Case No. 8 PASCO VS. HEIRS OF FILOMENA DE GUZMAN G.R. No.

1655 4, 26 July 2010 Facts: The heirs of Filomena De Guzman, herein respondents filed before the MTC a complaint for the sum of money and damages against petitioners. They alleged in their complaint that petitioners obtained a loan of 140, 000.00php from Filomena. Such loan was secured by a chattel mortgage on Lauros Isuzu jeep in favor of Filomena. Upon Filomenas death, her heirs to collect from petitioners but despite numerous demands, petitioners refused to pay them. This prompted respondents to file the collection case against petitioner. They had authorized Cresencia, a co- heir, to be their attorney- in- fact through a SPA. During the pre- trial of the case before the MTC, the parties verbally agreed to settle the case. They executed a compromise agreement which was approved by the MTC. Petitioners, however filed a motion to set aside the compromise agreement alleging that the agreement was within a language not understood by them and the terms and conditions not fully explained to them. They also questioned MTCs jurisdiction alleging that the sum covered in the compromise agreement (588, 500.00) exceeded the jurisdiction limit of the MTC (200, 000.00). MTC denied the motion and granted Cresencias power for the issuance of a writ of execution. Petitioners applied for TRO/PI before the RTC which initially granted but later reconsidered and set aside its decision. Petitioners elevated the case to the CA via an appeal but the CA dismissed the same. Thus, case is now before the SC. Issue: Do the heirs have an interest in the collection of the loan? Ruling: Yes. The heirs have an interest in the preservation of the estate and recovery of its properties, for at the moment of Filomenas death, the heirs start to own the property, subject to the decedents liabilities. Article 777 provides that the rights to the succession are transmitted from the moment of the death of the decedent. The proceeds of the loan however should be released only upon settlement of Filomenas death.

Case No. 18 ALVAREZ VS. IAC, GR L-68053, 7 May 1990 Facts: The two parcels of land (Lots 773- A and 773-B), the subject of controversy in this case, were originally registered as Lot 773 under the name of the heirs of Anicito Yanes, herein private respondents. Unfortunately, a certain Fortunato Santiago later obtained a TCT covering the two lots. Santiago sold these to Monico Fuentebella Jr. Later, after Fuentebellas death and during the settlement of his estate, his wife being the administratrix, sold the lots toosendo Alvarez, the father of herein petitioners. Respondents filed before the CFI a complaint against Santiago, vda. De Fuentebella, Alvarez, and the Register of Deeds, for the reconveyance of the lots. During the pendency of the case however, Alvarez sold the subject lots to Rodolfo Siason. The CFI rendered a decision ordering the reconveyance of the subject lots to the plaintiffs but the execution of the decision was unsuccessful because Siason who purchased the lots was not a party per writ of execution . The court thus required Siason to produce the certificates of title of the subject lands. Siason filed a manifestation that he purchased the lands in good faith without any knowledge of any liens or encumbrances against said properties. The cadastral court found the manifestation well- founded. On the other hand, the Yaneses filed an action for recovery of the property praying for the cancellation of the TCTs issued to Siason for being null and void. The lower court found Siason a buyer in good faith for a valuable consideration. Although the Yaneses were negligent in their failure to place a notice of lis pendes before the Register of Deeds to protect their rights over the subject properties, the lower court ruled that they may recover the actual value of the land because the sale executed between Alvarez and Siason was without court approval. The Alvarez appealed to the IAC but the IAC affirmed the lower courts decision. Hence, case is now before the SC. Issue: WON Rosendo Alvarezs liability arising from the sale be borne solely by Rosendo or of his estate, after his death. Ruling: No. The doctrine of general transmissibility of rights and obligations of the deceased to his legitimate children and heirs must be applied pertinent to the provisions of the Civil Code, Arts. 774, 776, 1331. Under the law, the general rule is that a partys contractual rights and obligations are transmissible to the successors. Petitioners being the heirs of the late Rosendo Alvarez cannot escape the legal consequences of their fathers transaction, which gave rise to the claim for damages. Although petitioners did not inherit the property involved in this case, by legal fiction, the monetary equivalent thereof devolved into the mass of their fathers hereditary estate. And the hereditary assets are always liable in their totality for the payment of the debts of the estate. The petitioners are however, liable only to the extent of the value of their inheritance.

Case No. 28 Blas et al vs Santos et al FACTS: Sometime before 1898, Simeon Blas married Marta Cruz with whom he had three children. He also had grandchildren from his children with Marta Cruz. In 1898, Marta Cruz died. In 1899, Blas married Maxima Santos (they had no children) but the properties he and his former wife acquired during the first marriage were not liquidated. In 1936, Simeon Blas executed a will disposing half of his properties in favor of Maxima the other half for payment of debts, Blas also named a few devisees and legatees therein. In lieu of this, Maxima executed a document whereby she intimated that she understands the will of her husband; that she promises that shell be giving, upon her death, one-half of the properties shell be acquiring to the heirs and legatees named in the will of his husband; that she can select or choose any of them depending upon the respect, service, and treatment accorded to her by said legatees/heirs/devisees. In 1937, Simeon Blas died. In 1956, Maxima died and Rosalina Santos became administratrix of her estate. In the same year, Maria Gervacio Blas, child of Simeon Blas in his first marriage, together with three other grandchildren of Simeon Blas (heirs of Simeon Blas), learned that Maxima did not fulfill her promise as it was learned that Maxima only disposed not even one-tenth of the properties she acquired from Simeon Blas. The heirs are now contending that they did not partition Simeon Blas property precisely because Maxima promised that theyll be receiving properties upon her death. ISSUE: Whether or not the heirs should receive properties based on the promise of Maxima. HELD: Yes. The promise is valid and enforceable upon her death. Though it is not a will (it lacks the formality) nor a donation, it is still enforceable because said promise was actually executed to avoid litigation (partition of Simeon Blas estate) hence it is a compromise. It is not disputed that this document was prepared at the instance of Simeon Blas for the reason that the conjugal properties of his first marriage had not been liquidated. It is an obligation or promise made by the maker to transmit one-half of her share in the conjugal properties acquired with her husband, which properties are stated or declared to be conjugal properties in the will of the husband.

Case No. 39 Concepcion vs. CA GR No. 123450, August 31, 2005 FACTS: Gerardo Concepcion, the petitioner, and Ma. Theresa Almonte, private respondent, were married in December 1989, and begotten a child named Jose Gerardo in December 1990. The husband filed on December 1991, a petition to have his marriage annulled on the ground of bigamy since the wife married a certain Mario Gopiao sometime in December 1980, whom according to the husband was still alive and living in Loyola Heights, QC. Trial court ruled that the son was an illegitimate child and the custody was awarded to the wife while Gerardo was granted visitation rights. Theresa argued that there was nothing in the law granting visitation rights in favor of the putative father of an illegitimate child. She further wanted to have the surname of the son changed from Concepcion to Almonte, her maiden name, since an illegitimate child should use his mothers surname. After the requested oral argument, trial court reversed its ruling and held the son to be not the son of Gerardo but of Mario. Hence, the child was a legitimate child of Theresa and Mario. ISSUE: WON the child was that of Gerardo? HELD: Considering that Theresas marriage with Gerardo was void ab initio, the latter never became the formers husband and never acquired any right to impugn the legitimacy of the child. Theresas contention was to have his son be declared as not the legitimate child of her and Mario but her illegitimate child with Gerardo. In this case, the mother has no right to disavow a child because maternity is never uncertain. Hence, she is not permitted by law to question the sons legitimacy. Under Article 167 of the Family Code, the child shall be considered legitimate although the mother may have declared against its legitimacy or may have been sentenced as an adulteress. Having the best interest of the child in mind, the presumption of his legitimacy was upheld by the Court. As a legitimate child, the son shall have the right to bear the surnames of Mario and Theresa, in conformity with the provisions of Civil Code on surnames. Gerardo cannot then impose his surname to be used by the child, since in the eyes of the law, the child is not related to him in any way.

