ISBN: 0674013859

Author: Malise Ruthven, Azim Nanji

Publisher: Harvard University Press (May 28, 2004)
Pages: 208 Binding: Hardcover w/ dust jacket

Description from the publisher: Among the great civilizations

of the world, Islam remains an enigma to Western readers.
Now, in a beautifully illustrated historical atlas, noted scholar of
religion Malise Ruthven recounts the fascinating and important history of the
Islamic world.

From the birth of the prophet Muhammed to the independence of post-Soviet

Muslim states in Central Asia, this accessible and informative atlas explains the
historical evolution of Islamic societies. Short essays cover a wide variety of
themes, including the central roles played by sharia (divine law) and fiqh (jurisprudence); philosophy; arts and
architecture; the Muslim city; trade, commerce, and manufacturing; marriage and family life; tribal distributions;
kinship and dynastic power; ritual and devotional practices; Sufism; modernist and reformist trends; the European
domination of the Islamic world; the rise of the modern national state; oil exports and arms imports; and Muslim
populations in non-Muslim countries, including the United States.

Lucid and inviting full-color maps chronicle the changing internal and external boundaries of the Islamic world,
showing the principal trade routes through which goods, ideas, and customs spread. Ruthven traces the impact of
various Islamic dynasties in art and architecture and shows the distribution of sects and religious minorities, the
structure of Islamic cities, and the distribution of resources. Among the book's valuable contributions is the
incorporation of the often neglected geographical and environmental factors, from the Fertile Crescent to the
North African desert, that have helped shape Islamic history.

Rich in narrative and visual detail that illuminates the story of Islamic civilization, this timely atlas is an
indispensable resource to anyone interested in world history and religion.

About the Author --

Malise Ruthven is a former editor with the BBC Arabic Service and World Service in London and is the author of
Islam in the World and Islam: A Very Short Introduction. Azim Nanji is Professor and Director of the Institute of
Ismaili Studies and visiting professor at Stanford University.
 HISTORICAL
ATLAS OF THE
ISLAMIC
WORLD
 HISTORICAL
ATLAS OF THE
ISLAMIC
WORLD

Malise Ruthven
with
Azim Nanji
Book Copyright © Cartographica Limited 2004

Text Copyright © Malise Ruthven 2004

All rights reserved.

Historical Atlas of the Islamic World

eBook version
Published by Cartographica

Originally published in print format in 2004.

In this informative and beautifully illustrated atlas, noted

scholar of religion Malise Ruthven recounts the fascinating
and important history of the Islamic world.

Short and concise essays cover a wide variety of themes

including philosophy; arts and architecture; the Muslim city;
trade, commerce and manufacturing; marriage and family
life; ritual and devotional practices; the rise of the modern
national state; oil exports and arms imports; and much more.

Rich in narrative and visual detail, the Atlas is of critical

importance to both students and anyone seeking insight into
the Islamic world, history and culture.

● Published/Released: October 2005

● ISBN 13: 9780955006616
● ISBN 10: 0955006619
● Product number: 225062
● Page count: 208 pp.
 CONTENTS

Introduction 6 Balkans, Cyprus, and Crete 1500–2000 118

Foundational Beliefs and Practices 14 Muslim Minorities in China 122
Geophysical Map of the Muslim World 16 The Levant 1500–2002 124
Muslim Languages and Ethnic Groups 20 Prominent Travelers 128
Late Antiquity Before Islam 24 Britain in Egypt and Sudan in the 19th Century 132
Muhammad’s Mission and Campaigns 26 France in North and West Africa 136
Expansion of Islam to 750 28 Growth of the Hajj and Other Places of Pilgrimage 138
Expansion 751–1700 30 Expanding Cities 142
Sunnis, Shiites, and Khariji 660–c. 1000 34 Impact of Oil in the 20th Century 146
Abbasid Caliphate under Harun al-Rashid 36 Water Resources 148
Spread of Islam, Islamic Law, and Arabic Language 38 The Arms Trade 150
Successor States to 1100 40 Flashpoint Southeast Asia 1950–2000 152
The Saljuq Era 44 Flashpoint Iraq 1917–2003 154
Military Recruitment 900–1800 46 Afghanistan 1840–2002 156
Fatimid Empire 909–1171 50 Arabia and the Gulf 1839–1950 158
Trade Routes c. 700–1500 52 Rise of the Saudi State 160
Crusader Kingdoms 56 Flashpoint Israel–Palestine 162
Sufi Orders 1100–1900 58 Flashpoint Gulf 1950–2003 164
Ayyubids and Mamluks 62 Muslims in Western Europe 166
The Mongol Invasion 64 Muslims in North America 168
Maghreb and Spain 650–1485 66 Mosques and Places of Worship in North America 170
Subsaharan Africa—East 70 Islamic Arts 172
Subsaharan Africa—West 72 Major Islamic Architectural Sites 176
Jihad States 74 World Distribution of Muslims 2000 180
The Indian Ocean to 1499 76 World Terrorism 2003 184
The Indian Ocean 1500–1900 80 Muslim Cinema 188
Rise of the Ottomans to 1650 84 Internet Use 190
The Ottoman Empire 1650–1920 88 Democracy, Censorship, Human Rights, and Civil Society 192
Iran 1500–2000 92 Modern Islamic Movements 194
Central Asia to 1700 94
Chronology 196
India 711–1971 96
Russian Expansion in Transcaucasia and Central Asia 102 Glossary 200
Expansion of Islam in Southeast Asia c. 1500–1800 106
British, French, Dutch, and Russian Empires 108 Further Reading 203

Nineteenth-Century Reform Movements 110

Acknowledgments and Map List 204
Modernization of Turkey 112
The Muslim World under Colonial Domination c. 1920 116 Index 205
HISTORICAL ATLAS OF THE ISLAMIC WORLD

Introduction
Since September 11th 2001, barely a day pas- nations: Nairobi, Dar es Salaam, Mombasa,
ses without stories about Islam—the religion Riyadh, Casablanca, Bali, Tunisia, Jakarta,
of about one-fifth of humanity—appearing in Bombay (Mumbhai), Istanbul and Madrid.
the media. The terrorists who hijacked four The list grows longer, the casualties mount.
American airliners and flew them into the The responses of people and their govern-
World Trade Center in New York and the ments are angry and perplexed. The far-reach-
Pentagon near Washington killed some three ing consequences of these responses for inter-
thousand people. This unleashed a “War on national peace and security should be enough
Terrorism” by the United States and its allies, to convince anyone (and not just the media edi-
leading to the removal of two Muslim govern- tors who mold public consciousness to fit their
ments, one in Afghanistan and the other in advertisers’ priorities) that extreme manifesta-
Iraq. It raised the profile of Islam throughout tions of Islam are setting the agenda for argu-
the world as a subject for analysis and discus- ment and action in the twenty-first century.
sion. The debates, in newspaper columns and Muslims living in the West and in the
broadcasting studios, in cafes, bars, and growing areas of the Muslim world that come
homes, have been heated and passionate. within the West’s electronic footprint under-
Questions that were previously discussed in standably resent the negative exposure that
the rarified atmosphere of academic confer- comes with the increasing concerns of out-
ences or graduate seminars have entered the siders. Islam is a religion of peace: the word
mainstream of public consciousness. What is “Islam,” a verbal noun meaning submission
the “law of jihad”? How is it that a “religion
of peace” subscribed to by millions of ordi- JAZIRA RASLANDA
Qarnqi JAZIRA
LUQAGHA
JAZIRA J. SQUSIYYA
nary, decent believers, can become an ideology IRLANDA Aghrims JAZIRAT
DANMARSHA
JAZIRAT
of hatred for an angry minority? Why has Jazira Dans
INQILTARA
Gharkafurt
BILAD
Islam after the fall of communism become so Hastinks
Londras BALUNIYYA
Shant Mahlu Na
Diaba
freighted with passionate intensity? Or, to use Jol
Sin hr
u ARD AFRIZIYYA
ALAMANIN Na h r Danu
Abariz Qaghradun
the title of a best-selling essay by Bernard Faynash Shant
ARD AFLANDRIS
AL AFRANJ Nah r D rawa
BILAD
BU’AMIYYA
Majial
Lewis, the doyen of Orientalist scholars, Kh
a
Janbara
Kradis K
al- ltj

ha
“What went wrong?” with Islamic history, An Liyun

l ij
Shant Ya‘aqub

al-
glis Ankuna

Ba
hin Burdal Raghusa

nad
with its relationship with itself, and with the Nabal

iqa
Bisha
Manubas
Munt Mayur Shaghubiyya Mashiliyya
modern world? Tarakuna J. al-Nar Labiuna
Messina Kashtara
Such questions are no longer academic, but Qartajanna J. Qurshiqa Barsana
al-Mariyya J. Sardaniyya J. Siqilliyya
are arguably of vital concern to most of the Jalfuniyya
Jaza’ir bani
peoples living on this planet. Few would deny Mazjani
Lebda
Fas
that Islam, or some variation thereof— Tarabulus Surt
l Da ran Barqa
whether distorted, perverted, corrupted, or J aba Jabal Daran

hijacked by extremists—has become a force to Mastih

Jabal Tantana
be reckoned with, or at least a label attached to Jabal Ghaghara
ARD Nebranta
a phenomenon with menacing potentialities. KAMNURIYYA al L
uni
a al-Qasaba
Jab
Numerous atrocities have been attributed to Jabal Banbuan ARD GHANA
Nil a l-Sudan Takrur Kuku
and claimed by Islamic extremists, both before
Ghana
and since 9/11, causing mayhem and carnage
in many of the world’s cities and tourist desti-

6
 INTRODUCTION

(to God) is etymologically related to the word emies, are accused of viewing Islam through
salaam, meaning peace. The standard greet- the misshapen lens of Orientalism, a disci-
ing most Muslims use when joining a gather- pline corrupted by its associations with impe-
ing or meeting strangers is “as-salaam rialism, when specialist knowledge was
alaikum”—“Peace be upon you.” Westerners placed at the service of power.
who accuse Islam of being a violent religion This is fraught, contested territory and
misunderstand its nature. Attaching the label writers who venture into it do so at their own
“Muslim” or “Islamic” to acts of terrorism is peril. As with other religious traditions, every
grossly unfair. When a right-wing Christian generalization about Islam is open to chal-
fanatic like Timothy McVeigh blew up a US lenge, because for every normative descrip-
federal building in Oklahoma city, the worst tion of Islamic faith, belief, and practice,
atrocity committed on American soil before there exist important variants and consider-
9/11, no one described him as a “Christian” able diversity. The problem of definition is
terrorist. In the view of many of Islam’s made more difficult because there is no over-
adherents, “Westerners” who have aban- arching ecclesiastical institution, no Islamic
doned their own faith, or are blinkered by papacy, with prescriptive power to decree
religious prejudice, do not “understand” what is and what is not Islamic. (Even
Islam. Certain hostile media distort Western Protestant churches define their religious
viewpoints, prejudicing sentiments and atti- positions in contradistinction to Roman
tudes with Islamophobia—the equivalent of Catholicism.)
anti-Semitism applied to Muslims instead of Being Muslim, like being a Jew, embraces
The world according
Jews. Some scholars, trained in Western acad- ancestry as well as belief. People described as to al-Idrisi 549–1154

Ar
da Truiyya
l- Tabunt
ARD LASLANDA Buhayrat Janun
Sinubun
Ku
JANUB BILAD ma
niy
N ah
s

i
AL-RUSIYYA br ya
na
rA

a
Nahr Dnas
t .D mi Majuj
Kaw N Labada l ? Quruqiyya Khagan Majui
Shahadruj Jabal Su Adkash
Rushiyya n?? ARD MAJUJ
Basjirt
?

Bahr Nitas al-Dakhila

Filibus Arsan
Hiraqliyya Askisiyya
al-Qostantino
Atrabezunda
Samandar Bahr Jabal Mazrar
Ard Buhayrat Ghargun
Maqaduniyya Abidus al-Khazar Jajun
ARD
un

Salanik Qashtamuni r Kharba

Akhrida Ladikiyya Tiflis J. Karkuniyya ga YAJUJ
As
Dahistan Buhayrat al Buhayrat
Quniyya Ardabil Khwarazem Jab Jabal Janf Tehama
l Lalan
Nah

Tabriz Nahr
Sha Jaba
Amul
r al

s
Nahr

al-Mawsil l Ashla
th
Fra

Rudus
Jaba
?? D y l

Arkadiyya al- Sha ARD AL-KIMAKIYYA

i

???

m
?

Iskandaruna Tus MIN AL-ATRAK

al

F arg
a

Jazira Qum h
J. Iqritish Antakiyya Sisian
an

Qibris Bukhara Buhayrat

Baghdad Jujar
al- Dimyat
Dimashu Sarakhs Nashran
Iskandariyya
Abadan Yazd Harat BILAD AL-TIBET Khirkhir
Jazira
al-Taghlibiyya MIN AL-ATRAK
Qulzum al Yakut
Laka Buhayrat
Khaybar Bazwan
Jab

Wakhan
Yathrib
al A

al-Multan
la qa

Kashmir al-Kharija
lul

ttam
l Ja

Suhar Qandahar AQSA BILAD Baja

Makka
a
Jab

Asyut AL-HIND Sinis

Aydhab Tabala Kanbaya Lulua BILAD
Sur Daybul Katigura
Jazira Aurshin AL-SIN
M isr

Ba

ARD AL-ABADIYA Jazira

Khanfun Sa’ala
ba

N il Sandan
l- M

NUBIA MIN an MIN AL-YAMAN Jazira Jazira

Manquna da Jazira al-Mand Kulom Mak al-Romi
AL-SUDAN b
Adan Jazira al-
J. Suqutra Qotsoba al-Gharb Jazira Sarandib Jazira al-Qamr
Donqola Aqent Malot Jazira
al-Sila
Jazira Sarandib

ARD SUFALA
ARD AL-ZANJ AL-NABR
ARD AL-WAQWAQ

J ab
7
a l a l- K a m r
HISTORICAL ATLAS OF THE ISLAMIC WORLD
Muslims are religiously observant in different
ways. One can be culturally Muslim, as one
can be culturally Jewish, without subscribing
to a particular set of religious prescriptions
or beliefs. It would not be inappropriate to
describe many nonreligious Americans and
Europeans as “cultural Christians” given the
seminal importance played by Christianity in
the development of Western culture. The fact
that the term is rarely, if ever, used is reveal-
ing of Western cultural hegemony and its
pretensions to universality. The Christian
underpinning of Western culture is so taken
for granted that no one troubles to make it
apparent. At the same time the term
“Christian” has been appropriated by
Protestant fundamentalists who seek to
define themselves in contradistinction to sec-
ular humanists or religious believers with
whose outlook they disagree.
Similar problems of definition apply in the
Muslim world. Just as there are theological
disagreements between Christian churches
over all sorts of questions of belief and ritu-
al, within the Islamic fold there are groups
which differ among themselves ritualistically
or in terms of their respective tradition of
interpretation and practice.
Among the major groups in Islam, histor-
ically, the two most significant are the Sunni
and Shiites.
The Shiites maintain that, shortly before
his death, the Prophet Muhammad (c.
570–632 ) designated Ali, his first cousin and
husband of his daughter Fatima, as his succes-
sor. They further believe that this succession
continued in a line of Imams (spiritual lead-
ers) descendent from Ali and Fatima, each
specifically designated by the previous Imam.
The larger body of the Shiites, the “Twelvers”
or Imamis, believe that the last of these lead-
ers, who “disappeared” in 873, will reappear
as the Mahdi or messiah at some future time.
The Sunnis, on the other hand, maintain that
the Prophet had made an indication favoring
8
one of his companions, Abu Bakr (r. 624–632),
who was accepted as Caliph or successor by
agreement of the main leaders in the communi-
ty after the death of the Prophet. He, in turn,
appointed Umar (r. 634–644), who on his
deathbed designated Uthman (r. 644–656), after
consultation with leading Muslims. Uthman
was succeeded by Ali (r. 656–661), again with
the consent of leading Muslims of the time. In
the view of the Sunni majority the four caliphs
constitute a “rightly guided Caliphate.”
Over time the Shiites and Sunni both devel-
oped distinctive community identities. They
are divided into various branches and organ-
ized into different movements and tendencies.
While these, and other groups, differed with
each other and often fought over their differ-
ences, the general tenor of relations, in pre-
modern urban societies, allowed for a degree
of mutual coexistence and intellectual debate.
In recent times, however, there has been a
tendency for extremist sects and radical
groups to anathematize their religious oppo-
nents, or to declare those ruling over them to
be outside the pale of Islam. This narrow
perspective may be contrasted with a growing
awareness among the majority of Muslim
people of the diversity and plurality of inter-
pretations within the Umma.
Currently, the climate of religious intoler-
ance manifested in some parts of the Muslim
world has complex origins and may be symp-
tomatic, like the puritan extremism that
flourished in Europe in the seventeenth cen-
tury, of the dislocating effects of economic
and social changes. As the maps and essays
that follow make clear, modernity came to
the Muslim world on the wings of colonial
power, rather than as a consequence of inter-
nally generated transformations. The “best
community” decreed by God for “ordering
the good and forbidding the evil” has lost the
moral and political hegemony it held in what
was once the most civilized part of the world
outside China. When Islam was in the ascen-

dant, so was the climate of tolerance it
engendered. Muslim scholars and theolo-
gians polemicized against each other but
were careful not to denounce those who
affirmed the shahada—the declaration of
faith—and who prayed toward Mecca. As the
American scholar Carl Ernst observes, “In
any society in the world today, religious plu-
ralism is a sociological fact. If one group
claims authority over all the rest, demanding
their allegiance and submission, this will be
experienced as the imposition of power
through religious rhetoric.” [Carl Ernst,
Following Muhammad: Rethinking Islam in
the Contemporary World, London and
Chapel Hill, p. 206.]
In principle, if not always in practice, a
Muslim is one who follows Islam, an Arabic
word meaning “submission” or, more pre-
cisely, “self-surrender” to the will of God as
revealed to the Prophet Muhammad. These
revelations, delivered orally over the period
of Muhammad’s active prophetic career from
about 610 until his death, are contained in
the Koran, the scripture that stands at the
foundation of the Islamic religion and the
diverse cultural systems that flow from it. A
few revisionist scholars working in Western
universities have challenged the traditional
Islamic account of the Koran’s origins, argu-
ing that the text was constructed out of a
larger body of oral materials following the
Arab conquest of the Fertile Crescent. The
great majority of scholars, however, Muslim
and non-Muslim, regard the Koran as the
written record of the revelations accumulat-
ed in the course of Muhammad’s career.
Unlike the Bible, there are no signs of multi-
ple authorship. In contrast to the New
Testament in particular, where the sayings of
Jesus have been incorporated into four dis-
tinct narratives of his life presumed to have
been written by different authors, the Koran
contains many allusions to events in the
Prophet’s life, but does not spell them out in
INTRODUCTION
detail. The story of Muhammad’s career as
Prophet and Statesman (if one can use a
rather modern term for the leader of the
movement that united the tribes of the
Arabian Peninsula) was constructed from a
different body of oral materials. Known as
Hadith (traditions or reports about the
Prophet’s behavior), they acquired written
form after Muhammad’s death.
The Koran is divided into 114 sections
known as suras (rows), each of which is com-
posed of varying numbers of verses called
ayas (signs or miracles). Apart from the first
sura, the Fatiha, or Opening, a seven-verse
invocation used as a prayer in numerous ritu-
als, including daily prayers or salat, the suras
are arranged in approximate order of
decreasing length, with the shortest at the
end and the longest near the beginning. Most
standard editions divide the suras into pas-
sages revealed in Mecca (which tend to be
shorter, and hence located near the end of
the book) and those belonging to the period
of the Prophet’s sojourn in Medina, where he
emigrated with his earliest followers to
escape persecution in Mecca in 622, the Year
One of the Muslim era. Meccan passages,
especially the early ones, convey vivid mes-
sages about personal accountability, reward
and punishment—in heaven and hell—while
celebrating the glories and beauty of the nat-
ural world as proof of God’s creative power
and sovereignty. The Medinese passages,
while replicating many of the same themes,
contain positive teachings on social and legal
issues (including rules governing sexual rela-
tions and inheritance, and punishments pre-
scribed for certain categories of crime). Such
passages, supplemented with material from
the Hadith literature, came to be the key
sources for the development of a legal system
known as the Sharia. Different scholars of
Muslim thought added other sources to cre-
ate a methodology for the systematization
and implementation of the Sharia.
9
HISTORICAL ATLAS OF THE ISLAMIC WORLD
For believing Muslims, the Koran is the
direct speech of God, dictated without human
editing. Muhammad has been described by
some modern Muslim scholars as a passive
transmitter of the Divine Word. The Prophet
himself is supposed to have been ummi (illiter-
ate), although some scholars question this as he
was an active and successful merchant. For a
majority of Muslims, the Koran, whose text
was written down and stabilized during the
reign of the third caliph, Uthman (r. 644–656),
was “uncreated” and coeternal with God.
Hence, for believing Muslims, the Koran occu-
pies the position Christ has for Christians. God
reveals himself not through a person, but
The illuminated double page
from the Koran in the Bihari
script. This copy was completed
in 1399, the year after Timur’s
conquest of Delhi. The passage,
from the Al-Tawba (Sura of
Repentance), refers to the
Prophet’s Bedouin allies who are
not to be excused for failing to
join one of his campaigns.
through the language contained in a holy text.
Other religious traditions, including Buddhism,
Christianity, Hinduism, Judaism, Sikhism, and
Zoroastrianism, privilege their foundational
texts as sacred. Muslim rulers recognized this
common principle by granting religious tolera-
tion to the ahl al-kitab (Peoples of the Book).
In its initial phase the rapid expansion of
10
Islam beyond Arabia occurred on the basis of
the Arab conquest of the Fertile Crescent and
lands further afield in the century or so fol-
lowing the Prophet’s death in 632. Faith in
Islam and the Prophet’s divine calling—as
well as the desire for booty—united the
Arabian tribes into a formidable fighting
machine. They defeated both the Byzantine
and Sasanian armies, opening part of the
Byzantine Empire and the whole of Persia to
Muslim conquest and settlement. At first
Islam remained primarily the religion of the
“Arab”. Muslim commanders housed their
tribal battalions in separate military canton-
ments outside the cities they conquered, leav-
ing their new subjects (Christian, Jewish, or
Zoroastrian) to regulate their own affairs so
long as they paid the jizya (poll-tax) in lieu of
military service. The process of Islamization
occurred gradually, through marriage, as the
leading families of the subject populations
sought to join the Muslim elites. It also
occurred as impoverished or uprooted sub-

jects found support in the religion of their
rulers, or as people disenchanted with their
former rulers found a congenial spiritual
home in one that honored their traditions
while representing their teachings in a new,
creative synthesis. The role of early Muslim
missionaries was also crucial in this process.
Muslim theology, however, did have one
dynamic cultural dimension, which may help
to explain its evolution of an “Arab” religion
into a universal faith. As the quintessential
“religion of the Book,” which represented the
divine Word as manifested in a written text,
Islam carried with it the prestige of learning
and literacy into illiterate cultures. The cult of
the book, like La Rochefoucauld’s definition
of hypocrisy, was the homage not of vice to
virtue, but of illiteracy to learning. However
revelation is perceived—whether proceeding
directly from God or by way of an altered
mental state comparable to the operations of
human genius—Muhammad’s epiphany came
in the form of language. Time and again the
nomadic peoples on the fringes of the Muslim
empires would take over the centers of power,
and in so doing civilize themselves, becoming
in turn the bearers of Muslim cultural pres-
tige. After the disintegration of the great
Abbasid Empire, the dream of a universal
caliphate embracing the whole of the Islamic
world (and, indeed, the rest of humanity)
ceased to be a viable project. The lines of com-
munication were too long for the center to be
able to suppress the ambitions of local
dynasts. But the prestige of literacy, symbol-
ized by the Koran and its glorious calligraphic
elaborations on the walls of mosques and
other public buildings, as well as in the metic-
ulously copied versions of the book itself, was
powerful. Even Mongol invaders, notorious
for their cruelty, would succumb to the spiri-
tual and aesthetic power of Islam in the west-
ern part of their dominions.
The maps in this book do not aim to pro-
vide a comprehensive account of the shifting
INTRODUCTION
patterns of state and religious authority that
prevailed during the vast sweep of Islamic
history from the time of the Prophet to the
present. But it is hoped that they will illumi-
nate important aspects of that history by
opening windows into significant areas of
the distant and recent past, thereby helping
to explain the legacy of conflicts—as well as
opportunities—the past has bequeathed to
the present. Geography is vital for the under-
standing of Islamic history and its problem-
atic relationship with modernity.
As the maps in this atlas illustrate, the cen-
tral belt of Islamic territories stretching from A world map drawn in 1571–72
the Atlantic Ocean to the Indus Valley was by the al-Sharafi al-Sifaqsi family
perennially at the mercy of nomadic or semi- in the town of Sfax, Tunisia.
nomadic invaders. In premodern times,
before gunpowder weapons, air
power, and modern systems of
communication brought
peripheral regions under
the control of central
governments (usually
under colonial aus-
pices), the cities were
vulnerable to attack
by nomadic preda-
tors. The genius of
the Islamic system
lay in providing the
converted tribesmen
with a system of law,
practice and learning within
a foundation of faith to which
they became acculturated over time.
In his Muqaddima, or “Proglomena” to
the History of the World, the Arab philoso-
pher of history Ibn Khaldun (1332–1406)
developed a theory of cyclic renewal and state
formation, which analyzed this process in the
context of his native North Africa. According
to his theory, in the arid zones where rainfall is
sparse, pastoralism remains the principal
mode of agricultural production. Unlike peas-
ants, pastoralists are organized along “tribal”
11
HISTORICAL ATLAS OF THE ISLAMIC WORLD
lines (patrilineal kinship groups). They are rel-
atively free from government control. Enjoying
greater mobility than urban people, they can-
not be regularly taxed. Nor can they be
brought under the control of feudal lords who
will appropriate a part of their produce in
return for extending protection. Indeed, in the
arid lands it is the tribesmen who are usually
armed, and who, at times, can hold the city to
ransom, or conquer it. Ibn Khaldun’s insights
tell us why it is usually inappropriate to speak
of Muslim “feudalism,” except in the strictly
limited context of the great river valley systems
of Egypt and Mesopotamia, where a settled
peasantry farmed the land. In the arid regions,
pastoralists move their flocks seasonally across
the land according to complex arrangements
with other users. Usufruct is not ownership.
Property and territory are not coterminous, as
they became in the high rainfall regions of
Europe. Here feudalism and its offshoot, capi-
talism, took root and eventually created the
bourgeois state that would dominate the coun-
tryside, commercializing agriculture and sub-
jecting rural society to urban values and con-
trol. In most parts of Western Asia and North
Africa, in contrast, the peoples at the margins
continued to elude state control until the com-
ing of air power. Even now the process is far
from complete in places such as Afghanistan,
where tribal structures have resisted the
authority of the central government.
Urban Moroccans had a revealing term for
the tribal regions of their country: bled al-
siba—the land of insolence—as contrasted
with bled al-makhzen, the civilized center,
which periodically falls prey to it. The supe-
riority of the tribes, in Ibn Khaldun’s theory,
depends on asabiyya, a term which is usually
translates as group feeling or social solidari-
ty. This asabiyya derives ultimately from the
harsher environment of the desert or arid
lands, where there is little division of labor,
and humans depend for their survival on the
bonds of kinship. City life, by contrast, lacks
12
a common or corporative asabiyya. The
absence of bourgeois solidarity, in which the
corporate group interests of the burghers
transcend the bonds of kinship, may partly
be traced to the operations of Muslim law.
Unlike the Roman legal tradition, the Sharia
contains no provision for the recognition of
corporate groups as fictive “persons.”
In its classic formulation, Ibn Khaldun’s
theory applied to the North African milieu
he knew and understood best. But it serves as
an explanatory model for the wider history
of Western Asia and North Africa, from the
coming of Islam to the present. The theory is
based on the dialectical interraction between
religion and asabiyya. Ibn Khaldun’s concept
of asabiyya, which is central to his outlook
on Muslim social and political history, can be
made to mesh with modern theories of eth-
nicity, whether one adopts a “primordial” or
“interactive” model. The key to Ibn
Khaldun’s theory may be found in two of his
propositions singled out by the anthropolo-
gist and philosopher Ernest Gellner: (1)
“Leadership exists only through superiority,
and superiority only through group feeling
(asabiyya)” and (2) “Only tribes held togeth-
er by group feeling can live in the desert.”
The superior power of the tribes vis-à-vis
the cities provided the conditions under which
dynastic military government and its variants,
royal government underpinned by mamlukism
or institutionalized asabiyya, became the
norm in Islamic history prior to the European
colonial intervention. The absence of the legal
recognition of corporative bodies in Islamic
law prevented the artificial solidarity of the
corporation, a prerequisite for urban capitalist
development, from transcending the “natural”
solidarities of kinship. In precolonial times the
high cultural traditions of Islam constantly
interacted with these primordial solidarities
or ethnicities: they did not replace them.
Formally the ethic of Islam is opposed to
local solidarities, which privilege some

believers above others. In theory there exists
a single Muslim community—the umma—
under the sovereignty of God. In practice this
ideal was often modified by recognition of
the need to enlist asabiyya or tribal ethnicity
in the “path of God.” Islamic practice stress-
es communitarian values through regular
prayer, pilgrimage, and other devotional
practices, and given time, generates the urban
scripturalist piety of the high cultural or
“great” tradition. But it does not of itself
forge a permanent congregational communi-
ty strong enough to transcend the counter-
vailing dynamic of local ethnicities. Be they
secular—based on differences of tribe, vil-
lage, or even craft—or sectarian religious—
based on divisions between different mad-
habs (schools of jurisprudence), or the mysti-
cal Sufi orders which are often controlled by
family lineages, or the differences between
Sunnis and Shiites—such divisions militate
against the solidarity of the Umma.
Like the Baptist movement in the United
States, Islam (especially that of the Sunni
mainstream, comprising about 90 percent of
the world’s Muslims) is a conservative, pop-
ulist force, which resists tight doctrinal or
ecclesiastical controls. While Muslim scrip-
turalism and orthopraxy provide a common
language which crosses ethnic, racial, and
national boundaries—creating the largest
“international society” known to the world
in premodern times—it has never succeeded
in supplying the ideological underpinning for
a unified social order that can be translated
into common national identity. In the West
the institutions of medieval Christianity,
allied to Roman legal structures, created the
preconditions for the emergence of the mod-
ern national state. In Islamdom the moral
basis of the state was constantly undermined
by the realities of tribal asabiyya. These
could be admitted de facto, but never accord-
ed de jure recognition. This may be one rea-
son why a civilization that by the tenth and
INTRODUCTION
eleventh centuries was far ahead of its
Christian competitor eventually fell behind,
to find itself under the political and cultural
dominance of people it regarded—and which
some of its members still do regard—as infi-
dels.
The Islamic system of precolonial times,
embedded in the memory of contemporary
Muslims, was brilliantly adapted to the polit-
ical ecology of its era. Even if the strategy of
“waging jihad in the path of God” were
adopted for pragmatic or military reasons,
Islamic faith and culture were the beneficiar-
ies. The nomad conquerors and Mamluks
(soldier-slaves), imported from peripheral
regions to keep them at bay, became Islam’s
foremost champions, defenders of the faith-
community and patrons of its cultures and
systems of learning.
The social memory of this system exercises
a powerful appeal over the imaginations of
many young Muslims at this time. This is espe-
cially true when the more recent memory of
modernization through colonization can be
represented as a story of humiliation, retreat,
and betrayal of Islam’s mission to bring univer-
sal truth and justice to a world torn by division
and strife. The violence that struck America on
September 11th 2001, may have been rooted in
the despair of people holding a romantic, ide-
alized vision of the past and smarting under the
humiliation of the present. While those who
planned the operation were almost certainly,
educated, sophisticated men, fully cognizant
with the workings of modern societies, it does
not seem accidental that most of the fifteen
hijackers were Saudi citizens, several from the
province of Asir. This impoverished mountain-
ous region close to the modern borders of
Yemen was conquered by the Al Saud family in
the 1920s, and still retains many of its links
with the Yemeni tribes. Like all decent people,
Ibn Khaldun would have been horrified by the
indiscriminate slaughter of 9/11: but it is
doubtful that he would have been surprised.
13
HISTORICAL ATLAS OF THE ISLAMIC WORLD
Foundational Beliefs and Practices
In the majority of Islamic traditions, all
Muslims adhere to certain fundamentals.
The most important is the profession of
faith, a creedal formula that states:
“There is no God but God. Muhammad is
the Messenger of God.” Stated before
witnesses, this formula—called the
Shahada—is the sufficient requirement
for conversion to Islam and belonging to
the Umma.
Muslims affirm tawhid (the Unity and
Uniqueness of God). They believe that
God has communicated to humanity
throughout its history by way of
Messengers, who include figures like
Abraham, Moses, and Jesus, and that
Muhammad was the final Messenger to
whom was revealed the Koran. In person-
al and social life, Muslims are required to
adhere to a moral and ethical mode of
behavior for which they are accountable
before God.
As well as tawhid, articles of faith
adhered to by Muslims include the belief
that angels and other supernatural
beings act as divine emissaries; that Iblis
or Satan, the fallen angel, was cast out of
heaven for refusing God’s command to
prostrate himself before Adam; and that
Muhammad is the “seal” of the
prophets, the last in a line of human
messengers sent by God to teach and
warn humanity. The Koran affirms that
the recipients of previous revelations—
the Christians and Jews—have corrupted
the scriptures sent down to them. It
warns of the Day of Judgement when all
individuals, living or dead, will be
answerable to God for their conduct.
The virtuous will be rewarded with eter-
14
nal bliss in the gardens of heaven. Those
who have failed in their duty will be sen-
tenced to the fires of hell.
The Koran also articulates a frame-
work of practices which have become
normative for Muslims over time.
One of them is worship, which takes
several forms, such as salat (ritual
prayer), dhikr (contemplative prayer), or
dua (prayers of exhortation and praise).
Muslims performing salat prostrate
themselves in the direction of the Kaba,
the cubic temple covered in an embroi-
dered cloth of black silk that stands at the
center of the sacred shrine in Mecca.
Salat is performed daily: early morning,
noon, mid-afternoon, sunset and evening,
or combined according to circumstance.
Prayer may be performed individually, at
home, in a public place such as a park or
street, or in the mosque (an English word
derived from the Arabic masjid, “place of
prostration”) or other congregational
places. The call to prayer (adhan) is made
from the minaret which stands above the
mosque. It includes the takbir (allahu
akbar “God is most great”), as well as
shahada and the imperative: “Hurry to
salat.” In the past, before electronic
amplification, the beautifully modulated
sounds of the adhan were delivered in
person by a muezzin from the minarets
five times a day. The noon salat on Friday
is the congregational service, and is
accompanied by a khutba (sermon) spo-
ken by the Imam, or prayer leader or
other religious notable. In the early cen-
turies of Islam, the name of the caliph or
ruler was pronounced with the khutba.
When territories changed hands between

different rulers (as frequently happened),
the official indication of a change of gov-
ernment came in the form of the procla-
mation of the new ruler’s name in the
country’s leading mosques.
Another foundational practice is
zakat, sharing of wealth (not to be con-
fused with voluntary charity or sadaqa).
In the past, zakat was intended to foster
a sense of community by stressing the
obligation of the better-off to help the
poor, and was paid to religious leaders or
to the government. At present, different
Muslim groups observe practices specific
to their traditions.
Sawm is the fast in daylight hours dur-
ing the holy month of Ramadan, when
believers abstain from eating, drinking,
smoking, and sexual activity. Abu Hamid
al-Ghazali, the medieval mystic and the-
ologian, listed numerous benefits from
the discipline of fasting. These included
purity of the heart and the sharpening of
perceptions that comes with hunger,
mortification and self-abasement, self-
mastery by overcoming desire, and soli-
darity with the hungry: the person who is
sated “is liable to forget those people
who are hungry and to forget hunger
itself.” Ramadan is traditionally an occa-
sion both for family reunions and reli-
gious reflection. In many Muslim coun-
tries, the fast becomes a feast at sun-
down—an occasion for public conviviali-
ty that lasts well into the night. Ramadan
is the ninth month in the hijri (lunar cal-
endar) which falls short of the solar year
by 11 days: thus Ramadan, like other
Muslim festivals, occurs at different sea-
sons over a 35-year cycle.
INTRODUCTION
Another significant ritual practice is
the Hajj or pilgrimage to Mecca, which
practicing Muslims are required to per-
form at least once in their lifetimes, if
able to do so. Historically the Hajj has
been one of the principal means by which
different parts of the Muslim world
remained in physical contact. In pre-
modern times, before mass transporta-
tion by steamships and aircraft brought
the Hajj within the reach of people of
modest or average means, returning pil-
grims enjoyed the honored title of Hajji
and a higher social status within their
communities than non-Hajjis. As well as
providing spiritual fulfilment, the Hajj
sometimes created business opportunities
by enabling pilgrims from different
regions of the world to meet each other. It
also facilitated movements of religious-
political reform. Many political move-
ments were forged out of encounters that
took place on the pilgrimage—from the
Shiite rebellion that led to the foundation
of the Fatimid caliphate in North Africa
(909) to modern Islamist movements of
revival and reform. The end of Ramadan
is marked by the Id al-Fitr (the Feast of
Fast Breaking), while the climax of the
Hajj involves the Id al-Adha (Feast of
Sacrifice) in which all Muslims partici-
pate by sacrificing animals. These two
feasts are the major canonical festivals
observed by Muslims everywhere. There
are, in addition, many other devotional
and spiritual practices among Muslims
that have developed over the centuries,
based on specific interpretations of the
practice of faith and its interaction with
local traditions.
15
HISTORICAL ATLAS OF THE ISLAMIC WORLD
Geophysical Map of the Muslim World
Although lands of the Islamic world now
occupy a broad belt of territories ranging
from the African shores of the Atlantic to the
Indonesian archipelago, the core regions of
Western Asia where Islam originated exer-
cised a decisive influence on its development.
Compared to Western Europe and North
America, the region is perennially short on
rainfall. During the winter, rain and snow
Originally built in the fourteenth
century, the mosque at Agades,
in Niger, is made of mud. Its
structure is constantly renewed
by workers bearing new mud
who climb up the wooden posts
that protrude from the sides and
serve as scaffolding.
born by westerlies from the Atlantic fall in
substantial quantities on the Atlas and Riffian
Mountains, the Cyrenaican massif, and
Mount Lebanon, with the residue falling
intermittently on the Green Mountain of
Oman, the Zagros, the Elburz, and the moun-
tains of Afghanistan. But the only rains that
occur with predictable regularity fall in the
16
highlands of Yemen and Dhufar, which catch
the Indian Ocean monsoons, and the Junguli
region lying south of the Caspian Sea under
the northern slopes of the Elburz, which
catches moisture-laden air flowing southward
from Russia.
Before recent times, when crops such as
wheat, requiring large amounts of water,
appeared in the shape of food imports, and
underground fossil water (stored for millions
of years in aquifers) became available through
modern methods of drilling, agriculture was
highly precarious. A field that had yielded
wheat for millennia would fail when the annu-
al rainfall was one inch instead of the usual
twenty. Ancient peoples understood this well,
and provided themselves with granaries.
However, agriculture did flourish in the great
river valleys of Egypt and Mesopotamia (now
Iraq). Here the annual flooding caused by the
tropical rains in Africa and melting snows in
the Anatolian and Iranian highlands pro-
duced regular harvests and facilitated the
development of the complex city-based cul-
tures of ancient Sumer, Assyria, and Egypt.
The need to manage finely calibrated systems
of irrigation using the nutrient-rich waters of
the Tigris, the Euphrates, and the Nile
required complex systems of recording and
control, making it necessary for literate
priestly bureaucrats to govern alongside the
holders of military power. Together with the
Yellow River in China and the Indus Valley,
the three great river systems of the Fertile
Crescent are at the origins of human civiliza-
tion. The first states, in the sense of orderly
systems of government based on common
legal principles, appeared in these regions
more than five millennia ago.
The limited extent of the soil water neces-
sary for agricultural production had a decisive
impact on the evolution of human societies in
the arid zone. Though conditions vary from

one region to another, certain features distin-
guish the patterns of life from those of the
temperate zones to the north or tropical zones
to the south. Where rainfall is scarce and
uncertain, animal husbandry—the raising of
camels, sheep, goats, cattle, and, where suit-
able, horses—offers the securest livelihood for
substantial numbers of humans. The “pure
deserts” or sand seas of shifting dunes shaped
by the wind, which cover nearly one-third of
the land area of Arabia and North Africa, are
wholly unsuitable for human and animal life,
and have generally been avoided by herdsmen,
traders, and armies. But in the broader semi-
desert regions complex forms of nomadic and
seminomadic pastoralism have evolved. In
winter the flocks and herds will range far into
the wadis or semidesert areas, to feed on the
grasses and plants that can spring up after the
lightest of showers. In the heat of summer
they will move, where possible, to pastures in
the highlands, or cluster near pools or wells.
GEOPHYSICAL MAP OF THE MUSLIM WORLD
Unlike peasant cultivators, a portion of
whose product may be extracted by priests in
the form of offerings or by the ruler in taxes,
nomadic pastoralists will often avoid the con-
fines of state power. People are organized into
tribes or patrilineal kinship groups descended
from a common male ancestor. Military
prowess is encouraged because, where food
resources are scarce, tribal or “segmentary”
groups may have to compete with each other,
or make raids on settled villages, in order to
As Islam established itself along
the Silk Road, mosques were
built for travelers and local
converts. This mosque in the
Xinjiang province of China
reflects the Central Asian
influence in its design.
survive. Property is held communally, classi-
cally in the form of herds, rather than in the
form of crop-yielding land. Property and ter-
ritory are not coterminous (as they tended to
become in regions of higher rainfall) because
the land may be occupied by different users at
different seasons of the year. Vital resources,
such as springs or wells in which everyone has
an interest, are often considered as belonging
to God, and are entrusted to the custodian-
ship of special families regarded as holy.
17
HISTORICAL ATLAS OF THE ISLAMIC WORLD
Muslim Languages and Ethnic Groups
There are approximately one billion Muslim
people—about one-fifth of humanity—living in
the world today. Of these the largest single-
language ethnic group, about 15 percent, are
Arabs. Not all Arabs are Muslims—there are
substantial Arab Christian minorities in Egypt,
Palestine, Syria, and Iraq, and small numbers of
Arabic-speaking Jews in Morocco—although
the numbers of both these communities have
rapidly declined in recent decades, mainly
through emigration. As the language of the
Koran, of Islamic scholarship and law, Arabic
long dominated the cultures of the Muslim
world, closely followed by Persian—the lan-
guage of Iran and the Mughal courts in India.
The spread of Islam among non-Arab peo-
ples, however, has made Arabic a minority lan-
guage—although many non-Arab Muslims
read the Koran in Arabic. An ethnographic sur-
vey published in 1983 lists more than 400 eth-
nic/linguistic groups who are Muslim. The
largest after the Arabs, in diminishing order,
are Bengalis, Punjabis, Javanese, Urdu speak-
ers, Anatolian Turks, Sundanese (from Eastern
Java), Persians, Hausas, Malays, Azeris,
Fulanis, Uzbeks, Pushtuns, Berbers, Sindhis,
Kurds, and Madurese (from the island of
Madura, northeast of Java). These groups
number between nearly 100 million (Bengalis)
down to 10 million (Sindhis, Kurds, and
Madurese). Of the hundreds of smaller groups
listed, the smallest—the Wayto hunter gather-
ers in Ethiopia—number fewer than 2,000.
However, three of the languages spoken by
more than 10 million people—Javanese,
Sundanese, and Madurese—are in the course
of being overlaid by Bahasa Indonesia, the offi-
cial language taught in Indonesian schools.
With Indonesians constituting the world’s
largest Muslim-majority nation, Bahasa
20
Indonesia could overtake Arabic as the most
widely spoken Muslim language.
In addition to Muslims living in their coun-
tries of ethnic origin, there are now millions of
Muslims residing in Europe and North America.
Given that English is the international language
of commerce, scholarship, and science, with sec-
ond-generation European, American, and
Canadian Muslims speaking English (as well as
French, German, Dutch, and other European
tongues) the growth of English among Muslims
is a significant recent development.
The modern nation-state, based on interna-
tionally recognized boundaries, a common lan-
guage (in most cases), a common legal system,
and representative institutions (whether these are
appointed or elected) is a recent phenomenon in
most of the Muslim world. Often imposed by
arrangements between the European powers,
modern boundaries cut across lines of linguis-
tic/ethnic affiliation, leaving peoples such as
Kurds and Pushtuns divided into different states.
Before the colonial interventions began to lock
them into the international system of UN mem-
ber states, Muslim states tended to be organized
communally rather than territorially. States were
not bounded by lines drawn on maps. The power
of a government did not operate uniformly with-
in a fixed and generally recognized area, as hap-
pened in Europe, but rather “radiated from a
number of urban centers with a force which tend-
ed to grow weaker with distance and with the
existence of natural or human obstacles.”
[Albert Hourani A History of the Arab Peoples
London, Faber, revised ed. 2002, p. 138.] Patriot-
ism was focused, not as in Renaissance Italy,
England, or Holland, on the city, city-state, or
nation in the modern territorial sense, but on the
clan or tribe within the larger frame of the
umma, the worldwide Islamic community. Local
 MUSLIM LANGUAGES AND ETHNIC GROUPS

solidarities were reinforced by endogamous prac- through military power was balanced by the
tices such as marriage between first cousins, a moral force and cultural prestige of Islam.
requirement in many communities. Clan loyalties Time and again in precolonial times the pred-
were further buttressed by religion, with tribal ators were converted into Islam’s most trusted
leaders often justifying their rebellions or wars of defenders. To borrow a phrase of the anthro-
conquest by appealing to the defense of true pologist Ernest Gellner, “the wolves become
Islam against its infidel enemies. sheepdogs.” Just as the Prophet Muhammad
Viewed from the perspective of modern had tamed the Arabian tribes by his personal
Western history the systems of governance that example, the eloquence of the Koran, and the
evolved in the arid region were divisive and system of governance that proceeded from it,
unstable. In Europe, a region of high rainfall, so the Sharia (divine) law and human systems
the state emerged out of constitutional struggles of fiqh (jurisprudence) to which it gave rise
between rulers and their subjects animated by mediated the perennial conflicts between pas-
conflicts between social classes, within ethnical- toral predators, cultivators, and townsfolk.
ly homogeneous populations sharing common The system, embedded in the social memory
national, political, and cultural identities of today’s Muslim populations, was based on
(although these were sometimes contested, as in the duty of the ruler to uphold social justice by A Tuareg policeman in the Sahel
Ireland). In the arid zone dominant clans or trib- governing in accordance with Islamic law. The region south of the Sahara. From
ally based dynasties exercised power over subor- formidable task facing contemporary Muslim their center at Timbuktu, the
dinate groups or tried to ensure their dominance states is to harness political and social tradi- Tuareg controlled the trade
by importing mamluks (slave-soldiers), from dis- tions forged in a very different context from routes between the
tant peripheries, who had minimal social con- modern-day conditions. Mediterranean and West Africa.
tacts with the indigenous populations. Peasant
cultivators and townsfolk remained vulnerable
to the predations of nomadic marauders—the
proverbial “barbarians at the gates.” The
asabiyya (loyalties or group solidarity) that
bound the clans was stronger than urban soli-
darity. Lacking the corporate ethos of their
Western counterparts, the Muslim urban classes
failed to achieve the “bourgeois” or capitalist
revolutions that gave rise to the modern state
systems of Europe and North America.
There is, however, a different way of view-
ing the same historical landscape. Given the
predominance of pastoral nomadism in the
vast belt of territories where Islam took root,
stretching from the Kazakh steppes to the
Atlantic shores (and in similar regions in
northern India and south of the Sahara) the
inability of relatively weak agrarian states to
tax nomadic predators or control them

21
HISTORICAL ATLAS OF THE ISLAMIC WORLD

B.
LUX. CZECH.
SLOV. UKRAINE
AUS. MOLD.
SWITZ. HUN. ROM.
FRANCE SL. GYPSIES

C a s p
TATARS
B.H.
IT BOSNIANS
YUG. BULG. B l a c k S e a R
A GYPSIES POMAKS

i
Rome GEORG.

a
ALB. RUMELIAN TURKS

LY

n
Istanbul
Madrid ALBANIAN POMAK
AZA. ARM.

S e a
PORT. BOSNIANS Ankara
POMAK AZERI
SPAIN GREECE TURKMEN
Lisbon M e
d i TURKEY AZERI SHAHSE VAN
t a
r Athens CIRCASSIANS YORUK
Tunis ARABIC
Algiers KURDISH

r
a
n N CH Tehran
e
a
RUMELIAN TURKS
F RE SYRIA LUR
PERS
n
Rabat S e BAKHTIARI
Casablanca LEB. Baghdad
BERBER
a
QASHQA'I
Tripoli ISRAEL
O Alexandria HEBREW
IRAQ
CC
O Cairo JORDAN
R

ALGERIA
O

Al Kuwayt
M

E
A L I B YA ARABIC

N
EGYPT SAUDI
WESTERN R
A

G
Riyadh
SAHARA
B I C U.A.

