Logic without Metaphysics and Other Essays in the Philosophy of Science by Ernest Nagel Review by: Albert William

Levi Ethics, Vol. 68, No. 2 (Jan., 1958), pp. 142-144 Published by: The University of Chicago Press Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2379207 . Accessed: 07/07/2013 12:04
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ETHICS the "Law of Societal Difference." On page 362 this law is cited as having been recognized previously, but not until page 366 is it defined, while the index registers no occurrence earlier than page 362. Additional detective work uncovers mention of the law on page 373, with Footnote 3 there referring to chapter xix for its elucidation; but unfortunately examination of chapter xix discovers no mention of the furtive law. Despite these shortcomings,however, The Institutions of Society has an important theme, the primacy of institutions for sociology; and the treatment of this theme, especially in Parts IV and V where Feibleman analyzes and classifies institutions, is an original contribution to social philosophy. But above all else, the book's main virtue is its imaginative power, or speculative character. "Let us now sit and speculate," Feibleman recommends on page 297 when dealing with an isolated problem which lacked empirical evidence for its solution. Although Feibleman explicitly eschews armchair philosophy if empirical inquiries are possible and indeed holds that the social studies investigate metaphysical systems as empirical facts, the intrinsic brilliance of his work stems from his talent for speculation, a talent which, so rare in an age of analysis, has courageously displayed itself in nineteen books and countless articles, including novels, poems, dramas, memoirs, and a massive Ontology. To this already impressive literature The Institutions of Society is a creditable addition.
ANDREWJ. RECK

dominant ontology, a set of basal beliefs about being and value that shape the culture in pervasive, subtle, yet decisive ways. Likewise institutions are embodied implicit philosophies, manifest in their myths and symbols; and in fact the institution which dominates the culture, whether by force or by persuasion, contributes the implicit dominant ontology. Feibleman's metaphysics is moderate realism. Propounded at length in the Ontology, where it is sometimes called axiological or value-realism, it means in social theory "the avoidance of idealism on the one hand and of nominalism on the other. The former would lead to the theory of the superior reality of the society, the latter to the social atomism which holds to the theory of the sole reality of the individual and the fictional nature of all social organization . . . according to its [realism's] tenets, all that is is real, and, moreover, equally real, and so includes the individual at one level of analysis and the social group, the institution and society, at others" (p. 18). Thus when sketching the perfect individual and the ideal institution within the natural society (chap. xxii), he avoids both the paralysis of despair and utopian optimism, because, while acknowledging the values such ideals promise, he is nonetheless sensitive to the limitations of actuality. In the last chapter (chap. xxiii), "On the Problem of Social Control," he formulates what he calls "the fundamental dilemma of society, that consistency and completeness in social organization are incompatible" (p. 389). In practical terms this division is tantamount to the awful impasse between totalitarianism and liberalism threatening contemporary civilization. What Feibleman proposes for this crisis is "the search for that philosophy whose application to society will permit the most complete attainment of what can be consistent" (p. 389). The Institutions of Society contains several obvious defects. More careful editing could have compressed the book to half its size, though the style gains through expansiveness a facility that makes it a pleasure to read. The exceptions to clarity are the discussions of qualitative logic (chap. x, pp. 130 ff.) and of value (chap. xviii, pp. 265 ff.). When treating these truly technical and somewhat esoteric topics Feibleman's prose borders on what Tawney has dubbed "mumbo jumbo." But, perhaps worst of all, the organization of the book, while excellent in over-all plan, occasionally breaks down. The most glaring instance is the strange case of

Yale University

LOGIC WITHOUT METAPHYSICS AND OTHER SAYS IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE.

EsBy Ernest Nagel. Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1956. Pp. xviii + 432. $6.00.