Case No. 50 Lolita Enrico vs Heirs of Spouses Eulogio Medinaceli and Trinidad Medinaceli, Represented by Vilma Articulo, G.R. No. 173614 September 28, 2007, CHICO-NAZARIO, J.: Facts: Eulogio and Trinidad Medinaceli was married on June 14, 1962 during their marriage they begot 7 children, herein respondents, Edward, Evelyn, Vilma, Mary Jane, Haizel, Michelle and Joseph Lloyd. During his marriage with Trinidad, Eulogio lived, openly and publicly, together with one Lolita Enrico (petitioner) and their union begot 2 children . On May 1, 2004 Trinidad died. Subsequently Eulogio married Lolita on August 4, 2004. Eulogio died on February 10, 2005. In impugning petitioners marriage to Eulogio, respondents averred that the same was entered into without the requisite marriage license. Respondents posited further that petitioners marriage with their father does not fall under the marriages that are exempt of the license requirement. . To further their cause, respondents raised the additional ground of lack of marriage ceremony due to Eulogios serious illness which made its performance impossible. As an affirmative defense, she sought the dismissal of the action on the ground that it is only the contracting parties while living who can file an action for declaration of nullity of marriage. On 11 October 2005, the RTC issued granting the dismissal of the Complaint for lack of cause of action based on A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC in Section 2, par.(a). On Motion for Reconsideration of Respondent, RTC reversed its decision and reinstated the complaint on the ratiocination that the assailed Order ignored the ruling in Nial v. Bayadog. Petitioner filed for Motion for Reconsideration but was denied by the RTC. Petioner filed a Petiton for Certiorari in the Supreme Court. Issues: Which rule in Assailing Nullity , Voiding and Annulment of Marriage applies in the case at bar? Ruling: We grant the Petition. In reinstating respondents Complaint for Declarat ion of Nullity of Marriage, the RTC acted with grave abuse of discretion. We cannot apply the decision in the case of Nial for the reason that the impugned marriage therein was solemnized prior to the effectivity of the Family Code. The Court in Nial recognized that the applicable law to determine the validity of the two marriages involved therein is the Civil Code. While A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC extend to those marriages entered into during the effectivity of the Family Code which took effect on 3 August 1988. There is no need to reconcile the provisions of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC with the ruling in Nial, because they vary in scope and application. While A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC declares that a petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed solely by the husband or the wife, it does not mean that the compulsory or intestate heirs are already without any recourse under the law. They can still protect their successional right, for, compulsory or intestate heirs can still question the validity of the marriage of the spouses, not in a proceeding for declaration of nullity, but upon the death of a spouse in a proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the deceased spouse filed in the regular courts. WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. Civil Case No. II-4057 filed before the Regional Trial Court of Aparri, Cagayan, Branch 6, is ORDERED DISMISSED without prejudice to challenging the validity of the marriage of Lolita D. Enrico to Eulogio B. Medinaceli in a proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the latter. No costs

Case No. 61 G.R. No. L-34395 May 19, 1981, BEATRIZ L. GONZALES, petitioner, vs. COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF MANILA (BRANCH V), et.al. FACTS: Benito Legarda y De la Paz, the son of Benito Legarda y Tuason, died [Manila] on June 17, 1933. He was survived by his widow, Filomena Races, and their seven children: four daughters named Beatriz, Rosario, Teresa and Filomena and three sons named Benito, Alejandro and Jose. On July 12, 1939, the real properties left by Benito Legarda y Tuason were partitioned in three equal portions by his daughters, Consuelo and Rita, and the heirs of his deceased son Benito Legarda y De la Paz who were represented by Benito F. Legarda. Mrs. Legarda on March 6, 1953 executed two handwritten Identical documents wherein she disposed of the properties, which she inherited from her daughter, in favor of the children of her sons, Benito, Alejandro and Jose (sixteen grandchildren in all). Filomena Legarda y Races died intestate and without issue on March 19, 1943. Her sole heiress was her mother, Filomena Races Vda. de Legarda. During the period from July, 1958 to February, 1959 Mrs. Legarda and her six surviving children partitioned the properties consisting of the one-third share in the estate of Benito Legarda y Tuason which the children inherited in representation of their father, Benito Legarda y De la Paz. In the testate proceeding, Beatriz Legarda Gonzales, a daughter of the testatrix, filed on May 20, 1968 a motion to exclude from the inventory of her mother's estate the properties which she inherited from her deceased daughter, Filomena, on the ground that said properties are reservable properties which should be inherited by Filomena Legarda's three sisters and three brothers and not by the children of Benito, Alejandro and Jose, all surnamed Legarda. That motion was opposed by the administrator, Benito F. Legarda. ISSUE: Whether the properties in question are subject to reserva troncal. WON the properties could be conveyed by will. RULING: 1. In reserve troncal (1) a descendant inherited or acquired by gratuitous title property from an ascendant or from a brother or sister; (2) the same property is inherited by another ascendant or is acquired by him by operation of law from the said descendant, and (3) the said ascendant should reserve the said property for the benefit of relatives who are within the third degree from the deceased descendant (prepositus) and who belong to the line from which the said property came. So, three transmissions are involved: (I) a first transmission by lucrative title (inheritance or donation) from an ascendant or brother or sister to the deceased descendant; (2) a posterior transmission, by operation of law (intestate succession or legitime) from the deceased descendant (causante de la reserve) in favor of another ascendant, the reservor or reservista, which two transmissions precede the reservation, and (3) a third transmissions of the same property

In the instant case, the properties in question were indubitably reservable properties in the hands of Mrs. Legarda. Undoubtedly, she was a reservor. The reservation became a certainty when at the time of her death the reservees or relatives within the third degree of the prepositus Filomena Legarda were living or they survived Mrs. Legarda. 2. We hold that Mrs. Legarda could not convey in her holographic will to her sixteen grandchildren the reservable properties which she had inherited from her daughter Filomena because the reservable properties did not form part of her estate (Cabardo vs. Villanueva, 44 Phil. 186, 191). The reservor cannot make a disposition mortis causa of the reservable properties as long as the reservees survived the reservor.

Case No. 72 Reyes vs. CA, 20 October 1997 FACTS: On January 3, 1992, Torcuato J. Reyes executed his last will and testament. The will consisted of two pages and was signed by Torcuato Reyes in the presence of three witnesses: Antonio Veloso, Gloria Borromeo, and Soledad Gaputan. Private respondent Julio A. Vivares was designated the executor and in his default or incapacity, his son Roch Alan S. Vivares. Reyes died on May 12, 1992 and on May 21, 1992, private respondent filed a petition for probate of the will before the Regional Trial Court of Mambajao, Camiguin. The petition was set for hearing and the order was published in the Mindanao Daily Post, a newspaper of general circulation, once a week for three consecutive weeks. Notices were likewise sent to all the persons named in the petition. On July 21, 1992, the recognized natural children of Torcuato Reyes with Estebana Galolo, namely Manuel, Mila, and Danilo all surnamed Reyes, and the deceased's natural children with Celsa Agape, namely Lyn and Marites Agape, filed an opposition with the following allegations: a) that the last will and testament of Reyes was not executed and attested in accordance with the formalities of law; and b) that Asuncion Reyes Ebarle exerted undue and improper influence upon the testator at the time of the execution of the will. The opposition further averred that Reyes was never married to and could never marry Asuncion Reyes, the woman he claimed to be his wife in the will, because the latter was already married to Lupo Ebarle who was still then alive and their marriage was never annulled. Thus, Asuncion can not be a compulsory heir for her open cohabitation with Reyes was violative of public morals. On July 22, 1992, the trial court issued an order declaring that it had Acquired jurisdiction over the petition and, therefore, allowed the presentation of evidence. After the presentation of evidence and submission of the respective memoranda, the trial court issued its decision on April 23, 1993. The trial court declared that the will was executed in accordance with the formalities prescribed by law. It, however, ruled that Asuncion Reyes, based on the testimonies of the witnesses, was never married to the deceased Reyes and, therefore, their relationship was an adulterous one. ISSUES: Whether or not the lower court may look into the intrinsic validity of the will. RULING: The lower court was not asked to rule upon the intrinsic validity or efficacy of the provisions of the will. As a result, the declaration of the testator that Asuncion "Oning" Reyes was his wife did not have to be scrutinized during the probate proceedings. The propriety of the institution of Oning Reyes as one of the devisees/legatees already involved inquiry on the will's intrinsic validity and which need not be inquired upon by the probate court.