L
F R E N C H ARABIA
TEBU

I
TEBU BEJA

MAURITANIA
TUAREG S ARABIC
MEIDOB H
BERBER MALI NIGER BILIN
TUKULOR TEBU
MIMI HAUSA
WOLOF FULANI BERI
SENEGAL SONGHAY KANEMBU CHAD ARABIC Khartoum JABARTI
EN
Dakar FULANI SONINKÉ KANEMBU
BUDUMA BUDUMA
MABA
TAMA
MASALIT FUR BERTI
BENI AMER
ERITREA YEM
SERER DIOLA FULANI HAUSA TUNJUR
BAMBARA KURI ARABIC HADDAD
MANDINKA MOSSI SONGHAY F U L A N I
ARABIC
BARMA
DAJU S U DA N TIGRE
SINYAR TUNJUR TAQALI WAYTO
MANDINKA KANURI HADDAD
FULANI BAMBARA
JAHANKA FULANI DYULA SONINKÉ
BURKINA SONGHAY HAUSA KANURI
FULANI KOTOKO
FONGORO FULANI
NUBA
AFAR

SENUFO HAUSA BATONUN

GUINEA SONINKÉ DYULA KAMBERI GBAGYI HAUSA Addis SOMALI
Conakry FULANI GBAYA
SOSO YALUNKA SENUTO MOSSI MOLÉ-DAGBANI SHANGAWA Ababa
NUPE FULANI
TEMNE FULANI DYULA GHANA RESHAWA ARGOBBA
S O M A L I
MENDE MANDINKA
MANDINKA N I G E RIA CENTRAL ETHIOPIA
IVORY YORUBA YORUBA
YORUBA GBAYA
AFRICAN

IA
VAI Lagos GURAGE
COAST AKAN OROMO
N

LIBERIA

AL
REPUBLIC
O

Accra SADAMA
O

Abidjan M
ER
TOGO CA M SO
GANDA OROMO SOMALI
SOGA
O
ONG

UGANDA
A T L A N T I C BENIN NYANKOLE KENYA
REP. C

NORTHEAST BANTU
O C E A N GABON Nairobi
CONGO SWAHILI
NYAMWEZI
Kinshasa
CENTRAL TANZANIAN
TANZANIA
Languages and peoples of Islam Dar es Salaam
SWAHILI
Muslim population, 50% or more Luanda
YAO
ENGLISH Imperial languages still in regional use
YAO
ANGOLA
YAO
A

I
B
ZAM
E

22
 MUSLIM LANGUAGES AND ETHNIC GROUPS

K A Z A K H S TA N
A N
I
S MONGOLIA
S KAZAKHS Harbin
U
UYGUR
UZBE
KI
ST KIRGHIZ. UYGUR Shenyang
AN

KIRGHIZ
Beijing
TURK Tianjin N. KOREA
ME TURKMEN
NI TAJIK.
KIRGHIZ TAJIK Seoul
ST
AN

TAJIK QIZILBASH PASHAI S. KOREA

KHO
AIMAQ Kabul
SHING
BALTIS C H I N A Pusan

I A N PERSIANS AFGHAN. HAZARAS KOHISTANIS KASHMIRIS

Lahore
UN
SHT GUJARS
P U BRAHUI Chengdu Shanghai
N

IRAN JAT Wuhan

TA
IS

Delhi
BALUCH K NE
PA PA
L BH.
E MEOS
SINDHIS
URDU
Karachi
N Dhaka
Ahmadabad Guangzhou Taiwan
E. GUJARATIS Calcutta
G H BURMA Hong Kong
INDIA
AN

P A C I F I C
L I S (MYANMAR)
ORISSANS BANGLA-
M

MAHARASHTRIANS O C E A N
DECCANI DESH L
O

Bombay Hainan
A
OS

Hyderabad
VI

Rangoon Luzón
ET

THAILAND
Manila
NA M

MAPPILLA Bangkok
Bangalore Madras
TAMIL
CAMB.
LABBAI
PHILIPPINES
Ho Chi
TAMIL Minh
SRI Mindanao
LANKA
BRUNEI BAJAU
ACEHNESE
GAYO M A L AY S I A
BATAK
I N D I A N O C E A N MINANGKABAU GORONTALESE
TOMINI
Sumatra Borneo Sulawesi
WAND
OGAN-BESEMAH
BUGIS
I N D O
Jakarta N E S I A
N Java
Timor

23
HISTORICAL ATLAS OF THE ISLAMIC WORLD
Late Antiquity Before Islam
This rock relief from Magshi-i
Rus Van depicts Ardeshir I,
founder of the Sasanian dynasty,
facing a hostile Parthian warrior.
24
The Muslim community emerged in seventh-
century Arabia in a region dominated by
ancient civilizations, empires, cultures, and
ethnic groups. Traces of Mesopotamian cul-
ture still survived in the Tigris and Euphrates
valleys, and the areas bordering the
Mediterranean and the Gulf had long felt the
impact of the adjoining powers that plied the
maritime trade in these waters. Byzantium,
the Eastern Roman and Orthodox state based
in Constantinople, was the primary Christian
kingdom in the region and
at odds with the powerful
Zoroastrian Sasanian Empire based in Persia
(modern Iran). The ebb and flow of conflict
between the various major states influenced
trade as well as relations with the prosperous
region of Arabia to the south. The history of
some of the ancient Arab kingdoms is still
preserved in archaeological remains, such as
those of the Nabateans at Petra (first century
BC —first century AD ), Palmyra (second—
third century AD), and of the Ghassanids in
later centuries, whose patrons were the
Byzantines and the Lakhmids, who gave
allegiance to the Sasanian Empire.
A major influence on intellectual life that
was to emerge in the Muslim world came
from the academies and learning institutions
that preserved influences from Persia, Greece,
and India. In particular, the Hellenistic and
Persian legacies in the fields of medicine, the
sciences, and philosophy would bring about a
strong tradition of intellectual inquiry in
Muslim societies.
The cultures in the regions were influenced
by the cosmopolitan nature of this
Mediterranean world to
different degrees, preserv-
ing the heritage of classi-
cal antiquity and the
Hellenistic legacy in its
various forms, architec-
tural, philosophical, artis-
tic, urban, and agricultur-
al. Of the major religions
in the region, Christianity
in its orthodox form also
held sway in southern
Arabia while Zoroastrian-
ism predominated in Iran
and Mesopotamia. Juda-
ism had a long history in
the Near East and small Jewish communities
had also settled in Yemen and the oases of
Arabia, such as Medina. The inherited values,
literature, and practices of all these traditions
coexisted in this vast, multifaith and multieth-
nic milieu, which within a century of the death
of the Prophet Muhammad would be overtaken
by Muslim conquest. Over time it would form
part of a larger set of civilizations linked by the
faith of Islam, while still preserving continuities
with the various heritages of antiquity.
 LATE ANTIQUITY BEFORE ISLAM

30° 35° 40° 45° 50° 55° 60°

Black Sea Cauca
Constantinople su
s M
40°
t s Arabia before the Muslim conquests
Ankyra Occupied by Sasanians 607–28

Anatolia KALB Arab tribe

E A S T E R N R O M A N
Ardabil Caspian
Attaleia Edessa Dara Sea
Dabiq Harran Nisibis
Aleppo Qazvin
Antioch

Ti
gr
Rayy

is
35°

Hamah
C Y PRU S Eu
ph
Tripoli Homs ra
t
Palmyra es
Jafula
Mediter ranean Nihavand
M
Sea Damascus es
Tyre op
ot Ctesiphon S A S A N I A N E M P I R E
Yarmuk Karbala am
Caesarea Isfahan
Alexandria Kufa ia
Jerusalem
Ajnadain Qadisiya P e r s i a
30°
Mu’tah
al-Fustat
(Cairo) Petra GHASSAN Basra Istahar
LAKHM (Persepolis)
KALB
E M P I R E
Pe

BAKR Siraf
rs

GHATAFAN
N

a
ile

A n
Sahara G
u
l f

Gulf
25°
Desert r
JUHEINA

o
f
Medina
R e

Bedr a Om
Tropic of Ca
an
ncer
KINDA al-Yamama
d

HANIFAH
S e

N O BATI A b
JA

MAZUN
a

S U L AY M
Z
DE

i
SE

Mecca Q U R AY S H
RT

20°
a
NO

HAWAZIN
MA

MA K K U R A
DS

li
ha er
K rt
DES

Dongola
al a
MAHRAH
AZD b qu
Sa
ERT

u y
R pt
san

em
NOM

t he
ian
ADS

15°
A LWA Arabian Sea
De
Ye m

N
pe

AX U M
n
en

en
d

cies 0 200 km

H I M YA R 0 200 miles

25
HISTORICAL ATLAS OF THE ISLAMIC WORLD
Muhammad’s Mission and Campaigns
Although Muhammad’s image is
considered taboo, pictures of the
heroic deeds of his uncle, Hamza,
and others were circulated to show
the first epic battles of the
Muslims. This painting from India
c. 1561–76 is from a series of
large-format illustrations shown to
audiences while the epic stories
were read aloud.
26
Islam is an Arabic noun from the verb aslama,
to surrender oneself. In its primary sense the
active participle muslim means someone who
surrenders himself or herself to God as
revealed through the teachings of the Prophet
Muhammad (c. 570–632). Muhammad is
believed by Muslims to have communicated
God’s revelation in the Koran, a text Muslims
regard as the final revelation of God to
humankind. Collected under the third of
Muhammad’s successors, the Caliph Uthman
(r. 644–656), the Koran is composed of 114
chapters, or suras. These are said to have been
revealed in Muhammad’s native city of Mecca,
where he was a respected merchant, and suras
also date from the period of his sojourn in
Medina (622–632).
In Mecca, the Koran’s condemnation of the
sins of pride, avarice, and the neglect of social
duties, its warnings of divine judgement, and
its attacks on pagan deities brought
Muhammad and his followers into conflict with
the leaders of his own tribe, the Quraish. His
fellow clansmen were boycotted, with Muslim
converts subjected to persecution, and a num-
ber took refuge in Axum (Ethiopia). However,
Muhammad’s fame as a prophet and trusted
man of God spread beyond Mecca. He was
invited to act as judge and arbitrator between
the feuding tribal factions of Yathrib, later
renamed Madinat al-Nabi (“the city of the
Prophet”), usually shortened to Medina, an
oasis settlement about 250 miles northeast of
Mecca. The hijra (migration) of the Muslims in
622 marks the beginning of the Muslim era.
The passages in the Koran dating from the
Medina period, when Muhammad was the
effective ruler, contain some of the legislative
material (such as rules regarding marriage and
inheritance) that would form the basis of what
became Islamic law. After a series of campaigns
against the Meccans, the Muslims emerged vic-
torious. In the last year of his life Muhammad
returned in triumph to Mecca, receiving the
submission of the tribes along the way. He
reformed the ancient ceremonies of the hajj
(pilgrimage), discarding their animist aspects
and reorienting them to what he believed to be
the original monotheism of Abraham. After
further expeditions he returned to Medina. He
died there after a short illness in 632.
 MUHAMMAD’S MISSION AND CAMPAIGNS

Muhammad’s Missions and

Campaigns to 632
Muhammad moves to Medina 60°
30° 35° 40° 45° 50° 55°

Campaigns

Conquered by Muhammad to 632

Conquered by Abu Bakr 632–34

A n a t o l i a
Battle site with date

Marash Samosata
Edessa
Dabiq
Harran
Aleppo Mosul Qazvin

Ti
Antioch

gr
Rayy
is
35° Raqqa
Cyp r u s
Hamadan
Tripoli Homs
Jafula S A S A N I A N
E

Mediter ranean Nihavand

Eu
ph
PIR

Sea Damascus
ra

Ctesiphon E M P I R E
t
es

Caesarea
Wasit
Damietta Gaza Kufa Isfahan
E M

Alexandria Jerusalem Qadisiya 636

Heliopolis
30°
E

al-Fustat Basra Kerman

(Cairo)
N

Dumat al-Jandal
I

T Shiraz
B Y Z A N
Pe
rs

Siraf
ia
H
N

n
i le

E
JA

G
u l
25°
f
Z

G
ul
Aswan 625 f o
Medina al-Yamama f Oman
R e

624 A r a b i a 632 Muscat

NOBATIA
d
S e

630
a

Mecca
r
20° l i t e
a r
h
MAKKURA K a
u
a l q
u b t y
R p
e m
t h e
633

ALWA A r a b i a n S e a
15°
Sana N

AXUM
633 0 400 km

0 400 miles

27
HISTORICAL ATLAS OF THE ISLAMIC WORLD

Expansion of Islam to 750 10

° 0°

FR NG
N

A
I
A

N
Muhammad’s death left the Muslim communi-

K
E

AS
SH

I
O

D
C

TU
M
ty without an obvious leader. One of his oldest

AQ
RI
AS

UI
IC
companions, Abu Bakr (r. 632–634), was

TA
T

IN
acknowledged by several leaders as the first

E
N
LA
caliph, or successor. Under Abu Bakr and his

T
A
successor Umar (634–644), the tribes, who had
begun to fall away on the death of Muhammad,
were reunited under the banner of Islam and

Ag
a
di
r
converted into a formidable military and ideo-
Rome
logical force. The Arabs broke out of the penin-

B
E
sula, conquering half the Byzantine provinces

R
B
E
as well as defeating the armies of Sasanian

R
S
Persia. Ctesiphon, the Persian capital, fell in Ca
r
Ka thage
637, Jerusalem in 638. By 646, under Umar’s iro
ua 698

I F
n6
70

S
successor Uthman (r. 644–656), the whole of

R
I Q
The Dome of the Rock in Egypt had come under Arab Muslim control.

I Y
a
Jerusalem, built by the Caliph Acquiring ships from Egypt and Syria, the nomadic preda-

A
Tr
ipo
li 6
47
Abd al-Malik in 691–92, is the Arabs conducted seaborne raids, conquering tors would have

h
first great building to have been Cyprus in 649 and pillaging Rhodes in 654. taken the plunder or
Religious differences between the Byzantine held onto land, dispersing

a
constructed after the Arab
conquest. Embellished with rulers and their subjects in Egypt and Syria as landlords or peasants

r
Koranic quotations proclaiming ensured that the Muslims were met with indif- among the conquered peoples.
the unity of God, the building ference, or even welcomed by fellow monothe- In a farsighted decision Caliph

surrounds the rock from where
Muhammad is believed to have
embarked on his miraculous
“night journey” to heaven.
ists embittered by decades of alien Byzantine
rule. But secular factors were also important.
The Arabs were motivated by desire for plun-
der, as well as religious faith. In previous eras
a
Umar encouraged the tribes to settle
with a system of stipends paid from the
common treasury, which took control of
the conquered lands. The Arabs were kept
apart from the population in armed camps that
evolved into garrison cities such as Basra and
Kufa in Iraq. Although the tensions over the
distribution of booty would erupt into open
civil war the overall control exercised by the
fledgling Islamic government remained under
dynastic rule. Though individual dynasties
would often be challenged as ruling contrary to
Islamic principles of equality and justice, the
dynastic system of governance fitted the pre-
vailing form of social organization, the patriar-
chal kinship group, and remained the norm
until modern times. Under the Umayyads the
remarkable expansion of Islam continued, with
the Arab raiders reaching as far as central
France and the Indus Valley.

28
 EXPANSION OF ISLAM TO 750

10
° 20° 30° 40° 50° 60° 70° 80° 90°

S Expansion to 750
L
A V S Arab advance

B U L G A R S Battle site

Expansion of Islam:
AV
AR Under Muhammad
EM 50°
PI
RE H U N G A R I A N S Under Abu Bakr (632–634)
K
K. OF THE L

H A Under Umar (634–644)

Z A
R Under Uthman (644–656)
E M
S

and Ali (656–661)

L A

P I E S
R E
P L
Under the Umayyads (661–750)
V S
OM

O
BU E
LG P
BAR

AR
IA C
DS

I
K
Aral S yr
Da

R
Black Sea ry
751
a
Sea A

T U
Talas AN
Ca

Con T
B 673–7stantinop R GH
Y 7, 717 le A FER
spi

–18 40°
Z

N
A
an

SO
N ARMENIA
T I Am

X
Tiflis Derbend uD
N E

IA
ary
0
and 71
a

N
E M Samark
Sea

Erzuru

A
P I R m 710
M E A Bukhara
ZE

e
RB

d
AI

i t Tarsu M 664
JA

s Edessa Tabriz Ardabil Mery Balkh

e r Rhod
N

e
ES

r a 654 s
N

Cypr Antioch A
O

n e
Mosul 641 RG r 651 l 664
PO

u
a n 649 s GU Nishapu Kabu
Eu

TA

S e Rayy
ph

LIB a S
YRIA Jalula KHU Herat JAB
PUN
ra

YA Da te s
capital mascus 63 RASAN
IA

from 6 5
58 Kerbela Nehavend
Ram 642
la Yarmu 680 N 1
A an 71
Alex k 636 Ctesiphon N I
andr
ia Fih S A S A Mult 30°
646 Jerusalel
m 638 Kufa Susa I A
al-Fu Ajnada Qadisiya 636 Isfahan E R S
stat 6 in 634 P
Faiyu 70 Heliop
oli DU
m 640 s HIN
FA
us
SEISTAN
TES
Basra
E G 656 R Istahar 648 Ind STA
Y P K
S

Tabuk IR
T
M SI N D
BA

Pe A
HR

rs
N
Nil

ia
AI

AN
n MAKR cer
e

Can
ic of
Gu
Trop
H

lf
EJ

Badr 624 Suhar Sea

AZ

Medina O
Muscat
Arabian
Y

A M
M AN
A
M 20°
M A K

A
Re

Mecca A r a b i a n
622
K U

Dong
d

ola P e n i n s u l a
Se
R

A
a
I

T
N Najran U
A AN
Soba M
R
A OCE
H IAN
ALODIA
H
AD IND
YEMEN

KINGDOM
Aden 0 300 km 10°
OF AXUM

0 300 miles

29
HISTORICAL ATLAS OF THE ISLAMIC WORLD
Expansion 751–1700
The tower of the great mosque
in Kairouan, now in Tunisia,
dates from the ninth century.
Built near the site of ancient
Carthage, the design of three
superimposed towers is based on
the lighthouses and watchtowers
of classical antiquity.
30
Islam expanded by conquest and conversion.
Although it was sometimes said that the faith of
Islam was spread by the sword, the two are not
the same. The Koran states unequivocally,
“There is no compulsion in religion” (2:256).
Following the precedent established by the
Prophet, who allowed the Jews and Christians
to keep their religion if they paid tribute, the
caliphs granted all the people of the Book
(including Zoroastrians) the right to maintain
their religious practices provided they paid the
jizya tax (tribute), a payment in lieu of military
service. Initially Islam remained the religion of
the Arabs, a badge of unity and mark of superi-
ority. When conversions did occur the converts
were required to become mawali (clients) of the
Arab tribes, the assumption being that the
Arabs retained a hegemonic role.
Many factors, however, encouraged conver-
sion after the initial conquests. For those
Christians who were tired of centuries of eru-
dite theological wranglings over the precise bal-
ance between Christ’s divine and human
natures, Islam provided the hospitality of a reli-
gion in which Christ had an honored place as a
forerunner to Muhammad. Likewise for Jews
Islam could appear as a reformed faith in the
tradition of Abraham and Moses. Zoroastrians,
deprived of state support for their religion after
the Arab conquest of the Sassanian Empire,
would find in Islam a religion, like theirs, of
individual ethical responsibility and later, in the
Shiite idea of a Mahdi (messiah) from the
House of Ali, a concept similar to the Saoshyant
of Zoroastrian eschatology. Messianic ideas
have a universal appeal, and are found in nearly
all religious traditions. After the Islamic con-
quests in India, the Awaited Imans of the Shiite
eschatology would sometimes be identified with
a forthcoming avatar of Vishnu. In the metro-
politan areas converts from the older traditions
helped to detribalize the Arabian religion by
asserting their rights as Muslims, by emphasiz-
ing the universality of its message, and by stress-
ing its legitimizing function in the establishment
of the new social order and forms of political
power. Further afield the simplicity of the con-
version process (the mere utterance before wit-
nesses of the formula: “There is no god but
 EXPANSION 751–1700

God. Muhammad is the Messenger of God”) numerous guises: educated, literate mer-
would contrast favorably with the often com- chants, wandering scholar-teachers, charis-
plex conversion procedures of the mystery reli- matic dervishes, native princes with impres-
gions. In Subsaharan Africa local spirits could sive retinues, sophisticated intellectuals and
be Islamized by incorporating them into the dais (missionaries) from esoteric traditions
This Koran, written using
Koranic storehouse of angels, djinns, and devils. who specialized in tailoring their message
muhaqqaq script, was produced
Ancestor cults could be accommodated by and rituals to suit audiences of widely differ- in Baghdad in 1308. The large
grafting local kinship groups onto Arab or Sufi ent cultural backgrounds. Lacking a central- format indicates that this
spiritual lineages. ly directed missionary program, the religion manuscript was a presentation
There were also more worldly considera- has proved itself sufficiently adaptable to copy, used for public recitation
tions behind many conversions. Islamic mar- spread organically. in the mosque.
riage rules are weighted in favor of spreading
the faith, for while a woman from one of the
ahl al-dhimma (protected communities) who
marries a Muslim is not required to change
her religion, the converse does not apply, and
the children are expected to be brought up as
Muslims, ensuring the Islamization of subse-
quent generations. This demographic advan-
tage would have carried considerable weight
in societies where it was customary for the
victors to marry the women of defeated
tribes. More generally, there exists the natu-
ral tendency of bright and ambitious individ-
uals to enter the ranks of the ruling elites. As
Islamic society developed in metropolitan
areas such as the cities of Iran and Iraq,
knowledge of the Law and the Traditions of
the Prophet, alongside secular learning in
such fields as literature, astronomy, philoso-
phy, medicine, and mathematics, became the
mark of distinction among the patrician
classes. Conversions inspired by social ambi-
tion should not be dismissed as mere oppor-
tunism: at its high point in the classical era,
the Islamic world was the most developed
and sophisticated society outside China. The
models of urbane sobriety and order it
offered would have exercised their own
appeal quite apart from conscious missionary
activity. Peoples on the fringes of the core
regions would have encountered the faith in

31
HISTORICAL ATLAS OF THE ISLAMIC WORLD

165° 150° 135° 120° 105° 90° 75° 60° 45° 30° 15°

70°
Arctic Circ Greenland
le

60°

Iceland
(to Denmark)
50°

Rupert’s Land SCOTLAND

IRELAND
ENGLAND
40° Newfoundland
New France
Nova Scotia FRANCE

British Colonies Madrid

PORTUGAL
30° Azores SPAIN

Madeira
ATLANTIC MOROCCO
Tropic of Cancer Florida
PACIFIC OCEAN Canary Is.
Bahamas S a h
OCEAN
V

20°
ic

e- Cuba
R Hispaniola
oy
al Belize Jamaica ARMA
ty Puerto Rico
of St. Louis
Cape Verde Is.
Ne TERKUR
SONGHAI

Mosquito w S KALI SEGU

10° Coast
pain Potugese
Guinea Mossi
Trinidad MALI states

ASHANTI

Santa Fé Elmina
de Bogotá

0°
Quito
Vi

Recife
ce
-R

10° Lima Bahia

oy

Expansion 750–1700
al

La Paz
ty
of

Muslim expansion to 900

Peru

20° Muslim expansion to 1300

rn
Tropic of Caprico
Muslim expansion to 1500

Muslim expansion to 1700 Santiago

30° Muslim land lost by 1300

Muslim land lost by 1500

Muslim land lost by 1700

40°

50°

60°
165° 150° 135° 120° 105° 90° 75° 60° 45° 30° 15° 0

32
 EXPANSION 751–1700

0° 15° 30° 45° 60° 75° 90° 105° 120° 135° 150° 165° 180° 165°
80°

ARCTIC
OCEAN 70°

AY
RW 60°
O
N
&
RK

EN S i b e r i a Okhotsk
DENMA

D
E
W St Petersburg 50°
R U S S I A N E M P I R E
S

Moscow
HOLY
POLAND
ROMAN
EMPIRE NOGAIS 40°
HUNGARY
KIRGHIZ
TU

UZ KALMYKS
RKO

BE
MA

Constantinople KS MANCHU
NS

KOREA JAPAN
PAPAL E CHINESE
STATES R
PI EMPIRE 30°
EM SAFAVID
OTTOMAN EMPIRE TIBET
MU
GH
Cairo A A
ra L Shan PACIFIC
h a r a States
b E Formosa
OCEAN
i MP
IRE 20°
a

Oman
Mecca
LA

ARAKAN AVA
OS

AN
FU

Philippine Is.
NA

YA
NJ

AIR KANEM- Goa

M

DARFUR
HA
ET HI O

BORNU WADAI MARATHA Manila

Yemen
AYUTT

TERRITORY
Hausa Hindu 10°
states AWSA
Kingdoms CAMBODIA
PI
A

OYO SAYLAN

OROMO ACEH
Malacca

Borneo 0°
Islamic
city states Celebes
Mombasa
INDIAN Sumatra Spice Is.

LUNDA LUBA
CONGO New Guinea
OCEAN MATARAM
Luanda Comoro Is.
Timor
10°
Mozambique

ROZWI
Madagascar
Mauritius
Bourbon
(Réunion) 20°
Delagoa Bay Fort Dauphin
New Holland

Cape Town
30°

40°

50°

60°
0° 15° 30° 45° 60° 75° 90° 105° 120° 135° 150° 165° 180° 165°

33
HISTORICAL ATLAS OF THE ISLAMIC WORLD
Sunnis, Shiites, and Khariji 660–c. 1000
The major divisions of Islam, revolving
around the question of leadership, go back
to the death of the Prophet but were intensi-
fied by the first civil war (656–661) and its
aftermath in the following generation
(680–81). The first caliph, Abu Bakr, had
been one of the Prophet’s oldest companions
and the father of his youngest wife, Aisha.
On the Prophet’s death he had been chosen
by acclamation with the powerful support of
Umar, an early convert and natural leader.
When Abu Bakr died Umar’s caliphate was
generally acknowledged, and it was during
his ten-year reign that the Muslim state
began to take shape. Under Umar the ten-
sions resulting from the conquests, over the
distribution of booty and the status of trib-
al leaders in the new Muslim order, began to
surface. The tensions were kept in check
under Umar’s stern and puritanical rule but
would surface disastrously during the reign
of his successor, Uthman, who was mur-
dered in Medina by disgruntled soldiers
returning from Egypt and Iraq. Though
renowned for his commitment to the new
religion as an early convert, Uthman was
linked to the Umayyad clan in Mecca that
had originally opposed Muhammad’s mes-
sage. He was accused of favoring his fellow
clansmen at the expense of more pious
Muslims. The latter congregated around
Ali, the Prophet’s cousin and closest surviv-
ing male relative, who was already regarded
by some of his followers as the originally
designated successor to the Prophet, and
who now assumed the role of caliph. Ali’s
failure to punish Uthman’s assassins pro-
voked a rebellion by two of Muhammad’s
closest companions, Talha and Zubayr, sup-
ported by Aisha. Though he defeated Talha
and Zubayr, Ali failed to overcome
Uthman’s kinsman Muawiya, the governor
of Syria, at the Battle of Siffin. His eventual
34
decision to seek a compromise with
Muawiya provoked a rebellion among his
more militant supporters, who came to be
known as Kharijis (seceders). Though Ali
defeated the Kharijis in July 658, enough of
them survived to continue the movement,
which has lasted to this day in a moderate
version known as Ibadism. One of the
Khariji leaders, Ibn Muljam, avenged his
comrades by murdering Ali in 661. Ali’s
elder son Hasan made an accommodation
with the victorious Muawiya, who became
the first Umayyad caliph. On Muawiya’s
death in 680, when the succession passed to
Muawiya’s son, Yazid, Ali’s younger son
Hussein made an unsuccessful bid to restore
the caliphate to the Prophet Muhammad’s
closest descendants. The massacre of
Hussein and a small group of followers at
Karbala in 680 by Yazid’s soldiers provoked
a movement of repentance among Ali’s sup-
porters in Iraq. They became known as the
Shiites, the “partisans” of Ali.
The Mughal emperors and their descendants had
an abiding interest in the history and wisdom of
their faith. This was expressed both in their
memoirs and in their paintings. By the mid-
1600s, the Emperor Jahangir’s artists had
developed a format in which two or more sages,
or holy men, were depicted seated in discussion.
Mughal artists did not shrink from depicting
fabled holy men from the past as if they were
still alive. The figures in this painting represent
the Muslim orthodoxy, with the only
nonconformist being the bare-headed dervish
seated at the lower left.
SUNNIS, SHIITES, AND KHARIJI 660–c. 1000

35
HISTORICAL ATLAS OF THE ISLAMIC WORLD
Abbasid Caliphate under Harun al-Rashid
A romanticized nineteenth-
century portrait of Harun al-
Rashid with an Ottoman-style
mosque in the background. The
revival of the caliphate by the
Ottoman sultans was intended
to grant them rights over the
Muslim subjects of European
powers to balance the rights
claimed by the latter over the
sultan’s Christian subjects.
36
Byzantines kept them at bay. Upon becoming
caliph in 764, Harun established diplomatic
relations with Charlemagne (r. 742–814) and
the Byzantine emperor. Diplomatic and com-
mercial ties were also established with China.
Harun’s reign is often referred to as the Gold-
en Age, a period of significant cultural and lit-
erary activity during which the arts, Arabic
grammar, literature, and music flourished under
his patronage. Al-Rashid
figures prominently in the 20° 10°
famous literary compila-
tion One Thousand and
One Nights. Among his
40
°
courtiers were the poet
Abu Nuwas (d. 815), who
was renowned for his Li
sb
on
wine and his love poetry, Um
756 ayya To
–10 ds led
and the musician Ibrahim Sev 31 o
ille
al-Mawsili (d. 804). Abu Ta
Cor
Uma dova, c
ngi y ap
er Gib yad Em ital of
’l Hasan al-Kisai (d. 805), Rab ral irate
tar
at
who was tutor to al- Id
Tle
mc
789 risids en
–92
Rashid and his sons, was 6 Rus
Ma
rrak S 776 tamids
esh ijilmas –906
the leading Arabic gram- 30° sa
marian and Koran reciter
of his day. The classical
texts were translated from
Greek, Syriac, and other
The reign of caliph Harun al-Rashid (r. languages into Arabic.
764–809) marked the height of military con- Harun was famous for his
quests and territorial acquisition under the largesse: a well-turned
Abbasids, with the caliphate extending from the poem could earn the gift
boundaries of India and Central Asia to Egypt of a horse, a bag of gold, 20°
and North Africa. or even a country estate.
N
Harun rose through the ranks as a military His wife Zubaida was
commander before assuming the caliphate from famous for her charities,
his murdered brother al-Hadi (r. 785–86) and especially for causing
served variously as governor of Ifriqiya (mod- numerous wells to be dug
ern-day Tunisia), Egypt, Syria, Armenia, and on the pilgrimage route
Azerbaijan. His military campaigns against the from Iraq to Medina.
 ABBASID CALIPHATE UNDER HARUN AL-RASHID

Sufism (Islamic mysticism) flourished under Barmaki family, led to a period of political
Abbasid Empire
the caliph. The famous ascetic and mystic and territorial decline. Harun’s decision to c. 850
Maruf al-Karkh (d. c.815) was among the lead- divide the empire between his two sons al- Extent of Abbasid Empire 786–809

ing expositors of Sufism in Baghdad. By con- Amin and al-Mamun, appointing the elder al- Other Muslim dynasties

trast, Harun instituted a policy of repressing the Amin (r. 809–813) as his successor, con- Islamic expansion 750–850
Shiites, who were thought to challenge this rule. tributed to a two-year civil war that was fol-
Byzantine Empire
The latter half of Harun’s reign was lowed by periods of continued instability and
Abbasid campaigns
marked by political instability. The granting insurrection. The reign of al-Mamun (r.
Islamic naval attacks
of semiautonomy to the governor of Ifriqiya, 813–833), though intellectually brilliant, was
Saffarid incursions
Ibrahim b. al-Aghlab, in 800, followed by marked by territorial decline and the waning
Qarmation expansion
Harun’s destruction of the all-powerful al- of Abbasid influence.

° °
0° 10° 20° 30° 40° 50° 60° 70 80

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m

37
HISTORICAL ATLAS OF THE ISLAMIC WORLD
Spread of Islam, Islamic Law, and Arabic Language
The rapid spread of Islam acted as a formida-
ble force of change in the Old World. By the
end of the reign of Umar ibn al-Khattab (d.
644), the whole of the Arabian Peninsula was
conquered, together with most of the Sasan-
ian Empire, as well as the Syrian and Egyptian
provinces of Byzantium. Following the tragic
Battle of Karbala, which led to the death of
Imam al-Hussein (AD 680), a new phase was
ushered in with the making of the Umayyad
Empire (661–750), which eventually extended
its dominion from the Ebro River in Spain to
the Oxus Valley in Central Asia. Claiming uni-
versal authority over far-reaching frontiers,
the Umayyad dynasty took Damascus as its
capital city, and remained virtually unchal-
lenged in its reign until the rise of the Abbasid
caliphate with its capital in Baghdad
(749–1258). While Spain continued to be
under Umayyad rule (756–1031), new regional
powers confronted the Abbasid hegemony, like
the Fatimids in Egypt (909–1171), and the
Saljuqs in Iran and Iraq (1038–1194), along
with waves of Crusader invaders in the Levant.
Numerous traditions in thought flourished,
like the Sunni schools of legal reasoning
(hanafi, maliki, shafii, hanbali) and the
“Twelver Shiite” lineage descending from the
Imam Ali ibn Abi Talib (d. 661). The upsurge in
intellectual activities was also marked by the
founding of the mutazila and ashari methods of
kalam, in addition to the maturation of philos-
ophy, the sciences, and mysticism. Many
notable centers of learning were established,
along with associated productions of manu-
scripts, like al-Azhar in Cairo, the Zaytuna in
Tunis, the Qarawiyyin in Fez, the coteries of
Córdoba in Andalusia, the schools of Najaf and
Karbala in Iraq, and those of Qumm and Mash-
had in Iran.
38
Being the language of the Koran, Arabic
was carried to the new converts. Becoming
the lingua franca of medieval Islam, the dis-
tinctiveness of Arabic was evident in all
spheres of high culture, from religious to
legal, official, intellectual, and literary dic-
tions. While in the western provinces Arabic
dominated the vernacular dialects, Persian
remained in use eastward; witnessing a liter-
ary revival in the tenth century AD with the
unfurling of an Arabo-Persian idiom, which
became prevalent across Iran as well as
Transoxiana and northern India.
A theme that recurs in this formative peri-
od of Islamic thought is the relationship,
often tense, between revelation and reason.
Under the Abbasid caliph al-Mamun (r.
813–833) there existed a group of theologians
known as the Mutazila. They had absorbed
the work of Greek philosophers and adopted
a rationalist style of argumentation that
equated God with pure reason. For the
Mutazila the world created by God operated
according to rational principles humans could
understand by exercising reason. As free
agents, humans were morally responsible for
their actions, and since good and evil had
intrinsic value, God’s justice was constrained
by universal laws. They held to the view that
the Koran was created in time, inspired by
God in Muhammad, but not part of his
essence. Their opponents, the hadith scholars,
insisted that the Koran was “uncreated” and
coeternal with God. They believed it was not
for man to question God’s injunctions or
explore them intellectually, and that all
human action was ultimately predetermined.
The Mutazili view, buttressed by the mihna
(an “inquisition” or test applied to ulama and
public officials), held sway for a period. How-
 SPREAD OF ISLAM, ISLAMIC LAW, AND ARABIC LANGUAGE

ever, it was reversed under

his successor al-Mutawakil
(r. 847–61) as a result of
populist pressures focused
on the heroic figure of
Ahmad ibn Hanbal (d. 855)
who resisted imprisonment
and torture to defend the
“uncreated” Koran. A kind
of compromise between
reason and revelation was
reached in the work of Abul
Hasan al-Ashari (d. 935).
He used rationalistic meth-
ods to defend the “uncreat-
ed” Koran and allowed for a
degree of human responsi-
bility. However, the conse-
quences of the Mutazili
defeat were far reaching.
The caliphs ceased to be the
ultimate authorities in doc-
trinal matters. Mainstream
Sunni theologians espoused
the command theory of
ethics: an act is right
because God commands it,
God does not command it
because it is right. Mutazil-
ism is a term of abuse for
many conservative Islamists,
especially in Saudi Arabia,
which follows the Hanbali
tradition in law.

The courtyard at al-Azhar in

Cairo, founded by the Shiite
Fatimids in 970. Al-Azhar became
the foremost center of Sunni
scholarship and an important
source of manuscripts.

39
HISTORICAL ATLAS OF THE ISLAMIC WORLD

Successor States to 1100

autonomy in return for an annual tribute,
founded a dynasty that lasted until 909. The
puritanical Kharijis, who held to the princi-
ple of an elected imam or caliph, established
independent states based in Wargala oasis,
Tahert, and Sijilmassa. Of Tahert, destroyed

10°
Ta
he Ro
rt
me

Tu
nis

Ifriqiy
This clay model clearly shows
the physical features that Arab
and Persian commentators noted
as typical of the Turkish soldiers M

a
Tr ed
ipo
recruited by the caliphs. li it
er
ra
A ne
an
f
Even at its maximum extent the Abbasid
r
Empire failed to contain the whole Islamic
world. In Spain an independent dynasty had i
been founded by an Umayyad survivor, Abd c
al-Rahman I (r. 756–788). A grandson of the a
Caliph Hisham, he escaped the massacre of
his kinsmen and after various adventures
made his way to the peninsula. Here he per-
suaded feuding Arabs and Berbers to accept Post-Imperial Successor
him as their leader, instead of the governor Regimes late 10th Century
sent by the Abbasids. In what is now Moroc- Abbasid Caliphate c. 900

co, a descendant of Ali and Fatima, Idris bin Byzantine Empire

Abdullah, who escaped from Arabia after Fatimids

the failure of a Shiite revolt in 786, arrived at
Hamadanids
the old Roman capital of Volubilis. Here he
Buyids
formed a tribal coalition, which rapidly con-
Samanids
quered southern Morocco. His son Idris II
founded Fez in 808. In Tunisia (Ifriqiya) the Ghurids

descendants of Ibrahim ibn Aghlab, Harun

al-Rashid’s governor, who had been granted

40
 SUCCESSOR STATES TO 1100

by the Fatimids in the tenth century, the At the heart of the empire, however, polit-
chronicler Ibn Saghir wrote: ical and religious tensions were rife. The dis-
“There was not a foreigner who stopped in puted succession between Harun’s sons
the city but settled among them and built in Amin and Mamun led to a civil war that last-
their midst, attracted by the plenty there, the ed a decade, weakening the Abbasid armies
equitable conduct of the Imam, his just behav- and the institution of the caliphate. Though
ior toward those under his charge, and the Mamun won the war, his attempt to impose
security enjoyed by all in person and property.” the Mutazili doctrine of the “created” Koran

20° 30° 40° 50° 60° 70° 80°

E u 50°
r o
p e
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lga

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Blac
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Con a
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a
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(Ox gar
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Alepp Tabriz
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Tabaristan Khurasan Kabul

ph

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Samarra
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Afghanistan
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Iraq an
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us

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Ind

Pe Fa Kirman Indi
a
rs
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n
A r a b Gu
i a Bahrain lf
R e

He

r
f Cance
jaz

Medina
Tropic o
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O
ma
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S e

Mecca
a

Arabian 20°
Nu Sea N
bia

t
au
am
d hr
Ha
Y
em

e n

41
HISTORICAL ATLAS OF THE ISLAMIC WORLD

met with strong resistance from the populist Mamun’s most effective general, Tahir,
ulama (religious scholars) grouped around established a hereditary governorate. To off-
Ahmad Ibn Hanbal. For the latter, who saw set the power of the Tahirids Mamun’s suc-
the divine text as “uncreated” or eternal, the cessor Mutasim relied increasingly on merce-
doctrine of the created Koran derogated naries recruited from Turkish-speaking
from the idea of the Koran as God’s speech. tribes in Central Asia—a practice that has-
They looked to the Koran and the emerging tened the breakup of the empire and the
corpus of hadiths (traditions or reports establishment of de facto tribal dynasties.
about the Prophet Muhammad) as the sole The construction of a new capital at Samar-
sources of religious authority, with them- ra further isolated the caliph from his sub-
selves as qualified interpreters. They regard- jects. By the end of the tenth century the
ed the caliph as the executive of the will of Abbasid caliphs were mainly titular mon-
the community, not the source of its beliefs. archs, their legitimacy challenged by
As the caliph’s religious authority weak- claimants in the line of Ali. The most radical
ened, so did his political and economic con- of these movements, the Qaramatians,
trol. In cultivated regions including Iraq the fomented peasant and nomad rebellions in
system of iqta (tax-farming) built up a class Iraq, Syria, and Arabia in the name of a mes-
of landlords at the expense of central gov- siah descended from Ali through his descen-
ernment. In Iran and the eastern provinces dant Ismail bin Jaafar. In the 920s the Qara-

Ta 10° 20° 30° 40° 50° 60° 70° 80°

he Ro E u 50°
rt me r o
p e
a
BY

Tu
Vo

nis s i
l ga
Ifriqiy

A
Z

Blac
A

N Con k Se
a
T stan
IN tinop Aral
le Sea
Ath E
Ca s

M ens EM
Tr a
ipo ed Smy han
p ian

PI Khwarizm rg
a

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it

ya
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ar
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Sea

D
Tr

A ra Sy
r
ne ns
a

an ies Bukhara ox Sa markand

t
f Se Local dynas ia n
a
A

a Alepp Mosul Tabriz m

u
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r Syria Daylam ry a
Merv Balkh
Eu

Ale Tabaristan Kabul

ph

i xan Khurasan Ghazni

ra

dria te
s Samarra Rayy
c Jerus Baghdad Qom Herat
alem an
a Cair Karbala Afghanist
o Isfahan
Iraq an
Egy Basra Mult
pt Ahwaz 30°
Post-Imperial Successor Sistan
s

Shiraz
du

Regimes early 11th Century

In

Pe Fa Kirman Indi
a
rs
ia rs
Byzantine Empire A r a b n
Gu
i a
R e

Bahrain lf
He

r
Medina of Cance
jaz

Fatimids Tropic
O
d

ma
n
Qarkhanids Mecca
S e

Arabian 20°
a

Buyids Nu N
bia Sea

Ghaznavids
t
au
m
ra
dh
Ha
Y
em

en

42
 SUCCESSOR STATES TO 1100

matians, who created an independent state in Turkish tribe of Qarluqs, led by the
Bahrain, shocked the whole Muslim world by Qaraqanid dynasty, which he did his best to
pillaging Mecca and carrying off the Black confine to the Oxus basin in the north. Mah-
Stone. In 969 Egypt—already semi-inde- mud crossed the Indus Valley, establishing
pendent under Ibn Tulun and his successors, permanent rule in the Punjab, and conducted
the Ikhshids—was taken over by the Ismaili raids into northwestern India, plundering
Fatimids, who established a new caliphate cities and destroying numerous works of art
under a “living imam” descended from Ali as idolatrous. This earned him a fearsome
and Ismail. In northern Syria and the Upper reputation as a ghazi against the infidel. On
Tigris the bedouin Arab Hamdan family— his western front, in the lands of “old Islam”
also Shiite—ruled a semi-autonomous, he pushed the Buyids back almost to the fron-
sometimes independent, state. In Khurasan tiers of Iraq.
and Transoxiana the Samanid family
replaced the Tahirids as defenders of the
mixed Arab-Persian high culture against
incoming nomadic tribes. Even in the central
heartlands of the empire—Iraq and western
Iran—the caliphs were virtual prisoners of
the Shiite Buyids, a warrior clan from Day-
lam, south of the Caspian.
In Inner Asia, where the Samanids had
established a flourishing capital in Bukhara,
the adoption of Islam by Turk-
ish-speaking tribes subverted the
role of the Samanids as ghazis.
These were frontier warriors
entrusted with the defense of
Islam against nomadic incur-
sions. The practice of recruiting warrior-
slaves, known as mamluks or ghulams, from
mountainous or arid regions hastened the
disintegration of the empire. When
power declined at the center, the
mamluks went on to establish
their own “slave-dynasties.”
Thus the Ghaznavids who supplant-
ed their former Samanid overlords in
Mahmud of Ghazna crosses the Ganges. The
Khurasan started as slave-soldiers in the fron- Ghaznavids, Turkish military governors, enjoyed great
tier region of Ghazna, south of Kabul. When renown in later times as the first to extend Muslim
the Samanid regime collapsed in 999, Mah- power into India. This image is from the Compendium of
mud of Ghazna (r. 998–1030), son of a slave- Chronicals, composed for the vizier Rashid al-Din in the
governor, divided their territory with the early fourteenth century.

43
HISTORICAL ATLAS OF THE ISLAMIC WORLD

The Saljuq Era

Despite challenges to their authority and the loss Khurasan, laying the foundations of the Saljuq
of military and effective political power, the Empire. Defeating the Buyids in 1055 they took
Abbasid caliphs retained immense prestige in the control of Baghdad, where the caliph crowned
eyes of most townspeople and many of the tribes their leader Tughril Beg Sultan in acknowledg-
as the lawful successors to the
Prophet and heads of the Muslim 20° 30°
HU
NG
community. The division of the AR
Y
world into Dar al-Islam and Dar
ZE
( S E TA
al-Harb facilitated the spread of RB
IA)
Islam centripetally as well as cen- H E N
P E C
trifugally: when tribes from the
40°
margins who encountered Muslim Sof
ia
merchants, scholars, or wandering Sal
oni Co
ka nst Blac
Sufis, accepted Islam the caliphs ant
ino k
ple
tended to legitimize their rule, Sino
pe
appointing their leaders as gover-
nors. Conversion civilized the
SA L
J UQ
nomadic and pastoral peoples by fro m
S OF
RUM
1095
subjecting them formally (if not
always in practice) to the Sharia M
ed
Following the rapid advance of law, reducing the cultural differences between ite Antioch
rra
ne
the Saljuqs into Anatolia, Konya the peoples of the desert and steppes and those an
Sea
(formerly Iconium) became their of the cities and settled regions. Tribes recently 30°
capital. This elaborately converted often became the greatest builders and S U Acre
decorated portal from the Ince L A
patrons of Islamic high culture in art, architec- Y N Jerus
alem
Minare Madrasa shows the
ture, and literature. At the same time conversion
extraordinary richness of the Cairo
made it difficult for rulers to defend their heart-
Saljuq style. The “Slender E g
lands from nomadic predators, since if the y p
Minaret” from which the school t
nomads were no longer infidels the jihad (strug- FA T
IMID
takes its name was partially CA L
gle or “holy war”) launched against them lost its IPH
destroyed by lightning in 1900. AT E
Trop
ic of R
raison d’être. Can
cer
e
Two Turkish-speaking peoples, the Qarluqs
d
Nile

and the Oghuz, established states that made sig-

nificant contributions to this process. In Tran- 20°

soxiana the Qaraqanid dynasty accepted the N

nominal authority of the Abbasid caliphs,

becoming the patrons of a new Turkish culture
derived in part from Arab and Persian models.
After defeating the Ghaznavids the Oghuz peo-
ple, led by the Saljuq family, became the rulers of

44
 THE SALJUQ ERA

ment of his supreme authority. In exchange for Crusade in 1096. Although the Saljuqs con-
formal recognition, the sultans agreed to uphold quered half of Anatolia, laying the foundations
Islamic law and defend Islam from its external for later Ottoman-Turkish rule, their system of
enemies. The massive defeat inflicted by the authority was too fragmented to maintain the
Saljuqs on the Byzantine army at Manzikert in unity of the empire, or to defend the frontiers of
1071 was one of the factors leading to the First Islam against further nomadic incursions.

