SUCCESSION: ARTICLES 788-795 1. Dionisio vs.

Dionisio

The will was in Tagalog and was translated in Spanish by the oppositor as well as by the official court interpreter. If the oppositors translation was correct then the attestation clause would not have been made in accordance with the law. The members of the court held that the interpretation of the court interpreter is correct and in conformity with the idiomatic usage of the Tagalog language. 788 in case of doubt, interpretation that will make the disposition operative shall be preferred. 791 2 modes of interpreting, the one that will prevent intestacy will be preferred. 2. In re will of Riosa

The will was executed prior to the enactment of an act which required additional formalities. The question is which law will govern? SC ruled that the law at the time the will was executed will govern. Hence the additional formalities need not be complied with. 795 validity of a will as to its form depends on the law in force at the time of execution 3. Enriquez, et al. vs. Abadia, et al.

Holographic will was executed before the enactment of the New Civil Code. Prior to the said code, holographic wills were not allowed. SC ruled using 795. Rationale for 795 although the will operates after the death, the wishes of the testator was nevertheless given solemn expression at the time the will was executed (provided of course it complied with the formalities then required) Also, SC added that if a will was void under the law during its execution and a subsequent law is passed which does away with certain formalities, the will does not become valid. 4. RABADILLA vs. CA June 29, 2000 A will is a personal, solemn, revocable and free act by which a person disposes of his property, to take effect after his death. Since the will expresses the manner in which a person intends how his properties be disposed, the wishes and desires of the testator must be strictly followed. Thus, a will cannot be the subject of a compromise agreement which would thereby defeat the very purpose of making a will. 5. HERREROS vs. GIL 88 PHIL 260 Will-making is not an inherent act, not an inherent right. It is merely a privilege as evident by the clause Permitted xxx to control to certain degree the disposition of his estate. 6. MONTINOLA vs. HERBOSA The poem by Rizal is not a will. Because when he made that poem, he did not think of making a will. There was no animus testandi. It was merely an expression of parting. Actually, he was not giving anything to anybody because at the time when he was executed he has no properties. So what was there to give? Another thing, there was an erroneous translation. It was not actually To give. I give all my parents, my relatives. Can you give your parents, your relatives? Are they properties? No. So the poem is not a will. 7. MERZA vs. PORRAS 93 PHIL 142 When you disinherit a person you actually disposed of your property by not letting that person participate in your property. Still, it you who will determine who will get your property and who will not get your property by the act of disinheritance.

9. VITUG vs. CA 183 SCRA 755 Because the account was a joint account and they made a will while they were married, so naturally the cash would be their absolute community or conjugal property. The cash is owned in-common by them. When the spouses opened savings account, they merely put what rightly belonged to them in a money-making venture. They did not dispose of it in favor of the other. Since the wife predeceased her husband, the latter acquired upon her death a vested right over the amount under the savings account . 10. CASTANEDA vs. ALEMANY 3 PHIL 426 The mechanical act of drafting the will can be left to a third person . What is important is the testator signs the will or he let another person to sign but under his direction. 11. MERZA vs. PORRAS 93 PHIL 142 When you disinherit a person you actually disposed of your property by not letting that person participate in your property . Still, it you who will determine who will get your property and who will not get your property by the act of disinheritance. SUCCESSION: ARTICLES 915-1014 1. FERNANDEZ v DIMAIGBA G.R. No. L-23638 REYES; October 12, 1967 A probate decree finally and definitively settles all questions concerning capacity of the testator and the proper execution and witnessing of his last will and testament, irrespective of whether its provisions are valid and enforceable or otherwise. There being no controversy that the probate decree of the Court below was not appealed on time, the same had become final and conclusive. Hence, the appellate courts may no longer revoke said decree nor review the evidence upon which it is made to rest. Thus, the appeal belatedly lodged against the decree was correctly dismissed. The presentation and probate of a will are requirements of public policy, being primarily designed to protect the testator's, expressed wishes, which are entitled to respect as a consequence of the decedent's ownership and right of disposition within legal limits. Evidence of it is the duty imposed on a custodian of a will to deliver the same to the Court, and the fine and imprisonment prescribed for its violation (Revised Rule 75). It would be a non sequitur to allow public policy to be evaded on the pretext of estoppel. Whether or not the order overruling the allegation of estoppel is still appealable or not, the defense is patently unmeritorious and the Court of Appeals correctly so ruled. The existence of any such change or departure from the original intent of the testatrix, expressed in her 1930 testament, is rendered doubtful by the circumstance that the subsequent alienations in 1943 and 1944 were executed in favor of the legatee herself, appellee Dimagiba. But even if Art 957 were applicable, the annulment of the conveyances would not necessarily result in the revocation of the legacies, if we bear in mind that the findings made in the decision decreeing the annulment of the subsequent 1943 and 1944 deeds of sale were also that it was the moral influence, originating from their confidential relationship, which was the only cause for the execution 2. BELEN v BPI G.R. No. L-14474 REYES; October 31, 1960 In her argument, FILOMENA invokes Art. 959 of the CC, which says: A distribution made in general terms in favor of the testator's relatives shall be understood as made in favor of those nearest in degree. However, the argument fails to note that this article is specifically