Case No. 83 Bellis vs Bellis, 20 SCRA 358

FACTS: Amos Bellis was a citizen of the State of Texas, and of the United States. By his first wife whom he divorced he had five legitimate children, by his second wife, who survived him, he had three legitimate children, and three illegitimate children. Before he died, he made two wills, one disposing of his Texas properties and the other disposing his Philippine properties. In both wills, his illegitimate children were not given anything. The illegitimate children opposed the will on the ground that they have been deprived of their legitimes to which they should be entitled, if Philippine law were to be applied. ISSUE: Whether or not the national law of the deceased should determine the successional rights of the illegitimate children. HELD: The Supreme Court held that the said children are not entitled to their legitimes under the Texas Law, being the national law of the deceased, there are no legitimes. The parties admit that the decedent, Amos G. Bellis, was a citizen of the State of Texas, U.S.A., and that under the laws of Texas, there are no forced heirs or legitimes. Accordingly, since the intrinsic validity of the provision of the will and the amount of successional rights are to be determined under Texas law, the Philippine law on legitimes cannot be applied to the testacy of Amos G. Bellis. Article 16, par. 2, and Art. 1039 of the Civil Code, render applicable the national law of the decedent, in intestate or testamentary successions, with regard to four items: (a) the order of succession; (b) the amount of successional rights; (e) the intrinsic validity of the provisions of the will; and (d) the capacity to succeed. Intestate and testamentary successions, both with respect to the order of succession and to the amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions, shall be regulated by the national law of the person whose succession is under consideration, whatever may he the nature of the property and regardless of the country wherein said property may be found.

Case No. 94 Abangan v. Abangan, 40 Phil 476 FACTS: On September 19, 1917, CFI of Cebu admitted to probate Ana Abangans will executed July, 1916. From this decision the opponents appealed. The will consists of 2 sheets. The first contains all the disposition of the testatrix, duly signed at the bottom by Martin Montalban (in the name and under the direction of the testatrix) and by three witnesses. The following sheet contains only the attestation clause duly signed at the bottom by the three instrumental witnesses. Neither of these sheets is signed on the left margin by the testatrix and the three witnesses, nor numbered by letters. These omissions, according to appellants contention, are defects whereby the probate of the will should have been denied. ISSUE: Whether or not the will was duly admitted to probate. RULING: YES. In requiring that each and every sheet of the will be signed on the left margin by the testator and three witnesses in the presence of each other, Act No. 2645 evidently has for its object the avoidance of substitution of any of said sheets which may change the disposition of the testatrix. But when these dispositions are wholly written on only one sheet (as in the instant case) signed at the bottom by the testator and three witnesses, their signatures on the left margin of said sheet are not anymore necessary as such will be purposeless. In requiring that each and every page of a will must be numbered correlatively in letters placed on the upper part of the sheet, it is likewise clear that the object of Act No. 2645 is to know whether any sheet of the will has been removed. But, when all the dispositive parts of a will are written on one sheet only, the object of the statute disappears because the removal of this single sheet, although unnumbered, cannot be hidden. In a will consisting of two sheets the first of which contains all the testamentary dispositions and is signed at the bottom by the testator and three witnesses and the second contains only the attestation clause and is signed also at the bottom by the three witnesses, it is not necessary that both sheets be further signed on their margins by the testator and the witnesses, or be paged. The object of the solemnities surrounding the execution of wills is to close the door against bad faith and fraud, to avoid substitution of wills and testaments and to guaranty their truth and authenticity. Therefore the laws on this subject should be interpreted in such a way as to attain these primordial ends. But, on the other hand, also one must not lose sight of the fact that it is not the object of the law to restrain and curtail the exercise of the right to make a will. So when an interpretation already given assures such ends, any other interpretation whatsoever, that adds nothing but demands more requisites entirely unnecessary, useless and frustative of the testators last will, must be disregarded.

Case No. 105 Tedoro CANEDA, et al., petitioners vs. Hon. COURT OF APPEALS and William CABRERA, as Special Administrator of the Estate of Mateo Caballero, respondents. G.R. No. 103554, May 28, 1993 FACTS: Mateo Caballero, a widower without any children, executed a last will and testament before three attesting witnesses and he was duly assisted by his lawyer and a notary public. It was declare therein that, among other things, that the testator was leaving by way of legacies and devises his real and personal properties to specific persons, all of whom do not appear to be related to Mateo. Not long after, he himself filed a petition before the CFI seeking the probate of his last will and testament but the scheduled hearings were postponed, until the testator passed away before his petition could finally be heard by the probate court. Benoni Cabrera, one of the legatees named in the will, sought his appointment as special administrator of the testators estate but due to his death, he was succeeded by William Cabreara, who was appointed by RTC which is already the probate court. In the course of the hearing, herein petitioners claiming to be nephews and nieces of the testator, appeared as oppositors and objected to the allowance of the testators will on the ground that on the alleged date of its execution, the testator was already in the poor state of health such that he could not have possibly executed the same; and that the signature of the testator is not genuine. The probate court rendered a decision that such will is the Last Will and Testament of Mateo Caballero and that it was executed in accordance with all the requisites of the law. Upon appeal to CA, the petitioners asserted that the will in question is null and void for the reason that its attestation clause is fatally defective since it fails to specifically state the instrumental witnesses to the will witnessed the testator signing the will in their presence and that they also signed the will and all the pages thereof in the presence of the testator and of one another. However, CA affirmed the decision of the trial court ruling and ruling that the attestation clause in the Last Will substantially complies with Article 805 of the Civil Code. Due to denial of petitioners motion for reconsideration, hence this appeal before the Supreme Court. ISSUES: 1. Whether or not the attestation clause in the last will of Mateo Caballero is fatally defective such that whether or not it affects the validity of the will. 2. Whether or not the attestation clause complies with the substantial compliance pursuant to Article 809 of the Civil Code. RULING: An attestation clause refers to that part of an ordinary will whereby the attesting witnesses certify that the instrument has been executed before them and to the manner of the execution of the same. It is a separate memorandum or record of the facts surrounding the conduct of execution and once signed by the witnesses, it gives affirmation to the fact that compliance with the essential formalities required by law has been observed. Under the 3rd paragraph of Article 805, such a clause, the complete lack of which would result in the invalidity of the will, should state: 1. The number of pages used upon which the will is written; 2. That the testator signed, or expressly cause another to sign, the will and every page thereof in the presence of the attesting witnesses; and

3. That the attesting witnesses witnessed the signing by the testator of the will and all its pages, and that the said witnesses also signed the will and every page thereof in the presence of the testator and of one another. It will be noted that Article 805 requires that the witness should both attest and subscribe to the will in the presence of the testator and of one another. Attestation and subscription differ in meaning. Attestation is the act of sense, while subscription is the act of the hand. The attestation clause herein assailed is that while it recites that the testator indeed signed the will and all its pages in the presence of the three attesting witnesses and states as well the number of pages that were used, the same does not expressly state therein the circumstance that said witnesses subscribed their respective signatures to the will in the presence of the testator and of each other. What is then clearly lacking, is the statement that the witnesses signed the will and every page thereof in the presence of the testator and of one another. The absence of the statement required by law is a fatal defect or imperfection which must necessarily result in the disallowance of the will that is here sought to be admitted to probate. Petitioners are correct in pointing out that the defect in the attestation clause obviously cannot be characterized as merely involving the form of the will or the language used therein which would warrant the application of the substantial compliance rule, as contemplated in Article 809 of the Civil Code: In the absence of bad faith, forgery, or fraud or undue and improper pressure and influence, defects and imperfection in the form of attestation or in the language used therein shall not render the will invalid if it is not proved that the will was in fact executed and attested in substantial compliance with all the requirements of Article 805. The defects and imperfection must only be with respect to the form of the attestation or the language employed therein. Such defects or imperfection would not render a will invalid should it be proved that the will was really executed and attested in compliance with Article 805. These considerations do not apply where the attestation clause totally omits the fact that the attesting witnesses signed each and every page of the will in the presence of the testator and of each other. In such a situation, the defect is not only in the form or language of the attestation clause but the total absence of a specific element required by Article 805 to be specifically stated in the attestation clause of a will. That is precisely the defect complained of in the present case since there is no plausible way by which it can be read into the questioned attestation clause statement, or an implication thereof, that the attesting witness did actually bear witness to the signing by the testator of the will and all of its pages and that said instrumental witnesses also signed the will and every page thereof in the presence of the testator and of one another.

