BORDERS, TRANSPORTATION, AND MANAGING RISK

January 26-27, 2004

TEAM 5 STAFF STATEMENT OUTLINE - DRAFT

Commission Sensitive

Staff Statement One: The Border Security System Prior to September 11

(JKR and TE)

I. Introduction

II. The U.S. Border Security System pre-9-1 1 (Exhibit - simple chart)
.r ou*
• The State Department: visas, watchlists, rel. w/ FBI and CIA (TE)
• The INS: role in CT and entry (primary and secondary) (JKR)
• Interior Enforcement such as it was (JKR)
• Immigration Benefits such as it was (JKR)

III. How the hijackers got into the United States - debunking the myth of clean
operatives, clean visas, clean entries, and clean stays.

• Clean operatives? No. Al Qaeda's tactics (including any document and

passport fraud) learned from the detainee reports and CIA finished
intelligence. (Exhibit - hijackers' passports, and possibly, notebook)
(SG)

Discussion of how the hijackers gained "legal" access to the U.S.

• Clean visas? Not really. Opportunities at the consulates. Visas for the 1 9
hijackers (Exhibit - visa applications). Clean applicants? Not entirely.
A brief bit on Saudi visa policy and its origins. 214(b)'s prominence. Visa
express in Saudi Arabia. Issues with their visa applications and
opportunities to catch the hijackers. Examples of Khalid Al Mihdhar,
KSM show flaws. (TE)

• Clean entries? At least not for the pilots. Opportunities at our border.
Total numbers on entries for all hijackers (eg opportunities lost w/o intel);
3 referrals to secondary inspection (explain what that is) out of these and
opportunities to exclude two of the pilots. Entry of the 19 hijackers
(Exhibit - Secondary report(s)). Atta for his unapproved M-l
application; S. Al Ghamdi b/Q_he listed no address on his 1-94, spoke little
English, and had a one way ticket; and Al Shehhi to determine whether
had legit extension/change of status from B2 to Ml. (JKR)

• Clean stays? Not entirely. Opportunities for interior enforcement. Focus

on Jarrah and Hanjour, and N. Al-Hazmi. Student visa and interior
 enforcement issues with particular focus on the pilots (Exhibit - change
of status applications of Atta and Al Shehhi). Absolutely not. 3
overstays (Atta, Hanjour, N. al- Hazmi). Student application
violations (Atta abdicated his when left the U.S., Hanjour failed to show
up). Local law enforcement could have detected them had they been
looking. (JKR)

IV. What went right? A description of hijackers and plotters who didn't make
it in and why. (Exhibit - chart of runner-ups and what happened to them). [Note:
Need to figure out what to do with Moussaoui.] (TE, JKR)

• Visas: Jihad Al Ghamdi, Binalshibh, Essabar, Ali Aziz,

• Entry: Qahtani
• Other: Al Hamlan, Saud Al Rasheed, Zuhair Al Thubaiti

V. A critical assessment of the reasons for success and opportunities lost

including consideration of programs such as entry-exit and student tracking (Exhibit -
opportunities and how many indicators applied) (All)

Panel One: Main Points we want to elicit from each witness

Ryan (TE):
The law did not present ay obstacles to denying visas to terrorists before 9-11. Although
the standards for keeping out terrorist was high, if they lied, you could always use 214(b).

Tipoff was a major innovation and success that kept out a lot of terrorists.

State did not give great scrutiny to the visa applicants from Saudi Arabia , UAE, Egypt,
and Lebanon. Visa Express was consistent with State's mandates and beliefs abut the
intelligence. CO's were mostly concerned with 214(b).

The computer system was not designed to check the truth of assertions on visa
applications.

The State Department compartmentalized security in the visa process, and believed
reasonably that they were getting all the intelligence they needed. [Note: hard to finesse
watchlist issue here to be discussed later in staff statement.]

Interviewing for terrorists is difficult and not something CO's had been trained to do. An
interview can provide useful information, but interviewing everyone creates a great drain
on resources, and may not be the best way to manage risk and balance commerce and
security. Interviewing everyone was not an option for CA prior to 9-1 1 .

Visa waiver was helpful to State, and, although it posed risks, State believed they were
addressed adequately.
Biometrics will help, but will not solve the intelligence problem.
State was responsive and helpful in developing pilot student tracking program, but in the
end the INS pulled the plug.

Meissner (JKR):

There was adequate law available to exclude or remove the hijacker pilots; however,
some of the laws key to exclusion or removal failed to be implemented, eg entry-exit and
student tracking.

Visa issuance information was not available at primary.

CT was not given a high priority in INS pre 9-11; the NSU Unit had solid personnel, but
were self-tasked and under resourced.

The INS was wholly reliant on State for its terrorist lookouts, and State in turn was
wholly dependent on the intelligence community.

