G.R. No.

L-14683

May 30, 1961

JOAQUIN QUIMSING, petitioner-appellant, vs. CAPT. ALFREDO LACHICA, Officer-in-Charge of the PC Controlled-Police Dept., Iloilo City; LT. NARCISO ALIO, JR., Actg. Chief of Police of the City of Iloilo; and MAJ. CESAR LUCERO, PC Provincial Commander of the Province of Iloilo, respondents-appellees. Ramon A. Gonzales for petitioner-appellant. The City Fiscal of Iloilo City for respondents-appellees. CONCEPCION, J.: Appeal from a decision of the Court of First Instance of Iloilo dismissing the petition in this case, as well as the counterclaim of respondents herein, without costs. Petitioner Joaquin Quimsing is the owner and manager of a duly licensed cockpit, located in the District of Molo, City of Iloilo. On February 13, 1958, the cockpit was raided by members of the city police force and the Constabulary under the command of Capt. Alfredo Lachica and Lt. Narciso Alio Jr., upon the ground that it was being illegally operated on that day, which was Thursday, not a legal holiday. Quimsing claimed that the cockpit was authorized to operate on Thursday by an ordinance of the City Council of Iloilo, approved on October 31, 1956. This notwithstanding, Capt. Lachica allegedly threatened to raid the cockpit should cockfighting be held therein, thereafter, on Thursdays. Moreover, Quimsing and nine (9) other persons were arrested and then charged in the Municipal Court of Iloilo with a violation of Article 199 of the Revised Penal Code, in relation to sections 2285 and 2286 of the Revised Administrative Code. Quimsing, in turn, commenced the present action, in the Court of First Instance of Iloilo, against Major Cesar Lucero, as the then provincial commander of the Constabulary, and Capt. Alfredo Lachica and Lt. Narciso Alio, Jr., as incumbent PC officer in charge and acting chief of police, respectively, of the Iloilo City Police. In his petition, Quimsing set up two (2) causes of action: one for the recovery from respondents, in their private capacity, of compensatory damages, as well as moral and exemplary damages allegedly sustained in consequence of the raid and arrest effected on February 13, 1958, upon the ground that the same were made illegally and in bad faith, because cockfighting on Thursdays was, it is claimed, authorized by Ordinances Nos. 5 and 58 of the City of Iloilo, in relation to Republic Act No. 938, and because Quimsing was at odds with the city mayor of Iloilo; and another for a writ of preliminary injunction, and, after trial, a permanent injunction, restraining respondents, in their official, capacity, and/or their agents, from stopping the operation of said cockpit on Thursdays and making any arrest in connection therewith. In their answer, respondents alleged that the raid and arrest aforementioned were made in good faith, without malice and in the faithful discharge of their official duties as law enforcing agents, and that, pursuant to the aforementioned provisions of the Revised Penal Code and the Revised Administrative Code, petitioner cannot legally hold cockfighting on Thursdays, despite said ordinances of the City of Iloilo. Respondents, likewise, set up a P150,000 counterclaim for moral and exemplary damages. After due hearing, the Court of First Instance of Iloilo rendered judgment dismissing the petition, as well as respondents' counterclaim. Hence this appeal by petitioner herein, who maintains that: 1. The lower court erred in not disqualifying the city fiscal from representing the respondents-appellees in the first cause of action of the petition where they are sued in their personal capacity;

2. The lower court erred in not disqualifying the city fiscal from asking the invalidity of an ordinance of the City of Iloilo; 3. The lower court erred in declaring Ordinance No. 51 series of 1954, as amended by Ordinance No. 58, series of 1956, of the City of Iloilo as illegal; 4. The lower court erred in not awarding damages to the petitioner. The first three assignments of error are related to petitioner's second cause of action, whereas the fourth assignment of error refers to the first cause of action. Hence, we will begin by considering the last assignment of error. At the outset, we note that the bad faith imputed to respondents herein has not been duly established. In fact, there is no evidence that Major Lucero had previous knowledge of the raid and arrest that his co-respondents intended to make. What is more, petitioner would appear to have included him as respondent merely upon the theory of command responsibility, as provincial commander of the constabulary in the province and city of Iloilo. However, there is neither allegation nor proof that he had been in any way guilty of fault or negligence in connection with said raid and arrest. As regards Capt. Lachica and Lt. Alio Jr., the records indicate that they were unaware of the city ordinances relieved upon by petitioner herein. Indeed, they appeared to have been surprised when petitioner invoked said ordinances. Moreover, there is every reason to believe that they were earnestly of the opinion, as His Honor the Trial judge was, that cockfighting on Thursdays is, despite the aforementioned ordinances, illegal under Article 199 of the Revised Penal Code, in relation to sections 2285 and 2286 of the Revised Administrative Code. Although petitioner maintains that such opinion is erroneous, the facts of record sufficiently warrant the conclusion that Capt. Lachica and Lt. Alio Jr. had acted in good faith and under the firm conviction that they were faithfully discharging their duty as law enforcing agents. In the light of the foregoing and of the other circumstances surrounding the case, and inasmuch as the assessment of moral and exemplary damages "is left to the discretion of the court, according to the circumstances of each case" (Art. 2216, Civil Code of the Philippines), it is our considered view that respondents herein should not be held liable for said damages. Neither should they be sentenced to pay compensatory damages, the same not having been proven satisfactorily. Hence, the fourth assignment of error is untenable. The first assignment of error is based upon section 64 of the Charter of the City of Iloilo (Commonwealth Act No. 158), pursuant to which the City Fiscal thereof "shall represent the city in all civil cases wherein the city or any officers thereof in his official capacity is a party." Although this section imposes upon the city fiscal the duty to appear in the eases specified, it does not prohibit him from representing city officers sued as private individuals on account of acts performed by them in their official capacity, specially when, as in the case at bar, they claim to have acted in good faith and in accordance with a legal provision, which they earnestly believed, as the lower court believed, should be construed in the manner set forth in their answer. Again, under petitioner's second cause of action, respondents are sued in their official capacity. This fact and the circumstances under which respondents performed the acts involved in the first cause of action sufficiently justified the appearance of the City Fiscal of Iloilo on their behalf. We need not pass upon the merits of the second assignment of error, the same not being essential to the determination of this case, for, regardless of whether or not it is proper for the City Fiscal of Iloilo, as such, to assail the validity of an ordinance thereof, it cannot be denied that respondents herein may do so in their defense. Referring now to the third assignment of error, Article 199 of the Revised Penal Code provides:

The penalty of arresto menor or a fine not exceeding 200 pesos, or both, in the discretion of the court, shall be imposed upon: 1. Any person who directly or indirectly participates in cockfights, by betting money or other valuable things, or who organizes cockfights at which bets are made, on a day other than those permitted by law. 2. Any person who directly or indirectly participates in cockfights, by betting money or other valuable things, or organizes such cockfights at a place other than a licensed cockpit. Respondents maintain that this legal provision should construed be in relation to sections 2285 and 2286 of the Revised Administrative Code, reading: SEC. 2285. Restriction upon cockfighting. Cockfighting shall take place only in licensed cockpits and, except as provided n the next succeeding section hereof, only upon legal holidays and for a period of not exceeding three days during the celebration of the local fiesta. No card game or games of chance of any kind shall be permitted on the premises of the cockpit. SEC. 2286. Cockfighting at fairs and carnivals. In provinces where the provincial board resolves that a fair or exposition of agricultural and industrial products of the province, carnival, or any other act which may redound to the promotion of the general interests thereof, shall be held on a suitable date or dates, the council of the municipality in which such fair, exposition or carnival is held may, by resolution of a majority of the council, authorize the cockfighting permitted at a local fiesta to take place for not to exceed three days during said exposition fair, or carnival, if these fall on a date other than that of the local fiesta. Where this action is taken, cockfighting shall not be permitted during the local fiesta unless a legal holiday occurs at such period in which case cockfighting may be permitted upon the holiday. Petitioner assails, however, the applicability of these two (2) provisions to the case at bar, upon the ground that said provisions form part of Chapter 57 of the Revised Administrative Code which chapter is entitled "Municipal Law" governing regular municipalities, not chartered cities, like the City of Iloilo, for, "except as otherwise specially provided", the term "municipality", as used in that Code and in said section 2286, "does not include chartered city, municipal district or other political division" (Section 2, Revised Administrative Code). Petitioner's contention is well-taken but it does not follow therefrom that he was entitled to hold cockfightings on Thursdays. Pursuant to section 21 of Commonwealth Act No. 158, otherwise known as the Charter of the City of Iloilo: Except as otherwise provided by law, the Municipal Board shall have the following legislative powers . . . to tax, fix the license fee for, and regulate, among others, theatrical performances . . . and places of amusements (par. j) . . . . Moreover, under section 1 of Republic Act No. 938, as amended by Republic Act No. 1224: The municipal or city board or council of each chartered city and the municipal council of each municipality and municipal district shall have the power to regulate or prohibit by ordinance the establishment, maintenance and operation of nightclubs, cabarets, dancing schools, pavilions, cockpits, bars, saloons, bowling alleys, billiard pools, and other similar places of amusements within its territorial jurisdiction:Provided, however, That no such places of amusement mentioned herein shall be established, maintained and/or operated within a radius of two hundred lineal meters in the case of night clubs, cabarets, pavilions, or other similar places, and fifty lineal meters in the case of dancing schools, bars, saloons, billiard pools, bowling alleys, or other similar places, except cockpits, the distance of which shall be left to the discretion of the municipal or city board or council, from any public building, schools, hospitals and churches: Provided, further, That no municipal or city ordinance fixing distances at which