Case No. 116 FELIX AZUELA v. COURT OF APPEALS and GERALDA AIDA CASTILLO, substituted by ERNESTO G. CASTILLO G.R. 122880, 12 April 2006, Tinga, J. (Third Division) FACTS: A will whose attestation clause does not contain the number of pages on which the will is written is fatally defective. A will whose attestation clause is not signed by the instrumental witnesses is fatally defective. And perhaps most importantly, a will which does not contain an acknowledgment, but a mere jurat, is fatally defective. Any one of these defects is sufficient to deny probate. A notarial will with all three defects is just aching for judicial rejection. Felix Azuela filed a petition with the trial court for the probate of a notarial will purportedly executed by Eugenia E. Igsolo on June 10, 1981 and notarized on the same day. The will consisted of two (2) pages and was written in Filipino. The attestation clause did not state the number of pages and it was not signed by the attesting witnesses at the bottom thereof. The said witnesses affixed their signatures on the left-hand margin of both pages of the will though. Geralda Castillo opposed the petition, claiming that the will was a forgery. She also argued that the will was not executed and attested to in accordance with law. She pointed out that the decedents signature did not appear on the second page of the will, and the will was not properly acknowledged. The trial court held the will to be authentic and to have been executed in accordance with law and, thus, admitted it to probate, calling to fore the modern tendency in respect to the formalities in the execution of a willwith the end in view of giving the testator more freedom in expressing his last wishes. According to the trial court, the declaration at the end of the will under the sub-title, Patunay Ng Mga Saksi, comprised the attestation clause and the acknowledgement, and was a substantial compliance with the requirements of the law. It also held that the signing by the subscribing witnesses on the left margin of the second page of the will containing the attestation clause and acknowledgment, instead of at the bottom thereof, substantially satisfied the purpose of identification and attestation of the will. The Court of Appeals, however, reversed the trial courts decision and ordered the dismissal of the petition for probate. It noted that the attestation clause failed to state the number of pages used in the will, thus rendering the will void and undeserving of probate. Azuela argues that the requirement under Article 805 of the Civil Code that the number of pages used in a notarial will be stated in the attestation clause is merely directory, rather than mandatory, and thus susceptible to what he termed as the substantial compliance rule. ISSUE: Whether or not the subject will complied with the requirements of the law and, hence, should be admitted to probate HELD: The petition is DENIED. A will whose attestation clause does not contain the number of pages on which the will is written is fatally defective. A will whose attestation clause is not signed by the instrumental witnesses is fatally defective. And perhaps most importantly, a will which does not contain an acknowledgment, but a mere jurat, is fatally defective. Any one of these defects is sufficient to deny probate. A notarial will with all three defects is just aching for judicial rejection.

Case No. 127 Cruz v. Villasor 54 SCRA 752 FACTS: The CFI of Cebu allowed the probate of Valente Z. Cruzs last will and testament. His surviving spouse, Agapita Cruz, opposed the allowance of the will alleging it was executed through fraud, deceit, misrepresentation and undue influence; that the said instrument was execute without the testator having been fully informed of the content thereof, particularly as to what properties he was disposing and that the supposed last will and testament was not executed in accordance with law. Agapita appealed the allowance of the will by certiorari. ISSUE: W/N the will was executed in accordance with law (particularly Articles 805 and 806 of the NCC, the first requiring at least three credible witnesses to attest and subscribe to the will, and the second requiring the testator and the witnesses to acknowledge the will before a notary public.). HELD: NO. Of the three instrumental witnesses to the will, one of them (Atty. Teves) is at the same time the Notary Public before whom the will was supposed to have been acknowledged. The notary public before whom the will was acknowledged cannot be considered as the third instrumental witness since he cannot acknowledge before himself his having signed the will. To acknowledge before means to avow (Javellana v. Ledesma; Castro v. Castro); to own as genuine, to assent, to admit; and before means in front or preceding in space or ahead of. Consequently, if the third witness were the notary public himself, he would have to avow assent, or admit his having signed the will in front of himself. This cannot be done because he cannot split his personality into two so that one will appear before the other to acknowledge his participation in the making of the will. To permit such a situation to obtain would be sanctioning a sheer absurdity. Furthermore, the function of a notary public is, among others, to guard against any illegal or immoral arrangement (Balinon v. De Leon). That function would defeated if the notary public were one of the attesting instrumental witnesses. It would place him in inconsistent position and the very purpose of acknowledgment, which is to minimize fraud, would be thwarted. Admittedly, there are American precedents holding that notary public may, in addition, act as a witness to the executive of the document he has notarized. There are others holding that his signing merely as notary in a will nonetheless makes him a witness thereon. But these authorities do not serve the purpose of the law in this jurisdiction or are not decisive of the issue herein because the notaries public and witnesses referred to in these cases merely acted as instrumental, subscribing attesting witnesses, and not as acknowledging witnesses. Here, the notary public acted not only as attesting witness but also acknowledging witness, a situation not envisaged by Article 805-06. Probate of will set aside.

Case No. 138 Codoy v. Calugay 312 SCRA 333 FACTS: On 6 April 1990, Evangeline Calugay, Josephine Salcedo and Eufemia Patigas, devisees and legatees of the holographic will of the deceased Matilde Seo Vda. de Ramonal, filed a petition for probate of the said will. They attested to the genuineness and due execution of the will on 30 August 1978. Eugenio Ramonal Codoy and Manuel Ramonal filed their opposition claiming that the will was a forgery and that the same is even illegible. They raised doubts as regards the repeated appearing on the will after every disposition, calling the same out of the ordinary. If the will was in the handwriting of the deceased, it was improperly procured. Evangeline Calugay, etc. presented 6 witnesses and various documentary evidence. The first witness was the clerk of court of the probate court who produced and identified the records of the case bearing the signature of the deceased. The second witness was election registrar who was made to produce and identify the voters affidavit, but failed to as the same was already destroyed and no longer available. The third, the deceaseds niece, claimed that she had acquired familiarity with the deceaseds signature and handwriting as she used to accompany her in collecting rentals from her various tenants of commercial buildings and the deceased always issued receipts. The niece also testified that the deceased left a holographic will entirely written, dated and signed by said deceased. The fourth witness was a former lawyer for the deceased in the intestate proceedings of her late husband, who said that the signature on the will was similar to that of the deceased but that he can not be sure. The fifth was an employee of the DENR who testified that she was familiar with the signature of the deceased which appeared in the latters application for pasture permit. The fifth, respondent Evangeline Calugay, claimed that she had lived with the deceased since birth where she had become familiar with her signature and that the one appearing on the will was genuine. Codoy and Ramonals demurrer to evidence was granted by the lower court. It was reversed on appeal with the Court of Appeals which granted the probate. ISSUE: 1. W/N Article 811 of the Civil Code, providing that at least three witnesses explicitly declare the signature in a contested will as the genuine signature of the testator, is mandatory or directory. 2. Whether or not the witnesses sufficiently establish the authenticity and due execution of the deceaseds holographic will. HELD:

1. YES. The word shall connotes a mandatory order, an imperative obligation and is inconsistent with the idea of discretion and that the presumption is that the word shall, when used in a statute, is mandatory. In the case at bar, the goal to be achieved by the law, is to give effect to the wishes of the deceased and the evil to be prevented is the possibility that unscrupulous individuals who for their benefit will employ means to defeat the wishes of the testator. The paramount consideration in the present petition is to determine the true intent of the deceased. 2. NO. We cannot be certain that the holographic will was in the handwriting of the deceased. The clerk of court was not presented to declare explicitly that the signature appearing in the holographic will was that of the deceased. The election registrar was not able to produce the voters affidavit for verification as it was no longer available. The deceaseds niece saw pre-prepared receipts and letters of the deceased and did not declare that she saw the deceased sign a document or write a note. The will was not found in the personal belongings of the deceased but was in the possession of the said niece, who kept the fact about the will from the children of the deceased, putting in issue her motive. Evangeline Calugay never declared that she saw the decreased write a note or sign a document. The former lawyer of the deceased expressed doubts as to the authenticity of the signature in the holographic will. (As it appears in the foregoing, the three-witness requirement was not complied with.) A visual examination of the holographic will convinces that the strokes are different when compared with other documents written by the testator. The records are remanded to allow the oppositors to adduce evidence in support of their opposition. The object of solemnities surrounding the execution of wills is to close the door against bad faith and fraud, to avoid substitution of wills and testaments and to guaranty their truth and authenticity. Therefore, the laws on this subject should be interpreted in such a way as to attain these primordial ends. But, on the other hand, also one must not lose sight of the fact that it is not the object of the law to restrain and curtail the exercise the right to make a will. However, we cannot eliminate the possibility of a false document being adjudged as the will of the testator, which is why if the holographic will is contested, the law requires three witnesses to declare that the will was in the handwriting of the deceased. Article 811, paragraph 1. provides: In the probate of a holographic will, it shall be necessary that at least one witness who knows the handwriting and signature of the testator explicitly declare that the will and the signature are in the handwriting of the testator. If the will is contested, at least three of such witnesses shall be required.

