Hazard and Operability

Studies
(HAZOP)
Brieng
Health & Safety Brieng No. 46a
May 2012
www.theiet.org
Principles
Introduction
Other Health and Safety Briengs have discussed aspects of Risk Assessment:
Risk Assessment Practical Application in the Workplace
http://www.theiet.org/factles/health/hsb05b-page.cfm
Risk Assessment Legal Position and Interpretation
http://www.theiet.org/factles/health/hsb05a-page.cfm
Quantied Risk Assessment Techniques (Part 1) Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA)
http://www.theiet.org/factles/health/hsb26a-page.cfm
Quantied Risk Assessment Techniques (Part 2) Event Tree Analysis (ETA)
http://www.theiet.org/factles/health/hsb26b-page.cfm
Quantied Risk Assessment Techniques (Part 3) Fault Tree Analysis (FTA)
http://www.theiet.org/factles/health/hsb26c-page.cfm
Hazard Analysis - (HAZAN)
http://www.theiet.org/factles/health/hsb46b-page.cfm
This Brieng Note is intended to explain the meaning of the term Hazard and Operability Studies (HAZOP). It is intended merely
to illustrate the technique and its vocabulary and is in no sense intended to be a denitive treatment.
HAZOP
Hazop is structured technique, which may be applied typically to a chemical production process, identifying hazards resulting
from potential malfunctions in the process. It is essentially a qualitative process. A HAZOP study would typically be undertaken
by a multi-disciplinary team involving chemists, engineers, production managers, designers and safety specialists etc. asking a
series of what if? questions. By undertaking a HAZOP study at an early design stage, potential problems can be avoided instead
of having to make costly modications after the plant is built. The HAZOP team would systematically examine a proposed process
design by asking questions using guidewords representing deviations from the intended parameters of the process - see Table 1.
Table 1
Guide Words Meaning
No or None The negation of the intention (e.g. no ow)
More A quantitative increase (e.g. high pressure)
Less A quantitative decrease (e.g. low pressure)
As Well As In addition to (e.g. impurity)
Part Of A qualitative decrease (e.g. only one of two components present)
Reverse The opposite of the intention (e.g. backow)
Other Than Complete substitution (e.g. wrong material)
Table 2 indicates the type of problems that could be associated with different types of deviation:
Table 2
Type of Deviation Typical Problems
No Flow Blockage, pump failure, valve closed or jammed, suction vessel empty, vapour lock, control failure etc.
Reverse Flow Pump failure, non-return valve failure, pump reversed, over pressurisation etc.
More Temp.
More Pressure
Blockage, loss of control, reaction, explosion, valve closed, high ambient temperature etc.
Less Flow Pump failure, leak, partial blockage, sediment, cavitation, poor suction head etc.
Less Temp.
Less Pressure
Heat loss, vapourisation, leak, imbalance of input and output etc.
As Well As Presence of contaminants, e.g. water, air, lubrication oil, corrosion products, presence of other process
products due to leakage etc.
An example to illustrate the process could be the delivery of liquid propane to a xed tank currently tted with a pressure relief
valve and a liquid level gauge. Table 3 indicates how HAZOP could be applied to this simple situation.
Table 3
Deviation Cause of deviation Consequences Existing controls Possible action
More Level 1. Overlling
Human error
2. Pump fails ON
Release through relief valve
As above
Level gauge
As above
Consider high level alarm
As above
Less Level 1. Leak
2. Not lled properly
Human error
Release to atmosphere
Economic loss
None
Level gauge
Review inspection/maintenance
regime and consider gas detectors
More
Temperature
Fire near vessel Possible release and
escalation
None Consider automatic sprinkler and
re procedures
More
Pressure
Relief valve fails closed Vessel overpressure/rupture None Consider high pressure alarm
Less
Pressure
1. Relief valve fails
open
2. Filling hose
ruptures
Release to atmosphere
As above
None
Operator action
Consider detection and emergency
planning
Check integrity of hose and quality
control
As Well As 1. Water
contamination
2. Impurities
Out of spec. supply
As above
None
None
Review QA procedures
As above and can reaction occur
Other Than Wrong substance
delivered
Possible reaction None Review QA procedures/can
reaction occur
Under Possible Action will be listed possible mitigating measures as well as questions needing resolution. This example is given
merely to illustrate the principle underlying the technique. The actual use of the technique requires knowledge derived from a
team of different specialists with an experienced group leader.
UK legislation and implementation
Further reading
Chemical Industries Health and Safety Council (1977) Hazard and Operability Studies. Chemical Industries Association:
London
Lees F P (1981) Some features of and activities in HAZOP studies. The Chemical Engineer
Kletz T A (1986) HAZOP & HAZAN Notes on the Identication and Assessment of Hazards. The Institution of Chemical
Engineers: London
The IET is unable to provide further information on this topic. Please contact the HSE. http://www.hse.gov.uk/
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Safety Executive. Legal advice should be obtained on any specic issues.
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The IET 2012
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