China DA

China Market Access Disadvantage
Wisconsin Novice Packet 2013-2014
China Market Access Disadvantage Table of Contents
China Market Access Disadvantage Table of Contents (1/3) ............................................................. 1 Summary ........................................................................................................................................... 3 Glossary ............................................................................................................................................ 4 NEGATIVE FILES ................................................................................................................................. 5 1NC SHELL ....................................................................................................................................... 6 1NC China Market Access Disadvantage (1/4) ......................................................................... 7 1NC China Market Access Disadvantage (2/4) ......................................................................... 8 1NC China Market Access Disadvantage (3/4) ......................................................................... 9 1NC China Market Access Disadvantage (4/4) ....................................................................... 10 Uniqueness ..................................................................................................................................... 11 Uniqueness: Cuba- China engaging Cuba now ........................................................................... 12 Uniqueness: Mexico- Chinese Influence High ............................................................................. 13 Uniqueness: Mexico- United States Engagement Low ................................................................ 15 Answers to: United States Engagement with Mexico Durable ..................................................... 16 Uniqueness: Venezuela- China engaging now ............................................................................ 17 Uniqueness: Latin America - Chinese Influence High-................................................................. 19 Answers to: United States Engagement with Latin America Durable ........................................... 21 Links ................................................................................................................................................ 22 Link [Cuba] - US engagement with Cuba trade off with China ..................................................... 23 Link [Cuba] - Engagement with Cuba is a political symbol .......................................................... 25 Link [Cuba] - Engagement with Cuba key to Chinese regional plan ............................................ 26 Link [Mexico] - Economic Engagement with Mexico crowds out China ....................................... 27 Link [Mexico] - Modernizing Border increases US engagement- commercial relations ............... 28 Link [Mexico] - Modernizing Border with Mexico increases US engagement- Trade ................... 30 Answers to: United States Wont Crowd out China from Mexico ................................................. 31 Link [Venezuela] Economic Engagement with Venezuela crowds out China ........................... 32 Link [Venezuela] - Economic Engagement with Latin America increases ties with US ................ 33 Link [Venezuela] - Increasing trade with Latin America shuts out China ..................................... 34
Answers to: United States Wont Crowd out China from Latin America ....................................... 35 Impacts ............................................................................................................................................ 38 Impact: Chinese Growth provide regional stability in Asia ........................................................... 39 Answers to: Exports to Latin America are not key to Chinese Growth ......................................... 40 Impact- Chinese Softpower.......................................................................................................... 42 Answers to: Chinese Softpower Fails .......................................................................................... 43 Answers To: Chinese Influence Bad ............................................................................................ 44 Turns case: Latin American Growth ............................................................................................ 45 Turns Case: Trade ....................................................................................................................... 46 AFFIRMATIVE FILES ......................................................................................................................... 47 Uniqueness ..................................................................................................................................... 48 US Investing in Venezuela Now................................................................................................... 49 China Engagement With Cuba Low ............................................................................................. 50 Non-Unique: United States Engagement in Latin America is Durable ......................................... 51 Links ................................................................................................................................................ 52 Venezuela Oil not key .................................................................................................................. 53 United States wont crowd out China from Mexico ....................................................................... 54 US-Mexico Cooperation Inevitable .............................................................................................. 55 Relations are Not Zero Sum Trade & Economics ..................................................................... 56 Engagement with Latin America is not Zero Sum- Cooperation .................................................. 57 Impacts ............................................................................................................................................ 58 North American Regional Integration Promotes Stability ............................................................. 59 No Impact- Exports not key to Chinese Economy........................................................................ 60 No Impact CCP Collapse ........................................................................................................... 61 Answers to: Regional Stability Impact .......................................................................................... 63 No Impact: Chinese Soft Power Fails .......................................................................................... 64 No Impact: Chinese Cant Use Soft Power .................................................................................. 65 Chinese Engagement Bad - Environment .................................................................................... 66 Chinese Engagement Bad- Latin America Economic Growth ...................................................... 67 Chinese Engagement Bad- Latin American Government Stability .............................................. 68
Summary The disadvantage argues that increasing the United States economic engagement in Latin America will crowd out China from Latin American markets that are necessary for continued Chinese economic growth. The major link story is that there is that there is a limited amount of market share available in Latin America and efforts by the United States and China to establish strong relations with countries in Latin America contribute to their market share. The disad argues that this is a zero sum game, when the US wins new market share, China will have to lose some market share. Economic growth in China is crucial to maintain the control of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP).over the country. Loss of control would result in chaos across China and the larger region. The file is organized by argument type and then by country. At the end of each argument section are generic cards about Latin America that can be used in a debate against any affirmative on the topic.
Glossary Chinese Communist Party (CCP)- the only political party in China that controls the government, military and media Enrique Pea Nieto- President of Mexico, elected in 2012 Jeopardy- Danger of loss, harm, or failure. North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA)- trade agreement between the United States, Canada and Mexico which allowed goods to be traded between the countries without additional import taxes Narcotraffickers- people who smuggle illegal drugs across borders Renminbi- Chinese currency, like their version of the dollar soft power -a dynamic created by a nation whereby other nations seek to imitate that nation, become closer to that nation, and align its interests accordingly. Unparralled- Having no parallel or equal; exceptional Western Hemisphere- North and South America and nearby islands Rule of Law- authority and influence of law in society, especially as a constraint upon behavior, including behavior of government officials Maritime- an adjective that describes objects or activities related to the sea. Trilateral- three sided Zero Sum Game- A game in which the sum of the winnings by all the players is zero. In a zero-sum game, a gain by one player must be matched by a loss by another player.
NEGATIVE FILES
China Market Access Disadvantage 1NC Shell
1NC SHELL
1NC China Market Access Disadvantage (1/4) A. Uniqueness: Chinas influence in Latin American trade is expanding now Shaiken et al, Prof in the Center for Latin American Studies at UC-Berkeley, 2013 [Harley, and Enrique Peters Center for Latin American Studies at the University of Miami. And Adrian Hearn Centro de Estudios China-Mexixo at Universidad Nacional Autonoma de Mexico. China and the New Triangular Relationships in the Americas: China and the Future of US-Mexico Relations, 2013. Pg 7-8] This paper highlights the reality that China has indeed integrated itself into North America in a process beginning in 2001 with Chinas adherence to the World Trade Organization. Before 2001, both Mexico and the U.S. were increasing and deepening trade relations and regional specializations within the parameters of NAFTA. Since 2001, however, this process has reversed as a result of Chinas massive trade volume with both the U.S. and Mexico. The analysis presented herein shows that Chinas rapidly developing trade relationship with both Mexico and the U.S. has had significant effects on each countrys respective trade dynamics. For instance, today China is the second largest trading partner for both Mexico and the United States, falling behind only the total intra-NAFTA trade volume. As we have seen from our examination of the top twenty products imported by Mexico from the U.S. and China, the structure of trade in the region is shifting significantly: for Mexico, its export share in the U.S. market has fallen sharply, contrary to the trade growth of Asia, and particularly of China. As discussed previously, from 2000-2011 both the U.S. and Mexico endured substantial losses in their respective export markets in the NAFTA region, particularly in regards to the manufacturing sector and in products such as telecommunications equipment, electric power machinery, passenger motor vehicles, and clothing accessories and garments, among many others. NAFTA, since its origins, has passed through two distinct phases. During the first phase (1994-2000), the region was deeply integrated as a result of trade, investment, and rules of origin in specific industrial sectors such as autopartsautomobiles (AA) and yarn-textile-garments (YTG). In this first phase, NAFTA evolved in accordance with some of the predictions and estimations that we discuss in the literature survey. The region as a whole grew in terms of GDP, trade, investment, employment, and wages, among other variables, while intra-industry trade increased substantially. While some of the gaps between the U.S. and Mexico were slowly closing, however, this was only true for a small portion of Mexicos highly polarized socioeconomic and territorial structure. In other words, even in Mexican sectors highly integrated with NAFTA, the integration process did not allow for the promotion of backward and forward linkages in Mexico. In the second phase (2000-), NAFTA has shown a deterioration of this process of integration in terms of investment and intra-industrial trade, among other variables. During this time period, both Mexico and the United States have been on the losing end of competitions with third-party countries, a topic only discussed somewhat in debates on NAFTA (see the survey in part two of this paper).
1NC China Market Access Disadvantage (2/4) B. Link: Chinese engagement with Latin America is high increased US engagement will trade-off with Chinese involvement in the region. Watson 09 Professor of Strategy at National War College [Cynthia A. Watson, U.S. Responses to Chinas Growing Interests in Latin America: Dawning Recognition of a Changing Hemisphere, Enter the Dragon? Chinas Presence in Latin America, http://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/EnterDragonFinal.pdf] The United States and China claim that each is serious about adopting the economic philosophy that undergirds capitalism: economic growth is a net benefit for all, not a zero sum game. If true, China, Latin America, and the United States benefit from the greater Chinese engagement in this region because it creates competition. Pure economic theory, however, always runs up against political philosophies, leading to trade conflicts, protectionism, and all-toooften a zero sum view based on the international relations theory of realpolitik: whats good for my adversary must be bad for me. The risks of arousing realpolitik in the United States, particularly as the nation faces increased frustration with the reality of the Middle East, is significant, probably more than the PRC bargained for when it began engaging more with Latin America over the past decade. It appears unlikely that Beijing will seriously accelerate its involvement in the region because of the number of Congressional hearings, public conferences and assessments, and other warnings alerting the United States to China having discovered Latin America. To accelerate its involvement would risk the relatively strong relations with Washington at a time when other trade problems and overall concerns about Chinas growing power are already rising in the United States. At the same time, Washingtons ability to focus equally on all areas of the world is not possible. With U.S. interests directed elsewhere, it seems highly likely that Beijing will be able to maintain the level of involvement in the region it already has, without Washington raising too great a ruckus. Indeed, Beijings best outcome from its current balance of involvement in the area is probably going to be the long-term development of trust and ties over several decades with the leaders of this region, rather than immediately creating crucial, highly public ties between itself and Latin American leaders. As so often appears true in the international system, probably the old tale of the tortoise and hare applies here, where Chinas biggest gain will be accomplished over a long time of getting to know the region, rather than showing up repeatedly in the rock star role which is too soon and too rash for a long-term, stable set of ties. Washington seems likely to worry about the rock star phenomenon, rather than attempting to manage the emergence of another state becoming a long-term partner with its Latin American neighbors.
1NC China Market Access Disadvantage (3/4) C. Internal Link: Chinese lead in Latin American economies are vital to maintain Chinas economic growth. Arnson et al., writers for Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars,2009 (Cynthia Anderson, Mark Mohr, Riordan Roett, writers for Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Enter the Dragon? Chinas Presence in Latin America, http://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/EnterDragonFinal.pdf) (JN) Chinas role in Latin America is, above all, based on trade, despite U.S. concerns about Chinas military inuence in Latin America. The major exception to this rule is Cuba, for which China represents a political relationship as well as one based on economic interests. Although Venezuelan authorities may also prefer that its relationship with China have political as well as economic dimensions, it is not clear that China has the same expectations of its relationship with Venezuela. To China, Latin America represents a signicant source of the necessary natural resources that will help China maintain its economic growth. Due primarily to trade with China, Latin Americas trade volume grew from $2.8 billion in 1988 to $49 billion in 2005. Also, and as publicly announced, China intends to surpass $180 billion in trade with Latin America by 2010, not only due to the countrys need for natural resources, but also as a result of Chinas intention to diversify and expand its markets in the region. Thus, Latin America represents a substantial market for Chinese goods.
1NC China Market Access Disadvantage (4/4) D. Impact: Sustained economic growth prevents social unrest that would collapse the ruling party that would cause great power war. Kane, PhD in Security Studies from the University of Hull ,2001 [Thomas Kane, PhD in Security Studies from the University of Hull & Lawrence Serewicz, Autumn, http://www.carlisle.army.mil/usawc/Parameters/01autumn/Kane.htm] Despite China's problems with its food supply, the Chinese do not appear to be in danger of widespread starvation. Nevertheless, one cannot rule out the prospect entirely, especially if the earth's climate actually is getting warmer. The consequences of general famine in a country with over a billion people clearly would be catastrophic. The effects of oil shortages and industrial stagnation would be less lurid, but economic collapse would endanger China's political stability whether that collapse came with a bang or a whimper. PRC society has become dangerously fractured. As the coastal cities grow richer and more cosmopolitan while the rural inland provinces grow poorer, the political interests of the two regions become ever less compatible. Increasing the prospects for division yet further, Deng Xiaoping's administrative reforms have strengthened regional potentates at the expense of central authority. As Kent Calder observes, In part, this change [erosion of power at the center] is a conscious devolution, initiated by Deng Xiaoping in 1991 to outflank conservative opponents of economic reforms in Beijing nomenclature. But devolution has fed on itself, spurred by the natural desire of local authorities in the affluent and increasingly powerful coastal provinces to appropriate more and more of the fruits of growth to themselves alone.[ 49] Other social and economic developments deepen the rifts in Chinese society. The one-child policy, for instance, is disrupting traditional family life, with unknowable consequences for Chinese mores and social cohesion.[ 50] As families resort to abortion or infanticide to ensure that their one child is a son, the population may come to include an unprecedented preponderance of young, single men. If common gender prejudices have any basis in fact, these males are unlikely to be a source of social stability. Under these circumstances, China is vulnerable to unrest of many kinds. Unemployment or severe hardship, not to mention actual starvation, could easily trigger popular uprisings. Provincial leaders might be tempted to secede, perhaps openly or perhaps by quietly ceasing to obey Beijing's directives. China's leaders, in turn, might adopt drastic measures to forestall such developments. If faced with internal strife, supporters of China's existing regime may return to a more overt form of communist dictatorship. The PRC has, after all, oscillated between experimentation and orthodoxy continually throughout its existence. Spectacular examples include Mao's Hundred Flowers campaign and the return to conventional Marxism-Leninism after the leftist experiments of the Cultural Revolution, but the process continued throughout the 1980s, when the Chinese referred to it as the "fang-shou cycle." (Fang means to loosen one's grip; shou means to tighten it.)[ 51] If order broke down, the Chinese would not be the only people to suffer. Civil unrest in the PRC would disrupt trade relationships, send refugees flowing across borders, and force outside powers to consider intervention. If different countries chose to intervene on different sides, China's struggle could lead to major war. In a less apocalyptic but still grim scenario, China's government might try to ward off its demise by attacking adjacent countries.