The word shall connotes a mandatory order, an imperative obligation and is inconsistent with the idea of discretion and that the presumption is that the word shall, when used in a statute, is mandatory. Case No. 149 TRILLANA vs. CRISOSTOMO 89 Phil. 710 G.R. No. L-3378 August 22, 1951 FACTS: The deceased, Damasa Crisostomo, allegedly made two wills: one will was made on August 16, 1948 and the other will was executed on October 19, 1948. Trillana, the administrator of the estate, presented the subsequent will executed on October 19 for probate, and was granted by the court. Crisostomo and others, claiming to be nephews and nieces of the deceased, filed a petition for relief of the judgment rendered by the probate court to disallow the subsequent will and allow the former will executed on August 16, alleging that the proceedings during the probate of the subsequent will was attended by fraud.

Contention of the Appellants( Crisostomo et al): Appellants argue that they are interested parties and therefore may appeal in the present case, because in the event the will of October 19 is disallowed and that of August 16 is allowed, and the legacies in the latter are declared invalid or the legatees incapable to inherit, the legacies will go to the appellants.

Contentiton of the Appellee (Trillana) The will of August 16, 1948 was expressly and absolutely revoked by the will of October 19, 1948, executed by the same executrix or deceased. The probate of the subsequent will was not attended by fraud and the appellants show no proof of the alleged fraud committed in the probate of the subsequent will.

ISSUE: 1. Whether a revoked will must be included in the probate of the subsequent will. 2. Are the appellants parties in interest in the present case and therefore entitled to appeal the decision of the lower court? RULING:

1. No, a revoked will may no longer be presented in the probate of the subsequent will. If two wills are presented for allowance but one of them was a revoked will, it cannot be included in the probate of the latter subsequent will, because it would be a waste of time to allow the revoked will if the subsequent revoking will is allowed. The revoked will may be probated and allowed only if the subsequent revoking will is disallowed.

2. No, the appellants are not considered as interested parties in the probate proceedings of the will of the deceased Damasa Crisostomo, and therefore, are not entitled to appeal the decision of the lower court. In civil actions and special proceedings, unless otherwise provided by law , the interest in order that a person may be a party on appeal must be material and direct, so that he will be materially and directly benefited or injured by the court's order, decree or judgment: and not indirect or contingent. The appellants in the present case merely allege in their petition for relief that they are "nephews and nieces and therefore legal heirs of the deceased Damasa Crisostomo," without specifying the degree of relationship they had to the latter. They contend that if the will made on October 19, 1949, be disallowed, they will inherit the estate left by the testatrix. The interest claimed by the appellants is purely contingent or dependent upon several uncertain and future events to (1) The disallowance of the will of October 19, 1948 (2) The allowance of the will of August 16, 1948, and (3) invalidation of certain legacies left in said will of August 16, 1948.

Case No. 160 Gallanosa v. Arcangel, 83 SCRA 675 FACTS: Florentino Gallanosa executed a will in 1938 when he was 80 years old. He owned 61 parcels of and at that time. He died in 1939 childless and survived by his brother Leon. In his will, he bequethed his 1/2 share of the conjugal estate to his second wife Tecla and if she predecease him (as what occurred), the said share shall be assigned to the spouses Gallanosa (Pedro & Corazon). Pedro is Tecla's son by her 1st marriage. He also gave 3 parcels of land to Adolfo, his protege. The said will was admitted to probate with Gallanosa as executor. In 1952, thjhe legal heirs filed an action for the recovery of said 61 parcels of land. The action was dismissed on the ground of res judicata. Then, 28 years after probate, another acton agaisnt Gallanosa for annulment of the will, recovery of the lands alleging fraud and deceit, was filed. As a result, the lower court set aide the 1939 decree of probate. Issue: Whether or not a will which has been probated may still be annulled RULING: No. A final decree of probate is conclusive as to the due execution of the will. Due execution means that the testator was of sound and disposing mind at the time of the execution and that he was not acting under duress, menace, fraud or undue influence. Finally, that it was executed in accordance with the formalities provided by law. The period for seeking relief under Rule 38 has already expired, hence the judgment may only be set aside on the grounds of, 1) lack of jurisdiction or lack of due process of law, and 2) the judgment was obtained by means of extrinsic collateral fraud (which must be filed within 4 years from the discovery). Finally, Art. 1410 cannot apply to wills and testament.

Case No. 171 G.R. No. L-41947 January 16, 1936

In re Will of the deceased Silvestra Baron. VIVENCIO CUYUGAN, petitioner-appellant, vs. FAUSTINA BARON and GUILLERMO BARO FACTS: Silvestra Baron died on January 30, 1933. The death certificate recites that she was eighty-six years of age and died of heart failure. The petition further recites that she left an estate exceeding in value the sum of P80,000 which she disposed of by will dated December 17, 1932, that she died single without forced heirs. The will appointed Vivencio Cuyugan, her nephew, as executor. The original of this will is signed "Silestra On" and the copy is signed "Silestra Baron" (t.s.n. pp. 170, 171). Both copies are written in the Pampanga dialect and consist of one sheet and are witnessed in due form by Vicente David, Valeriano Silva and Zacarias Nuguid (known to the testator). The evidence shows that the same morning when Silvestra Baron signed the alleged will she suffered a physical collapse of such a serious nature that a physician and a nurse were immediately called in. By reason of her advanced age and the gravity of her illness, she was unable to do anything for herself. The subscribing witnesses stated that it was their belief that Silvestra understood the alleged will which she signed, but all of them admitted that although they were in her house about two hours not one of them exchanged a single word of conversation with Silvestra. ISSUE: WON the testator possessed testamentary capacity. RULING: The burden of proving sanity, which falls on the shoulders of the proponent of a will, was discharged by Vivencio Cuyugan when he put to the witness stand Attorney Quirino Abad Santos, the drawer of the will, and attorneys Vicente T. David and Valeriano Silva, and the chief of police of San Fernando, Pampanga, Zacarias Nuguid, the three witnesses who signed the will. They testified unanimously that when testatrix signed her will she was of sound mind, judging from her appearance and the manner she signed it. "An attesting witness to a will may base an opinion of the testator's mental capacity upon his appearance at the time of executing the will. (Brownlie vs. Brownlie, 93 A.L.R., 1041.) This testimony was sufficient to make and did make a prima facie case, (68 Corpus Juris, 450), and the burden of going forward to show testamentary incapacity having shifted to the contestants (68 Corpus Juris, 451). It was not therefore the duty of the proponent to call the doctor and the nurse who attended Silvestra Baron when she collapsed to show that she was of sound mind but of the contestants to show incapacity.

While it is true that in the present case no physician testified as to the condition of Silvestra Baron's mind when she signed her will, we have however the testimony of three reputable attorneys to the effect that judging from her appearance and the ways she acted when she signed her will she was of sound mind. This was corroborated by the fact that when the next day Attorney Jose A. Narciso, upon learning that she had made a will, he tried to make her revoked said will which she refused. This in itself is an admission that she was of sound disposing mind. The very finding of the lower court that Silvestra Baron was unduly influenced in the making of her will is an implied admission that she possessed testamentary capacity. The preponderance of evidence and the implied admission of the lower court show, therefore, the when Silvestra Baron made her will she was of sound disposing mind.