40° 50° 60° 70° 80° 90°

E G S
Sarkel
Vo

1028–38 S
U R
lg
a

G H
t o C h e r n i g ov U I
K H A Z
A R S
Aral
Sea Sea
gar
r rya Kash
Otra Da
Ca

.A

Ca yr

S
mu D

uc
a su Urgench kent
sp

Trebizo sM Tash
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ry
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ou a
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SHME rkan
ND Sama
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EMIR
na
soxia
AT E
Dandangan Bukhara Tran
a

from 109 sh
5 Manzikert
108 Ku
0 1071
du
in
Merv H
Aleppo Mosul Balkh
l
Kabu war
Homs Nishapu
r Pesha
Eu

1042
ph

ot
ra

Damasc
te
s
Rayy Sialk
2
us 1040–4

Hamadan
Baghdad Kermanshah
Isfahan
I r a q
s
du

Shiraz
In

A R A B
Pe

S
rs

a
i

n Siraf
G
ul
Medina f The Saljuq Era
Major Saljuq campaign
A O Muscat
r a b i m Saljuq sultanate at its
a a n maximum extent, c. 1090

Mecca Byzantine Empire, c. 1095

S

Sea Territory lost to Byzantine

bian
e

Ara Empire and Crusader

states, 1097–99
a

Extent of the Khwarizm

Shahdom, c. 1220

45
HISTORICAL ATLAS OF THE ISLAMIC WORLD

Military Recruitment 900–1800

The recruitment of armies from the peripher- military rulers had no ethnic, cultural, lin-
al regions, mainly from the steppelands of guistic, or historical connection with the peo-
inner Asia, the Caucasus, and the Balkans, ples over whom they ruled, society tended to
became the most distinctive feature of the develop outside the purview of the state, with
Islamic systems of governance until modern the ulama—the religious scholars and experts
times. Known as mamluks—“owned ones”— on law—merging with merchant and
these warriors were purchased as slaves from landowning families to form elites of nota-
the highlands and steppes or captured from bles whose prestige was dependent on reli-
defeated tribes. Brought in as the sultan’s pri- gious knowledge. While allowing a form of
vate armies and palace bodyguards, they were civil society to develop separately from the
taught the rudiments of the Islamic faith and military state, the practice of mamlukism
culture and trained in the military arts. militated against the type of communal loy-
Attaching the word “slave” to mamluks (as in alties or patriotisms that would emerge in
“slave-warriors” or “slave-dynasties”) is Western Europe at a later period. The pattern
somewhat misleading. Though mamluks and
ghulams (household slaves) were bought and
0° T H E 15°
sold as personal property, their social position
Paris H O LY R O M A N
reflected that of their masters, rather than E M P I R E Buda
AT L A N T I C
their own servile status. Eventually manumit- FRANCE
OCEAN
Venice
ted they became freedmen, clients of their for-
Milan
mer masters entitled to property rights, mar-
Santiago Marseilles
riage, and personal security, with some of
Corsica Rome
them rising to become rulers. Madrid Barcelona
PORTUGAL Naples
The practice of mamlukism started with S PA I N Balearic Is. Sardinia
Lisbon
the Abbasid caliphs, who recruited tribes i t
e d e
from Transoxiana, Armenia, and North M r
r
Sicily
Algiers Tunis a
Africa to offset the power of the Tahirids. Ceuta n
ALGIERS TUNIS e
They balanced these tribes with Turkish ghu- a

lams who were purchased individually before

being trained and drafted into regiments
5 A F R I C A
under individual commanders. Since they
were housed in separate cantonments, with
their own mosques and markets, their alle- S a h a r a
giance was to their commanders, rather than
to the caliphs. In the breakup of the empire Military Recruitment c. 1500
after 945 the practice was adopted by the de- Movements of troops
facto rulers who inherited the political power
1 Janissaries, from Balkans
of the Abbasids. All the post-Abbasid states
in the East—the Buyids, Ghaznavids, Qara- 2 Circassians, from Caucasus

qanids, and Saljuqs—were created by ethnic
minorities, including mercenaries from the
Caspian region, and Turkish and other
nomadic peoples from inner Asia. Since new
3 Turkic nomads, from Central Asia
4 Al-Qaitis, from Yemen
5 South Atlas, from South Atlas Mountains

46
 MILITARY RECRUITMENT 900–1800

of recruiting erstwhile nomadic predators to the Circassians in the Caucasus) the Egyptian
defend society against other nomads—of mamluks resisted becoming absorbed into the
making “wolves into sheepdogs”—is found ranks of the indigenous elites. For the most
throughout the Muslim heartlands, from the part they remained a one-generation aristoc-
Maghreb to the Indus Valley. racy, without ties of blood to the rest of
The system of military slavery reached its Egyptian society.
fullest development in Egypt, a densely popu- Under the Ottomans military slavery
lated country of peasant cultivators without evolved in a somewhat different direction.
an indigenous military class. The system was From the late fourteenth century the sultans
institutionalized so successfully that mamluk began to offset the power of their sipahi cav-
rule lasted for more than two and a half cen- alry units levied from the estates of the nobil-
turies (1250–1517), and resurfaced in a mod- ity or recruited as mercenaries from Arabic,
ifed form under the Ottomans (1517–1811). Kurdish, and Farsi-speaking nomads, an
By constantly replenishing their ranks from infantry corps of “new troops”, Janissaries,
abroad (firstly from among the Kipchak levied mainly from its Christian provinces in
Turks from Central Asia, later from among the Balkans. The levy (known as the

30° 45° 60° 75° 90°

POLAND-LITHUANIA Sarai-Berke
MOLDAVIA
Pest KHANATE
KHANATE
HUNGARY OF CRIMEA
OF ASTRAKHAN
Crimea Aral 15°
Sea
1 WALLACHIA
2 Caspian MONGOLISTAN
Sofia B l a c k S e a
Tiflis Sea 3
Constantinople Kucha
C

a Shemakha Tashkent
O u
ca U Z
T su Baku B E K H S
T s
O M E
A N E M PIR
SA Balkh Kashgar
Morea Athens
Adalia F A Tabriz
Aleppo V
Mosul I Kabul
Crete
D

Cyprus
a n
S
KHORASAN KASHMIR
e a
Baghdad E Isfahan PUNJAB
TIBET
M LO
P DI
Alexandria IR SU
E
LT

MULTAN 30°
AN

EMP IRE OF Cairo

TE
A
Pe

Delhi NEPAL
Bandar Abbas OF
rs

MA MLUK E S DE
LHI
i

a RAJPUTANA
N A r a b i a n Hormuz
Gul BIHAR
ile

f
Re

SIND
BUNDEL-
d

MALWA KHAND
Muscat BENGAL
GUJERAT
Se

Mecca Diu
a

Arabian
Damah BERAR
Suakin Sea
ORISSA Bay of
UT AHMADNAGAR BIDAR GOLCONDA Bengal
MA Hyderabad
RA BIJAPUR
YEMEN DH
HA 45°
4
VIJAYANAGAR
ABYSSINIA

47
HISTORICAL ATLAS OF THE ISLAMIC WORLD

devshirme) was conducted in the villages

about every four years: the towns were usual-
ly exempt, as the sons of townsfolk were con-
sidered too well educated or insufficiently
hardy. Boys between 13 and 18 were selected
(although there are reports of children as
young as 8 being chosen). Since married men
were exempt, the Orthodox peasants often
married off their children very young to avoid
the levy. The selected boys (estimates are put
at around 20 percent) were given Muslim
identities and trained in the arts of war, with
the brightest selected for personal service to
the sultan, where they often rose to be rulers
of the empire. Although slave recruitment
ceased in the 1640s the Janissaries continued
to prosper, with increasing numbers of Mus-
lim-born boys joining their ranks. Having
substantial commercial interests, salaries, and
state-funded pensions they became a privi-
leged and tyrannical elite, resistant to change.
In 1826 Sultan Mahmud II used his newly
formed military force to slaughter most of
them at a muster in Istanbul.

The Janissary corps, dressed in their gold finery, parade at

a court reception. Originally recruited from the Christian
Balkans, the Janissaries became a formidable power
within the state. Sultan Mahmud II abolished the
Janissaries in 1826, as part of his program of
modernization.

48
MILITARY RECRUITMENT 900–1800

49
HISTORICAL ATLAS OF THE ISLAMIC WORLD

Fatimid Empire 909–1171

10°

The Shiite Ismaili caliphate of the Fatimids was the Fatimid caliphate
0°
established in Ifriqiya in the Maghreb when a embarked on its decline.
group of Kutama Berbers accepted the claims of Northern Syria was
Abdallah al-Mahdi to be the rightful descen- irrevocably lost in
dant of Ali and Fatima and rose against the 1060. By then,

a l-
An
Aghlabids in 909. By 921, al-Mahdi had settled the Fatimids

da
Có
rd

lus
in his new capital city of Mahdiyya on the were con-

ob
E

a
AT
coastline of Ifriqiya. As successors to the Agh- fronted E MI
R
D
labids, the Fatimids also inherited their fleet and with the YA
AY
UM

Ag
the island of Siqilliyya (Sicily). By the end of al- grow-

a
di
r
M
Mahdi’s reign (909–934), the Fatimid state ing

ag
hr
extended from present-day Algeria and Tunisia

eb
to the Libyan coast of Tripolitania. The third

F
A
Fatimid caliph al-Mansur (r. 946–953) built a
Tu Sicil

T
n
new capital city named Mansuriyya after him- Ka is
iro
y

I
ua
n
self. Situated near Sabra to the south of M

M
ah
diy
ya
Qayrawan, Mansuriyya served as the Fatimid

I
capital from 948 until 973.

D
S Tr
ipo
Fatimid rule was firmly established in North a li

C
Africa only during the reign of the fourth mem- h

A
ber of the dynasty al-Muizz (r. 953–975), who

transformed the Fatimid caliphate from a
regional power into a great empire. He suc-
ceeded in subduing the entire Maghreb, with
the exception of Sabra, before concerning him-
self with the conquest of Egypt, an objective
attained in 969. A new Fatimid capital city was
built outside Fustat; it was initially called
Mansuriyya, but renamed al-Qahira al-
Muizziyya (Cairo), “The Victorious City of al-
Muizz,” when the caliph took possession of his
new capital in 973. The extension of Fatimid
power in Syria became the primary foreign pol-
icy objective of al-Muizz’s son and successor al-
Aziz (r. 975–996). By the end of his reign, the
Fatimid Empire had attained, at least nominal-
ly, its greatest extent, with Fatimid suzerainty
being recognized from the Atlantic and the
western Mediterranean to the Red Sea, the
Hejaz, Syria, and Palestine. By 1038, the
Fatimids had also extended their authority to
the emirate of Aleppo.
In the long reign of al-Mustansir (1036–94),
L
a
menace r
of the Saljuq a
Turks, who were
laying the foundations
of a new empire. In 1071,
Damascus became the capital of
the new Saljuq principality of Syria and
Palestine. By the end of al-Mustansir’s rule, of
the former Fatimid possessions in Syria and
Palestine, only Ascalon and a few coastal
towns, like Acre and Tyre, still remained in
Fatimid hands. By 1048, the Zirids, ruling over
Ifriqiya on behalf of the Fatimids, placed them-
selves under Abbasid suzerainty. By 1070, when
they lost Sicily to the Normans, Barqa had
become the western limit of the Fatimid Empire,
which soon became effectively limited to only
Egypt. Ascalon, the last Fatimid foothold in
Syria-Palestine, was lost to the Franks in 1153.
Fatimid rule ended in 1171, when Salah al-Din
(Saladin), who became the last Fatimid vizier
after taking over Egypt, had the khutba (ser-

50
 FATIMID EMPIRE 909–1171

mon) read in Cairo in the name of the reigning

Fatimid Empire and other
Abbasid caliph while the last Fatimid caliph, al- Islamic States c.1000
Adid (r. 1160–71), lay dying in his palace.
Fatimid Empire c. 1000

Abbasid caliphate at its

greatest extent
Ceramic bowl from Fustat (Cairo), tenth–eleventh
Abbasid caliphate, c. 900
century. The lusterware design has
10°
characteristically Fatimid motifs, with a hare Major battle

at the center and the sides decorated

with stylized plants.
20°

80°
30°
BY

70°
40°
ZA

50° 60°
N
T
IN

KHAZAR
E

B l a S Aral S yr
Talas
Da
Ca

c k
S e a TURKS Sea r

ya
40°
sp

Con
stant
inople
ia

Am
u
n

Da
r ya
EM Tiflis Derbend
PI and
RE Samark
M
Bukhara
Se

e Erzurum
D S
d
A N I
a

i t Tarsu
e s S A M
r r
Tabriz Ardabil Balkh
Ale Merv
Antio ppo Edess
a n
Bar a
Ti

qa e a ch
gr

is
n Mosul r
Nishapu l
Kabu
S e
a
Eu

Rayy
ph

I Herat ni
Jalula Ghaz
at
r

Tyre Dama es Nehavend

P scus
Acr BUWAYHID EMIRATES
H Asca e Kerbela 30°
Alex lo
andr n ZN I
Je -d OF GHA Mult
an
MAHMUD
A ia 977 rusalem Baghda Isfahan
Helio Susa
T Cair p o lis
E Faiy o 969
um
971 Basra
s
u

Istakar
Ind

Tabu
k
Pe
rs
Nil

ncer
of Ca
ia
Tropic
e

n
KA

RM Gu
lf
AT
r

Medina IA Sea
Arabian
Badr NS Suhar
Muscat
a

20°
b

M AK
KURA
Re

Mecca
i

Dong
d

ola
Se

a
a

Najran AN
Soba OCE
IAN
IND
N

0 300 km
10°
Aden 0 300 miles

51
HISTORICAL ATLAS OF THE ISLAMIC WORLD
Trade Routes c. 700–1500
Muhammad is said to have traveled outside
Arabia as a merchant. His tribe, the Quraish,
who led the Arab conquests, were among the
foremost traders in the peninsula. Merchants
continued to be held in high esteem, often
marrying into the families of ulama, who they
supported by endowing their educational
institutions. Islamic rituals favor commercial
activity. Mosques are often adjacent to mar-
kets, and though Friday is the day for congre-
gational prayer, it was not treated as a sab-
bath until recent times. Markets opened
before and after the noonday prayer. Since the
whole male population was gathered in town,
Fridays were good days for doing business.
Similarly, the pilgrimages to Mecca (umra and
hajj), where Muslims from distant parts of
the world meet each other, have always been a
facilitator of trade. Pilgrims would finance
the long and arduous journey (which in pre-
modern times could take half a lifetime) by
trading goods or working as artisans. Mer-
chants would join the pilgrim caravans to sell
their goods in the Hejaz.
By bringing vast areas of territory and
coastlands under a single government, the
Arab conquests created an enormous area of
free trade, facilitating the expansion of trade
far beyond the empire’s borders. The extent of
this trade has been revealed by archaeology,
with significant numbers of coins from
Abbasid times discovered in Scandinavia, and
Chinese silks and ceramics found in burial sites
in western Asia. Muslim merchants were not
subject to tariffs within the empire. Foreign
merchants who entered the lands of Islam were
subject to the same rates imposed on Muslim
merchants in their homelands. The new elite of
the caliphal courts, with their demand for lux-
ury goods, boosted trade. Though the breakup
of the empire led to economic decline in some
areas, with rival dynasties augmenting their
budgets by imposing extra taxes and tariffs,
52
the frequency with which such measures were
denounced as illegal, oppressive, and unjust
indicates that the general temper remained
favorable to mercantile activity, even under
adverse political conditions.
Initially the Arab conquest had the effect of
bringing two oceanic trade routes—through
the Persian Gulf and Red Sea—within a single
market based on common law, language, and
currency. Under the Abbasids the most attrac-
tive route for goods from East and South Asia
to the Mediterranean went up the Tigris to
Baghdad, or up the Euphrates to an easy
portage to Aleppo and from there to a Syrian
port such as Antioch. The towns along these
routes depended on the exchange of commodi-
ties for their existence.
The Mesopotamian cities absorbed luxury
goods from India and China. These were sold
in the markets alongside necessities such as
food grains, fuel, timber, and cooking oils.
Mesopotamia was also the terminus of the
chief land route to China and India as well as
north to the Volga basin and the well-watered
lands of Eastern Europe, sources of fur, amber,
metal goods, and hides. In the earliest period
Muslim ships from ports such as Basra or
Hormuz went all the way to China, returning
after two or three years with cargoes such as
silk, porcelain, jade, and other valuables. How-
ever, as the trade became more sophisticated
merchants no longer traded directly with
Guangzhou (Canton) and Hangzhou, but
acquired goods from China at ports in Java,
Sumatra, or the Malabar coast.
Muslim merchants from the Maghreb
were active in the gold trade, which took
them across the Sahara Desert to the Sahel
cities of Timbuktu and Gao, and beyond, to
the goldfields of western Africa. The chain
of commercial centers established by Muslim
traders on the east African coast, including
Lamu, Malindi, and the island of Zanzibar,

extended as far south as Sofala in modern
Mozambique. Intrepid Muslim travelers
penetrated the African interior in search of
gold, slaves, ivory, rare woods, and precious
stones centuries before Europeans followed
in their paths.
When the decline of Abbasid power and
the incursions of Turkish tribesmen made
the trans-Syrian route less secure the alter-
native water route, via the Red Sea and the
Nile, came into prominence. It was the more
difficult as the land route from the Gulf of
Suez to the Nile was more arduous than the
route across Syria, except for a brief period
when the Mamluk sultans revived an ancient
canal originally dug by the pharaohs. Red
Sea ports such as Aden, Jidda, Aydhab, and
Qulzum benefited from this trade, as did
Cairo and Alexandria. Trade on the Indian
Ocean was monopolized by Muslims until
the arrival of the Portuguese, followed by
the English and Dutch from the sixteenth
century onward.
TRADE ROUTES c. 700–1500
The land routes linking western Asia and
the Mediterranean with eastern and south-
ern Asia were just as important as the mar-
itime routes. With many cities landlocked or
distant from rivers and oceans, even bulky
items had to be carried by animals. Careful
planning was needed before the caravans set
out on long journeys. Food had to be pro-
cured for animals and humans, and nomadic
tribes had to be hired as guards. In remote
areas networks of khans (overnight resting
By the 1500s, the Ottoman
Empire, with its capital at Con-
stantinople, had become one of
the Islamic world’s most impor-
tant trading centers. The sultan’s
court, together with his advisors,
took careful account of annual
trade.
places) or khaniqas (Sufi lodges) provided
food and hospitality. Some were built like
fortresses for defense against Bedouin
marauders. The vast distances over rough
terrain, combined with the breakdown in
territorial authority, made road construction
impracticable. Even by late Roman times,
wheeled traffic had all but disappeared. The
results can be seen in many of the cities of
western Asia and North Africa. Before mod-
ern times few of them had boulevards broad
enough for carts or carriages.
53
HISTORICAL ATLAS OF THE ISLAMIC WORLD

30° 15° 0° 15° LAPP R E I N DE

30°E R 45° 60°
H E R DE R S

Iceland

WA -
NOR ARK
(Denmark)

Y
EN
ED

M
SW

DEN
60°
RU S S I A
SCOTLAND

ARS
TAT
ENGLAND POLAND-
KA ZAN
HOLY LITHUANIA
ROMAN
A T LA N T I C O CE AN NOG
EMPIRE AIS
AN
HUNGARY
A KH
S
FRANCE TR AR Astrakhan
45°
Venice AS TAT

TUR
Pisa O
Marseille Rome TT Edirne
OM

KO
VENICE Constantinople
AN

M
PAPAL
SPAIN NS

A
STATES Amalfi Bursa EMP
PORTUGAL IRE
Azores Denia Ardabil
(Port.) Cordoba Konya Tabriz
Algiers Tunis Palermo Izmir Lajazzo Nishapur
Almeria
ALGIERS Kairouan
Mahdia Crete Cyprus Samarra Damghan
Tlemcen Damascus
Fez TUNIS Baghdad S A F AV I D
Meknes Tripoli
Marrakech TRIPOLI Jerusalem
Basra
EMPIRE
30° MOROCCO Cairo

A
Siwa

R
Canary Is. Sijilmasa

A
(Spain)

B
Ghat
N
Tropic of Cancer Kubra Medina O M
C A M E Muscat
L A
N O M D OMAN
A D Mecca S
S
Suakin GHARRA
FUNJ
Timbuktu MAHRA
Cape Verde Is. Sanaa
15° (Port.) SENEGAL SONGHAI KANEM-
Soba HADRAMAUT
Abeche
YEMEN
Cacheu BORNU
(Portugal) MOSSI Aden
MALI STATES HAUSA WADAI DARFUR
STATES Zaila
ADAL
AKAN

OYO ETHIOPIA
N
NI

Benin
BE

Elmina Galla
(Portugal) Fernando Póo DROMO
(Port.)
Mogadishu
0°
Lamu

LUBA Mombasa
(Portugal)
CONGO LUNDA Zanzibar
ISLAMIC
CITY-STATES

15°
Madagascar

54
 TRADE ROUTES c. 700–1500

75° 90° 105° 120° 135° 150° 165°

Trade Routes and Empires

c. 1500
SIBERIAN REINDEER HERDERS Empires Routes
Portuguese Trading routes

Spanish Gold trade

State society Silk road

SIBIR TATARS
Other

EURASIAN S AINU HUNTER-

TEPPE AN
D DESE
RT NOMA GATHERERS
DS MONGOLS
KI
RG
UZ HI KALMYKS
BE Z
KS
Tashkent
Chiwa
Bukhara
Samarkand Kashgar
Merv Schar-i-Sabz KOREA

N
A
Balkh P
MUGHAL JA
Herat EM TIB E T MING
Lahore CHINESE
PI

EMPIRE
ISL

Delhi
E
AM
IC

A RAJPUTANA
N
D
HI
ND
U ST BURMESE
Taiwan
Kambaya AT E S BENGAL KINGDOMS P A C I F IC OCE AN
Thana LAOS
Goa ORISSA
(Portugal) PEGU
AN

A
NA
Y
HA

VIJAYANAGARA
Philippine
TT

Islands
CAMBODIA
Kulum Mali
AY U

SAYLAN
Colombo Ceylon
(Portugal)
ACEH
Malacca
(Portugal)
MALACCA Borneo

I NDI A N O C E AN Sumatra M
AL
AYA New Guinea
N IS L A M
N
IC STATES
Java
Timor
(Port.)

AUSTRALIAN
ABORIGINAL
HUNTER-GATHERERS

55
HISTORICAL ATLAS OF THE ISLAMIC WORLD

Crusader Kingdoms
35°
The Crusades occurred at a time of
Islamic disunity and retreat.
SALJUQS OF RUM There were Christian
County advances in Spain—
Gargar
GREAT
Behesni
Toledo fell in 1085—
Marash
SALJUQ
of
Samosata
and in Sicily, which
Sis EMPIRE
Cilicia Rancular
the Normans con-
Aintab
Saruj
quered in 1091–92.
Adana
Tarsus Turbessel
Eu
Economically, the
Ravendam
BYZANTINE EMPIRE decline of the Abbasid

ph
Alexandretta

rate
1097 Edessa
ch
t io

s
Asas caliphate and the Saljuq inva-
An

Antioch
sions had diverted the East Asian
of

St. Simeon Kafr Aleppo

it y

1097 Tab
trade away from Baghdad and
p al
n tes
n ci

Cerep
Constantinople. Sending it through Egypt
Or o
P ri

Latakia 1103 and into the hands of Italian merchant shipping, it

Nicosia Jabala 1109 enriched the Italian cities. Harassed by Muslim
Cyprus Famagusta Valania 1109
35°
Maraclea 1102 Masyaf
pirates, Pisa and Genoa destroyed Mahdia, the polit-
Rafaniyan
Tortosa 1102 ical and commercial capital of Muslim North Africa
Limassol
in 1087. The fluctuating frontiers between the
oli

Homs
ri p

Mediterranean Tripoli 1109 Byzantine and Fatimid Empires allowed the cities of
T
of

Botron 1104 Syria and Palestine considerable autonomy, making it

ty
un

Gibelet 1104 Baalbek

Sea difficult for them to unite against the invaders. The
Co

Beirut 1110 defeat of the Byzantine army at Manzikert in 1071

ni

opened the rich Anatolian pastures to migration by

ta

Sidon 1110
Li

Damascus
bands of Oghuz Turks, not all of them under Saljuq
Tyre 1124
control. Alarmed at the danger to Christendom
Acre 1104 Lake posed by the Turks as well as by Norman attacks on
Haifa 1099 Tiberias
Tiberias Byzantine lands in Italy, Pope Urban II launched a
EMIRATE
Caesarea 1101 OF Holy War for the defense and unity of Christendom.
DAMASCUS
The movement was stimulated by charismatic, pop-
Arsur 1101
Jo r d a n

Jaffa 1099
Nablus ulist preachers such as Peter the Hermit and by the
as-Salt
growing popularity of the pilgrimage to Jerusalem as
Ascalon Jerusalem
Gaza Dead
a way of earning spiritual merit or as an act of atone-
Darum
Hebron Sea
ment for sins such as murder.
Krak des
Moabites Christian Crusades In the event, the knights from the Latin West,
Segor First Crusade, Norwegian
FATIMID (including England, Scandinavia, Germany, Italy,
1099–1100 Crusade, 1107–40
CALIPHATE KINGDOM OF
N JERUSALEM
Territory held
by Crusaders to
Crusades of Pope and France) supported by ragtag armies of towns-
Calixtus II, 1122–26
Montréal
1100 folk and peasants lured by the promise of indul-
Crusaders’ Crusade of 1128–29
S i n a i gains, 1100–44 gences, were not wholly interested in saving
1110 Date of Crusaders’
Crusaders’
D e s e r t losses, 1144–45
conquest Christendom by helping their Orthodox brethren.
0 50 km

Muslim territory
Maximum range of (They actually sacked Constantinople in 1204,
0 50 miles Egyptian warfleet
Aila
Other Christian inflicting untold damage on the capital of Eastern
territory Prevailing wind
Christianity.) They wanted to carve out feudal

56
 CRUSADER KINGDOMS

domains in the well-watered lands of the 35°

Mediterranean littoral. The remarkable success of

the First Crusade, culminating in the capture of SALJUQS SULTANATE OF KONYA

Jerusalem from the Fatimids in 1099, contained the

seeds of the Byzantine Empire’s eventual demise.
The need to support the intrusive Latin states whose
Sis
existence depended on Muslim disunity overrode M E N I A
A R
the need to maintain Byzantium’s eastern frontiers. F
O
For the most part the Franks, as the invaders were M Tarsus Mamistra
D O
known, were hated as oppressors by Muslims and K I N G Corycus
Alexandretta
Syrian
Gates
Trapezac
local Christians alike—not to mention the Jews, Gaston
Principality
who lost the protection they had enjoyed under of Antioch
Antioch Aleppo
St. Simeon
Muslim rule, and were massacred in Palestine as Cursat

they had been in Europe. Far from checking the Saone

SYRIA

Orontes
Turkish advance on Christian domains, the
Kyrenia Latakia
Crusaders’ attacks on Byzantium helped to destroy Nicosia Gastria Jabala
Apamea

the only polity that could have prevented it. Though 35°
KINGDOM Famagusta
Margat Shaizar
OF CYPRUS Maraclea Masyaf Hamah
the Latin kingdoms were eventually eliminated, Tortosa Coible
Mamluk tributary from 1260
Limassol
their existence damaged the previously good rela- 1270 Mamluk fleet
Christian until 1302 Ruad
Chastel Blanc Krak des Chevaliers
founders off Limassol Coliat County Homs
tions that had existed between the eastern churches, Villejargon of Halba
Tripoli

E
their Muslim protectors, and local Islamic commu- Nephin Tripoli
Gibelcar

Botron
nities, leaving a legacy of mistrust of the West that

T
Gibelet Baalbek
has lasted to the present.
Beirut

ni
a
Lit

A
KINGDOM ANTI
OF LEBANON
Entry of the Crusaders into Damietta, Egypt, in June 1249. Sidon
JERUSALEM
Damascus

N
After losing Jerusalem, the Crusaders made several attacks Belfort Tibnin
e tt a Tyre
Belinas
mi
on Egypt in the hope of regaining territory in the Holy Da Toron
Chastel Neuf
Montfort
rf om

A
Jacob’s Ford
Land. From an illuminated manuscript painted in Acre Acre Safad (Saphet)
Hammon Tiberias
Haifa GALILEE L. Tiberias
Château Pèlerin Nazareth
T
shortly after 1277. This school of illuminators was probably Zir’in
Meggido Jisr al-Majami
founded by Louis IX during his stay in Palestine, 1250–54. Caesarea Belvoir
Bethsan
L

Mediterranean Caco Jenin

Nablus
Arsur
Jo r d a n

SAMARIA

Sea Jaffa al-Awja

Jericho
S

Ascalon Jerusalem
Bethleem
Gaza Dead
Darum Hebron Sea
K
The Mamluk conquest
U Kerak of the coast
(Krak des
L Moabites) 1263–1291
Muslim conquests
N M 1263–1271
A Montréal Muslim conquests
M 1285–1290

Muslim conquests, 1291

Christian territory
after 1291
0 50 km
Aila Castle
0 50 miles

57
HISTORICAL ATLAS OF THE ISLAMIC WORLD
Sufi Orders 1100–1900
The Sufi orders were and remain the most
important organized expression of Islamic
spirituality. The word Sufism (from the
Arabic Sufi, one who wears wool), is
thought to derive from the coarse woolen
garments worn by early Muslim ascetics
who sought to develop an inner spirituality.
This was sometimes expressed as the quest
for union with God and it set them apart
from believers who were content with the
formal observance of Islamic law and ritual.
Early adepts, sometimes known as “drunk-
en” Sufis, cultivated mental states that
would lead them to experience annihilation
of the self in the divine presence. The desire
for ecstatic union with the divine, and the
pain of separation from it, is the theme of
much Sufi poetry. Drunken Sufism some-
times displayed itself in extravagant displays
aimed at demonstrating contempt for the
flesh, such as piercing the body with iron
rings or handling dangerous animals. Sober
Sufism—exemplified in the teachings of Abu
Hamid al-Ghazali (d. 1111)—insisted that
the path to spiritual fulfillment lay firmly
within the boundaries of normative legal
and ritual practice.
Present from the beginnings of Islam, all
Sufi movements would claim to have their
origins in the religious experience of
Muhammad and his closest Companions
Abn Bakr and Ali. Organized Sufism, how-
ever, was consolidated in the twelfth and
thirteenth centuries, gaining ground rapidly
in Asia in the aftermath of the Mongol
invasions, when the institutional fabric of
Muslim life was severely dislocated.
Internally the Sufi orders cemented the
sociopolitical order by providing rulers with
popular sources of religious legitimacy, sup-
plementing the formal authority conferred
by the ulama. Many rulers were patrons of
Sufi orders and placed themselves under the
58
spiritual guidance of Sufi masters from
whose baraka (blessedness or charismatic
spiritual power) they derived benefit. Further
afield the Sufi orders were instrumental in
spreading Islam in peripheral regions such as
the Malay archipelago, Central Asia, and
Subsaharan Africa. Access to the normative,
textual Islam of the ulama, based on the
Koran, hadith, fiqh (jurisprudence), and
tafsir (hermeneutics), required knowledge of
Arabic, restricting its appeal. The Sufi
shaikhs and pirs, however, were adept at
spiritual improvisation and were able to con-
vey Islamic teachings verbally, using local
languages. The esoteric Sufi rituals, known
as dhikrs (ceremonies held in remembrance
of God), allowed them to develop spiritual
techniques that meshed with practices
derived from non-Islamic traditions such as
ritual dances or controlled yoga-style breath-
ing practiced in India. In Africa Sufis and
Marabouts (from the Arabic murabit) were
able to propagate Islam by assimilating local
deities or spirits to the numinous forces such
as djinns and angels referred to in the Koran.
Ancestor cults could be accommodated by
adding local kinship structures onto Arab
lineages or Sufi silsilas, chains of spiritual
authority linking the shaikhs and Marabouts
to the Prophet and his Companions. In
peripheral regions such as the High Atlas
these silsilas provided a quasi-constitutional
framework through which segmentary tribal
groups achieved a basic minimum of cooper-
ation, with leaders of saintly families acting
as arbiters in intertribal conflicts. In all parts
of the Muslim world Sufi holy men (and
occasionally women) became the objects of
popular veneration. In due course such cults
became the targets of reformers who regard-
ed the excessive devotion given to saintly
mediators as a violation of the Islamic pro-
hibition on idolatry.
SUFI ORDERS 1100–1900

A group of Mevlevi Sufis or

dervishes (mendicants)
perform their traditional
whirling ritual. The
“dance,” a dhikr, or
“remembrance of God,”
brings the adept closer to
the divine, balancing
spiritual ecstasy with
formal discipline. The
Mevlevi order was founded
by Jalal al-Din Rumi
(1207–73), the famous Sufi
poet and mystic.

59
HISTORICAL ATLAS OF THE ISLAMIC WORLD
In contrast to the ulama, who tended to
reflect the consensus of the learned, the Sufi
tariqas developed elaborate hierarchical
organizations with spiritual power concen-
trated into the hands of the leader—known
variously as the shaikh, murshid, or pir.
Murids (members or aspirants) were bound
by the baya, oath of allegiance, to the leader
or murshid who headed a hierarchy of ranks
within the order based on ascending spiritu-
al stages. Although the systems varied con-
siderably, with some tariqas being more
exclusive and tightly controlled than others,
the combination of devotion to the leader
and rankings within the organization made
it possible for the tariqas to convert them-
selves into formidable fighting forces. In the
Caucasus the Imam Shamil waged his cam-
paign against the Russians from 1834 to 1839
under the spiritual authority of his murshid
and father-in-law Sayyid Jamal al-Din al-
Ghazi-Ghumuqi, shaikh of the Khalidiyya
branch of the Naqshbandiyya. In North
Africa Abd al-Qadir, a shaikh of the
Qadiriyya, took the lead in the struggle
against the French; in Cyrenaica the
Sanusiyya were at the forefront of resistance
against the Italian occupiers. In other region-
al contexts, however, the tariqas ran with the
flow of colonial power. In Morocco during
the late nineteenth and early twentieth cen-
turies the influential Tijaniya order accepted
lavish subsidies from the French, who used
the order to further their colonial interests.
In Senegal the Muridiya order founded by
Amadu Bamba (c. 1850–1927) turned away
from resistance to develop a work ethic
based on peanut cultivation that brought
economic stability to the country under the
French-dominated regime.
The tariqas, in many cases, provided the
leadership for the reform and revival move-
ments that swept through the Islamic world
60
in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.
The term “neo-Sufism” is sometimes applied
to movements that strive to balance “out-
ward” political activity with “inner” spiritu-
al experience, with the structure of the
tariqa providing the vehicle for the transmis-
sion and implementation of ideas. A well-
known example is the Nurculuk movement
in Turkey founded by Said Nursi (1876–
1960). A Naqshbandi-trained preacher and
writer, he sought to revitalize Islamic
thought by integrating science, tradition,
theology, and mysticism in a new version of
the Naqshbandi slogan of “the hand turned
to work and the heart turned to God.” In
contrast to the Muslim Brotherhood in
Egypt, which was also influenced by Sufi
ideas, the movement works with the grain of
Turkey’s secular state.
In recent decades Sufi ideas and devotion-
al practices have come under attack from two
quarters—modernists, who regard Sufism as
retrograde, and Wahhabi-inspired Islamists,
who have taken over many Islamic insitutions
with financial support from Saudi Arabia
and other oil-rich countries. Though the two
agendas are somewhat different, the conse-
quences are the same. Modernists, adapting
the ideas of the European Enlightenment,
began with demands for a “rational” reli-
gion. They ended by turning against religion
altogether. The Islamists, reacting against the
modernists, are caught in the same “all-or-
nothing” attitudes.
Sufism occupies the middle ground
between modernism and fundamentalism,
enabling religion to accommodate itself to
changing social conditions. Without the medi-
ating, adaptive power of Sufism, it is unlikely
that the advocates of political Islam (or
“Islamism”) will succeed in accommodating
the variegated strands of Islam within the
“restored” Islamic order that they seek.
 SUFI ORDERS 1100–1900

Order Founding Saint Site Location

Suhrawardiyya Shihab al-din Abu Hafs Umar (1145–1234) Baghdad

Rifaiyya Ahmad ibn Ali al-Rifai (1106–82) Umm Abida

Sufi Orders 1145–1389
Qadiriyya Abd al-Qadir al-Jifani (1077–1106) Baghdad
Shrine of founding saint of most important Orders
Shadhiliyya Abu Madyan Shuaib (1126–97) Tiemcan
Egyptian and North African tradition derived from Iraqi tradition
Abul Hasan Ali al-Shadhili (1196–1258)
Iranian and Central Asian traditions from al-Junaid and al-Bistami Pupil of a pupil of Abu Madyan who gave
his name to the Order
Iraqi tradition from al-Junaid
Badawiyya Ahmad al-Badawi (1199–1276) Tanta
RIFAIYA Major Order in development of institutional Sufism. All subsequent Orders
Kubrawiyya Najm al-din Kubra (1145–1221) Khiva
trace their lineage back to one or more of these Orders. Located where they
first developed, although by 1500 they had spread widely beyond these
regions except for Mawlawiyya, Qadiriyya, and Chishtiyya Yasawiyya Ahmad ibn Ibrahim ibn Ali of Yasi (((d. 1166) Turkestan

Mawalawiyya Jalal al-din Rumi (1207–73) Konya

Alwaiya Other Orders of importance in 1500, located where they were most prominent
Naqshbandiyya Muhammad Baha al-din al-Naqshbandi (1318–89) Bukhara
Abd al-Khaliq al-Ghujdawani (d. 1220) is regarded
as the first organizer of the Order

Chishtiyya Muin al-din Hasan Chishti (1142–1236) Ajmer

15° 0° 15° 30°

60°
45° 60° 75° 900°

0 200 km
20

0 200 miles

Aral Laka Balkhash

45°
Sea YASAWIYYA
Black Se a Turkestan
Caspian
Sea Khiva
Bektashiyya Khalwatiyya
Shamsiyya Safawiyya Rukniyya KUBRAWIYYA
MAWLAWIYYA Bukhara
Haidariyya
Medite Konya NAQSHBANDIYYA
rr Ightishashiyya
an Yunusiyya
ean Dhahabiyya
Tiemcen Sayyadiyya QADIRIYYA
Sea Nurbakshiyya
Shuaibiyya SHADHILIYYA Baghdad
Hahiyya Sadiyya SUHRAWARDIYYA
Hazmiriyya Tanta Umm Abida
Sanhajiyya Dasuqiyya RIFAIYYA 30°
Nimatailahiyya Hamadaniyya
BADAWIYYA
Pe

Ashtalfiyya
rs
ia

n
Gu Ajmer Shaltariyya
Wafaiyya lf
Firdawsiya
Tropic of Cancer CHISHTIYYA
Humalthira
Re
dS

Alwaiyya Ba y o f
ea

Alwaniyya Ben ga l
15°
A ra b i a n S e a

INDIAN OCEAN
0°

61
HISTORICAL ATLAS OF THE ISLAMIC WORLD
Ayyubids and Mamluks
Saladin, depicted here as the
archetypically heroic Saracen by
Gustave Doré (1884), was
equally admired by the Muslims
and his Crusader foes for his
sense of honor and humanity.
His reputation in the West was
enhanced by the popularity of
Sir Walter Scott’s novel The
Talisman (1825).
62
Having established themselves in a fragment-
ed part-Muslim world, the Crusader king-
doms eventually stimulated a united
response. The revival can be traced to the
seizure of Aleppo by the Saljuq governor of
Mosul, Zangi, in 1128. His son Nur al-Din,
who ruled in Damascus from 1154 to 1174,
consolidated his power in Syria and Meso-
potamia, sending his Kurdish general Salah
al-Din (Saladin) to take control of Egypt in
1169. Two years later Saladin assumed power
symbolically by deposing the last of the
Fatimid caliphs. He and his descendants, the
Ayyubids, broadened the appeal of Sunnism
in Egypt by allowing scholars from the differ-
ent legal schools to work alongside each
other, while popular devotion to the House of
Ali was permitted at the mosque of Hussein,
where the martyr’s head is buried. From Egypt
Saladin conquered Syria and upper Meso-
potamia, restoring a unified state in the East
for the first time since the early Abbasids. In
1187 he crowned his achievement by taking
Jerusalem from the Franks.
Saladin’s Ayyubid dynasty, however, was not
to endure. In 1250 the last Ayyubid sultan was
killed by his Turkish mamluk soldiers. They
proclaimed their own general sultan, initiating
more than two and a half centuries of mamluk
rule. Ten years later the brilliant mamluk gen-
eral Baybars defeated the Mongol invaders at
Ayn Jalut in Syria. By 1291 his successors had
reunited Syria, expelled the last Crusaders, and
expanded the boundaries of their empire into
the upper Euphrates valley and Armenia. The
mamluks kept their Turkish names and the
exclusive right to ride horses and to own other
mamluks as slaves. For the most part they mar-
ried the female slaves who had been imported
with them. If they married local women or
took on Muslim-Arab names, they lost caste
among themselves. When the supply of
Kipchak Turkish slaves began to run out the
Kipchak mamluks (known as Bahris) were
replaced by Circassians (known as Burjis).
Though most of the sultans tried to establish
dynasties, their efforts were rarely successful,
since minors or weaklings were invariably
ousted by more powerful rivals. Nevertheless
they demonstrated their devotion to Islam by
patronizing scholarship and the Sufi orders,
and by the magnificent buildings, including
mosques, seminaries, and inns, which they lav-
ished on Cairo in the distinct and ornate style
that carries their name.
 AYYUBIDS AND MAMLUKS

25° Adrianople 30° 35° 40° 45° 50°

Constantinople Black Sea
G E Tiflis
Nicaea O
40° Trebizond R
G
aly
s Amasia I A
BYZANTINE H (Amasya)
Shemakha
Sebastia
EMPIRE SELJUQS (Sivas)
OF RUM
T U R K O M A N S K
Smyrna
Caesarea U ARMENIANS
Ephesus Myriokephalon (Kayseri) Melitene (Malatya)
R Caspian
Iconium A Z E R BA I JA N Sea

D
(Konya)
ARM E NIA Tabriz
Maras

S
Adalia Mayyafariqin
Tarsus Edessa Maragha
1144 Zangi D I YA R BA K I R ISMAILIS
Aleppo takes Edessa Mosul Alamut
CRETE Antioch Sinjar 1127 Zangi appointed
35° 1128 Zangi Raqqa
atabeg of Mosul
takes Aleppo 1171 Mosul recognizes
Hamah
CYPRUS Masyaf suzerainty of Nur al-Din
Limassol ISMAILIS Homs
Tripoli Euphr Hamadan

at e

Tig
SYRIA

s
Kermanshah

ris
M e d Damascus
i t e r r a n e a n S e a Hattin
Acre 1154 Nur al-Din Baghdad
takes Damascus
I R A N
Jaffa Rama Hilla
Damietta Ascalon
Alexandria Jerusalem Kufa IRAQ

Tig
30° S Eup
hra

ris
Cairo t es
1169–1171
Saladin overthrows
N Basra

Fatimid caliphate
I
E G Y P T
U
O

Pe
D

rs
E A R A B I A an

i
B
N

Gu
ile

lf
Qus
25°

Medina
Aswan Yenbo
R
e

HEJAZ
d

Ibrim Aydhab
NUBIA
Jedda
S

Mecca
20°
e
a

The Muslim Near East

1127–1174
Suakin
Territory of Zangi, c.1145
Alwa
Territory of Nur al-Din, c.1174
N
ile
N

Other Muslim territory, c.1174

ite

Wh
Christian territory, c.1174 Sada 0 100 km
Dahlak
15° Seat of caliphate (Abbasid) Islands 0 100 miles
Massawa
Seat of caliphate (Fatimid) Sana

YEMEN

63
HISTORICAL ATLAS OF THE ISLAMIC WORLD

The Mongol Invasion

Ghenghis Khan in state
surrounded by his attendants.
However luxurious his court, as
shown by this lavishly decorated
yurt, the Great Khan remained a
nomad to the end of his life.
Unlike the deserts of Arabia the steppelands of
inner Asia are comparatively well watered, with
extensive grazing for horses. The horseback
nomads who dwelt there were organized along
similar lines to the Arabs in patrilineal tribal for-
mations. Like the Arab and Turkish nomads they
were able to construct large federations for suc-
cessful raids on cities and areas of cultivation,
creating substantial empires under formidable
clear rules of succession. The descendants of
Ghenghis Khan competed for his legacy, creating
several independent, sometimes mutually hostile,
states. They included present-day Mongolia,
northern China, the realm of the Golden Horde
(centered in the Volga basin), the Chaghatay
Khanate in the Oxus (Amu Darya) region,
and the Ilkhan dynasty, which invaded
Iran and destroyed Saljuq power in

Ri
PO

ga
leaders: Attila, who Anatolia.

LA
N
D
W Legn 1
ravaged central Europe The Mongols were not

ar ica
sa
M

w
12 nica
in
in the fifth century just ruthless and violent sk

4
Leg 241
ITIES

1
PAL
with his Huns, is a nomads. Their sys- R I N I
C
P
AN

Mo 241 NGA
SSI

1 U
hi
well-known example. tem of communi- RU

H
Ki
The Chinese emperors ev

RY
BYZANT
understood the dan- O
de
ssa
gers of these large for-

NE EI
mations of horse-

MP
Co Bl
ns ac

IR E
ta
borne invaders, and nt
in
op
kS
ea
le
used their forces to
break them up when- SAL
J UQ
TUR
ever strong enough to KS
GE
OR
Tif
lis
GI
De
rbe
do so. The Great Wall Al AZ
A nt
ex ER
an
had been built as a dr
ia
Da
m Al
ep
BA
IJ A
as po N
Ain cu Ta
defensible barrier to Ca
iro J
12 alut
s bri
z
60 Mo
keep them out. sul Ala
AY TE
Y U B I D S U L T A NA mu
Early in the thir- t
Nile

Qa
zvi

E u ph r
n
teenth century a Ba
Ra
i
ates
gh
da
new formation d
Qo
m
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A
developed CA BBAS
LI
PH ID
among the AT
E

Mongols in
A r

a remote region bordering the Siberian

P er
a b

sia

forests under Ghenghis Khan (c. 1162–1227).

nG

A clever and ruthless leader, he took command of

ul
i a

a wide grouping of tribes from about 1206. By

OM

N
the time of his death he had dominated most of
AN

northern China and his armies had reached the

shores of the Caspian. Divided between his sons,
the empire continued to expand, overwhelming
the rest of northern China and sweeping through
eastern Europe as far as Germany. As with other
nomadic formations, however, there were no

64
 THE MONGOL INVASION

cations and knowledge of the latest warfare families of notables actively collaborated, and
Mongol Invasions 1206–59
techniques were sophisticated enough to enable even encouraged attacks on their Muslim ene-
OIROTS Original tribe
them to wreak unprecedented levels of destruc- mies in order to gain favor with the conquerors.
Homeland of the Mongol
tion. In the initial conquests, entire populations Members of the ulama rose to prominence and tribes
of cities were massacred, without regard to age power. For instance, the Sunni historian al- Mongol Empire, 1206
or gender. Buildings were leveled, rotting heads Juvaini accompanied the Mongol army under
Mongol Empire, 1236
stacked in gruesome pyramids. Mongol cruelty the warlord Hulegu to Alamut, where the last
was a form of psychological warfare designed to Ismaili stronghold to survive the fall of the Mongol Empire, 1259

send the message that resistance was useless. As Fatimids was destroyed in 1256. After the con- Area paying tribute or under
loose Mongol control
a strategy, terror was highly effective: the quest of Baghdad two years later, al-Juvaini
Mongol campaign
30

amirs who governed in the Iranian high- became its governor. Within a few generations
°

°
60
N

lands hastened to demonstrate the western Mongols had converted to Islam, City sacked by Mongols
ov

0°
14
go

40
°
ro

Ya
their homage. The local opening a brilliant new era in the story of
d

ro
sla
vl
50
bureaucrats and its development. 130
°

a
°

tsk
Se
kk of
ho
M Vl na
os ad ° e
co im 60° 120 L

O
Ry w ir
az
an 70° 110°
80° 100°
90°

°
50
Bu
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lg
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G O ar
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ey

E
N
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Volga

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D BURYATS

LS
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sh

OIROTS
ITS

Ol
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dS ME R
era
i KERAITS TAR S
TA

NS
IMA
NA
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m
Karakoru
Caspian

N g
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Aral IA 1235 yan

Sea

X capital from Liao Sea 40°

Sea SO A
AN O L I PIR
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of n
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Tash Balasaghun
ken t ing son
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Bukh Kokend NIXIA ong
E KHWARIZM

apur ara Sam ggy

ark and low Ton
Ho

xia ng
Ning Jini Yel ea
an
ng

Kashgar
1226 Taiyu S
a

Amu
Hu

D ary a
Balk u
ang cho
h Pingy Zai
ng
Hera Kabu Kaife
t l
A 30°
Hsian N t
IR LA I Eas na
Ghaz M DA H chou
i
Ch ea
ni SH C Han
SHA

KA KH S
T I B E T R E
P I
H

Chengdu E M
G
S U N
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Ind Lhasa
SULTA ng
ia

NATE O ncer
of Ca
J

F DELHI
ng

Tropic
Cha

Delhi
n
Arab Cantongzhou)
ian Gan
ges ASSAM (Gua
Sea T
RA
JE
GU BENGAL
YADAVA Hanoi
A Daluo
ISS
OR
Bay of Bengal

65
HISTORICAL ATLAS OF THE ISLAMIC WORLD

Maghreb and Spain 650–1485

e
10° 0° Tours 10° 20

ATLANTIC 732 Poitiers

FRANKISH EMPIRE
OCEAN AVAR
Limoges
Lyon

KI
~ Bordeaux

N
La Coruna Venice

G
Turin Po

Rhône
Oviedo AQUITAINE O

D
718 Santander
CANTA
BRIAN Genoa M
S BASQ Toulouse O
U ES 721 Nice

F
Eb Florence
Marseille Frejus Ancona

Ti
ro
Oporto

ber
Ad
40° ria
713

T
U

tic

H
Zaragoza Corsica Se

E
713 LO a
Madrid Barcelona Rome M
M

from
gus BA
Ta
Toledo RD

711
Lisbon 711
712 Sardinia Naples S
Valencia Taranto
A

Palma s
Cordoba 711 nd
s la
c I
Y

Baleari
712 711

from
Granada Cartagena
Cádiz
Y

711
Gibraltar Sicily
Tangier
Bône
652–6
8 B
A

Tunis 698
Tahant
D

Meknès Kairouan
Taza 683 670 M
Fes 698
e
C d i
A t
L P H A
Gabès

Aghmat T E Tripoli
Sijilmasa 647
30°
Misurata

E R B E
B R
Wargla
S
Muslim conquests in North Ghadamés
Africa and Europe El Galsa
634 to 732
Conquests under Muhammad

By 644
Garama
By 720

Major Muslim campaign In Saleh Zawilah

Murzuk
Further campaigns
S a Ghat
Muslim raids h a r a
Tropic of Ca D e
ncer s e r t
Muslim victory

Muslim defeat 0 300 km

Trans-Saharan trade routes

20° 0 300 miles

66
 MAGHREB AND SPAIN 650–1485

0° 30° 40°

EMPIRE
C a u c a s u s M t
s Baku
LAZICA
by 66
BULGARIA 1
B l a c k S e a
be
D anu
B a l k a n s Varna

Resht
Qu
izi
E
l U zun

Constantinople 716
7 R
–7
Salonika 670 I
A n a t o l i a
Hamadan

Aegean
P Mosul
4
by 64
Sea
M Mts

Ti
Smyrna Konya us
E

gri
Adana
r

s
Ta u

Athens Aleppo

E Hama
I N
Y Z A N T Cyprus
Homs
Tripoli
Euphrate s
Crete Candia Beirut Basra
Damascus

a Haifa
S e
e r r a n e a n
Jerusalem

Gaza
642
Ajdabiya Alexandria
646 Tanta

al-Fustat
al Giza (Cairo) A R A B I A
al Faiyum Under Muhammad
Awjilah 640
644
al Minya
E g y p t
N
ile

R
Luxor
e

al Kharga Medina
d
S

W
ad
e

ia
sS
a

Aswan ub
Aidnab ai
ny a
di Ra
Jedda Mecca Wa
N
Kuffra W

to Dongola
652 NUBIANS
Suakin

67
HISTORICAL ATLAS OF THE ISLAMIC WORLD

Islamic Spain c. 1030

Al-Andalus is the Arabic name for territories region in the eleventh and twelfth centuries.
Christian states
in the Iberian Peninsula that came under They were the Almoravids (1056–1147) and
Caliphate of Córdoba to 1031
Muslim rule and influence for nearly 800 the Almohads (1130–1269). By the end of
Granada Islamic kingdoms after 1031

Archdiocese
years. The first Muslim contact with the Almohad rule, various Christian rulers had
Important Jewish community region came in 711. A Muslim army crossed united to begin the period of reconquista.
Population the Straits of Gibraltar from North Africa Except for the rule of the Nasrids in Granada
Christian
and by 716 a number of cities and kingdoms until 1492, most of the Iberian Peninsula was
Mostly Berber and converts had been defeated. The nature and extent of lost to Muslim authority.
Mostly Arab Muslim rule in the area was dramatically After the 1492 defeat of Granada, most
Muslims and Jews fled to
North Africa to avoid the
N
F R A N C E Inquisition. Some submitted
and converted to Christianity,
Bilbao
Oviedo Vizcaya Guipuzcoa while a small number were
1 02 8–
C a 3 5 r uled b

Santiago de
Pamplona
Compostela
NAVARRE ARAGON BARCELONA 42°
allowed to retain their faith,
San Marcos
s t y Cas

de León but under much more con-

Vich
i l tile

L E Ó N e Saragossa Barcelona
S a ra g o ssa strained circumstances. By the
Zamora
Oporto sixteenth century, however, the
Salamanca As
Sahla process of conversion and
n ds 40°
la
a

Alpuente Is
expulsion of Muslims was
ci

ic
Toledo ar
n

B a d a j o z e Valencia e
a l - A n d a l u s Val B
al almost complete and the pres-
ence of Islam in the region
Lisbon Badajoz
Denia
38°
Merida
Córdoba
Alicante remained only through cultural
Murcia
Seville Córdoba Granada Murcia Mediterranean Sea traces.
Mertola Ecija
Lucena Almería Cartagena The civilization engendered
Ben i Niebla
Muzai n Bah r i s Seville Moron Granada
in Muslim Andalusia was
a

Ronda
g

36°
Cádiz
la
Málaga linked to the broader develop-
M á
9° Gibraltar ments in the Middle East and
6° 3° 0° 3°
North Africa, but was distinc-
tive in several respects. The art
F A T I M I D S
0 100 km
and architecture associated
0 100 miles
with the cities of Córdoba,
Granada, Seville, and Toledo
affected by the collapse of the Damascus- remain as landmarks. The literary heritage
based Umayyad dynasty in 750. A member of that flowered in the later period was also dis-
the family fled to Spain, becoming a governor tinctive in its contribution to Romance litera-
before initiating a new Umayyad dynasty, ture. But perhaps the most enduring legacies
which eventually declared Iberia and North were reflected in the philosophical, theologi-
Africa as a separate caliphate. cal, and legal writings of Muslims and Jews,
Inspired by a more orthodox vision of which would exercise a great influence on
Muslim rule, the two movements arriving in subsequent Latin scholasticism in Europe.
North Africa established control over the Among this tradition’s most outstanding

68
 MAGHREB AND SPAIN 650–1485

The court of the lions in the

Alhambra palace in Granada.
The kingdom of Granada, the
reference points were Ibn Rushd (also last Islamic outpost in Western
known as Averroës), who died in 1198 and Europe, held out for 250 years in
Ibn Arabi (d. 1240), who wrote many mysti- the face of the Christian
cal works that influenced succeeding gener- Reconquista. Despite the
ations. The great Jewish thinker Moses external pressures, under the
Maimonides (d. 1204) also worked in this Nasrid dynasty it remained a

most intellectually invigorating and cultur- sophisticated and tolerant center

ally resplendent milieu. where Islamic and Western

cultures were blended in a
brilliant, creative synthesis.