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China Market Access Disadvantage Uniqueness
Uniqueness
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Uniqueness: Cuba- China engaging Cuba now [ ] Chinese leading party is turning to Cuba to insure economic growth
Global Times, 2013 (6/2/2013, Global Times, Senior CPC official looks to expansion of China -Cuba cooperation, http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/786078.shtml#.Ube0__nvu9E) A senior Communist Party of China (CPC) official said in Havana Saturday China was willing to expand cooperation with Cuba in various fields to promote both countries' economic development. Cuba was the first Latin American country to establish diplomatic ties with China, Guo Jinlong, a member of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee, said when he met Mercedes Lopez Acea, vice president of the Cuban Council of State and first secretary of the Havana Provincial Committee of the Cuban Communist Party (CCP). Guo said the CPC was ready to maintain high-level exchanges with the CCP and share experience in state governance and party building. As twin cities and capitals, Beijing was willing to work jointly with Havana to deepen cooperation and expand cultural and people-to-people exchanges, said Guo, who is also secretary of the CPC Beijing Municipal Committee. Lopez said the relationship between Cuba and China, which was based on mutual understanding and mutual respect, had become a model of bilateral ties. Each country faced the task of building socialism with its own national characteristics, she said, adding Cuba was ready to further boost exchanges and cooperation with China. Guo also met Ricardo Cabrisas Ruiz, vice president of the Cuban Council of Ministers, on Thursday afternoon. A CPC delegation led by Guo arrived here Thursday. He will also visit Brazil. [ ] Cuba and China re committed to increasing political and economic ties
UPI 6/18/13 (United Press International, China and Cuba seek greater cooperation,, June 19 2013, http://www.upi.com/Top_News/World-News/2013/06/19/China-and-Cuba-seek-greatercooperation/UPI-69371371651113/) BEIJING, June 19 (UPI) -- Chinese President Xi Jinping said his country would like to work more closely with Cuba on international and regional issues. Xi told Cuba's visiting first vice president, Miguel Diaz-Canel, that China would like to forge a good partnership with Latin American and Caribbean nations, the official Chinese news agency Xinhua reported. The Chinese leader called for stronger cooperation between China and Latin America. As for China and Cuba, Xi said he would like to maintain a bilateral high-level exchange of visits, increase party-to-party exchanges and enhance political trust. Diaz-Canel said Cuba places great importance on building ties with China. He concludes his three-day visit to China on Wednesday.
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Uniqueness: Mexico- Chinese Influence High [ ] China and Mexico are committed to deepening their economic ties now. Fox News Latino 6/2/13 (China's President Wants To Open the Floodgates of Trade with Mexico, Fox News, June 2 2013, http://latino.foxnews.com/latino/money/2013/06/02/china-president-wants-toopen-floodgates-trade-with-mexico/)//CB During the April talks, Xi said "he is committed to working with Mexican authorities to help Mexico export more," Mexico's vice minister of foreign relations, Carlos de Icaza, told The Associated Press. That's key for Mexico, because its trade deficit with China is exploding, far surpassing that of any other Latin American nation. While China is looking to assure supplies of raw materials, Mexico is looking to diversify its trade and investment, which have long been dominated by its superpower neighbor to the north. "In the new global geopolitical and economic map, China is, and I think it has arrived to stay, the world's second economic power," De Icaza said. Mexico "has to understand and strengthen relations with a nation that has such great strategic value." De Icaza said the countries hope to sign at least a dozen agreements in the fields of trade, energy, tourism, science and technology during Xi's visit. Mexican exports to China came to a bit over $5.7 billion in 2012, while its imports from that country stood at almost $57 billion, according to statistics from Mexico's Economy Department. Cell phones, video games and parts for electronics factories have been pouring into Mexico, which sends China minerals such as copper and lead. Overall trade between China and Latin America has expanded quickly over the past decade and the continent now imports more from China than it does from the European Union, according to the U.N. economic agency for the region.
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Uniqueness: Mexico- Chinese Influence High [ ] Chinese influence is outpacing the US in Mexico.
Menedez, economist and principal of The Cordoba Group International LLC, 2013 [Fernando. The East is rising, in Latin America 5/10/13 http://www.thecommentator.com/article/3488/the_east_is_rising_in_latin_america] Trade with China has also increased dramatically over the last decade. For example, China now accounts for 19 percent of Brazils total trade as compared with 2.8 percent in 2001. Similarly, China accounts for nearly 20 percent of Chiles total trade in contrast to 5.6 percent a decade ago. China has also concluded free-trade agreements with both Chile and Peru opening up those markets to Chinese manufactured goods. By 2014, China will overtake the European Union as Latin Americas second largest trading partner after the United States. While it still has some way to go in potentially overtaking the United States as the leading trade partner, it is, nevertheless, probable. Most recently, Brazil and China signed an agreement to pay for $30 billion in trade per year using local currencies and thus dropping the dollar. There is also general speculation concerning a new renminbi-based currency, which, if it does not replace the dollar or the euro, may well become a significant alternative foreign currency backed by commodities and natural resources. Some even speak of a renminbi trading bloc. All of these moves demonstrate the power of Chinas purse, which the US is increasingly unable to match. The speed and extent of Chinas growth in Latin America also raises concerns about its geopolitical and military policy objectives in the Americas. Many Chinese firms, especially in telecommunications, have longstanding ties to the Peoples Liberation Army, and that should raise red flags.
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Uniqueness: Mexico- United States Engagement Low [ ] US engagement with Mexico is decreasing Priest, Latin American Reporter for the Washington Post, 2013 [Dana. U.S. role to decrease as Mexicos drug-war strategy shifts. The Washington Post, 5/1/13 ln] For the past seven years, Mexico and the United States have forged an unparalleled alliance against Mexicos drug cartels, one based on sharing sensitive intelligence, U.S. training and joint operational planning. But much of that hard-earned cooperation may be in jeopardy. President Obama heads off Thursday on a three-day visit to Mexico to cement relations with the newly elected president, Enrique Pea Nieto, with vows of neighborly kinship and future cooperation. Obamas visit comes as the fight over border security and immigration overhaul has begun to consume Congress. The December inauguration of Pea Nieto brought the nationalistic Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) back to power after 13 years, and with it a whiff of resentment over the deep U.S. involvement in Mexicos fight against narco-traffickers. The new administration has shifted priorities away from the U.S.-backed strategy of arresting kingpins, which sparked an unprecedented level of violence among the cartels, and toward an emphasis on prevention and keeping Mexicos streets safe and calm, Mexican authorities said.
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Answers to: United States Engagement with Mexico Durable [ ] Some collaboration might be inevitable, but the increase in economic engagement facilitated by the plan is distinct Stratfor, geopolitical intelligence firm, 2013 [Stratfor, Global Intelligence. Evolving U.S.-Mexico Relations and Obama's Visit 5/2/13 http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/evolving-us-mexico-relations-and-obamas-visit ] Domestic political factors will determine the success of the pending overhauls. But the labor reform could improve bilateral commerce and investment with the United States, as would a successful liberalization of the country's energy sector in the coming years. Mexico is already the United States' third-largest trading partner, and economic coordination between the two countries has become a routine matter at the ministerial level, but there is still a need to ease bureaucratic trade and investment barriers. [ ]Comparatively China is outpacing US engagement with Mexico.
Padgett, Latin America Reporter for TIME, 2013 [Timothy.. The Obama Administration Looks to Latin America After Years of Neglect TIME, 5/13/13 http://world.time.com/2013/05/13/has-washington-finally-discovered-latin-america/#ixzz2UhOE2vcE On the other hand, Latin America can also be excused if its a little irked if its asking the U.S., Why did you wait so long to make this outreach, if you really are making a genuine outreach? Washington feels more urgency to look south at the moment largely because of Chinas increasing incursion into the hemisphere: annual ChinaLatin America trade exceeds $200 billion today compared with less than $10 billion in 2000. U.S.Latin America trade may be robust. But this month Sabatinis publication, Americas Quarterly, lays out striking evidence of U.S. decline: in 1995, for example, the U.S. sent Brazil, Latin Americas largest economy and now the worlds sixth largest, more than a fifth of that countrys imports; by 2011 it was 15%, the same share sent from China. Ditto with regard to Brazils exports: in 1995 the U.S. bought 21%, but just 10% in 2011, while for China it was 17%. China, as a result, surpassed the U.S. as Brazils top trading partner in 2009. Whats more, business with the Americas as a share of total U.S. trade has actually dropped over the past decade. The investment tally is even more striking: in 1995, the U.S. accounted for 37% of Brazils foreign direct investment vs. 10% in 2011 less than Chinas. Granted, its good for Latin America to be less dependent on the U.S. But its hardly unreasonable to conclude that Washington wouldnt be facing this China syndrome in its own hemisphere if it had simply taken high-level engagement on Latin America more seriously a decade or more ago. Or even four years ago, when Obama took office pledging a more benign U.S. foreign policy toward the region and then used that, say critics, as an excuse for benign neglect.
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Uniqueness: Venezuela- China engaging now [ ] China is increasing their influence and economic control of Venezuela because of US absence. Barrionuevo and Romero, Reporter from the New York Times and Brazil bureau chief for The New York Times, 2009 (Alexei- and Simon- Deals Help China Expand Sway in Latin America, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/04/16/world/16chinaloan.html?_r=0, April 15, 2009) China has also pushed into Latin American countries where the United States has negligible influence, like Venezuela. In February, Chinas vice president, Xi Jinping, traveled to Caracas to meet with President Hugo Chvez. The two men announced that a Chinese-backed development fund based here would grow to $12 billion from $6 billion, giving Venezuela access to hard currency while agreeing to increase oil shipments to China to one million barrels a day from a level of about 380,000 barrels. Mr. Chvezs government contends the Chinese aid differs from other multilateral loans because it comes without strings attached, like scrutiny of internal finances. But the Chinese fund has generated criticism among his opponents, who view it as an affront to Venezuelas sovereignty. The fund is a swindle to the nation, said Luis Daz, a lawmaker who claims that China locked in low prices for the oil Venezuela is using as repayment Despite forging ties to Venezuela and extending loans to other nations that have chafed at Washingtons clout, Beijing has bolstered its presence without bombast, perhaps out of an awareness that its relationship with the United States is still of paramount importance. But this deference may not last. This is China playing the long game, said Gregory Chin, a political scientist at York University in Toronto. If this ultimately translates into political influence, then that is how the game is played.
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Uniqueness: Venezuela- China engaging now [ ] China increasing economic involvement in L.A. now infrastructure and energy cooperation Fei, web editor at Xinhua, 2013 (Xu, Xi's Trip Opens New Horizon for Ties with Latin America, CRJ English, June 7 2013, http://english.cri.cn/6909/2013/06/07/195s769020.htm)//CB China and Latin America have expanded pragmatic cooperation in recent years, delivering tangible benefits to both sides. With two-way trade reaching 261.2 billion U.S. dollars in 2012, China has become the second largest trading partner of Latin America and the Caribbean, which witnessed the world's fastest growth in exports to China. By investing nearly 65 billion dollars so far in Latin America and the Caribbean, China has helped create much-needed jobs in the region. However, both sides are fully aware that there is potential to be tapped. China's development offers great opportunities for Latin America. As the world's second biggest importer, China will buy goods worth over 1 trillion dollars over the next five years and its overseas investment will exceed half a trillion dollars. As Xi has mentioned in his speech at the Mexican Senate, China is confident in maintaining steady economic expansion, which would create more business opportunities for the world including Latin America and the Caribbean. Latin America needs Chinese investment and participation in infrastructure construction. The region's products such as farm produce and energy need the Chinese market.
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Uniqueness: Latin America - Chinese Influence High[ ] Chinas pursuing increased influence in Latin America
Goodman, . Latin America Desk for Bloomberg BusinessWeek, 2013 [Joshua. Latin America Desk for Bloomberg BusinessWeek. Biden Circles Xi as U.S. Duels China for Latin America Ties 5/29/13 http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-05-29/biden-circles-xi-as-u-sduels-china-for-latin-america-influence.html] For Xi, his week-long tour of Trinidad, Costa Rica and Mexico precedes a visit to California for his first face-to-face talks with Obama since taking office. The trip to Latin America and the Caribbean, coming so early in Xis presidency, reflects the rising confidence of the Chinese leadership as it pursues its strategic interests with little concern for U.S. reaction, said Evan Ellis, a professor at the National Defense University in Washington. China in recent years has ousted the U.S. to become the top trade partner for Brazil and Chile. In the past Chinese presidents were very deferential to the U.S., always making reference to Washingtons backyard, said Ellis, the author of dozens of papers and a book about Chinas penetration of Latin America. You dont hear any of that from Xis team, though you dont find any threatening rhetoric either. [ ] Chinese engagement in Latin America is outpacing the US now.
Goodman, . Latin America Desk for Bloomberg BusinessWeek, 2013 [Joshua. Latin America Desk for Bloomberg BusinessWeek. Biden Circles Xi as U.S. Duels China for Latin America Ties 5/29/13 http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-05-29/biden-circles-xi-as-u-sduels-china-for-latin-america-influence.html] The competition between the worlds two biggest economies for influence in Latin America is on display this week as U.S. Vice President Joe Biden arrives in Rio de Janeiro today near the end of a three-nation tour of the region with Chinese President Xi Jinping close behind. The dueling visits -- Biden departs Brazil May 31, the same day Xi arrives in Trinidad & Tobago to begin his first tour of the region since Chinas political transition ended in March -- underscore how Latin Americas natural resources and rising middle class are making it an increasingly attractive trade partner for the worlds top two economies. Competing with Chinas checkbook isnt easy for the U.S. Seeking South American soy, copper and iron ore, China boosted imports from Latin America 20-fold, to $86 billion in 2011 from $3.9 billion in 2000, according to calculations by the Inter-American Development Bank. By contrast, the U.S. policy of pursuing free-trade accords has been controversial, said Kevin Gallagher, a Boston University economist. If Im a Latin American leader, Im very happy because I now have more chips to play with, said Gallagher, author of the 2010 book The Dragon in the Room, about Chinas inroads in the region. The onus is on the U.S. to come up with a more flexible, attractive offer but thats not so easy because it doesnt have the deep pockets like it used to
