Missing Political Law Case Doctrines Macalintal vs PET, GR 191618, June 7, 2011 (Admin Law, PET, Quasi-judicial power)

1. Whether or not PET is constitutional. - Yes. The explicit reference of the Members of the Constitutional Commission to a Presidential Electoral Tribunal, with Fr. Joaquin Bernas categorically declaring that in crafting the last paragraph of Sec. 4, Art VII of the 1987 Constitution, they constitutionalized what was statutory. Judicial power granted to the Supreme Court by the same Constitution is plenary. And under the doctrine of necessary implication, the additional jurisdiction bestowed by the last paragraph of Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution to decide presidential and vice-presidential elections contests includes the means necessary to carry it into effect. 2. Whether or not PET exercises quasi-judicial power. - No. The traditional grant of judicial power is found in Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution which provides that the power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law. The set up embodied in the Constitution and statutes characterize the resolution of electoral contests as essentially an exercise of judicial power. When the Supreme Court, as PET, resolves a presidential or vice-presidential election contest, it performs what is essentially a judicial power. 3. The COMELEC, HRET and SET are not, strictly and literally speaking, courts of law . Although not courts of law, they are, nonetheless, empowered to resolve election contests which involve, in essence, an exercise of judicial power, because of the explicit constitutional empowerment found in Section 2(2), Article IX-C (for the COMELEC) and Section 17, Article VI (for the Senate and House Electoral Tribunals) of the Constitution. FERDINAND S. TOPACIO vs. ASSOCIATE JUSTICE OF THE SANDIGANBAYAN GREGORY SANTOS ONG G.R. No. 179895, December 18, 2008 1. The title to a public office may not be contested except directly, by quo warranto proceedings; and it cannot be assailed collaterally, Gonzales v. COMELEC, et al., 129 Phil 7, 29 (1967), even through mandamus or a motion to annul or set aside order. [See also: Pilar v. Sec. of the DPWTC, et al., 125 Phil. 766 (1967); Gamboa, et al. v. CA, et al., 194 Phil. 624 (1981)]. In Nacionalista Party v. De Vera, 85 Phil. 126 (1949), the Court ruled that prohibition does not lie to inquire into the validity of the appointment of a public officer. 2. [T]he writ of prohibition, even when directed against persons acting as judges or other judicial officers, cannot be treated as a substitute for quo warranto or be rightfully called upon to perform any of the functions of the writ. If there is a court, judge or officer de facto, the title to the office and the right to act cannot be questioned by prohibition. If an intruder takes possession of a judicial office, the person dispossessed cannot obtain relief through a writ of prohibition commanding the alleged intruder to cease from performing judicial acts, since in its very nature prohibition is an improper remedy by which to determine the title to an office. 3. A quo warranto proceeding is the proper legal remedy to determine the right or title to the contested public office and to oust the holder from its enjoyment. [Sec. Defensor Santiago v. Sen. Guingona, Jr., 359 Phil. 276, 302 (1998)]. It is brought against the person who is alleged to have usurped, intruded into, or unlawfully held or exercised the public office [Pilar v. Sec. of the DPWTC, et al., 125 Phil. 766 (1967)], and may be commenced by the Solicitor General or a public prosecutor, as the case may be, or by any person claiming to be entitled to the public office or position usurped or unlawfully held or exercised by another. [RULES OF COURT Rule 66, Sec. 5]. Civil Service Commission v. Department of Budget and Management G.R. No. 158791 July 22, 2005 1. That the no report, no release policy may not be validly enforced against offices vested with fiscal autonomy is not disputed. Indeed, such policy cannot be enforced against offices possessing fiscal autonomy without violating Article IX (A), Section 5 of the Constitution. 2. Websters Third New International Dictionary defines automatic as involuntary either wholly or to a major extent so that any activity of the will is largely negligible; of a reflex nature; without volition; mechanical; like or suggestive of an automaton. Further, the word automatically is defined as in an automatic manner: without thought or conscious intention. Being automatic, thus, connotes something mechanical, spontaneous and perfunctory.As such the LGUs are not required to perform any act to receive the just share accruing to them from the national coffers. By parity of construction, automatic release of approved annual appropriations to petitioner, a constitutional commission which is vested with fiscal autonomy, should thus be construed to mean that no condition to fund releases to it may be imposed. 3. The Constitution grants the enjoyment of fiscal autonomy only to the Judiciary, the Constitutional Commissions of which petitioner is one, and the Ombudsman. To hold that petitioner may be subjected to withholding or reduction of funds in the event of a revenue shortfall would, to that extent, place petitioner and the other entities vested with fiscal autonomy on equal footing with all others which are not granted the same autonomy, thereby reducing to naught the distinction established by the Constitution. The agencies which the Constitution has vested with fiscal autonomy should thus be given priority in the release of their approved appropriations over all other agencies not similarly vested when there is a revenue shortfall. 4. This phrase subject to availability of funds does not, however, contradict the present ruling that the funds of entities vested with fiscal autonomy should be automatically and regularly released, a shortfall in revenues notwithstanding. What is contemplated in the said quoted phrase is a situation where total revenue collections are so low that they are not sufficient to cover the total appropriations for all entities vested