9° 6° 3° 0° 3°
B a y o f B i s c a y F R A N C E
A s t u r i a s Guipuzcoa
Vizcaya Cerdagne
G a l i c i a
KINGDOM Roussillon
Santiago de R.
Compostella
Eb
ro OF
Burgos
NAVARRE
o L e ó n A r a g ó n
Miñ
R.
O l d C a t a l o ñ a
42° Mallén Saragossa
Castrotorafe
KINGDOM OF ARAGÓN
C a s t i l e
Belchite
Castronuño Caspe
Tarragona
R . D ou
ro Penausende

Alfambra
KINGDOM C A S T I L E Culla
Pulpis Peñiscola
Villel
Onda
OF Consuegra Libros
Valencia ds
Soure Ocaña l an
40° Bétera Is
PORTUGAL Alconétar Toledo Olocau Valencia ic
Mora ar
Alcázar de e
San Juan Torrente
Silla B al
Belver N e w C a s t i l e Sueca
Malagón
s

Alhambra Anna The Christian

gu

Montánchez a
Ta ia n
ua d
Lisbon
R.
Coruche R. G Calatrava Reconquest
la Vieja Montiel Enguera
Almagro Murcia Date of reconquest
Almada Alange
Palmela Socovos
Evora Hornachos Yeste Cieza 1080
Setúbal Usagre Segura Moratalla Ricote 1130
Santiago Moura A n d a l u s i a Caravaca Cehegin
1210
de Cacem Llerena Baeza 1250
38° Setefilla u i vi
r
alq Aledo 1275
Aljustrel Serpa uad
Lora .G Martos Muslim
Alcaudete
R

Mértola domination
Estepa 1275
Marachique Seville Archdiocese
Muslim
a

Osuna Benameji Granada

Albufeira Cacela retaken
e

Military orders
Morón
S

G R A N A D A Hospital
Cote
n Santiago
a N lif
e Che
Caltrava
n Alcántra
Medina Sidonia Alcalá de los Gazules
r r a
Avis
Vejer i t e Cristo
0 100 km M e d
Montesa
36°0 Ceuta
100 miles
Tangier
S U L T A N A T E O F M O R O C C O

69
HISTORICAL ATLAS OF THE ISLAMIC WORLD

Subsaharan Africa—East
The southernmost outpost of
Dar al-Islam until modern times,
Kilwa had a population of about
10,000 in 1505, when the
Portuguese took the island by
storm. The first Muslim
occupants were mariners and
merchants from the Persian Gulf
who settled around AD 800.
PLAN OF THE GREAT MOSQUE AT KILWA
0 15 m
From the time of the ancient pharaohs the
Upper Nile regions of East Africa had belonged
to the same cultural universe as Egypt. Ethiopia
was Christianized by Coptic missionaries from
the fourth century, and according to the earliest
Islamic sources, the Christian Negus gave
refuge to a group of persecuted Muslims from
Mecca even before the Hijra. The Arab con-
querors of Egypt reached Aswan in 641 and for
centuries continued to move southward, giving
N
prestigious of all Islamic lineages in the form of
Quraishi pedigrees, a trend that would emerge
among other religious and tribal leaders. While
Arabic and—in some cases—Persian brought by
mariners retained their prestige as the language
of “True Islam,” vernacular languages devel-
oped rich oral literatures that would eventually
acquire written form. The first Swahili text
dates from 1652. The Swahili culture that dom-
inates the thousand-mile coastal strip from
Mogadishu to Kilwa is the fruit of many cen-
turies of interaction between the ideas brought
by Arab-Persian merchants, traders, and set-
tlers, and the indigenous peoples of the eastern
seaboard with whom they intermarried.
After Vasco da Gama rounded the Cape
of Good Hope in 1498 the Portuguese sys-
tematically destroyed the prosperous
Swahili cities that had sprung up along
the coast. In 1505 Kilwa was captured and
Mombasa was sacked. By 1530 the
Portuguese controlled the entire coast
from their fortresses on Pemba, Zanzibar,
and other islands. In the 1650s, however,
the Omanis who were Ibadi Muslims
expelled them from Muscat, restoring the

0 50 ft eastern part of the Indian Ocean to Muslim

the Upper Nile region its predominantly Arabic
character. The Funj sultanate, which main-
tained a monopoly on the gold trade that last-
ed until about 1700, was created by herders
moving downstream along the Blue Nile. It
consolidated the Arabic influence by attracting
legal scholars and holy men (known locally as
faqis) from Egypt, the Maghreb, and Arabia.
The Arab character of East African Islam
was reinforced by the proximity of the coastal
regions to the Hejaz and Yemen. From an early
period Somali cattle-breeders acquired the most
rule. The Omanis built up the trade in cloth,
ivory, and slaves between East Africa and
India. In the nineteenth century, under the sul-
tan Sayyid Said bin Sultan (1804–56), Muscat
and Zanzibar were briefly united under a sin-
gle ruler, opening the way to settlement by
new waves of Muslim immigrants from South
Arabia. Much of Zanzibar was turned over to
the commercial production of cloves and other
spices, using slave-plantation methods similar
to those employed in the United States. After
the division of the empire between the sons of
Sultan Said, Zanzibar came under increasing

70
 SUBSAHARAN AFRICA—EAST

Mediterranean pressure to abolish the slave trade by

Sea
the British, who used their navy to
Alexandria

30° Cairo enforce the antislave trade laws and

MA M LU K to pursue their own commercial
EMPIRE
interests. After becoming a British
N
Libyan ile
Desert
R Qusayr protectorate, Zanzibar played host
ive

Muscat
R
r

to a new wave of immigrants from

ed

Tropic of Cancer Aswân

Se

British India. Many of these

a

Faras Jedda A r a b i a
Mecca
migrants were Muslims from minor-
N ubian Desert
20° ity communities including Momens,
Suakin T
Old Dongola ALWA Berber A
U Ithnashari Khojas, and Ismailis.
M
A
R
an

Dahlak H
D
of

Soba A
rd

Dibarwa H Shihr
F U NJ Y E MEN
Ko

DARFUR Sennar Axum Mocha

ile R.

Bl u e N

Aden Socotra
h i te N

Lalibela
i

e Saylac
l

R.
AGAU
ETHIOPIA Berbera Ras Xaafuun
10°
W A DA L
Debre Libanos Debre Birhan
S OM A L I
Bernra Dakar
y

OR OM O
e
l l

NILOTES
V a

Lake
Turkana
Jasiira Mogadishu
f t

Baraawe I N D I A N
Equator Bigo S WA H I L I
0°
i

C I T Y S TAT E S
R

Lake
Victoria O C E A N
Shanda
Ungwana Manda
Gedi Malindi
Mombasa
N
Pemba
Lake
Tanganyika Zanzibar
Kikulu
Sanga Kamilamba Mafia
Kalongo
Kilwa Kisiwani
10° 0 300 km
Comoro
Is. 0 300 miles
Lake
Nyasa
Vohémar
SHONA
W

Zamb ez i River
L
K I East African Slave Trade The entrance to a private house in Stone
MWENEMU TA PA to 1500
Town, Zanzibar. The decorated portals
Tananarive Slave trading states
20° Great carved from local hardwoods or trees
Khami Sofala
Zimbabwe Approximate area
TORWA imported from the mainland symbolized the
Madagascar supplying slaves
Mapungubwe Manekweni Chibuene social status of the house’s owner. The walls
Li m popo R Slave routes
Tropic of Capricorn iver
Other kingdoms and states
are made from coral rag and need constant
maintenance to prevent destruction by
30° 40° 50°
torrential monsoon rains.

71
HISTORICAL ATLAS OF THE ISLAMIC WORLD
Subsaharan Africa—West
Detail from a fourteenth-century
Catalan map showing a king
enthroned, with his royal regalia.
The portrait may be of Mansa
Musa of Mali, whose wealth
made a great impression on his
contemporaries when he traveled
to Mecca in 1324–25.
72
The expansion of Islam in West Africa was
largely peaceful. The introduction of camels for
transportation into the Sahara sometime before
AD 600 had established a growing network of
caravan routes between the Maghreb and the
Sahil (shore), the vast belt of grassy steppelands
that lies between the Sahara and the tropical
forests of Guinea. The principal export from the
south was gold from Bambuko on the Senegal
River, which was
for centuries the
principal source
of gold for the
Maghreb, West
Asia, and Europe.
Gold—along
with slaves, hides,
and ivory—was
exchanged for
copper, silver,
handcrafted arti-
cles, dried fruits,
and cloth. More
significant than
the trade, how-
ever, was the dif-
fusion of ideas.
Islam was brought south by merchants, teachers,
and Sufi mystics the French had named
Marabouts Arabic Murabits. The latter were
often members of saintly families who acted as
hereditary arbiters among rural tribesfolk.
In the eleventh century Murabits from the
Lamtuna Berber group established a center in
Mauretania for the propagation of Islam, from
where they launched a jihad against the kings of
Ghana, rulers of the largest and wealthiest of
the West African states. The reforming zeal of
the Murabits (known as Almoravids in Spanish)
carried them northward to Iberia, where they
reunited the petty principalities of al-Andalus
to ward off the threat of the Christian recon-
quest. There were some forcible conversions of
Africans south of the Sahara, but these were
mostly rare. The earliest converts were usually
the royal families that had always relied on reli-
gious prestige to extract taxes or military serv-
ice from subordinate clans and communities. As
Muslim merchants settled in Sahil cities (most
of which had their own Muslim quarters by the
late tenth century) the royals would seek to ben-
efit from the cultural prestige they carried by
adopting Islam as the court religion.
For the most part local kingdoms continued
to form and re-form under different tribal
dynasties, with Islamic rituals and practice
intermingling with tribal customs. With each
new state the capital would become a center of
wealth and Islamic learning, as rulers sought
prestige by patronizing religious scholarship.
The most spectacular cultural center was the
Tuareg city of Timbuktu on the Niger. The
Tuaregs were a camel-borne elite who grew
rich from the trans-Saharan trade, using slaves
to exploit the salt mines and settling serfs
from African tribes to cultivate the oases
along their routes.
The most celebrated Muslim ruler from
Subsaharan Africa was Mansa Musa (1307–32),
king of Mali. He made the pilgrimage to Mecca
in 1324–25 in the grandest possible style, leav-
ing an impression that would last for genera-
tions. Unlike the Nilotic Sudan where the
Arabic language took root, Islam was diffused
in local vernaculars from a relatively early
stage. From around 1700 (and possibly earlier)
scholars and teachers developed a modified ver-
sion of Arabic script to convey Islamic teach-
ings in Fulfulde and Hausa, the leading lan-
guages of the western Sahil.
 SUBSAHARAN AFRICA—WEST

Ghana and Mali Empires 10° 0°

Gharnata
(Granada)
Ghana Empire, c. 1000
Algiers
Almoravid state, 1055 Tangier Tunis

Almoravid state, 1100 Tlemcen

Fez
Mali Empire, c. 1350

Travels of Ibn Battuta, 1352 MOROCCO

Trade route
Marrakesh
Sijilmasa
Alluvial gold 30°

Ghadamés

Canary Islands

Tuat

S a h a r a D e s e r t
Tropic of Cance
r

Taghaza

Wadan
(Ouadane)
B E R B E R S
Ribat Chinguetti T U A R
20° E G

SANHAJA
LAMTUNA

Awdaghust Tadmekka
Walata
SONINKÉ
Timbuktu
TOKOLOR Gao
Se
ne
g al Kumbi Saleh MOSSI Koukya
R. Ghana Empire capital Azelik
G am BAM
b ia
R. B INKE
Jenne SONGHAY
SOSSO MAL Sokoto
UK
O

Kirina Niamey
Ni
ge
r

R.
Niani
BURE

10°

Volt
a
Sassandra R.

Akan goldfields
R.

Bito

0 300 km

0 300 miles

73
HISTORICAL ATLAS OF THE ISLAMIC WORLD

Jihad States
From the seventeenth to the nineteenth century
a series of jihad movements occurred in West
Africa that led to the creation of a number of
Islamic states and transformed the presence of
Islam in the region. Most of these jihads
involved rebellions by nomadic tribesmen
against nominally Islamic rulers who held to
traditional African concepts of divine kingship,
mixing rituals of pagan origin with symbols
Mudbaked mosque at
Djenne, Mali. Designed in
the local vernacular style,
the building fabric is
merging with the local elites prior to the French
conquest. The most famous of the West African
jihad leaders was Uthman Dan Fodio
(1754–1817) a mallam (religious scholar) from a
well-established family of scholars in the inde-
pendent Hausa kingdom of Gobir. After attack-
ing the king for mixing Islamic and
pagan practices, Dan Fodio fol-
10°
lowed the classical Muhammadan
scenario of making the hijra
beyond the borders of the king-
dom, before waging jihad
against the king and other Fez
Hausa rulers in

O
constantly renewed from the Marrakesh
the name of C
material of which it is made. C
a purified O
R
O
M

BANNU
HASSAN
Ouadane
Argvin MASINA
Chinguetti
derived from Islam. The leadership of these 1810
movements usually came from the literate class
of ulama—scholars, teachers, and students— Oualata
Timbuktu
WALO KAARTA
who had studied with Sufi masters locally or St. Louis
FU

CAYOR SEGU
TA

had acquired their reformist ideas in Mecca and Gao

Gorée
BOAL 177
TO

6 Segu Jenne
RO

Medina. Their followers were Fulani cattle- Fort James

BONDU Mali MOSSI
herders moving south in search of pasture, who 1688 MANDINGO Bamako STATES
resented taxes imposed on them by the Hausa FUTA Ouagadougou
Cachea
JALLON FULA KONG
kings, joined by disgruntled peasants, runaway 1725 EMPIRE
slaves, and other outcasts. Ibrahim Musa Bunce Island Kong

(Karamoko Alfa d. 1751), a Fulani torodbe

SUSU ASANTE
(scholar), waged a struggle against the local OYOLA
Kumasi
rulers. This resulted in the creation of the state
Little Accra
of Futa Jallon in the uplands of Senegambia. N Cestos
Axim
Elmina
The jihad movement (which Ibrahim Musa’s
descendants exploited to capture slaves for
export and work in plantations) spread to Futa 0 200 km

Toro in the Senegal River valley. Here torodbes 0 200 miles

formed an independent Islamic state, before

74
 JIHAD STATES

Islam. His preaching conveyed a powerful mes- expanded to include most of what is now Jihad States c. 1800
sage of social justice in the classic manner of northern Nigeria and the northern Camer-
Extent of Islam, c. 1800
Muhammad, mixing theological attacks on oons. In 1817 Dan Fodio retired to a life of
Center of Islamic learning
idolatry with denunciations of illegal taxes, reading, writing, and contemplation, leaving
European trading post,
sequestration of property, compulsory military the empire to his son Muhammad Belo, who 1600–1800

service, and the enslavement of Muslims. By became the Sultan of Sokoto—the most power- Arab trading post or city

1808 the movement had overthrown most of the ful Muslim emirate in what eventually became States established by jihad
Hausa kingdoms; in the next two decades it with date
the British colony of Nigeria.
SAN Major tribe

0° 10° 20° 30° 40°

50°

Tunis
Tlemcen

E
ALGIERS M e di te rr ane an S e a
Tunis

R
Alexandria
Tr 30°
ip

I
oli ic a
Cy rena Cairo P
O Egyp t
T M
T E
O M A N Asyut
Re
d

T U A R E G Medina
Aswan Tropic of Cancer
Se
a

Mecca
Jedda
20°

AIR C H A D
Dongola
A R A B S Suakin

FUNJ

Massawa
Hodeida
HAUSA BO RN U WADAI
STATES DARFUR Sennar Axum Zabid
KAN E M
Kukuwa Gondar AWSA Aden
Wara El Fasher
S Ngarzagmu
O Kano Awsa
ETHIOPIA Saylae
BA

K
BORGU O INGALA GI
RM
Berbera 10°
MAHI O
T
O 1 I
OY 804
DAHOMEY OLD –17
Harer
A LI
Lagos BENIN
IGBO S OM
Benin
BOBANGI GALLA
Old Calabar NILOTES
Brass OROMO
Bohney
Porto Novo
BABWA Mogadishu
Quida
Baraawe
Equator

75
HISTORICAL ATLAS OF THE ISLAMIC WORLD

The Indian Ocean to 1499

Before the advent of Islam the Indian Ocean
was part of an overlapping and interconnect-
ed local, regional, and transcontinental net-
work of trade routes stretching between
China, Southeast Asia, East Africa, and the
Mediterranean.
The Periplus (Circuit) of the Erythrean
Sea, a Greek-language merchant-mariner’s
(Socotra), to northeast Africa (Adulis and
Opone in Axum/Ethiopia), and down the
coast of East Africa by way of Menouthias
near Pemba as far as Rhapta (whose site is yet
to be discovered, but may be Bagamoyo on the
coast of modern Tanzania). The other route
40°

20

30
Al

°
ex Al Tif
an ep
guide of the first century, describes two mar- dr
ia An po lis
tio
ch
itime trade routes commencing from ports on Ca Ta
bri
iro Mo z
Qu sul
the Red Sea (i.e., Myus Hormus, Leuke Jer

Tigris
lzu u
m sal
em
Kome, and Berenike). These connected mer-

E u ph r
Ay
la Ba
gh
chants of the classical Greco-Roman world

ates
da
d

engaged in the trade of items such as textiles, N

Bas
He ra
copper, spices, and slaves to their partners on ja
Ya
z
nb
the western Indian Ocean littoral. One route Ay
dh
u Shir
az
ab Jed Me
din

P e rs
went down through the Red Sea to southern d a a
Me Bah
rain

ia n
cca

R e d
Arabia by Muza (Mocha) and Dioscurides

Gu
f

l
A

Sea
Suha
Dhow is a generic term for a variety of R O r
A m
B an
lateen-rigged craft that plied the Indian I A
Ocean. Designed for seasonal San
’a
monsoons, the dhows stayed close to the Mo
Ax ch a Shih
coast, planning their runs to coincide um r
Ad
Zay en
A la
with the monsoon cycles.
f r
Ber
i c ber
a Soco
a Islan tra
d

Mo
Mo gad
ishu
mb
asa
Zan
ziba Pem
r ba is
land

Kilw
a

Madagascar

76
 THE INDIAN OCEAN TO 1499

veered toward India’s northwestern shores by powered navigation, the northeast monsoon
Barygaza (Broach) and then south to Muziris allowed the large lateen-rigged sails of the
Cranganore and Komar (Cape Comorin). Arabian, Persian, and Indian dhows to sail
The movements of people and goods were such routes as Aden to Cochin with the sails
regulated by the Indian Ocean’s predictable trimmed to keep the ship pointing as closely as
monsoon cycle. The benign northeast or win- possible into the direction of the wind. They
ter monsoon lasts approximately half the year traded up the Malabar coast of India on the
(from November to March). Before the days of opposite tack before returning with their sails

° ° °
50° 60° 70° 80° 90° 100° 110° 120 130 40° 140
Caspain Sea

A
Se ral rum
a Karako
Trade routes to 1500
Urg Trade routes
ench

a Under Islamic control

ary
Buch S yr D g
ara Sama
rkand Beijin

e
low

gH
Kashgar Yel ea
A

an
uD S

Hu
ary
30°
a
ng
P E Hera Kaife
R S t
ou
I A Luoy
ang nzh
Ha

A
I N
Hor
muz C H er
Canc
ic of
u s
ng Trop
Ind Multan Lhasa Jia
ng

zhou
Cha

Quanchou)
Mu an
sca t
Delhi (Chu 20°
Daybul
n
Ahmedabad Cantou)
Gan
ges
ngzho
Mus
Cambay
Is. ira
Broach (Gua
Diu
Surat Chittagong Hanoi
A r a Daman
b
S e ai a n Annam
I N D I uth
A Burma
M e So
kon

h ina
g

C
a
Champa Se 10°
Mala

B a y o f B e n g a l
bar C

Khmer Min
dana
o
Sulu
oast

Calicut Sea

Quillon Gulf
of bes
Cape Siam Cele a
Comorin
Se

0°
Maldive
Islands

Malacca eo
Born
S
u
m
a
t
I N D I A N r
a
s Sea
Java Sea Flore
O C E A N
10°
Java

77
HISTORICAL ATLAS OF THE ISLAMIC WORLD

full and their yard arms swinging free before
the wind. The southwest monsoon, which
brings rain to western India and generates
more turbulent weather, was best avoided.
By the seventh century, the trading worlds
described in The Periplus had long disap-
peared. Western Indian Ocean ports and
trade routes were caught up in increasing
rivalry between the Byzantine and Sasanian
(Persian) Empires. The Byzantines supported
Ethiopian raids on South Arabia from ports
on the Red Sea, while the Persians secured
their control over the Persian Gulf (Bahrain)
and southern Arabia at Aden, Suhar, and

Saljuq ruler on his throne.

Their position at the western
end of the Silk Road enabled the
Saljuq sultans to indulge their
taste for luxuries, such as the
finest Chinese silks and jewels,
from Central Asia.
Manuscript, 13th century.

78

Daba. In between the two empires were the
Quraish, who would become the first
Muslims engaged in land-based trade at their
sanctuary at Mecca.
The early trajectory of Muslim conquest
and expansion was away from the Indian
Ocean and toward the Mediterranean. But
successive Muslim dynasties made efforts to
gain political and economic control over the
Indian Ocean. The Umayyad conquest and
occupation of Daybul in Sind in 712 was a
first step in this direction. Subsequently, the
Abbasids’ founding of their capital Baghdad
in 762 near the Tigris, with its access via
Basra to the Persian Gulf, provided further
impetus to Muslim maritime trade and settle-
ment from the shores of East Africa to south-
ern China. Mariners’ reports collected in the
Akhbar al-Sin Wal-Hind (c. 850) provide a
glimpse into what a typical round-trip mer-
cantile sea voyage from Siraf (south of
Shiraz) to Canton would have been like in
Abbasid times. Contemporary maritime
activity in the southwestern Indian Ocean,
from Arabia to East Africa (Bilad al-Zanj), is
attested to in the Muruj al-Dhahab of al-
Masudi (d. 928).
In 969, the Fatimids conquered Egpyt and
founded Cairo, posing a serious political and
commercial challenge to the Abbasids. The
Fatimids succeeded in diverting trade in the
western Indian Ocean from Baghdad and the
Persian Gulf to Fustat and the Red Sea. The
commercial importance of Egypt and the Red
Sea trade route to the western Indian Ocean
was maintained by the Fatimids’ successors,
the Ayyubids and Mamluks. Documents from
the Cairo Geniza collection offer evidence of
the complex network of Fustat-based traders,
stretching between North Africa and India via
the western Indian Ocean, operating between
the eleventh and thirteenth centuries.
THE INDIAN OCEAN TO 1499
Political and economic control over Indian
Ocean trade routes by Muslim dynasties based
in the Middle East was complemented by the
growth of Muslim communities, mercantile
centers, and independent states around the lit-
toral, many of which have complex and multi-
stranded histories that have yet to be studied.
The eastern African coast, and its Swahili-
speaking peoples, had multiple connections to
the Arabian Peninsula, the Persian Gulf, and
India. Muslim settlements (mosques and bur-
ial sites) at Shanga date to the latter half of
the eighth century and there is evidence to
support the presence of local Muslim dynas-
ties and their control of island settlements on
Pemba, Zanzibar, Mafia, and Kilwa between
c. 1000 and 1150. Many of these communities
were thriving when Ibn Battuta visited the
region by way of Mogadishu in 1331.
Ibn Battuta is also a source of information
for the presence of Muslims along China’s
southern coastline up to Quanzhou (Zaitun),
which he reached in 1347. At Quanzhou, buri-
als and a mosque (c. 1009) mark the presence
of a Muslim community at the trading port.
The histories of Muslim communities in
Southeast Asia are also informed by
transoceanic trade. By the fifteenth century, it
was the entrepot of Malacca on the Malay
coast that emerged as a major maritime cen-
ter in the larger Muslim Indian Ocean trading
network, eclipsing centers on Java and
Sumatra. Malacca had a sizeable Muslim
population that had strong connections to
western Indian merchants and ports such as
Cambay (Gujarat). Ironically, Ibn Majid, the
mariner credited with piloting Vasco da Gama
through the Indian Ocean in 1498, provides an
unfavorable description of Malacca. The port
fell to the Portuguese in 1511, marking the
firm establishment of the first European mar-
itime power in the Indian Ocean.
79
HISTORICAL ATLAS OF THE ISLAMIC WORLD

The Indian Ocean 1500–1900

The forts guarding the entrance Vasco da Gama’s voyage around the Cape of

Red Sea
to the harbor of Muscat were Good Hope in 1498 was an epoch-making 20
°
originally built by the event, putting an end to the Muslim mono-
Portuguese in the sixteenth poly of trade in the Indian Ocean and open-
century on the site of earlier ing the way for the British and Dutch
strongholds. After surviving Empires in South Asia and the East Indies.
Ottoman attacks, the The era of European imperialism began with
Portuguese garrisons merchant adventurers who established trad-
surrendered to the Omani Imam ing posts in the southern seas, which became
Sultan bin Saif in 1650. the bases for further expansion. The
Portuguese were the pioneers, taking Kilwa
and sacking Mombasa in 1505 before
establishing bases in Zanzibar and Pemba.
In 1509 they defeated a combined
Egyptian-Indian fleet to take Goa on the
Malabar coast. In 1515 they conquered
40
°
Malacca and in the same year Hormuz
on the Persian Gulf. Portuguese hegemony
O
TT

was soon replaced by that of the Dutch,

OM

whom the Portuguese had tried to exclude

AN EM

30
° from the lucrative pepper and spice trade.
PIR

SA
FA
Red Sea

VI
20 (PE D EM
Indian Ocean
Per

c. 1580 ° RS P
IA) IRE
A r

Bah
sia

151 rain I
Portuguese possession 5 Ban HU
Tro –1622 MANC
n

.
da
a b

with date of acquisition Hor r Abba

G

Ma pic
u

of C lf m s 150
ssa anc 1515– uz 7–16
22
i a

Portuguese factory wa er 1622

152 Delhi
0–2
Portuguese town 2 Agra
Mas
k
1550– at
Portuguese trade routes 1650 MOGUL
A Ade Cambay1539
n1 Diu Hooghly
f 524– Arab 1535 Surat 1540–1 1537–1640
r 38 ia 615 BU RM A
Gu Sea n 1530 Bom Daman 15

A
i lf o f A d e n bay 58

N
c Chaul EMPIRE
N
a 1509 Bay of –1613
Syriam 1520
A
Soc
1516 otra I. Bengal

M
–11 Masulipatam SI A M
1505 A a
njediva 1570–1605 Ayutthay
1560–16
37 Bhatka
1510–16 i
16 Cannanor Mangalore Singapor
e
Mo e Cal
Bar g icut 1510–1616 1526
aw adishu 1502 Cochin
a Jaffna 1560
M Quilon Malacca
Mo alind 1512 Colombo Batticaloa
1511–1641
mb i 152 1519–1638
Pem sa 150 0
a 1518
5–2 Galle Sri Lanka Pasei
Zan ba I.
1 8 Maldiv
1518–1640 1518 1514–1641 Atjeh 1520–24
Kilw zibar I 520
e Is.
aK .1503 Pidie
i
1505 siwan 1509
i I N Baros Su
to M D I 1519 m
oçam A N N a
biqu O C E tr
e 150 A N a
7
0 500 km
Bantam
Equato 0 500 miles 1512–96
r

80
 THE INDIAN OCEAN 1500–1900

AN U
G
)
OTTOMAN EMPIR

(J AN
AP
P
ZI
a
him
ki aS
SA asa neg
FA E Nagshima) Ta 2
VI P IR (De –1859 154
(PE D EM U EM 1
164 t
MANCH
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(CHI i ng)
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anc
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–
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s Is. 1624
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eelan EA
Ft. Z 1624–62
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o OC
1 5 5 C
Diu 1640 Hooghly FI
1530–1 15 Surat 1618–83 Serampore CI
664 Port 35 A
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1661 En . Bombay
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ia Chaul MOGUL N
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–49
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37 EMPIRE h
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N
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M
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Tutticorin Trin coma li 1639 1 6 o Dja almah21
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ah 1642 ui

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1657/
1601 English Atjeh Pas mudra a n
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Is
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a
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Cer 8/52 Aru 3
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s 1641 Sin tan I. B o
ana be s r u
Bu 2/58 16
I N 1519–1668 Port. Baro Bin Sukad7–35 Neth. Cele 162 Is. I.
0 bar
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Su

I A N m 2 En gl ish kassar uton67 etar I.

/ W 75
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B
Ma 67 Port. 1613 1672
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16 16
C E A N 1659 r aDjam B 1545– 70 English 0
1663 Painan em b an g 1668 S e a 1601– –15 Neth. o r 152
P al 1607 7 Neth. ntuka m
Indrapura 1616
Java
1648/6 rt Lara 1667
Ti
0 500 km 1659 to Neth. Fo 2
Batavia
1630–64 English 1610
Ja va 1 a w a Is.
AN U

b
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0 500 miles ok an
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r Lamb
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Indian Ocean c. 1650

AP
P
ZI

a Dutch possessions

ega
Sh
im
The Dutch defeated the Portuguese at
n
Ta 2 Portuguese possessions
Easna
t 154 Amboyna in 1605, taking Banda in 1621,
i
E Ch ea Spanish possessions
P IR S Ceylon (Sarandib, now Sri Lanka) in 1640,
EM gpo
Nin –45 and Malacca in 1641. Batavia (now Jakarta), British possessions
1533
A) which would become the capital of the Danish possessions
IN
(CH Factory
gcho
w Dutch East Indies, was founded in 1619.
Chan47–49
15
Can t o n N Although the process was a gradual one,
hn I. ow Shan)
EA
o S t J o OC the Portuguese intervention introduced
Maca 5 (Shangc
h
155 FIC
1555 CI
PA changes in the patterns of trade and in the
Ph political economies of the Muslim states in
h
Sout a ili
Chin
pp
in
the region. By the end of the seventeenth cen-
Se a e
Is
. tury England and Holland, two small coun-
tries perched on the western periphery of
e Is.
Spic 1621 21
– –16 Eurasia, had become (with France) the domi-
1512 1522
e r nate
ado T
Men1540 nant forces in world trade. Cargoes of raw
1564 an I. commodities—timber, grain, fish, and salt—
Batj 1558 .
na I
orneo boi
B es
Am 1–99
15 1 replaced the traditional trade in luxury
C eleb
goods. The shift in cargoes heralded even
ssar
Maka 667 more far-reaching changes, whereby the
1545–
1 520
Sea a or 1
Java ntuk Tim
Lara 1557 world would be divided between colonies
Fort
Ja va
producing raw materials and industrial and

81
HISTORICAL ATLAS OF THE ISLAMIC WORLD

As the British began to

establish themselves in India,
they imported their own
architectural styles, as shown
in a watercolor of a house
built at Chapra in 1796.

commercial centers producing high-value (these had included the Venetians and 30
°
goods and services. Viewed from the perspec- Genoese who plied the waters of the eastern
tive of the twenty-first century, Vasco da Mediterranean as well as the Muslim Eg
yp
Gama’s voyage represents the beginnings of a traders who carried goods by land). The t

process that culminates in “globalization.” gunpowder revolution—like the revolu- 20

°
Two technological factors drove these tion in sailing techniques—was grad-
changes: better sails and gunpowder. Their ual, but reached equally far in its An
Eg glo-
yp
position on the eastern shore of the Atlantic consequences. With the develop- Su tian
da
n
had encouraged the Portuguese to develop ment of cannon, stone fortresses
powerful naval vessels capable of riding the ceased to be impregnable, lend-
Atlantic storms and sailing closer to the ing the military advantage to ET
HI
OP
wind than the lateen-rigged Arab dhows. well-organized central powers IA

The Portuguese ships were larger and stur- that could afford to make the
dier than their Arab and Persian counter- costly investment in artillery Bri
tis
hE
parts, and thus able to hold more cargo and and firearms. As military Af
ric
ast
a
engage in longer runs. The new route around technology advanced, a shift
Ge
rm
southern Africa to the Indies bypassed the took place in the balance of Af
an
Ea
ric st
West Asian trade routes, bringing goods power between the tradi- a
Za
nzi
bar
from South Asia and the Indies—spices, tional warrior classes, for
cloths, and other valuable commodities— whom military prowess was vested
directly to Lisbon, enriching the merchants in notions of tribal solidarity, honor,
there but cutting out the intermediate benefi- prestige, and courage (classic virtues of the
ciaries of the trade between Europe and Asia nomadic conquerors), and economic powers

82
 THE INDIAN OCEAN 1500–1900

with sophisticated administrative centers

capable of keeping up with the latest military Indian Ocean 1800 – 1900

technology. Under European pressure the frag- European, U.S., and Spheres of influence,
Japanese territories in Asia c. 1907
mented Muslim states that followed in the Russian Empire,
British British 1855
wake of Arab caliphate and the Mongol inva- Allied to British To Russia
French by 1900
sions were consolidated into larger units dom- administration
French Occupied by
inated by the three great “gunpowder Russian Russia, 1900
Dutch
empires”: Ottoman Eurasia, Shiite Iran, and German
Portuguese Treaty Port in China,
Mughal India. Japanese with date of opening
German
Major railway
United States

0
15
60

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°

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ter 40°
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M a 13
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189 61
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wa

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it P Ch hangh ou 1
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E A FG Kabu Khotan an S ngch 842

R l R. Hu Ha gpo 1 1895
Kashmir SianfuA

PA
S H AN Peshaw
M Ba I A ISTA ar N Ninenchou876
P er

ed 186 hrai N
C H I i c)
in a 7 Br n publ Ichang ko w W uhu 1 JA
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itish P u n ja b R.
1907 W 42
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nG

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pic
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sphe h
T i b e t Chung ooch
ang

of C
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cca 1895 h i F
Red Se

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f

r
sta us Sha Amoy
er c hi Ind
Jiang

a Lhasa 1895
b B a lu R. Delhi 1842
i to Om NE N
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an Agra on
Can2t
a PA tou EA
a

an Mas
m

kat Karachi Sind L BHUTAN

184 Swa8 C
Rajputana R. G
Ass
am
Pak hoi 1876 185 CO
Benares
ange
s g Kong I FI
Hon PAC
t Bengal ao
Hadhramau Ara g Mac
Dj bia Central
Calcutta Tongkin
Up pe r Bu rm a
Kuria
ibo Aden Mar S
ia Is. e a
n
gchou
ut Bombay Provinces Chittagong Kwan ou
Br. i L An ch
Som a n Kiung
o a 1858 ila
alia Bay of Man
Is.
m

pine
Soco
Benga l
s

tra
a Yanaon Rangoon Philip
ali Goa S I A M
h
Sout
om
a
Chin
nS Mysore Cambodi
a Sea
lia Laccad Madras
Ita ive Is.
Mahé Pondicherry Andaman Is.
Karikal Saigon
ah
1896 Brun Sab w
I N Colombo ei Ne nea
Maldive Is.

Ceylon Nicobar Is. i

D
I A (Sri Lanka) Gu
ak

N Federal s
e
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a
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Malay S ar d
i
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a s
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a t c or
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0 500 km
Java r
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0 500 miles

83
HISTORICAL ATLAS OF THE ISLAMIC WORLD

Rise of the Ottomans to 1650

b
50° 0° 10°

The Ottoman Empire became the most far- HOLY ROMAN

Paris
reaching of all the Islamic states. It began its EMPIRE

remarkable expansion as a frontier state con-

ducting raids on Byzantine territories from FRA SWISS
NCE CONFED.
Bithynia near the Sea of Marmara early in the
S
thirteenth century. In 1242–43 the Mongols

A
Milan Venice

VO
VE
defeated the Saljuqs, making them vassals, RE NE

Y
The great period of Ottoman PU TIA
Genoa BL N
expansion occurred during the and pushing increasing numbers of Turkish IC

A
REP. OF GENO
reign of Suleiman I “the nomads into the peninsula in search of pas- P AP A L

Magnificent.” The painting turage and booty. The breakup of Saljuq SPA
IN Corsica S T AT E S
below depicts an Ottoman fleet power led to the creation of several petty Rome
N A P L ES
attacking the French town of states under loose Mongol overlordship. After 40°
ds S A R D I N IA
taking Bursa, which they made their capital in slan
Toulon in 1545. ic I
e ar
Ba l T yrrehenian
Sea

Barbary Coast SICILY

Algiers
Bona Tunis
ALGERIA
1518 MALTA
TUNIS
1574

Jerba
1560

Tripoli
TR
IPO
Wargla 1551 LI
1566
30°

S
a h a

1326, the Ottomans became players in the

factional strife that beset the Byzantine
Expansion of the Ottoman Empire 1328–1672
Empire in its latter days. It was as auxiliaries Ottoman territory, 1520
Ottoman territory, 1328
(Selim I)
to one of the contending parties that they
Ottoman territory, 1355 Ottoman vassal from 1541
first crossed the straits and occupied
Ottoman territory, 1566
Ottoman vassal from 1394
Byzantine territory in Europe. They occupied 20° (Suleiman I)
Ottoman territory, 1402
Greece, Macedonia, and Bulgaria, and finally (prior to Mongol attack)
Ottoman territory, 1660

established their control over the western Ottoman territory, 1481 Ottoman territory, 1630–72
(Muhammed II)
Balkans by defeating the Serbs at the Battle of Ottoman vassal from 1475 Ottoman vassal from 1664
Kosovo in 1389. Successive campaigns involv-
ing coalitions of Latin and Orthodox powers

84
 RISE OF THE OTTOMANS TO 1650

R
30° 40° 50°
Do n ets
20°

POLAND
Dn
ie pe
r
EA
L IA RIM of TU
PODO F THE C Az RK
Y
Dniester
AT EO OM
NGAR K H AN AN
HU C
Vienna AN
a S
1529 M O L D AV
IA JEDIS sp
164 ia
Buda Tere
k
DA 5 vass
T R A N S Y LV A N
IA GE al

n
B U JA K Caucasus ST
HUNGARY 1664 AN
1541 Kaffa

S
ea
u
Mohacs Bak
GIA
1526 WALLACHIA OR
GE 510
S e a
ja

Bucharest D a n ub
e.
c k 1
ru

8 G
Belgrade Nicopolis b B l a 157 BA
1396 Do nd RA
Sarajevo Varna Sinop
e T rebizo KA 0
BULGARIA 159 N
SERBIA 1444 Samsu IJA
T R EBIZ O N D rum BA
Sofia Erze NIA iran ZE
R
Kosovo
RME Chald1514 A
Tab
riz
1389 A
IA le 1453
op Van
BOSNIA-
UM
EL Constantin Sintori I D
HERZEGOVINA R Ankara S HA V E
Salonika Bursa HR F A R
ST A
N ZU
R S A P I
Otranto KARASI MIY
A
MAN KURDI E M
AL

Aegean G ER K A R A MA NI A N
A R A TA
B

( C A
N
IA Sea
Konya IA MES
O P O T AMI A RIS
LU

Ti
AYDI
N HAM I D C ILIC

g ri
s
Ionian Lepanto o
Athens E Adan
a Alepp
1571 ES H KE
Sea M E NT
MOREA EK Bagh
dad
T
A

gusta
Fama
I

Euphrates
Cyprus ra
Bas
R
1516

Crete
Pe
Y

rsi
an
S e a E G
S

n
r a n e a L ul
M e d i t e r A f
lem H
Jerusa A
S
Benghazi dria r A
Alexan
CA Cairo
Aqaba
N AI
R E 1521 a
H

CY
E J 517

A
PT Z
EGY
1

cer
Can
1517 ic of
Trop
b

N
ile
R
e a
Medin
i

d
r a
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e

a
a

Mecca

i Am
Wad

N
Sana
At
ba
EN
ra

0 200 km
YEM
0 200 miles

85
HISTORICAL ATLAS OF THE ISLAMIC WORLD
(including Naples, Venice, Hungary,
Transylvania, Serbia, and Genoa) failed to
stem the Ottoman advances into Europe. In
1453 Constantinople fell to the forces of
Mehmet the Conqueror, fueling Ottoman
imperial ambitions and providing the basis
for further expansion. In 1521 the Ottomans
captured Belgrade from the Hungarians. By
1529 they had reached the gates of Vienna,
the Habsburg capital. By the time of the
death of Suleiman the Magnificent in 1566
they controlled a swath of European territory
from the Crimea to southern Greece.
Ottoman victories were even more spec-
tacular in the lands of Islam. After defeating
the Safavids at Chaldiran in 1514, the
Ottomans annexed eastern Anatolia and
northern Mesopotamia, enabling them to
control the central Asian trade routes linking
Tabriz and Bursa. In 1516 and 1517 they took
over the Mamluk Empire in Syria and Egypt,
giving them control of the holy places of the
Hejaz. Building on the Greek seamanship
acquired from their Byzantine predecessors,
they contested the power of Venice in the
eastern Mediterranean and challenged the
dominance of Habsburg Spain in the western
Mediterranean, taking Algiers (1529), Tunis
(1534–35), Jerba (1560), and the strategic
island of Malta, the last Crusader strong-
hold, in 1565, as well as Cyprus in 1570. This
string of naval victories finally provoked a
successful counterattack. In 1571, the defeat
of the Ottoman navy at the Battle of Lepanto
by a Venetian–Habsburg coalition was cele-
brated all over Europe as a triumph for
Christendom. Although the Ottomans refur-
bished their fleets and retook Tunis in 1574, a
balance of power was achieved in the
Mediterranean, confirming the frontiers that
remained between the Muslim lands to the
south and Christian lands to the north.
Paradoxically the early Ottoman state was
both militantly Islamic and strongly influ-
enced by Greek culture, heir to the Saljuqs
86
but also to practices and structures derived
from the Roman–Byzantine Empire it
replaced. Straddling the Christian Balkans
and the western reaches of Dar al-Islam, it
was a bridge between rival civilizations. Being
close to Constantinople, which had long been
the goal of Muslim conquest, the state ruled
by the Osmanli family (from which the
English spelling Ottoman derives) attracted
many of the ghazis (holy warriors) seeking
glory in the jihad against Christendom. In
Anatolia these Turkish incomers and pas-
toralists tended to be prejudiced against the
Christian villagers, some of whom may have
converted to avoid persecution. Among the
incomers, however, there were also dervishes
and members of Sufi brotherhoods from
Inner Asia, such as Hajji Bektash (d. 1297).
He preached versions of Islam that tended to
merge Islamic beliefs, both Sunni and Shiite,
with Christian beliefs and religious practices,
facilitating the conversion of Greek and
Armenian-speaking peoples. The Ottoman
rulers assisted this process by excluding bish-
ops and metropolitans from their sees, leav-
ing the Christians without leaders, and by
replacing the Orthodox infrastructure of hos-
pitals, schools, orphanages, and monasteries
with Islamic institutions staffed by Persian
and Arab scholars. By the fifteenth century
more than 90 percent of the Anatolian popu-
lation had become Muslim, though substan-
tial minorities of Christians and Jews
remained in the cities. While the peasants
were mostly converted, the nobility and civil
servants of the old imperial system were inte-
grated into the Ottoman armies and adminis-
tration, giving the state a distinctly Byzantine
character. Though a measure of religious
autonomy was permitted through the millet
system of self-governing minorities the
Ottoman state was highly centralized. In
other Muslim lands (including some of the
Arab provinces that came under the looser
forms of Ottoman dominion) the practice of
 RISE OF THE OTTOMANS TO 1650

Islam in law and society was virtually

self-regulating. The rulers appointed the
qadis (judges) but in most other respects
allowed the religious institutions such as
the mosques and madrasas where the
ulama were trained, the networks of
Sufi lodges, and the guilds of artisans
that were often connected to them, to
flourish independently. By contrast with
other Islamic regimes, the Ottomans
dominated, controlled, and shaped the
societies they governed. Though theo-
retically subject to the Sharia, the sul-
tans supplemented the divine law with
firmans (decrees) regulating the status
and duties (including dress codes) of all
their subjects. They brought the ulama,
the Sufi lodges, and the guilds of arti-
sans under state control by dictating
appointments, grading, and licenses.
Society was divided into two classes: the
rulers and the ruled, the principal dis-
tinction being the right of the askeri
(rulers) to exploit the wealth of the sub-
jects through imposts and taxes. In the-
ory all the land was the personal prop-
erty of the sultan. The ruling elites were
not confined to the ranks of pashas,
beys, and ayan (Muslim notables) who
dominated the empire in the provinces:
they included patrician Greek families,
ecclesiastical authorities, and prominent
Jewish and Armenian bankers, as well
as princely families from the Balkans.

This portrait was intended to show Suleiman to his

royal peers in Europe. The Ottoman sultans did
not display their images to their own subjects until
late in the nineteenth century.

87
HISTORICAL ATLAS OF THE ISLAMIC WORLD

The Ottoman Empire 1650–1920 0° 10°

G ERMANY
50°
At its peak in the sixteenth century the
Ottoman system was highly efficient. But it Paris
also contained crucial weaknesses, notably the
Vienna
system of succession. In nomadic societies the
F R A N SWISS AUSTRIA-
absence of a fixed mode of succession has a C E CONFED.
HU
sound Darwinian rationale: after a struggle
Milan Venice
with his peers, a chief will emerge who is fittest Po

to lead his tribe. Transferred to the center of an A

dr
ia
Genoa tic
imperial system, the result will be civil war.