It is perhaps one of the consequences of the analytical tradition in modern philosophy that books have ceased to be books and have become collections of articles and reviews. In any case, this is true of Logic without Metaphysics. Its first two-thirds are made up of a series of articles which originally appeared elsewhere. They cover a range of twenty years from the "Verifiability, Truth, and Verification" of 1934, the "Notes toward a Naturalistic Conception of Logic" of 1935, and the long, descriptive "Impressions and Appraisals of Analytic Philosophy

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BOOK REVIEWS in Europe" of 1936 to the "Symbolism and Science" of 1953 and the "Naturalism Reconsidered" which was the Presidential Address at Baltimore in 1954. The last third of the work is a series of book reviews appearing during the forties and fifties in periodicals like the New Republic, the Nation, Partisan Review, the New Leader, and the Journal of Philosophy. The reviews are generally of works-within or on the periphery of the philosophy of science-by figures like Jeans, Oppenheimer, Haldane, Langer, Hayek, MacIver, Cornforth, and Mumford. Although this list is heterogeneous, there is a certain Gibraltar-like quality in the attitude from which Professor Nagel criticizes them. It is solid, judicious, eminently reasonable,and critical in a fashion which almost never violates the rules of fair play. It is an attitude which can detect merit between the lines of the most extreme conservatism and even in philosophic positions uncongenial to the critic, but its chief concern is to defend the objectivity of science and the experimental temper of mind against the social critics of the left or the mystics and intuitionists of the right. None of the reviews is individually important, but as a collection they do admirably exhibit the critical intelligence at work. The articles, dealing with more professional matters, also have a certain central focus. They are concernedwith naturalism as a point of view and with the defense of a naturalistic conception of logic. They are also concerned with the problem of truth and verifiability and of issues growing out of the logical activity of analysis and formalization. Therefore beneath the surface are points of difficulty not specifically resolved (and, I think, never completely faced either) which spring from the fact that Nagel's outlook has in the two decades in which these essays fall been framed with one eye on Dewey and the other on Carnap. Now, there are those who say that it is just these lenses which provide perfect binocular vision; but it also seems the case that there are areas of experience where to focus with both lenses is apt to make a man slightly cross-eyed. This is particularly true of the area of values. To be sure, none of the essays is a direct assault upon this area, but there are moments when even more theoretical questions of method and the interpretation of scientific objects suggest a certain latent uneasiness. All of the essays presented here have been available for some time, and they have called out discussion, attack, and defense. So they do

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not require technical consideration here again. But I believe that their chief interest for those concerned with contemporary philosophy lies less in their substance than in the insight which they provide about an attitude which has become more vocal than most others in the last few years-an attitude which tries to combine the logic of positivism with the naturalistic metaphysics of pragmatism. Here Nagel is both candid and helpful. He has provided a ten-page Introduction which is exactly to the purpose. Like many who came to intellectual maturity between the two wars, he professes a lack of enthusiasm for the grand philosophical system, a keen interest in the critical method of those trained in mathematics and the physical sciences, and a concern for the fresh viewpoints emerging in psychology and the social sciences. This, he says, led to a general perspective "unabashedly naturalistic in content and empirical in temper." The teachers were Morris Cohen, Dewey, Woodbridge. The great influential names included Peirce, Russell, and Santayana. To these influences came to be added that of the European positivists Carnap, Frank, and others. Two problems particularly interested Nagel: the role and status of logical and mathematical propositions and the scope of the logic of the natural sciences and its relation to moral and social problems. In the first case he adopted a position similar to that of Peirce and Dewey and unlike that of Poincare and Russell. In the second he saw no alternative to the use of the methods of natural science for the solution of social problems. In general, it can be said that Nagel's concern with the first problem has been more fruitful than his interest in the second, and perhaps this is due to the fact that the theory of inquiry which he owes to Dewey is more successful in dealing with speculative matters relating to the ontological status of logical principles than it is in dealing with the practical issues of social science and social policy. Nagel has contrasted "the use of the logic of natural science in a responsible study of human affairs"with its alternative of "impressionistic conjecture" or "the recourse to the authority of dogmatic tradition," but he has dealt neither with the adequacy of the knowledge which the social sciences purport to give nor with the role which such knowledge might play in the area of policy concerns. It would not be fair to chide Logic without Metaphysics for those essays which it omits, but the duality of interest suggested by its Introduction

