjectures and Refutations, pp. 350352. 32. See Shklar, op. cit., pp. 235256; and Carl Friedrich, The Political Thought of NeoLiberalism, American Political Science Review, 49 (1955). 33. Popper, Public Opinion and Liberal Principles, p. 351; Popper, The Open Society and Its Enemies, v. I, pp. 171201. 34. Popper, Public Opinion and Liberal Principles, p. 351; see, also Popper, The Open Society and Its Enemies, v. I, p. 187. 35. See Popper, On the Sources of Knowledge and Ignorance, p. 6; and Popper, Autobiography, p. 91. 36. Popper, The Open Society and Its Enemies, v. II, p. 238. 37. Popper, Public Opinion and Liberal Principles, p. 352. 38. Popper, Towards a Rational Theory of Tradition, in op. cit., pp. 120135; Popper, On the Sources of Knowledge and Ignorance, in op. cit., pp. 418; and Popper, Public Opinion and Liberal Principles,in op. cit., pp. 350353. 39. Karl Popper, The Logic of Scientific Discovery (New York: Harper and Row, Publishers, 1959), p. 108. 40. Popper, The Open Society and Its Enemies, v. II, p. 225. 41. Ibid., v. I, pp. 186ff, and v. II, pp. 227228. 42. Ibid., v. II, p. 225. 43. See Barbara Goodwin, Utopia Defended Against the Liberals, Policy Studies 28 (1980).