Quantum Mechanics,

Quantum Information Theory,

and the Sirens of Interpretation
Candidate #80716

A dissertation submitted for the degree of

MSc in the Philosophy & History of Science

London School of Economics and Political Science

Department of Philosophy, Logic, and Scientific Method

22 August 2005
Contents

1. Introduction ..................................................................................................... 3

2. The Problems of Quantum Mechanics ........................................................... 5

2.1 Introduction................................................................................................................... 5
2.2 The measurement problem ......................................................................................... 6
2.3 The Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen paradox ..................................................................... 7
2.4 Probabilities ................................................................................................................... 9

3. Fuchs’ Programme .........................................................................................10

3.1 Quantum information theory.................................................................................... 10

3.2 Fuchs’ research programme ...................................................................................... 11
3.2 New problems arise .................................................................................................... 13

4. Does Quantum Mechanics Need an Interpretation?.....................................14

4.1 Interpretations—an introduction ............................................................................. 14

4.2 Interpretation without interpretation is still interpretation................................... 16
4.3 Quantum mechanics as a principle theory .............................................................. 20
4.4 Other approaches........................................................................................................ 23
4.5 The benefits of interpretation ................................................................................... 26

5. A New Interpretation is Not a New Theory ..................................................28

6. Conclusion ......................................................................................................30

7. References.......................................................................................................32

2
Quantum Mechanics,
Quantum Information Theory,
and the Sirens of Interpretation

1. Introduction

The philosophical interpretation of quantum mechanics is a problem—a big prob-

lem. Enigmatically, despite having a solid formulation of its principles for approxi-
mately 75 years, and despite exploiting its consequences with remarkable precision
and success, a transparent conceptual underpinning continues to elude us. It is a
theory precise enough to get the lambda shift correct to seven decimal places, suc-
cessful enough to not have been refuted by any experiment, and yet odd enough so
that no one confidently understands why it works.
Of course, there has been no shortage of attempts to give sense to quantum
mechanics. The enormous number of interpretations available and the myriad of
varieties within each is ample evidence of this: the Copenhagen tradition, originating
in the writing of Niels Bohr, has perhaps the largest contingency of followers; others
include advocates of Bohmian mechanics, consistent historians, the various theories
of spontaneous collapse, and the many-worlds followers of Hugh Everett. The list
goes on and on—each interpretation offering radically different conceptions of the

3
universe, with developments ongoing and new ones always on the horizon—but
none able to affirm a distinguishingly clear advantage.
Indeed, possibly because of a backlash towards this sprawling research, a
new enthusiasm now shared amongst many practicing physicists is that all of these
foundational pursuits are directionless because quantum mechanics in fact needs no
interpretation at all (see e.g. Fuchs and Peres 2000). Motivated by new insight af-
forded by quantum information theory (QIT), many are of the opinion that quan-
tum mechanics can best be understood as an epistemic theory of information
transfer and manipulation (cf. e.g., Wheeler 1989; Caves et al. 2000; Mermin 2001;
Fuchs 2002; Clifton et al. 2003) instead of a physical theory connected directly to the
world. Because the formalism of the theory directly reflects an information-led un-
derstanding, so the position maintains, no interpretation is involved by adopting this
viewpoint.
In this paper I examine these claims and critically evaluate the alleged nov-
elty of an interpretation of quantum mechanics founded in QIT. My investigation is
directed primarily towards the research programme of Christopher Fuchs (see e.g.
Fuchs and Peres 2000; Fuchs 2001; and Fuchs 2002) and his efforts to persuade the
physics community toward this end. I begin with a brief look at some of the issues
commonly referred to as problems in the foundations of quantum mechanics in Sec-
tion 2 of this paper. Two are the most prominent, largely because they are the most
perplexing of quantum theory’s conclusions: the problem of measurement, particu-
larly the collapse of the wave function; and the problem of non-locality surrounding
the EPR thought experiment. I also discuss the issue of interpreting probability and
of how this is a key problem in ascertaining how one wishes to interpret quantum
mechanics. In Section 3 I introduce Fuchs’ programme and go on to explain how
Fuchs feels the aforementioned vices of Section 2 to be the virtues of his position.
Here I also outline some immediate complaints with an information-led interpreta-
tion.
In Section 4 I then examine Fuchs’ claims that his programme has natural
priority over other interpretations. This section composes the bulk of the paper, for
in it, I try to understand what is new with Fuchs’ interpretation and evaluate the jus-
tifications offered why it should be adopted over others in light of so many extant

4
alternatives. I begin with an introductory look at the interpretation of scientific
theories, and draw general conclusions which I use to appraise his programme.
Here, I also contrast his specific views with others who have also embraced infor-
mation as the key to understanding quantum mechanics to show the inherent un-
derdetermination with any interpretation. The conclusion is made that Fuchs’
programme does not have special attributes that take his interpretation above and
beyond others.
Having established that Fuchs’ programme is an interpretation without pri-
ority, in Section 5 I then discuss how it, like any other interpretation, cannot offer
new physics. I look to be especially critical here because proponents of QIT believe
that profound beneficial consequences will ensue from adopting the epistemic view-
point—certainly a contentious claim, and I seek to illuminate why this is so. In Sec-
tion 6 I sum up these findings and reflect on the general benefits of and the
necessity for the interpretation of quantum mechanics.

2. The Problems of Quantum Mechanics

2.1 Introduction

The formalism of quantum mechanics has long been established, but there remain
conceptual difficulties with a number of its consequences. Two non-intuitive con-
sequences remain among the most heatedly discussed: the apparent problem of
measurement and the “collapse” of the wave function; and the ramifications of non-
locality intimated by the EPR thought experiments. To appreciate the appeal of
Fuchs’ programme as a way of resolving these problems, I review their standard
presentation and then elucidate how they are reconciled under his information-based
approach in the following section. I also review the problem of the interpretation of
probability and its direct relation to the interpretation of quantum mechanics to later
show how Fuchs’ epistemic approach has a natural place for a subjective interpreta-
tion.