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Uniqueness: Latin America - Chinese Influence High [ ] China-Latin America relations growing recent visit strengthened partnership Xinhua News Service, 6/7/2013 (Xi's Latin America tour deepens ties with developing countries, Global Times, June 7 2013, http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/787469.shtml#.UbepbPmTif4)//CB President Xi Jinping's tour in Latin America marks the full launch of China's ties with the region that is increasingly important to both sides, according to Chinese scholars. From May 31 to June 6, Xi paid state visits to Trinidad and Tobago, Costa Rica and Mexico. He also met with leaders from several Caribbean countries in Trinidad and Tobago's Port of Spain. In a speech given at the Mexican Senate on Wednesday, Xi called for concerted efforts to beef up relations China and Latin America. Yang Zhimin, a research fellow from the Latin America Institute under the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, said Xi's visit marks the full launch of ties of China and Latin America, which, in geological terms, is composed of four sub-regions, including South America, Central America, the Caribbean region and Mexico. Yang said the three states Xi visited represent distinct subdivisions of Latin America and are economically complementary to China. "For example, Chinese tourists can boost the development of the tourism industries in those countries, while those countries' agricultural products and mineral resources can find a market in China," Yang said. Yang said China can learn from some Latin American countries in terms of financial services and ecological conservation. In 2008, China's government published a policy document detailing its ties with Latin America, vowing to build a comprehensive cooperative partnership with mutual benefit and equality. Trade volume between the two sides has increased from 2.29 billion US dollars in 1990 to 261.2 billion US dollars in 2012. Of the 10 free trade agreements China has signed with other countries, three are with Latin American countries. While holding a luncheon with state leaders from Caribbean countries, Xi said China will unswervingly develop a comprehensive cooperative partnership with these countries . "Xi met with a number of leaders from Caribbean countries. The outcome of the meetings was quite positive and demonstrates the attention China has paid to the region," Yang said. In San Jose, Xi and Costa Rican President Laura Chinchilla agreed to enhance high-level exchanges and pragmatic cooperation. Yang said Costa Rica serves as an important hub between North and South America, adding that China can strengthen its economic ties with other countries in the region that have no diplomatic ties with China. Xi said at the Mexican Senate that a stronger partnership between China and Latin America will boost the development of both sides and serve peace, stability and prosperity in the region and the world. The visits mark Xi's second foreign trip since he became China's president in March. At the end of March, Xi visited Russia, Tanzania, South Africa and the Republic of Congo. He also attended the fifth BRICS leaders' summit in Durban.
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Answers to: United States Engagement with Latin America Durable [ ] US actions never aligned with the rhetoric of politicians in regards to Latin America.
Padgett, Latin America Reporter for TIME, 2013 [Timothy.. The Obama Administration Looks to Latin America After Years of Neglect TIME, 5/13/13 http://world.time.com/2013/05/13/has-washington-finally-discovered-latin-america/#ixzz2UhOE2vcE There are of course skeptics. I asked Robert Pastor, a former White House national security advisor for Latin America and now an international relations professor at American University in Washington, D.C., if he thinks the U.S. is doing enough to keep itself relevant in the Americas. No its not, he says. President Obamas trip (to Mexico and Central America) is a good first step, but he needs to do a lot more to open up and show Americas interest in re-engaging with the rest of South America. Pastor has a point: for decades, Latin America has heard a lot of rhetoric from the U.S. about engagement -- the kind Biden offered the Council of the Americas in Washington recently, when he declared that the hemisphere matters more (to the U.S.) today because it has more potential than any time in American history.
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China Market Access Disadvantage Links
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Link [Cuba] - US engagement with Cuba trade off with China [ ] Cuba engagement by the United States reverses Chinese dominance
Luko, National Council For Soviet East European Research, the Smithsonian Institute, 2011 (James, China's Moves on Cuba Need to Be Stopped, 6/29, http://www.nolanchart.com/article8774chinas-moves-on-cuba-need-to-be-stopped.html) The Red Dragon takes another wide step of not only flexing its muscles in Asia, but now wishes to supplant Russias and (former USSRs) forward base presence 90 miles from the United StatesCUBA. Cuba is China's biggest trade partner in the Caribbean region, while China is Cuba's second-largest trade partner after Venezuela. Over the past decade, bilateral trade increased from $440 million in 2001 to $1.83 billion in 2010. [1] In 2006 China and Cuba discussed offshore oil deals and now China's National Petroleum Corporation is a major player in Cuban infrastructure improvements. [ibid] In 2008, none other than China's President himself, Hu JinTao visited Cuba with a sweet package of loans, grants and trade deals. If Cuba becomes a 'client' state of China, it will be a source of leverage against America whenever the U.S. Pressures China on Tibet and Taiwan. Soon we will witness the newly constructed blue-water navy of China cruising Cuba's coast in protection of their trade routes and supply of natural resources. In 2003 it was reported that Chinese personnel were operating at least TWO (2) intelligence signal sations in Cuba since at least 1999 ! [2] This month, June 2011, the Vice President of China made an important visit, extending more financial aid, interest-free, as well as related health projects to be paid for by China. A client state in the making ! [3] The best way to counter the Chinese in Cuba is to reverse Americas 50 year old, ineffective and obsolete policy of isolationism and boycott of Cuba. The Chinese threat in Cuba should be the catalyst for the US to establish open and normalized relations , with economic incentives to re-Americanize Cuba, return of American investments and security agreements. Checking the Chinese move in Cuba early on is vital to preventing a strategic Chinese foothold 90 miles from Florida. Allowing China to replace Russia in Cuba would be a strategic disaster. China is dangling financial assistance and investments in order to establish a beachhead close to the shores of America. This is a counter-response to Americas continued military presence in Asia, continued support of Taiwan and recent increased American aid to the Philippines in its spat with China over sovereignty of the Spratly Islands. The Cuban people wish to return to the American fold and re-establish the traditional relationship with the Cuban anchor in Florida- namely the almost 900,000 Cubans living in Florida alone! [4]
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Link [Cuba] - US engagement with Cuba trade off with China [ ] Increased economic engagement with Cuba shores up US-Cuban relationsstops Chinese engagement Benjamin-Alvadaro, Professor of Political Science at University of Nebraska at Omaha 06 (Jonathan, The Current Status and Future Prospects for Oil Exploration in Cuba: A Special, http://cri.fiu.edu/research/commissioned-reports/oil-cuba-alvarado.pdf) Given that there are no formal diplomatic of economic relations between the governments of the United States and Cuba, the level of interest has grown significantly in the 3 years due primarily to three reasons in the following interest areas: energy security interests; broader regional strategic; and purely economic interests. First, the energy security interests in the potential of Cuban oil although it really would not minimize the immediacy of an American energy crisis is seen as possible if only partial remedy to energy supply concerns. Second, as Cuba, in part because of the increasing number of oil partnerships furthers its diplomatic and economic ties to with countries like Venezuela, China, Brazil and members of the European Union it may prove to provide Cuba for a sufficient buffer against U.S. opposition as it solidifies it economic and diplomatic role in the region. This is important inasmuch as there is a de facto trend in the Americas that clearly disavows and attempts to minimize the influence of the United States in the region, and with the growing demands on the world economy by China, it stands to reason that Cuba may assume an increasing stature that almost potentially lessens the presence of American influence in Cuban and hence regional affairs. Finally, and as demonstrated by the presence of American oil interests in the February 2006 U.S.- Cuban Energy Summit in Mexico City, there may be interest in cooperating in joint venture projects, and by extension assisting in the long-term development in Cubas oil industry. To accomplish this task the report seeks to lay out some national security policy considerations applying strategic thought to what I will term Post-Oil Cuba a Cuba that has a small but vibrant and growing oil and gas production capacity with extensive relations with a number of partners, and an increasingly positive outlook toward addressing energy and economic development questions that have plagued the Castro regime since the Cuban Revolution.3
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Link [Cuba] - Engagement with Cuba is a political symbol [ ] Cuba is strategically important for China political symbol of influence.
Hearn, Senior Research Fellow at the University of Sydney, 200 9. (Adrian, Senior Research Fellow at the University of Sydney, and Kiriyama Research Fellow at the University of San Francisco Center for the Pacific Rim, "China's relations with Mexico and Cuba: A Study of Contrasts" Pacific Rim Report -- No 52 -- January -usf.usfca.edu/pac_rim/new/research/pacrimreport/pacrimreport52.html) One summary of Chinas relations with six Latin American countries (Jorge I. Domnguez et al., 2006) juxtaposes political cooperation with trade patterns. The study argues that although economic considerations are paramount, Cuba, Venezuela, Argentina, and Brazil have to varying degrees used China to balance U.S. influence in the region. Varying degrees of alarm about this prospect are expressed in the publications of research institutions and think tanks associated with the U.S. military and government (CLATF 2006:2, Eisenman 2006, Lam 2004, Mrozinski 2002). Indeed, the triangular relationship between China, Latin America, and the United States is emerging as a prominent topic of debate (e.g. Arnson et al. 2007). Chinas multiple objectives in Latin America are evident in the diversity of its activities in Cuba and Mexico. Although Cuba harbors some economic value for China through oil exploration, nickel extraction, biomedical collaboration, and electronics sales and manufacturing, its appeal is mainly political. Diplomatic links with Cuba promote Chinas image as a non-aligned protagonist of South-South cooperation, providing ideological common ground with the eight mineral-rich countries that make up Latin Americas New Left. Mexico, by contrast, offers China more conventional economic incentives such as a market for Chinese consumer products, a manufacturing base with geographic and legal access to North American markets, and the prospect of potentially massive investment in the oil sector. The following sections discuss the challenges and opportunities that China has brought to Mexico and Cuba, and the steps taken by both governments to respond effectively.
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Link [Cuba] - Engagement with Cuba key to Chinese regional plan [ ] Influence in Cuba key to Chinas overall Latin American agenda.
Hearn, Senior Research Fellow at the University of Sydney, 200 9. (Adrian, Senior Research Fellow at the University of Sydney, and Kiriyama Research Fellow at the University of San Francisco Center for the Pacific Rim, "China's relations with Mexico and Cuba: A Study of Contrasts" Pacific Rim Report -- No 52 -- January -usf.usfca.edu/pac_rim/new/research/pacrimreport/pacrimreport52.html) China is Cubas second largest trading partner after Venezuela, with 2.7 billion dollars in bilateral trade reported for 2007 (Cubaencuentro 2008). This trade is more valuable to Cuba than to China, though this could change if Chinese oil, nickel, and electronics manufacturing operations in Cuba expand. Furthermore, for the eight resource-rich countries that comprise Latin Americas New Left, Cuba is a unique ideological symbol of resistance to U.S. hegemony. For China, whose pursuit of Latin American natural resources is at least as voracious as that of the United States, cooperation with Cuba, strongly supported by Ral Castro, decreases the danger of being perceived in the region as an externalpotentially imperialisticthreat to economic sovereignty.
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Link [Mexico] - Economic Engagement with Mexico crowds out China [ ] Mexico-- Increased economic engagement by the United States crowds out China. Lack of US influence is key to Chinas expansion in Latin America. Shaiken et al, Prof in the Center for Latin American Studies at UC-Berkeley, 2013 [Harley, and Enrique Peters Center for Latin American Studies at the University of Miami. And Adrian Hearn Centro de Estudios China-Mexixo at Universidad Nacional Autonoma de Mexico. China and the New Triangular Relationships in the Americas: China and the Future of US-Mexico Relations, 2013. Pg 7-8] The dominant strategies of each of the parties and how these strategies evolve over time: Mexicos regional and global position is being shaped by an increasing accent on diplomatic and trade diversification. The decline in US influence and the expected reforms in the Mexican energy sector may open more room for Mexico to adjust to a growth strategy less dependent on the United States. Chinas rising role as a regional and global power and the new economic scenario marked by higher wages and growing concentration in industrial commodities and products are likely to affect the pace of change according to which Chinas going out strategy will develop in the near future. If Mexico and China reorient their strategies, it is likely that there will be an adjustment in the triangles dynamic, which may result in a closer relationship between these two countries.
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Link [Mexico] - Modernizing Border increases US engagement- commercial relations [ ] Creating a modern border infrastructure is crucial to developing the Mexico-US commercial relationship Figueroa, Lee and Van Schoik, Research and Policy Analyst, Associatiate Director and Director at the North American Center for Transborder Studies, 2012 (Alejandro , Erik, and Rick Realizing the Full Value of Crossborder Trade with Mexico, North American Center for Transborder Studies, 2/9/2012) Sharing a 2,000-mile long border needs to be recognized as both a challenge and an opportunity. While land ports of entry between the two nations were first envisioned to process the legitimate crossing of people, goods and services across the border, security has taking a dominant role in recent years, hampering the ability of federal agencies to efficiently manage border traffic. Advances in border infrastructure simply did not happen during the last decade, which is astounding given the greatly expanded post-NAFTA binational commercial relationship. Our borders infrastructure and capacity today reflects the needs of a bygone era. This became evident as never before when on September 14, 2011, the San Ysidro, California port of entry the busiest land port of entry in the worldhad to shut down its 24 north-bound lanes due to the collapse of part of its roof, injuring several people and damaging vehicles trying to cross into the U.S. from Tijuana, Mexico. According to a report by the San Diego Association of Governments, inadequate infrastructure capacity just at the border crossings between San Diego County and the state of Baja California creates traffic congestion and delays that cost both the U.S. and Mexican economies on average an estimated $7.2 billion in forgone gross output and more than 62,000 jobs on an annual basis. These border delays could cause $86 billion in output losses over the next ten years. The border has been a filter to what shouldnt get in, when it can be a facilitator to what should get in. Rachel Poynter, U.S. State Department These delays are significant for a number of reasons, not the least of which is that American firms are constantly attempting to reduce their inventory costs in an attempt to remain competitive. While importing from China to the U.S. may require a company to hold more than 100 days of inventory, if efficiently managed, our proximity to Mexico can provide American firms with a constant and predictable flow of goods that may reduce inventory costs and provide firms the ability to respond rapidly and effectively to sudden market changes. With this fundamental fact in mind, in May of 2010 the U.S. and Mexico signed the 21st Century Border Management Joint Declaration. Recognizing the importance of fostering the commercial relationship, both countries have agreed to coordinate efforts to enhance the economic competitiveness by expediting lawful trade. The idea is that development of modern and secure 16 border infrastructure will give an added boost to our regions competitiveness in the world and at the same time increase our access to a wider, more affordable and ever improving quality set of goods.
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Link [Mexico] - Modernizing Border increases US engagement- economic integration [ ] Cross border infrastructure building is crucial for economic integration
Figueroa, Lee and Van Schoik, Research and Policy Analyst, Associatiate Director and Director at the North American Center for Transborder Studies, 2012 (Alejandro , Erik, and Rick Realizing the Full Value of Crossborder Trade with Mexico, North American Center for Transborder Studies, 2/9/2012) Today more than 75,000 trucks (carrying close to 80 % of our two-way trade) cross our border on a daily basis. That this much traffic is able to cross our congested borders is due in part to important advances in border infrastructure in the last couple of years as new ports of entry have been opened. One important policy development is master planning processes for regional border infrastructure, which have been initiated in conjunction with local border communities and state governments. It is hoped that these regional processes will eventually make the overall binational infrastructurebuilding process more transparent, more robust and ultimately a better fit for two such powerful economies and next door neighbors. Much Opportunity, but the Real Work Has Only Just Begun Total trade between the United States and Mexico has expanded by more than 600% since 1990. Yet we need further commitment and investment in the infrastructure needed to sustain such growth, which is critical for both economies. The question now is whether our current border management system will be able to sustain that growth, and if so, for how much longer. A strong trade/joint production relationship with Mexico can help create high-quality jobs within our borders. For reasons of geography and history, Mexicos fate is intertwined with that of the United States. And despite the current global economic environment, and transnational organized crime affecting Mexico and the United States, the two countries need to implement a 21st Century border that not only re-invigorates crossborder trade and economic integration but which will also lead to increased safety and quality of life for the residents of both countries. Both countries need to remain committed to promoting the global competitiveness of our region and to ensuring that the benefits of expanding trade flows keep reaching businesses, workers and consumers on both sides of our shared border. We will be able to accomplish this if leaders can explain the critical nature of our commercial relationships in ways that are more concrete and easier for citizens to understand. It is past time for our shared border to begin to meet tomorrows demands, acting as a facilitator and conductor of the lawful flows of goods, services and people between our nations, so that we may capitalize on the full potential of our partnership. If a billion dollars worth of trade crosses the U.S.-Mexico border on a daily basis and sustains six million jobs in the U.S., imagine what could be accomplished with a truly 21st century border.