I
Se

a
A
Marseille

L
Abdul Hamid II was the last SPAIN Corsica

Y
Ottoman sultan to wield Rome
Barcelona
effective power over the Empire.
40° s
land Sardinia
An absolute monarch and ri c Is
Ba lea T y rrehenian
opponent of political Sea
liberalization, he nonetheless
encouraged educational, legal, Sicily
Barbary Coast
and economic reforms. Algiers Bona
Tunis
Algeria M A LTA
1830 French
Tunisia
1881 French

Tripoli

Tr
ipo
li
Wargla

30°

Fez
zan1 9 1 2

After a series of fratricidal struggles, the S a h

Ottomans dealt with the problem of the suc-
cession by confining the sultan’s male relatives Ottoman Empire 1683–1914
to the palace’s Inner Courtyard or harem, Territory lost by 1718
thereby preventing future sultans from acquir- Territory lost by 1812
ing vital knowledge of military and secular
Territory lost by 1881 N A
affairs. From the seventeenth century the
Territory lost by 1914
Ottoman sultans, who came to power as a
result of “Byzantine” maneuvers and harem 20° Ottoman Empire, 1914

intrigues, lacked experience in the field and 1811 Date granted autonomy

familiarity with the realities of politics. The 1830 Date of territory lost
0 200 km

power of the state and the army held up briefly 0 200 miles

under ruthless viziers such as Mehmed Koprulu

88
 THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE 1650–1920

20° 30° 40° 50°

R U S S I A N E M P I R E

LIA EA
PODO RIM
9 9 HEC
Dni 1 6 F T Azo
v
e st
EO C
N AT 4
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r
BE a
SS
AR K HA 177 sp
AN DA
AB J E D IS G i
MO

IA
1792 ES

a
TA
HUNGARY
LD

n
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AV

T R A N SY 172
18
182

3
12

Se
1699
IA

u
Kaffa
9

pol
UNGARY ANAT Sevasto Bak
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a
B
1699 1718 D O B RU
JA OR
A GE 1730
WALLACHI 1878
a
Sava 1829 S e AG
Bucharest
k B
B l
a c RA
BOSNIA Belgra
de 1908 izon d K A 1730
inope Treb
D a n u be
1878 S
JA
N
1878 Bulgaria Varna Sams
u
A I 730
Sarajevo SERBIA T R EBIZ O N D eru
m
NIA ER
B 1
1878 Erz
1878 Sofia R ME AZ riz
a Van
E. Rumeli A Tab A
1913
I
tinople Sintori S
R A G U SA Constan Ankara R
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Alb a nia

1718 Salonika Bursa P

nia

1913
i a
do

1913 o l AN
a t
ce

A n ST
Aegean Me sop RI
Ma

1881 Kony
a otam LU 1730

Ti g
a
Sea Adan ia

r is
o
Alepp
d
Athens hda
Bag
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1830 1878
a

Sea Eu
1912 to Britain Famagu
sta phr
ates
i

ra
to Italy Bas
s orate
Cypru AIT protect
r

KUWBritish sian
Crete 1899 Per ulf
y

1898 A E G
S e a l
S

n e a n H rain in
Bah7 to Brita
e r r a r a
M e d i t lem sa
Jerusa
168
a
dria
Alexan
Benghazi
Cairo a
b
ca Aqab
ai H
r en ej 1853
az from itain
Cy
i
pt to Br
Egy
t o I t a l y
1811
a

1882
British R
te a
Protectora Medin
e
d
a
r S
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Mecc
nc er
Tropic of Ca

a
c
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f r
i Am
Wad

Sana
At
ba
EN
YEM
ra

89
HISTORICAL ATLAS OF THE ISLAMIC WORLD
(r. 1656–61), son of an Albanian Christian, and
his son Ahmed (r. 1661–76), allowing further
expansion north of the Crimea and (after
Ahmed’s death) even a second siege of Vienna
(1683). The process of decline, however, proved
irreversible. The influx of Spanish silver from
the Americas created a massive inflation prob-
lem, undermining the commercial classes and
the ability of government to pay for troops
whose modern weaponry (muskets and gun-
powder) required cash rather than booty.
Provincial governors and local magnates gained
power at the expense of the center, hiring pri-
vate armies or raising taxes for themselves. The
Janissaries, who had evolved into a privileged
body within the state, became enmeshed in
large-scale nepotism and misrule. Land conces-
sions that should have nurtured agriculture
degenerated into tax-farms, driving cultivators
off the land, and creating gangs of rural ban-
dits or urban migrants who drifted into cities
already overcrowded and subject to famine,
plague, and disorder. The millet system, which
allowed the Christian and Jewish communities
(and in Iraq the Shiite) a high degree of admin-
istrative autonomy, undermined the legitimacy
of the state by privileging Western traders and
encouraging Greek and Balkan Christians to
look toward the Empire’s enemies in Russia and
Western Europe for inspiration and support.
Internally decentralized, the Empire proved
no match for the rising powers of Europe,
whose military and economic systems were
beginning to benefit from the revolution in sci-
entific thought. During the last two decades of
the seventeenth century, the European powers
made significant advances at the Empire’s
expense. Between 1684 and 1687 the Habs-
burgs took most of Hungary north of the
Danube and took Serbia in 1689. The
Venetians seized Dalmatia and southern
Greece (Morea). Poland invaded Podolia, and
the Russians, under the newly modernized
army of Peter the Great, took Azov in the
Crimea. Although the Ottomans regained
90
some of these territorial losses during the first
half of the eighteenth century, in the longer
term they were unable to stem the tide of
Russian advance. In 1768 the Russians began a
new campaign, occupying Moldavia and
Wallachia (modern Romania) and the Crimea.
Under the humiliating terms of the treaty of
Kuchuk Kaynarca (1774) the Ottomans were
obliged to allow Russia a foothold on the Black
Sea, as well as freedom of navigation and com-
merce, with access to the Mediterranean and
to overland trade in the Empire’s Asian and
European provinces. Although Moldavia and
Wallachia remained technically under Otto-
man suzerainty, the increased autonomy they
were granted laid them open to Russian manip-
ulation. Under Russian pressure a clause per-
mitting the erection of a Russian church in
Istanbul would be converted into a general
right of Russian intervention on behalf of all
the sultan’s Orthodox Christian subjects.
The flow of ideas that followed in the wake
of European victories would prove even more
devastating than military defeats. Napoleon
Bonaparte’s brief occupation of Egypt in 1798
planted the seeds of modern scientific thought
and revolutionary change in the Empire’s
wealthiest (but most neglected) province. By
defeating the neo-mamluk amirs who governed
Egypt under Ottoman authority, Napoleon
opened the way for penetration of Western
ideas under the modernizing dynasty of
Mehmed Ali (r. 1805–48), an Albanian officer
who seized power in 1805, making himself an
independent ruler in all but name. The colonial
ambitions of a restored French monarchy led
to the loss of Algeria from 1830 and the estab-
lishment of a protectorate in Tunisia (1881).
The winds of nationalism that tore through
Europe in the wake of the French Revolution
reached the Christian communities in the
Balkans, starting with the Serbian revolt of
1804–13 and the Greek war of independence
(1821–29). They culminated in the treaty of
San Stefano in 1878, by which the Ottomans

were forced to concede the independence of
Bulgaria, Serbia, Romania, and Montenegro.
The final dismemberment of the Empire was
only postponed because of rivalries between
the European powers, with Britain and France
propping up the “sick man of Europe” against
Russia in the Crimea (1854–56) while Austria
competed with Russia for ascendancy in the
Balkans. In 1911, Italy invaded Tripoli and
Cyrenaica, forcing the Ottomans to concede
their suzerainty. In 1912, the combined Balkan
powers (Serbia, Bulgaria, Greece, and
Montenegro) took all the remaining Ottoman
territories in Europe, except for a strip of land
around Istanbul, before arguing among them-
selves. In August 1914 the rivalries between the
European powers in the Balkans erupted into a
THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE 1650–1920
worldwide war, with the Ottoman Empire
ranged alongside Austria and Germany
against Britain, France, Italy, and Russia. The
defeat of the Central Powers in 1918, the abdi-
cation of the sultan in 1922, the abolition of
the caliphate in 1924, as well as the exchange
of populations between Turkey and Greece in
1921 brought the Ottoman Empire to its end.
The Dolmabahçe Palace, Istanbul. The classical Venetian-
style facade of this palace, like others built for the
Ottoman sultans in the nineteenth century, reveals
change in cultural orientation, as they abandoned their
former seclusion and displayed their power like
European monarchs.
91
HISTORICAL ATLAS OF THE ISLAMIC WORLD
Iran 1500–2000
Shah Suleiman and his courtiers
with Western visitors, shown
against a lyrical European-style
landscape. The Safavid rulers
exported carpets and silk to
Europe as well as ceramics
designed by Chinese craftsmen
for the Western markets. They
broke with the traditional
religious hostility toward
figurative painting by claiming
that the Imam Ali, revered by
the Shiites, had been a painter as
well as a calligrapher.
92
The history of modern Iran began with the
ruling Safavid dynasty (1501–1722) which
established Twelver Shiism as the state religion.
The dynasty’s founder Shaikh Safi al-Din
(1252–1334) was a Sufi teacher and mujaddid
(renovator) of Sunni allegiance who started a
movement of reform among the tribes of eastern
Anatolia and
northwestern Iran.
His descendant
Shah Ismail
(1487–1524) acti-
vated popular
eschatological
expectations in the
period of disorder
following the col-
lapse of the
Timurid Empire by
proclaiming himself the Hidden Imam, or
expected Shiite messiah. Led by a fearsome band
of warriors known as Qizilbashis (red heads)
from their distinctive red turbans, the movement
enabled Shah Ismail, who proclaimed himself
king in Tabriz in 1501, to conquer most of Iran in
the course of the next decade.
Though the power of the Safavid state, based
on the brilliant new capital built by Shah Abbas
(1588–1629) in Isfahan, was limited, relying for its
authority on a network of uymaqs or smaller
chieftains and the traditional iqta system of tax-
farming, the Safavid strategy of religious consoli-
dation gave Iran the distinctive Shiite character it
retains to this day. Once the Qizilbashis had done
their work Ismail’s messianic claims were deem-
phasized, and Shiite scholars were imported from
Syria, Iraq, Bahrain, and al-Hasa to promote the
“official” version of Twelver Shiism, according to
which the return of the Imam/Messiah is indefi-
nitely deferred. Sunnism was suppressed, the
tombs of Sufi saints desecrated, and khanaqas
(hostelries) given over to Shiite youth. Jews and
Zoroastrians were subjected to forcible conver-
sion. The pilgrimage to Mecca was discouraged in
favor of ziyaras (visits) to the lavishly-endowed
shrines of the Shiite imans. In the eighteenth cen-
tury, following the disintegration of the Safavid
Empire, Iran endured a period of anarchy with
Ottomans and Russians controlling the north, and
Afghans, Afshars, Zand, and Qajar tribal chiefs
vying for power in the south. Though Nadir Shah,
an Afshar chieftain who proclaimed himself Shah
in 1736, curbed the power of the Shiite ulama, the
turbulence of the eighteenth century permitted the
ulama to obtain a higher degree of institutional
autonomy than their Sunni counterparts.
Under the Qajar dynasty (1779–1925) the pow-
ers of the Shiite ulama were enhanced by zakat
and khums (religious taxes), which were paid to
them directly, while their custodianship over
shrines and waqfs (charitable trusts) gave them
access to rents from land and housing. The loca-
tion of two of the most important shrines at
Karbala and Najaf in Iraq, in Ottoman-controlled
territory, gave them a power base outside the
domain of the state. The mourning ceremonies
commemorating the martyrdom of the Imam
Hussein at Karbala and the associated taziya (pas-
sion plays) became characteristic features of pop-
ular religiosity, making Shiism a component ele-
ment in Iranian national identity.
As pressures from Russia and Britain began to
impinge on Iran in the nineteenth century, the
ulama came to the forefront of nationalist resist-
ance. In 1873 they forced the Shah to cancel far-
reaching economic and financial concessions
made to a British citizen, Baron de Reuter, and in
the 1890s they led a national boycott against a
tobacco monopoly granted to another Briton,
Major Talbot. The political momentum engen-

dered by the tobacco agitation culminated in the
Constitutional Revolution of 1906, when a coali-
tion of liberal ulama, merchants, and members of
the Westernized intelligentsia forced the Shah to
convene a national assembly and to submit to a
form of parliamentary government. A brief period
of constitutional rule, during which tensions
between conservative ulama and the liberals came
to the surface, was brought to an end by the
Russians in 1911, when they intervened to restore
the Shah’s autocracy.
In 1925 Reza Khan Pahlavi, an officer in the
Cossack Brigade, came to power after a period of
instability following the Russian Revolution. Reza
Shah instituted a radical modernizing regime that
sought to break the power of tribal leaders and to
curb the autonomy of the ulama by introducing
secular education and government supervision of
religious schools. Secular courts were established
depriving the ulama of their legal monopoly,
which included the lucrative business of registering
land transactions. During the Second World War
Britain and Russia, who needed a compliant
Iranian government to facilitate the passage of
war material to the eastern front, forced Reza
Shah to resign and replaced him with his son, the
young Muhammad Reza.
After the Second World War oil, first discov-
ered in 1908 and leased to the British under gener-
ous concessions, became a bone of contention
when the nationalist Prime Minister, Muhammad
Mosaddeq, attempted to nationalize the Anglo-
Iranian Oil Company. In the crisis engendered by
a boycott of Iranian oil by Western oil companies,
the CIA intervened to help the army restore the
autocratic Pahlavi regime.
The collapse of the regime in 1979 and the
ensuing Islamic revolution were the result of a
complex combination of economic, cultural, and
political factors. Far from benefiting small tenants
and landless peasants, the Shah’s ambitious land
reforms in the 1960s favored large-scale enterpris-
IRAN 1500–2000
es and agribusiness (in which the ruling family had
interests), while alienating the ulama, many of
whom were themselves wealthy landowners or
controlled extensive waqfs in land. The sudden
increase in oil prices after 1973 increased wealth in
the small modernized sector of the economy, while
adversely affecting small businesses in the bazaari
community, which had close links to the ulama.
The corruption of the Pahlavi family and ruthless
repression by SAVAK, the secret police, alienated
the educated middle classes, and especially the
younger generation of students, who had come
under the influence of Marxism and the leftist ver-
sions of Islamic ideology promoted by Dr Ali
Shariati and Jalal Al-e-Ahmed, author of a highly
influential tract entitled Westoxification. Poor
rural migrants to the cities provided the tinder for
revolution.
Under a deal reached between the Shah and
Saddam Hussein, Iraq expelled the dissident cleric
Ayatollah Ruhallah Khomeini from the Shiite cen-
ter of Najaf, where his lectures calling for a
restored Islamic government under ulama supervi-
sion found a receptive audience among ulama and
students. From his place of exile in a Paris suburb
Khomeini had access to the international media,
while taped copies of his fatwas and sermons
denouncing the Shah were smuggled into Iran.
Early in 1979 a series of massive demonstrations,
timed to coincide with the ritual of Ashura (the
Day of Mourning for the Imam Hussein), forced
the Shah into exile, bringing Khomeini home to a
tumultuous reception. For ten years, until his
death in 1989, he ruled the Islamic republic as the
supreme religious leader. Although the Ayatollah
Khamenei, Khomeini’s successor as the supreme
religious authority, lacks Khomeini’s charisma, the
right of the Guardianship Council which he con-
trols to vet candidates for the parliament has effec-
tively curbed its power to introduce changes that
the religious establishment regards as being con-
trary to its interests.
93
HISTORICAL ATLAS OF THE ISLAMIC WORLD

Central Asia to 1700

The history of inner Asia, like that of the Fertile ed Turkish-Mongolian power in Central Asia,
Crescent where Islam originated, was dominated creating an empire that would stretch, at its
by the relationship between nomadic pastoralists height, from western India (including Delhi) to
and settled peoples. In the vast semiarid steppe- the shores of the Black Sea. After defeating the
lands to the north and east of the Black and Ottomans at Ankara in 1402, where he captured
Caspian Seas lived peoples whose livelihoods the sultan, Bayazid I (r. 1389–1402), he became
depended mainly on cattle, horses, goats, sheep, well known in Europe. The disruption of
camels, and yaks. They were organized into patri- Ottoman power in Anatolia relieved the pressure
archal kinship groups based on families, clans, on Constantinople (which survived for another
and confederations or hordes, the greatest of half century) and reopened the trade routes to
which was that organized under the leadership of China, while his defeat of the Golden Horde
Ghenghis Khan and his successors. Under assisted the rise of Christian Russia.
the leadership of Ghenghis Khan’s son Batu
(r. 1227–55) the Golden Horde of Mongol- Yelet
s
Turkish people (who became known as Tatars in
Russia) established its base from two sarays Ode
ssa
(palace headquarters) on the Volga River. From
here they conquered the Ukraine, southern
OT Kaff
Poland, Hungary, Bulgaria, and Russia, creating a TO a
M Bla
Con AN ck
vast empire of which the ruler in Moscow was the stan
tino EM
Sea
ple
principal tributary. Leading Tatar families became PI
Ath R
ens
Muslims from the mid-thirteenth century after TRE

E
Sm Ank BIZ
y ara ON
contact with the sedentary peoples of Iran, 140 rna 140 D
2
by T 2: Ottom Sivas
Baye imur. Ott ans defe 1400
Khwarzm, and Transoxiana. Brought by the mer- zid I oman ated
dies S u lt
in ca
Kon ptivit an
SAL ya
JUQS y
chants and Sufi dervishes who traveled along the Me OF RUM
The Shah mosque (now Imam Silk Road, Islam in inner Asia acquired a mystical, dit
err
mosque) in Isfahan, with the pluralistic character resulting from its encounters an
ea 1400
Alep Mosu
n S po l
names of God and Muhammad with Zoroastrianism, Buddhism, Nestorian ea
Eu
Dam
ph
written in bold geometric
Christianity, and older traditions of shamanism. Ale ascu
r at
xan s
1400
es
characters on the minaret. Built dria
The conversion to Islam by Tarmarshirin Jeru
between 1612 and 1630, its salem
(r. 1326–34), the ruler of the lands in Transoxiana
spectacular blue-tiled decoration Cairo
A

bequeathed by Ghenghis Khan to his second son

epitomizes the style and MA
Chagatai, caused a split in his clan. This was clev- ML
r

splendor of Shah Abbas. SU UK

LT
erly exploited by Timur Lenk, a member respect- AN
a

AT
E
ed by the impoverished clan of Turkomans.
b

Though lame from birth Timur (r. 1370–1405),

i

known as Tamerlane in the West, was a brilliant

a

political strategist and military commander. By

uniting Transoxiana and Iran (previously ruled by
the Ilkhans, descendents of Hulegu) he regenerat-

94
 CENTRAL ASIA TO 1700

Under Timur, his successor Ulugh Beg distinguished scholars, artists, historians, and
(r. 1404–49), and the Uzbek Shaybanids poets of his time, setting the stamp of “royal”
(1500–c. 1700) who inherited Timurid power in Islamic high culture that would be imitated
inner Asia, Herat, Samarkand, and Bukhara with rather more refinement by his successors.
were transformed into world-class cities. They He was broad-minded on religious matters.
were embellished by the plunder and legions of Though a Sunni Muslim who launched his con-
skilled craftsmen and artisans Timur and his quests in the name of the Sharia under the pre-
successors had imported from Persia, India, text that his enemies were apostates and trai-
Iraq, and Syria. Though utterly ruthless and tors to Islam, he gave his protection to the
cruel (before taking Delhi, he had thousands of Shiites. Shaikks (Sufi pirs) were his chief spiri-
male prisoners executed so they would not be tual advisors. The Naqshbandi Sufi order,
able to change sides) Timur was far from being named after Baha al-Din Naqshband (d. 1389),
an ignorant barbarian. He mastered Persian, who is buried near Bukhara, put down deep
and surrounded himself with some of the most roots in inner Asia during this period.

K H A The Dominions of Timur

NAT E E
O F T H E G O L D E N H O R D Timur Empire

New Sa Ottoman Empire

1395: Capi i
ra
Horde sack tal of Golden
ed by Tim kh ash Empire of the Great Khan
ur
Bal
Vo

ke
lga

La Sultanate of Delhi
Astrakhan
Khanate of the Golden Horde
Aral
Sea
GA TA I Mamluk Sultanate
CHA
Ca
sp

Derben
t nt N AT E Chagatai Khanate
KHA
ian

Urgench Otrar Tashke

Tiflis Major attacks and campaigns
1404: Timur dies during a
Sea

planned invasion of Chin nd iana ter

Transox
137
9 and is buried at Samarka as m Kashgar
ur becomes
Samarkand 1369: Tim ana, formerly 0 500 km
of Transoxi Chagatai Kharate
Bukhara part of the
Tabriz 0 500 miles
1
138

1383

Am
E
TH
u Da
rya
E OF
Balkh
PIR N
Nishapur EM HA
A T K
E M Kabul GR
E
P I R E Herat
Baghda
d O F T I M U R
1401
Isfahan
1387 Kandahar

Multan

Shiraz
Delhi ur invades India
Ganges
s
du

98: Tim
In

Pe 13 cks Delhi
N rs and sa
ian
HI
Gu DEL
OF
lf TE
ANA
S U LT

95
HISTORICAL ATLAS OF THE ISLAMIC WORLD
India 711–1971
Islam first appeared in the South Asia subconti-
nent with the Arab invasion of Sind (711–713). In
the tenth century Fatimid dais (missionaries)
from Cairo converted local rulers in Multan to
Ismailism. However, these were replaced by Sunni
governors appointed by the Ghurids in the after-
math of the conquest of the Punjab by Mahmud
of Ghazna, who sacked Lahore and devastated
northern India in 1030. The systematic conquest
of the subcontinent began with the Ghurids, who
occupied Multan, Lahore, and Delhi (1175–92)
before one of their generals, Qutb al-Din Aybeg,
established the first of several independent sul-
tanates in Delhi. These endured from 1206 to
1526 under a succession of different dynasties.
The Delhi sultanates help to establish the distinc-
tive character of Indian Islam, a legacy carried by
the Timurid Mughal Empire founded by Timur’s
grandson Babur in 1526. This lasted more than
three centuries until its dissolution by the British
after the “Mutiny” or Great Rebellion in 1858.
The Mughal Empire absorbed a number of inde-
pendent Muslim dynasties that had been estab-
lished in Bengal (1356–1576), Kashmir
(1346–1589), Gujerat (1407–1572), and the
Deccan (1347–1601). At the Empire’s greatest
extent under Aurungzeb (r. 1658–1707) the
emperor’s name was read from the pulpits of
mosques as far apart as Kabul and Mysore.
Some of the early Muslim rulers were fired
with iconoclastic zeal against “idolators” and
destroyed Hindu temples, replacing them with
large mosques intended to symbolize Islamic
domination. The Tughluq dynasty (1320–1413),
however, initiated a pattern of tolerance that
would help to establish a pluralistic version of
Islam in India that contrasted with the more rigid
and austere varieties of earlier times. To counter
the political influence of well-established Muslim
families, the dynasty’s founder Muhammad
Tughluq (r. 1325–51) appointed non-Muslims to
military and government offices, took part in
local festivals, and allowed the construction of
96
temples. While there was an initial period of
Muslim immigration into India from Afghanistan
and Central Asia after the conquests, the process
of conversion and Islamization was slow and rel-
atively limited. It is doubtful if more than 20 or 25
percent of the Indian population became Muslim,
with the Muslim populations concentrated in the
Indus Valley, the northwestern frontier region,
and Bengal. While the ruling classes were the
descendants of warriors from Afghanistan, Iran,
and inner Asia, most of the converts were from
the lower Hindu castes or tribal and rural peoples
whose lives were improved by joining the religious
community of the rulers. The fullest diversity of
Islamic faith, practice, and tradition came to be
reflected among Indian Muslims, Sunni, Shiite,
and Sufi, with a vast number of variations. The
pluralistic character of Indian Islam is reflected in
its magnificent architectural heritage where
motifs drawn from Islamic and Hindu vernacu-
lars were blended into a new, creative synthesis.
Muslim devotional literature, including poetry,
exists in a large number of Indian languages in
addition to Arabic and Persian, the languages
taught in the institutions of higher learning along
with law, theology, and mysticism.
While the ruling dynasties reflected an urban
pattern of Muslim life, which had much in com-
mon with the cosmopolitan culture of other
Muslim regions such as Iran and Central Asia,
rural Muslim populations retained a strong ver-
nacular heritage, with local Hindu rituals and
customs often mixed with Islamic beliefs and
practices. Sufi teachers and religious orders played
a particularly important role in the spread of
Islam in South Asia. Among the most important
tariqas were the Suhrawardiyya and the Chistiyya.
Though organized hierarchically in a way that fit-
ted the character of Indian society, the social roles
of the tariqas differed greatly. Whereas the
Suhrawardis maintained close relations with the
Delhi sultans, benefiting from endowments and
gifts of land that gave their leaders the status of
 INDIA 711–1971

70° 80° 90°

Banu
Muslim India
ri
Kabul Major religious sites, c. 1100–1400
nd
elma

R . Shel Srinagar R. Buddhist shrine

Ghazni

us
um
Ind

In
H

d
Kurram us
Hindu shrine
R.
Pass
Brahmaputra
Muslim shrine
Nagarkot and Kangra
Punj ab Lahore
Jawalamukhi R. Su
tlej
vi
b

na Ra
he R.
C

Dipalpur H
R.

30°
Multan lej Thanesar i
Sut Gangadvara m Lhasa
R.
Sirsa Tahari a R . Brahmaputra
Uch c. 1192 l
a
y
Delhi a s
R.
us Th a r G ang Kathmandu
d

es
In

Desert Mathura
R.

Tirhut tra
Pushkar bal pu
Ajmer R. Brah m a
i ham R
.J R
R. L un R.
C um
na Jaunp u r . Gogra
Jaunpur Pandua
Maner Bihar
Nalanda Gaur Sylhet
Canderi Prayaga Warandsi Bodh Gaya
M oe In
th

R.
Rann of Cut Dharmanatha Ga Sonargaon
ut d

hs ch R. Son ng
us o f Khajuraho e
Tropic of Cancer

s
Arbuda Sanchi
G. Ahmadabad
Gujerat da Chittagong
o f C utch
. Na
rma Bengal
Khambhat R

s
Girinagara Mandu M a l w a an
ge
Baruch R he G
. Ta R. Mahanadi M o u t h s of t
p ti Burhanpur
Somnath Gulf of Orissa Ratnagiri
Cambay Bhubaneswar
20°
W e s t

R. G Puri Konarak
oda Daulatabad
vari
. Indrava t i
R

R. s
Bh t
i a Bay of Bengal
D e c c a n
m

h
e r n

a
R. K

Bidar G
Gulbarga
istn

Arabian Sea
n
a

Bijapur
e

Golconda
G h

t
s
a
a t

Vijayanagar Chola state at its maximum

E

extent, c. 1100
R . Penner
s

Eastern border of Ghaznavid

Emirate, c. 1150
Balligave CHOLAS
Chandragiri Empire of Muhammad of
Ghur, c. 1206
Sringeri Kanchipuram
Mamallapuram Expansion of the Delhi Sultanate
Sravana
La

N uve Under Qutb al-Din Aybeg,

R. Ca ry
cca

1206–10
Chidambaram
Under Itutmish, 1210–36
div

Kumbakonam
Tanjore Under Ala-al-Din Khalji,
e I

10° it 1296–1316
Madurai tra
sla

kS Under Muhammad ibn

Pal
Jaffna Tughluk, 1325–51
n

PA N D Y A S
ds

Korkai Timur’s invasion, 1398–99

Gulf of
0 200 km Vijayanagar at its maximum
Mannar Anuradhapura
extent, c. 1485
0 200 miles
Ceylon Polonnaruva

Kandy

INDIAN OCEAN 97
HISTORICAL ATLAS OF THE ISLAMIC WORLD

60° 90°
A mu D 70° 80°
Hu

arya
Ka Major European trading
rg

sh settlements, c. 1700
French settlement
A F G H A N I S TA N
Dutch settlement
Hari Rud Kabul
Peshawar British settlement
I

nd
Kabul
d
ar

Danish settlement
an

Kashmir

us
H ud

us
ra
h lm T I B E T
He

d
Fa

Portuguese settlement

In
Attock
Kandahar SIKHS
Lahore
Lahore Sut
lej
man
H el b
a i
av
en
R
Ch

30°
lej Delhi
Sut

H
Multan Lhasa

i
Samana m
Multan Panipat a B rahmaputra
1526 l a
Dehli y a
Baluchistan
Th a r Ga JATS s
D e s e r t Aj mer SATNAMIS nges
s
du

Laswari
In

(Raj putana)
l
ngo

Fatehpur Sikri Agra Lucknow

Ajmer tra
Hi

Ta t t a Biana Ju O u d hG Brahm a p u
Jodhpur mn og
Hindaun a
ra
L u ni Gwalior Allahabad Bihar Rajmahal
RAJPUTS A g r a Benares Patna
Bengal
Lahari Bandar Allahabad
MeR

Tropic of Canc
th

er Kasimbazar
ou . I

Rann of Cu Dacca
Son
t h nd

so tch
us f Sarkhej Plassey
Ahmadabad Hooghly Chandernagore
G.
o f C utc h ada Serampore (Frederiksnagar) Chinsura
N ar m Calcutta Chittagong
Cambay Baroda M a l w a
Gujerat Asirgarh
Ara bian Sea Broach
Mahanadi Pipli of
Diu Surat Buranphur M o uth es
Nagpur Balasore the Gang
20° Gulf of Gondwana
Karanja
Cambay Daman Khandesh
God Assaye
sa
W e s

Bassein ava
ri s
Berar
Bombay Ahmadnagar ndra
vati s ri
I

t O
Chaul D e c c a n a
Janjira Poona h Bay of Bengal
t e r RATHAS

Ahmadnagar Golconda Bimlipatam

Satara G
Golconda Vizagapatam
MA

Hyderabad
n
r
n

Vengurla Bijapur
t

Masulipatam
G h

Vi j aya n a g a r
s

Goa Nizampatam The Mughal Empire

a

1526 – 1707
E
a

Nellore
t

Bhatkal Chandragiri Mughal conquest by 1525

s

Bijapur Pulicat
Madras Mughal conquest by 1539
INDIAN OCEAN Mangalore
Sadras
Empire at Akbar’s death,
La

Pondicherry
very Fort St. David 1605
c

Cau
ca

Tegnapatan A g ra Mughal subab (province)

Calicut
N
di

Tranquebar
10° Negapatam
ve

Empire at the death of Shah

Tanjore
Jahau (Aurungzeb), 1707
Strait
Is

Cochin Madura lk
la

Pa Maratha raids, 1664–1700

nd

Tuticorin
Quilon
s

Gulf of Maratha territory, c. 1700

Kayal Mannar
Under Maratha influence,
Ceylon c. 1700
Colombo People in rebellion against
JATS
0 200 km the Empire, c. 1700

0 200 miles Battle

98
 INDIA 711–1971

India, Invasions, and

provincial notables, the Chistis made a point of Mughal decline, when the British became the Regional Powers 1739–60
refusing endowments and rejecting government dominant power in India. Reformers in the tradi- English base, 1700

service, living by cultivating wastelands and from tion of Shah Wali Allah encouraged Muslims to French base, 1700
donations by their devotees. avoid collaboration with power or social mixing Portuguese
base, 1700
The pirs (Sufi shaikks), who won converts with non-Muslims. While Sufi devotional prac-
Dutch base, 1700
among tribal or marginal peoples or from the tices (including worship at the shrine of saints and
British territory,
lower Hindu castes, used local languages (includ- colorful popular festivals) continued to attract the c. 1785

ing ritual languages) to convey the Islamic mes- poor, the reformist currents gained ground Maratha territory,
c. 1785
sage in social and religious milieus that were very among the emerging class of literate profession- Mysore territory,
c. 1785
different from those prevailing in the regions als. The reform college of Deoband, founded in Center of Gurkha
power, c. 1785
where Islam originated. At a popular level it mat- 1867, used the new technology of print in Urdu
Campaigns
tered little if a holy man presented himself as a and the burgeoning rail network to reach a mass Nadir Shah
of Persia
Muslim or a devotee of Shiva: what inspired Muslim audience throughout the subcontinent,
Ahmad Khan
bakhti (devotion) was his individual aura of holi- Abdali of
Afghanistan
ness. At an intellectual level the philosophical jus- R. A
m
BUKHARA 60° 50° 1759 40°
Haidar Ali
u D ar ya
Faizabad of Mysore
7

tification for religious collaboration between

173

Gurkhas
Islam and what would come to be known as 1738
KASHMIR Chinese
Kabul
Hinduism (a term invented by Europeans in the 1752 R
1739

.I
nineteenth century) could be found in the writ- Rawalpindi Marathas

nd
1738 1 C H I N A
75

u
s
AF G H AN I S TAN 2

ings of the great Andalusian mystic Ibn al-Arabi,

s
ndu

Kandahar Lahore Battle

Ladakh
R. I

Lahore
whose doctrine of “unity of being” could be har- R.
Ra
v
17
57 1720
Quetta Punjab T i b e t
monized with the spiritual teachings of the Vedas 30°
1761 1739
1790 Lhasa
1739 R . Brahmaputr a
DELHI
and the Upanishads. The high point of Hindu- BELUTSHISTAN
Multan 1761 Dehli N
1792

im
Rampur E P
R

Muslim religious harmony was reached during .G A L

kk
an
u AGRA
ge 1790 1787

Si
d
R. In

R A J P U TA NA Kathmandu Bhutan
the reign of Akbar I (1556–1605), a supporter of Sind Agra
176
Jodhpur Ajmer 1 Lucknow
the Chistis who instituted the Din-i-Ilahi (divine Hyderabad Benares
Bihar 1789
R.
1761

Karachi G Bengal
religion). This was an imperial cult with Akbar at

an
ge
179

Tropic of Cancer Dacca

its center combining the roles of Sufi master and
0

1738
Chandernagore
philosopher-king. Gujerat
M A R AT H A
Calcutta
CONFEDERACY
In due course, however, practices seen by the Diu Nagpur
ck

ulama as syncretic or idolatrous would become 1724

ta

20°
Cut
rs

R. G Bay of Bengal
the targets of reformist movements inspired by
ca

oda
var
ir

Bombay
C

1791-92 1760
more orthodox teachings emanating from the
n

Nizam’s
er

Dominions
th

centers of Islam to the west. The leaders of this

or

Hyderabad
N

GOLCONDA
Yanam
tendency were Shaikh Ahmad Sirhindi 1736
Goa
(1564–1624) and his follower Shah Wali Allah Arabian Sea
(1702–63). The public form of this reaction began 1779
MYSORE 1740
Bangalore
under Akbar’s grandson Aurungzeb, who Madras
t i c

Mangalore
1771 1780
1783
reversed the policy of accommodation with 1769
n a

Pondicherry
La

Mahé 1776
1779 Karikal
a r

MALABAR
cca

Hindus. He imposed the jizya (poll tax) on non- 1759 Negapatam

C

it
div

10° COCHIN tra

kS
Muslims, ordered the destruction of Hindu tem- N Cochin Pal Jaffna
e I

TR
AV

ples, and founded Muslim colleges for the study

sl

AN

Gulf of
CO
an

Mannar
R

Ce y l o n
E
ds

of the Sharia, as well as banning music at court. (Dutch)

Kandy
0 200 km Colombo
The reformist currents helped to preserve a dis-
0 200 miles INDIAN OCEAN
tinctive Muslim identity during a century of

99
 HISTORICAL ATLAS OF THE ISLAMIC WORLD

reinforcing Muslim communal distinctiveness. arate Hindu and Muslim electorates at local level,
“To like and appreciate the customs of the infi- thereby consolidating a separate identity of
dels,” wrote leading Deobandi scholar Maulana Muslims legally and politically. From there the
Ashraf Ali Thanawi, “is a grave sin.” “two-nations” theory, which held that Muslims
The sense of Muslim separateness was and Hindus constituted distinct and separate
encouraged by the British, who tended to stress nations, was a small but inevitable step. The same
the importance of religious ties over family, lin- logic decreed that the Muslims of India were enti-
eage, language, caste, regional, or class affilia- tled to their own territorial homeland. The state
tions among India’s variegated communities. The of Pakistan, created on Indian independence in
Indian Councils Act of 1909 institutionalized sep- 1947, was constructed out of a disparate variety

RUSSIAN EMPIRE
AmB U K H A R A 60° 50° 40°
uD
ar ya
Faizabad s h Tu r k e s t a n
K u 0 200 km
u
n d
H i 0 200 miles
1893
Ladakh
Herat 1753
1842 Kashmir and Jammu
A F G H A N I S T A N Kabul
Peshawar 1846 British protectorate N
In
C H I N A
du

Rawalpindi
s

1839
1891 Jammu
Kandahar Punjab Amritsar
us

Lahore Jullundur T i b e t
Ind

vi
Ra
b

Firozpur
ab

30° R.
en

Quetta u tl
Ch

S
R. Lhasa
r Meerut
l pu B rahmaputra
cy
wa Rampur N Lhasa gen
a Dehli E P er A
h nti
Ba A L ro n
st F itai s s
am
Bareli Ea o Br A
G

Baluchistan an
ge rth 14 t
Kathmandu No 913–
PERSIA Rajputana s
Mainpura Sitapur B h u tan 1
Indus

a
tr
1818 British protectorate Agra O u d h ma p u
Ajmer Lucknow Brah
Kanpur Azamghar B i h a r Darjeeling Carchar
Sind Jodhpur Nimach 1 85 1882 British protectorate
7–5 Patna
Hyderabad Gwalior 8
Karachi Kalpi Benares Ga Manipur
Erinpura Jhansi Allahabad ng 1886 British protectorate
es

Nimach 18 U ppe r
Tropic of Cancer Fatehpur 57
I N D I A Sikri B en gal Dacca Bur ma
Rann of Bhopal Dum-Dum 1886 to Britain
Cuch
Indore Chandernagore Chittagong formerly Chinese territory
Arabian Sea Jabalpur Calcutta Mandalay
Baroda Mhow
British Conquest of
India Central Indian Provinces
Surat Nagpur 1826
ck

British
20° annexation Diu Orissa Cuttack
Daman
ta

to Portugal Berar Cut

1753–75 God
ava Lower
ri Burma
Bombay s 1857
1792–1805 Poona
c ar
Nizam’s Dominions ir
C Rangoon
rn
1815–1858 Bay of Bengal Bassein
Hyderabad e
h Moulmein
o rt Yanam 1826
After 1858 Bijapur N

Dependant state Goa

Minor dependant state Mysore

1831 British
Under British supervision, protectorate Andaman Is.
Bangalore Madras
c

later annexed Mangalore 1857

t i

Coorg
Boundary of British India, Pondicherry
c. 1890 Mahé
n a

Other territories Karikal

10°
a r

Laccadive Cochin ai
Str
Tr a

Portuguese Islands l k
Pa Jaffna
van

French
co

Anjengo Gulf of Trincomalee

re

Area most affected by the Trivandrum Mannar

Indian mutiny of 1857 1815 1818 INDIAN OCEAN
Kandy
Colombo C eylo n
Major center of uprising 1798 to Britain

British campaigns

100
 INDIA 711–1971

of Muslim communities located in the territories

60° 50°
of Sind, Baluchistan, the Northwest Frontier TAJIKISTAN Xinjiang Uygur Zizhiqu
1963
province, the western half of the Punjab, and a claimed by India as part of
Faizabad Kashmir border agreed by
part of Bengal, a mainly Muslim territory locat- Pakistan and China C H I N A
ed more than a thousand miles to the east, sepa- Area of sporadic
conflict since 1964
rated by Indian territory. In western Pakistan, AFGHANISTAN Under Pakistani control
more than half the people were Punjabis, some 20
control Aksai Chin area
percent were Sindhis, 13 percent were Pashtuns, 1 9 7 L ine of
Kabul 1 claimed by India,
occupied by China
and 3–4 percent were Baluchis, with the remain- Ja mmu a nd In 1962
der, apart from small Hindu and Christian Ka shmir Chinese attack on

du
Rawalpindi

s
under Indian control Aksai Chin area
minorities, Muhajirs, or refugees from India. The 1971

exchange of populations following partition led

Tibet
to a massive bloodbath, in which hundreds of

us
Himcha l N

Ind
thousands of people were killed in communal Pra desh
Lahore
rioting. The unresolved dispute over Kashmir, P A K I S T A N Amritsar
1965
where the Hindu ruler chose to accede to the Punjab
ab

Sikh struggle for

Indian Union against the wishes of his Muslim
en

30° separatist state (Khalistan)

Ch

subjects, has contributed to three wars between I N D I A

Haryana NE
India and Pakistan, in 1949, 1965, and 1971, as PA L
0 200 km Dehli
well as to a continuing cycle of insurgency and us Rampur
Ind Ga
repression. Pakistan’s political fragility was 0 200 miles
n ge
s
reflected by the succession of military govern-
ments that alternated with periods of precarious and destroyed by Hindu militants in 1991, is still
democratic rule by parties accused of corruption a powerful source of contention between India’s Conflict over Kashmir
1949 – 1971
and lacking Islamic legitimacy. In the final analy- Hindu and Muslim communities. In the commu-
Pakistani attacks
sis the army, controlled by the British-trained nal riots that followed the mosque’s destruction,
Indian attacks
Punjabi officer class, proved the only institution thousands of Muslims were killed—a story tragi-
capable of holding the country together. In 1971, cally repeated in 2003 when Hindu pilgrims Religious unrest and rivalry

with military help from India, East Pakistan returning from Ayodhya were attacked by
broke away from western Pakistan to form the Muslims in Gujerats, causing widespread com-
independent Muslim state of Bangladesh. The munal conflict in the region.
fractious relationship between India and Pakistan
The Taj Mahal, Agra, India
(both of them now nuclear powers) has yet to be
(completed 1653). One of the
resolved. The erosion of India’s secular culture
world’s best-known monuments,
consequent on Hindu political revival and official
it is the most enduring emblem of
Islamophobia occasionally tolerated in some
Mughal rule in India. It was built
states—notably Gujerat—has made the position
by the Emperor Shah Jahan in
of the Muslim minority remaining in India—
memory of his wife Mumtaz
which numbers some 120 million, about 10 per-
Mahal. Shah Jahan, who was
cent of the population—more vulnerable than at
deposed by his son Aurungzeb, is
any time since partition. The legacy of the
also buried there.
Muslim conquests has yet to be fully absorbed in
Indian popular consciousness. A mosque in
Ayodhya, said to have been built by Babur on the
site of a temple devoted to the hero-deity Rama,

101
HISTORICAL ATLAS OF THE ISLAMIC WORLD

Russian Expansion in Transcaucasia and Central Asia

The Russian expansion into Transoxiana and
the Caucasus region, which would culminate
in the incorporation of more than fifty mil-
lion Muslim peoples into the Soviet Union,
began in the fifteenth century when the rulers
Imam Shamil of Daghestan (c. 1797–1871), on horseback, from a Russian engraving of c. 1850.
Shamil waged a heroic campaign (1834–59) against the Russians under the spiritual authority of
his father-in-law, a shaikh of the Naqshbandiyya Sufi order. Though eventually defeated and sent
into exile, his memory remained alive in Daghestan and Chechnya, where it has inspired
successive anti-Russian and anti-Soviet revolts up to the present day.
of Moscow threw off the Tatar yoke. By the
1550s Moscow had absorbed the autonomous
Muslim states of Kazan and Astrakhan, giv-
ing it control of the Volga and the northern
shores of the Caspian Sea and opening the
way for the conquest of the Kazakh steppes.
The Kazakhs had pulled out of the confeder-
ation of Turkish-Mongol tribes that had cre-
ated the Timurid and subsequent empires,
remaining qazaq (freely roaming) lords of the
steppes. The Russians built a string of forts
between the Ural and the Irtysh rivers. This
enabled them to bring the whole region under
Russian control, a process marked by the abo-
lition of the Kazakh khanates in the 1820s.
However, Kazakh resistance, inspired by
Islam, would last until the 1860s.
In its earlier phases Russian rule over its
Muslim populations was extremely harsh.
The Tatar nobility were subjected to forced
conversion and expelled from important
cities. Their lands were given over to the
Russian nobility and monasteries, who plant-
ed them with Orthodox serfs and monks. The
policy was relaxed under Catherine the Great,
who regarded Islam as a more civilizing influ-
ence than Christianity. Muslims were guaran-
teed religious freedom, mosques were built
with state sponsorship, and institutions creat-
ed with broad authority over the Muslim pop-
ulation. The situation, however, was not to
last. In the Crimea, which Russia had
acquired from the Ottomans in 1783, the
Russians took over Tatar lands and confiscat-
ed waqfs (religious endowments) for the ben-
efit of European colonists. Further east the
mainly pastoral peoples of Inner Asia fell
prey to the colonizing ambitions of Russian
generals and the desire of the tsars to secure
trading advantages with Iran, India, and

102

China, forestalling potential British rivalry.
Tashkent was occupied in 1865, Samarkand in
1868, and Bukhara was forced to open its
frontiers to Russian traders. In the north
Caucasus the Russians overcame resistance
inspired by the Naqshbandi and Qadiri
orders, overthrowing the Islamic state estab-
lished by Imam Shamil in 1859. By 1900 the
tsarist conquest of Transcaucasia and Central
Asia was virtually complete.
Far from leading to the dissolution of the
tsarist empire in Asia the Bolshevik revolution
of 1917–18 led to its consolidation. In their
struggle against their own conservative reli-
gious establishments, intellectual advocates of
Islamic reform, known as jadidists, joined the
Communist Party. They hoped to modify
Russian policies to meet the needs of the
Muslim populations and to promote versions
of Muslim nationalism in alliance with Soviet
Russia. The Muslim nationalists were outma-
neuvered by Stalin and the party centralizers.
Their leading advocate Mir Said Sultan Galiev
(b. 1880) was arrested in 1928 and disap-
peared soon afterward. However, a sense of
shared values between Islam and communism
(social justice, the priority of public over pri-
vate interest, of community over the individ-
ual) encouraged them to work for their inter-
ests within the party by adopting a strategy of
taqiyya (dissimulation). But official Islam suf-
fered serious assault during the 1930s when
Stalin launched his “second revolution” from
above. Mosques were placed in the hands of
the Union of Atheists, to be turned into muse-
ums or places of entertainment, while two of
the five “pillars” of the Islamic faith, the pil-
grimage to Mecca and the collection of zakat
(the religious dues used to maintain mosques
and provide funds for the needy) were effec-
tively forbidden. The ban on Arabic script
RUSSIAN EXPANSION IN TRANSCAUCASIA AND CENTRAL ASIA
and its replacement by Latin and later Cyrillic
scripts ensured that future Soviet generations
would have much less access than in the past
to the canonical texts of Islam.
The potential for political solidarity among
Soviet Muslims was attacked by a deliberate
policy of divide and rule. Central Asian states
of today owe their territorial existence to
Stalin. He responded to the threat of pan-
Turkish and pan-Islamic nationalism by parcel-
ing out the territories of Russian Turkestan
into the five republics of Uzbekistan,
Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and
Tajikistan. The prosperous Fergana Valley,
which lies at the core of the region and had
always been a single economic unit, was divid-
ed between Uzbeks, Tajiks, and Kyrgyz. Stalin’s
policies demanded that subtle differences in
language, history, and culture between these
mainly Turkic peoples be emphasized in order
to satisfy the Leninist criteria on nationality,
which required a common language, a unified
territory, a shared economic life, and a com-
mon culture. To the new territorial configura-
tions were added the straitjackets of collec-
tivization and monoculture. Under Khrus-
chev’s Virgin Lands scheme vast tracts of
Kazakhstan were given over to cereal produc-
tion, and when the mainly pastoral Kazakhs
resisted, Slavs and other peoples were imported
to do the work. In Uzbekistan more than 60
percent of gross domestic production was
turned over to cotton. This served the interests
of the ruling party elites, some of whose mem-
bers became involved in gargantuan frauds
based on the systematic falsification of pro-
duction figures. It also left a devastating envi-
ronmental legacy by starving noncotton crops
of irrigation and drying up the rivers and lakes,
including the Aral Sea.
Distrusting the loyalty of Muslims during
103
HISTORICAL ATLAS OF THE ISLAMIC WORLD

the Second World War because some of them 40° 50°

collaborated with the Germans, Stalin

deported the whole population of Chechnya-
Ingushiite and the entire Tatar population of R
the Crimea to Central Asia.
U
Although there were undoubted benefits
S
resulting from industrialization and the
S
introduction of almost universal literacy, the I
retreat of Soviet power following the jihad
Tsaritsyn
in Afghanistan inevitably saw an upsurge of
non-communist ideologies, including local
nationalisms, pan-Turkism, and militant KHANATE OF
CRIMEA
forms of Islam. The resurgence of Islamic 1783 to Russia from 1761 nominally dependent
from 1825 complete Russian control
activity after 1989 after more than half a

CIR
BLACK SEA
Astrakhan Guryev

CA
PROVINCE Stavropol

SS
century of repression may partly be 1829

IAN
S

G RE
accounted for by the mystical Sufi tradi- 1864

AT
B l a c k Pyatigorsk
tions. Originating in Central Asia, they had ABKHAZIA AB

K
S e a ARMozdok
1810 1858 D IA 1784
retained their roots. Naqshbandi Sufism, in

C
Poti 1803 Fort Shevchenko
1829 1806 1817
particular, was able to survive official perse- 1804 1846

a
1804 Vladikavkaz
Kutais
Batumi 1859 Petrovsk Russian vassal

DA
cution as the tradition of “silent” rituals 1824

s p
KHANATE 1884 from 1731

GH
1829 Tiflis
1878

ES
enabled meetings to take place under other

TA
Kars OF GEORGIA
Derbent 1806

N
Aleksandropol 1830

i a n
guises. Additionally old family networks founded KHANATE
1877 KHANATE 1804

T
OF KUBA
based on the asabiyya of extended kinship OF ERIVAN 1806
Kuba
Erivan Gandzha

U
founded KHANATE OF 1806
groups persisted or even flourished by tak- 1827 K. OF KARABAGH
Shemakha 1806

R
NAKHICHEVAN
ing control of communist institutions. In 1828 Shusha 1805 KHANATE Baku

K
Nakhichevan OF

S e
SHIRVAN Krasnovodsk
Chechnya where Russia has fought two bru- KHANATE OF 1869
TU TALISH
tal wars in 1994–96 and 1999–2002 to sup- (O RK 1813
TT EY
a
OM Tabriz
press local independence movements, the EM
PI AN Turkmanchai
persistence of Sufi networks and allegiances RE Chikishilyar
)
after seven decades of Soviet rule provides a Resht

better explanation for anti-Russian activity

than the foreign-funded Islamist or Tehran
“Wahhabi” militants targeted by spokesmen
P E R S I A
in the Kremlin. Baghdad
1907–21
N
In Central Asia, despite the retreat of
Russia, general disillusionment with Soviet
rule, and the collapse of the local economies,
Isfahan
the old communist nomenklaturas have man-
Yezd
aged to cling to power under new, so-called 0 500 km
democratic labels that barely conceal the real-
0 500 miles
ity of bureaucractic authoritarian rule.