5
2.2 The measurement problem

I illustrate the problem of measurement by describing an idealized thought experi-

ment involving spin-1/2 electrons.1 The goal is to measure whether a microscopic

isolated electron is either spin up ϕ up or spin down ϕ down . At hand is a macro-

scopic measuring apparatus with eigenvectors M up and M down which corre-

spond, respectively, to an output (that is, a “meter reading”) for the electron spin
being up or down. Initially, the two systems are isolated and do not interact. Then,
the electron enters a region of interaction with the measuring apparatus and the state
of the macrosystem becomes correlated with that of the microsystem. When the
two systems are separated, the interaction ceases, and we read off the output of the
apparatus to learn what the state of the microsystem had been before the measure-
ment. Ideally, the final state of the apparatus is uniquely and perfectly correlated
with what the state of the microsystem was before the interaction and leaves the ini-
tial state of the microsystem undisturbed.
For example, if the measuring apparatus were initially neutral (that is, in an
idle state not having yet taken a reading), and we knew the electron to be in the state
ϕ up , then the entire system initially would be ϕ up M neutral ; then, after interac-

tion, the state would evolve via the Schrödinger equation to ϕ up M up . Likewise,

if the measuring apparatus were neutral and we knew the electron to be in the ex-
cited state, the initial state would be ϕ down M neutral ; and, after interaction, would

evolve to the final state ϕ down M down .

However, prior to measurement, the state of the electron is not known.

That is, at best we can describe the electron spin as a superposition:

Ψsystem = α ϕ up + β ϕ down , where α + β = 1.

2 2

1This elucidation of the measurement problem is inspired by Albert (1992) and Cushing (1994, 34–
39).

6
Here is where the problem arises. The linearity of the Schrödinger equation requires
that, after the interaction with the measuring apparatus, the initial system state

(
Ψinital = α ϕ up + β ϕ down )M neutral

become the final system state

Ψ final = α ϕ up M up + β ϕ down M down .

The right side of this equation, however, does not correspond to any known macro-
scopic reality, for to read the result literally is to affirm that the macroscopic appara-
tus assumes a superposition reading both up and down. Such observations are
never made macroscopically; it is always either up or down, one or the other. This is
the measurement problem: our theory predicts results that seem to clash completely
with our experience of the everyday world. It is here that the standard approach
invokes a “collapse” of the wave packet upon “observation” to resolve the problem,
and it is here that arguments and intuitions lead in various directions.

2.3 The Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen paradox

The results just described are troubling. It seems that an unobserved particle does
not possess physical properties that exist independent of observation; rather, such
physical properties arise as a consequence of measurements performed upon the
system. The question naturally arises: is there perhaps more to the story that we are
unaware of? Many, including Albert Einstein, have been motivated by this very rea-
soning. The Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen article of 1935 is a major effort of Einstein to
explain his objection to the incompleteness of quantum mechanics. He believed the
theory to be a good one, but one that presented an incomplete description of quan-
tum phenomena. Einstein felt we are being misled by quantum mechanics in think-
ing the states it describes have physical significance; instead, there must exist
“hidden variables” in a grander theory that describes quantum phenomena without
the need for probabilities.

7
 The set-up for the thought experiment is as follows.2 Consider an entangled
pair of qubits belonging to Alice and Bob, respectively. This is represented by the
spin singlet

0 1 −1 0
ψ = .
2

The states are represented by eigenvectors 0 and 1 and correspond with eigenval-

ues of +1 and –1. Suppose that Alice and Bob are a long way away from one an-
r
other. Alice performs a measurement of spin along any axis v and obtains the
result +1. This then means that she can predict with certainty that Bob will measure
r
–1 on his qubit were he to measure spin along the same v axis. Alternatively, if Al-
ice were to obtain the result –1, she could predict with certainty that Bob would ob-
tain result +1 on his qubit. Alice’s result immediately singles out one state over
another, and hence, Alice can always predict the value of the measurement recorded
when Bob’s qubit is measured.
This consequence, simple as it seems, however, immediately presents prob-
lems with causal relations. If i) the state vector represents the objective state of a
quantum system, ii) the collapse is a physical mechanism, and iii) the two measure-
ments are space-like separated, then there exist Lorentz frames where Bob’s meas-
urement is earlier than Alice’s. This ambiguity underscores the difficulty of
reconciling relativistic covariance with physical collapse. Predications such as these
were later proved rigorously by John Bell (1964), who showed mathematically that
no theory holding the assumptions of locality—the assumption that Alice’s meas-
urements do not influence the results of Bob’s measurements—and realism—the
assumption that the system’s physical properties have definite values that exist inde-
pendent of observation—can account for the outcome of the EPR experiment.
This appears to imply that the world is non-local, which is seemingly a difficult fact
to accept.3

2I have borrowed this description of the EPR paradox from Nielsen and Chuang (2000).
3There exist volumes of literature on the Bell inequalities and their consequences for locality. See,
for example, Jarrett (1984) and Shimony (1986). Maudlin (1994) makes the case that non-locality in

8
2.4 Probabilities

The final problem in quantum mechanics I wish to touch upon here is the interpre-
tation of probabilities. In general, arguments about the interpretation of quantum
theory are at least partially arguments about the meaning of probability, distin-
guished by how they answer the question: “what are the quantum probabilities—the
probabilities which are calculated according to Born’s rule—probabilities for?”
(Maudlin 2001). That these probabilities are objective has long been the orthodox
view. Indeed, different agents do not appear to have a choice about the assignment
of a probability distribution, and hence, the probabilities have been long seen as ob-
jective, fixed, and mind-independent. There is a subjective element to how the sys-
tem is created, but the probabilities arrived at are believed to be ones intrinsic to
nature.
But the interpretation of probability—so crucial in quantum mechanics—has
proven to be a polemic issue. Despite many intuitive notions, there long failed to be
an interpretation that could properly accommodate what it meant to affirm an objec-
tive probability in the single-case scenario that withstood all criticisms (Galavotti
1995). Von Mises’ frequency interpretation (cf. von Mises 1939) was naturally as-
sumed as well-suited to quantum mechanics, but its inability to cope with single-
cases (as well as various other shortcomings) made it unacceptable. Others then
adopted Popper’s propensity interpretation (cf. Popper 1956), but this gained
ground in some areas only to lose it in others: in its early formulation it also was un-
able to predict single-case probabilities; and in its later formulation it rested on
metaphysical assumptions unable to be empirically tested (cf. Gillies 2000, chapter 6).
Later work in this area has advanced (see, e.g. Gilles 2000, chapter 7), but propensi-
ties remain controversial as an interpretation of probability for objective, single-cases
(see Humphreys 1985; and Milne 1986).
Indeed, the difficulties of interpreting probability theory as a physical theory
of phenomena governed by chance or randomness gave reason for some to interpret
it instead as a mental phenomenon. This was the motivation behind the subjectivist,

quantum mechanics and Lorentz-invariance in special relativity can coexist peacefully, but that the
assumptions associated with such an interpretation of quantum mechanics unlikely.