Case No. 182 NERI v AKUTIN 74 PHIL 185 MORAN; May 21, 1943

FACTS: Testator Neri indicated in his will that he was leaving all of his properties by universal title to his children by his second marriage with preterition of his children by his first marriage. Eleuterio, Agripino, Agapita, Getulia, Rosario and Celerina are all Neris children by his first marriage. The trial court annulled the institution of the heirs and declared total intestacy. The children by the second marriage filed a motion for reconsideration on the grounds that: 1) there is no preterition as to the children of the first marriage have received their shares in the property left by the testator 2) assuming that there has been a preterition, the effect would not be the annulment of the institution of heirs but simply the reduction of the bequest made to them. The children by the second marriage anchor their argument on the concept of heir whose A814 definition is deemed repealed by that of the Code of Civil Procedure. It is maintained that the word "heredero" under the Civil Code, is not synonymous with the term "heir" under the Code of Civil Procedure, and that the "heir" under the latter Code is no longer personally liable for the debts of the deceased as was the "heredero" under the Civil Code

ISSUES 1. WON there is preterition 2. WON there should be annulment of the institution of the heirs and open the estate to total intestacy

HELD 1. YES, there is preterition. According to the courts findings, none of the children by the first marriage received their respective shares from the testators property. Even if clause 8 of the will is invoked (said clause states that the children by his first marriage had already received their shares in his property excluding what he had given them as aid during their financial troubles and the money they had borrowed from him) the Court can rely only on the findings of the trial court that the inventory indicates that the property of Neri has remained intact and that no portion has been given

to the children of the first marriage. Neri left his property by universal title to the children by his second marriage and did not expressly disinherit his children by his first marriage but did not leave anything to them. This fits the case of preterition according to A814, CC which provides that the institution of heirs shall be annulled and intestate succession should be declared open. 2. YES The word "heir" as used in A814 of the Civil Code may not have the meaning that it has under the Code of Civil Procedure, but this does prevent a bequest from being made by universal title as is in substance the subject-matter of A814 of the Civil Code. It may also be true that heirs under the Code of Civil Procedure may receive the bequest only after payment of debts left by the deceased and not before as under the Civil Code, but this may have a bearing only upon the question as to when succession becomes effective and can in no way destroy the fact that succession may still be by universal or special title. Since a bequest may still be made by universal title and with preterition of forced heirs, its nullity as provided in article 814 still applies there being nothing inconsistent with it in the Code of Civil Procedure. The basis for its nullity is the nature and effect of the bequest and not its possible name under the Code of Civil Procedure. In addition, Secs. 755 and 756 of the Code of Civil Procedure affected A814 and A851 of the Civil Code. But these sections have been expressly repealed by Act No. 2141, thus restoring force to A814 and A851.

Case No. 193 RABADILLA vs. CA G.R. No. 113725 June 29, 2000

FACTS: In the codicil of testatrix, Rabadilla was instituted as a devisee of a lot, containing the following provisions. Rabadilla shall have the obligation until he dies, every year, to give to Belleza 100 piculs of sugar until Belleza dies. Should Rabadilla die, his heir to whom he shall give the lot shall have to obligation to still give yearly the sugar as specified to Belleza. In the event that the lot is sold, leased or mortgaged, the buyer, lessee, mortgagee, shall have also the obligation to respect and deliver yearly sugar to Belleza. Should the command be not respected, Belleza shall immediately seize the lot and turn it over to the testatrix near descendants.

ISSUE: WON the obligations of Jorge Rabadilla under the Codicil are inherited by his heirs.

HELD: This is not a case of simple substitution. The codicil did not provide that should Rabadilla default due to predecease, incapacity or renunciation, the testatrix near descendants would substitute him. Neither is there a fideicommissary substitution. Here, the instituted heir is in fact allowed under the Codicil to alienate the property provided the negotiation is with the near descendants or the sister of the testatrix. Also, the near descendants right to inherit from the testatrix is not definite. It will only pass to them if the obligation to deliver is not fulfilled. Moreover, a fideicommissary substitution is void if the first heir is not related by first degree to the second degree. In this case, the near descendants are not at all related to Dr. Rabadilla. This is also not a conditional institution. The testatrix did not make Rabadillas inheritance dependent on the performance of the said obligation. Since testamentary dispositions are generally acts of liberality, an obligation imposed upon the heir should not be considered a condition unless it clearly appears from the will itself that such was the intention of the testator. In case of doubt, the institution should be considered as modal and not conditional. The manner of institution is modal because it imposes a charge upon the instituted heir without affecting the efficacy of such institution. A mode imposes an obligation upon the heir or legatee but it does not affect the efficacy of his rights to the succession. In a conditional testamentary disposition, the condition must happen or be fulfilled in order for the heir to be entitled to succeed the testator. The condition suspends but does not obligate. The mode obligates but does not suspend.

Case No. 204 VIZCONDE vs. CA GR # 118449, February 11, 1998 FACTS: Estrellita purchased form Rafael a 10,110 sq. m. lot located at Valenzuela, Bulacan for P100k. She sold the Valenzuela property for P3, 405, 612 and in June of the same year, she bought a house and lot in BF Homes, Paraaque using a portion of the proceeds of the sale of the Valenzuela lot. Estrellita and her 2 children, Carmela and Jennifer, were killed. Lauro was left as the sole heir but he entered into an extrajudicial settlement of his wifes estate with Rafael and Salud, her parents. This settlement provided 50% of the total amount of the bank deposits of Estrellita and her daughters to Rafael while the other 50% was given to Lauro. The Paraaque property and the car were also given to Lauro with Rafael and Salud waiving all their claims, rights, ownership and participation as heirs in the said properties. Rafael died. In the intestate proceeding the Valenzuela lot allegedly was given by Rafael to Estrellita and that the heirs legitime should come from collation of all properties distributed to his children by Rafael during his lifetime. Ramon, Rafaels son, further claimed that the petitioner is one of Rafaels children by right of representation as Estrellitas widower. ISSUE: Can Lauro be considered a compulsory heir of Rafael? HELD: Petitioner is Rafaels son-in-law and not one of his compulsory heirs. With respect to Rafaels estate, petitioner, who was not even shown to be a creditor of Rafael, is considered a 3 rd person. As such, he may not be dragged into the intestate estate proceeding. Secondly, the order of collation is premature since the proceeding is still in its initiatory stage. There is nothing to indicate that the legitime of any of Rafaels heirs has been impaired to warrant collation. Further, collation of the Paraaque property, bought using the proceeds of the sale of the Valenzuela property which Rafael transferred to Estrellita, has no statutory basis. The Order of the probate court presupposes that the Paraaque property was gratuitously conveyed by Rafael to Estrellita. However, Estrellita paid P900, 000 to Premier Homes, Inc. for said property. The collation is improper for collation covers only properties gratuitously given by decedent during his lifetime to his compulsory heirs which do not obtain to the transfer of the Paraaque realty. Moreover, Rafael already waived his right to said realty. Lastly, Estrellita died ahead of Rafael. In fact, it was Rafael who inherited from her an amount more than the value of the Valenzuela lot. Thus, even assuming that the latter property maybe collated, collation may not be allowed as the value of the Valenzuela lot has long been returned to Rafaels estate.