such places of amusement may be established or operated shall apply to those already licensed and operating at the time of the enactment of such municipal or city ordinance, nor will the subsequent opening of any public building or other premises from which distances shall be measured prejudice any place of amusement already then licensed and operating, but any such place of amusement established within fifty lineal meters from any school, hospital or church shall be so constructed that the noise coming therefrom shall not disturb those in the school, hospital or church, and, if such noise causes such disturbance then such place of amusement shall not operate during school hours when near a school, or at night when near a hospital, or when there are religious services when near a church: Provided, furthermore, That no minor shall be admitted in any bar, saloon, cabaret, or night club employing hostesses: And provided, finally, That this Act shall not apply to establishments operating by virtue of Commonwealth Act Numbered Four hundred eighty-five nor to any establishment already in operation when Republic Act Numbered Nine hundred seventy-nine took effect. The question for determination is whether the power of the Municipal Board of Iloilo, under section 21 of its charter to "regulate . . . places of amusement", as broadened by Republic Act No. 938, as amended, to include "the power to regulate . . . by ordinance the establishment, maintenance, and operation of . . . cockpits," carries with it the authority to fix the dates on which "cockfighting" may be held. In this connection, it should be noted that said Republic Act No. 938, as amended, applies, not only to "the municipal or city board or council of each chartered city", but, also, to "the municipal council of each municipality or municipal district." Consequently, an affirmative answer to the question adverted to above would necessarily imply, not merely an amendment of sections 2285 and 2286 of the Revised Administrative Code, but, even, a virtual repeal thereof, for then local boards or councils could authorize the holding of cockfighting, not only on legal holidays, but on any day and as often as said boards or councils may deem fit to permit, whether it be during a fair, carnival, or exposition of agricultural and industrial products of the province, or not. Thus, the issue boils down to whether Republic Act No. 938, as amended, gives local governments a blanket authority to permit cockfighting at any time and for as long as said governments may wish it. Upon mature deliberation, we hold that the answer must be in the negative. To begin with, repeals and even amendments by implication are not favored, whereas an affirmative answer would entail a vital amendment, amounting, for all practical purposes, to a repeal, of sections 2285 and 2286 of the Revised Administrative Code. Secondly, grants of power to local governments are to be construed strictly, and doubts in the interpretation thereof should be resolved in favor of the national government and against the political subdivisions concerned. Thirdly, it is a matter of common knowledge that cockfighting is one of the most widespread vices of our population, and that the government has always shown a grave concern over the need of effectively curbing its evil effects. The theory of petitioner herein presupposes that the Republic of the Philippines has completely reversed its position and chosen, instead, to place the matter entirely at the discretion of local governments. We should not, and can not adopt, such premise except upon a clear and unequivocal expression of the will of Congress, which, insofar as said premise is concerned, is not manifest from the language used in Republic Act No. 938, as amended. Lastly, "cockpits" and "cockfighting" are regulated separately by our laws. Thus, section 2243 (i) of the Revised Administrative Code empowers municipal councils "to regulate cockpits". Yet, the authority of said council over "cockfighting" is found in sections 2285 and 2286 of said Code, not in said section 2243 (i). Similarly, Article 199 of the Revised Penal Code punishes, not illegal "cockpits", but "illegal cockfighting". What is more, participation in cockfights "on a day other than those permitted by law", in dealt with in said article separately from participation in cockfights "at a place other than a licensed cockpit." . So, too, the authority of local governments, under Republic Act No. 938, as amended, to "regulate . . . the establishment, maintenance and operation of . . . cockpits", does not necessarily connote the power to regulate "cockfighting", except insofar as the same must take place in a duly licensed "cockpit". Again, the first and second proviso in section 1 of said Act, regulating the distance of cockpits and places of amusement therein mentioned from "any public building, schools, hospitals and churches" and the third proviso of the same section, prohibiting

the admission of minors to some of those places of amusement, suggest that the authority conferred in said provision may include the power to determine the location of cockpits, the type or nature of construction used therefor, the conditions to persons therein, the number of cockpits that may be established in each municipality and/or by each operator, the minimum age of the individuals who may be admitted therein, and other matters of similar nature as distinguished from the days on which cockfighting shall be held and the frequency thereof. In short, we are of the opinion that the city ordinances relied upon by petitioner herein, authorizing cockfighting on Thursdays, are invalid. WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby affirmed, without special pronouncement as to costs. It is so ordered.

G.R. No. 86675 December 19, 1989 MRCA, INC., petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. BENJAMIN V. PELAYO, Judge, Regional Trial court, National Capital Judicial Region, Branch 168, Pasig, M.M., SPOUSES DOMINGO SEBASTIAN, JR. & LILIA TIOSECO SEBASTIAN, and EXPECTACION P. TIOSECO, respondents. Ramon A. Gonzales for petitioner. Tanjuatco, Oreta, Tanjuatco, Berenguer and Sanvicente for private respondents.

GRIO-AQUINO, J.: The petitioner prays this Court to set aside the decision promulgated on January 18, 1989 by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. SP 15745, affirming the order of the Regional Trial Court dismissing the complaint for non-payment of the proper filing fees as the prayer of the complaint failed to specify the amounts of moral damages, exemplary damages, attorney's fees and litigation expenses sought to be recovered by it from the defendants, but left them "to the discretion of this Honorable Court" or "to be proven during the trial." Invoking the decision of this Court in Manchester Development Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, 149 SCRA 562, the private respondents (defendants in Civil Case No. 55740 of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig, Metro Manila, entitled MRCA, Inc. vs. Spouses Domingo Sebastian, Jr., et al." filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on July 15, 1988. The petitioner opposed the motion, but the trial court granted it in its order of August 10, 1988 (p. 54, Rollo). The Court of Appeals upheld the trial court, hence, this petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. Petitioner argues that since the decision in Manchester had not yet been published in the Official Gazette when its complaint was filed, the ruling therein was ineffective; that said ruling may not be given retroactive effect because it imposes a new penalty for its non-observance; the dismissal of the complaint for want of jurisdiction; and, that it should not apply to the present case because the petitioner herein (plaintiff in the trial court) had no fraudulent intent to deprive the government of the proper docketing fee, unlike the Manchester case where enormous amounts of damages were claimed in the body of the complaint, but the amounts were not mentioned in the prayer thereof, to mislead the clerk of court in computing the filing fees to be paid. Petitioner's argument regarding the need for publication of the Manchester ruling in the Official Gazette before it may be applied to other cases is not well taken. As pointed out by the private respondents in their comment on the petition, publication in the Official Gazette is not a prerequisite for the effectivity of a court ruling even if it lays down a new rule of procedure, for "it is a doctrine well established that the procedure of the court may be changed at any time and become effective at once, so long as it does not affect or change vested rights." (Aguillon vs. Director of Lands, 17 Phil. 508). In a later case, this Court held thus: It is a well-established rule of statutory construction that statutes regulating the procedure of the courts will be construed as applicable to actions pending and undetermined at the time of their passage. Procedural laws are retrospective in that sense and to that extent. As the resolution of October 1, 1945, relates to the mode of procedure, it is applicable to cases pending in courts at the time of its adoption; but it can not be invoked in and applied to the present case in which the decision had become final before said resolution became effective. In this case, the motion for reconsideration filed by the defendant was denied on July 17, 1944, and a second motion for rehearing or consideration could not be filed after the expiration of the period of fifteen days from