9
or personalist, programme (see, e.g. de Finetti 1974). Since its inception, subjectiv-
ism as espoused by Bruno de Finetti was looked at sceptically as a serious candidate
for application to physical theories, particularly quantum mechanics. Though able to
accommodate the probabilities of quantum mechanics, de Finetti’s probabilism (cf.
de Finetti 1989) came off as too radical for scientists with uncompromising beliefs in
objectivity. To de Finetti, probabilities did not exist and were nothing other than
the sensation of an individual; likewise, he firmly believed there to be no such thing
as objective chance and dismissed it as a metaphysical construct. These were ideas
plainly at odds with dominant scientific thought.
The story up until now, then, runs approximately as follows. The general
belief for scientists working in quantum mechanics has been in objective probabili-
ties, but it is a belief without an interpretation solid enough against attacks that point
out shortcomings with regard to objective single-cases. Alternatively, a subjective
interpretation seems grossly improper for a theory with predictions about an objec-
tive, agent-independent world, despite being naturally suited for single-case scenarios.
Indeed, as long as quantum mechanics is interpreted as a theory of nature that
makes predictions about the outcomes of experiments with such high precision, its
probabilities do not appear to be properly interpreted as the mental degrees of belief
associated with the subjectivist interpretation.

3. Fuchs’ Programme

3.1 Quantum information theory

In the literature there now exists a number of proponents of the view that quantum
mechanics has always been a theory about information, and the suggestion is that
these traditional problems of measurement, non-locality, and the selection of the
interpretation of probability, are resolved when one views the quantum state as
solely representing one’s knowledge or information. A particularly vocal advocate of
this camp that quantum mechanics should be reformulated on the conceptual basis

10
of QIT, and the focus of this paper, is Christopher Fuchs. I now briefly review his
research programme, which interprets the wave function to be purely information-
based and its probabilities solely as subjective degrees of belief, and discuss how he
dissolves these foundational problems. This then leads into a critical assessment of
the entire epistemic, information-led programme that claims to be an “interpretation
without interpretation” (Fuchs and Peres 2000).

3.2 Fuchs’ research programme

Fuchs’ programme involves two strong conceptual shifts: i) thinking of quantum

mechanics purely as a theory of information, and ii) interpreting its probabilities as
subjective degrees of belief. Fuchs claims that the paradoxes of quantum mechan-
ics—which for many interpretations provide troubling consequences, particularly
those that ascribe a physical existence to the wave function—are resolved when
physical objectivity is removed and in its place pure, subjective information is substi-
tuted.
Typically, state vectors in quantum mechanics are interpreted as the objec-
tive state of a microscopic system, or at least have some physical tie with the system
being described. In the epistemic view promoted here, however, these state vectors
solely represent an agent’s degree of belief in the possible outcomes of macroscopic
measurements. The wave function no longer gets associated with anything physical;
instead, it is merely a mathematical expression for evaluating probabilities dependent
on the knowledge of whoever is doing the computing (Fuchs and Peres 2000).
If quantum theory is no longer interpreted as a theory about physical reality,
the aforementioned apprehensions about adopting subjective probabilities are molli-
fied. Moreover, making the switch to an information-led quantum mechanics makes
subjective probabilities a natural candidate. The development of Bayesian theory—a
theory largely about developing reliable methods of reasoning and making decisions
in light of incomplete information that serves as the guiding framework of the sub-
jective interpretation—has convinced many of the connection between the prob-

11
abilities of quantum mechanics and betting quotients of subjective Bayesianism. 4
The analogy of quantum mechanics to Bayesian probability runs roughly as follows.
The initial state p is the a priori probability distribution P(h) for some hypothesis, the
final state pd is the posterior probability distribution P(h|d), and the state-change rule
p → pd is the statistical model P(d|h) enacting the transition P(h) → P(h|d). Fuchs
finds the parallels striking and makes the claim that measurement in quantum me-
chanics, “is nothing more, and nothing less, than a refinement and a readjustment of
one’s initial state of belief” (Fuchs 2002, 34).
Consequently, the measurement problem is assuaged: the wave function as-
suming an eigenstate is no more than an adjustment of subjective probabilities,
conditionalized on newly discovered results of measurements. Collapses are no
longer a concern because they no longer exist—and in the place of any kind of
transformative physical process is merely an update in belief. Conceived as an
objective physical description of a microscopic system, the collapse of state vectors
presents problems because of its abrupt change. But conceived as a subjective
epistemic description, the state vector evolves unitarily as long as what is
conditionalized upon remains the same.
Likewise, the clash between collapse and Lorentz invariance is easily over-
come if one takes the state vector to merely represent an agent’s degree of belief in
measurements. What changes, then, upon measurement of the qubit, is Alice’s de-
gree of belief, and not the physical system under observation. Bob’s epistemic state
will change either if he himself performs a measurement or if Alice sends him the
result of her measurement by conventional means; but not otherwise. The problem
of non-locality arises only when one tries to reconcile the actual results of specific
experiments with the hypothetical results of other experiments that might have been
performed but were not—something not possible because information must be
passed between experimenters. In this light, quantum mechanics obeys physical lo-
cality because it does not describe physical reality.

4There are presently a number of papers that show how these probabilities can be successfully ac-
counted for in the framework of Bayesian probability theory: Mark Srednicki (2005); Ehud Lehrer
and Eran Shmaya (2005); Itmar Pitowsky (2003); Caves et al. (2002); Shack (2000) are recent contri-
butions.

12
3.2 New problems arise

I have thus far only highlighted the advertised advantages of Fuchs’ programme;
there are, indeed, a number of quibbles with its founding assumptions. Most appre-
hensions were largely foreseen by John Bell who originally warned against interpret-
ing quantum mechanics as purely epistemic: he listed “information” as one of his bad
words that “have no place in a formulation with any pretence to physical precision”
(Bell 1990, 34). Bell encapsulates the difficulties with this interpretation with two
rhetorical questions: “Information about What?” and “Whose Information?” Fuchs
has attempted to respond to these questions (e.g. Fuchs 2002), and reasonably so.
Here I briefly review some of the challenges made along these lines against the pro-
gramme as a segue into my own critical inquiry.
Many concerns are directed towards the process of updating beliefs. Is this
the measurement problem in disguise? What is the information about? Is it not
connected to the systems under study? Here the general worry is that Fuchs is un-
fairly ignoring the fact that the theory must somehow be connected to the system
being described. This will later be discussed as a reason why the epistemic approach
begs for further interpretation. Other concerns are directed towards the subjectivity
that Fuchs embraces—one that shouldn’t be allowed in an objective science. At-
tempts to refute the subjective approach of this type typically cite arguments in the
likeness of Wigner’s friend paradoxes in which two different agents come to disagree
on the state of a system. Since there can only be one true state, so the argument
goes, one must be wrong and the conflict telling of the inconsistencies inherent in a
subjective interpretation.
These are questions that Hagar (2003) raises and attempts to address. He
concludes that Fuchs’ interpretation able to cope with them, but only at the cost of a
“thin realism”—that is, Fuchs can maintain his interpretation only by sliding into
overwhelmingly instrumentalist territory. It is an interesting charge, but one I don’t
believe completely deserving; Lefteris Farmakis (unpublished) agrees. While I think
the reasoning of Farmakis not wholly satisfying, I remain of the same opinion that
Fuchs can successfully maintain a subjective Bayesian stance about quantum prob-

