Suggested Questions for President Bush and Vice President Cheney (4/22)

I. PRESIDENT: Before and during the transition the CIA briefed you on al Qaeda
and Bin Ladin. George Tenet reportedly ranked Bin Ladin as one of the top three threats
to America. In your interview with Bob Woodward, you mentioned that "I didn't feel
mat sense of urgency... My blood was not nearly as boiling" as it was after September
I1. How did you size up the terrorism problem as you were taking office?

Follow-up: Did you think the United States was facing the danger of a truly
catastrophic attack, one that might kill thousands of people?
Follow-up: What did President Clinton emphasize when he spoke to you before
you took office?

Follow-up: Do you recall President Clinton prioritizing national security threats,

and what those priorities were?

Follow-up: What do you recall from your briefing on al Qaeda from Director
Tenet and Deputy Director Pavitt?

2. PRESIDENT: We understand that you gathered principals shortly after taking

office to share thoughts about other major ongoing threats, like the principals meeting on
Iraq early in February. Did you consider getting principals together early on the al
Qaeda threat, to emphasize how important this problem was to you and hear their initial
views on it? Did you discuss this with Dr. Rice?

Follow-up: What direction did you give Dr. Rice on policy development on al
Qaeda?

3. PRESIDENT: |
9/11 Closed by Statute

J What did you know

about this pending investigation? What did you think America should do about it?

Follow-up: Did you consider at least saying something about these thoughts to
the American people, or at least to the administration, instead of just letting the Cole
attack hang out there, unanswered?

4. VICE PRESIDENT: We understand that, from the start, the President wanted you
to take a special interest in intelligence issues. If that is right, what intelligence issues did
you try to take on?
 Follow-up (if necessary): How did you and the President view the resources
being allocated to intelligence?

Follow-up for PRESIDENT and VICE PRESIDENT: In NSPD-5, you asked

George Tenet to study the future of the intelligence community. That was the study with
the outside panel chaired by Brent Scowcroft. Did Director Tenet give you his final
recommendations on how the community needed to change? .... What were your views
of his suggestions [if any]?

5. PRESIDENT: You had seen White House organization close up in your father's
administration. Could you talk for a moment about the choices you made in how to
organize the way you managed and related to your national security team?

Follow-up: What guidance did you give Dr. Rice, if any, on how to structure the
National Security Council staff?

6. PRESIDENT: As you were getting briefed about al Qaeda threats in the spring of
2001, we have heard you commented that you were tired of 'swatting flies.' Do you
remember when you said that? What did you mean by that, and what did you want the
government to do instead?

Follow-up: Did you think this effort was big enough, and fast enough?

Follow-up: Where did the idea originate to do a presidential directive on al

Qaeda?

7. PRESIDENT: What was your impression of the FBI? Did you think it was in
good shape when you took office?

Follow-up: Did you ever talk about counterterrorism with Director Freeh? With
Acting Director Pickard?

Follow-up: Did you ever talk about this subject with Attorney General Ashcroft?

8. PRESIDENT: When you were hearing about the al Qaeda threats in the spring
and summer, we understand that you asked the DCI and your CIA briefer about domestic
threats. They eventually prepared the famous August 6 PDB. Did you pose these same
questions to your Attorney General or the Director of the FBI? Did they give you an
assessment?
9. PRESIDENT and VICE PRESIDENT: What was your understanding of the
covert action plans left over from the Clinton administration to deal with al Qaeda? Did
you have any particular concerns about them?

Follow-up: What did you think of the readiness or capabilities of the CIA to carry
out a major covert action program against a country like Afghanistan?

10. PRESIDENT: Before 9/11, one of the ideas for dealing with Bin Ladin was to
use the armed Predator. What did you think of this idea as an option for dealing with Bin
Ladin?

Follow-up: Were any issues about the Predator ever brought to your attention? If
so, what were they?

Follow-up: Is the CIA the right agency to operate a weapon system like this?
Thinking about today, have you considered the possibility of giving covert action
authority to the Pentagon to allow them to operate weapon systems like this?

11. PRESIDENT and VICE PRESIDENT: Either in thinking about the Cole or as a
new policy to deal with al Qaeda was being developed during the spring and summer, did
either of you ever ask Secretary Rumsfeld or General Shelton for a briefing on the
Pentagon's existing military plans to deal with al Qaeda or Afghanistan?

Follow-up: Do you know whether your national security advisers (Rice, Libby)
ever received such a briefing?

12. PRESIDENT: In February 2001 you sent a message to President Musharraf of

Pakistan about the relationship. You mentioned the terrorism problem. How did you see
the challenge there? Did you think there was a realistic chance that diplomacy might
solve the Bin Ladin problem?

13. PRESIDENT: Before 9/11, had you talked with your advisers about how to
respond or deal with the consequences of a major terrorist attack on the United States?

14. PRESIDENT: Why did you ask the Vice President to study national preparedness
for an unconventional attack? What did you expect to come from this effort?

Follow-up for VICE PRESIDENT: What were your goals? What progress did
you make before 9/11? How often did you meet? Did this work help you after 9/11?
 Follow-up for VICE PRESIDENT: Were either you or the President briefed on
recommendations from commissions like those headed by Hart and Rudman, Gilmore, or
Bremer?