promulgation of the order or judgment deducting the time in which the first motion had been pending in this Court (Section 1, Rule 54); for said period had already expired before the adoption of the resolution on October 1, 1945. Therefore, the Court cannot now permit or allow the petitioner to file any pleading or motion in the present case." (People vs. Sumilang, 77 Phil. 765- 766.) The Manchester ruling was applied retroactively in Sun Insurance Office, Ltd., et al. vs. Asuncion, et al., G.R. Nos. 7993738, February 13, 1989, a case that was already pending before Manchester was promulgated. The complaint in this case was filed on March 24, 1988, or ten months after Manchester was promulgated on May 7, 1987, hence, Manchester should apply except for the fact that it was modified in the Sun Insurance case, where we ruled that the court may allow payment of the proper filing fee "within a reasonable time but in no case beyond the prescriptive or reglementary period." We quote: 1. It is not simply the filing of the complaint or appropriate initiatory pleading, but the payment of the prescribed docket fee, that vests a trial court with jurisdiction over the subject-matter or nature of the action. Where the filing of the initiatory pleading is not accompanied by payment of the docket fee, the court may allow payment of the fee within a reasonable time but in no case beyond the applicable prescriptive or reglementary period. (p. 80, Rollo.) Intent to cheat the government of the proper filing fees may not be presumed from the petitioner's omission to specify in the body and prayer of its complaint the amounts of moral and exemplary damages and attorney's fees that it claims to have suffered and/or incurred in its transaction with the private respondents. The petitioner might not have computed its damages yet, or probably did not have the evidence to prove them at the time it filed its complaint. In accordance with our ruling in Sun Insurance Office, Ltd., the petitioner may be allowed to amend its complaint for the purpose of specifying, in terms of pesos, how much it claims as damages, and to pay the requisite filing fees therefor, provided its right of action has not yet prescribed. This the petitioner is ready to do. WHEREFORE, the petition for review is granted. The Order of the Regional Trial Court is hereby set aside. The complaint in Civil Case No. 55740 (MRCA, Inc. vs. Domingo Sebastian, Jr. and Lilia Tioseco Sebastian) is reinstated and the petitioner is allowed to amend the same by specifying the amounts of damages it seeks to recover from the defendants (private respondents) and to pay the proper filing fees therefor as computed by the Clerk of Court. SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-66469 July 29, 1986 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and ALFREDO QUIJANO, petitioners, vs. HON. BERNARDO SALAS (In his capacity as Presiding Judge of RTC, Cebu, Branch VIII), MARIO ABONG, ALFREDO DE LEON, ERIWADWIN MONTEBON, ROMEO DE GUZMAN, & EDUARDO MABUHAY, respondents. Basilio E. Duaban for accused.

CRUZ, J.: Mario Abong was originally charged with homicide in the Court of First Instance of Cebu but before he could be 1 arraigned the case was reinvestigated on motion of the prosecution. As a result of the reinvestigation, an 2 amended information was filed, with no bail recommended, to which he pleaded not guilty. Trial commenced, but while it was in progress, the prisoner, taking advantage of the first information for homicide, succeeded in 3 deceiving the city court of Cebu into granting him bail and ordering his release; and so he escaped. The 4 respondent judge, learning later of the trickery, cancelled the illegal bail bond and ordered Abong's re-arrest. But he was gone. Nonetheless, the prosecution moved that the hearing continue in accordance with the constitutional 5 provision authorizing trial in absentia under certain circumstances. The respondent judge denied the motion, 6 however, and suspended all proceedings until the return of the accused. The order of the trial court is now before 7 us on certiorari and mandamus. The judge erred. He did not see the woods for the trees. He mistakenly allowed himself to be tethered by the literal reading of the rule when he should have viewed it from the broader perspective of its intendment. The rule is found in the last sentence of Article IV, Section 19, of the 1973 Constitution, reading in full as follows: Section 19. In all criminal prosecution, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved and shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel, to he informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him, to have a speedy, impartial, and public trial, to meet the witnesses face to face, and to have compulsory process to secure the attendance of witnesses and the production of evidence in his behalf. However, after arraignment, trial may proceed notwithstanding the absence of the accused provided that he has been duly notified and his failure to appear is unjustified. The purpose of this rule is to speed up the disposition of criminal cases, trial of which could in the past be indefinitely deferred, and many times completely abandoned, because of the defendant's escape. The old case 8 of People v. Avancea required his presence at certain stages of the trial which as a result, had to be discontinued as long as the defendant had not re-appeared or remained at large. As his right to be present at these stages was then held not waivable even by his escape, such escape thus operated to the fugitive's advantage, and in mockery of the authorities, insofar as the trial could not proceed as long as he had not been recaptured. The doctrine laid down in that case has been modified by Section 19, which now allows trial in absentia, Now, the prisoner cannot by simply escaping thwart his continued prosecution and possibly eventual conviction provided only that: a) he has been arraigned; b) he has been duly notified of the trial; and c) his failure to appear is unjustified. The respondent judge was probably still thinking of the old doctrine when he ruled that trial in absentia of the escapee could not be held because he could not be duly notified under Section 19. He forgets that the fugitive is