13
abilities, be an instrumentalist with regard to the quantum state, and still remain a
realist about other parts of quantum mechanics.
It is the assumption of this paper that Fuchs can maintain a consistent stance
with realist elements, but only at the sacrifice of holding onto the notion that his is
an “interpretation without interpretation”. To make the notion of information
meaningful, and to explain why the theory takes the form it does, Fuchs hypothe-
sizes about nature in ways that necessarily go beyond an instrumentalist interpreta-
tion. This is where I wish to attack, and my argument to evolve over the next two
sections is double-pronged. First, I show how his “no interpretation” stance is still
an interpretation that suffers from underdetermination like any other. Second, I dis-
cuss how, with any interpretation, there are no new consequences that can emerge
from the theory not already inherent within the postulates. Fuchs believes a minimal
reading of a theory gives it priority over others, but as the following discussion of
interpretation is to show, theoretical parsimony is not a necessary condition for
truthlikeness and so no such special status is deserved.

4. Does Quantum Mechanics Need an

Interpretation?

4.1 Interpretations—an introduction

The phenomena underdetermine the theory, and the theory, in turn, underdeter-
mines the interpretation.5 This has been the two-tiered obstacle of science since its
inception. In principle alternative developments of science can be theoretically in-
compatible yet empirically equivalent, and for each of these developments there al-
ways exist a variety of tenable interpretations. As van Fraassen (1991) writes, it is a
fine art to disentangle conceptual difficulties from questions about what the theory
itself implies, and such is the quagmire we have found ourselves stuck in for three-
quarters of a century with the emergence of quantum theory. We have at hand an

5 This thought in its terse sense was inspired by van Fraassen (1991).

14
incredible selection of interpretations, but no apparent way of singling one out.
Fuchs claims to have solved this dilemma—cutting the Gordian knot of the inter-
pretation of quantum mechanics—with his “interpretation without interpretation”;
but is this a satisfactory response? Is it a proper one? These are the questions we
now concern ourselves with.
Pursuit of an answer begins with another question: What do we mean to in-
terpret a theory? Redhead (1987) distinguishes two senses of the interpretation of a
theory, and I use this demarcation as a convenient, explicit definition. In the first
sense, call it S1, to interpret a theory is to provide rules which correlate mathemati-
cal components with physical quantities. This is an instrumentalist interpretation:
theories are merely instruments for expressing regularities among observations; con-
venience, parsimony, and simplicity are the only guides; and questions of truth that
go beyond the observable world are ignored (Redhead 1987, 44). In the second
sense, call it S2, the interpretation of a theory provides, “some account of the nature
of the external world and/or our epistemological relation to it that serves to explain
how it is that the statistical regularities predicted by the formalism with the minimal
instrumentalist interpretation come out the way they do” (Redhead 1987, 44). In-
terpretations of this sort attribute more to the theory than the formalism immedi-
ately presents in an attempt to make the results understandable.
Admittedly, what it means to explain and understand are themselves conten-
tious matters. If one believes that A serves to explain B, what explains A in the first
place? If we are to accept A, why not just accept B in the first place? (Redhead 1987,
45). In light of modern physics (e.g. the special and general theories of relativity),
this question has become increasingly problematic because the success of these
theories has forced the acceptance of non-intuitive principles. We often want to fall
back on “common sense” understandings of nature, but more and more nature has
forced thought to depart from comfortable intuitive notions.
In interpreting a theory, there is a delicate interplay between the elements we
cannot accept as they stand that demand explanation, and those we are willing to
accept because they abide by intuition. Omnès (1994) describes this as the subtle
relation between common sense and conformism. In the construction of a theory,
science pays deference to common sense as far as possible, but rejects it if necessary.

15
The general rule is that the constraints of common sense may be abandoned as soon
as they have shown their inability to take account of all the facts; however, when this
rejection is exercised is uncertain. This is where the discord between creativity and
conformism occurs and the boundaries between explanation and understanding be-
come blurred.
The significant conclusion to bear in mind for the remainder of this paper is
that any explanation offered to make a theory comprehensible takes it beyond the
instrumental interpretational sense of S1 into the sense of S2. This point is crucial
to understand whether Fuchs’ “no interpretation” is genuine, for, if it includes any
kind of explanation, it will necessarily possess the same underdetermination shared
by all interpretations in this second sense S2. Additionally, it will be worth evaluat-
ing whether a “no interpretation” stance can even manage to interpret satisfyingly in
the sense of S1 in the first place. Having this insight will aid in ascertaining whether
Fuchs’ programme can maintain a special status over other interpretations.

4.2 Interpretation without interpretation is still interpretation

A common thread in the motivations of QIT-led foundational studies is that the

“interpretation without interpretation” doesn’t suffer from the theoretical baggage
of other interpretations which tack on unnecessary ontological weight. Arguments
tend to be of the kind Jeffrey Bub (2004) offers. He, an advocate of an epistemic
interpretation of quantum mechanics, believes mechanical theories of quantum me-
chanics (such as Bohmian mechanics) face an unacceptable problem of underdeter-
mination. In his reasoning he draws upon the following methodological principle:

[I]f T΄ and T΄΄ are empirically equivalent extensions of a theory T,

and if T entails that, in principle, there could not be evidence favour-
ing one of the rival extensions T΄ or T΄΄, then it is not rational to be-
lieve either T΄ or T΄΄. (Bub 2004)

Bub’s motivation for this principle is the physical impossibility of any con-
formational evidence that would favour one extension over another. Any added