104
 RUSSIAN EXPANSION IN TRANSCAUCASIA AND CENTRAL ASIA

60° 70° 80° 90°

1707–18
50°
E
A K M O L I N S K 1763
4
82 R
–1
31 Semipalatinsk
1730 17 I
A N M P
E

N S K URYANKHAI
A T I 1864
TERRITORY
Turgai L
A
T U R G A I I P
Irgiz M 1912–21
U R A L S K E under Russian Prot.
1845 Ulutau S
1846

K A Z A K H S
Lake Balkhash
Aralskije (Raim) Syr 1854
1847 Dar Kopal
1853 ya W 1847
Kazalinsk all
1859 Kuldja
Aral Sea Perovsk 1871–81
(Ak-Mechet) Djilek
K

1861 1854
1853
A

1864
Verny
R

A
K K o k a n d W a l l Tokmak 1854
A L Well Irkibai Przhevalk
P A K S Turkestan
(Karakol)
1873
Chimkent 40°
KHANATE 1873
K y z y l K I R G H I S 1871
OF KHIVA K u m
Russian Prot. Naryn
from 1873 Khiva Tashkent 1868
1865 Kokand
Well Orta-Kuju C H I N A
1876
O

Ka
M ra Bukhara Samarkand
1868–70 T A D
1881
E Ku
m J I K
N S
KHANATE OF BUKHARA Pam 1895
Ashkhabad ir s Expansion of Russia in Asia
Russian Prot. from 1868
Merv 1598–1914

1884 Russian Empire 1598

Acquisitions by 1796
Meshed Penjdeh
1885 K a s h m i r Acquisitions by 1801
Kushka
Acquisitions by 1825

Acquisitions by 1855
Herat
Acquisitions by 1881

A F G H A N I S T A N Acquisitions by 1894
P u n j a b
Acquisitions by 1914
30°
I N D I A Russian sphere of influence

105
HISTORICAL ATLAS OF THE ISLAMIC WORLD

Expansion of Islam in Southeast Asia c. 1500–1800

As in other regions peripheral to the Islamic who arrived from Arabia and India, were able
heartlands, Islam came to Southeast Asia by to present Islamic teachings in forms that peo-
trade rather than conquest. In some cases ple raised in Hindu traditions could under-
Muslim merchants, who carried the prestige of stand. As trade expanded the adoption of Islam
Islamic high culture, married into local ruling made it easier for smaller communities to
families, providing them with wealth, diplo- become part of larger societies, favoring the
matic skills, and knowledge of the wider world. further expansion of trade.
Adoption of Islam made it easier for chiefs in The development of Islam in this largely
the coastal regions to resist the authority of the peaceful, organic fashion was disrupted, but
Hindu rulers who held sway in central Java. not reversed, by the appearance of the
Sufi teachers, some of them also merchants, Portuguese, who established themselves as a

SIAM Hue

PH
Andam
an Bangkok
Sea

IL
Vijaya South China

IP
CHAMPA

PI
Sea Min
do

NE
ro
Gulf of

Str
Siam

ait

S
Saigon

Palawan

Kedah Rattani
Sulu Sea Mindinao
Pasai Kelantan
S tr

Samudra
a it

ACEH Trengganu
Malay
of
M

Peninsula Brunei
ala

Pahang Brunei
cc
a

Singke BATAK
Malacca
Fansur
Celebes Sea
Johore
S

Singapore
u

it
m

t Tidore

Stra
ai

Borneo
Str

Ternate
a

ie r
ar
M

ass

p
Ka
IN

m
t

Da
ri

k
AN

Moluccas
Ma
ma

Tanjungoura
r
G KA

ta S

Celebes
a
BA

Palembang
trait
U

Banjermasin Serang
Martapura Ambon
Batang
Ja va S e a
Bay Bandanera
ait Macassar
Sunda Str Banlam Batavia
Demak
Tuban Banda Sea
Cheribon
J a v Gresik
a Pajang
ok

INDI Panarukan Flores Sea

Majapant
mb

AN Matar
it
Lo

am
Stra

OCEA Bali
Sumbawa Flores
N
ok

b Arafura Sea
L om Sum
ba Timor
Timor Sea

AUSTRALIA

106
 EXPANSION OF ISLAM IN SOUTHEAST ASIA c. 1500–1800

leading maritime power from the sixteenth and Portuguese along with the expansion of
century. Having taken Goa in 1509, the trade had the reverse effect, bringing contact
Portuguese conquered Malacca on the Malay with the Ottoman Empire and an influx of
Peninsula in 1511. Paradoxically, this aided the scholars and Sufis from Mughal India, espe-
spread of Islam by sending Muslim teachers cially in Acheh.
and missionaries to the courts of rulers in Differences between the coastal regions and
Acheh and Java, which became centers of the interiors, the legacies of Hindu and Buddhist
resistance to the Portuguese. The appearance kingships, the varying impacts of Portuguese,
of the Dutch (who founded Batavia, later Dutch, and British rule, and the different degrees
Jakarta, in 1619) in search of pepper, cloves, of resistance they engendered produced con-
nutmeg, and tin complicated the picture, but trasting Islamic styles throughout the Malay
did not reverse the spread, or appeal, of Islam Peninsula and Indonesian archipelago. A com-
in the region. Indeed conflict with the Dutch mon element is the rainfall and rich tropical soil
that makes much of the land highly produc-
15°
tive—this fed colonial appetites for cash crops
Expansion of Islam in such as coffee and, later, rubber. In Southeast
Southeast Asia Asia Islam encountered societies of settled culti-
1500 – 1800
vators and relatively ancient polities whose deep
Area of Islamic conversion by 1500
territorial roots contrast strikingly with the
Area of Islamic conversion by 1800 10°
flows of pastoral peoples that dominate Islamic
Islamic trade routes
history in Central or Western Asia. In some
Modern borders
instances the tides of the faith coming from
India and Arabia left a residue of ritual and
practice that combined with the older traditions.
5°
OCEAN In Java, for instance, villagers will describe
PA C I F I C themselves as Muslim, but their actual culture
combines Islamic with Hindu and animist ele-
ments. Elsewhere, as in Minangkabau, after a
period of economic upheaval in the eighteenth
0°
century, reformist currents preaching closer
adherence to the Sharia became dominant, gen-
erating social conflicts that resulted in Dutch
rck intercession and conquest (1839–45). Generally,
Bisma
Sea the Islamic legacy in Indonesia has crystallized
5°
N EW GU IN EA
into two broad tendencies—the rural abangan
style, which allows a tolerance for non-Sharia
customs including matrilineal forms of inheri-
tance, and the stricter santri tradition of the
Papua
cities. Though modern Islamists in both
10°
Malaysia and Indonesia generally oppose plural-
ism and cultural mixing, the fact remains that
Cape York
Coral both nations have undergone industrial revolu-
Sea tions that have placed them well ahead of Iran,
Pakistan, and the Arab-Muslim countries in
15°
terms of economic development.

107
HISTORICAL ATLAS OF THE ISLAMIC WORLD
British, French, Dutch, and Russian Empires
The enormous increase in the power of the
European countries that began to take over the
Muslim world from about 1800 can be traced
back to the scientific revolution of the seven-
teenth century and the industrial revolution to
which it gave birth. Before the mid-1600s
Western and Muslim civilizations were on rela-
tively equal terms, militarily and economically.
By 1800, however, the balance had shifted deci-
sively and permanently toward what would
come to be thought of as “the West.”
Napoleon’s ill-fated expedition to Egypt was
not halted by the neo-Mamluks, whom he
defeated at the Battle of the Pyramids, but by
the British admiral, Nelson, who destroyed the
French fleet at Aboukir Bay. Henceforth it
would be competition—military and economic
—between European nations, rather than con-
flicts between the Islamic world and the West,
that would determine the historical agenda for
the Muslim peoples.
Numerous explanations have been advanced
to account for the cumulative rise in European
power. These range from the spirit of capitalism
engendered by the Protestant reformers and the
sudden access to wealth brought back from the
Americas, to the radical methodology of ques-
tioning everything advocated by the French
philosopher René Descartes, one of the progeni-
tors of the scientific revolution. Whatever the
causes, the effects were far reaching and irre-
versible. European capital was systematically
reinvested to finance technical innovation in
industrial methods of production, such as cot-
ton spinning, which could destroy traditional
methods by competition. European military
power, benefiting from constant technical
improvements, was deployed to protect and
extend markets for manufactured products,
leading to the collapse of local economies and
108
the capacity of non-European powers to offer
resistance. From the perspective of previous eras
(for example, that of the Crusader Kingdoms
and the gradual loss of al-Andalus to the
Christians) the process was extraordinarily
rapid. By 1920 European power encompassed
virtually the whole of the planet, except for
regions considered too unpopulated, poor, or
remote to be worthy of imperial designs.
Muslim leaders, both spiritual and secular,
were at the forefront of resistance to European
world conquest. In Java Prince Dipanegara, a
member of one of the ruling families that suc-
cumbed to Dutch influence and pressures from
European cultivators, launched a revolt embrac-
ing displaced peasants and religious leaders that
lasted from 1825 to 1830. In Bengal, where the
British East India Company had been trading
since the early 1600s, the defeat of a local ruler,
Nawab Siraj al-Dawla, who tried to curb the
power of the company at the Battle of Plassey
(1757), opened the way to the British conquest.
After further defeat at Buksar in 1764 Muslim
resistance shifted to the large, formerly Hindu
kingdom of Mysore, where Haidar Ali, a
Punjabi soldier, created with French assistance a
disciplined force along European lines. His son
and successor Tipu Sultan (1750–99) secured a
notable victory over a British army at the Battle
of Conjeveram, near Madras, before eventually
being killed at Seringapatam in 1799, a battle
that effectively ended resistance to British rule in
southern India. Afterward resistance shifted to
the Northwest Frontier or to within the ranks of
the British-led Indian army. In the late 1820s
Sayyid Ahmed Barelwi (1786–1831), a mission-
ary preacher in the reformist Naqshbandi tradi-
tion who had spent three years in Mecca, tried
to rally the Yusufzai Pushtuns in the Northwest
Frontier province as part of a broader campaign
 BRITISH, FRENCH, DUTCH, AND RUSSIAN EMPIRES

of reform in Indian Islam. His aim of creating order, which had accepted Ottoman suzerainty,
an Islamic state on liberated territory outside became the source of organized resistance after
British control was frustrated by the Sikhs, who the Italian invasion in 1911.
defeated him at Balakot in 1831. The Northwest The British and French encountered similar
Frontier, however, continued to be the focus of movements of resistance throughout Muslim
resistance to British rule long after Barelwi’s Africa. Abd al-Qadir, a shaikh of the Qadiriyya
death. Between 1847 and 1908 there were no order, led the resistance to French rule after the
less than sixty rebellions against the British. conquest of Algiers in 1830. He established an
Many of them had millennarian overtones and Islamic state in the western Sahara. This lasted
nearly all were legitimized as jihads against until 1847, when the French finally overwhelmed
infidel rule. it and sent him into exile. In 1881 Muhammad

Iceland 15° 0° 15° 30° 45° 60° 75° 90° 105° 120° 135° 150° 165° 60°
E M P I R E Okhotsk
SWEDEN R U S S I A N
60° St Petersburg
GREAT
BRITAIN NETH. Moscow
THE POLAND
50° EMPIRE
Mongolia
Paris
FRANCE E M P I R E
OT Constantinople M A N C H U
PORTUGAL Madrid TO Korea JAPAN
40° MA ( C H I N A )
SPAIN Minorca N
EM
PI
Madeira CO
ALGIERS
TUNIS
RE
PERSIA Nagasaki Eurasian Empires c. 1700
OC AFGHANISTAN Tibet
Canary Is. M OR
30° Cairo Spanish possessions
Delhi
EGYPT A
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Tropic of Cancer Calcutta Portuguese possessions
bi

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S a h a r a BURMA
20°
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British possessions
N

St Louis Goa
AM

Masulipatam Philippine Is.

SIAM
Albreda Mangalore
Fort James French possessions
Quilon
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Ac ina

10°
a
cr
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s

Colombo
As

Atjeh Dutch possessions

Fernando Póo Singapore
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Borneo
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ZANZIBA

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Celebes
Comoro Is. Makassar Russian possessions
Loanda Batavia
S. Salvador Java

Many of these movements against European Ahmad, a shaikh of the Sammaniya branch of
imperialism were led by men trained in the dis- the Khalwatiya, proclaimed himself Mahdi in the
ciplines and hierarchies of the Sufi tariqas. In Upper Nile region, and launched a jihad against
the Caucasus the Imam Shamil, a leader in the the Egyptian government and its foreign backers,
Naqshbandi tradition, waged a campaign who were penetrating the region under European
against Russian penetration lasting from 1834 commanders. The defeat of the Mahdi’s succes-
to 1839. Although the Islamic state he founded sor at Omdurman in 1898 was hailed by Winston
was eventually incorporated into the tsarist Churchill, who witnessed the battle, as “the most
empire, Shamil’s memory remained vibrant signal triumph ever gained by the arms of science
among the peoples of Daghestan and Chechnya, over barbarians.” The “arms of science” on this
who mounted successive revolts against the occasion were the British machine guns. Familiar
Russians in 1863, 1877, 1917–19, during the weapons in small-scale punitive expeditions in
Second World War, and against the post- much of Africa in the 1890s, here they were used
communist administrations of Boris Yeltsin and for the first time against an army of more than
Vladimir Putin. In Cyrenaica, the Sanusiya fifty thousand men.

109
HISTORICAL ATLAS OF THE ISLAMIC WORLD
Nineteenth-Century Reform Movements
The tajdid (reform) movements, which have
dominated Islamic thought and practice since
the eighteenth century, have internal and exter-
nal dimensions. Internally the example of
Muhammad’s attacks on the pagan idolaters of
Mecca in the name of the “original” monothe-
istic religion taught by God to Adam, Ibrahim,
and Ismail, followed by the hijra to Medina, the
building of a new society, and his purging of
Mecca’s infidelities after his triumphant recon-
quest, is in itself a paradigm of religious reform.
Throughout Islamic history the Prophetic sce-
nario has been adopted by men of renowned
learning and piety who have attacked or
replaced corrupt rulers in the name of restoring
the true Islam of Muhammad and his genera-
tion. Many such movements occurred in the
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Some of
these movements were religious responses to
local practices, such as the custom of praying at
the tombs of Sufi saints, condemned by the
Arabian Wahhabis. Others, such as the reform
movements in the Senegambian region of West
Africa, involved local resistance to non-Muslim
political elites; many others, such as the jihad
movements on India’s Northwest Frontier or the
Mahdiya in the Nilotic Sudan, were responses
to European penetration.
Most of the militant movements of resistance
and reform, however, occurred among tribal peo-
ples in peripheral regions. Even when led by men
of learning, such as the Mahdi Muhammad
Ahmad or Uthman Dan Fodio, they could only
succeed if backed by military-tribal power. Once
it became clear that military solutions were not
going to work because of the overwhelming
power of the West, Muslim thinkers began to
interpret the reformist scenario intellectually.
Where the tribally based movements distin-
guished between correct religious practice and
unacceptable innovations, intellectual reformers
sought to regenerate Islam by distinguishing
between usul (fundamentals) of Islam, which
110
were timeless and adaptable, and furu (the details
of revelation), which applied to particular cir-
cumstances. All of the reformers recognized that
if Islam was to survive and prosper under mod-
ern circumstances, Muslims must embrace mod-
ern learning and modern education. In India Sir
Sayyid Ahmed Khan (1817–98) founded a college
at Aligarh aimed at creating a modern generation
of Muslim officials, lawyers, and journalists—
men who in the course of time would become
leaders of the Pakistan movement. A more con-
servative group of Indian ulama founded the
academy at Deoband in 1867, which combined
the study of revealed knowledge (Koran, hadith,
and law) with rational subjects like logic, philos-
ophy, and science. By taking advantage of the
railway system to distribute printed materials in
Urdu, the Deobandis were able to reach all parts
of Muslim India. This made Deoband the center
of a new kind of Muslim awareness that spread
to other countries, with many students coming
from Afghanistan, Central Asia, Yemen, and
Arabia. A graduate of Deoband, Maulana
Muhammad Ilyas, founded the reformist
Tablighi Jamaat (preaching association) in 1927.
Originally aimed at converting the Mewatis, a
peasant community near Delhi, to stricter
Islamic observance it combined adherence to the
Sharia with Sufi meditations on the spirit of
Muhammad as practiced by the Chisti order, to
which Ilyas himself belonged. The Tablighi
Jamaat, which formally eschews involvement
with politics, is one of the fastest growing Islamic
movements worldwide, with branches in more
than ninety countries.
In Egypt the most influential reformer was
Muhammad Abduh (1849–1905). Originally a dis-
ciple of the anti-British pan-Islamic activist Jamal
al-Din al-Afghani (1839–1970), Abduh accompa-
nied Afghani to exile in Paris after the British
occupation where they coedited a short-lived but
influential Arabic pan-Islamist journal Al-urwa al-
wuthqa “The Strongest Link.” In 1885 Abduh

broke with his mentor’s hostility to imperialism
and, returning to Egypt via Syria, decided like
Ahmad Khan to work with the grain of British
power, seeing in it a necessary force for modern-
ization. After rising in the legal service to become
chief mufti or law officer of Egypt, Abduh sought
to modernize the Sharia and to introduce subjects
such as modern history and geography into the
curriculum of al-Azhar in Cairo, the foremost
academy of Sunni Islam. He paid particular atten-
tion to the principle of maslaha (public interest) to
enable the law to be changed in accordance with
modern requirements, stating, “If a ruling has
become the cause of harm which it did not cause
before, then we must change it according to the
prevailing conditions.” Abduh believed that, prop-
erly understood, revelation must be in harmony
with reason, because Islam was “natural religion”
designed by God to fit the human condition. Like
Ahmed Khan he sought to distinguish between the
essentials and nonessentials of revelation, preserv-
ing the fundamentals while discarding those
aspects that were historically contingent or time-
specific. He tirelessly opposed what he saw as the
hidebound conservatism of the traditional ulama
and, again like Ahmad Khan, emphasized the
NINETEENTH-CENTURY REFORM MOVEMENTS
A locomotive drags its crowded
carriages up the narrow-gauge
Darjeeling Railway, c. 1900. The
Deobandi reformist movement
took advantage of the railway
network to disseminate Islamic
literature throughout the country,
adding to the sense of Muslims
as a distinct community in India.
need for new applications of the principle of ijti-
had (individual judgement) to meet modern con-
ditions. Abduh’s views were disseminated through
his legal rulings, writings, and lectures and after
his death through the periodical al-Manar (“The
Lighthouse”), published by his Syrian disciple
Rashid Rida, a member of the reformist
Naqshbandi order, which ran from 1897 to 1935.
As a mujaddid (reformer or renovator) of modern
Islam Abduh’s influence can hardly be underesti-
mated. In Southeast Asia the Java-based mission-
ary Muhammadiyah movement founded in 1912
by Ahmad Dahlan, which now has millions of
male and female adherents, owes much to Abduh’s
ideas. In the Arab world Dahlan is regarded, with
Afghani, as the founder of the Salafiyya move-
ment, inspired by the example of the “pious fore-
bears,” classically thought of as the first three gen-
erations of Muslims who received the message of
Islam in its original context. Modern Salafists who
can claim a part of Abduh’s intellectual legacy
range from militant activists who seek to establish
modern Islamic states, if necessary by violent
means, to secular nationalists who interpret
Abduh’s ideas as requiring a complete separation
between political and religious realms.
111
HISTORICAL ATLAS OF THE ISLAMIC WORLD

Modernization of Turkey
The modernization of Turkey extends back at
least two centuries, when the Ottoman Sultan
Selim III (1789–1807) attempted to introduce a
series of educational and military reforms. His
efforts threatened the interests of the ulama
and Janissaries and he was deposed. But after a
string of defeats in the Caucasus and Greece his
successor Mahmud II (r. 1807–39) made new
efforts at reform by introducing new Western-
oriented schools, destroying the Janissary corps
and dissolving the Bektashi Sufi order linked to
it. The autonomy of the ulama was weakened
by the state takeover of waqfs (religious endow-
ments), Sharia courts, and schools. A symbolic
separation of religion and state was effected by
a decree abolishing the wearing of turbans. For
everyone except the official ulama turbans,
often the mark of allegiance to one of the Sufi
tariqas, were replaced by the fez, the red-felt
cylindrical hat imported from the Maghrib.
Mahmud’s ambition to create a centralized,
absolutist state (along the lines of prerevolution
France or Prussia) was carried on by his succes-
sors in a series of programs known as the
Tanzimat-i Hairiye (Auspicious Reorderings)
that lasted from 1839 to 1876. Modern postal
systems, telegraph, steamship navigation, and
railroads were introduced alongside radical
legal reforms with Western-style courts and law
codes. A new civil code, the Mejelle, followed
the Sharia law in content, but differed from tra-
dition by being administered by state courts.
In 1855 the jizya (poll tax)—a formal mark
of religious inferiority—was replaced by a tax
on exemption from military service. The new
centralized government that was coming into
being was founded on a social base of new
professionally trained bureaucrats. The small
urban middle class enjoyed a rising economic
status that enabled it to challenge the religion-
based power-structure of the religious commu-
nities. The Tanzimat reforms altered the
previous basis of Ottoman society by abolishing
the autonomy of Islamic educational and judi-
cial institutions, bringing them under state con-
trol. The reforms stimulated the emergence of

British troops at Gallipoli,

together with other Western
Allies, were deployed on the
peninsula from 25 April 1915
until 9 January 1916. Their
objective was to threaten
Constantinople and to open a
supply route to Russia across the
Black Sea. The Turkish forces
were commanded by Lieutenent
Colonel Mustafa Kemal, whose
drive and energy thwarted the
Allied plan. His success would
lead him to the office of
National President.

112
 MODERNIZATION OF TURKEY

1 Austrian invasion of Serbia repulsed 5 Serbian retreat November 1915

The Balkans 1 1914–18 29 July – 15 December 1914

German attacks Russian retreat Romanian forces invade Transylvania

2 Germans advance up the Morava 6
valley October 1915 27 August 1916
Austro-Hungarian attacks Allied attack

Austro-Hungarian retreat Allied retreat Allied attempt to take Gallipoli German counteroffensive forces
3 7 Romanians to retreat Sept.–Dec. 1916
peninsula fails Feb.–Dec. 1915
Serbian counterattack Turkish counterattack

4 Bulgarian attack breaks through 8 Bulgarian advance forces back

Serbian retreat German front line
Serbian formations October 1915 Russian-Romanian defense Oct. 1916
Bulgarian attacks Austro-Hungarian front line

Romanian attacks Bulgarian front line Jassy

M R U S S I A N
Romanian retreat Romanian front line o l
d E M P I R E
a
v
6 i

a
a°
B e s s a r a b i 30
T r a n s y l v a n i a
A U S T R I A – H U N G A R Y

S ava
Temesvar

Ar g e
1 2
s
Belgrade
8 R O M A N I A
Oit
Bucharest
Constanta
44°
j a
ina ru
M ora

ube
Dr Dan b
Do
va 7
r
ka

Is

MONTENEGRO S E R B I A B l a c k
Pristina Tundza
5 4 Sofia S e a
B U L G A R I A Burgas
Lake Kosovo
Scutari Maric
Scutari Uskub Philippopolis a
Drini

Adrianople
Ne

Serbian Army st
rescued by Allies Durazzo
os
T r a c e
and transported to Salonika h
O T

Constantinople
Adriatic
Lake Lake Monastir Str
Sea uma
T O

Ohrid Prespa Sea of

donia
Axios
St

ce Marmara
Ma
rait

A L B A N I A
M

Thasos
C E AlliedSalonika
A

E landing 5 October 1915: Samothrace Gallipoli

of Otranto

Vjo
N

sa E The following offensive to assist Serbia 3

on

R is driven back by Bulgarian 2nd Army E

iak
m Gorkceada M 40°
G Al P
I R
Limnos
E
Corfu 22° Aegean Sea 26°

22°
Pristina Sofia Allied front lines,
Lake 1 15 September 1918
Scutari
SERBIA BULGARIA
Scutari Uskub Allied front lines,
2
S tru

2 29 September 1918
ma

ALBANIA The Balkans 2

Axi

September–November 1918
o

Lake Monastir
Ohrid 1 British advance and
Lake
Prespa front line
French advance and
front line
Vjo
s Salonika
Serbian advance
on
a

k m and front line

li a
40° GREECE A Italian advance and
front line
Greek front line

113
HISTORICAL ATLAS OF THE ISLAMIC WORLD
the “Young Turks,” a movement among the
intelligentsia who wished to move in a European
direction. In 1908 the vanguard of this move-
ment, the Committee for Union and Progress
(CUP), which had infiltrated the army, came to
power in a military coup. The sultan was forced
to restore the constitution he had suspended in
1876 and there was a front of parliamentary
government. The real power remained with the
army and the CUP, which embarked on a radical
program of secularization, reducing the powers
of the shaikh al-Islam (the chief religious func-
Mustafa Kemal Atatürk,
1881–1938, founder of the
Turkish secular state.
tionary), and imposing government control over
Sharia courts and Muslim colleges. Though
nationalist in outlook the Young Turks aimed to
keep control of the eastern part of the Empire.
114
With help from Germany, whose military advis-
ers were driving reforms in the army, the
Berlin–Baghdad railroad was constructed. The
first decade of the twentieth century also saw
the construction of the famous Hejaz railway
from Damascus to Medina (the link to Mecca
was never completed). While facilitating the
passage of pilgrims to the holy places of Islam,
the railway was also designed to speed the pas-
sage of troops into the Peninsula to control trib-
al revolts in Syria and Arabia. The Ottomans
continued to lose territory during the second
decade of the twentieth century with the loss of
Libya, Albania, and most of their European
possessions in the Balkan wars. The coup de
grâce came with the First World War (1914–18).
Having joined the Central Powers (Austria and
Germany) against Britain, France, and Russia,
the Empire lost its remaining Arab provinces to
the three-pronged attack launched by Britain in
Iraq and Palestine, and to the Arab tribes led by
the Sharif of Mecca’s son Faisal with the help of
the British adventurer T. E. Lawrence.
Despite the loss of its Arab provinces Turkey
itself retained its independence as a Muslim
country after the First World War, thanks to the
efforts of Mustafa Kemal (later to be called
Atatürk, “Father of the Turks”). A Young Turk
general, he had saved Istanbul by defending the
Gallipoli Peninsula from invasion by the British
imperial forces in 1915. After forming a provi-
sional nationalist government Atatürk mobi-
lized the Turkish people against the partition of
the Anatolian heartland, and losses to French-
controlled Syria and to Greece, as well as to
Kurds and Armenians (whose proposed state in
the northeast was effectively partitioned
between Turkey and the newly emergent Soviet
Republic). Having defeated the Greeks (who
had been awarded the mainly Greek area
around Smyrna (Izmir) under the humiliating
terms of the 1920 Treaty of Sèvres) Kemal won
international recognition for complete and
undivided Turkish sovereignty in Anatolia,
Adrianople (Edirne), and eastern Thrace
 MODERNIZATION OF TURKEY

(European Turkey) at the Treaty of Lausanne in civil code to Turkish needs. The Latin alphabet
1923. Atatürk resolved its problems with Greece was introduced for the Turkish language
by the brutal but effective means of an exchange (which had previously been written in Arabic
of populations. script), with a view to separating Turkey from
Having established his authority as the vic- the Islamic past and making literacy more
tor or ghazi-warrior over Turkey’s enemies, accessible. The Sufi orders were banned and
Atatürk embarked on a radical program of driven underground. The fez, which had ironi-
modernization. In 1923 the sultanate was sepa- cally acquired the status of an “Islamic” item
rated from the caliphate, and the former abol- of headgear, was abolished, to be replaced by
ished. The following year the caliphate was the peaked cloth cap worn by European work-
abolished, along with the Sharia courts. ers at that time.
Islamic law was replaced by adapting the Swiss

Adrianopole
Istanbul
30° 35° Sinope Black Sea 40° 45° 50° 55° 60°
Uskudar Zongdulak
Gallipoli Skelessi Trebizond Caspian
40° Mudania
Bursa
Nicoea Kars U S S R The New Turkey 1926
Eskisehir Ankara Baku
Sakarya Erzurum British possession, 1914
Izmir TURKE Y Sivas
Usak A r m e nia Sea
Alasehir Kayseri British mandate, 1920
Konya 1920–22
Malatya
Antalya to France Tabriz Under British protection, 1914
Gaziantep
Urfa Rasht
Hatay Aleppo French mandate, 1920
1920–22 Mosul Sharud Mashad
35° to Greece Latakia
Eup
Kirkuk Tehran
hr

Cyprus Terr. of Syria Italian possession

at

Alawites
es

Tig

from 1912 to Britain Tripoli Homs

ri s

to Italy 1878 leased Ottoman Empire, 1914

Beirut
1914 annexed Lebanon Kermanshah
1923 ceded by Turkey Damascus I r a q Turkey after the Treaty
Habbaniyya Baghdad ofPSèvres, 1920 S I A
Mediterranean Sea Palestine E R
Karbala Kut-el- Isfahan Temporary Italian
Alexandria Tel Aviv Amman Amara
Gaza Jerusalem occupation (to 1921)

30° Area ceded by USSR, 1921

Cairo Transjordan
Basra Kerman
Al Jawf Turkish campaign, 1920–23
Kuwait Shiraz
KUWAIT Major battle
Tabuk
E G Y PT neutral zones
Pe

Turkey after the Treaty

Ni

of Lausanne, 1923
r
le

Bandar-Abbas
s

Hej az
i

a
1916 independent N e d j n
Dhahran
25° 1925–26 to Nedj G u
l f Jask
Gu

QATAR f
l

Tropic of Ca Medina of
ncer Aswan Riyadh ST O m an
A
CO
P I R ATE
Muscat

Wadi Halfa HEJAZ AN D N E D J

OMAN
Jedda Mecca kingdom from 1926

20°
R

A s i r
e
d

Anglo-
S

Egyptian Abha
R.

e
At

Sudan
ba

ut
ra

15° 1889 to Italy

YEMEN a ma N
Massawa
hr
Bl

Asmara d
Ha
ue

Sana Ara bian Sea

E
N i le

i r
Aduwa t r Mukalla 0 200 km
e e
a torat
ABYSSINIA otec
de n Pr 0 200 miles
A
Aden

115
HISTORICAL ATLAS OF THE ISLAMIC WORLD

The Muslim World under Colonial Domination c. 1920

The defeat of the Ottoman Empire in the First destruction of the Islamic state created by the
World War brought the vast majority of Muslim Mahdi Muhammad Ahmad in 1898, Britain took
societies under direct or indirect colonial rule. By control of the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan, whose
1920 the only independent Muslim states were realm now extended deep into Equatorial Africa.
Turkey (revitalized under Kemal Atatürk), Persia, Having taken Tanganyika from Germany, Britain
where the Qajar dynasty would shortly be controlled most of the Swahili coast except for
replaced by the Pahlavis (1923), Afghanistan the portion that formed part of Italian
under the modernizing regime of King Somaliland. From Aden Britain contested the
Amanullah (1919–29), northern Yemen, where Bab al-Mandeb—the strategic entrance to the
the Zaidi Imam Yahya won control after the Red Sea—with Italy, which ruled in Eritrea, while
Ottoman defeat, Central Arabia (Najd), and the retaining its grip on the Arabian littoral from
Hejaz, the Muslim holy land containing the cities Aden to Basra, having locked the shaikhdoms
of Mecca and Medina, still under control of the south of Arabia and the Gulf into exclusive
Hashemite family. The remainder of Dar al- treaties that guaranteed British control of
Islam was either under direct colonial rule or defense and foreign policy.
under some form of internationally recognized In the Indian subcontinent, the British had
European “protection.” Two new principles were locked some 560 princely rulers—some of them
being established that would bring these former
SWITZ. AUS. HUN.
colonies or semi-colonies into the international FRANCE
system: the fixing of boundaries (usually for the ITALY Belgrade
YUG.
convenience of European states) and in the case Madrid Rome
of shaikhdoms bound by treaty to Britain, the PORTUGAL
SPAIN
“freezing” of dynasties to ensure continuity of
Gibraltar
government (though not necessarily through the SP. MOROCCO
Malta
TUNISIA
European system of primogeniture). Legitimacy Madeira CO
C
of succession would prevent the disruptive dis- O
R
O
M

putes that often followed the death of a tradi- Canary Is.

ALGERIA L I B YA
tional ruler and bind his heirs into the existing SP. SAHARA

treaty arrangements. RIO DE ORO

S a h a r a
By 1920 France controlled the whole of north-
western Africa except for the coastal strips of
Spanish Sahara and Spanish Morocco. Italy was FRENCH WEST AFRICA
St-Louis
extending its rule far beyond the coastal
IC A
GAMBIA
provinces of Tripoli and Cyrenaica (though this PORT. GUINEA RIA L AFR
NIGERIA
TOGO

task would not be completed until 1934). Britain, Freetown

GOLD ate
SIERRA-LEONE and
ON

COAST
which since 1882 had occupied Egypt, the cultur- Lagos Br. M
QUATO
RO

LIBERIA
al center of the Muslim world, permitted the for- Accra
ME
CA

Fernando Póo
mer Ottoman province a nominal independence
CH E

under a constitutional monarchy, but retained

EN
FR

overall strategic control. This led to the paradox

of a formally neutral country becoming host to
thousands of British and Empire troops during Luanda
the Second World War. Following Kitchener’s

116
 MUSLIM WORLD UNDER COLONIAL DOMINATION c. 1920

Muslims—into a mosaic of different treaties and who had liberated Damascus from Ottoman
European Imperialism in
agreements, placing them and their Muslim sub- Turkey with British help, had intended to make the Muslim World
jects under the umbrella of British rule. In Syria an independent Arab state in accordance Independent Muslim state,
1920
Southeast Asia Britain controlled the Malay with a somewhat ambiguous undertaking his Territory under colonial rule 1920
states, while the Netherlands had extended its father had received from Sir Henry McMahon, British

sway beyond its original colonies in Java and the British High Commissioner in Egypt in 1915. French
Sumatra. In Muslim Central Asia and the In the aftermath of the war, however, it became
Italian
Caucasus region, the communist revolution and clear that for the Muslim world imperial interests
Portuguese
subsequent civil war had consolidated the power would supersede the national right of self-
Spanish
of Moscow within a new regional order. determination famously proclaimed by President
In the core region of the Mashriq, Palestine Woodrow Wilson as the basis for the postwar set- Dutch

had been opened to Jewish settlement under the tlement in Europe. Protest at the double standard United States
terms of the mandate granted to Britain by the that allowed the recognition of national rights Russia
League of Nations. Under the terms of the secret for the subjects of Christian empires in Europe
Dependent princely state
Sykes-Picot agreement reached with France in (including Czechs, Slovaks, Hungarians, Jews,
Area of British influence
1916 Britain also acquired mandates—a euphe- and Irish, as well as former Ottoman subjects in
Area of Russian influence,
mism for colonies—in Transjordan and Iraq, the Balkans) while denying them to Muslims ani- 1907–21

while France took control of Lebanon and Syria. mated the anticolonial resentment that would Muslim concentration: Muslims
live in scattered communities
Faisal ibn Hussein, son of the sharif of Mecca surface throughout former Ottoman territories. throughout China

ROM. MONGOLIA
1921–24 People’s Rep.
R U S S I A N E M P I R E
BULG.
Istanbul Tashkent
Peking (Beijing)
SIN KIAN G
GREECE TURKEY
KOREA
Athens C H I N A Weihaiwei
SYRIA
Soviet
French influence Tehran E
Mandate
date AFGHANISTAN

R
an

PI
sh M
i PERSIA Nanking
Brit IRAQ

EM
TIBET Shanghai
Cairo JORDAN

SE
KUWAIT British Delhi NE
influence PA
NE
L BHUTAN Ryu Kyu Is.
EGYPT BAHRAIN
PA
Medina Riyadh Taiwan
Chandernagore Canton
JA

HEJAZ Calcutta Hong Kong

BURMA Kwangchowwan
Mecca AND OMAN
NAJD Under Br. Prot. Diu INDIA Macao
Daman
Bombay
Yanaon Luzón
Khartoum ER Goa
IT YEMEN HADHRAMAUT
SIAM
Manila
ANGLO- RE FRENCH
A ADEN
Madras Philippine
EGYPTIAN Mahé INDO-
Addis DJIBOUTI
Pondicherry CHINA Islands
Ababa BR. Socotra Andaman Is.
S U DA N
A ND

SOMALI- Karikal Saigon

LAND Laccadive Is.
LI L

Nicobar Is. Mindanao

ABYSSINIA Ceylon
N. BORNEO
MA

BR. BRUNEI
O

S MALAYA
AN
Maldive Is. SARAWAK
I
UGANDA AL Singapore Halmahera
BELGIAN KENYA IT
Sumatra Borneo
Belgium Nairobi Celebes New
Seychelles DU Guinea
Mandate TC
CONGO H E
Chagos Is. Djakarta AST
TANGANYIKA Zanzibar Amirantes Java INDIES
Br. Mandate
Cocos Is. Christmas Is. Timor

117
HISTORICAL ATLAS OF THE ISLAMIC WORLD
Balkans, Cyprus, and Crete 1500–2000
Stari Most bridge, Mostar,
Bosnia-Herzegovina. Before its
destruction by Bosnian-Croatian
artillery fire in 1993, the bridge
was one of the finest surviving
examples of Ottoman
engineering and design.
Completed in 1566 by
Khairuddin, a pupil of the great
Ottoman architect Sinan, it
spanned 30 meters with an arch
rising to 27 meters above the
Neretva River. The rebuilding of
the bridge has become a symbol
for the restoration of Bosnia’s
fractured community
relationships.
118
The Saljuq and subsequent Ottoman conquests
in the Balkans left a residue of Muslims in
Europe who arrived as settlers or adopted Islam
by conversion. Unlike the conquest of Anatolia,
where the Byzantine ecclesiastical institutions
were suppressed as imperial rivals, the Orthodox
Church in the Balkans was given effective juris-
diction of the Christian communities. This fac-
tor may have limited conversions in the Christian
Balkans as compared with Anatolia.
The permanent Islamic presence in Europe
was first established by Turkish migrants to
northern Greece, Bulgaria, and Albania in the
fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, with the lead-
ing role played by the tekkes (hospices) founded
by Sufi holy men, which often became the nuclei
of village communities. In rural areas conver-
sions were facilitated by Sufi orders such the
Mevlevis and Bektashis. They found ways of
conveying Islamic ideas to peasants with
Christian or “heretical” beliefs, such as those of
the Bogomils, an initiatory gnostic sect whose
influence spread throughout Catholic southern
Europe in the eleventh and twelfth centuries.
Conversion was greatest in Albania, Bosnia-
Herzegovina, and Bulgaria, especially among
the Pomaks of the Rhodopes, whose mountain-
ous lands extend into the modern states of
Greece and Macedonia, as well as Crete. Thanks
to official Ottoman support for Orthodoxy,
however, the fact that Christians remained the
overwhelming majority in the Balkans would
make them, initially, more susceptible than the
Empire’s Muslim subjects to the forces of
nationalism and revolution that swept through
Western Europe in the nineteenth century. A cen-
sus conducted between 1520 and 1530 showed
that 19 percent of the Balkan population was
Muslim, 81 percent was Christian, and there was
a small Jewish minority. The largest concentra-
tion of Muslims was in Bosnia (about 45 per-
cent). Most of the Muslims lived in cities. For
example, Sofia (now capital of Bulgaria) had a
Muslim majority of 66.4 percent.
With the turning of the tide of conquest in
Catholic Hungary, the rise of Orthodox nation-
alisms in Greece, Serbia, Romania, and
Bulgaria, and the dismemberment of the
Ottoman Empire in Europe, Muslims lost their
political protection. Many of those who failed
to retreat with the Ottoman armies were mas-
sacred or forcibly converted to Christianity.
Large numbers migrated after the Russo–
Turkish war of 1878, the Balkan wars of
1912–14, and after the First World War, when
there was a formal exchange of populations
between Muslim Turks living in Greece (includ-
ing Crete and the Dodecanese islands) and
Greeks on mainland Anatolia. Cyprus, which
like Crete had been taken by the Ottomans
from the Venetians (1571), became part of the
British Empire after the Congress of Berlin in
1878, preventing its Orthodox majority from
opting for union with Greece (as Crete did in
1913) and thus excluding it from the exchange
of populations in 1920. The island has been
divided since 1972, when Turkey intervened
militarily to prevent a nationalist military gov-
ernment from uniting the island with Greece.
Albania is still largely Muslim (70 percent) by
 BALKANS, CYPRUS, AND CRETE 1500 – 2000

culture. After a prolonged antireligious cam- communist governments (including the elimina-
paign by the communist government, which tion of Muslim first and family names).
declared the country to be the world’s first offi- In Bosnia Muslims constitute about 45 percent
cially atheist state, Islamic beliefs and practices of the population. The civil war (1991–95)
are being revived. Substantial Muslim minorities between the Serbs and the Muslim-Croat coalition
remain in Bulgaria (13 percent), although the led to a series of atrocities including massacres and
Bulgarian Turks (who number around 600,000) attempts at “ethnic cleansing,” which prompted
have migrated to Turkey in considerable num- intervention by NATO air forces and the signing of
bers following a sustained campaign of the 1995 Dayton Accords dividing Bosnia into sep-
Bulgarianization by communist and post- arate Muslim-Croatian and Serbian states.

Dn Bug
30°
iest
20° r R U S S I A N
E M P I R E
until 1917
Pr

K I N G D O M
ut
S ir

O F S e a o f
et

a
sz
Ti

H U N G A R Y MOLDAVIA BE
A z o v
SS
AR
AB
IA
Aust. Prtot. 1878 1878 C r i m e a
Annexed by Austria to Russia
1908–09 ul Izmail
A

O tt Galati
I

1878
N
B O S N I A A created 1858
R O M
Mitrovica
Bucharest
W A L L A C H I A DOBRUJA
Belgrade B l a c k S e a
Craiova
Mor
Dr

in e
ub
ava

a D an
P R . O F
S E R B I A Plevna 1908 Varna
1878 B U L G A R I A
Nish
PR. OF SANJAK
Sofia Yamboli Burgas
MONTE- OF 1878 to Serbia EAST RUMELIA
NEGRO NOVIPAZAR
Maritsa
1878 Prizren
Cattaro Gusinje Adrianople
Strum

Üsküb (Skopje) Constantinople

Scutari 40°
Dr

Va
a

r
in

O Dedeagach Sea of
da
ALB

T
r

Marmara
Durazzo I A
N Angora
O T Mudania
AN

E D Thasos Gallipoli (Ankara)

A C Salonika O
IA

M
Lemnos M
Larisa E
EPIRUS
A e g e a n A I R
(Shkadra) THESSALY Mitilini N E M P
Corfu
1881 to Greece (Lesbos)

LIVADIA S e a Smyrna
various minor border Euboea
Chios
adjustments in favour KINGDOM
of the Ottoman Empire Samos
1897 OF Athens
I o

GREECE Corinth
n i

I o n i a n
D
a

o
n

d
e

S e a c
an
I

l a Navarino Cyclades
s
e s Rhodes
n e
d s 1878 to Britain
1863 to Greece Cerigo Cyprus
N

Crete
1824–40 to Egypt
1908 to Greece The Balkans,
M e d i t e r r a n e a n S e a Crete, and Cyprus
0 200 km 1878–1912
0 200 miles
1878 date of independence

119
HISTORICAL ATLAS OF THE ISLAMIC WORLD

Dn Bug
20° 30°
iest
r R U S S I A N
The Balkans,
E M P I R E

Pr
until 1917
Crete, and Cyprus

ut
Sir
1912–13 S e a o f

et
a
sz K I N G D O M
Ti

MOLDAVIA BE
A zterritory
Ottoman o vin 1913
SS
O F AR
AB 1913 date of independence
IA

A
H U N G A R Y

NI
A
ul Izmail
Ot t

M
Galati
O
R

JA
B O S N I A F
O

BRU
M
Mitrovica
G DO Bucharest

DO
Belgrade KIN B l a c k S e a
Craiova
Mor

1913
Dr

e
in ub to Romania
ava

a D an
K I N G D O M
Plevna Varna
O F
S E R B I A Nish KINGDOM OF
K. OF BULGARIA Yamboli Burgas
MONTE- Sofia
NEGRO
1913 to 1913 to Bulgaria
Montenegro Maritsa
Cattaro Gusinje Djakova Kumanovo 1913 Adrianople
Üsküb (Skopje) to Bulgaria 1915 to Bulgaria Constantinople
Scutari THRACE 40°
Dr

(Shkadra) Va
1913 to Serbia 1913 to Bulgaria
in

Sea of
rd

St
Durazzo
ar

A rum Dedeagach Marmara

PR. OF NI a
O Mudania
ALBANIA D
E Thasos Gallipoli
C Salonika
1913 A O T T O M A N
1913 to Greece
M

Lemnos
Janina Larisa A e g e a n
EP
IR THESSALY Mitilini
Corfu US
(Lesbos)
KINGDOM E M P I R E
S e a Smyrna
LIVADIA Euboea
Chios
OF Samos
GREECE Corinth Athens
I o

PELOPONNESE
n i

I o n i a n
D

Tripolis
a

o
n

d
e

c
an
I

S e a s
l a Navarino
Cyclades es Annexed in 1914
n 1912 e Rhodes
d s by Britain
Italian occupied
Cerigo Cyprus
N
(Kythira)

Crete

M e d a n S e a
i t e r r a n e
0 200 km

0 200 miles

120
 BALKANS, CYPRUS, AND CRETE 1500 – 2000

Dn Bug
20° 30°
iest
r
U . S . S . R The Balkans,
H U N G A R Y

Pr
Crete, and Cyprus

ut
Sir
1920–23 S e a o f

et
a
sz demilitarized zone
Ti

MOLDAVIA A z o v
BE 1920–22
SS
AR
TRANSYLVANIA AB
IA
1918–20
R O M A N I A to Romania
ul Izmail
Ot t
Ploesti
VO Galati
JVO
SLA DIN

JA
VO A
NIA

BRU
Mitrovica
Bucharest

DO
B l a c k S e a
Y Belgrade
U Craiova
Mor

G
Dr

e
in O ub
ava

a
S D an
L
A SERBIA
V Plevna Varna
BOSNIA IA
Nish BULGARIA
Yamboli Burgas
Sofia
MONTENEGRO
Maritsa
Adrianople
Cattaro Gusinje Djakova (1923 Edirne) Constantinople
Kumanovo
Üsküb (Skopje) 1920–22 (1923 Istanbul)
Scutari
to Greece 40°
Dr

(Shkadra) Va
THRACE
in

Sea of
rd

St
Durazzo
ar

ru Dedeagach Marmara
A ma Ankara
NI Mudania
O
ALBANIA E
D Thasos Gallipoli
C Salonika
A
M

Lemnos T U R K E Y
Janina Larisa A e g e a n
EP
IR THESSALY
Corfu US Mitilini 1920–22
GREECE to Greece
Euboea
S e a Smyrna
Chios
Samos
Corinth Athens
I o

PELOPONNESE
n i

I o n i a n
D

Tripolis
a

o
n

d
e

c
an
I

S e a s
l a Navarino
Cyclades e
n Italian s e Rhodes
d s

Kythira Cyprus
N

Crete

M e d a n S e a
i t e r r a n e
0 200 km

0 200 miles

121
HISTORICAL ATLAS OF THE ISLAMIC WORLD
Muslim Minorities in China
This Chinese minaret symbolizes
the adaptability of Muslim
architecture to local vernacular
forms. Unlike the traditional
cathedral or church, there is no
religiously prescribed
architectural form for the
mosque other than the mihrab (a
decorated niche) indicating the
direction of prayer.
The Muslim communities of China are
descended from Arab, Persian Central Asian,
and Mongol traders who married Chinese
women and mostly lived in small communities
clustered around a central mosque. Their
descendents, along with those of other incom-
ers who arrived from Mongolia and Central
Asia over the course of centuries, are known as
the Hui. The Hui number roughly half of
China’s twenty million Muslims. Unlike other
groups, which tend to be concentrated in areas
bordering on the Central Asian republics, they
are spread throughout the country, though
there is a particular concentration in the
Ningxia Hui Autonomous region. The Hui are
recognized by the state as a national minority—
the third largest in China—and the only minor-
ity to be defined by religious affiliation. The
other recognized Muslim minorities include the
Uighurs of the Xinjiang region, and the
Kazakhs, Kyrgyz, Uzbeks, Tatars, and Tajiks
whose homelands are located in the territories
122
of the former Soviet Union.
Though they developed a distinctive way of
living as a Muslim minority outside the bor-
ders of Dar al-Islam the Hui were far from
being isolated from the spiritual currents flow-
ing from the Islamic heartlands. Sufism made
substantial inroads from the seventeenth cen-
tury, with shaikhs from the Naqshbandiyya,
Qadariyya, and Kubrawiyya orders establish-
ing networks of tariqas and brotherhoods
throughout mainland China. During periods
of turbulence from the seventeenth to nine-
teenth centuries the orders helped organize a
series of Muslim-led rebellions in Yunnan,
Shaanxi, Gansu, and Xinjiang. Much of this
unrest was the result of intra-Muslim violence
caused by the impact on local Hui communi-
ties of reformist ideas imported from Arabia.
For example, in 1781 a Naqshbandi shaikh,
Ma Mingxin (b. 1719), who had studied in
Arabia and Yemen for sixteen years, was exe-
cuted after leading a movement, known as the
 MUSLIM MINORITIES IN CHINA

New Teaching or New Sect, which attacked the the more traditionalist Hanafis known as
cult of saint-worship. In the 1860s and 70s Gedimu (from the Arabic qadim, meaning
another Naqshbandi shaikh, Ma Hualong, old). Though all Muslim groups were perse-
launched a major rebellion, which cut off the cuted during Mao Zedong’s Cultural
Qing (Manchu) Empire from the northwest, Revolution (1966–76), with at least one major China under
the Manchu
opening the way for rebellion of the Uighurs in massacre of Hui in the wake of an uprising in Dynasty 1840–1912
Xinjiang. In more recent times a Wahhabi- Yunnan, state patronage of the Yihewanis per- Area of rebellion

inspired reformist movement at the turn of the sisted in the more relaxed climate that followed Muslim rebellion,
1863–73
twentieth century known as the Yihewani the accession of Deng Xiaoping. British attacks,
1840–41
(from the Arabic ikhwan, meaning brother- After the incorporation of Hong Kong into the (the Opium War)

hood) was active in opposing practices deemed People’s Republic of China, the small Anglo-French
attacks, 1858–60
idolatrous. Such practices included the venera- Muslim community on the island Sino-French War, 1883–85
tion of Sufi saints or the wearing of Chinese has also built relations with Chinese attacks
0°

a
mourning dress. Under communist rule the other groups on the 14

Se

sk
40° French attacks

kh of
ot
°
Le
na 130
Yihewani received more state patronage than mainland.