now deemed to have waived such notice precisely because he has escaped, and it is also this escape that makes his failure to appear at his trial unjustified. Escape can never be a legal justification. In the past, his escape "rewarded" him by postponing all further proceedings against him and in effect ultimately absolving him of the charge he was facing. Under the present rule, his escape will, legally speaking, operate to Ms disadvantage by preventing him from attending his trial, which will continue even in his absence and most likely result in his conviction. The right to be present at one's trial may now be waived except only at that stage where the prosecution intends 9 to present witnesses who will Identify the accused. Under Section 19, the defendant's escape will be considered a waiver of this right and the inability of the court to notify him of the subsequent hearings will not prevent it from continuing with his trial. He will be deemed to have received due notice. The same fact of his escape will make his failure to appear unjustified because he has, by escaping, placed himself beyond the pale, and protection, of the law. Trial in absentia was not allowed in Borja v. Mendoza because it was held notwithstanding that the accused had not been previously arraigned. His subsequent conviction was properly set aside. But in the instant case, since all the requisites are present, there is absolutely no reason why the respondent judge should refuse to try the accused, who had already been arraigned at the time he was released on the illegal bail bond. Abong should be prepared to bear the consequences of his escape, including forfeiture of the right to be notified of the subsequent proceedings and of the right to adduce evidence on his behalf and refute the evidence of the prosecution, not to mention a possible or even probable conviction. We admonish against a too-literal reading of the law as this is apt to constrict rather than fulfill its purpose and defeat the intention of its authors. That intention is usually found not in "the letter that killeth but in the spirit that vivifieth," which is not really that evanescent or elusive. As judges, we must look beyond and not be bound by the language of the law, seeking to discover, by our own lights, the reason and the rhyme for its enactment. That we may properly apply it according to its ends, we need and must use not only learning but also vision. The trial judge is directed to investigate the lawyer who assisted Mario Abong in securing bail from the city court of Cebu on the basis of the withdrawn information for homicide and to report to us the result of his investigation within sixty days. WHEREFORE, the order of the trial court dated December 22, 1983, denying the motion for the trial in absentia of the accused is set aside. The respondent judge is directed to continue hearing the case against the respondent Mario Abong in absentia as long as he has not reappeared, until it is terminated. No costs. SO ORDERED.
10

G.R. No. L-48468-69 November 22, 1989 ORLANDO PRIMERO, petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS and HON. SOLICITOR GENERAL, respondents. Luis R. Reyes for petitioner.

PARAS, J.: Before the then Court of First Instance of Tarlac, Orlando Primero was charged with the crimes of Acts of Lasciviousness and Illegal Possession of Deadly Weapon. The complaint for Acts of Lasciviousness reads: That on or about 5:30 P.M., November 12,1975 in the municipality of Camiling, Province of Tarlac, the abovenamed accused, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, while armed with a deadly weapon (bayonet) and by means of force and intimidation and with lewd designs committed lascivious acts upon the person of the undersigned complainant at Brgy. Pindangan 2nd, Camiling Tarlac by then and there embracing, touching and fondling the breast and private parts of the undersigned against the complainants' will. CONTRARY TO LAW. Camiling Tarlac. (Decision, pp. 28-29, Rollo) While the Provincial Fiscal, filed an Information for Illegal Possession of Deadly Weapon, to wit: That on or about November 12, 1975, at about 5:30 in the afternoon, at Barangay Pindangan 2nd, in the Municipality of Camiling, Province of Tarlac, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said Orlando Primero did then and there Willfully, unlawfully and feloniously carry outside of his residence a deadly weapon, to wit: a bayonet, 19-1/2" long, which was not then being used as a necessary tool or implement to earn a living or being used in connection therewith, but was used in the commission of the crime of Acts of Lasciviousness for which he was charged in Crim. Case No. 1184 of this Honorable Court. Contrary to Law. Tarlac, Tarlac, February 19, 1976. (p. 29, Rollo) The aforementioned offenses were jointly tried for having been committed on the same occasion. The evidence for the prosecution, as found by the respondent appellate Court is as follows:

During the time material to this case Angelita Maycong was about 24 years old, single and a resident of Pindangan II, Camiling, Tarlac (p. 16, tsn., August 5,1976). On or about November 12, 1975, on their way home from Tarlac where they joined a parade (p. 30, tsn., August 30, 1976), Angelita Maycong and one Elena Garcia saw Orlando Primero emerge suddenly from the talahib along their path, brandishing a bayonet at them (p. 17, tsn., August 5, 1976). Elena Garcia ran away (p. 6, tsn., August 30,1976). Angelita Maycong descended on the 'pilapil' to her left side and also tried to run away (p. 18, tsn, August 5, 1976). Unfortunately, Angelita stumbled, as a result of which, Orlando grabbed her and pinned her down on the ground (Ibid), He held her neck with his right hand and held her breasts with the left hand and kissed her right cheek (pp. 19, 20, tsn., August 5,1976). Fighting back, she kicked Orlando near his organ and struck him with left hand (p. 20, Ibid.; p. 27, tsn., August 5,1976). In the struggle, Angelita was able to get the bayonet (p. 2, Ibid). In the meantime, Elena Garcia shouted for help (p. 20, tsn., August 5, 1976). Angelita also shouted for help (p. 20, Ibid). Upon seeing the bayonet in the possession of Angelita, Orlando Primero ran away (p. 23, tsn., August 5, 1976). Not long after, the father of Angelita Maycong, who was then tending his farm from where he heard the shouts for help, arrived (Ibid). Having teamed of the attempt made on the honor of her daughter, father and daughter reported the matter to the Barrio Captain (Ibid). The bayonet was surrendered to the police force of Camiling, Tarlac. (pp. 3-5, Solicitor's Brief) (Decision, p. 10, Rollo). The defendant, in turn, claims that the filing of these two (2) criminal accusations was motivated by revenge. He testified that he and the complainant were sweethearts who were engaged to get married. He lived in the house of the complainant for three (3) months where he was practically treated by the father of the complainant, Florentino Maycong, as a son-in-law helping in the farm work and in the daily chores in the house. However, the planned marriage did not take place because the complainant's family wanted an ostentations ceremony which he (defendant) could not afford. As an alternative, defendant suggested to complainant that they elope but the latter refused. Subsequently, the defendant left the complainant and married another woman, a decision which was allegedly resented by the complainant. Furthermore, defendant raises the defense of alibi. It is argued that at the time the incident was allegedly committed, he was in Paniqui, Tarlac harvesting palay with some other farm laborers. He maintained that he worked there from 6 o'clock in the morning to past 6 o'clock in the evening of November 12, 1975. The foregoing testimony of the defendant was corroborated by Cipriano Sudaria and Teodoro Cayabyab. After trial, the lower court convicted the defendant of the two (2) offenses charged in the two (2) separate informations and sentenced him as follows: WHEREFORE, finding the accused Orlando Primero guilty beyond reasonable doubt in Crim. Case No. I 1 84 of the offense of Acts of Lasciviousness punishable under Article 336 of the Revised Penal Code, he is hereby sentenced to a term of TWO (2) YEARS,

FOUR (4) MONTHS, and ONE (1) DAY to FOUR (4) YEARS and TWO (2) MONTHS of prision correccional, medium period, and in Crim. Case No. 1195 on the charge of Illegal Possession of a Deadly Weapon, punishable under PD 9, he is further sentenced to a prison term of TEN (10) YEARS which is the maximum term imposed by the law, with cost. The bayonet, Exh. A, is ordered confiscated and once this decision becomes final, the same shall be forwarded to the 184th PC Company, Paniqui, Tarlac for disposition according to law. (p. 12, Rollo) On appeal, the respondent Court rendered a decision, * the dispositive portion of which reads: WHEREFORE, affirming the judgment of conviction in both offenses but modifying the penalty imposed by the lower court, We hereby sentence the defendant to the following: 1. As regards to the accusation of acts of lasciviousness the defendant is hereby sentenced to a penalty of Six (6) Months of Arrests Mayor to Four (4) Years of Prision Correccional; and 2. As regards the violation of Presidential Decree No. 9 the defendant is hereby sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of Five (5) Years as minimum to Ten (10) Years as maximum. The bayonet, Exhibit A is ordered confiscated in favor of the government. (pp. 1516, Rollo) Hence, this petition raising the following issues: I The respondent Court erred in giving credence to the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses. II The respondent Court failed to pass upon the contention that bayonet is not one of the weapons the carrying of which outside one's residence is punished under Section 3 of Presidential Decree No. 9. III The respondent Court erred in its non-consideration of the defense of alibi interposed by the defendant. After a careful perusal of the entire record of this case, We find no cogent reason to disturb the findings of the respondent Court.

With regard to the issue of credibility, We cannot acquiesce with the argument raised by the petitioner that the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, being close relatives, (father and niece) of the complainant, should not be given weight and should be considered biased and self-serving. Be it remembered that mere relations cannot militate against the credibility of a witness. Neither could it distort the testimony due from such witnesses. In point is the ruling in the case of People v. Libed reported in 14 SCRA 410: The fact alone of relationship to the victim does not destroy a witness' credibility. It is not to be lightly supposed that the relatives of the deceased would callously violate their conscience ... by blaming it on persons whom they know to be innocent thereof. In this regard, it is relevant to restate herein that the trial court, which had the opportunity of observing the demeanor and deportment of the witnesses, found the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses to have the hallmarks of truth and credibility. Thus, the trial court pertinently observed: The Court is inclined to believe the claim of the complainant. Angelita Maycong, her father Florentino Maycong, and her companion Elena Garcia, appear to be credible witnesses. They impressed the Court as being innocent farm folks, and while appearance may be deceiving, their story is not incredible and was entirely believable, Being an unmarried woman and in the prime of her maidenhood (she was 25 years of age when she testified on August 5,1976), what reason would Angelita have for unnecessarily exposing herself if indeed the story of the accused violating her honor was not true. Her story was corroborated in material aspects by the two other witnesses, her companion Elena Garcia and her father Florentino Maycong. (Decision, p. 12 Rollo) Accordingly, it need not be emphasized that the trial court's finding that the testimonies of the witnesses were reliable, being supported by evidence of record, should be given credence. Thus, on matters of credibility the findings of the trial court are accorded the highest respect (People v. Cabanit, 139 SCRA 94; People v. Jones, 137 SCRA 166; People v. Canamo, 138 SCRA 141; People v. Pasco, Jr., 137 SCRA 137; Guita v. CA, 139 SCRA 576). Anent the second issue, We regret to say that the same is bereft of merit. It is worth noting that the dispositive portion of the respondent Court's decision makes mention of violation by the petitioner of P.D. No. 9 for which he was sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of five (5) years as minimum to ten (10) years as maximum, and wherein the bayonet was ordered confiscated in favor of the government. It goes without saying that the Court of Appeals would not have sustained the trial court's finding of petitioner's guilt as to the charge of illegal possession of deadly weapon were it not convinced that a bayonet is a "bladed, pointed or blunt weapon" decreed unlawful under P.D. No. 9. It can not be disputed that, ordinarily, the enumeration of specified matters in a statute is construed as an exclusion of matters not enumerated unless a different intention appears. However, the maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius is only an auxiliary rule of statutory construction. It is not of universal applicationneither is it conclusive. It should be applied only as a means of discovering legislative intent which is not otherwise manifest and should not be permitted to defeat the plainly indicated purpose of the legislature (Statutory Construction, Martin, sixth edition, 1984, pp. 71-72). Where a statute appears on its face to limit the operation of its provisions to particular persons or things by enumerating them, but no reason exists why other ... things not so enumerated should not have been included, and manifest injustice will follow by not so including them, the maxim expressio unius est