16
structure becomes untestable, and hence, superfluous. Fuchs doesn’t explicitly ad-
vocate Bub’s principle, but his arguments ring of the same tone when he states that
“trying to fulfill a classical worldview by encumbering quantum mechanics with hid-
den variables, multiple worlds, consistency rules, or spontaneous collapse, without
any improvement in its predictive power, only gives the illusion of a better under-
standing” (Fuchs and Peres 2000).
The immediate problem with this argument is that there is no such thing as
an a priori criterion for theory selection (and, likewise, choice of interpretation).
This is why considering empirically equivalent theories is part of the scientific inves-
tigative process. Both T΄ and T΄΄ are interpretations that point to how the world can
possibly be the way the theory describes it to be, and both are pursued because they
may open the way to non-equivalent theories.
Bub believes it rational to believe in T, but if this theory is selected from its
empirical equivalents, it must be so on the basis of criteria other than empirical
ones—perhaps something like criteria for simplicity along the lines of Ockham’s
razor. But criteria selection of this sort is highly contentious and remains the subject
of lively debate. Despite numerous attempts at deriving objective, a priori grounds
for theory selection, the problems of developing a precise formulation and a unified
justification remain unsolved. Indeed, it seems as though there can be no unique
warrant of simplicity stemming from truthlikeness that biases the choice of one the-
ory over another when equally backed by empirical evidence.6
Fuchs argues that “[n]othing more is needed for using the theory and under-
standing its nature” than his information-led interpretation, but the validity of this
claim is unsound. He makes a series of speculations about nature that are not ex-
plicitly outlined by the theory, many of which are localized around aspects of quan-
tum mechanics he believes entails an external world independent of an observer that
puts epistemological constraints on the information that can be accessed and ma-
nipulated. The various no-go theorems (that is, Bell’s theorem that suggests that all
hidden-variable theories have to be non-local, and Kochen-Specker’s theorem that

6For a review of the problems of defining simplicity in scientific theories see “A Panel Discussion of
Simplicity of Scientific Theories,” Philosophy of Science 28 (1961), pp. 109–71. Michael Friedman (1983)
has made a convincing case for theoretical simplicity in formulations of space-time, but I don’t find
his arguments applicable to interpretations of quantum mechanics.

17
precludes the possibility of assigning values to all observables in all states) suggest
that “there is something in the world that keeps us from ever getting more informa-
tion than can be captured through the formal structure of quantum mechanics”
(Fuchs 2002). He finds further evidence for this from Andrew Gleason’s theorem
(Gleason 1957), which proves that the set of quantum states is complete—that is, all
possible probability measures are generated by the density operators of pure or
mixed states by the Born rule—and, referring to earlier work of Paul Busch (1999)
and independently by Caves et al. (2000), believes it illuminating that it is much eas-
ier to derive the proof for the theorem through positive operator-valued measure-
ments (POVMs). Moreover, that the quantum-state change rule has nothing to do
with spacetime considerations “is telling us something deep: The quantum state is
information. Subjective, incomplete information” (Fuchs 2002, 11). Notice that all
of these statements act as explanatory aids that go beyond the interpretational sense
S1.
So Fuchs believes that quantum mechanics is telling us that the world is con-
trived in such a way that it conceals information from us. But the perplexing oddi-
ties of quantum mechanics carry through into his interpretation. The question
remains: Why is it like that? It is apparent that the ignorance that is inherent with an
epistemic interpretation calls for explanation; Fuchs recognizes this and attempts to
provide meaningful explanations—albeit minimal ones—why quantum theory looks
the way it does. But I argue, that while his link between theory and nature is a
nominal one, it still goes above and beyond the “no interpretation” position he es-
pouses.
Because Fuchs’ epistemic interpretation attempts to go beyond the instru-
mental sense of S1, his “no interpretation” is an interpretation underdetermined like
any other in the sense of S2. Fuchs’ posits are not the only admissible ones from
the formalism of quantum mechanics and his justifications remain speculative con-
jectures. Indeed, a number of the aforementioned posits about what to infer from
the minimal interpretation remain disputed. For instance, Carlton Caves, a collabo-
rator of Fuchs, believes that Hamiltonians should be thought of as real in quantum
mechanics, whereas Fuchs believes them to be incorporated into the subjective

18
framework.7 Fuchs is compelled to offer explanations how his theory fits into the
framework of the world, and in so doing must hypothesize the connections because
the formalism of the theory does not define them for him.
Relating this back to Omnès’ dialectic between common sense and conform-
ism, Fuchs has rejected common sense—that is, the intuitive notion that a complete
description of quantum phenomena is achievable—by abandoning a mechanical un-
derstanding of quantum mechanics to conform with the unintuitive notion that the
universe regulates information transfer. He sees this as an advantage because he
needn’t posit super-theoretical fields or multiple worlds, but his gains in theoretical
parsimony come at a loss in explanatory utility. Quantum mechanics, on its own,
inherently begs for further explanation, and to explain the quirkiness, he insists that
the universe places epistemological constrains on information transfer. It is easy to
see, however, how things can be construed differently.
Marchildon (2004) elucidates why the epistemic interpretation necessarily
demands an interpretation in the sense of S2. He finds that the epistemic view in
fact begs the question of interpretation and that its putative success at solving the
problems associated with measurement and collapse is arrived at only at the price of
giving up the search for a spelled out consistent view of nature. If we grant the epis-
temic interpretation as being true—that is, that it is the case that the world is actually
like it says it is—then it necessarily posits a link between quantum and macroscopic
objects, but one that we remain ignorant to. “Once this is realized,” writes Marchil-
don, “the urge to investigate the nature of this connection [between the quantum
and macroscopic world] will not easily subside” (Marchildon 2004). One could stop
interpretation of a purely epistemic position at sense S1, but one (at least of the
slightest realist disposition) cannot rest content with this kind of instrumental inter-
pretation.
The existence and the necessity of an interpretation is the result of the very
nature of physics. 8 Of course, scientific instrumentalists can contently resist this
urge and practitioners can continue to work with the theory in absence of an inter-

7 This came out in discussion at the “Being Bayesian in a Quantum World” conference in Konstanz,
Germany, 1–5 Aug 2005. Further elucidating the underdetermination of Fuchs’ programme, Michael
Dickson in a talk entitled “Subjective and Objective in Quantum Theory” concluded that there might
not be any unique way of distinguishing the subjective from the objective.
8 Omnès (1994) makes this very point as well.

19
pretation, but scientists of a realist bent will always remain curious why the theory is
constructed the way it is. This is why Hagar (2003) argues that interpretations are
“part and parcel of the scientific enterprise”: an attempt is always made to offer rea-
sons why the relations that emerge from the algebras take a specific form. Fuchs
believes that his programme, having the virtue of theoretical parsimony, has a status
above other interpretations, but this economy provides no such distinction and
leaves the interpretation underdetermined like any other. Moreover, as has been
alluded to here, only gains this putative advantage at the cost of explanatory utility.