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ETHICS Milovan Djilas is a Montenegrin who seems unacquainted with fear. He was a Communist-one of the most powerful Communist leaders in Yugoslavia. He also happens to be a humane and principled individual, a man whose moral convictions are inviolable laws of personal behavior. He is equipped with a sharp, critical, ironical intelligence. This combination of qualities drove him down a path which led, through conspiracy, revolution, and power, into a Communist prison. They also caused him to write a book. In this book he exposes with deadly accuracy the despotic ruthlessness of his former comrades. He does more than expose, however. Djilas tries to understand Communist despotism, to see why it has achieved success where it has, to determine the organizational engine which enables it to persist in the form that it takes today, to forecast its future. Djilas is liberal to the core. His most fundamental political conviction is that there are definite limits to the power which any communal agency is entitled to exercise over a human being. These limits define a man's rights. But, like John Locke, Djilas writes in the idiom of his political milieu. He writes in the idiom of the Marxist. Djilas' basic argument is schematically simple. He argues that there is an immutable law "that each human society and all individuals participating in it strive to increase and perfect production." This law has a corollary: "No society or nation allows production to lag to such an extent that its existence is threatened." The primacy of these convictions reflects the persistence of Marxist orientation, at least sociologically. Applying these assumed laws to the development of communism, Djilas maintains that, contrary to orthodox Marxist beliefs, communism could triumph only in industrially underdeveloped societies. He argues for this conviction in the following way. Revolutionary Communists wish to change society in fundamental ways. That is, they wish to transform existing social relationships-most particularly, property relationships. Because of this, communism can gain the support only of those who are so discontented that they are willing to risk anything to improve their lot. Even in underdeveloped countries, these amount to a small minority. In industrially developed countries, decisive support of communism is an impossibility because the basic in-

is not borne out by a perusal of its major contents. There are three questions which such a work leaves with its reviewer. Most of the pieces are critical. This is to say not merely that they are closely reasoned, but that they tend to assert whatever positive doctrine is to be found in the course of a criticism of opposing views. There are some minds in which this is an inherent quality. But would not a volume affirmatively conceived, controlled by the discipline of a single unified argument, be the next fitting use of Nagel's enormous philosophic talent? Also the heritage to which Nagel appeals is not (as I have suggested) quite consistent. One would like to see him deal directly with the kind of disagreement which existed between Dewey and Reichenbach on such matters as the possibility of scientific valuation and the metaphysical status of scientific objects. Would not such an examination make unambiguously clear the points at which logical empiricism and pragmatism can join hands or must part company? Finally, a word about Nagel's value assumptions as disclosed by a hasty content analysis of his rhetoric. His two pervasive adjectives are "mature" and "responsible." So he speaks constantly of "mature" evaluation and "mature" philosophizing, and even more widely of "responsible" discourse, "responsible" criticism, and "responsible"analysis. But one cannot help but notice that the method for securing an exactitude of responsibility is through the limitation of liability of the philosopher's role. Responsibility becomes a function of the minute closure of the area of examination. But there is a difficulty here. For the commitments of a "mature" naturalism may be far broader than the limitations of "responsible" analysis, and when this is the case is there not civil war instituted between the analytical and the metaphysical instinct? Nagel's head seems to lead him toward Peirce and Carnap, but one is left with the sneaking suspicion that his heart is still in Abraham's bosom with Cohen, Dewey, and Woodbridge.
ALBERT WILLIAM LEVI

Washington University

THE

NEW CLASS. By Milovan Djilas. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1957. Pp. 214. $3.95.

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