exclusio alterius should not be invoked (Ibid, p. 79). Applying the same in the instant case, it cannot be convincingly argued that a bayonet is not a bladed, pointed or blunt weapon, possession of which outside of one's residence is decreed by P.D. No. 9 to be illegal. True enough, if the carrying outside one's residence of such weapons as fan knife, "balisong" or club, which are less deadly than the bayonet, are prohibited under the law, there is no logical reason why the bayonet should be exempted from the prohibition. Finally, as regards the defense of alibi, not only is it a weak defense but also it cannot prevail over the positive Identification of the accused and by credible prosecution witnesses (People v. Obenque, 147 SCRA 448; People v. Pacada, Jr., 142 SCRA 427; People v. Canturia, 139 SCRA 280). Moreover, defendant failed to prove that it was physically impossible for him to be at the scene of the incident. WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision appealed from is AFFIRMED in toto. Costs against petitioner. SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 84811 August 29, 1989 SOLID HOMES, INC., petitioner, vs. TERESITA PAYAWAL and COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.

CRUZ, J.: We are asked to reverse a decision of the Court of Appeals sustaining the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City over a complaint filed by a buyer, the herein private respondent, against the petitioner, for delivery of title to a subdivision lot. The position of the petitioner, the defendant in that action, is that the decision of the trial court is null and void ab initio because the case should have been heard and decided by what is now called the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board. The complaint was filed on August 31, 1982, by Teresita Payawal against Solid Homes, Inc. before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City and docketed as Civil Case No. Q-36119. The plaintiff alleged that the defendant contracted to sell to her a subdivision lot in Marikina on June 9, 1975, for the agreed price of P 28,080.00, and that by September 10, 1981, she had already paid the defendant the total amount of P 38,949.87 in monthly installments and interests. Solid Homes subsequently executed a deed of sale over the land but failed to deliver the corresponding certificate of title despite her repeated demands because, as it appeared later, the defendant had mortgaged the property in bad faith to a financing company. The plaintiff asked for delivery of the title to the lot or, alternatively, the return of all the amounts paid by her plus interest. She also claimed moral and exemplary damages, attorney's fees and the costs of the suit. Solid Homes moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground that the court had no jurisdiction, this being vested in the National Housing Authority under PD No. 957. The motion was denied. The defendant repleaded the objection in its answer, citing Section 3 of the said decree providing that "the National Housing Authority shall have exclusive jurisdiction to regulate the real estate trade and business in accordance with the provisions of this Decree." After trial, judgment was rendered in favor of the plaintiff and the defendant was ordered to deliver to her the title to the land or, failing this, to refund to her the sum of P 38,949.87 plus interest from 1975 and until the full amount was paid. She was also awarded P 5,000.00 moral damages, P 5,000.00 exemplary damages, P 10,000.00 attorney's 1 fees, and the costs of the suit. Solid Homes appealed but the decision was affirmed by the respondent court, which also berated the appellant for its obvious efforts to evade a legitimate obligation, including its dilatory tactics during the trial. The petitioner was also reproved for its "gall" in collecting the further amount of P 1,238.47 from the plaintiff purportedly for realty taxes and registration expenses despite its inability to deliver the title to the land. In holding that the trial court had jurisdiction, the respondent court referred to Section 41 of PD No. 957 itself providing that: SEC. 41. Other remedies.-The rights and remedies provided in this Decree shall be in addition to any and all other rights and remedies that may be available under existing laws. and declared that "its clear and unambiguous tenor undermine(d) the (petitioner's) pretension that the court a quowas bereft of jurisdiction." The decision also dismissed the contrary opinion of the Secretary of Justice as impinging on the authority of the courts of justice. While we are disturbed by the findings of fact of the trial court and the respondent court on the dubious conduct of the petitioner, we nevertheless must sustain it on the jurisdictional issue.
2

The applicable law is PD No. 957, as amended by PD No. 1344, entitled "Empowering the National Housing Authority to Issue Writs of Execution in the Enforcement of Its Decisions Under Presidential Decree No. 957." Section 1 of the latter decree provides as follows: SECTION 1. In the exercise of its function to regulate the real estate trade and business and in addition to its powers provided for in Presidential Decree No. 957, the National Housing Authority shall have exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide cases of the following nature: A. Unsound real estate business practices; B. Claims involving refund and any other claims filed by subdivision lot or condominium unit buyer against the project owner, developer, dealer, broker or salesman; and C. Cases involving specific performance of contractuala statutory obligations filed by buyers of subdivision lot or condominium unit against the owner, developer, dealer, broker or salesman. (Emphasis supplied.) The language of this section, especially the italicized portions, leaves no room for doubt that "exclusive jurisdiction" over the case between the petitioner and the private respondent is vested not in the Regional Trial 3 Court but in the National Housing Authority. The private respondent contends that the applicable law is BP No. 129, which confers on regional trial courts jurisdiction to hear and decide cases mentioned in its Section 19, reading in part as follows: SEC. 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases.-Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction: (1) In all civil actions in which the subject of the litigation is incapable of pecuniary estimation; (2) In all civil actions which involve the title to, or possession of, real property, or any interest therein, except actions for forcible entry into and unlawful detainer of lands or buildings, original jurisdiction over which is conferred upon Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts; xxx xxx xxx