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Link [Mexico] - Modernizing Border with Mexico increases US engagement- Trade [ ] Construction of improved border crossings and the resulting increase in trade would increase engagement between the United States and Mexico. Negroponte, nonresident senior fellow at the Brookings Institution 2012 (Diana, , Viewpoints: What Should the Top Priority Be for U.S. Mexican Relations? American Society/Council of the Americas, 12/3/12, www.as-coa.org/articles/viewpoints-what-should-toppriority-be-us-mexican-relations) Deepening the trade relationship and facilitating the shipment of component parts between Mexico and the United States requires the creation of access roads some eight miles ahead of the principal border crossings. With electronic submission of customs/immigration documentation and with electronic seals on transnational containers, trucks filled with bilaterally manufactured products can more rapidly pass across the border. Currently, the trucks are delayed principally for lack of access roads leading up to the border, especially on the Mexican side. In order to construct these roads, private-public partnerships are needed. The NADBANK, established 20 years ago to support environmental projects, is the best placed to mobilize these partnerships. The bank's bylaws permit this. However, the environmental impact needs to be interpreted broadly. The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) could recognize that new roads relieve the congestion and high levels of air pollutants at the border crossing itself. Use of access roads may spread pollution further inland, but the levels of pollutants will be significantly lower than those currently suffered each side of the Rio Grande. NADBANKs initiative and the White House leadership to facilitate EPA approval could lead to the development of access roads and decongestion at the actual border. Mexican presidential encouragement to NADBANK's directors to seek PPPs and U.S. presidential urging to the EPA for a broad interpretation of its mandate could result in a decade's work of new infrastructure projects. This will facilitate the anticipated tripling of cross-border trade as both countries negotiate a Trans-Pacific Partnership and Mexico negotiates a Pacific Trade Alliance with its South American partners. Presidential decisions to advance on instructing NADBANK to move forward with PPPs for these infrastructure projects are relatively easy. Their consequences will enhance the trade and prosperity of both nations.
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Answers to: United States Wont Crowd out China from Mexico [ ] US-Mexico economic relations crowd out China.
Fischer, Analyst for Capitol Media, 2012 [Howard. Analyst for Capitol Media. Fox says US-Mexico ties deter China's influence 9/14/12 http://azstarnet.com/news/local/border/fox-says-us-mexico-ties-deter-china-sinfluence/article_b8fd3834-acdc-5b33-b1fb-d983fdf8d2de.html] Former Mexican President Vicente Fox said the United States has to bolster ties with Mexico including recognizing the benefits of migrant labor - or get used to the idea of China setting the international agenda on its own terms. "The threat is this so-called power shift from the West to the East," he told a press conference Thursday at an economic development event organized by the city of Peoria. "Those nations on the East are getting ready and prepared to lead," Fox explained, saying there are forecasts showing the Chinese economy will be larger than that of the United States within a dozen years. "And that means a very important question to all of us: Under what principles are those leading nations (going to) be exercising their leadership?" Fox said. His point: The U.S. would be better off dealing with Mexico and other Latin American countries than perhaps those with different worldviews. "We have our values in the West that we share," Fox said. "So we all on this continent, especially North America, must get ready to meet that challenge." That means bolstering the economies of the United States and Mexico, he said. If the West wants to keep its edge, Fox said, there needs to be a recognition that Mexicans in the United States, legally or not, contribute to the economy of both countries. And that, he said, will require resolving the issue of who can come to this country and under what circumstances. "
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Link [Venezuela] Economic Engagement with Venezuela crowds out China [ ] China is expanding its influence into Latin America nowincreasing US economic engagement with the region allows us to push China back and contain its spread of influence Hearn, Australian Research Council Future Fellow at the University of Sydney China Studies Centre, 2013 (Adrian, May 1st, China and Latin America: Economy and Society, Latin American Poli cy Volume 4, Issue 1, pages 2435, June 2013, dml) Although some Chinese investments may not register as economic transactions, their significance should be evaluated in the context of contemporary Latin American politics . Venezuela, Cuba, Bolivia, Nicaragua, and Ecuador are building a trade network called the Bolivarian Alliance for the Americas (ALBA), which has proven more successful than the (now abandoned) U.S.backed Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA). In addition to creating an ALBA Development Bank, the network promotes the exchange and bartering of resources, particularly Venezuelan oil and assistance with debt relief for Cuban doctors, the use of Ecuadorian oil refining facilities, Bolivian coca and soy products, and Nicaraguan meat and dairy. Chinese assistance with physical and human development initiatives fits neatly into this model. Such exchanges may not produce immediate financial returns, but as Hugo Chvez pointed out during a February 2006 public speech in Havana, their value lies in stable alliances, face-to-face cooperation, direct assistance to poor communities, and long-term economic outcomes. As Chinese inroads into Latin America deepen, the United States must balance its strategic and commercial interests in new ways . Mrozinski, Williams, Kent, & Tyner (2002) point out that, although Latin American resource exports fuel China's economic growth, this process serves the interests of U.S. corporations with manufacturing operations in China. The resulting conflict of strategic and economic interests was a little-discussed motivating force behind the FTAA negotiations. A crucial component of the FTAA was the Central American Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA), whose political merits George W. Bush emphasized when he pushed it through Congress on a combined national security and economic platform (Economist, 2005). Bush said that the political logic behind CAFTA was to shore up democracy in Central America rather than leave it prey to the intervention of foreign socialist governments. Meanwhile, CAFTA's economic logic lies in a value-adding business environment in Latin America that could lure investorsparticularly those from the United Statesaway from China. If CAFTA and some revived variant of the FTAA ever succeed in bringing this about, the conflict between U.S. economic and political interests will diminish, potentially clearing the way for more-assertive measures from Washington to contain China's influence in the Western Hemisphere.
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Link [Venezuela] - Economic Engagement with Latin America increases ties with US [ ] An economic approach to relations draws Latin American countries closer to the US.
Valencia, contributing writer for Global Voices Online, 2013 (Robert, U.S. and Latin America Economic Cooperation Without Militarization?, 5/20/13 www.worldpolicy.org/blog/2013/05/20/us-and-latin-america-economic-cooperation-withoutmilitarization) In May, President Barack Obama visited Mexico and Costa Rica and vowed to strengthen economic ties with these two countries and the rest of Latin America. He pledged to expand renewable energy development and education initiatives in recognition of the joined fates of the United States and Latin America. This approach to Latin America is refreshing, but its impact on the ongoing War on Drugs remains to be seen. Undoubtedly, the United States bears much of the responsibility for the failed campaign, but the Obama administration has seen that some Latin American countries are taking their own lead in tackling the drug trade and are increasingly relying less on Washington. The Obama administration, for its part, has realized that shifting the legendary treatment of Latin America as the U.S. backyard to an economic approach would draw Latin America closer to Washington, especially given the fact that Latin American leaders like Mexicos Enrique Pea Nieto and Brazilian President Dilma Rouseff want to be considered trade partners and not U.S. subordinates.
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Link [Venezuela] - Increasing trade with Latin America shuts out China [ ] Increasing economic engagement through trade shuts out Chinese interests
Johnson, Senior Policy Analyst for Latin America at the Heritage foundation, 2005 [Stephen,.Balancing China's Growing Influence in Latin America, 10/24/05, http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2005/10/balancing-chinas-growing-influence-in-latinamerica] The United States and China have competing inter-ests in Latin America. Washington would like to see its hemispheric neighbors develop into stable, demo-cratic, prosperous trade partners that embrace the rule of law. Beijing sees the region as a source of raw materials, a market for manufactured goods, and a platform for power projection. U.S. interests probably coincide more with Latin American needs. In con-trast, China represents an opportunity to temper American dominance with broader alliances. Regrettably, Chinese aid and commodity imports may buy time for state industries, powerful presi-dents, and influential oligarchs. Most of all, such commerce could delay needed reforms and indus-trialization that might lift Latin America's near majority underclass out of poverty. America's strength is competition, and it should influence the rules of the game in that direction. As a good neighbor and in its own and Latin America's interests, the United States should: Accelerate free trade agreements. Free trade agreements have been the hallmark of U.S. pol-icies toward the region since the 1990s. As an inducement, America should drop its agricul-tural and steel subsidies that dissuade potential partners and cost taxpayers money. Improved U.S. trade relations with Andean neighbors (and eventually Southern Cone countries) will open market access for both U.S. and Latin American enterprises and provide an outlet for industrial growth. Adopt more comprehensive relationships. Single-issue diplomacy that emphasizes U.S. interests, such as counternarcotics, leaves vacu-ums in other areas such as security assistance and trade capacity development that other powers can fill. Plan Colombia is working because the United States is helping Colombia to combat terrorism, expand public safety zones, strengthen institutions, reactivate the economy, and promote rural peace.[11] Cut red tape on assistance. This policy should be followed to the greatest extent possible. Per-formance requirements are blunt instruments that do not cover every situation. Constraints such as annual certifications on counternarcot-ics cooperation and Article 98 letters that with-hold security assistance occasionally backfire by withdrawing support for allies in areas of mutual interest. If Congress considers such restrictions absolutely necessary, it should tai-lor them to suspend only economic aid that is not crucial to immediate U.S. interests. Press harder for reforms and use public diplomacy. Once Latin America had elected leaders and fledgling markets in the 1990s, U.S. support for democracy and economic reforms declined. Although each country is responsible for solving its own problems, exter-nal pressure can encourage progress. U.S. pub-lic diplomacy, which is mostly reactive toward Latin America, should be strengthened and more supportive of U.S. development goals.
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Answers to: United States Wont Crowd out China from Latin America [ ] Strong relations in Latina America are necessary for China to maintain access, US can crowd China out diplomatically. Ellis, Professor of National Security Studies at the Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies, 2011 (R. Evan Ellis, Dr. R. Evan Ellis is a professor of national security studies, modeling, gaming, and simulation with the Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies, with a research focus on Latin Americas relationships with external actors, including China, Chinese Soft Power in Latin America: A Case Study, http://www.ndu.edu/press/lib/images/jfq-60/JFQ60_85-91_Ellis.pdf) (JN) As with the United States and other Western countries, as China becomes more involved in business and other operations in Latin America, an increasing number of its nationals will be vulnerable to hazards common to the region, such as kidnapping, crime, protests, and related problems. The heightened presence of Chinese petroleum companies in the northern jungle region of Ecuador, for example, has been associated with a series of problems, including the takeover of an oilfield operated by the Andes petroleum consortium in Tarapoa in November 2006, and protests in Orellana related to a labor dispute with the Chinese company Petroriental in 2007 that resulted in the death of more than 35 police officers and forced the declaration of a national state of emergency. In 2004, ethnic Chinese shopkeepers in Valencia and Maracay, Venezuela, became the focus of violent protests associated with the Venezuelan recall referendum. As such incidents increase, the PRC will need to rely increasingly on a combination of goodwill and fear to deter action against its personnel, as well as its influence with governments of the region, to resolve such problems when they occur. Blocking the Consolidation of U.S. Influence in the Region and Its Institutions. The rise of China is intimately tied to the global economy through trade, financial, and information flows, each of which is highly dependent on global institutions and cooperation. Because of this, some within the PRC leadership see the countrys sustained growth and development, and thus the stability of the regime, threatened if an actor such as the United States is able to limit that cooperation or block global institutions from supporting Chinese interests. In Latin America, Chinas attainment of observer status in the OAS in 2004 and its acceptance into the IADB in 2009 were efforts to obtain a seat at the table in key regional institutions, and to keep them from being used against Chinese interests. In addition, the PRC has leveraged hopes of access to Chinese markets by Chile, Peru, and Costa Rica to secure bilateral free trade agreements, whose practical effect is to move Latin America away from a U.S.-dominated trading block (the Free Trade Area of the Americas) in which the PRC would have been disadvantaged.
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Answers to: United States Wont Crowd out China from Latin America [ ] Chinas market potential, influence in Latin America, and perception of emergence are key to soft power. US economic engagement in the region upsets Chinas growth. Ellis, Assistant Professor of National Security Studies at the National Defense University 2011 [R. Evan.. Chinese Soft Power in Latin America: A Case Study Joint Force Quarterly, Vol 60. 2011. http://www.ndu.edu/press/chinese-soft-power-latin-america.html] In general, the bases of Chinese soft power differ from those of the United States, leading analysts to underestimate that power when they compare the PRC to the United States on those factors that are the sources of U.S. influence, such as the affinity of the world's youth for American music, media, and lifestyle, the widespread use of the English language in business and technology, or the number of elites who have learned their professions in U.S. institutions. It is also important to clarify that soft power is based on perceptions and emotion (that is, inferences), and not necessarily on objective reality. Although China's current trade with and investment position in Latin America are still limited compared to those of the United States,3 its influence in the region is based not so much on the current size of those activities, but rather on hopes or fears in the region of what it could be in the future. Because perception drives soft power, the nature of the PRC impact on each country in Latin America is shaped by its particular situation, hopes, fears, and prevailing ideology. The "Bolivarian socialist" regime of Hugo Chvez in Venezuela sees China as a powerful ally in its crusade against Western "imperialism," while countries such as Peru, Chile, and Colombia view the PRC in more traditional terms as an important investor and trading partner within the context of global free market capitalism. The core of Chinese soft power in Latin America, as in the rest of the world, is the widespread perception that the PRC, because of its sustained high rates of economic growth and technology development, will present tremendous business opportunities in the future, and will be a power to be reckoned with globally. In general, this perception can be divided into seven areas: hopes for future access to Chinese markets hopes for future Chinese investment influence of Chinese entities and infrastructure in Latin America hopes for the PRC to serve as a counterweight to the United States and Western institutions China as a development model affinity for Chinese culture and work ethic China as "the wave of the future." In each of these cases, the soft power of the PRC can be identified as operating through distinct sets of actors: the political leadership of countries, the business community, students and youth, and the general population.