with fiscal autonomy. In such event, it would be practically impossible to fully release the Judiciarys appropriations or any of the entities also vested with fiscal autonomy for that matter, without violating the right of such other entities to an automatic release of their own appropriations. It is under that situation that a relaxation of the constitutional mandate to automatically and regularly release appropriations is allowed. AMERICAN BIBLE SOCIETY VS. CITY OF MANILA [101PHIL 386; G.R. NO. 9637; 30 APR 1957] 1. Section 1, subsection (7) of Article III of the Constitution is a constitutional guaranty of the free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship, which carries with it the right to disseminate religious information. 2. It may be true that in the case at bar the price asked for the bibles and other religious pamphlets was in some instances a little bit higher than the actual cost of the same but this cannot mean that appellant was engaged in the business or occupation of selling said "merchandise" for profit. For this reason, the provisions of City of Manila Ordinance No. 2529, as amended, cannot be applied to appellant, for in doing so it would impair its free exercise and enjoyment of its religious profession and worship as well as its rights of dissemination of religious beliefs. 3. With respect to Ordinance No. 3000, as amended, it does not impose any charge upon the enjoyment of a right granted by the Constitution, nor tax the exercise of religious practices. BALAO et al vs. GMA G.R. No. 186050 December 13, 2011 1. The Rule on the Writ of Amparo was promulgated on October 24, 2007 amidst rising incidence of extralegal killings and enforced disappearances. It was formulated in the exercise of this Courts expanded rule-making power for the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights albeit limited to these two situations. Extralegal killings refer to killings committed without due process of law, i.e., without legal safeguards or judicial proceedings. On the other hand, enforced disappearances are attended by the following characteristics: an arrest, detention, or abduction of a person by a government official or organized groups or private individuals acting with the direct or indirect acquiescence of the government; the refusal of the State to disclose the fate or whereabouts of the person concerned or a refusal to acknowledge the deprivation of liberty which places such person outside the protection of law. 2. Such documented practice of targeting activists in the militarys counter-insurgency program by itself does not fulfill the evidentiary standard provided in the Amparo Rule to establish an enforced disappearance. The similarity between the circumstances attending a particular case of abduction with those surrounding previous instances of enforced disappearances does not, necessarily, carry sufficient weight to prove that the government orchestrated such abduction. 3. Command responsibility, as legal basis to hold military/police commanders liable for extra-legal killings, enforced disappearances, or threats, may be made applicable to this jurisdiction on the theory that the command responsibility doctrine now constitutes a principle of international law or customary international law in accordance with the incorporation clause of the Constitution. The Court does not rule in such proceedings on any issue of criminal culpability, even if incidentally a crime or an infraction of an administrative rule may have been committed. The writ of amparo was conceived to provide expeditious and effective procedural relief against violations or threats of violation of the basic rights to life, liberty, and security of persons; the corresponding amparo suit, however, is not an action to determine criminal guilt requiring proof beyond reasonable doubt x x x or administrative liability requiring substantial evidence that will require full and exhaustive proceedings. LIWAYWAY VINZONS-CHATO v. HRET AND ELMER E. PANOTES G.R. NO. 204637 16 APRIL 2013 REYES J. 1. Section 2(3) of R.A. No. 9369 defines official ballot where AES [Automated Election System] is utilized as the paper ballot, whether printed or generated by the technology applied, that faithfully captures or represents the votes cast by a voter recorded or to be recorded in electronic form. 2. As established during the required demo tests, the system captured the images of the ballots in encrypted format which, when decrypted for verification, were found to be digitized representations of the ballots cast. As such, the printouts thereof [PIBs] are the functional equivalent of the paper ballots filled out by the voters and, thus, may be used for purposes of revision of votes in an electoral protest. 3. To substitute our own judgment to the findings of the HRET will doubtless constitute an intrusion into its domain and a curtailment of its power to act of its own accord on its evaluation of the evidentiary weight of testimonies presented before it.