4.3 Quantum mechanics as a principle theory

I now wish to emphasize the necessity of interpretation by seeing what limitations

arise when Fuchs’ ambitions regarding information-theoretic axioms are pursued. In
a need to explain why we must go beyond common sense and accept the notion of a
universe that limits information, Fuchs draws an analogy between the current state
of QIT and the plethora of interpretations of quantum mechanics, and Einstein’s
special theory of relativity (STR) and Lorentz-Fitzgerald contraction theory. The
principles introduced by Einstein provided the abstract mathematical structure of
the Lorentz transformations meaning. The same, he argues, is required in quantum
mechanics: the postulates we now use should be substituted with information-
theoretic axioms (that is, certain no-go rules of information transfer and manipula-
tion) in order to develop an understanding of the abstract structure of Hilbert space.
Recently, a paper by Clifton et al. (2003) attempts to formulate quantum mechanics
in this information-theoretic scheme. I will use the conditions developed in Clifton
et al. as a test bed for Fuchs’ claims that an axiomatic theory will make other inter-
pretations redundant.9

Einstein distinguished between two sorts of theories in physics. One sort, called
constructive theories, involves the reduction of a domain of complex phenomena to
the properties of simpler elements. An exemplar of this variety is kinetic theory,

9Admittedly, Fuchs does not explicitly emphasize the search for a principle theory (to be later defined)
as Clifton et al. set out to; however, he does so indirectly when he discusses a search for fundamental
no-go axioms.

20
which aims at reducing the mechanical and thermal behaviour of gases to the mo-
tion of molecules. The other sort, called principle theories, is composed of ‘no go’
principles that impose constraints on physical processes or events. An exemplar of
this variety is thermodynamics, which, through a series of “laws” such as “there are
no perpetual motion machines” limits the processes possible in physical systems. It
was the view of Einstein that progress is often best achieved by focusing first on the
establishment of such restricting principles (Howard 2004).
Those like Jeffrey Bub (2004) share Fuchs’ belief that, in the light of QIT,
quantum mechanics should be formulated as principle theory because it has a num-
ber of telling rules of constraints. He cites Einstein’s STR as making a fundamental
advancement in science because it no longer regarded a field as a physical manifesta-
tion of vibrations in a mechanical medium; instead, STR recognized a field as a new
physical primitive in its own right. Likewise, just as the rejection of Lorentz’s theory
in favour of STR (formulated in terms of Einstein’s two principles) involved taking
the notion of a field as a new physical primitive, Bub and collaborators see the rejec-
tion of Bohm’s theory in favour of quantum mechanics (formulated through infor-
mation-theoretic principles) involves taking the notion of quantum information as a
new physical primitive.
Clifton et al. (2003) describe how this is to be done. The Clifton-Bub-
Halvorson (CHB) theorem is quantum mechanics reformulated into three informa-
tion-theoretic principles. They are: i) no superluminal information transmission be-
tween two systems by measurement on one of them, ii) no broadcasting, and iii) no
unconditionally secure bit-commitment. They admit that the third axiom is defeasi-
ble, but remain confident in the importance of their cause. Clifton et al. argue that
the information-theoretic restrictions of the CBH theorem prevent us from freely
adopting interpretations and their claim is that the lesson of modern physics is that a
principle theory is the best one can hope to achieve as an explanatory account of
quantum phenomena
The reconstruction is fraught with uncertain promise, however, for the rea-
soning suffers from a number of shortcomings. Christopher Timpson (2004) high-
lights that our confidence in the information-theoretic constraints lies in their being
consequences of the standard quantum formalism, and the empirical evidence we

21
have for them derives second-hand from the empirical evidence from quantum the-
ory. Since such evidence fails to settle the question of how the formalism is to be
interpreted, such evidence is consistent with various different views on what the
status of the information-theoretic conditions should be. Bub and his collaborators
are attempting to argue for their interpretation when it has no more empirical
grounding than other interpretations.
Clifton et al. (2003) aim to provide an axiomatic derivation of the mathe-
matical structure of quantum theory with the belief that, as a principle theory, in this
sense an interpretation is automatically provided. The analogy used in justifying this
belief is not apt, however, because in the case of quantum mechanics the standard
range of interpretations would still be applicable. Indeed, if the goal of the CBH
theorem is to recover the standard structure of quantum theory, then the usual range
of interpretive options will remain as possible candidates. Timpson, who is pessi-
mistic towards the CBH cause, elucidates further why this must be so: while “the
CBH theorem provides us with an explanation of why the states and observables in
our theory have to take their characteristic quantum structure,” “nothing is said
about how the world should be understood if states and observables take on this
form” (Timpson 2004).
The response here can be to accept it as a brute fact—it’s like that because it
is!—but this is hardly certain; it is only an interpretation of the theory motivated by
what one understands the characteristics of nature to be. This is a problem for “no
interpretation” exponents, and is one inherent in the principle theory approach. To
take the principle theory approach at face value is the first sense S1 of interpretation,
but this doesn’t inform us as to how it should be interpreted in second sense S2,
which is what theorists are really after. In this case, instead of the CBH theorem
motivating a principle theory viewpoint (‘an information-theoretic perspective’) that
ameliorates the conceptual puzzles of quantum mechanics, it simply fails to engage
with these questions in the first place (Timpson 2004).

22
4.4 Other Approaches

The preceding discussion looked to establish how QIT reformations of quantum

mechanics begged the question of interpretation, and that any kind of minimal in-
terpretation still encompasses some level of subjective understanding. The purpose
of this section is to elucidate that point by highlighting discrepancies between QIT
advocates. The rhetoric as of late is that quantum mechanics is trying to tell us
something profound and that QIT bears the answer. The problem, however, is
quantum mechanics seems to be telling different stories to different ears. Even
those who share the common interest of viewing quantum mechanics through the
same different angle—that quantum mechanics is best viewed as a theory completely
about information—are guided by different intuitions and consequently arrive at
disparate conclusions.
As I have already reviewed, Fuchs reinterprets measurement through
POVMs, and hints at information-theoretic axioms that may be found as a result;
and Clifton et al. believe that those information-theoretic axioms are at hand, and
strive to create a principle theory of quantum mechanics. Alternatively, I now ex-
plore how other approaches see things very differently: David Mermin believes that
quantum mechanics is a theory of correlations with probabilities that are objective
propensities rather than subjective degrees of belief; and from a different perspec-
tive altogether E.T. Jaynes uses subjective degrees of belief to represent our igno-
rance to a causal story yet to be discovered. The comparison emphasizes that once
one attempts to explain a model—which is necessary if one wishes to go beyond in-
strumentalism—the interpretation, no matter how “minimal,” suffers from a com-
mon underdetermination. The conclusion I wish to develop is that QIT is no more
privy to the secrets of nature than quantum mechanics in its original form.