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Answers to: United States Wont Crowd out China from Latin America [ ] Both the United States and China view engagement in the region as a zero sum proposition. Watson, Professor of Strategy at National War College, 2007 (Cynthia A., Professor of Strategy at National War College, Washington, D.C. ENTER THE DRAGON? Chinas Presence in Latin America, 2007, http://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/EnterDragonFinal.pdf) Beijing probably might not have increased its role in Latin America had the Middle East not been a major distraction for Washington over the past ve and a half years. Washington has wanted Beijing to modernize its economy. This was bound to create more economic, diplomatic, and trade prowess for China as it has reached beyond the isolationism of the Cultural Revolution, particularly in the newly globalized world. In many ways, Beijings increased involvement in Latin America reects the unanticipated consequence of getting what the West hoped for from China. But, the inability of Washington to consider anything beyond the concerns about terrorism spreading around the world, and trying to salvage a peace of some sort without nuclear weapons in the Middle East, is having consequences for U.S. interests in other parts of the world. For cultural and geographic reasons, the ties between the United States and Latin America ought to be stronger than those between China and the Latins. Expectations of the strength of Latin AmericaU.S. ties have probably always been unrealistic and frankly ahistorical; the two parts of the world actually have a number of fundamental differences. But the distance between Latin Americas experiences and those of China are even vaster, ranging from religion to ethnic homogeneity to historical roles in the world. Washington must make a more concerted effort to act as a genuine partner with the region, rather than relegating it to the position of secondary or tertiary thought that assumes absolute U.S. leadership. The United States and China claim that each is serious about adopting the economic philosophy that undergirds capitalism: economic growth is a net benet for all, not a zero sum game. If true, China, Latin America, and the United States bene t from the greater Chinese engagement in this region because it creates competition. Pure economic theory, however, always runs up against political philosophies, leading to trade con icts, protectionism, and alltoo-often a zero sum view based on the international relations theory of realpolitik: whats good for my adversary must be bad for me. The risks of arousing realpolitik in the United States, particularly as the nation faces increased frustration with the reality of the Middle East, is signi cant, probably more than the PRC bargained for when it began engaging more with Latin America over the past decade. It appears unlikely that Beijing will seriously accelerate its involvement in the region because of the number of Congressional hearings, public conferences and assessments, and other warnings alerting the United States to China having discovered Latin America. To accelerate its involvement would risk the relatively strong relations with Washington at a time when other trade problems and overall concerns about Chinas growing power are already rising in the United States.
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China Market Access Disadvantage Impacts
Impacts
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Impact: Chinese Growth provide regional stability in Asia [ ] Strong Chinese growth key to solve Asian stability, North Korean proliferation, and terrorism. Krawitz, Visiting Senior Fellow @ NDU, former Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, 2010. (Howard M., , Chinas trade opening and implications for regional stability The Peoples Liberation Army and China in Transition National Defense University Press -http://www.scribd.com/doc/3099389/the-peoples-liberation-army-and-china-in-transition) A strong services sector, and the millions of jobs it will create, would not only support a real middle class but also slow growth in Chinas chronically unemployed underclass, a worrisome source of destabilizing social pressure. China must place over 10 million new workers into the economy every year. It must also find jobs for an estimated 150 million unemployed migrants, a number expected to swell by at least 5 to 6 million a year. Again, domestic stability is the issue. Domestic stability in China benefits America. Comfortable, prosperous Chinese citizens are more likely to share concerns similar to those Americans have and be more willing to cooperate on the range of issues relating to such concerns. For example, China already shows increased interest in working with U.S. officials and private experts on environmental problems (for example, pollution, hazardous waste, and transportation), drug trafficking, medicine, and public health. These are now issues of real concern for Chinese citizens in more prosperous areas of the country. They are also issues that transcend borders and have the potential to draw China into the international arena as a nation with a stake in making cooperation work. Dialogue on matters of mutual interest promotes communication, increased cooperation, and, ultimately, trust. A wealthy, stable China can serve U.S. regional security interests. A China that risks tangible loss from aggressive and confrontational behavior should be less likely to favor precipitous action and conflic t. It should be more likely to be interested in preserving regional peace and stability, more open to consulting with Pacific Rim neighbors, and more willing to cooperate on regional security issues, strategies, and disputes. Speaking from a vantage point of growing economic strength and military capability would give Beijing the respect, prestige, and diplomatic stature it craves , making it easier for China to see itself as a player whose opinion is given serious weight by peers. This could calm Chinese fears of being marginalized or contained, making it easier for China to find common cause with the United States, Japan, and others in the region in maintaining calm and promoting dialogue on Korean Peninsula security issues, combating international terrorism and piracy, and perhaps even becoming more involved in curbing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.
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Answers to: Exports to Latin America are not key to Chinese Growth [ ] Chinese influence in Latin America is key to sustained growth new markets.
Ellis, Professor of National Security Studies at the Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies, 2011 (R. Evan Ellis, Dr. R. Evan Ellis is a professor of national security studies, modeling, gaming, and simulation with the Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies, with a research focus on Latin Americas relationships with external actors, including China, Chinese Soft Power in Latin America: A Case Study, http://www.ndu.edu/press/lib/images/jfq-60/JFQ60_85-91_Ellis.pdf) (JN) Access to Latin American Markets. Latin American markets are becoming increasingly valuable for Chinese companies because they allow the PRC to expand and diversify its export base at a time when economic growth is slowing in traditional markets such as the United States and Europe. The region has also proven an effective market for Chinese efforts to sell more sophisticated, higher value added products in sectors seen as strategic, such as automobiles, appliances, computers and telecommunication equipment, and aircraft. In expanding access for its products through free trade accords with countries such as Chile, Peru, and Costa Rica, and penetrating markets in Latin American countries with existing manufacturing sectors such as Mexico, Brazil, and Argentina, the PRC has often had to overcome resistance by organized and often politically well-connected established interests in those nations. In doing so, the hopes of access to Chinese markets and investments among key groups of businesspeople and government officials in those nations have played a key role in the political will to overcome the resistance.
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Answers to: Latin America is not key to Chinese Growth [ ] Access to Latin American markets are key to Chinese economic growth.
Li, Professor of Political Science, Merrimack College, 2007 ( He, Chinas growing interest in Latin America and its implications", Journal of Strategic Studies Vol 30 Issue 4-5, p. online) Among the consequences of Deng Xiaopings modernization strategy has been an explosive growth of Chinas trade with the world.19 With its share in the world trade expected to more than triple by 2020, China will most likely become the second largest trading nation, after the United States.20 It has already become the third largest exporter behind the United States and Germany and an emerging exporter of capital. Its total foreign exchange reserves topped $1 trillion and its gross national income reached $2.3 trillion in 2006.21 As its economic clout increases, China has three major goals: (a) to gain recognition of full market status;22 (b) to secure the raw materials it needs and to diversify the sources in order to reduce the countrys vulnerability; (c) to maintain a high level of access to the market in order to assure the exports of its dynamic manufactured products. Latin America plays a role in satisfying each of these goals. Though Chinas relations with that continent have important political and security aspects, at present the most prominent dimension is economic. The region exhibits many features that complement the Chinese needs and strategy: Latin America has an abundance of raw materials and agricultural products and the region is in a good position to supply China with services such as tourism. It has potential to consume Chinese exports and thereby to encourage their diversication.
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Impact- Chinese Softpower [ ] Expanding Chinese influence is necessary to solve for a number of global challengesincluding global warming, poverty, and international conflict. Zhang, Prof of Diplomacy and IR at the Geneva School of Diplomacy, 2012 [Weiwei. The Rise of Chinas Political Softpower 9/4/12 http://www.china.org.cn/opinion/2012 09/04/content_26421330.htm ] As China plays an increasingly significant role in the world, its soft power must be attractive both domestically as well as internationally. The world faces many difficulties, including widespread poverty, international conflict, the clash of civilizations and environmental protection. Thus far, the Western model has not been able to decisively address these issues; the China model therefore brings hope that we can make progress in conquering these dilemmas. Poverty and development The Western-dominated global economic order has worsened poverty in developing countries. Per-capita consumption of resources in developed countries is 32 times as large as that in developing countries. Almost half of the population in the world still lives in poverty. Western countries nevertheless still are striving to consolidate their wealth using any and all necessary means. In contrast, China forged a new path of development for its citizens in spite of this unfair international order which enabled it to virtually eliminate extreme poverty at home. This extensive experience would indeed be helpful in the fight against global poverty. War and peace In the past few years, the American model of "exporting democracy'" has produced a more turbulent world, as the increased risk of terrorism threatens global security. In contrast, China insists that "harmony is most precious". It is more practical, the Chinese system argues, to strengthen international cooperation while addressing both the symptoms and root causes of terrorism. The clash of civilizations Conflict between Western countries and the Islamic world is intensifying. "In a world, which is diversified and where multiple civilizations coexist, the obligation of Western countries is to protect their own benefits yet promote benefits of other nations," wrote Harvard University professor Samuel P. Huntington in his seminal 1993 essay "The Clash of Civilizations?". China strives for "being harmonious yet remaining different", which means to respect other nations, and learn from each other. This philosophy is, in fact, wiser than that of Huntington, and it's also the reason why few religious conflicts have broken out in China. China's stance in regards to reconciling cultural conflicts, therefore, is more preferable than its "self-centered" Western counterargument. Environmental protection Poorer countries and their people are the most obvious victims of global warming, yet they are the least responsible for the emission of greenhouse gases. Although Europeans and Americans have a strong awareness of environmental protection, it is still hard to change their extravagant lifestyles. Chinese environmental protection standards are not yet ideal, but some effective environmental ideas can be extracted from the China model.
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Answers to: Chinese Softpower Fails [ ] Chinese influences effective in the context of Latin America
Ellis, Assistant Professor of National Security Studies at the National Defense University 2011 [R. Evan.. Chinese Soft Power in Latin America: A Case Study Joint Force Quarterly, Vol 60. 2011. http://www.ndu.edu/press/chinese-soft-power-latin-america.html] China as "the Wave of the Future." Perhaps China's greatest source of soft power is the most intangible. China's emergence as a key global player is a phenomenon that has assumed almost mystical proportions within Latin America. The rapid growth in PRC trade with and investment in Latin America, and the expansion of contacts at all levels, only reinforce the perceived significance of "China's rise," as observed from Latin America. In addition to opportunism for commerce, Latin America's belief in the rise of China and its globally transformational implications draws the attention of the people and leaders of the region to the PRC and shapes their course of action. Costa Rican president Oscar Arias, for example, established regular diplomatic relations with the PRC as a necessary part of ensuring the relevance of his country as an international actor. At the popular level, the rise of China is most likely behind a swelling interest in the Chinese language in the region. The dedication of 5 or more years by students to gain a basic capability in the Mandarin language and its character set, for example, is arguably driven by their calculation that the ability to communicate in Chinese will be fundamental to the pursuit of opportunities in the PRC, and with Chinese businessmen and government officials, in the future.
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Answers To: Chinese Influence Bad [ ] Chinese interaction in Latin American markets inevitable
Shaiken et al, Prof in the Center for Latin American Studies at UC-Berkeley, 2013 [Harley, and Enrique Peters Center for Latin American Studies at the University of Miami. And Adrian Hearn Centro de Estudios China-Mexixo at Universidad Nacional Autonoma de Mexico. China and the New Triangular Relationships in the Americas: China and the Future of US-Mexico Relations, 2013. Pg 7-8] Several policy recommendations result from this analysis. First, solely bilateral negotiations, i.e. between just the U.S. and China or just Mexico and China, are not sufficient given the quick and profound shifts in trade occurring in the NAFTA region. Thus, long-term NAFTA-China trade negotiations seem to not only be plausible, but inevitable, given the comprehensive production and trade integration between Mexico and the U.S. Second, NAFTA countries require additional policies and incentives to encourage competitiveness in the region, particularly regarding the manufacturing sector. Behind the substantial trade losses since the year 2000 are million of jobs. If the governments of the United States and Mexico are sincere in their aim to maintain and increase high-quality jobs, manufacturing will play a critical role. Coordination of policies in these areas within NAFTA from industrial and innovation policies to research and development should be promoted actively not only at the national level, but at the regional level as well.
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Turns case: Latin American Growth [ ] China not the US is key to Latin American growth
Ellis, Assistant Professor of National Security Studies at the National Defense University 2011 [R. Evan.. Chinese Soft Power in Latin America: A Case Study Joint Force Quarterly, Vol 60. 2011. http://www.ndu.edu/press/chinese-soft-power-latin-america.html] Access to Latin American Markets. Latin American markets are becoming increasingly valuable for Chinese companies because they allow the PRC to expand and diversify its export base at a time when economic growth is slowing in traditional markets such as the United States and Europe. The region has also proven an effective market for Chinese efforts to sell more sophisticated, higher value added products in sectors seen as strategic, such as automobiles, appliances, computers and telecommunication equipment, and aircraft. In expanding access for its products through free trade accords with countries such as Chile, Peru, and Costa Rica, and penetrating markets in Latin American countries with existing manufacturing sectors such as Mexico, Brazil, and Argentina, the PRC has often had to overcome resistance by organized and often politically well-connected established interests in those nations. In doing so, the hopes of access to Chinese markets and investments among key groups of businesspeople and government officials in those nations have played a key role in the political will to overcome the resistance. In Venezuela, it was said that the prior Chinese ambassador to Venezuela, Zheng Tuo, was one of the few people in the country who could call President Chvez on the telephone and get an instant response if an issue arose regarding a Chinese company.
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China Market Access Disadvantage Impacts Turns Case: Trade [
] Chinese engagement boosts trade across Latin America.
Shaiken et al, Professor in the Center for Latin American Studies at UC-Berkeley, 2013 [Harley, and Enrique Peters Center for Latin American Studies at the University of Miami. And Adrian Hearn Centro de Estudios China-Mexixo at Universidad Nacional Autonoma de Mexico. China and the New Triangular Relationships in the Americas: China and the Future of US-Mexico Relations, 2013. Pg 7-8] Some countries may find that their shares in regional markets are diminishing with the arrival of outside countries prompted by the framework of the WTO, yet the presence and influence of external countries may bring new opportunities to these regions. For example, in regards to the relationship between China and Mexico, the two countries may compete to some degree in terms of exporting to the United States. However, Chinese-Mexican relations go far beyond exporting to the U.S. market. As an emerging power and a representative of a region enjoying robust economic development, China now means more to Mexico economically than does the United States. Firstly, the adjustment of Chinas economic structure may help to change the false impression of Chinese-Mexican trade relations and allow Mexico to further pursue interests in economic cooperation with China. In regards to Chinese-Mexican relations, the common perception is that the two countries compete with each other in the U.S. market due to the fact that their exports are very similar. However, this may not necessarily be the case, as some scholars have pointed out that the competition between China and Mexico has been exaggerated, and in fact the two nations complement each other in more aspects than in which they compete (Xie 2005). Moreover, China does not want to become involved in trade conflicts with other developing countries, given that it is trying to change the mode of its economic development and update its export structure. With a stronger focus on bolstering its domestic market and supplying more high-value products to the world, China hopes that it can further coordinate its own production with Mexico and other developing countries. In addition, China is able to provide Mexico with new markets and investors. It would be erroneous, therefore, to simply define Chinese-Mexican economic relations in terms of competition for the US market. Chinas increasing engagement with Mexico and Latin America has the potential to positively impact numerous aspects of these transnational relations.