Case No. 215 G.R. No. L-14474 October 31, 1960, ONESIMA D. BELEN, vs. BANK OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS and MILAGROS BELEN DE OLAGUERA FACTS: Benigno Diaz executed a codicil on September 29, 1944. On November 7, 1944, Benigno Diaz died; and the aforesaid codicil, together with the will, was admitted to probate in Special Proceedings No. 894 of the same Court of First Instance of Manila. The proceedings for the administration of the estate of Benigno Diaz were closed in 1950 and the estate was thereafter put under the administration of the appellee Bank of the Philippine Islands, as trustee for the benefit of the legatees. Filomena Diaz died on February 8, 1954, leaving two legitimate children, Milagros Belen de Olsguera, married, with seven (7) legitimate children, and Onesima D. Belen, single. On March 19, 1958, Onesima D. Belen filed a petition in Special Proceedings No. 9226, contending that the amount that would have appertained to Filomena Diaz under the codicil should now be divided(equally) only between herself and Milagros Belen de Olaguera, as the surviving children of the said deceased, to the exclusion, in other words, of the seven (7) legitimate children of Milagros Belen de Olaguera. The court, in its order on May 23, 1958 denied, as initially pointed out Onesima's petition. ISSUE: Do the words "sus descendientes legitimos" refer conjointly to all living descendant (children and grandchildren) of the legatee, as a class; or they refer to the descendants nearest in degree? RULING: Appellant Onesima Belen contends that the phrase should be taken to mean the relatives nearest in degree to Filomena Diaz; and that the legacy should be therefore divided equally between her and her sister Milagros Belen de Olaguera, to the exclusion of the latter's sons and daughters, grand children of the original legatee, Filomena Diaz. As authority in support of her thesis, appellant invokes Article 959 of the Civil Code of the Philippines (reproducing ne varieter Article 751 of the Code of 1889): A distribution made in general terms in favor of the testator's relatives shall be understood as made in favor of those nearest in degree. The argument fails to note that this article is specifically limited in its application to the case where the beneficiaries are relatives of the testator, not those of the legatee. In such an event, the law assumes that the testator intended to refer to the rules of intestacy, in order to benefit the relatives closest to him, because, as Manresa observes,

la razon y la logica ha cen fundadamente suponer que, al procurar este favorecer a sus parientes, habria de ajustarse mas a ligadas al mismo (testador) por los vinculos de la sanger y de la familia (6 Manresa, Comm., 7th Ed., p. 72). But the ratios legis (that among a testator's relative the closest are dearest) obviously does not supply where the beneficiaries are relatives of another person (the legatee) and noot of the testator . There is no logical reason in this case to presume that the testator intended to refer to the rules of intestacy, for he precisely made a testament and provided substitutes for each legatee; nor can it be said that his affections would prefer the nearest relatives of the legatee to those more distant, since he envisages all of them in a group, and only as mere substitutes for a preferred beneficiary.

Case No. 226 Gonzales v. CA G.R. No. L-37453 May 25, 1979 Guerrero, J. (Ponente) Facts: Petitioner Rizalina Gonzales and Lutgarda Santiago (Private respondent) are the nieces of the deceased Isabel Gabriel who died a widow. A will was thereafter submitted to probate. The said will was typewritten, in Tagalog and appeared to have been executed in April 1961 or two months prior to the death of Isabel. It consisted of 5 pages including the attestation and acknowledgment, with the signature of testatrix on page 4 and the left margin of all the pages. Lutgarda was named as the universal heir and executor. The petitioner opposed the probate. The lower court denied the probate on the ground that the will was not executed and attested in accordance with law on the issue of the competency and credibility of the witnesses. Issue: Whether or not the credibility of the subscribing witnesses is material to the validity of a will RULING: No. The law requires only that witnesses posses the qualifications under Art. 820 (NCC) and none of the disqualifications of Art. 802. There is no requirement that they are of good standing or reputation in the community, for trustworthiness, honesty and uprightness in order that his testimony is believed and accepted in court. For the testimony to be credible, it is not mandatory that evidence be established on record that the witnesses have good standing in the the community. Competency is distinguished from credibility, the former being determined by Art. 820 while the latter does not require evidence of such good standing. Credibility depends on the convincing weight of his testimony in court.

Case No. 237 G.R. No. L-19382 August 31, 1965

IN RE SUMMARY SETTLEMENT OF THE ESTATE OF MELODIA FERRARIS. FILOMENA ABELLANA DE BACAYO vs. GAUDENCIA FERRARIS DE BORROMEO, CATALINA FERARIS DE VILLEGAS, et. al FACTS: Melodia Ferraris was a resident of Cebu City until 1937 when she transferred to Intramuros, Manila. She was known to have resided there continuously until 1944. Thereafter, up to the filing on December 22, 1960 of the petition for the summary settlement of her estate, she has not been heard of and her whereabouts are still unknown. More than ten (10) years having elapsed since the last time she was known to be alive, she was declared presumptively dead for purposes of opening her succession and distributing her estate among her heirs. Melodia Ferraris left properties in Cebu City, consisting of one-third (1/3) share in the estate of her aunt, Rosa Ferraris, valued at P6,000.00, more or less, and which was adjudicated to her in Special Proceeding No. 13-V of the same court. The deceased Melodia Ferraris left no surviving direct descendant, ascendant, or spouse, but was survived only by collateral relatives, namely, Filomena Abellana de Bacayo, an aunt and half-sister of decedent's father, Anacleto Ferraris; and by Gaudencia, Catalina, Conchita, and Juanito, all surnamed Ferraris, her nieces and nephew, who were the children of Melodia's only brother of full blood, Arturo Ferraris, who pre-deceased her (the decedent). These two classes of heirs claim to be the nearest intestate heirs and seek to participate in the estate of said Melodia Ferraris. The trial court ruled that the oppositors-appellees, as children of the only predeceased brother of the decedent, exclude the aunt (petitioner-appellant) of the same decedent reasoning out that the former are nearer in degree (two degrees) than the latter since nieces and nephews succeed by right of representation, while petitioner-appellant is three degrees distant from the decedent, and that other collateral relatives are excluded by brothers or sisters or children of brothers or sisters of the decedent in accordance with article 1009 of the New Civil Code. ISSUE: WON the aunt is of the same or equal degree of relationship as the oppositors appellees, three degrees removed from the decedent; and that under article 975 of the New Civil Code no right of representation could take place when the nieces and nephew of the decedent do not concur with an uncle or aunt RULING:

We agree with appellants that as an aunt of the deceased she is as far distant as the nephews from the decedent (three degrees) since in the collateral line to which both kinds of relatives belong degrees are counted by first ascending to the common ancestor and then descending to the heir (Civil Code, Art. 966). Appellant is likewise right in her contention that nephews and nieces alone do not inherit by right of representation (i.e., per stripes) unless concurring with brothers or sisters of the deceased, as provided expressly by Article 975: ART. 975. When children of one or more brothers or sisters of the deceased survive, they shall inherit from the latter by representation, if they survive with their uncles or aunts. But if they alone survive, they shall inherit in equal portions. Nevertheless, the trial court was correct when it held that, in case of intestacy, nephews and nieces of the de cujus exclude all other collaterals (aunts and uncles, first cousins, etc.) from the succession.

Case No. 248 G.R. No. L-55373 July 25, 1983 GLICERIA CARANDANG-COLLANTES and LUZ C.ARANDANG, vs. FELIX CAPUNO, et. al

FACTS: A complaint for annulment of a Donation Inter Vivos executed by the late Josefa Capuno on March 6, 1970, in favor of defendants-appellants (petitioners herein) namely, Gliceria CarandangCollantes and Luz Carandang, was filed by plaintiffs-appellees (private respondents herein) before the Court of First Instance of Laguna on February 8, 1971 docketed as Civil Case No. SP-927. Four parcels of real property, including a residential house all situated in San Pablo, Laguna were donated under the deed. Private respondents, plaintiffs-appellees below, alleged in their complaint "4. That upon the death of Josefa Capuno on 8 April 1970, she left as her only heirs plaintiffs herein, Felix Capuno, Lydia Capuno, and Simeon Capuno, being her nephews by her deceased brother Silverio, and Gerardo Capuno and Aniceto Capuno being also her nephews, by her deceased brother Juan Capuno; . . . 6. That the thumbmark appearing on the instrument, allegedly that (of) the deceased Josefa Capuno, was not hers, and granting arguendo, that it was, she did not intend to convey said properties to defendants herein under said deed, her consent thereto having been secured either through undue influence or fraud; there being no relation between them . . ." They then prayed that the donation inter vivos be declared annulled and of no force and effect and they be declared true owners of the properties entitled to the possession thereof and the reasonable value of the fruits realized therefrom from 8 April 1970 up to the time of actual delivery with legal interest thereon until fully paid plus attorney's fees and costs of litigation. ISSUE: WON the thumbmark affixed to the deed of donation was authentic or genuine. RULING: Plaintiffs have not presented any proof in support of the alleged forgery or fictitiousness of the thumbmark in question, neither by an expert or by comparison with the true thumbprint of the donor, Josefa Capuno. The testimony of Aniceto Capuno that his aunt, Josefa Capuno, had indicated to him shortly before her death the division of the donated properties among the nephews and niece of Josefa is no proof that Josefa did not execute the deed of donation in favor of the defendants. Neither are the declarations of Albina and Lydia Capuno who claimed to be taking care of Josefa at the hospital from February 13 to March 14, 1970 and were always with her, prove that the deed in question was not executed by the donor. For these witnesses are parties to the case, biased and stand

to benefit from the annulment of the deed. Their testimonies are inherently weak as against the testimony of the notary public who notarized the document and declared that the document was acknowledged before him and the thumbmark was that of the donor, Josefa Capuno.