David Mermin (1996; 1998) has espoused his own interpretation, which he calls the
Ithaca interpretation of quantum mechanics (IIQM). Like Fuchs, Bub, and Clifton
et al., the IIQM views the wave function as nothing more than a computational tool,
and disagrees with approaches that view wave function collapse as a dynamical
physical process. He also looks to the historical past to direct research into the fu-

23
ture; but, instead of using Einstein’s STR as an exemplar, he draws his analogy with
late 19th century electrodynamics. Electrodynamic theory at this time, he believes,
was telling us that fields in empty space have physical reality, while the medium that
supports them does not. Likewise, Mermin believes that quantum mechanics is try-
ing to tell us that correlations have physical reality, and that which they correlate do
not.
However, in stark contrast with Fuchs and other QIT advocates, Mermin
believes that the probabilities of quantum mechanics should be interpreted as objec-
tive. Though the wave function may be based on subjective information, the prob-
abilities they present are correlations that are agent-independent and hence objective
in relation to the entire system under study. Mermin envisions a non-deterministic
world where the probabilities are intrinsic; no ignorance is involved because there is
nothing more to know. Mermin places a great deal of emphasis on the interpreta-
tion of probabilities, and believes that many of the difficulties encountered in inter-
preting quantum mechanics stem from an inadequate understanding of objective
probability. Moreover, he places even greater importance on the nature of con-
scious awareness—something not even mentioned in Fuchs’ writing.
Reading Mermin’s paper, the same talk of the advantages of a minimalist
reading of quantum mechanics to ascertain what it is “trying to tell us” is found; in-
deed, his (1998) paper goes by this very name. Consider the following passage:

By setting aside ‘the real essence of the phenomena’ we also acquire

the ability to replace the befuddling spectre of an endlessly branching
state of the universe—as disturbing in the self-styled down-to-earth
Bohmian interpretation as it is in the wildest extravagances of the
many worlds interpretation—with a quantum mechanics that simply
tells us how we can expect some of the manifold aspects of our ex-
perience to be correlated with others. (Mermin 1998)

Mermin parallels Fuchs’ views about taking a “no interpretation” stance to quantum
mechanics. Clearly, however, the conclusions drawn between the two are very dif-
ferent.

24
 E.T. Jaynes (1990; 2003, 327–329), similar to QIT advocates, believes quan-
tum mechanics to be a theory about information. He, like Fuchs and his collabora-
tors, also believes that probabilities should be interpreted as subjective degrees of
beliefs. But his reasoning for doing so and the conclusions arrived at again differs
markedly from the others discussed so far. To Jaynes, the subjective probabilities
result from our ignorance towards fundamental causes, and the theory, consequently,
is telling us to search out the full causal story. Quantum mechanics is not telling us
that the quantum world must remain a black box; on the contrary, it is warning us
that more is yet to be found.
Jaynes (2003) outlines his concerns as follows. Normally in science, say in
medicine or biology, if one notes that an effect E does not occur unless a condition
C is present, one naturally infers that C is a necessary causative agent for E. In in-
stances where condition C does not always lead to the effect E, we posit that in ad-
dition to C there must be some other causative factor F yet to be identified. But in
quantum theory, the format of reasoning diverges sharply. Here, with no cause ap-
parent, one simply postulates that no cause exists. Consider, for example, the pho-
toelectric effect. We observe experimentally that electrons will not appear ejected
from the metal surface unless light is present. But the light does not always produce
ejected electrons. Jaynes asks rhetorically: “Why then do we not draw the obvious
inference, that in addition to the light there must be a causative factor, still unidenti-
fied, and the physicist’s job is to search for it?” (Jaynes 2003, 327–328). The answer
is that we have been brought up under the dogma that the laws of physics are inde-
terministic and can be expressed only in probability form.
It is peculiar to Jaynes that quantum mechanics should be allowed such a
special status in science: we ought to concede that we don’t know the full story and
that we remain ignorant as to what is really going on underneath our theory. Jaynes
sums up his opinions well:

In current probability theory, probabilities express our own igno-

rance due to our failure to search for the real causes of physical phe-
nomena; and, worse, our failure even to think seriously about the
problem. This ignorance may be unavoidable in practice, but in our

25
 present state of knowledge we do not know whether it is unavoid-
able in principle; the ‘central dogma’ simply asserts this, and draws
the conclusion that belief in causes, and searching for them, is phi-
losophically naïve. If everybody accepted this and abided by it, no
further advances in understanding of physical law would ever be
made; indeed, no such advance has been made since the 1927 Solvay
Congress in which this mentality became solidified into physics. But
it seems to us that this attitude places a premium on stupidity; to lack
the ingenuity to think of a rational physical explanation is to support
the supernatural view. (Jaynes 2003, 329)

Jaynes’ remarks here conflict with Mermin’s. Mermin believes that there is no more
to be found because nature has put a licence on what we can know—that quantum
mechanics is telling us to accept that we will always remain ignorant of the causal
story and that we should focus our efforts at managing the information we are al-
lowed. Jaynes, however, believes that more is to be found because the heart of sci-
ence rests in finding causes—that quantum mechanics is telling us that the
incompleteness is unacceptable and our efforts should be directed towards finding
those causes in order to remove the crippling probabilistic underpinnings currently
in place. Who is right and who is wrong? Is the ignorance enforced—an artefact of
nature? Or is the ignorance unnecessary—an artefact of the theory? The question
remains unanswered, and it should be clear that quantum mechanics remains reticent
on the issue.

4.5 The benefits of interpretation

I have attempted to make clear that one cannot simply assume that nature is con-
structed this way or that. In light of underdetermination inherent in any explanation
of a theory that goes beyond the formal relations deduced and the empirical conse-
quences predicted, at best one can guess (reasonably) at what structure lies under-
neath and simultaneously accept that alternative descriptions are also possible. It is a
simple point, but one that cannot be emphasized enough to those who tout of the

26
natural advantages for a “no interpretation” or minimal reading of quantum me-
chanics.
One cannot avoid underdetermined interpretation if one wishes to go
beyond instrumentalism; moreover, as I wish to elaborate here, nor should one wish
to do so in the first place. According to van Fraassen (1991, 9), the questions What
is really going on (according to this theory)? or even the more modest How could the world
possible be how this theory says it is? will always remain if science is to help us construct
and revise our world-pictures, and the way we attempt to do this is through
interpretation. Despite the inherent underdetermination, an interpretation in the
sense of S2 offers a way to conceptualize a theory beyond its mathematical
formalism—something crucial for understanding and development. Indeed, a
variety of interpretations should all be seen as relevant, even though some may seem
more significant than others. Van Fraassen stresses all of this when he writes the
following:
What is the world depicted by science? That is exactly the question
we answer with an interpretation, and the answer is not unique. Per-
haps no interpretation ever finishes the task of answering all ques-
tions about the depicted world it displays as the theory’s content. To
have even a sketch of one interpretation is valuable and brings
understanding. To appreciate, however dimly, its horizon of
alternative possible interpretations brings more insight. There
cannot be in principle, but only as historical accident, convergence to
a single story about our world. (van Fraassen 1991, 481–482)