O
5 0°
120°
60°
E
110° R
05
I a 19 an
80° 100°
oR ussi ap
to J
90° P
60 t
R.

M 18
Ye

E
nis

N
ey

R U S S I A
R. A

E
I rty

mur
ur ia
nch ussia
sh

chins
k by R
Ner M a 5 occupied Japan ence

R
R.

– 0 d b y influ
1900 occupie panese
1905 1905 Ja

I
1912 to Russia after
50°

P
hin
orc

M
Urga
Sea
Kh

n
kde of n
O L I A Mu

E
ia M O N G
a
ar Jap
n g sia 191 2 i n d e p e n d e nt ia
D z u864 to Rus g ol 19
K
o
1 re
on ) )
10
to
M a r jing

E
Jap a
Urumchi
er a h (Bei an
ary
yr D a n Pe king
R. S 1871–81 In h S
K ok a n to Russia ( C
40° d
o

ng
gH

Aksu ntu
Shansi

low
Chihli

Sha Yel ea
uan

Hui-Pu
N

Da S N
R. H

rya Kashgar
u
ngs p’ing
A

Kansu si Kia g T’ai- al

Shen an kin capit
Kash Hon Nan
P

mir A wei
t
C I N Eas na
A FGH H Anh i
A

g Ch ea
ANIST
Hu peh kian
AN
T i b e t Che S
J

n
Punja S zechwa ngsi
Kia
ng

b ia an
s 30° gJ Hun
ien
u n
ha
Ind .C Fuk
R

Lhasa
NE how
PA K w e ic an
Taiw osa)
L ng tung
BH UTAN s am Kwa o r m
(F 1895
Oudh
As -t’ien an
si Chin to Jap
British R. G Yunna
n Kwan 1860 ng
India ’i
Tropic of Ca ang T’ai-p n
ncer es io
Bengal rebell ak
o re
u tb

Burma French
Indo-
C h in a
Bay of Bengal
20°
SIAM

123
HISTORICAL ATLAS OF THE ISLAMIC WORLD

The Levant 1500–2002

Unlike Egypt, which the Ottomans and their formally subjects of the Ottoman sultans until the
clients ruled as a single substate or province, the twentieth century, when France and Britain divid-
Levant, comprising Syria, Mount Lebanon, and ed the region into client states with precarious
Palestine, remained a patchwork of communities national identities. The Levant remained subject
bound by a variety of tribal, ethnic, and religious to occidental cultural influences long after the
affiliations under local leaders. The latter were Crusades, with the Maronite Church based in the

R K E Y
32° 36°
Urfa
The Last Years of Turkish Rule Ceyhan
Gaziantep
Adana

Eup
Antalya
1882–1916
Mersin

hrate
Official attempts to prevent Zionist of

n
lf ru Kilis
Gulf ofimmigrants landing

s
Gu n d e Iskenderun
Antlya Gö ke
ksu Is (Alexandretta)
Jewish settlements 1886–1914

Anti-Zionist societies established (also

in Cairo and Constantinople (Istanbul)) Aleppo
(Hales) 36°
Zionists purchase 2400 acres of land
1910–11 Iolib

Anti-Zionist newspapers published VILAYET OF

Haifa 1908–14 protesting Jewish land ALEPPO
purchase from Arabs Latakia
Line west of which should be excluded S Y R I A
from future Arab State
(McMahon, 25 October 1915)

A
ssi
Areas declared by Sharif of Mecca to Nicosia Famagusta Hama

(O nte
CYPRUS

ro
be part of a purely Arab kingdom
(5 November 1915) Larnaca
s)

Limassol Homs
0 50 km
Tripoli N
0 50 miles

T
U
Beirut Rayak
I R

Zahle
B E

Saida
Damascus
O F

VILAYET
Metulla
OF
Y E T

M e d i t e r r a n e a n S e a DAMASCUS

Acre Safed
V I L A

Haifa
Nazareth Al-Suwaida

Hadera
Netanya
Jordan

Petah Tikva Nablus

Tel Aviv 32°
Jaffa Ben Shemen
Jerico Amman
Rehovot Gar-al-Azraq
Jerusalem
Lake Bethlehem 2500
Burullus Hebron
Gaza 1500
Damietta MUTASARRIFLIK Kaf 1000
OF JERUSALEM
W

Lake
500
a

Harzala Beersheba d
i
Si 200
El Arîsh rh
an 100
Suez Canal

0m
El Qantara
E G Y P T Bayir
El Quseima

124
 THE LEVANT 1500 – 2002

northern Lebanese highlands adopting Latin rites Druzes was relatively even, with Ottoman gover-
and acknowledging Papal supremacy. The south- nors balancing the interests of both groups. How-
ern highlands overlooking the plains of Galilee ever, the decline in Ottoman power from the eigh-
were the homeland of the Druze people, a schis- teenth century saw increasing tension and sectar-
matic Shiite sect regarded as heretical by other ian rivalry between Maronites and Druzes, abet-
Muslims. Under the Maan family (1544–1697) ted by competition between France and Britain.
and the Shihabs (1697–1840), who replaced them, This led to a succession of massacres and bitter
the division of power between the Maronites and sectarian wars between 1838 and 1860.

Gallipoli Izmit 35° 40° 45°Tbilisi 50°

Biga
k
Bursa ma Amaysa R U S S I A N E M P I R E
i l Ir
K iz K il k Gumusane
Tokat it
Eskisehir Ankara Baku
Yerevan
ur

K
Sivrihisar Siyas Erzincan a 40°
Akhisar Erzurum
Izmir Manisa Usak Afyon
Alasehir TURKEY ARMENIA
Kayseri Caspian
Aydin Nazilli Aksaray
Men dares Malatya Khvov
Konya Sea
Bitlis
yan Adiyaman Diyarbakir Tabriz
Karaman Maras
Sa

Antalya Hakkari
Rhodes Adana Gaziantep Urfa Rasht
Mardin

Qe
el O

z
Alexandretta uz
an
Antakya Aleppo Mosul
Qazvin
Latakia SYRIA Eup
Nicosia Kirkuk Tehran
P E R S I A
hr

C Y P R U S Limmasol Hama
at
es

(British)
Tripoli Homs Tig
ris
Hamadan 35°
Qom
Mediter ranean Beirut Kermanshah
Sea Kashan
Damascus Borujerd
Habbaniyah Baghdad Khorramabad
Haifa
PA L E S T I N E I R A Q
Tel-Aviv Karbala Al Hillah
Amman Esfahan
Jerusalem Dezful
Alexandria An Najaf
Port Said Gaza Shushtar
Damanhur
Tanta Beersheba
Zagazig
Ahvaz
El Giza Cairo Abu Dhabi
Basra
Bandar-e
El Faiyum Al Jawf Sakakah Abadan Sharpur
E G Y P T Beni Suef 30°
(under British protection) K U WA I T
JEBEL SHAMMAR Kuwait
Pe

Bahariya Oasis
rs

El Minya Tabuk
ia
n

Oasis of
Gu

Farafra Asyut Tayma'

Ha'il
lf
HE
N
ile

BAHRAIN
JA

Gena Al Wajh (under

R

Buraydah Al Qatif British

Dhahran protection)
Unayzah
e d

Sykes–Picot Plan May 1916

QATAR
N E J D (under
French rule Al Hufuf British
S

Medina 25° protection)

e a

Russian rule Yanbu‘al Bahr Riyadh

Wadi S
a
Arab State, to be under French protection h ba

area to be under British, French and Tropic of Cancer

Russian protection N
Wadi Halfa
British rule, including Haifa enclave

Arab State to be under British protection

S U D A N Jedda 0 150 km
(under British protection) Mecca
0 150 miles

125
HISTORICAL ATLAS OF THE ISLAMIC WORLD

The Ottoman defeat in 1918 saw the division imposed direct rule on Syria and Lebanon while
of the Levant between French and British Britain opened up Palestine for European Jewish
spheres of influence, with the victorious allies settlement and established client monarchies in
creating four colonial dependencies—Iraq, Transjordan and Iraq. While creating a modern
Syria, Lebanon, and Palestine—out of the for- bureaucracy in Syria along with an infrastructure
mer Ottoman provinces. After ousting Faisal, of roads and communications networks, the
son of the ruler of Mecca and leader of the Arab French undermined national integration by
revolt against the Turks who had set up a provi- organizing administrative districts that reinforced
sional government in Damascus, the French ethnic and religious divisions. In particular they

30° 35° 40° 45° 50°

Konya TURKEY
yan Adiyaman Diyarbakir
Maras
Sa

Antalya Karaman Mardin Hakkari League of Nations Mandate 1921

Adana Gaziantep Urfa
Rasht

Qe
French
z e Mandate, 1921,Lahijan
(areas formally
Iskenderun underl Ottoman
Ou rule)
HATAY za Babol
Antakya Aleppo Mosul Arab areasnhelped by Britain in their
Qazvin
revolt against Ottoman rule, then
35° Latakia becoming independent
Eup Kirkuk Tehran
Nicosia British Mandate, 1921, (areas formallySemnan
Damavan
TERR. OF
hr

CYPRUS Hama
at

Limmasol ALAWITES under Ottoman rule)

SYRIA
es

Mediter ranean Tripoli Homs IRAQ Areas under British rule or control in 1914
( M E S O P O TA M I A ) Qom
Sea Beirut
Ti g
Palestine in 1922
LEBANON ri Kashan
Damascus s

Habbaniyah Baghdad Khorramabad

Haifa

PA L E S T I N E Karbala Al Hillah Isfahan

Tel-Aviv Amman
Alexandria Jerusalem Dezful
Port Said Gaza An Najaf Shushtar
Damanhur PERSIA
Tanta Beersheba
Zagazig Ahvaz
(IRAN)
30° Cairo TRANS-
al-Giza J O R DA N
E G Y P T Basra
Bandar-e
al-Faiyum Al Jawf Sakakah Abadan Sharpur
Beni Suef
K U WA I T Shiraz
Kuwait
NEUTRAL ZONE
Pe

Tabuk Firuzabad
rs

al-Minya
ia
n

Asyut Tayma
Hail G
ul
N

f
ile

Re

Gena
d

al-Wajh al-Qatif
Burayda
Dhahran BAHRAIN
Unayza
25°
Se

al-Hufuf Q ATA R
a

Medina
Aswan Yanbual Bahr Riyadh
Wadi S
H E D J A Z A N D
a h ba
N E J D
TRUCIAL
Tropic of Cancer S TAT E S

Wadi Halfa

ANGLO - EGYPTIAN Jedda Mecca

SUDAN At Taif 0 150 km
20°
0 150 miles

126
 THE LEVANT 1500–2002

Saida Damascus
basis for rule after independence. The system
Mediterranean
ensured a modicum of social peace but militated

IRA
Metulla
Sea S Y R I A
against national development. When Palestinians

Q
Haifa Es Suweida
Nazareth
used Lebanese territory to launch attacks against
Jordan

Netanya
Tel Aviv- Nablus Israel in the 1970s the Israeli reprisals reopened
32° Jaffa Jerico Amman
Jerusalem N
sectarian divisions leading to widespread civil
Bethlehem
Gaza
Hebron Kaf war (1975–82) and the fragmentation of Lebanon
Beersheba
into zones controlled by rival Christian, Shiite,
Bayir Sunni, and Druze militias. The chaos was com-
raba

T R A N S
Wadi A

pounded by the 1982 Israeli invasion aimed at

EG

J O R D A N Shubaih
N E J D
YP

expelling the Palestinians and installing a

T

Aqaba
Hejaz
Maronite regime allied to Israel. While the for- Invasion of Lebanon
Taba June 1982 – September 1983
0 80 km
Haqal
mer objective was achieved with the expulsion of Israeli attacks
0 80 miles
the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) Israeli withdrawal

Pledges and Border Changes from its Lebanese bases, the principal outcome of Israeli front line 6 June 1982
Tebuk
1920 – 1923 Israeli front line
The Palestine Mandate, granted to Britain
the invasion was the establishment of a de-facto 3 September 1983
28°

Separated from Palestine by Britain in

Syrian hegemony and the emergence of the Shiite Syrian forces
1921, and given to the Emir Abdullah.
Dhaba Hezbollah, backed by Syria and Iran—a more Maronite forces
Ceded by Britain to the French
Mandate of Syria, 1923 effective enemy to Israel than the Palestinians. Druze forces
36°
The Israeli occupation of South Lebanon proved
Lebanese forces
costly and ineffectual, provoking the government
UN forces
favored the military recruitment of the Alawi into making a unilateral withdrawal in 2002.
(Shiite) sectarians from the highlands above
Latakia. After independence the Alawis were able Beirut
to take control of the nationalist Baath (Renais- Zahle
Rayak
N

Baabda
sance) Party, establishing a sectarian dictatorship Aley
O

that combined socialist ideologies imported from Damour

Eastern Europe with the time-honored Arab sys-
N

Jebel
Barouk
Mediterranean
tem of asabiyya (group solidarity). Sea
A

The French enlarged Lebanon by adding the

B

districts of Tripoli, Sidon, the Biqaa Valley, and Sidon A wa l i

Jezzine Damascus
South Lebanon to the smaller Ottoman province, 33°30' Rachaya
E

substantially increasing the proportion of Mus- Zah

ara
L

ni
S Y R I A
lims from the Sunni and Shiite communities. Mt Hermon

U N Force
Hammadiye
Building on Ottoman precedents they instituted a Marjayoun (after 1978)

constitution by which power was divided between L it a ni e N

n
U

the main religious groups, with Maronites retain-

N
o

Tyre U N Force
B u f f e
Z

(after 1978) Kiryat Shmona

ing supreme power through the offices of presi-
y
i t

G o l a n
dent and commander-in-chief of the army,
r
r

e l i H e i g h t s
I s r a u
Z o n

regardless of demographic changes. The division S e c

Bint Jubail
Jordan

0 25 km
of power along sectarian lines was reaffirmed in
e

0 25 miles
I S R A E L
the 1943 National Pact, which established the

127
HISTORICAL ATLAS OF THE ISLAMIC WORLD
Prominent Travelers
Ibn Battuta spent more than a
year in the Maldive Islands,
where, with some reluctance, he
accepted the post of qadi
(judge). He regarded the people
as “upright and pious” but
disapproved of the way women
were bare from the waist
upwards.
128
The pilgrimage to Mecca gave rise to a rich
genre of travel writing. Pilgrims kept jour-
nals of their travels or dictated their
accounts to scribes, providing fascinating
details about everything from food to
architecture.
One of the most interesting accounts is
the Safarnama (travelogue) of the Persian
philosopher-poet Nasir Khusraw (1004–c.
1072), who journeyed to Cairo by way of
Nishapur, Rayy, Lake Van, Aleppo, and
Jerusalem. From Cairo he made two pilgrim-
ages to Mecca before returning to Central
Asia as the chief Ismaili dai (missionary) for
the Fatimid Imam-caliph al-Mustansir
(r. 1036–94). Attacked for his preaching by a
Sunni crowd in the city of Balkh, (probably
at the instigation of Saljuq officials) he took
refuge in Badakhshan in the western Pamirs,
where he spent the rest of his life under the
protection of an Ismaili prince. The Ismailis
of the Pamirs (located in eastern
Afghanistan and the autonomous region of
Gorno-Badakhshan in the former Soviet
Republic of Tajikistan) revere him as their
founding saint. In local legend, he not only
converted the people to the Ismaili faith, but
named all their villages, canonizing the
topography of places far removed from each
other (in the same way that Ireland’s patron
saint is associated with regions as far apart
as Mayo, Tipperary, Antrim, and Armagh).
While his poems reflect the loneliness of
exile, the rationalist temper of his philo-
sophical writings made him acceptable to
the communists who took over the region in
1920 and he retains his status as a national
hero in Tajikistan.
The Cairo Nasir described in his book is
a model for wise and just administration.
The artisans are decently paid, leading to an
improved quality of their products. The sol-
diers are paid regularly, making them less
likely to molest the peasants. The judges get
good salaries, ensuring fairness and sparing
citizens from corruption and injustice. If a
merchant is caught cheating a customer,
according to Nasir, “he is mounted on a
camel with a bell in his hand and paraded
about the city, ringing the bell and crying
out: ‘I have committed a misdemeanor and
am suffering reproach. Whoever tells a lie is
rewarded with public disgrace.’”
 PROMINENT TRAVELERS

The Arabic version of the pilgrimage- of information about the Crusades, the state
travelogue is known as a rihla. The genre of navigation in the Mediterranean, and the
was devised by the Andalusian Ibn Jubair political and social conditions of the times.
(1145– 1217), who wrote a famous account It served as a model for many other narra-
of the two-year journey he made from tives, most importantly the rihla of the
Granada, starting in February 1183, to greatest of all Muslim travelers, the Moroc-
Mecca. Here he spent nine months before can Ibn Battuta (1304–c.1370), whose jour-
returning from the Muslim Holy Land by neys took him from his native Tangier to
way of Iraq and Acre, where he boarded a China and Subsaharan Africa. Ibn Battuta
Genoese ship bound for Sicily. After surviv- made at least six pilgrimages to Mecca in
ing a dramatic shipwreck in the Straits of the course of his travels and the earlier parts
Messina, he reembarked at Trapani, arriving of his narrative conforms to the rihla genre.
safely at Granada in April 1185. Ibn Jubair’s However, as his journeys became more
narrative provides an abundance of informa- extended his book grew more comprehen-
tion about the countries and cities through sive, evolving into an unrivaled description
which he passed, and is an invaluable source of the known world. As with Marco Polo’s

BY
M

30° 40° 50° 60° 70°

ZA 50°
ed

N
TI
C aspian S

UM
it

12,000
er

ra AR
M 6,000
E Jax
n
ea Ak NIA Ara ar
t 3,000
lat AZ KH
Al Sea l

es
ex n ER WA 1,500
Tr

(Sa
an Lake BA RIZ
E dr
Se i
Be poli Al IJA M

yh
600
G ia a
ir M ep Ha Van N

un
Y Ty ut al- aar po rra 0 ft

)
P r Nu rat n
T Ca Ha Acre e ma
ea

iro Ti ifa n Tabr O

nn D am iz
xu
us as TR
SY
s

cu
(Ja

s AN
Jer R SO
yh

Q us XIA
ul ale IA N
un

zu m Da A
yla
le

m
)

m
Ni

As
yu Ba
t IR ghdad Ray
y Bista
A m Bukha
Q ra Sama
Sim Damg Merv rkand 40°
T H E

ma han
n Nish
Ku apu Sarakhs
fa r
Marv
As Ba Rud Balkh
H I J A Z

wa sra
n Isfah
an BAD
A Nain Hara
AKH
SHA
R QA Taba Qain t N
A RM
s
B AT
Yazd
I OF I S
A BA
HR TA
Per

Ay Me TE
dh al- din AY
N
PER
ab Jar a SIA
Shira
z (IR
sia

Jed
La
hsa AN)
da
n

Me
cca Ba
Fal hra
G
Red Sea

aj yn
u

Ta
l

if f

du
s INDI 30°
In A
UM SI N D
AN

NasirJ Khusraw’s Journeys

c. 1040
Tropic
of Can
cer

129
HISTORICAL ATLAS OF THE ISLAMIC WORLD

equally famous travelogue, Ibn Battuta did
not write his book himself but dictated it to
a collaborator—in his case the Granadan
scholar Ibn Juzay (1321–c.1356). He wrote
down Ibn Battuta’s narrative at the behest
of the ruler of
(r. 1349–58). By the time the book was writ-
ten the rihla genre had already become well
established among educated people and
questions arise (as with most other trave-
logues) as to the reliability of some of Ibn
Battuta’s descriptions. A modern scholar
suggests that Ibn Juzay may have “systemat-
ically exaggerated in the direction of fanta-
sy tendencies which in the original work
were certainly more moderate” and re-
arranged some of Ibn Battuta’s itineraries
for stylistic reasons. Scholarly quibbles,
however, cannot detract from Ibn Battuta’s
reputation as one of the greatest travelers of
all time. The wealth of information he
passed down to posterity about the world of
his era is unparalleled. Like all great travel-
Fez, Abu Inan ers, his observations tell us as much about
his own social world as the countries in
which he traveled. He had a sharp eye for
detail. His curiosity takes his readers behind
life’s obvious appearances, with every sen-
tence underpinned by a wealth of question-
ing: “The Chinese infidels eat the flesh of
swine and dogs, and sell it in their markets.
They are wealthy folk and well-to-do, but
they make no display either in their food or
in their clothes. You will see one of their
principal merchants, a man so rich that his
wealth cannot be counted, wearing a coarse

10° 0° 10° 20° 30° 40° 50°

HOLY
FRANCE ROMAN HUNGARY
EMPIRE
B l a c k S e a
AL

B Y
TUG

ARAGON
40° Rome Z A
CASTILE N T
POR

I N E
E M P I R
E
Granada
Granada
Trapani St. of Messina Syria
Sic ily
Hammadids
Damascus
Zirids Iraq
Acre
M e d i t e r r a n e a n S e a
E
T

30° Alexandria A
I PH
C AL
D
MI
A r a b i a
I
FAT

Medina
R

Tropic
e

of C
d

ancer
Mecca
S
e
a

20°
Travels of Ibn Jubair 0 100 km
1183–85
0 100 miles

130
 PROMINENT TRAVELERS

cotton tunic.” The contrast with Muslim Construction of an astrolabe.

societies, where textiles were highly valued This eleventh-century map was

and the fabrics worn in public an important designed to establish the

direction of Mecca—of great
indicator of wealth and social status, is
importance to Muslims at prayer.
implicit. In the empire of Mali Ibn Battuta
admires the Africans for their devoutness,
and especially their zeal for learning the
Koran by heart, “They put their children in
chains if they show any backwardness in
memorizing it, and they are not set free until
they have it by heart.” He disapproves, how-
ever, of their diet and their women’s lack of
attire: “Women go into the sultan’s presence
not properly covered, and his daughters also
go about naked…. Another reprehensible
practice among many of them is the eating
of carrion, dogs, and asses.”

Travels of Ibn Battuta

15° 0° 15° 30° 45° 60° 75° 90° 105° 120° 135° 150°
1325 – 1354
Journey 1325–27
60°
Journey 1327–41
Disputed journeys
Moscow A S I A
Journey 1341–54
Bulgar
Disputed journeys KHANATE OF THE Lake Baikal
Kiev GOLDEN HORDE
New Sarai
EUROPE Karakorum
0
133

Lake Balkhash
Venice EMPIRE OF THE
Astrakhan Aral Sea 45°
CHAGATAI GREAT KHAN
Ca

Black sea
Am

Rome Constantinople
spi

KHANATE G o b i
uD

Khanbaliq
an

Anatolia ar Samarkand
sea

ya
Granada Medit
err
an Antioch Tabriz Balkh C H I N A
Tangier ean
Fez
Sea II-KHANATE
Acre Baghdad TIBET
32 Hangzhou
1

Marrakesh 5– Jerusalem East

27 Cairo 30°
13 Multan
China
52
Pe r

–5 Delhi Sea
MAMLUKS
s
Indu

4 Hormuz
s
ia n

Gu Gan
ges Quanzhou
Red

lf
S a h a r a Guangzhou Tropic of Cancer
Se

Mecca
a

Ara bian Pagan

Nil e

Peninsula
Timbuktu Ara bian Bay of South
Sea Bengal China
A F R I C A Angkor Sea 15°
MALI Jenne Aden
N

i
Calicut
ge
r

Is.

Niani
s
Maldive

1346
1341

Ceylon
–3 0

Mogadishu
13 27

Equator
0°
Malindi Sumatra
Momcasa I N D I A N O C E A N
Zanzibar
Java
Kilwa

131
HISTORICAL ATLAS OF THE ISLAMIC WORLD

Britain in Egypt and Sudan in the 19th Century

General Charles George “Chinese”
Gordon (1833–85) was killed by
the forces of the Mahdi on the
steps of the governor’s house in
Khartoum after a siege lasting five
months. Seen by the British public
as a Christian martyr, his death
was avenged by Kitchener’s
reconquest of Sudan in 1898. This
drawing by the Victorian
illustrator Lowes Dickenson is
entitled “Gordon’s Last Watch.”
A lg e r ia
Tunis
Tripoli
British control of Egypt began with the mod-
ernizing regime of Muhammad Ali—who was
formally the Ottoman governor of Egypt but
really an independent ruler—and his descen-
dant Ismail Pasha (r. 1863–79), a passionate
Europhile. His ambitious plans for economic
development—including railroads and tele-
graph and the construction of the Suez Canal
(opened 1869)—led to national bankruptcy
and the imposition of a foreign-managed
financial administration. A group of native
Egyptian army officers, supported by ulama,
landowners, journalists, and the pan-Islamist
activist Jamal al-Din al-Afghani (1839–97)
were opposed to the debt-management regime
and took control of the war ministry, forming
a parliamentary government under the “rebel”
minister Urabi Pasha. William Gladstone, the
British prime minister, bombarded Alexandria
and landed troops who defeated Urabi at the
Battle of Tel al-Kebir. Under the British resi-
dent Sir Evelyn Baring (later Lord Cromer),
who held the financial reins of government, the
Mediterranean Sea
Cyrenaica
N ile
Egyptian economy was managed efficiently—
but in the imperial interest. Agricultural pro-
ductivity improved, barrages were built to
control the floodwaters of the Nile, and the
railroad system was extended. Increasing
quantities of raw cotton were grown for
export but the British limited industrialization
for fear of encouraging competition.
Egyptian penetration into Sudan began in
the 1820s, when Muhammad Ali overthrew
the Funj sultanate as part of his bid to create
an Egyptian empire in Africa. In 1830 Khar-
toum on the White Nile was founded as a new
fortified capital. Using European officers to
command local levies and Egyptian troops,
Muhammad Ali’s successors expanded their
territory to the Upper Nile and equatorial
provinces. Acting on the principles of admin-
istrative reform that were being applied in
Egypt and the Ottoman Empire, the Egyptians
imposed state trading monopolies—with slave
raids becoming state business—while stan-
dardizing legal practice under the official
Ottoman Hanafi code. This undercut
the authority of local ulama (who were
Malikis) as well as weakening local Sufi
Ottoman Africa
cults. Paradoxically this helped the
c. 1880
spread of reformist tariqas including the
French possessions
30° Sammaniyya and Khatmiyya inspired by
Ottoman possessions
pilgrims returning from the Hijaz,

Fezzan African states where the reformist spirit had been

R.

Egypt
1866 vice-royalty
of the Ottoman Empire Tropic of Cancer strong since the eighteenth century.
R

When the Egyptian state monopolies

e d

20° were abolished in the 1850s Europeans

E gypt ian Sudan
S

began entering Sudan to take over the

e a

Massawa
1862–83 to Egypt
trade in gum arabic, ostrich feathers,
Lake Darf ur and ivory, damaging local business.
Chad WADAN
SOKOTO
BORNU K ordofan ETHIOPIA
Under pressure from Britain the govern-
EMPIRE H arar
Nige 1874 to Egypt 10° ment signed a convention abolishing the
R.

wa
rR

Ben ue
Ada
ma slave trade (1877). The ensuing resent-
nd

SOMALI
.

ila

I B O
Benin E quatoria ments flared up in the great rebellion
al

Yoruba
om

ire R. KAMBA S launched by Muhammad Ahmad. A

Za NANDI
shaikh of the Sammaniyya, he enjoyed a

132
 BRITAIN IN EYGPT AND SUDAN IN THE 19th CENTURY

10° I 20° 30°

Black Sea 40° 50°
T
A 40°
L Constantinople
Y
Caspian
Sea
A n a t o l i a
G R E E C E

E
M e d i
t e r r a n
e a n R
S e a
Tripoli I
Bengazi
P
T r i p o l i
Alexandria M
Suez 30°
Cyrenaica E Canal
N 1869
A Cairo
O T T O M

A
Lib y a n Jagbub Tel-el-Kebir r
1882 a
Des er t headquarters of b
Sanusi Order Ni
F e z z a n le
i
R.
a

R
Muzuk

e d
Aswan
Tropic of Cancer
E G Y P T
from 1882

S
under British occupation

e a
Mecca

20°
Suakin
1883

Dongola 1887–90
Italian
occupation
1818–66 to Egypt
Omdurman Massawa
1898
MAHDIST Khartoum TIGRÉ Dahlak
Adowa
E Is.rit
STATE 1895 r YEMEN
1896 ea
Da r f u r Senna AMHARA
Northeast Africa WADAI al-Obeid 1883
1874 Mahdist capital Gondar
B lue N

1840–98 to Egypt Magdala

Nuba Mts QWARA 1868 from 1862 to France
DARFUR Lake Tana Djibouti
il e

Ottoman Empire, 1840 a r

ETHIOPIA H a r
Ottoman Vice-Royalty SHILLUK GOJJAM
Zaila t
yp
o Eg 1
of Egypt under SHOA – 84 t
A

Fashoda 1874
AW

Muhammed Ali, 1840

Addis Ababa Harar
AM

To Egypt, 1871–74
NUER SOMALI
AD

WALLEKA
Main area of activity HARAR
of Sanusi Order, Islamic
I

reformist movement, W Equator ia OROMO

L

after 1856 ZANDE 1871 to Egypt

hit

DINKA JIMMA
eN

Mahdist state, 1881–98

ile

Northern boundary of SIDAMA

O

Free Trade Zone

Berlin Act, 1885 GHIMIRA
S

Lake
Ethiopia at its Turkana
maximum extent under Co n g o F r ee S ta te
Menelik of Shoa from 1885
(Menelik II), c. 1907 N
British East Africa
Occupied by Britain, NDA
GA
1882 Equator
BU

0°
0 100 km
To Italy by 1889
French Lake
Victoria INDIAN
Congo 0 100 miles German East Africa OCEAN
To France by 1890
from 1885

To Belgium

133
HISTORICAL ATLAS OF THE ISLAMIC WORLD
great reputation for piety. Declaring himself to
be the Mahdi (the Muslim messiah, widely
expected to appear at the end of the thirteenth
hijri century in November 1882), he roused the
Baqqara cattle-herding tribes against the “infi-
del” Turko-Egyptian government. Having
annihilated a force of 8,000 levies under Hicks
Pasha at Sheikhan, the Mahdi went on to take
Omdurman and Khartoum. General Gordon
(who had disobeyed his instructions to evacu-
ate the garrison) was killed here on the steps
of the Governor’s mansion. This left the Vic-
torian public in Britain with a thirst for
revenge. The Mahdi died (probably of typhus)
six months after his triumphal entry into
Khartoum. Under his successor, the Khalifa
Abdullahi al-Taishi, the movement continued
to expand southward into the Nuba Moun-
tains and Bahr al-Ghazal regions. This
brought many non-Muslim animists including
the Nuer, Dinka, and others into their orbit,
planting the seeds of future conflict.
Having challenged and humiliated British
power in a strategically sensitive region where
France also had imperial designs, the Mahdist
state was doomed. In 1898 the Khalifa’s army
of 50,000 was massacred by an Anglo-
Egyptian force commanded by General Her-
bert Horatio Kitchener. The Khalifa’s spears
and elderly rifles were no match for the new
Gatling guns Kitchener had brought up the
Nile in his flotilla of armored steamers.
The defeat of the Mahdi led to more than a
half-century of British rule under the Anglo-
Egyptian Condominium. The Mahdi’s former
followers—known as the Ansar, after Muham-
mad’s original “helpers” in Medina—adopted
the “peaceful” jihad, extending their influence
in urban areas. In 1944 their leader Sayyid Abd
al-Rahman, a son of the Mahdi, formed the
Umma Party, which remained well-disposed to
the British while working for independence.
The Khatmiyya formed the National Union
Party, which favored a union with Egypt to
counter the influence of the Ansar. Though
134
the union was overwhelmingly rejected after
the 1952 Egyptian revolution the bitter rivalry
between the two religiously based parties per-
sisted, opening the way for military rule under
General Ibrahim Abbud (r. 1954–64) and later,
under Jafar Numairi (r. 1969–85). Initially
Numairi tried to heal the divisions between
the Muslim north and predominantly non-
Muslim (Christian and animist) south by
granting limited autonomy to the Bahr al-
Ghazal, Equatorial, and Upper Nile provinces.
In 1983, however, Numairi radically switched
directions, launching a campaign of total
Islamization. He was supported by Hasan al-
Turabi, leader of the National Islamic Front
(the Sudanese version of the Muslim Brother-
hood). Though overthrown in 1985 after
becoming increasingly erratic and unstable,
the program of Islamization continued under
General Umar al-Bashir, who seized power
with Turabi’s support in 1989. Turabi’s insis-
tence on Arabizing and Islamizing the non-
Muslim population, which was subjected to
Islamic punishments, provoked increasing
resistance among Southerners. Many joined or
supported the Sudan People’s Liberation
Movement led by Colonel Garang. The strug-
gle between north and south, Africa’s longest-
running civil war, has been described by a
leading historian as a “civil war of genocidal
proportions… with tactics that include starv-
ing the civilian populations and forcing them
to migrate.” [Ira Lapidus, A History of Islam-
ic Societies, 2nd edition Cambridge, 2002, p.
768.] Peoples adhering to African religions,
such as the Nuer and Dinka, have been sub-
jected to forcible conversion. Bashir used the
NIFs program, which included purges and exe-
cutions of non-Islamists in the top ranks of
the army and civil service, to smash the power
of the traditional political parties, dominated
by the Sufi (mystical) brotherhoods. Ten years
into the dictatorship, Turabi had served his
purpose. In December 1999 the General oust-
ed him in a “palace coup.”
 BRITAIN IN EYGPT AND SUDAN IN THE 19th CENTURY

20°
10° 0° 10° 20° 30° 40° 50°
PORTUGAL SPAIN

Algiers
Tangier Tunis
Oran
Madeira Tunis
Fez 1881 protectorate
O Algeria
CC Tripoli
Mediterranean Sea
RO conquered
O 1871–90 Alexandria
Canary Is. M
Tripoli 30°
Ifni Ottom. Prov. Cyrenaica Cairo
Canary Is.
to Sp.
Fezzan Vice-royalty A r a
Ottom. Prov. of Egypt b i

N
a

ile
pro r o
te

Mourzouk
ora

R
R.
i sh O
tect

e d
1882 British occupation
Tropic of Cancer
p an e

Aswan
4S d
1 88 i o

Wadi Halfa
R

S
e a
S a h a r a 20°

Berber
Senegambia Marewe 1884 to Mahdi
St. Louis Timbuktu 1885 to Mahdi
DARFUR Massawa
Dakar Khartoum 1885 to Italy
Kayes KANEM
1885 to Mahdi

ER
Gambia SOKOTO BORNU
YATENGA El Fasher Assab

IT
Sokoto Sennar Gondar

RE
Segu WAGADUGU CALIPHATE Kuka Lake Chad to Italy

A
Port. Guinea GURMA Nige WADAI El Obeid Obok
Kano BA
G MAHDI’S DOMINION
rR

Samory’s MAMPRUSSI IR Br. Somaliland

M 1881–98 ETHIOPIA 10°
.

Operations DAGOMBA I 1884–85 Br. protectorate

Freetown Bussa RABEH’S
Sierra Yola Harar
R.

Leone Porto Novo EMPIRE 1875–85 to Egypt

Ashanti Lagos Ben ue ADAMAWA c.1881–1907
Monrovia conquest under Menelik II
LIBERIA BENIN EQUATORIA
Ivory Gold Lomé Douala ZANDE
R.

Coast Coast 1884 to Ger.

Fernando Póo Kribi
gi
Uban

Principé Rio Muni RO

YO
São Tomé Libreville Congo Free State N DA Equator
AN
BU

0°
UGLake
B

Gabon Victoria
Congo

Witu
Brazzaville 1885–90 to Germany
R. German Mombasa
Leopoldville
Cabinda East Pemba Is.
SO UTH ATLAN TI C 1886–91 to Portugal
Lake Africa Zanzibar Is.
Tanganyika
Ambriz LUBA
O CEAN
Loanda Aldabra Is.
LUNDA KAZEMBE
o l a

10°

Benguela Lake Comoro Is.

n g

Nyasa
ca
A

Africa after the Berlin Macâmedes mb

R. Za ezi
ri

f Mozambique
Conference 1885 LOZI A
Tete st
British possessions MATABELE Ea Tananarive
EMPIRE se
German
t u gue

French possessions TAWANA Beira 20°

South -west Madagascar
Africa po
Limpo R. 1885 French
Ottoman possessions Walvis Bay protectorate
N 1884 German
or

SOUTH
protectorate AFRICAN P Tropic of Capricorn
NA

Portuguese possessions
REPUBLIC
UA

Lüderitz
1883 to Germany CH Johannesburg
Spanish possessions BE
nge
eR
Orang . a te ZULULAND
German possessions Or e Sta
e
Fr B. Natal
Durban
African state 30°
0 500 km
INDIAN
Boundary of Free Trade Zone Cape Colony OCEAN
Cape Town
(Berlin Act), 1885 0 500 miles

135
 HISTORICAL ATLAS OF THE ISLAMIC WORLD

France in North and West Africa

The French conquest of northwest Africa began held some 2.7 million hectares, between 35 and
in earnest in 1830 when the government of the 40 percent of the arable land, with wine (forbid-
restored Bourbon monarch, Charles X, support- den to Muslims) the dominant export.
ed by Marseille merchants with long-standing The cultural destruction was massive. Tradi-
interests in the wool trade, invaded Algeria. tional Islamic colleges were abolished or had their
While the French occupied Algiers and other revenues seized, and though they were supposed
coastal to be replaced by French schools, only a small
10°
SPAIN
0° 10° 20° towns, the minority of Algerian Muslims benefited. Unlike
PORTUGAL
replacement the British, who preferred to rule their empire
Algiers 1830 to France
Ceuta
to Spain
Algeria TUNIS
Tunis of Ottoman through pliant surrogates, France had a policy of
Madeira Tangier Oran 1830–48 to Fr. Nominally Subject M e dite rrane an
1418 to Spain
Fez
to Spain
until 1881 Se a power in the assimilation, and though its application was lim-
Mazagan Tripoli
O interior by ited, it brought into being a small Francophone
Canary Is. CC te Tripoli Cyrenaica
1496 to Spain O a
R tan 1521–1835 Europeans elite that identified with French civilization. In the
O l autonomous
M Su
Fezzan provoked a 1920s and 30s a nationalist movement combining
movement of Islamic reformers grouped around Abd al-Hamid
resistance by bin Badis (Ben Badis) and Arab nationalists
Arguin S a h a r a D e s e r t Abd al- inspired by Messali Hajj gained ground, planting
Qadir, son the seeds for the full-grown war of independence
Pador
SENEGAL to France KAARTA
Timbuktu of the head that erupted in the late 1950s, with support from
St. Louis Wara
FUTA TORO
MASINA BORNU WADAI
of the the Soviet bloc, Egypt, and other Arab countries.
1816 to Br. KHASSO SEGU
SO
Lake Chad Qadiriyya, In 1958 a counter-movement by French colonists
FUTA JALLON Nige K O
PORT. GUINEA T
O in alliance opposed to independence toppled the government
r

Bissau I BADAN
Freetown EMPIRE with the Sul- of the Fourth Republic and brought General de
ADAMAWA
Sierra Leone ILORIN
EY

1787–1807 to Britain Ben ue tan of Gaulle to power in France. Contrary to the

DAHOM

ASHANTI
LI Accra
BE Monrovia Whydah BENIN
RI
A founded 1821
GOLD COAST
M o r o c c o . colonists’ expectations, however, de Gaulle con-
1821 to Britain Fernando Póo
N Bight 1483 to Portugal Fo l l ow i n g ceded Algerian independence. After protracted
gi
Uban

of 1778 to Sp. 1827–34 to Br.

Benin Principé the defeat of negotiations at Evian, France recognized Algerian
0 500 km São Tomé 1483 to Portugal
Annobón 1483 to Portugal
Congo the Moroc- sovereignty in 1962. However, the economic,
0 500 miles 1778 to Spain Basin
can army by social, and political ties between France and Alge-
General ria remained close, with the FLN—the nationalist
Africa c. 1830 Thomas-Robert Bugeaud at the Battle of Isly in party that negotiated independence—replacing
British possessions 1844, the way was opened for French coloniza- the French administration as a quasicolonial
French possessions tion. Bugeaud destroyed orchards, crops, and Francophone minority ruling over a majority of
Ottoman and Egyptian whole villages, killing large numbers of people Arabic and Berber speakers. In December 1991
possessions
and leaving many thousands to starve. Vast areas the army intervened to prevent the Islamic Salva-
Portuguese possessions
of land were confiscated, with Arab and Berber tion Front (FIS) from coming to power in nation-
Spanish possessions
clans displaced to make way for French and other al elections. More than 100,000 Algerians lost
African states European colonists. There were insurrections their lives in the ensuing civil war, which partly
Major legal slave route, against the French throughout the nineteenth represented a struggle between a Francophone
with date where known
century culminating in a massive uprising elite committed to Western values and the
crushed in 1871. Colonization of the productive Islamists who claimed to possess a superior cul-
lands of the Algerian littoral continued well into tural legitimacy.
the twentieth century. By 1940 European settlers French colonial ambitions in Algeria spilled

136
 FRANCE IN NORTH AND WEST AFRICA

over into neighboring Tunisia, an autonomous by nationalist revolt was repeated less starkly in
Ottoman province that France took over pro- other parts of the French empire in Africa,
gressively after 1881. By 1945 there were some where France had economic ambitions but little
144,000 European settlers occupying about one- interest in colonization. Its primary economic
fifth of the cultivable land. These settlers, how- interest was to stimulate the production of cash
ever, never formed such a powerful domestic crops such as peanuts, timber, and palm oil.
lobby as their counterparts in Algeria. After The French collected taxes in cash and used
being defeated in Indo-China after the Second forced labor on
N
10° 0° 10° 20° 30°
World War France conceded Tunisian independ- banana, cocoa, and
ence in 1956. The same pattern of French eco- coffee plantations. Spanish
Algiers
Tunis
Morocco Tangier Oran
nomic penetration followed by administrative They built railways to Casablanca Fez Tunisia
Tripoli
Mediterranean Sea
Morocco Algeria Benghazi
control and colonization occurred in Morocco, transport goods from Agadir
Ifni
Alexandria

with the important difference that the country the interior to the Spanish
Sahara L i b y a
Cairo

E g y p t
retained its status as a Muslim polity under the Atlantic, destroying Rio de Murzuq
Oro S a h a r a
Sharifian dynasty (claiming descent from the the time-honored
Prophet) that came to power in the seventeenth camel traffic
St. Louis
F r e n c h W e s t A f r i c a

l A fric a
century. Like the Iranian rulers of his day, the across the Sahara. Dakar
Sen egal
Timbuktu
Niger A ng l o-
Gambia French Sudan Eg y pt i a n
Moroccan Sultan was short of revenues from African trade was L. Chad
S uda n

a t o ria
Port. Guinea Vo lta C h a d
p er Sokoto Fort Lamy
Up
which to pay his armies. This was especially so undermined, with French Guinea

E qu
Dahomey
Togolan
Gold Ni ger i a
Sierra
after the production of one of his most valuable Levantine Arabs, Coast

nch
Leone
Ivory Lagos

F re
LIBERIA Coast Accra Lomé Ubangi Shari
commodities, sugar, passed into European Greeks, and South K am e r un
Douala
hands with the development of plantations in Asians taking over the Rio Muni

the Canaries and the Americas. In order to main- retail trade in French 0 500 km French Equatorial B e l g i a n
Africa C o n g o
tain his hegemony over insubordinate tribes, the colonies. African edu- 0 500 miles

sultan mortgaged his customs revenues and bor- cation was neglected,
rowed heavily from French banks. When this with only 3 percent of
Northwest Africa
provoked a revolt among the ulama the French Africans in the French to 1914
intervened directly, imposing a protectorate empire enabled to go British possessions
(alongside a smaller one granted to Spain) in to school. Nevertheless
French possessions
1912. Moroccan land was opened up to purchase a small Francophone
Spanish possessions
by Europeans, who by 1953 controlled about 1 elite was fostered,
million hectares, or 10 percent of the crop land, which would come to Portuguese possessions

and 25 percent of orchards and vineyards power after independ- Belgian possessions
(though Europeans formed barely 1 percent of ence. In 1958 de Gaulle German possessions
the population). Unlike in Algeria and Tunisia, offered to France’s
Italian possessions
however, the dynasty was able to place itself at African colonies the
Independent state
the head of the movement for independence. In choice between imme-
1953 the French made Sultan Muhammad V into diate independence or
a hero by sending him into exile when he refused self-government within the French economic
to agree to a system of dual sovereignty. After community. Only Guinea opted for immediate
massive protests and violence the French allowed independence (a costly decision that seriously
the sultan to return, conceding independence in impaired its economic development). France’s
1956. The dynasty remains in power under Sul- remaining dependencies in West Africa
tan Muhammad’s grandson, Muhammad VI. acquired complete independence in the course
The pattern of colonial conquest followed of the 1960s.

137
HISTORICAL ATLAS OF THE ISLAMIC WORLD

Growth of the Hajj and Other Places of Pilgrimage

The hajj is one of the five “pillars” or reli- foreign residents). About 50 percent of the
Pilgrim Routes of Arabia gious duties that every Muslim is obliged to overseas pilgrims are from the Arab world, 35
Durub al–Hadjdj (Pilgrim roads) perform at least once in his or her lifetime. percent from Asia, 10 percent from subsaha-
Diversions
Today the duty is made comparatively easy ran Africa, and 5 percent from Europe and
by affordable air transportation. The hajj ter- the Western Hemisphere.
Towns, villages
minal at Jedda airport—a vast tented struc- The origins of the rites of the hajj are
Mikat
ture spread over several acres—accommo- obscure. Shortly before his death in 632
Be rut Muhammad took the preexisting cults of
Damascus
30 days to Medina
Baghdad Mecca and its vicinity and reformed them.
Karbala

Gaza
Spread over several days the reformed versions
Kufa/Nadjaf An Najaf
35 days to Mecca
27 days to Mecca
Manarat al-Kurun
Samawa include the tawaf (circumambulation) around
al-Kahira
Maan
Wakisa
Basra the Kaba, the square temple at the center of
Suez 30° Salman
Akaba
the sanctuary in Mecca; the say or ritual run-
Zubala
ning between the hillocks of Safa and Marwa;
Pe
al-Tur
Madyan
rs
Tabuk
Aynuna Hafar
ia

al-Talabiyya a day spent on the plain of Arafat; the

n

Tayma
G

Ha'il
onrush—now a massive jam of people and
u

Safa
lf

Mada in Salih Faydal

al-Sukya
Kus Al Wajh
Burayda
traffic—through Muzdalifa; the stoning of
Khaybar Zilfi
the jamarat (pillars) representing the devil at
al
-K

Edfu 25° Nukra

ar
ya
t

Mina. In reforming the pagan hajj Muham-

ay

Komombo Medina
n

Yanbu‘ Riyadh
Abyar
al-Yamama
Ali
Madan 'Afif al-Kusuriyya Wadi S mad may have redirected a series of solar,
R

a h ba
Sufayna
Rabigh
al-Djuhfa
Shurma rainmaking, and other rituals surrounding the
e

Aydhab
Jedda
Usfan
Dhat Irk
Black Stone. A mysterious “heavenly rock” or
d

Kurn al-Manazil
Mecca
At Taif
Turaba a meteorite, it is set in the southeastern corner
Yalamlam
Barara
20°
Port Soudan Raghdan Tabala
of the Kaba toward the exclusive worship of
S

Bisha
Sawakin
Sadwan Allah as revealed to the patriarch Abraham
Kunfida
e

Ibl Hamdha
From Central Africa Mahayl Dahban (Ibrahim) and his son Ishmael (Ismail), the
a

Wakasha
Zahran mythical ancestor of the Arabs. The final act
Khor Baraka

N
At
Djizan
of the hajj, the sacrifice of an animal com-
bara

Sada
Mushaynika
al-Abr Tarim

Kawuda
memorating the sheep that Allah accepted in
15°
Sana
Mabar 43 days to Mecca
Rada'a al-Shihr place of Abraham’s son, is celebrated
Dhamar
T

ak
az al-Sawadiyya
0 200 km
ze
Zabid
Aryab Sala
la throughout the Muslim world at the Id al-
Taizz From

0 200 miles Aden

Adha, when Muslims kill their own animals
or consume ritually slaughtered animals at
dates more passengers at one time than any home. The umra (minor pilgrimage) is limited
other airport terminal in the world. The hajj to the sanctuary surrounding the Kaba and
physically connects Muslims from all parts of can be performed separately at any time of
the world with each other. It attracts about the year or in conjunction with the hajj.
one million pilgrims from abroad each year, In premodern times the journey could be
and about the same number of pilgrims from extremely arduous, especially from distant
within Saudi Arabia (including Saudis and peripheries. It could take many years of a

138
 GROWTH OF THE HAJJ AND OTHER PLACES OF PILGRIMAGE

person’s life—even a whole lifetime—to com- Road to

Wadi Fatma 40 Road to Arafat, Taifand Nejd
and Medina Wadi Fatma
plete the “fifth pillar” of Islam. Vast moving 0 500 paces
Road to Tanim 40 Water reservoir
caravan cities under the command of the 41 Summer garden of the sherifs
Amir al-Hajj set out from Syria, Egypt, and 40
Tomb of Khadijah
burial ground of el-Maala
Iraq. The caravan commanders were generals Plan of Mecca
in the field. In fact, their primary duty was to

in
1 The Quarter of Jirwal.

Pla
Road from Jedda 36 2 The Quarter of el-Bab.

dy
protect the pilgrims from the attacks of the paved
road 3 The Quarter of esh-Shebeka.