Case No. 259 J.L.T.AGRO,INC.v.BALANSAG Facts: Don Julian L. Teves (Don Julian) contracted two marriages, first with Antonia Baena (Antonia), and after her death, with Milagros Donio Teves (Milagros Donio). Don Julian had two children with Antonia, namely: JosefaTeves Escao (Josefa) and Emilio Teves (Emilio). He had also four (4) children with Milagros Donio, namely: MariaEvelyn Donio Teves (Maria Evelyn), Jose Catalino Donio Teves (Jose Catalino), Milagros Reyes Teves (MilagrosReyes) and Pedro Reyes Teves (Pedro).The present controversy involves a parcel of land known as Lot No. 63 of the Bais Cadastre, which was originallyregistered in the name of the conjugal partnership of Don Julian and Antonia. When Antonia died, the land wasamong the properties involved in an action for partition and damages. Thereafter, the parties to the case enteredinto a Compromise Agreement which embodied the partition of all the properties of Don Julian. The property was toremain undivided during the lifetime of Don Julian. The Compromise Agreement lays down the effect of theeventual death of Don Julian that in the event of death of Julian L. Teves, the properties now selected and adjudicated to Don Julian shall exclusively be adjudicated to the wife in second marriage of Don Julian and his four minor children.On 16 November 1972, Don Julian, Emilio and Josefa executed a Deed of Assignment of Assets with Assumptionof Liabilities in favor of J.L.T. Agro, Inc. Less than a year later, Don Julian, Josefa and Emilio also executed aninstrument entitled Supplemental to the Deed of Assignment of Assets with the Supplemental Deed. Thisinstrument transferred ownership over Lot No. 63 in favor of J.L.T. Agro, Inc. Don Julian died intestate.Meanwhile, Milagros Donio and her children had immediately taken possession over the subject lot after theexecution of the Compromise Agreement. In 1974, they entered into a yearly lease agreement with spouses Antonio Balansag and Hilaria Cadayday. At the Register of Deeds while trying to register the deed of absolute sale,respondents discovered that the lot was already titled in the name of petitioner. Issue : Whether Don Julian had validly transferred ownership of the subject lot during his lifetime? Held: Evidently, at the time of the execution of the deed of assignment covering Lot No. 63 in favor of petitioner,Don Julian remained the owner of the property since ownership over the subject lot would only pass to his heirsfrom the second marriage at the time of his death. Thus, as the owner of the subject lot, Don Julian retained theabsolute right to dispose of it during his lifetime. His right cannot be challenged by Milagros Donio and her childrenon the ground that it had already been adjudicated to them by virtue of the compromise agreement.The adjudication in favor of the heirs of Don Julian from the second marriage became automatically operative uponthe approval of the Compromise Agreement, thereby vesting on them the right to validly dispose of Lot No. 63 infavor of respondents. All things which are not outside the commerce of men, including future things, may be theobject of a contract. All rights which are not intransmissible may also be the object of contracts. No contract may beentered into upon future inheritance except in cases expressly authorized by law. Well-entrenched is the rule thatall things, even future ones, which are not outside the commerce of man may be the object of a contract. Theexception is that no contract may be entered into with respect to future inheritance, and the exception to theexception is the partition inter vivos referred to in Article 1080. The first paragraph of Article 1080, which providesthe exception to the exception and therefore aligns with the general rule on future things, reads: ART. 1080. Should a person make a partition of his estate by an act inter vivos, or by will, such partition shall berespected, insofar as it does not prejudice the legitime of the

compulsory heirs.. . . .The partition inter vivos of the properties of Don Julian is undoubtedly valid pursuant to Article 1347. However,considering that it would become legally operative only upon the death of Don Julian, the right of his heirs from thesecond marriage to the properties adjudicated to him under the compromise agreement was but a mereexpectancy. It was a bare hope of succession to the property of their father. Being the prosp ect of a futureacquisition, the interest by its nature was inchoate. It had no attribute of property, and the interest to which itrelated was at the time nonexistent and might never exist.

Case No. 270 [G.R. No. 137287. February 15, 2000] REBECCA VIADO NON, JOSE A. NON and DELIA VIADO, petitioners, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, ALICIA N. VIADO, CHERRI VIADO and FE FIDES VIADO, respondents. LEX FACTS: During their lifetime, the spouses Julian C. Viado and Virginia P. Viado owned several pieces of property, among them a house and lot located at 147 Isarog Street, La Loma, Quezon City, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 42682. Virginia P. Viado died on 20 October 1982. Julian C. Viado died three years later on 15 November 1985. Surviving them were their children -- Nilo Viado, Leah Viado Jacobs, and herein petitioners Rebecca Viado, married to Jose Non, and Delia Viado. Nilo Viado and Leah Viado Jacobs both died on 22 April 1987. Nilo Viado left behind as his own sole heirs herein respondents --- his wife Alicia Viado and their two children Cherri Viado and Fe Fides Viado. Petitioners and respondents shared, since 1977, a common residence at the Isarog property. Soon, however, tension would appear to have escalated between petitioner Rebecca Viado and respondent Alicia Viado after the former had asked that the property be equally divided between the two families to make room for the growing children. Respondents, forthwith, claimed absolute ownership over the entire property and demanded that petitioners vacate the portion occupied by the latter. On 01 February 1988, petitioners, asserting co-ownership over the property in question, filed a case for partition before the Quezon City RTC (Branch 93). Jj sc Respondents predicated their claim of absolute ownership over the subject property on two documents --- a deed of donation executed by the late Julian Viado covering his one-half conjugal share of the Isarog property in favor of Nilo Viado and a deed of extrajudicial settlement in which Julian Viado, Leah Viado Jacobs (through a power of attorney in favor of Nilo Viado) and petitioner Rebecca Viado waived in favor of Nilo Viado their rights and interests over their share of the property inherited from Virginia Viado. Both instruments were executed on 26 August 1983 and registered on 07 January 1988 by virtue of which Transfer Certificate of Title No. 42682 was cancelled and new Transfer Certificate of Title No. 373646 was issued to the heirs of Nilo Viado.

ISSUE: WON the late Nilo Viado employed forgery and undue influence to coerce Julian Viado to execute the deed of donation. RULING: The issue raised boil down to the appreciation of the evidence, a matter that has been resolved by both the trial court and the appellate court. The Court of Appeals, in sustaining the court a quo, has found

the evidence submitted by petitioners to be utterly wanting, consisting of, by and large, self-serving testimonies. While asserting that Nilo Viado employed fraud, forgery and undue influence in procuring the signatures of the parties to the deeds of donation and of extrajudicial settlement, petitioners are vague, however, on how and in what manner those supposed vices occurred. Neither have petitioners shown proof why Julian Viado should be held incapable of exercising sufficient judgment in ceding his rights and interest over the property to Nilo Viado. The asseveration of petitioner Rebecca Viado that she has signed the deed of extrajudicial settlement on the mistaken belief that the instrument merely pertained to the administration of the property is too tenuous to accept. It is also quite difficult to believe that Rebecca Viado, a teacher by profession, could have misunderstood the tenor of the assailed document. The fact alone that the two deeds were registered five years after the date of their execution did not adversely affect their validity nor would such circumstance alone be indicative of fraud. The registration of the documents was a ministerial act and merely created a constructive notice of its contents against all third persons. Among the parties, the instruments remained completely valid and binding.