(8) In all other cases in which the demand, exclusive of interest and cost or the value of the property in controversy, amounts to more than twenty thousand pesos (P 20,000.00). It stresses, additionally, that BP No. 129 should control as the later enactment, having been promulgated in 1981, after PD No. 957 was issued in 1975 and PD No. 1344 in 1978. This construction must yield to the familiar canon that in case of conflict between a general law and a special law, the latter must prevail regardless of the dates of their enactment. Thus, it has been held thatThe fact that one law is special and the other general creates a presumption that the special act is to be considered as remaining an exception of the general act, one as a general law of the land 4 and the other as the law of the particular case.

xxx xxx xxx The circumstance that the special law is passed before or after the general act does not change the principle. Where the special law is later, it will be regarded as an exception to, or a qualification of, the prior general act; and where the general act is later, the special statute will be construed as remaining an exception to its terms, unless repealed expressly or by necessary 5 implication. It is obvious that the general law in this case is BP No. 129 and PD No. 1344 the special law. The argument that the trial court could also assume jurisdiction because of Section 41 of PD No. 957, earlier quoted, is also unacceptable. We do not read that provision as vesting concurrent jurisdiction on the Regional Trial Court and the Board over the complaint mentioned in PD No. 1344 if only because grants of power are not to be lightly inferred or merely implied. The only purpose of this section, as we see it, is to reserve. to the aggrieved party such other remedies as may be provided by existing law, like a prosecution for the act complained of under 6 the Revised Penal Code. On the competence of the Board to award damages, we find that this is part of the exclusive power conferred upon it by PD No. 1344 to hear and decide "claims involving refund and any other claims filed by subdivision lot or condominium unit buyers against the project owner, developer, dealer, broker or salesman." It was therefore erroneous for the respondent to brush aside the well-taken opinion of the Secretary of Justice thatSuch claim for damages which the subdivision/condominium buyer may have against the owner, developer, dealer or salesman, being a necessary consequence of an adjudication of liability for non-performance of contractual or statutory obligation, may be deemed necessarily included in the phrase "claims involving refund and any other claims" used in the aforequoted subparagraph C of Section 1 of PD No. 1344. The phrase "any other claims" is, we believe, sufficiently broad to include any and all claims which are incidental to or a necessary consequence of the claims/cases specifically included in the grant of jurisdiction to the National Housing Authority under the subject provisions. The same may be said with respect to claims for attorney's fees which are recoverable either by agreement of the parties or pursuant to Art. 2208 of the Civil Code (1) when exemplary damages are awarded and (2) where the defendant acted in gross and evident bad faith in refusing to satisfy the plaintiff 's plainly valid, just and demandable claim. xxx xxx xxx Besides, a strict construction of the subject provisions of PD No. 1344 which would deny the HSRC the authority to adjudicate claims for damages and for damages and for attorney's fees would result in multiplicity of suits in that the subdivision condominium buyer who wins a case in the HSRC and who is thereby deemed entitled to claim damages and attorney's fees would be forced to litigate in the regular courts for the purpose, a situation which is obviously not in the 7 contemplation of the law. (Emphasis supplied.) As a result of the growing complexity of the modern society, it has become necessary to create more and more administrative bodies to help in the regulation of its ramified activities. Specialized in the particular fields assigned to them, they can deal with the problems thereof with more expertise and dispatch than can be expected from the legislature or the courts of justice. This is the reason for the increasing vesture of quasi-legislative and quasijudicial powers in what is now not unreasonably called the fourth department of the government.

Statutes conferring powers on their administrative agencies must be liberally construed to enable them to 8 discharge their assigned duties in accordance with the legislative purpose. Following this policy in Antipolo Realty 9 Corporation v. National Housing Authority, the Court sustained the competence of the respondent administrative body, in the exercise of the exclusive jurisdiction vested in it by PD No. 957 and PD No. 1344, to determine the rights of the parties under a contract to sell a subdivision lot. It remains to state that, contrary to the contention of the petitioner, the case of Tropical Homes v. National 10 Housing Authority is not in point. We upheld in that case the constitutionality of the procedure for appeal provided for in PD No. 1344, but we did not rule there that the National Housing Authority and not the Regional Trial Court had exclusive jurisdiction over the cases enumerated in Section I of the said decree. That is what we are doing now. It is settled that any decision rendered without jurisdiction is a total nullity and may be struck down at any time, 11 even on appeal before this Court. The only exception is where the party raising the issue is barred by 12 estoppel, which does not appear in the case before us. On the contrary, the issue was raised as early as in the motion to dismiss filed in the trial court by the petitioner, which continued to plead it in its answer and, later, on appeal to the respondent court. We have no choice, therefore, notwithstanding the delay this decision will entail, to nullify the proceedings in the trial court for lack of jurisdiction. WHEREFORE, the challenged decision of the respondent court is REVERSED and the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City in Civil Case No. Q-36119 is SET ASIDE, without prejudice to the filing of the appropriate complaint before the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board. No costs. SO ORDERED.