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AFFIRMATIVE FILES
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China Market Access Disadvantage Affirmative Answers - Uniqueness
Uniqueness
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US Investing in Venezuela Now [ ] US investment in Venezuela high now.
Alvarado, former Venezuelan Diplomat to the Organization of American States -2013 [Liza Torres, , "The U.S. Must Re-evaluate its Foreign Policy in Latin America" Diplomatic Courier -www.diplomaticourier.com/news/regions/latin-america/1457-the-us-must-re-evaluate-its-foreignpolicy-in-latin-america, 5-13] Although there has been a decline in U.S. influence in the region, its presence is still there. In Venezuela, for example, U.S. oil companies have seen their actions limited, yet they still operate there. The United States is Venezuelas top commercial partner, as Venezuela supplies 12 percent of U.S. oil imports
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China Engagement With Cuba Low [ ] China is engaged in Cuba, but is shifting its focus toward economic development in Mexico and Costa Rica. Cuba is not Chinas immediate focus. The Economist, June 6, 2013 [Why has China Snubbed Cuba and Venezuela?. http://www.economist.com/blogs/economist-explains/2013/06/economist-explains-3] But as wages in China have increased and high energy prices have raised the cost of shipping goods from China to America, Beijing may be looking for bases such as Mexico and Costa Rica where it can relocate Chinese factories and benefit from free-trade agreements with the United States. This idea thrills the Mexican government, but does it pose an immediate threat to Venezuela and Cuba? Probably not: China will continue to need their staunch ideological support over issues like Taiwan, for one thing. But it does suggest that Chinas economic interest in the region is broadening, especially along the Pacific coast. If that proves to be the case, Cuba and Venezuela, deprived of the charismatic Chvez to court Beijing on their behalf, will have to work hard to stay relevant.
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Non-Unique: United States Engagement in Latin America is Durable [ ] US influence in Latin Americas resilient and the theory of their argument is wrong
Duddy and Mora, Former US Ambassador to Venezuela and former Assistant Secretary of Defense,Western Hemisphere, 2013 [Patrick and Frank, Latin America: Is U.S. influence waning? Miami Herald, 5/1/13 http://www.miamiherald.com/2013/05/01/3375160/latin-america-is-us-influence.html#storylink=cpy] Finally, one should not underestimate the resiliency of U.S. soft power in the region. The power of national reputation, popular culture, values and institutions continues to contribute to U.S. influence in ways that are difficult to measure and impossible to quantify. Example: Despite 14 years of strident anti-American rhetoric during the Chvez government, tens of thousand of Venezuelans apply for U.S. nonimmigrant visas every year, including many thousands of Chvez loyalists. Does this mean we can feel comfortable relegating U.S. relations with the hemisphere to the second or third tier of our international concerns? Certainly not. We have real and proliferating interests in the region. As the president and his team head to Mexico and Costa Rica, it is important to recognize the importance of our ties to the region. We have many individual national partners in the Americas. We dont need a new template for relations with the hemisphere as a whole or another grand U.S.-Latin America strategy. A greater commitment to work more intensely with the individual countries on the issues most relevant to them would be appropriate. The United States still has the economic and cultural heft in the region to play a fundamental role and to advance its own interests.
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China Market Access Disadvantage Affirmative Answers - Links
Links
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China Market Access Disadvantage Affirmative Answers - Links Venezuela Oil not key [ ] China doesnt care about Venezuelan oil.
Dominguez, Professor of International Affairs at Harvard, 2006. [Jorge, Professor @ Harvards Weatherhead Center for International Affairs, "China's Relations With Latin America: Shared Gains, Asymmetric Hopes" Inter-American Dialogue Working Paper -- June -www.thedialogue.org/PublicationFiles/china.pdf] China has an interest in diversifying its sources of petroleum imports. This explains its interest in the Venezuelan energy sector. In fact, the main surprise is how slow China has been in developing its energy sources in Venezuela. In December 2004, President Hu Jintaos triumphal tour included Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Cubanot Venezuela. As a Chinese government official explained, the political conditions in Venezuela were too unstable and uncertain to permit a presidential visit. In fact, Venezuela was more stable in late 2004 than it had been in years, which suggests a high level of Chinese government risk aversion . The Chinese position regarding why there is so little Chinese investment in Venezuela is, There is too much risk for little return. The Chinese government is aware of the economic costs of addressing the technical obstacles, noted above: Venezuelas oil business deals with the United States are more lucrative than any possible oil business deal with China because of the heavy costs entailed. That is why China buys so little Venezuelan oil, focusing mainly on purchases of Orimulsion (a special emulsion used as a power station fuel in heavy industry and as boiler fuel). Venezuela offered China the option of buying 120,000 barrels of fuel oil per day but China has so far declined: We dont need it; we have other sellers.74
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United States wont crowd out China from Mexico [ ] US and China influences do not trade off in Mexico.
Xiaoxia, Staff Writer for the Economic Observer, 5-6 [Wang.. In America's Backyard: China's Rising Influence In Latin America The Economic Observer, 5/6/13 http://worldcrunch.com/china-2.0/in-america-039-s-backyard-china-039-s-rising-influence-inlatin-america/foreign-policy-trade-economy-investments-energy/c9s11647/ ] For South America, China and the United States, this is not a zero-sum game, but a multiple choice of mutual benefits and synergies. Even if China has become the Latin American economys new upstart, it is still not in a position to challenge the strong and diverse influence that the United States has accumulated over two centuries in the region. [ ] No trade-off the plan facilitates a trilateral relationship thats key
Shaiken et al, Professor in the Center for Latin American Studies at UC-Berkeley, 2013 [Harley, and Enrique Peters Center for Latin American Studies at the University of Miami. And Adrian Hearn Centro de Estudios China-Mexixo at Universidad Nacional Autonoma de Mexico. China and the New Triangular Relationships in the Americas: China and the Future of US-Mexico Relations, 2013. Pg 7-8] The analysis of Ping Wang highlights that in the Mexico-US-China triangular trade relationship, the United States is the key player. While Chinas presence has increased, the United States remains a critical influence on both Mexico and China. Furthermore, the author suggests that Chinas rise and emergence in terms of trade and investments in LAC, and specifically in regards to this triangular relationship, will slow increasingly in the future, considering its specialization in industrial commodities and products, rising wages in China, and the high number of multinational corporations involved in Chinese exports. For Ping Wang, the politically and historically subordinated role of Mexico with the United States, in contrast to Chinas increasing regional and global status, is a basis for understanding future scenarios in which the Mexico-United States relationship is more stable in comparison to that of China and the United States (where the US, for example, views China as a threat).
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US-Mexico Cooperation Inevitable [ ] Cooperation between the United States and Mexico will happen no matter what, the war on drugs proves. Seelke, Specialist in Mexico Affairs at the Congressional Research Service, 2013 [Claire.. Mexico and the 112th Congress 1/29/13 http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL32724.pdf] Over the last five years, U.S.-Mexican security cooperation has intensified significantly as a result of the Mrida Initiative. U.S.-Mexican cooperation has evolved to the point where it is able to continue even amidst serious strain caused by sometimes unforeseen events. For example, bilateral efforts against weapons trafficking continued even after the failed Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives (ATF) operation dubbed Fast and Furious resulted in firearms being trafficked into Mexico. 47 U.S. training and law enforcement support efforts have advanced even as U.S. personnel have been injured and even killed while working in Mexico. The U.S. government has helped Mexican govern ment investigate the circumstances under which two U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) employees were wounded on August 24, 2012, as their vehicle came under heavy fire from Mexican Federal Police.
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Relations are Not Zero Sum Trade & Economics [ ] Chinese and the US do not compete for influence in Latin America it is not a zero sum relationship. Cerna, graduate student in International Policy Management at Kennesaw State University, 2011 ( Michael, a graduate student in International Policy Management, Chinas Growing Presence in Latin America: Implications for U.S. and Chinese Presence in the Region http://www.chinacenter.net/chinas-growing-presence-in-latin-america-implications-for-u-s-andchinese-presence-in-the-region/, April 15, 2011) With both the U.S. and China making gains in the region in different sectors, there is seemingly room for each side to grow; which implies that, in fact, trade with Latin America is not a zero-sum game. China presents an alternative to the United States, but that is not necessarily a bad thing. The U.S. is much more diversified than China at the moment and therefore does not need to enter into direct competition. However, as China responds to calls from Brazil and diversifies its investments, there is increasing worry that China is going to outmatch U.S. trade in the region. These fears may be economically based, but there are potentially harmful political consequences primarily, providing Latin America with a quasi-world power as an alternative to the U.S. Since the Monroe Doctrine, Latin America has been considered a secure sphere of influence for the U.S. The fact that China presents a less democratic.alternative to U.S. influence presents a major problem. [ ] Latin America isnt zero sum- China and US can both make gains
Feinberg, Professor of International Political Economy, 2011 (Richard Feinberg, professor of international political economy, China, Latin America, and the United States:Congruent Interests or Tectonic Turbulence? 2011, Latin American Research Review volume 46 number 2 http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/latin_american_research_review/v046/46.2.feinberg.html) In China's and India's Challenge to Latin America: Opportunity or Threat?, the various contributorsWorld Bank economists and consultants, including renowned specialists in international tradecome down solidly on the side of opportunity. This is not surprising: in the neoclassical (or neoliberal) paradigm dating back to Adam Smith and David Ricardo, and widely accepted among trained economists, market-generated economic exchanges typically produce mutually beneficial gains, and any losers can be compensated from the resulting surplus. In contrast to the security games realists imagine, in which there are triumphant winners and vanquished losers, economics is not a zero-sum game! In the arena of trade, the expanding Chinese economy is creating both direct and indirect gains for Latin America: direct gains as China sucks in massive quantities of raw materials (e.g., iron ore, copper, petroleum, soybeans and other grains) and indirect gains from the rising price of natural resources (commodities in which Latin America and especially South America have a comparative advantage) and from spillovers in third markets (e.g., demand from China bolsters the U.S. economy, which in turn can purchase more Latin American products at higher prices).
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Engagement with Latin America is not Zero Sum- Cooperation Concerns are hype; its not zero sum five reasons Shixue, professor at Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, 2011 (Jiang Shixue, The U.S Factor in Sino-Latin America Relations, http://www.chinausfocus.com/foreign-policy/the-u-s-worry-factor-in-sino-latin-american-relations/) The U.S. concerns are unnecessary and unfounded. First , both China and Latin America have been opening to the outside world. In the age of globalization, both should cooperate to promote South-South collaboration. As a matter of fact, further cooperation between China and Latin America will benefit regional peace and development in the Asia-Pacific and Latin America. This outcome would certainly be welcomed by the United States. Second , it is well-known that Latin America has been implementing reforms and opening to the outside world for almost two decades. It endeavors to attract more foreign investment and liberalize the market to stimulate growth. As a result, China is only one of the economic partners Latin America has been trying to cooperate with. Third , Chinas relations with Latin America are for economic purposes, not for political outcomes to be used against the U.S. China well understands that Latin America is the backyard of the United States, so there is no need for it to challenge American influence. Fourth , Chinas cooperation with Latin America in military and security fields is not targeting any third party and it is hardly a secret issue. Chinas first policy paper on Latin America, published in November 2008, openly set aside one section to deal with the issue. It said: The Chinese side will actively carry out military exchanges and defense dialogue and cooperation with Latin American and Caribbean countries. Mutual visits by defense and military officials of the two sides, as well as personnel exchanges, will be enhanced. Moreover, Chinas military relations with Latin America are undertaken according to the following principles: 1) to gain better understanding of the Latin American military; 2) to improve professional expertise by learning from each other; 3) never target any third party; and 4) never harm regional and hemispheric stability. These principles are not counter to U.S. national interest and dominance in the western hemisphere. Finally , China does not wish to be used as a card against the United States. It has no enthusiasm for getting entangled in the problems of U.S.-Latin American relations.
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China Market Access Disadvantage Affirmative Answers - Impacts
Impacts
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North American Regional Integration Promotes Stability [ ] Cooperation between the US and Mexico creates North American regional integration and stability. Zamora, Professor of Law, University of Houston, 2011 (Stephen, RETHINKING NORTH AMERICA: WHY NAFTA'S LAISSEZ FAIRE APPROACH TO INTEGRATION IS FLAWED, AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT, Villanova Law Review ,56 Vill. L. Rev. 631. P. Lexis) IV. International Relations in an Era of Disaggregated States and the Role of Civil Society in Mediating Integration The failure of NAFTA's governments to mediate the effects of economic integration and globalization is prejudicial to a stable economy and society in North America. The answer to instability and disruption will not be found in military measures or in the construction of fences along our borders, but rather in multilateral cooperation. Dr. Isabel Studer, a Mexican expert in North American affairs, has clearly identified the shortcomings of laissez faire integration in North America: The three [NAFTA] countries should begin by recognizing how their failure to act collectively is undermining the potential benefits accrued from their complementarities and the already high levels of integration in North America. New forms of cooperation and policy coordination are certainly in the realm of the possible, but the essential ingredients are political leadership and the kind of collaboration and commitment between the public sector and the private sector that brought NAFTA to life in the early 1990s. In the absence of these factors, and of a more institutionalized framework, it is difficult to imagine how the NAFTA countries can resolve common transnational problems in such strategic areas as migration and labor disputes, climate changes, and energy. n82
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No Impact- Exports not key to Chinese Economy [ ] Domestic commerce key to Chinese economy not exports