The history of science has taught us that, though we will always remain ignorant as
to what specific direction scientific development will lead to, having various research
programmes can offer some help in finding the way. Consequently, a number of
consistent interpretations available to us is a good thing, for each brings deeper
awareness about the possible implications of quantum mechanics. Fuchs undeserv-
edly attempts to “slam” the various programmes investigating the foundations of
quantum mechanics: the existence of variegated research programmes is beneficial

27
for science—Feyerabend (1993) makes this point aptly—and not something to be
shunned.
Fuchs and others have mistakenly affirmed that a minimal reading of quan-
tum mechanics is somehow special, but I have remarked already how simplicity and
theoretical parsimony is not a criterion of truth. James Cushing (1994) offers
thoughts along these lines. As a pragmatic matter, one can choose from consistent,
empirically adequate theories one which allows us to best understand the phenom-
ena of nature. One does so, however, while simultaneously “not confusing this
practical virtue with any argument for the ‘truth’ or faithfulness of representation of
the story thus chosen” (Cushing 1994, 215). Another lesson from the history of sci-
ence worth appreciating here is that successful theories and their interpretations
once thought to be true have routinely turned out to be false; and so interpretations
remain poor guides in providing deep ontological lessons about the nature of physi-
cal reality (see e.g. Laudan 1981).
To compare and contrast programmes is the way that some can be distin-
guished from others in heuristic value. Granted, quantum mechanics reformulated
in QIT foundations can afford an intuitive model of understanding, but to make the
further claim that this must then imply a closer realisation to truth is ill-founded.
Moreover, such claims that quantum mechanics reformulated in information-
theoretic terms reflects nature in any truthful way beyond empirical adequacy cer-
tainly goes beyond the “no interpretation” stance upheld by Fuchs and his collabora-
tors.

5. A New Interpretation is Not a New Theory

I wish to touch upon one final concern with Fuchs’ programme. Ultimately, I re-
main unconvinced of the potential for success in the sense of unearthing more out
of quantum mechanics than there already is through the interpretational lens of QIT.
Indeed, within the formalism is embedded all the possible predictive power, and
what interpretation is adopted really only acts a catalyst for development already
possible. If this new formulation (say, in the framework of CBH-equivalent axioms)

28
is to derive all the same consequences as quantum mechanics, no new science is to
be found.
Interpretation certainly has its role as a heuristic device, and by this standard
I rate Fuchs’ programme rather high. He anticipates that an adoption of informa-
tion-theoretic principles can speed development, which is a fair enough claim:
changing the language used can simplify the way we talk of problems in quantum
mechanics, and consequently solutions can begin to take on more meaning and be-
come easier to find. He hints here specifically at promising applications in quantum
cryptography. Having found the strikingly close connection between Bayesian
probabilities and quantum probabilities, Fuchs hypothesizes that perhaps the way to
look at the process of quantum eavesdropping is to identify the conditions under
which a set of decision-making agents can come to a common probability assign-
ment for some random variable in spite of the fact that their initial probabilities dif-
fer (Fuchs 2002, 50). Like a change in coordinates in a mathematical problem, or a
change in basis in a quantum mechanical one, a change in language can help simplify
conceptual problems in areas of quantum mechanics. Here specifically, handling
problems of information transfer in information-theoretic terms certainly seems a
worthwhile enterprise.
But can reshaping the formalism lead to “new” formalism? I conclude that
it cannot. Current goals of manipulating the formalism of quantum mechanics is
not a way to unearth what quantum mechanics is “trying to say.” To the contrary, it
seems more reflexive of what we are projecting onto it. Certainly, there are benefits
to be reaped from the reformation of a theory, and Fuchs’ proposal does show
promise of offering glimmers of insight into how to push applications of quantum
theory even further beyond its already monstrous success. But Fuchs’ interpretation,
like any interpretation, remains a heuristic device—simply a stronger light to cast
upon the fundamental postulates to reveal hidden consequences already there—and
cannot offer the novel discoveries he desires.

29
6. Conclusion

My first conclusion has been that Fuchs’ “no interpretation” becomes an interpreta-
tion as soon as he attempts to explain what quantum mechanics is putatively hinting
at. Advocates of QIT should be hesitant about declaring what quantum mechanics
is trying to say and maintaining a “no interpretation” stance, for, as I have attempted
to make plain, if it is saying anything, it is saying different things to different people.
To some, its probabilities are objective; to others, subjective. To some more re-
mains to be explored in the way of a causal story, and to others the universe in all its
incompleteness has already revealed itself—all that remains is better management of
the limited information it allows us to manipulate. No description is guaranteed be-
cause underdetermination affects any interpretation, minimal or not, the moment it
attempts to explain anything beyond that afforded by the instrumental sense of S1.
My second conclusion, a consequence of the first, is that no novel discover-
ies of quantum mechanics are afforded by looking at it through QIT. While I do
concede a level of heuristic efficacy that may consequently arise from Fuchs’ efforts,
the prospects of getting more out of this new interpretation remain dim because in-
terpretations in general do not offer new science, just science that is better under-
stood. Fuchs’ programme of must propose more radical changes to quantum theory
itself to arrive at the novel discoveries he anticipates. Admittedly, a motivation be-
hind this programme may be that research in this direction can act as a vehicle for
the creation of this new theory, but in its present, nascent form, a radical departure
of this sort from what is already present is lacking.
Fuchs writes with fervour that his programme can get at the heart of quan-
tum mechanics because it parallels the formalism most closely, but this thinking—
with all of its hope and vision—is of a credulous variety. At present Fuchs’ interpre-
tation is subject to the same tug-of-war between common sense and conformity that
any other must face, and with no direct empirical evidence must be placed on par
with all other underdetermined interpretations he wishes to supersede. Ultimately,
the issue of interpretation cannot be settled with metaphysical debate, but with ex-
perimental tests, and so it remains beneficial to explore all avenues of possibility to

30
find whether that experimental arena can be found. It is the nature of interpretation;
it is the nature of science.

31
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All pre-prints refer to the http://arxiv.org website.

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