15. PRESIDENT: In the spring and summer of 2001, as you were getting all these
ominous threat reports, how did you view your role? What did you think you could do?

Follow-up: Did you consider gathering your principals, including the Attorney
General, to talk about any measures to address this threat reporting?

16. PRESIDENT: On the August 6 PDB, what was your reaction to the report?

Follow-up: Did you discuss with Dr. Rice or anyone else the significance of this
information?

Follow-up: Did you take any steps to follow up on the report?

Follow-up: Was any other intelligence - about airplanes as missiles, Islamic

extremists learning to fly - ever brought to your attention?

17. PRESIDENT: On the morning of 9/11, when you got word of the second attack,
the second plane hitting the World Trade Center, why did you stay in the education
event? After you left, did you or your aides discuss what immediate decisions you might
need to make, aside from making an initial public statement?

18. PRESIDENT and VICE PRESIDENT: Both of you apparently spoke on the
telephone just after the Pentagon was hit, while the Vice President was in the tunnel on
the way to the PEOC. Do you remember what that conversation was about?

19. VICE PRESIDENT: Do you remember just when you first discussed the possible
need to shoot down an American airliner with the President? Was that after you arrived
in the PEOC, after the aide came in with the information about the plane that was 80,
then 60, miles out?

Follow-up with the PRESIDENT: Do you remember anything else about that
conversation?

20. VICE PRESIDENT: Do you recall later authorizing engagement by planes

scrambled out of Andrews AFB? Did you know that those planes were not under
NORAD's command, but were National Guard aircraft alerted by the Secret Service?
21. PRESIDENT and VICE PRESIDENT: You both had to work a command and
control system while America was under attack. In retrospect, thinking about lessons
learned, how well did you think the crisis management system worked?

Follow-up: How good was your awareness of the military situation and the
choices you had to make in the minutes after the attacks began? Was it the case that
those choices did not become clear to you until more than an hour after the attacks began,
and after all the attackers had hit their targets or crashed?

22. PRESIDENT: What did you think were the most important decisions you made
in the first hours after the attacks?

Follow-up: The choice of war? The decision to go to war against those who
"harbor" terrorists?

Follow-up: The $20 billion commitment to New York City?

Follow-up: Were you involved in the Attorney General's decisions to use

immigration and other laws to order the detention of Muslim males suspected of links to
terrorism?

23. PRESIDENT: Talk to us about the way you decided to organize your decisions
about war. Did you make any special decisions about how to handle the crisis
management? Any lessons for future Presidents?

24. PRESIDENT and VICE PRESIDENT: Did either of you get a request from the
Saudi government to help them evacuate their nationals, such as the Bin Ladin family,
after 9/11 ? If so, what action did you take?

25. PRESIDENT: In Dick Clarke's book, he recounts a conversation with you on the
evening of September 12 in the Situation Room when he says you asked him, in an
intimidating way, to find out if Saddam did this. Do you remember this? Can you help
us understand what was on your mind? Did you believe Iraq was connected to the 9/11
attacks?

26. PRESIDENT: We have heard about documents that describe a two phase
approach you arrived at for the overall strategy in the war. The first phase would involve
Afghanistan. The second phase would go beyond Afghanistan. Could you help us
understand your approach at that time?
 Follow-up: Although we understand Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz pushed at
Camp David for a possible attack on Iraq, that was put aside. But your order on Monday,
September 17, did call for planning against Iraq, and planning for the DOD idea about
seizing just oil fields. How did you see these Iraq plans fitting in?

27. PRESIDENT: What did you think of the war plans you first saw after 9/11 ?

Follow-up: What lessons have you learned about getting the most out of the
Pentagon?

28. PRESIDENT: What have you learned about how a President should receive and
evaluate intelligence?

29. PRESIDENT: Our nation is in the middle of a historic transformation for anew
kind of world and new threats. We are working on possible recommendations. Do you
think that our national strategy for countering terrorism is where it needs to be? Where
do you think the strategy needs more development?

30. PRESIDENT and VICE PRESIDENT: We have heard a lot about coordination
problems. A lot of this is being pushed into a White House staff that is growing and
growing, and seems more and more unwieldy. Have you thought about ways to get the
government organized better for joint work without having everyone come to the White
House in order to do it?

Follow-up: Is the Terrorism Threat Integration Center working out the way you
had intended?

Follow-up: From a management point of view, what do you think is the toughest
challenge Tom Ridge now must overcome?

Follow-up: The Department of Defense now has at least three unified commands
working on terrorism: SOCOM, NORTHCOM, and CENTCOM. The Department of
State has a larger counterterrorism office, but is otherwise unchanged. Are we keeping
the right balance of effort in the war on terrorism?

31. PRESIDENT: You built a broad international coalition to help wage this war on
terror. But do you think you have brought them around to a common coalition strategy?
Is this coalition too ad hoc to hold up over time?
32. PRESIDENT and VICE PRESIDENT: Everyone talks about the information
management problems. We have learned that, if you want real sharing, no agency can
solve these problems on its own. The problems are not just technical; they are legal and
policy challenges too. What does the White House need to do to bring the information
revolution to the national security agencies?

33. PRESIDENT: One of the questions that the Commission is wrestling with is
accountability, and how we make judgments about accountability. As we now look back,
why was the government unable to defense the country on 9/11?

Follow-up: Where does accountability rest?