Weihua,writer for ChinaDaily citing IMF official, 3/14/13 (Chen,, Domestic Demand Holds Key to Chinese Growth, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/bizchina/2013-03/14/content_16307121.htm) (JN) A top International Monetary Fund official warned on Tuesday of the need for China to followthr ough on plans to shift its economy from an investment-driven model to one that relies on domestic consumption. Zhu Min, one of the IMF's three deputy managing directors, said the key to this transition is economic reform and the quality, rather than the rate, of growth. Chinese GDP grew 7.8 percent in 2012, higher than the government's adjusted forecast of 7.5percent . Although it was China's slowest rate of economic expansion since 1999, theperformance was amon g the strongest in the world. This year, GDP is expected to grow 8 to8.25 percent. Zhu pointed out that China's economy has been moving from a long-established focus on exports to investment. However, the 48 percent of Chinese GDP that investment accounted forlast year was far too high, he told a seminar at Johns Hopkins University's Paul H. Nitze Schoolof Advanc ed International Studies in Washington. Overcapacity is a major challenge in China, where utilization of manufacturing resources hasdropped to 60 percent, a level Zhu described as risky. "Over-investment is a big concern and the quality of growth is a big concern," he said. Zhu, who assumed his current post in July 2011, blamed overinvestment for constraining thewages of Chinese workers. Household income remains a very small sh are of the country'seconomy, he said. To maintain growth at or near current levels, China needs to keep moving toward consumptio n as its key economic driver, the IMF official said. This goal is stressed in the 12th Five-Year Plan (201115), as well as the Government WorkReport delivered last week by Premier Wen Jiabao at the Nation al People's Congress. The transition has sparked heated debate in China, and Zhu said on Tuesday that how peopletalk ab out it is important.
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No Impact CCP Collapse [ ] Economic decline wont collapse the CCP
Pei, senior associate in the China Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace 2009 (Minxin Pei is a, 3-12-09, Will the Chinese Communist Party Survive the Crisis? Foreign Affairs, http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/64862/minxin-pei/will-the-chinese-communist-party-survive-thecrisis) With no end to the global crisis in sight, many are wondering how long China's economic doldrums will last and what the political impact of stagnation will be. The conventional wisdom is that low growth will erode the party's political legitimacy and fuel social unrest as jobless migrants and college graduates vent their frustrations through riots and protests. Although this forecast is not necessarily wrong, it is incomplete. Strong economic performance has been the single most important source of legitimacy for the CCP, so prolonged economic stagnation carries the danger of disenchanting a growing middle class that was lulled into political apathy by the prosperity of the postTiananmen years. And economic policies that favor the rich have already alienated industrial workers and rural peasants, formerly the social base of the party. Even in recent boom years, grass-roots unrest has been high, with close to 90,000 riots, strikes, demonstrations, and collective protests reported annually. Such frustrations will only intensify in hard times. It might seem reasonable to expect that challenges from the disaffected urban middle class, frustrated college graduates, and unemployed migrants will constitute the principal threat to the party's rule. If those groups were in fact to band together in a powerful coalition, then the world's longest-ruling party would indeed be in deep trouble. But that is not going to happen. Such a revolutionary scenario overlooks two critical forces blocking political change in China and similar authoritarian political systems: the regime's capacity for repression and the unity among the elite. Economic crisis and social unrest may make it tougher for the CCP to govern, but they will not loosen the party's hold on power. A glance at countries such as Zimbabwe, North Korea, Cuba, and Burma shows that a relatively unified elite in control of the military and police can cling to power through brutal force, even in the face of abysmal economic failure. Disunity within the ruling elite, on the other hand, weakens the regime's repressive capacity and usually spells the rulers' doom. The CCP has already demonstrated its remarkable ability to contain and suppress chronic social protest and smallscale dissident movements. The regime maintains the People's Armed Police, a well-trained and wellequipped anti-riot force of 250,000. In addition, China's secret police are among the most capable in the world and are augmented by a vast network of informers. And although the Internet may have made control of information more difficult, Chinese censors can still react quickly and thoroughly to end the dissemination of dangerous news.
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No Impact CCP Collapse [ ] No Chinese regime collapse too many low probability events have to occur in tandem with one another Chang, Professor of Government at Claremont McKenna, 2004 (Gordon Chang, Collapse Perhaps? The Stability of the Modern Chinese State, 4/8/04, http://www.gordonchang.com/articles/paper.pdf) Regime collapse is a low probability event, says Minxin Pei. Actually, he says its worse than that: governments completely fail only when a series of low probability events occur at the same time.11 Maybe its more precise to say that they crumble only when unlikely events happen in the right sequence, but Pei begins to explain why there are so few instances of government failure in the past. Its not easy to get historical forces to converge on cue. No wonder bad systems last so long. You need a lot to bring down a government, even a decrepit one. Political scientists, who like to bring order to the inexplicable, tell us that a host of factors are required for regime collapse. There must exist, for example, general discontent or even anger, solidarity among the aggrieved, the ability to resist official action, strong leadership, demands with mass appeal, a broad coalition, a divided government.12 Most of the listed requirements cannot be found in the Peoples Republic todayor at least they cant be found in sufficient quantities. China, it would seem, must be a long way from its next revolution. Whatever school of thought one belongs
62
Answers to: Regional Stability Impact [ ] Chinese economy is not the driving factor for stabilizing influence in the region. Previous downturns prove. Blackwill, former associate dean of the Kennedy School of Government, 2009 (Robert, RAND, The Geopolitical Consequences of the World Economic RecessionA Caution, http://www.rand.org/pubs/occasional_papers/2009/RAND_OP275.pdf) Next, China. Again, five years from today. Did the recession undermine the grip of the Chinese Communist Party on the Peoples Republic of China (PRC)? No. Again, as Lee Kuan Yew stressed in the same recent speech, China has proven itself to be pragmatic, resilient and adaptive. The Chinese have survived severe crisesthe Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution few societies have been so stricken. These are reasons not to be pessimistic. Did the crisis make Washington more willing to succumb to the rise of Chinese power because of PRC holdings of U.S. Treasury Bonds? No. Did it alter Chinas basic external direction and especially its efforts, stemming from its own strategic analysis, to undermine the U.S. alliance system in Asia? No. Did it cause the essence of Asian security to transform? No.
63
No Impact: Chinese Soft Power Fails [ ] Chinese soft power fails, seen as an international bully not facilitator.
Boot, Senior Fellow Council on Foreign Relations, 2001 (Max, The Rising Dragon and Smart Diplomacy, 27 September 2010, http://www.commentarymagazine.com/blogs/index.php/category/contentions?author_name=boot) For years we have been hearing about how effective Chinese diplomacy is a supposed contrast with a ham-handed, distracted Uncle Sam who was letting the rising dragon take over East Asia while we werent paying attention. No one should underestimate the rising military challenge posed by China. As Robert Kaplan notes in this Washington Post op-ed: China has the worlds second-largest naval service, after only the United States. Rather than purchase warships across the board, it is developing niche capacities in sub-surface warfare and missile technology designed to hit moving targets at sea. At some point, the U.S. Navy is likely to be denied unimpeded access to the waters off East Asia. Chinas 66 submarines constitute roughly twice as many warships as the entire British Royal Navy. But a funny thing happened on the way to Chinese hegemony: its rise has alarmed pretty much all its neighbors, ranging from India and Australia to Japan and South Korea. The latest sign of how Chinese hectoring and bullying is souring other countries is the flap over a Chinese fishing trawler that collided with Japanese coast-guard vessels near a disputed island in the East China Sea that is claimed by both countries. The Japanese agreed to release the fishing captain on Friday after what the New York Times described as a furious diplomatic assault from China, which included the cut-off of ministerial-level talks on issues like joint energy development, and curtailed visits to Japan by Chinese tourists. In the short term, this is a victory for China. But for the long term, it leaves hard feelings behind and convinces many more Japanese and other Asians that Chinas rise poses a threat to them. Keep in mind that the Democrats, the current Japanese ruling party, came to power talking about weakening the U.S.Japanese alliance and strengthening ties with China. If China were better behaved, that might have come to pass. But Chinese assertiveness is rubbing the Japanese the wrong way. The same is true with South Koreans, Australians, and other key Chinese trade partners. In those countries, too, hopes of a closer relationship with China have been frustrated; instead, they are drawing closer to the U.S. The fundamental problem is that Chinas ruling oligarchy has no Marxist legitimacy left; its only claim to power is to foster an aggressive Chinese nationalism. That may do wonders for support on the home front, but it is doomed to antagonize its neighbors and possibly bring into being a de facto coalition to contain Beijing. That, at least, should be the goal of American policy. Even as we continue to trade with China, we should make sure to curb its geopolitical ambitions. That is a goal in which we should be able to get the cooperation of many of Chinas neighbors if we actually practice the sort of smart power diplomacy that the Obama-ites came into office promising.
64
No Impact: Chinese Cant Use Soft Power [ ] Alternative causes to Chinese soft power loss and they wont use it effectively
Walker, Senior Director of the Global Business Policy Council, 2011 (Martin, Martin, China's soft-power hurdle, United Press International. 28 June 2011 http://www.upi.com/Top_News/Analysis/Walker/2011/06/28/Walkers-World-Chinas-soft-powerhurdle/UPI-39731309267283/) It is far from clear that this will succeed. Three years ago, at the time of the Beijing Olympics, the goodwill for what China called its "peaceful rise" was widespread. The World Bank's Robert Zoellick was talking of China as a fellow stakeholder in the global economy, ready to play by the common rules of international commerce and behavior. That was then. This is now. Surging with self-confidence after navigating the global financial crisis, China has been throwing its weight around in the South China Sea, alarming Vietnam, the Philippines, Indonesia and Brunei with its insistence that the whole sea and its mineral wealth belong to China. Japan has been shaken by some minor clashes over other disputed islands, and India frets over China's apparent plans to start building dams in Tibet near the source of the Brahmaputra River, which supplies about a third of northern India's water. China's impressive investments in Africa have become controversial, since so many of the jobs in construction are going to imported Chinese workers rather than Africans. China's readiness to do business with unsavory regimes does not go down quite as well in the age of the democratic upsurge of the Arab Spring as it did before. China's latest clampdown on various dissidents and on the Internet (while also being blamed for many cyberattacks) has caused alarm. The United Nations startled Chinese diplomats with its recent press release expressing concerns over China's "recent wave of enforced disappearances." Doubtless China will learn from this, even as it navigates the preliminary phases of the transition of power to the next generation of leaders, a process that may help explain the latest crackdown on dissidents, human-rights lawyers and other activists. And doubtless China's astute deployment of its massive wealth to investments and various causes overseas will also pay dividends. But the fact remains that China may well be influencing people, and it has a highly impressive record of economic management to flaunt, but it is not exactly winning friends. Joseph Nye of Harvard's Kennedy School of Government invented the concept of soft power, as opposed to the hard power of coercion. He defined it as the ability to get other people and countries to want what you want. China has yet to show it understands the distinction. It is in Beijing's own interest -- as well as the world's -- that the Chinese leadership learns this quickly.
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Chinese Engagement Bad - Environment China economic engagement bad speeds up deindustrialization and exploits environmentally sensitive areas Gallagher, professor of international relations at Boston University, 2013 (Kevin, professor of international relations at Boston University and a research fellow at the Global Development and Environment Institute, Latin America playing a risky game by welcoming in the Chinese dragon 5/10/2013, http://www.bu.edu/bucflp/2013/05/30/5464/) (JN) While the Chinese do not attach policy conditions to their loans, they have required that borrowers contract Chinese firms, buy Chinese equipment, and sometimes sign oil sale agreements that require nations to send oil to China in exchange for the loans instead of local currency. Chinese investment accentuates the deindustrialisation of Latin America. Large scale, capital intensive commodities production is not very employment-intensive, nor does it link well with other sectors of an economy. Dependence on commodities can cause a "resource curse" where the exchange rate appreciates such that exporters of manufacturing and services industries can't compete in world markets and thus contribute to deindustrialisation and economic vulnerability. Producing natural resource-based commodities also brings major environmental risk. Many of China's iron, soy and copper projects are found in Latin America's most environmentally sensitive areas. In areas such as the Amazon and the Andean highlands, conflict over natural resources, property rights and sustainable livelihoods have been rife for decades. In our report, we find that Chinese banks actually operate under a set of environmental guidelines that surpass those of their western counterparts when at China's stage of development. Nevertheless, those guidelines are not on par with 21st century standards for development banking. Stronger standards should be in place at a time when environmental concerns are at an all-time high.
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Chinese Engagement Bad- Latin America Economic Growth [ ] Chinese influence in Latin America is bad US economic engagement is comparatively superior Shaiken et al, Professor in the Center for Latin American Studies at UC-Berkeley, 2013 [Harley, and Enrique Peters Center for Latin American Studies at the University of Miami. And Adrian Hearn Centro de Estudios China-Mexixo at Universidad Nacional Autonoma de Mexico. China and the New Triangular Relationships in the Americas: China and the Future of US-Mexico Relations, 2013. Pg 7-8] However, closer ties to China also have signifi-cant disadvantages for both Latin America and the United States: Growing trade deficits. Latin American lead-ers who sign trade and investment deals with the PRC have noticed that China's exports are more affordable than their own goods, which contributes to trade deficits. Chinese goods are made by laborers who work for one-third of the wages of Latin American counterparts and who tolerate worse working conditions. Officials in Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico have signaled their unease about trade with such a hot com-petitor. In September 2005, Mexican President Vicente Fox made it clear to visiting President Hu Jintao that dumping electronics and cloth-ing was unacceptable. For every dollar that Mexico makes from exports to China, the PRC makes $31 from exports to Mexico .[9] Disinterest in economic reform. Some ana-lysts believe that the commodities-based trade model used by China will undermine the progress that Latin America has made toward industrialization. While countries like Chile and Brazil have moved beyond raw materials exports, others with powerful presidents or rul-ing oligarchies may be tempted to fall back on plantation economics. Income gaps between the rich and poor may widen as a result. More-over, such narrowly focused economies are vul-nerable to downturns in commodity prices. Some 44 percent of Latin Americans already live below the poverty line. If these countries fail to adopt reforms, social inequality and political instability could depress U.S. exports to the region and increase migration problems. Scramble for resources. To obtain commodi-ties, China offers tempting investments in infra-structure. In contrast, the United States cannot offer direct tie-ins to state industries and can only offer development aid, now in decreasing amounts. Chinese competition may make Mil-lennium Challenge Account (MCA) money a less effective incentive to democratize govern-ments and liberalize markets. The one-to-two year lead time from proposal to disbursement of MCA aid gives volatile governments a chance to back away from marketoriented perfor-mance requirements.
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Chinese Engagement Bad- Latin American Government Stability [ ] Chinese demand in Latin America is bad corrupts governments and unbalances economies Gallagher, Professor of International Relations at Boston University, 2012 (Kevin P. Gallagher, professor at Boston University IR Department and an expert on: Economic Development, Capitalizing on the China Cycle: Time is Running out for Latin America, http://ase.tufts.edu/gdae/Pubs/rp/GallagherCapitalizeChinaCycle.pdf) (JN) Even if commodities prices remain high, they may not lead to prosperity for the region. Chinese trade and investment have been concentrated in six Latin American countries and a handful of sectors, chiefly in primary commodities. Research shows that development has remained elusive for commodity-dependent countries because they become subject to the resource curse . Demand tends to attract investment toward certain commodities at the expense of
others.
Such trade and investment can strengthen a nations currency as well, making it even harder for firms outside of the extractive sector to export their products. Demand also attracts speculative investment in commodities, associated currencies, and public debt. Such investment is highly volatile and can make a nation prone to crises. It is also said that natural resources development spurs corruption, making it hard for governments to be disciplined enough to channel the profits of commodity exports into productive development. The result can be de-industrialization, an erosion of noncommodity (and often employment-intensive) economic sectors, and costly environmental degradation. These trends eventually can lead to increased imports and decreased exports, creating balanceof-payments problems, and leading to poor economic performance.
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China Market Access Disadvantage