The INS was an extremely complicated myriad of services and enforcement, and had
difficulty creating or implementing holistic strategies or programs.
• student tracking (fully piloted, with biometric id card, but denied development
because of lack of support from senior management)
• entry-exit (no pilot, Canada, trade groups and N Border governors not in favor of
it)
• fraud and backlogs in timely adjudication required a holistic approach, but never
considered, despite the well publicized problems in both areas

Access to intelligence was extremely limited, and there was no effort to collect and
analyze CT information from inspectors, Border Patrol, or interior enforcement prior to
9-11.

Full immigration information integration was never considered which would create
"border bios" of aliens. The databases were difficult to use, informationally inadequate,
not available to all users who needed them and the technology supporting them was
inadequate.

Inspectors were never given adequate or continuing training on document fraud or

interview techniques.

No entity with oversight over the INS ever took interior enforcement seriously, so the
possibly of actually enforcing the law against those who managed to get within US
borders was minimal.

Visa Waiver was an additional burden on an already stressed border system.

Panel Two; An Incident in Florida

Main Points we want to elicit from Melendez-Perez (JKR)

Human beings, not just technology, are critical in countering terrorism.

Interviews by CBP officers conducted by those well trained in behavior and interview
techniques can yield significant results.
• MP relied on a DOJ Arab language translator and his own military training in
interviewing. The documents looked clean so no FDL support, and no Customs
or JTTF involvement.
• Q looked like a hit man, told inconsistent stories, and seemed evasive.
• Q's demeanor and responses indicated he was lying, and confirmed MP's growing
suspicion that he was a security risk to the US.

The fingerprint and photo taken in secondary inspection helped confirm that the Q
removed on August 4, 2001 at Orlando was the same Q at Gitmo.

MP and other inspectors have broad discretion to turn people around at the border.
However, the culture at the border has been to err on the side of admission, not exclusion,
despite the letter of the law being the opposite. Give example.

Initiative like MP's was not always rewarded. Saudis, who flew directly into Orlando
during the summer months, were presumed admissible and "untouchable", as most were
families on their way to Disney World.

Q had a number of indicators that led to his being pulled into secondary - call it profiling
on intending immigrants and drug couriers.

MP received unusual support for his request to remove Q, and attempt to place Q under
oath and creatively use existing law to remove him.

The FBI never followed up with MP, even after Q ended up at Gitmo and his link to 9/11
was established, despite MP providing the local JTTF Q's secondary inspection report on
9/11 itself.

In the new CBP, immigration officers need to be treated with dignity, or good ones like
MP may resign.

Statement Two: The Hijackers and Watchlists (SG)

I. The Watchlist Issue

What is a watchlist and how does it work?

The story of State and Tipoff, the Blind Sheikh and Viper
The CIA and watchlisting
The FBI and watchlisting
 The Hazmi and Mihdhar story (as best we can tell it publicly) (SG, BG)

II. A critical assessment of the opportunities lost, to include the earlier

material on border systems, State and INS.

Panel Three; Visas and Watchlistins Today

Main Points we want to elicit from each witness

Ziglar

Pre 9/11: job assigned by Ashcroft was to restructure the INS; CT was not on the bill of
lading.

On 9/11:
• the borders were not shut down, they were put on high threat level, meaning every
person and vehicle was searched. This did slow things down significantly.
• Ziglar had to give new authority at headquarters to get command and control in
the field, via Border Patrol.
• A tremendous strain was placed on human resources at the border, with Border
Patrol and the National Guard soon called in for backup
• In attempting to address the 9/11 investigation, INS was given certain chores
• In attempting to address prevention of another 9/11, strong ideas were put forward
in the SIOC that later bore fruition in four alien initatives, mostly imposed upon
Ziglar without prior discussion.

Post 9/11:
• Ziglar quantifies what it would take for the INS to truly secure the borders, while
continuing the attempt at restructure. Ultimately, the restructure is not permitted
to move forward, as Ziglar receives a call from Andy Card that DHS is supported
by the WH.
• Interagency coordination on border security.

Bonner

Pre 9/11: job as seen by Bonner was to increase the private public partnership on trade
while enforcing the law.

On 9/11:
• Not sworn in until 9/20, but Verrone agreed with Ziglar to declare threat level at
POEs.
• Any "emergency response" on 9/11 conducted by Customs.
• Interagency coordination on border security.

Versa
Pre 9/11 border support:
• Posse Comitatus defined at the border
• Border Patrol with equipment, personnel and technology.
• Personnel pull back after fatal use of weapon, which was maintained even after
9/11

9/11: ??
Post 9/11:
• Request from Ashcroft and response, ie use of National Guard and
equipment/technology and February MOU
• Intelligence integration within US to support borders

Panel Four: The Response on the borders to September 11

Main Points we want to elicit from each witness

Harty (SG. TE)

Harty has made many changes since 9-11,

Resnick (SG. TE)

Bucella (SG, TE)