limited in its application in cases where the beneficiaries are relatives of the testator, not those of the legatee. In such an event, the law assumes that the testator intended to refer to the rules of intestacy, in order to benefit the relatives closest to him based on the ratio legis that among a testator's relative the closest are dearest. Obviously, this does not apply where the beneficiaries are relatives of another person (the legatee) and not of the testator . There is no logical reason in this case to presume that the testator intended to refer to the rules of intestacy, for he precisely made a testament and provided substitutes for each legatee; nor can it be said that his affections would prefer the nearest relatives of the legatee to those more distant, since he envisages all of them in a group, and only as mere substitutes for a preferred beneficiary. The result of applying the "nearest relatives" rule of Article 959 is that the inheritance would be limited to her children excluding the grandchildren altogether. This could hardly be the intention of the testator who in the same clause 10 of his codicil speaks of his grandchildren indicating clearly that he understood well that hijos and descendientes are not synonymous terms. 3. DE LOS SANTOS v DE LA CRUZ G.R. No. L-29192 VILLAMOR; February 22, 1971 1. Partition of property affected between a person entitled to inherit from the deceased owner thereof and another person who thought he was an heir, when he was not really and lawfully such, to the prejudice of the rights of the true heir designated by law to succeed the deceased, is null and void. (De Torres vs. De Torres, et al., 28 Phil. 49). 2. No estoppel arises where the representation or conduct the party sought to be estopped is due to ignorance founded upon a mistake. And which there is authority to the contrary, the weight of authority is that the acts and declarations of a party based upon an innocent mistake as to his legal rights will not estop him to assert the same, especially where every fact known to the party sought to be estopped is equally well known to the party setting up the estoppel. (21 C.J., 1125, 1126.) 4. DIAZ v IAC 183 SCRA 427 PARAS; February 21, 1990 The right of representation is not available to illegitimate descendants of legitimate children in the inheritance of a legitimate grandparent. The determining factor is the legitimacy or illegitimacy of the person to be represented. If the person to be represented is an illegitimate child, then his descendants, whether legitimate or illegitimate, may represent him; however, if the person to be represented is legitimate, his illegitimate descendants cannot represent him because the law provides that only his legitimate descendants may exercise the right of representation by reason of the barrier imposed Article 992. 5. ABELLANA DE BACAYO v DE BORROMEO 14 SCRA 986 REYES; August 31, 1965 In this case, as an aunt of the deceased, de Bacayo is as far distant as the nephews from the decedent (three degrees) since in the collateral line to which both kinds of relatives belong degrees are counted by first ascending to the common ancestor and then descending to the heir (Civil Code, Art. 966). Appellant is right in her contention that nephews and nieces alone do not inherit by right of representation (i.e., per stirpes) unless concurring with brothers or sisters of the deceased, as provided expressly by Article 975. Nevertheless, the trial court was correct when it held that, in case of intestacy, nephews and nieces of the de cujus exclude all other collaterals (aunts and uncles, first cousins, etc.) from the succession.

6. CORPUS v CORPUS 85 SCRA 567 AQUINO; October 23, 1978 Article 943 of the old Civil code "prohibits all successory reciprocity mortis causa between legitimate and illegitimate relatives."

The rule in article 943 is now found in article 992 of the Civil Code which provides that "an illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestato from the legitimate children and relatives of his father or mother; nor shall such children or relatives inherit in the same manner from the illegitimate child". That rule is based on the theory that the illegitimate child is disgracefully looked upon by the legitimate family while the legitimate family is, in turn, hated by the illegitimate child. The law does not recognize the blood tie and seeks to avod further grounds of resentment. Under articles 944 and 945 of the Spanish Civil Code, "if an acknowledged natural or legitimated child should die without issue, either legitimate or acknowledged, the father or mother who acknowledged such child shall succeed to its entire estate; and if both acknowledged it and are alive, they shall inherit from it share and share alike. In default of natural ascendants, natural and legitimated children shall be succeeded by their natural brothers and sisters in accordance with the rules established for legitimate brothers and sisters." 7. SAYSON v CA (SAYSON) 205 SCRA 321 CRUZ; January 23, 1992 Adopted children do not have the right of representation. 9. PASCUAL v PASCUAL-BAUTISTA 207 SCRA 561 PARAS; March 25, 1992 The rules laid down in Article 982 that `grandchildren and other descendants shall inherit by right of representation' and in Article 902 that the rights of illegitimate children . . . are transmitted upon their death to their descendants, whether legitimate or illegitimate are subject to the limitation prescribed by Article 992 to the end that an illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestato from the legitimate children and relatives of his father or mother. The term "illegitimate" refers to both natural and spurious . Under Article 176 of the Family Code, all illegitimate children are generally placed under one category, which undoubtedly settles the issue as to whether or not acknowledged natural children should be treated differently, in the negative. 10. ERAZO v HANSEN ENRIQUEZ; JUNE 24, 1963 Article 996 of the new Civil Code provides: If a widow or widower and legitimate children or descendants are left, the surviving spouse has in the succession the same share as that of each of the children. Professors Tolentino, Paras, and Jurado believe that th e case is governed by Article 996 under the rule of statutory construction that the plural can be understood to include the singular, despite the apparent unfairness to the child, as acknowledged by Tolentino, who does not get any increase over his legitime, while the spouse receives double his legitime which, moreover, has been converted from usufruct to full ownership. Hence, both will get equal intestate shares, in accordance with the clear intent of the law to consider the spouse as a child. The widower and the child each gets of the estate.