Wisconsin Novice Packet 2013-2014

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China Market Access Disadvantage

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China Market Access Disadvantage

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China Market Access Disadvantage

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China Market Access Disadvantage

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China Market Access Disadvantage 1NC Shell

Wisconsin Novice Packet 2013-2014

China Market Access Disadvantage 1NC Shell

Wisconsin Novice Packet 2013-2014

China Market Access Disadvantage 1NC Shell

Wisconsin Novice Packet 2013-2014

China Market Access Disadvantage 1NC Shell

Wisconsin Novice Packet 2013-2014

China Market Access Disadvantage 1NC Shell

Wisconsin Novice Packet 2013-2014

China Market Access Disadvantage Uniqueness

Wisconsin Novice Packet 2013-2014

China Market Access Disadvantage Uniqueness

Wisconsin Novice Packet 2013-2014

China Market Access Disadvantage Uniqueness

Wisconsin Novice Packet 2013-2014

China Market Access Disadvantage Uniqueness

Wisconsin Novice Packet 2013-2014

China Market Access Disadvantage Uniqueness

Wisconsin Novice Packet 2013-2014

China Market Access Disadvantage Uniqueness

Wisconsin Novice Packet 2013-2014

China Market Access Disadvantage Uniqueness

Wisconsin Novice Packet 2013-2014

China Market Access Disadvantage Uniqueness

Wisconsin Novice Packet 2013-2014

China Market Access Disadvantage Uniqueness

Wisconsin Novice Packet 2013-2014

China Market Access Disadvantage Uniqueness

Wisconsin Novice Packet 2013-2014

China Market Access Disadvantage Uniqueness

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China Market Access Disadvantage Links

Wisconsin Novice Packet 2013-2014

China Market Access Disadvantage Links

Wisconsin Novice Packet 2013-2014

China Market Access Disadvantage Links

Wisconsin Novice Packet 2013-2014

China Market Access Disadvantage Links

Wisconsin Novice Packet 2013-2014

China Market Access Disadvantage Links

Wisconsin Novice Packet 2013-2014

China Market Access Disadvantage Links

Wisconsin Novice Packet 2013-2014

China Market Access Disadvantage Links

Wisconsin Novice Packet 2013-2014

China Market Access Disadvantage Links

Wisconsin Novice Packet 2013-2014

China Market Access Disadvantage Links

Wisconsin Novice Packet 2013-2014

China Market Access Disadvantage Links

Wisconsin Novice Packet 2013-2014