San
38 35
4 The Quarter of Suq es-saghir.
marauding Bedouin or (from the late eigh- 5 The Quarter of el-Mesfala.
teenth century) the tribes belonging to the 6 The Quarter of Bab el-Umra.
7 The Quarter of Shamiyya.
Wahhabi-Saudi movement regarded all non- 16 8 The Quarter of Sueqa.
9 The Quarter of Qarara.
14
Wahhabis as infidels. Ibn Jubair, who made 10 Huts.
13 11 The Quarter of Rakuba.
15
the pilgrimage in 1184, described the tent of 12 16 12 The Quarter of en-Naqa.
39 19 13 The Quarter of al-Selemaniyya.
the commander of the Iraqi caravan on the 11 18 14 The Quarter of Shib Amir.
22 17 15 The Haddadin (Blacksmiths’ street).
20
Plain of Arafat as resembling a “walled city” 10 16 The street el-maala.
9 23 22 21 17 The Gazza quarter.
or “powerful fortress” with “four lofty Jabal Hindi 9
27 18 Palace of the Grand Sherif Aun ar-
1 8 24 26 Rafiq (1882–1905) built by his father
gates,” through which one entered a series of A
34 25
Muhammed ibn Aun.
7 24 27
32 31 19 Palace of the Grand Sherif
vestibules and narrow passageways. In the 6 30 Abdallah, elder brother of Aun ar-
37 28
Rafiq.
nineteenth century the arrival of steamship Burial ground of 3 6 29
29
20 The Quarter of Shib el-Maulid.
esh-Shebeka 4
navigation under colonial auspices, com- 5 Sandy Plain
el-Haram (the Mosque)
21 The Quarter of Suq el-lel.
5 22 The Quarter of el-Muddaa.
bined with the emergence of special hajj sav- 23 El-Merwa.
The Great Castle 24 El-masa.
ings clubs, placed the pilgrimage within reach Jebel Omar
25 Stone Street (Zuqaq el-Hajar).
A 26 Maulid Sittana Fatma.
N
of thousands of ordinary peasants and 27 The Quarter of el-Qushashiyya.
28 Es-Safa.
fen

townsfolk from outlying regions such as Ben-

Tara

29 The Quarter of el-Jiad (in this

i et-

33 quarter are the Eqyptian Tekkiyye

Wad

gal, Malaya, and the Dutch East Indies who
could never have hoped to fulfill the religious
duty in preindustrial times.
A disastrous side effect of the consequent
increase in attendance was a series of devas-
tating cholera outbreaks. In 1865 an epidem-
ic originating in Java and Singapore killed an
estimated 15,000 out of 90,000 pilgrims
before the hajj—which occurred in May—
was over. By the following month the disease
had spread to Alexandria, where 60,000
Egyptians died. By November the disease
had spread as far as New York. Quarantine
restrictions introduced by the Ottoman and
colonial governments shielded Egypt and
Europe from infection, but cholera contin-
ued to rage in the east and in the Hejaz,
where there were eight epidemics between
1865 and 1892. The worst of all occurred in
Vegetable and Foundation building, and the new
fruit gardens Government building).
30 Main Guard house.
31 House of Wali (Governor) of the
Hejaz. The Police office etc.
1893, when almost 33,000 pilgrims out of a 32 Madrasah, now used as office of
the Committee for the Aqueduct of
total of 200,000 perished at Jedda, Mecca, Zubaydah and bureau of the Reyyis
(Chief of the muaddhins).
and Medina. The epidemics continued until 33 Birket Majin (pronounced Majid)
great cistern in connection with the
1912, by which time the strict quarantine reg- aquaduct.
34 Court of Justice and dwelling house
ulations had finally taken hold. Compared of the Qadhi.
35 Tomb of Abu Talib (uncle of
with the horrors of the late nineteenth and Muhammad).
36 Water place in connection
early twentieth century, recent disasters to with aquaduct.
have afflicted the hajj, such as the deaths of 37 Tomb of Seyyid Aqil.
38 Tomb of the Saint Shikh Mahmud.
more than four hundred mainly Indonesian 39 Jebel Queqian.
40 The Quarter of Maabda.
pilgrims in the fire that broke out at Arafat 41 Reservoir of water from the
aquaduct. Several such reservoirs
in 2000, seem almost minor. are now in all the main streets.
A Bedouin huts.
Many, if not most, pilgrims supplement
the hajj with a visit to the Prophet’s mosque
at Medina, where Muhammad’s family,
wives, and prominent Companions are
buried. In 1925 the puritanical Saudi-

139
HISTORICAL ATLAS OF THE ISLAMIC WORLD

Wahhabi movement leveled all the structures tion of Wahhabism, which was manifested in
marking these graves. Ziyara (the custom of the Saudi–Wahhabi attacks on the shrines of
visiting graves or praying at them) was the Shiite imams, Ali and Hussein at Najaf,
severely restricted. According to Wahhabi and Karbala in Iraq, in 1801. However,
tenets, not shared by other Sunni communi- ziyaras to the tombs of the imams and their
ties, ziyaras amount to saint veneration or descendents are an important aspect of pop-
shirk (idolatry). The restrictions are an ular Shiism. Some of these ziyaras are per-
aspect of the virulently anti-Shiite orienta- formed at all times of the year, others at spe-

140° 130° 120° 110° 100° 90° 80° 70° 60° 50° 40° 30° 20° 10° 0°
GREENLAND
Alaska
60°

UNITED
KINGDOM
IRELAND
C A N A D A London
50° Vancouver

Seattle FRANCE
U N I T E D
Chicago Boston
New York

PORTUGAL
40° SPAIN
San Francisco S T A T E S Norfolk Azores

Los Angeles O
San Diego CC
RO
30° O
Canary M AL G
New Orleans Islands
A T L A N T I C WESTERN
SAHARA
Tropic of Cancer MEXICO Gulf of
Mexico CUBA
20° O C E A N MAURITANIA
Br. MA L
Honduras Caribbean Sea Cape Verde SENEGAL
Islands GAMBIA BURKINA
GUINEA FASO
10° BISSAU GUINEA
VENEZUELA Br. IVORY
Panama SIERRA LEONE COAST
Guiana

TO
PACIFIC OCEAN COLOMBIA LIBERIA

G
GHANA
0° Galapagos
Islands ECUADOR

PERU B R A Z I L
10°

BOLIVIA
20°
Tropic of Capricorn PARAGUAY

30°

ARGENTINA
CHILE
40°

50°
The Growth of the Hajj
Falkland
Pilgrims traveling to Mecca Islands

Cape Horn

140
 GROWTH OF THE HAJJ AND OTHER PLACES OF PILGRIMAGE

cial times in the Muslim calendar. For exam- annual festival of Ashura (the day of his
ple, the ziyara of the Imam Rida in Mashhad martyrdom) when thousands of Shiite pil-
is recommended in the month of Dhu al- grims from all over the world congregate at
Qada. Ziyaras are popular with women, the mosque surrounding his tomb. Other
especially to the shrines of female saints Muslim saints have shrines whose sanctity is
such as Sayyida Zainab (daughter of the associated with national or regional identi-
Imam Ali) in Cairo and Sayyida Ruqayya ties. Two of the most prominent are the
(daughter of Imam Hussein) in Damascus. shrines of Moulay Idris (founder of the
The shrine of Hussein at Karbala is visited Idrisid dynasty) at Fez in Morocco and
on Thursday evenings, but especially at the Amadu Bamba (c. 1850–1927) in Senegal.

10° 20° 30° 40° 50° 60° 70° 80° 90° 100° 110° 120° 130° 140° 150° 160° 170° 180° 170°
N
AY

DE
RW

SWE
NO

EST.
LATVIA R U S S I A N F E D E R A T I O N
Moscow
LITH.

BELARUS
Berlin POLAND
GERMANY
CZ. SLO.
AUST. UKRAINE K A Z A K S T A N
SWITZ. HUNG.
SL. ROMANIA M ONGOLIA
CR. B.H.
SER.
IT BULG. UZ
AL BE

N
Y AL. GEORGIA AZER- KI KYRGYZSTAN
ARM. BAIJAN ST
TURKEY AN Peking
(Beijing) KOREA

A
GREECE TAJIKISTAN
SYRIA
TURKMENISTAN Tokyo
Malta
TUNISIA

Suez C H I N A P
Canal IRAQ IRAN AFGH. A
Shanghai
JORDAN J Midway
GERIA PAKISTAN NEPAL
LIBYA
EGYPT SAUDI I NDI A BANG.
ARABIA
Mecca Calcutta Hong Kong
LA

BURMA Mariana
OS

LI
NIGER CHAD Islands
THAI. PHILIPPINES Guam PACIFIC OCEAN
SUDAN Aden CAM. VIETNAM

NIGERIA ETHIOPIA
IA

CENT. AFRICAN
BE GO

BRUNEI
AL

REP. Caroline Islands

NI

MALAYSIA
N

SO

CAMEROON SRI LANKA

EQ. GUINEA UG. KENYA
O

GABON
NG

CONGO
CO

INDONESIA
TANZANIA Solomon Is.

ANGOLA
M.
ZAMBIA
UE

Fiji Is.
S CA
Q

Coral Sea
BI

I N D I A N
M

AGA

ZIM.
MOZA

MAD

NAMIBIA BOTS.
O C E A N
A U ST R A L I A
SWAZ.
Brisbane
SOUTH LESOTHO
AFRICA Perth Sydney
Cape Town
Auckland
Melbourne
D
N

Cape of
A
AL

Good Hope
ZE
EW

N
N

0 2500 km

0 2500 miles

141
HISTORICAL ATLAS OF THE ISLAMIC WORLD

Expanding Cities
Baghdad the caliph was murdered along with thousands
Founded in AD 762 by Abu Jafar al-Mansur, the of his subjects. Whole quarters were destroyed
second Abbasid caliph, the city of Baghdad was by looting and fire. The irrigation system on
originally built on the west bank of the Tigris which the city and its gardens depended was
River. wrecked, adding dramatically to the city’s
Although its original name was Madinat decline. By the time Baghdad became part of
al-Salam (City of Peace), Baghdad was more the Ottoman Empire in 1534 it had suffered
popularly known as the Round City from the obscurity and neglect for several centuries.
circular walls surrounding it. The caliph’s Improvements were made on a modest scale
palace and the grand mosque stood at at the beginning of the twentieth century with
the center, with four roads radi- the building of schools and hospitals. The oil
Syrian ating outward. Towering boom of the 1970s brought increased wealth to
N Gate
above the palace was Baghdad and the city began to develop on a
outer
wall the Green Dome, much more impressive scale, with the construc-
standing nearly tion of middle-class residential areas. New sew-
ices hou 165 feet high, ers and water lines were laid and above ground
o ff ses
topped by a a network of superhighways was constructed,
nt

guard room
an
me

ds
ern

hop

mounted as well as a new airport. Eleven bridges con-

gov

horseman. nected the two halves of the city, many of which

Basra
palace guard room Khurasan As Baghdad were subsequently destroyed by US bombing in
Gate Gate
mosque gradually 2003. Tahrir Square, standing on the river’s left
s p r e a d bank at one end of the Jumhuriyyah Bridge, is
ffices
nt o

beyond the now the heart of the city from which its main
hou

me

inner
s es

an
ern

ds
hop go
v
wall
original walls streets radiate.
s
to the east bank Under the dictatorial regime of Saddam Hus-
of the Tigris, the sein a number of massive monuments were con-
0 500 metres two halves were structed, including the notorious “Victory
0 500 yards Kufa
joined by a bridge of Arch”, a vast confection in bronze actually
Gate boats. The eastern section modeled from maquettes of Saddam Hussein’s
was called Rusafa. forearms. An altogether more impressive exam-
Baghdad reached the height of its commer- ple of recent monumental art is the Shahid
cial prosperity and cultural power during the (Martyrs’) Monument commemorating the
eighth and ninth centuries. Under the rule of dead of the Iran–Iraq War (1980–88). Designed
the caliphs al-Mahdi and Harun al-Rashid, it by Ismail Fattah, it consists of a vast onion-
stood at the nexus of the trade routes between dome vertically sliced into two sections and
the East and West linking Asia with Europe. Its glazed with traditional blue ceramic tiles. Apart
impressive buildings and magnificent gardens from these monuments most of the improve-
gave it the reputation of the richest and most ments to Baghdad were brought to a halt by the
beautiful city in the world. war with Iran in the 1980s, the Gulf War that
In the latter half of the ninth century, the followed Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait, and the UN
Abbasid caliphs’ power was weakened by inter- sanctions imposed afterward. The major excep-
nal strife leading to civil war. When the Mon- tions to this story of renewed decline were the
gols invaded Baghdad in the thirteenth century, presidential palaces, actually vast compounds

142
 EXPANDING CITIES

surrounded by high walls or fences, containing university. Cairo was founded by Jawhar in 970.
Saddam’s lavishly decorated residential villas Later it was embellished by the mamluk amirs,
for visiting dignitaries set beside artificial lakes. who built hundreds of mosques, tombs, inns,
Before the removal of the Iraqi Baathist regime hospices, hospitals, and other public buildings.
by US military action in March 2003 access to Their distinctive decorative style made use of
these sites by UN weapons inspectors had been the same Muqattam limestone as the pyramids
a major source of contention between the of Giza (and in some cases, using the pyramids’
regime and the United Nations. outer casings). Salah al-Din al-Ayyubi (Saladin)
who took over
after the collapse
Jazirat al-Fil Cairo at the time of
Sultan al-Nasir of the Fatimids,
Densely settled walled city
built the magnif-
icent citadel to
mostly dry

Well-populated sections
outside the walls
the south where
Newer sections being
opened to settlement Muhammad Ali,
Nile River

Bulaq Birkat Road

former al-Ratli al-Husayniya the nineteenth-
now

al-Maqs
Bab al-Nasr Wall century reform-
er,

cemetery
riv

ing autocrat,
of

constructed the great Ottoman-style mosque

Qasb

Qayt-Bay Qarafa
cemetery that still commands the old city.
Bab-Zuwayla
Bab-al-Luq The earliest settlement in this crucial spot on
Birkat
al-Nasiri the east bank of the Nile, opposite the

Citadel
Birkat
al-Quarun
mosque of Cairo at the time of
Imam Tulun
Rawda Fumm al-Kalij Ismail 1869 – 1870
Old city
tomb of
Imam Shafi N Clo
tB Added by Ismail
ey
mosque of Amr Planned new arteries
l
ana

0 500 m for old city

ah C
ally

0 500 yds Railways

Ism

Bulaq al-Sikkah al-Jadidah

Cairo
et
Stre
l Aziz

Cairo, which comes from the Arabic word

Abdu

al-Qahira, meaning the victorious, takes its

Muh
am

name from the city founded by a brilliant gen-

ma

e
bridg
d

al-Nil
Ali

eral Jawhar al-Siqilli. A slave of Sicilian, possi- Qasr

Stre
et

bly Slav, origin he conquered Egypt in 969 on Maydans

Nile River

behalf of his master, the Fatimid Caliph al-

N
Muizz. Like the previous conquerors he staked Citadel
out a separate garrison city for his troops, Muhammad
Ali Square
north of the city, al-Fustat, founded by the
Arabs, who had conquered Egypt in 642. The
0 1000 m
Fatimid city, with its palaces, schools, and 0 1000 yds

mosques, includes al-Azhar, the world’s oldest

143
HISTORICAL ATLAS OF THE ISLAMIC WORLD
0 2 km
0 2 miles
Giza
pyramids, was Babylon (now Misr al-Qadima),
a fortress built by the invading Persians in 525
BC to guard an important crossing of the Nile.
The city’s steady northward migration (which
continued into the twentieth century with the
construction of the desert suburb of Heliopo-
lis) was influenced by the prevailing northerly
breezes, which sent the smells of ordure and
burning rubbish southward. Before the nine-
teenth century the city’s westward expansion
was limited by the river’s floodplains. The
Mamluk amirs and Ottoman princes built fine
palaces with vast palm-shaded gardens while
most of the populace lived in labyrinthine
streets and alleyways contained within the
144
Growth of Cairo
1800 – 1947
Developed before 1800
Added up to1905
Added up to 1915
Added up to 1925
Added up to 1935
Added up to 1947
medieval walls of al-Qahira. The European-
style city of fine boulevards and circuses was
laid out in the 1860s in conscious imitation of
Baron Haussmann’s redesigned Paris. Improved
flood control and the stabilization of the river-
banks and the two large islands of Rawdah and
Gezirah allowed the city to expand across the
river toward Giza and Imbaba. This makes
modern Cairo (with 18–20 million people) one
of the world’s largest megalopolises.
Tashkent
Until the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991
Tashkent, with a population of 2.3 million, was
the fourth-largest Soviet city after Moscow,
 EXPANDING CITIES

Leningrad, and Kiev. Much of it was destroyed
by an earthquake in 1966, which wrecked
95,000 homes and left 300,000 people (one-
third of its population) homeless. Rebuilt as a
model Soviet city, it has broad boulevards, wide
public spaces with splashing fountains, and
rows of concrete office and apartment build-
ings in the international modernist style,
though it retains traditional Uzbek motifs and
arcades, and galleries with open verandas,
mosaics, and paneling. The city has spacious
parks and a modern underground railway sys-
tem. After Uzbekistan became independent in
1992 the Russians, who formed about half of
the population, were reported to be leaving at
the rate of 700 a week. However, Russian is still
spoken by at least half of Tashkent’s citizens.
Before the reconstruction there were two
distinct cities, the old Islamic city and the
modern Russian one, separated by a canal.
Some of the labyrinthine streets and alleyways
of Old Tashkent, with traditional homes built
around pleasant vine-shaded
courtyards, survived the
city recovered some of its previous prosperity
under Timur and his successors. Contested by
successive rulers, Uzbeks, Kazakhs, Persians,
Mongol Oirots, and Kalmyks, it nevertheless
maintained a degree of autonomy. In the eigh-
teenth century it was divided into four, some-
times mutually hostile, quarters sharing a
common bazaar. Conquered by the Russians
in 1865, its population had almost tripled
(from 56,000 to 156,000) by the time the
Transcaspian Railway reached Tashkent in
1898. The Soviet period saw intensive industri-
alization and the expansion of residential
quarters with generous parks and gardens.
Mosques, madrasas, and other religious build-
ings were either destroyed, or converted into
factories, warehouses, or printing presses.
Since independence the whole city has been
reasserting its Islamic character, with large
brightly domed mosques being constructed
alongside modern shopping malls and arcades
stocked with goods from Southeast Asia.
ur

H
us
earthquake. Tashkent is the
Amir Tem

nid
d in
As
om Tashkent
most recent of several names ov
M
M Metro station
Saghb

given to the old city, origi-

on

I Internet access
nally an oasis settlement for
M
nomads and traders on the M

Chirchik River, a tributary Be

ru
ny
M
M
M
of the Syr Darya. When the M
M
Yuli
M uk Ipak
Arabs defeated a Chinese M M B uy

I hkin
M Pus
army at the Battle of Talas M M
M Navo
I M
Par
ken
t Ku
M i AvenI M cha
M si
Furkat

ue I
in 751 the settlement was M
M
P ush
kin

M M M
known as Chach, Arabized M
ue

M M
Aven

M M
M M M
to al-Shash. Arab writers
hidov

M M M I I
Movaroun
f Ras

described it as a prosperous
Sharo

M M
place of vineyards, teeming
nakhr

M I
M M
with bazaars and busy M
N
M
craftsmen. Tashkent, mean-
Bobu

M
Fa
ue

rgh
en

M
Av

on
r

M
ing “stone-town” in the local
igi

a
stl

M
Du

Yu

uk
li
er

im
Turkic languages, first
alk

y M M
eli
Kh

M M tav
us M
us
aR

M
appears on coins in the uk
ot

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0 1 km

Mongol period. Though I 0 1 mile

I
sacked by the Mongols, the

145
HISTORICAL ATLAS OF THE ISLAMIC WORLD
Impact of Oil in the 20th Century
The impact of oil and natural gas has been a
mixed blessing for the Muslim societies of
western Asia and particularly the Gulf
region (including Iraq), which contains
between 60 and 65 percent of the world’s
proven oil reserves. On the one hand it has
enabled the oil-bearing countries to build
impressive modern cities with high-rise
buildings, shining shopping malls, six-lane
highways, state-of-the-art communications
An oil refinery plant in Saudi
Arabia. Approximately 95
percent of the world’s oil has
been produced by about 5
percent of its oilfields, two-thirds
of which are located in western
Asia, Saudi Arabia being the
world’s largest producer.
systems, and other trappings of modernity. It
has enabled Saudi Arabia, once one of the
world’s poorest and least developed coun-
tries, to provide impressive health-care and
education systems for its population (includ-
ing the formerly secluded female half). On
the other hand, it has added to the region’s
instability by consolidating the power of
146
tribal oligarchies whose control of the oil
has enabled them to govern by a combination
of patronage and repression.
The most conspicuous example of the dis-
astrous effects of oil dependency was seen in
Iraq, where the network of kinship con-
trolled by Saddam Hussein extended itself
through every branch of society after the
nationalization of oil in 1972. The group
controlled the distribution of land (confis-
cated from old regime landowners or politi-
cal opponents) licenses for setting up busi-
nesses (including arms imports), foreign
exchange, and labor relations. Its coercive
power was reinforced through the ubiquitous
mukhabarat (intelligence services), which
acquired a fearsome reputation for torture
and extra-judicial killing. Iraq was an
extreme example, but the same considera-
tions apply to most of the big oil-producing
Arab states where a single ruling family exer-
cises power through a network of patron-
client relationships and is freed from the
constraints exercised by elected bodies of
tax-paying citizens. Oil also frees the rulers
from the need to democratize their societies
by placing the industries on which they
depend in the hands of nonenfranchised for-
eign workers and administrators. The elec-
torate for the Kuwaiti parliament, for exam-
ple, is restricted to males from families resi-
dent before 1959—meaning that only 80,000
out of a potential 600,000 Kuwaiti men (not
to mention the foreigners who constitute
between 70 and 85 percent of the workforce)
are eligible to vote. Even with such a restrict-
ed franchise the ruling family has at times
found parliament unacceptably critical, dis-
solving it between 1976 and 1981 and 1986
and 1992. At the same time full Kuwaiti citi-
 IMPACT OF OIL IN THE 20th CENTURY

zens (whose average per capita income in 1998 Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and Kazakhstan
amounted to more than $22,000 per annum) have promising oil reserves, but cannot export
are able to enjoy an extensive cradle-to-grave their oil without sending it through pipelines
welfare system, with state utilities, health that pass through neighboring countries. The
care, housing, telecommunications, and edu- most economical route from Turkmenistan and
cation all heavily subsidized by the state. Azerbaijan would run though Iran to the Gulf
The political volatility of the Gulf region, using Iran’s existing network of pipelines. This
demonstrated by three major wars since 1980, route, however, has been opposed for political
has stimulated the search for oil in other reasons by the US, which favors a much more
Muslim regions, notably Central Asia and the expensive project running to Ceyhan on
Caspian. The post-Soviet states of Azerbaijan, Turkey’s Mediterranean coast.

UKRAINE Volgograd
Rostov K A Z A K H S TA N
MOLDOVA MONGOLIA
Lake
Balkhash
Aral 45°
Caspian Tangiz
Novorosisk Sea
Sea
Ossetia Chechnya UZBE
Black Sea KI Xinjiang
Abkhazia ST
GEORGIA A KYRGYZSTAN Turfan
Istanbul
N

Ankara ARMENIA Baku TURK Tarim

ME Basin
AZERBAIJAN N
IS
T TAJIKISTAN
TURKEY A
N

s Ceyhan
Marw
C H I N A
SYRIA Tehran Kabul
Mediterranean
LEBANON Baghdad AFGHANISTAN
Sea Lahore
IRAN
Alexandria IRAQ
ISRAEL
JORDAN KUWAIT 30°
Cairo
The Kharg Island PAKISTAN New Delhi N
EP
Dhahran Gulf AL
BHUTAN
EGYPT BAHRAIN
QATAR
Riyadh Karachi
R

Ahmadabad Tropic of Cancer

e
d

Arabian BANGLADESH
SAUDI ARABIA UNITED Sea
S

ARAB I NDI A
e

EMIRATES BURMA
a

Bombay
M

O
Hyderabad
Bay of
Bengal
Khartoum
ERITREA EN 15°
YEM en
S U DA N Ad
of
lf Bangalore Madras
Gu
DJIBOUTI
Addis
Ababa
Oilfields and Pipelines
ETHIOPIA N
in the Middle
SRI East and Inner Asia
LANKA
IA

0 300 km
Oil and gas reserves
AL

M 0 300 miles Principal projects for oil and gas lines

SO

30° UGANDA 45° 60° 75° 90°

147
HISTORICAL ATLAS OF THE ISLAMIC WORLD
Water Resources
Water and its scarcity have had a determining
impact on the core regions of the Islamic world.
In ancient Egypt many centuries of human expe-
rience in ordering the flow of the Nile’s annual
flood through complex systems of basin irriga-
tion lay behind the finely calibrated geometry of
the pyramids. In Mesopotamia, as in Egypt, the
state, with its bureaucratic structures of power
and control, was the gift of the river. In Arabia
the aridity of the land and the value of water is
fundamental to the language of Islam. In the
Koran the rare and precious rain that makes the
desert bloom overnight is one of the ayas (signs
or proofs) of God, a metaphor for the resurrec-
tion. “…for among His signs is this: thou seest
the earth lying desolate—and lo! When We send
down water upon it, it stirs and swells [with life]
Verily, He who brings to life can surely give life to
the dead … for behold! He has the power to do
anything!” (Koran 41:39). The root meaning of
Sharia—the divine law—is the way or path to a
watering place, the source of life and purity. An
eighteenth-century Arabic dictionary likens the
Sharia to the “descent of water” that quenches
man’s thirst and purifies him through fasting,
prayer, pilgrimage, and marriage. Water man-
agement was fundamental to the success and
failure of Islamic governments in the past. In the
Upper Euphrates region the early Abbasid rulers
restored and extended the system of underwater
channels built by the Sasanians, bringing new
lands under cultivation. Neglect of irrigation in
subsequent centuries hastened the dynasty’s eco-
nomic and political decline.
Water management was central to the
development of modern Egypt. Under the dynasty
of Muhammad Ali the first barrages were built to
control the Nile floods, bringing new lands under
cultivation and releasing the floodplain between
Cairo and Gizeh for a new European-style city of
circuses with radiating boulevards. Gamal Abd al-
Nasser, the charismatic nationalist leader who
overthrew the monarchy in 1952, precipitated the
148
1956 Suez crisis by nationalizing the Suez Canal
after the US refused to finance the High Dam at
Aswan. Built with Soviet help, the dam at the head
of Lake Nasser now controls the river by storing
its floodwaters in what is now the world’s largest
artificial reservoir. Some experts consider the
High Dam to have been a long-term ecological
disaster. The dam has stopped the river from
bringing the rich nutrients from the tropical
regions, increasing the salinity of the soil, and
reducing fish stocks in the eastern Mediterranean.
Dams built by Turkey on the Euphrates have been
no less contentious. The Keban (1975) and
Karakaya (1987) dams, each designed to store
about 30 million cubic kilometers of water to gen-
erate electricity and to regulate the river’s flow,
were partly financed with loans from the World
Bank. However the World Bank refused to con-
tribute to the larger Ataturk Dam, which has a
storage capacity of 46 cubic kilometers, because
the downstream riparians, Syria and Iraq, failed
to approve the project. The dams and associated
irrigation projects have reduced the flow of the
Euphrates by almost half, from some 30 million to
just below 16 million cubic meters per year. In
defense of its action Turkey argues that the aver-
age use of the flow by Syria and Iraq has never
exceeded 15 cubic kilometers per year—so neither
need suffer. Turkey is also developing the Tigris
through a series of projects that may lead to
reductions in flow, but improvements in reliability.
Iraq is the main beneficiary of the Tigris. Any
shortfall affecting the Euphrates as a result of
Turkish engineering could be made good by devel-
oping the Tigris waters.
Nowhere is the highly charged issue of water
management more apparent than in discussions
about sharing the waters of the Jordan River, cen-
tral to the Arab–Israeli dispute. The peace treaty
between Israel and Jordan signed in October 1994
included the provision of a phased 200 million
cubic meters of water per year for Jordan, to be
allocated partly from current Israeli sources and
 WATER RESOURCES

partly from joint development. During the pre- 34° 30' 35° 35° 30'
liminary negotiations between Israel and the
The Struggle for Water
Palestinians, known as Oslo (1993) and Oslo II 1950 – 1967
L E B A N O N
(1995), water was included as one of five crucial Groundwater area and
direction of flow
issues along with territory, Jerusalem, Jewish set- Water divide Tyre
Litani

tlements, and refugees. With the continuing East Ghor canal

intifada (uprising) and the breakdown of the so- Extension of east Ghor canal
Pre-1967 proposal for
called “road map to peace” sponsored by the US, west Ghor canal SYRIA
National water carrier
the UN, the European Union, and Russia, the
Planned Arab division
issue remains unresolved. However the very fact Proposed routes for Mediterranean Golan
33°

that the sharing of water could have been part of Sea – Dead Sea canal Heights
Acre
the negotiations illustrates an important truth: Nahariya
Lake
the principal water resource for the Israeli, Haifa Tiberias

Palestinian, Syrian, and Jordanian economies, Ein Gev

both at present and in the future, lies outside the Nazareth k

mu
ar
region in the form of “virtual water.”

Y
“Virtual water” is a concept used by econo-
mists and hydrologists to indicate the quantities of 33° 30'
water needed to produce imported foods, such as
Beit
Mediterranean Sea
wheat from water-rich regions like North SAMARIAN
MOUNTAINS
Shean

America. Every ton of wheat or similar food com-

Jordan
Jenin
modity requires approximately one thousand Northern
Tulkarm aquifer
J O R D A N
times its volume in water to produce it. Judging by
Nabulus
L

Netanya
the rate of cereal imports into western Asia and SAMARIAN
Zarqa
MOUNTAINS
North Africa, the region has been “running out” Kalkiliya King
Talal
Tel Aviv Western
of water since the 1970s. This has not, however, Jaffa Dam
E

aquifer
Eastern
led to starvation. By importing wheat and other aquifer 32°

staples from regions where soil water and soil OCCUPIED

TERRITORIES
moisture are high the countries of the region have
A

(after 1967)
subsisted by means of the “virtual water”’ embed-
Ashdod
ded in the staples they import. According to this Soreq
Jerusalem
analysis, it is cheaper and much more sensible to
R

Bethlehem
import food measured in terms of “virtual water”
than to produce it locally. For example, Saudi
S

JUDAEAN
Arabia is using fossil water from nonrenewable Sh Dead
iq Hebron HILLS
Gaza 32° 30'
aquifers to grow wheat in considerable quantities. ma

It is now the world’s sixth-largest exporter of cere- Sea

I

als. But the cost is prohibitive. In 1989 Saudi farm-

ers were being paid $533 per ton to produce wheat
Be s o r

N
available for $120 on the world market. The glob-
Beersheba
al trading system in grain can deliver 40,000 mil-
lion cubic meters of virtual water embedded in
0 20 km
grain imports without visible stress. No engineer-
0 20 miles
ing system could mobilize one-tenth of that
31°
amount with the same degree of flexibility.

149
HISTORICAL ATLAS OF THE ISLAMIC WORLD

The Arms Trade

The main elements of modern armed forces are
the types of weapon used, the sources of supply
of weaponry, and the organization of people to
use these weapons. The armed forces of states
with a mostly Islamic population have few char-
acteristics that distinguish them as Islamic.
All of these states have organized armed forces
staffed by full-time personnel. They are arranged
on a system of military structures developed in
Europe in the eighteenth century and adapted to
modern equipment including aircraft. For exam-
ple, the term squadron was used historically to
Islamic states have created elite units closely asso-
ciated with the rulers of the country as seen in
Iran’s revolutionary guards (the Pasdaran Inqilab)
or Royal Forces in Jordan, but this too is a cross-
cultural practice.
The types of weapons system include
armored vehicles, planes, ships, missiles, and in a
few cases chemical and nuclear weapons. All of
these types of weapon had been developed in a
form recognizable today by the industrial powers
in the Second World War.
All of the Islamic states form part of the

Shaheen I, Pakistan’s surface-to- B. LUX.

CZECH.
GER. SLO.
surface missile, can carry any
FRANCE AUS.
type of warhead, including a SWITZ.

nuclear device, up to 434 miles B.H.

IT YUG.
(700 kilometers). This picture A
ALB.

LY
was taken in October 2003, at a PORT.
SPAIN
time when peace talks with India
over the disputed territory of
Kashmir were apparently stalled.
CO
C
O

R
O
M
ALGERIA
L I B YA

WESTERN
SAHARA

MAURITANIA

MALI NIGER
CHAD
SENEGAL

BURKINA

describe small groups of ships or cavalry and then GUINEA

GHANA
was applied to aircraft. Uniforms too have a IVORY
NIGERIA CENTRAL
AFRICAN
COAST
strongly European design. The armed forces of all
N

LIBERIA REPUBLIC
O
O

ER
states are infused with the culture that creates TOGO CA M
O
NG

them and those in Islamic states are no exception. BENIN

CO
REP.

Thus Islamic traditions can be found in the styles GABON

and heraldry of units. Some states, notably the

smaller states in the Gulf, make extensive use of
mercenaries. However, this is an age-old cross-
cultural practice still found elsewhere in, for
ANGOLA
example, the UK’s units of Nepalese Ghurkhas
and the French Foreign Legion. Similarly, some

150
 THE ARMS TRADE

developing world. None has an advanced indus- nowadays mostly within the orbit of the US.
trial base, which means that all their major Consequently such states tend to train and
weapons systems have to be imported. The organize along US lines. This is continuing to
exceptions to this are twofold. First, rifles, pis- replace earlier British, French, and Russian
tols, their ammunition, and other small-scale influence except in the cases of Syria and
weapons are produced in abundance. Second, a Libya, where Soviet era weapons and organiza-
few states with powerful allies, notably tion are quite noticeable. Iran is perhaps excep-
Pakistan, Turkey, and Egypt, have been given tional in developing an independent center of
some assistance in developing a manufacturing military practice, but this is still in a weak and
industry for weapons. Pakistan is thought to early stage of development. Some members of
have obtained technical assistance for its the Iranian government have proclaimed
nuclear program from China. nuclear weapons un-Islamic. While similar sen-
In common with the vast majority of states, timents are expressed in Christian countries, it
Islamic nations from Morocco to Indonesia are is rare to find them inside government.

UKRAINE

MOLDOVA K A Z A K H S TA N
MONGOLIA
ROMANIA

BULGARIA UZBEK
IST
GEORG. A KYRGYZ.
N

AZA. ARM.
TURKMEN. N. KOREA
TURKEY TAJIK.

GREECE LEB. C H I N A
SYRIA S. KOREA
ISRAEL AFGHAN.
IRAN JAPAN
IRAQ
N
TA

JORDAN
IS

K NE
PA PA
L BH.
EGYPT SAUDI

A. E.
TAIWAN
BANGLADESH
ARABIA I NDI A BURMA
N
A

L
M

Hainan
A

O
OS

Luzón
IE

N THAI.
TNA M

Y EME
S U DA N
CAMB.

P HIL IPPINES

ETHIOPIA SRI Mindanao

LANKA
IA
AL

M
SO M A L AY S I A
UGANDA Military Spending and Service c. 2000
KENYA
7% or more Sumatra Borneo Sulawesi
More than 2 years
CONGO
5% – 6.9%
1–2 years
TANZANIA Jakarta I N D
O N E S I A
3% – 4.9% Java
6 months – 1 year Timor
1% – 2.9%
Up to 6 months
IA Less than 1%
B
ZAM AUSTRALIA
Voluntary military service
No data

151
HISTORICAL ATLAS OF THE ISLAMIC WORLD

Flashpoint Southeast Asia 1950–2000

Young girls in Acheh, Indonesia,
learning the Koran. Historically a
center of Muslim resistance to
Dutch colonial rule, Acheh is the
only Indonesian province where
the Sharia has been reintroduced
as the basis of public law.
The late 1940s and 50s saw the emergence of a
diverse set of nations in Southeast Asia. At present,
the region is comprised of the Republic of
Indonesia, the Federation of Malaysia, and the
Sultanate of Brunei, where Muslims are a majority,
and the Republics of Singapore and the Philippines,
Myanmar (the Socialist Republic of the Union of
Burma), the Kingdom of Thailand, the Lao People’s
Democratic Republic (Laos), the People’s Republic
of Kampuchea (Cambodia), and the Socialist
Republic of Vietnam, where Muslims are minorities.
flicts between Muslims and Christians broke out on
the eastern Indonesian islands of Maluku and
South Sulawesi. In October 2002, bombs (allegedly
planted by members of the international terrorist
group al-Qaeda) exploded in a nightclub on Bali,
leaving 202 people dead and 300 people injured.
Malaysia gained its independence in 1957 and
formed a federation between Malaya, Singapore,
Sabah, and Sarawak. Singapore seceded from the
federation in 1966 and espouses a multiethnic reli-
gious policy of governance. In contrast, Islam is the

95° 100° 105°

BUR
( M YA N M A

LA
MA R)

O
1948

S
THAIL
AN
(SIAM D Hue
)
1954
Andam
an Bangkok
Sea

M
CAMBOD

NA
IA
1953

ET
Gulf of
Siam VI
Saigon

1954

Kedah Rattani
Pasai
Kelantan
Str

Samudra
a it

Trengganu
of

Kual
Ma

Lumpu a Pahang
r
lac

M
ca

Singke A L A
Fansur
Malacca Y
Muslim involvement in the formation and develop- 1957
Johore
S

ment of a number of these nations over the past fifty Singapore

u

1957
years has been diverse. It has been punctuated, in
m

part, by a series of flashpoints involving Muslims of

a

Ka
ri
t

different orientations and aspirations.

ma
r

ta S

The formation of the Republic of Indonesia in

a

trait

Palembang

1949–50 saw uprisings (1948 and 1953) of many I

N
Batang
Muslims in western Java, South Sulawesi, and Bay
Sunda Strait Jakarta
Acheh (northern Sumatra), whose leaders disagreed (Batavia)

about the decision to limit the role of Islam in the 1945–49

INDI
new republic. In recent years, Indonesia has seen a AN
OCEA
series of local, regional, and international conflicts N

involving Muslims. Between 1999 and 2000, con-

152
 FLASHPOINT SOUTHEAST ASIA 1950–2000

state religion of Malaysia. Since before its founding, establishment of an autonomous homeland for
there were recurrent tensions in Malaysia between its Philippine Muslims. Successive Philippine govern-
Chinese and Malay populations, which erupted into ments have attempted to broker settlements with
the race riots that took place in 1969. Insofar as Muslims in the region. Muslims in Thailand are pri-
Malays are Muslim and constitute a majority, such marily located in Satun in northwestern Thailand,
intercommunal conflicts have a religious dimension. and the southern provinces of Pattani, Yola, and
But Malaysia is also witness to intracommunal ten- Narithiwat, which border Malaysia. Muslim resist-
sions in which Muslims continue to debate the nature ance to the Thai state in the form of armed strug-
and extent of Islam’s role in the matters of governance. gles and separatist calls reached their climax in the
In the Philippines, Muslims (often referred to as 1990s. Muslims in Myanmar (Burma) mostly reside
Moros) reside mostly on Mindanao and the Sulu in Arakan on the Myanmar border with
archipelago. The early 1970s saw Muslims calling Bangladesh, and since the 1950s have been in con-
for separation from the Philippine state and the tinual conflict with Myanmar about their status.

110° 115° 120° 125° 130° 135° 140° 145°

Hainan
(to China)
New States in Southeast
Asia
1950–2000 15°

1949 Date of independence

PH

Independence war
Manila
IL

Vijaya Post colonial and separatist

South China
IP

conflicts
PI

Sea Min
do
NE

ro
10°
Str
ait

1946
S
go
ela
hip

Palawan
rc

A
lu
Su Sulu Sea
Mindinao
OCEAN 5°
PA C I F I C
Sabah
1984
Brunei 1963
Brunei

S I A Celebes Sea
Sarawak
1963 0°
it

t
Stra
ai
Str

ie r
ar

Borneo
ass

Halmahera p
m
Da
k
Ma

Tanjungoura
rck
Sulawesi
M
a l u Bisma
k u Sea
(Celebes)
Banjermasin 5°
Seram
Martapura Buru
Ja va S e a Ambon 1963 to Indonesia
Bandanera PA P UA E A
D O
Macassar
I A NEW GU
IN
N E S 1984
1949 Banda Sea
ok

J a v Flores Sea
mb

a 10°
it

Timor
Lo
Stra

Bali
Sumbawa
Annexed by Indonesia 1976
Flores
Arafura Sea Coral
ok

b
Lo
m Sum
ba Timor Sea
Cape York Sea

153
HISTORICAL ATLAS OF THE ISLAMIC WORLD

Flashpoint Iraq 1917–2003

Mesopotamia 1915–18
Like the majority of Arab states, Iraq became state religion since the sixteenth century. About
British river-borne operations
an independent state after the breakup of the one-quarter of the population (based mainly in
other British operations Ottoman Empire at the end of the First World the north) was Kurdish. During the last years of
British retreat War. From its beginnings it faced problems in Ottoman rule a movement for autonomy
Turkish advance creating an integrated sense of national identi- fueled by Arab nationalist sentiment had devel-
Turkish retreat ty. Though ruled by Ottoman governers adher- oped among Ottoman army officers and urban
Oil field ing to the Sunni tradition, the majority of the notables. When Britain, which had captured
Oil pipeline Arab population (about 60 percent) were Baghdad in 1917 and installed a military gov-
Approximate extent of areas
inundated during the wet
Shiites with strong religious and cultural ties to ernment based in Basra, was awarded a man-
season
neighboring Iran, where Shiism has been the date for Iraq at the San Remo Conference in
1920, it faced a series of revolts by Ottoman
B l a c k S e a 40° 45° 50° officials, landowners, tribal chiefs, Sunni and
R U S S I A
(until November 1917) Kirovabad
Shiite ulama, and army officers. The British
Oc c u p i e d b y Ot t o m a n E m p i re
Gumusane
K i l k it
a f t e r t h e Tre a t y o f B re s t - L i t o v s k
Ozero
Ku
ra
response was to establish a constitutional
Yerevan Sevan
O Russ 40° monarchy under Faisal ibn Hussein, son of the
ian fro Erzurum
nt lin
et
oM Sharif of Mecca whom the French had removed
A r m e n i a
ch from his throne in Damascus. The British man-
ar
T

19
8
1

Malatya Van Gölu

Khvov Caspian
date ended in 1932 when Iraq was admitted to
Sea
the League of Nations, but Britain retained its
T

Intended link-up
with Russian forces Tabriz
Adiyaman Lake
Urmia airbases at Shuaiba and Habbaniyya, and a
Hakkari
controlling interest in the IPC (Iraqi Petroleum
O

Urfa Mardin
Rasht
Company), which started exporting oil in
Q

ez
el Lahijan
Ou
zan
Mosul 1934. Though the Iraqi elite was included in the
M

captured 3 Nov. 1918

government it remained divided between differ-
Eup P E R S I A
hr Kirkuk ent factional and tribal interests, while the
a te

captured 7 May 1918

A
s

Sanandaj troubles in Palestine caused by Jewish immi-

35°
gration fueled nationalist sentiments and anti-
T i gr

Syria 27 Jan. 1918

N

British mission leaves

is

British break Turkish

Tikrit for Kermanshah and Baku British feelings. A pro-Axis coup d’état by a
Kermanshah
lines 5 Nov. 1917
I ra q group of nationalist officers known as the
Baghdad
Baghdad Khorramabad Golden Square led to a second British occupa-
Ctesiphon 22 Nov. 1915
tion of Baghdad and Basra in 1941.
E

A r a b i a British attack at Ctesiphon

beaten off; British retreat
Karbala al-Hilla to Kut-al-Amara The tensions caused by the 1956 Suez crisis
The Siege of Kut
Kut-al-Amara Dezful
M

December 1915 – April 1916

N
0 1/2 mile An Najaf captured 28 Sept. 1915 and Iraq’s adherence to the pro-Western
lost 29 April 1916 Shushtar
0 3/4 km recaptured February 1917 Baghdad Pact (including Turkey, Iran, and
e
P

ne
ce li Pakistan) aimed at containing Soviet power
t lin

Nasiriya
va n
fron

captured 24 July 1915 Ahwaz

d
ish

Three British
sh a

Fort Kurna
T urk

relief attempts surfaced in the revolution that, with commu-

i
Turk

fail
Hawr al
Hammar Abu Dhabi

flooded in R
Basra
Sh Bandar-e nist support, overthrew the monarchy in
at

Sharpur
road to fort

ta

January
1958. However the new military government
lA

Ti
gr Fao Is. 30°
Townshend
ra

N
is E
Kut-al-Amarah British was itself replaced in 1963 (and again in
Protectorate Kuwait
Woolpress
Village Mosque K U WA I T
Pe r s i a n
Gulf
1968) by officers belonging to the secular-
British garrison
flooded in
February l-Hai surrenders 29 April 1916
0 100 km
oriented Baath (Renaissance) Party. Under
Shatt-a

El Hasa
snipers
0 100 miles Saddam Hussein al-Tikriti (vice president to
General Hasan al-Bakri and the regime’s

154
 FLASHPOINT IRAQ 1917–2003

effective “strong man” long before he formal-

Samawah
ly assumed the presidency in 1979) the al-Bu The Gulf War, Phase 1 Euphra
tes
I R A N
17 January to 23 February 1991
Nasiriyah 0 100 km
Nasr clan from Tikrit effectively used the East Allied units 0 100 miles

European-style Baath Party apparatus to Iraqi units

build a formidable network of power based Allied movements Basra

Abadan

on a combination of patronage and coercion. Iraqi airbase destroyed I R A Q

The regime proved remarkably durable. It Bridge destroyed

U.S. Special Forces

took steps toward creating a sense of Iraqi dropped behind
enemy lines for
reconnaissance K U WA I T Persian Gulf
for Allied forces
national identity based on the Arab-Muslim Rafha

atin
and pre-Islamic Mesopotamian heritage, with Kuwait

lB
d ia
Wa
US Marines

archaeology, folklore, poetry, and the arts NEUTRAL

ZONE Warah

enlisted to enhance Iraqi distinctiveness. The N

S A U D I
Kurds were ruthlessly suppressed, with some A R A B I A

1,000 villages destroyed and thousands of Hafar al Batin Khafji

civilians killed by chemical gas. The Shiite for

the most part supported the government dur- The Gulf War,
Phase 2
ing the disastrous war with Iran (1980–89), 24–26 February 1991 Samawah Euph
rates I R A N

although there was significant opposition Allied units Nasiriyah

Iraqi units
from the Dawa movement founded by the
Allied
Basra
murdered Ayatollah Baqr al-Sadr in the 1960s. movements
Iraqi airbase As Salman
After coalition forces drove the Iraqis out of destroyed Abadan

Bridge destroyed
I R A Q
Kuwait in 1991, a Shiite rebellion in a number Advance lines
101st Airborne
of southern cities including Basra, Najaf, and with timing
Division set up
resupply depot
Iraqi retreat
Karbala was ruthlessly suppressed—despite K U WA I T Persian Gulf
Rafha

the presence of US forces in the area. In its

atin
Kuwait
lB
d ia

drive to stamp out the last vestiges of opposi-

Wa

U.S. Marines
NEUTRAL After 48 hours
ZONE Warah
tion the government then proceeded to drain S A U D I
After 12 hours
N A R A B I A
the southern marshlands inhabited by the
0 100 km
Shiite. The Kurds, however, were protected by 0 100 miles Hafar al Batin Khafji

Allied air power.

Contrary to expectations, the UN sanctions
The Gulf War,
imposed on Iraq after the invasion of Kuwait Phase 3
Samawah
27 February 1991 Euph I R A N
merely served to strengthen the regime’s pur-
rates

Allied units Nasiriyah

chase over Iraqi society, enriching the networks Iraqi units

controlled by Saddam Hussein and his sons Allied movements

Basra
through the monopoly they obtained over ille- Iraqi airbase
destroyed
As Salman
Abadan

I R A Q
gal oil exports and the UN-approved “oil for Bridge destroyed
After 100 hours
Advance lines
food” program. The destruction of the regime with timing

following the Anglo-American attack on Iraq in Iraqi retreat

K U WA I T Persian Gulf

March 2003 was completed with the capture of Rafha

French forces
atin

set up western Kuwait

lB

defense line
Saddam Hussein in December. It was far from U.S. Marines
ia
d
Wa

After 80 hours
NEUTRAL
clear, however, if the Americans would succeed ZONE Warah
S A U D I
in their stated purpose of installing a democ- N A R A B I A

ractic system of government acceptable to all 0 100 km

0 100 miles Hafar al Batin
sections of the Iraqi population. Khafji

155
HISTORICAL ATLAS OF THE ISLAMIC WORLD
Afghanistan 1840–2002
An Afghan mujahid (warrior)
carries a shell to the front line.
Later these fighters would
receive the Stinger Surface-to-Air
missiles. This weapon, though
light and portable, contained
sophisticated target-seeking
electronics. Secretly supplied to
the mujahidin via the Pakistani
intelligence services (ISI), it had
a devastating impact on the
Soviet occupation, enabling
relatively untrained tribesmen to
bring down helicopter gunships.
156
A mountainous region with deep valleys,
deserts, and arid plateaus, Afghanistan has
never been a single political entity although
parts of it were incorporated into the Pushtun
Empire founded by Ahmad Shah Durrani (r.
1747–72). The population is extremely varied,
with that largest ethnolinguistic grouping, the
Pushtuns, comprising about 47 percent. This
group is concentrated in the southern belt of
the territory that straddles the border with
Pakistan, with Tajiks, the second-largest
group (comprising 35 percent) living mainly
in the north, along with Uzbeks, Turkmen,
and Kirghiz (8 percent), and the Imami Shiite
Hazaras (7 percent).
The disintegration of the Durrani Empire
into fratricidal strife in the nineteenth century
opened the way for Russian and British pene-
tration. Britain’s concern to protect its empire
from Russian encroachments prompted its
two invasions of Afghanistan in 1839–42 and
1879–80. Needing a strong central government
to consolidate Afghanistan as a buffer state
against the Russians Britain installed the
“Iron Amir,” Abd al-Rahman Khan (r.
1880–1901). He consolidated his power over
the country by waging jihad against the Shiite
and forcibly converting the indigenous non-
Muslim “infidels” of Kafiristan. Departing
with precedent he claimed to rule by divine
right rather than tribal delegation. Non-
Pushtuns were discriminated against and suf-
fered oppressive taxation.
Elements of the modern state, however,
were also introduced, with a centralized army
used to repress rebellious tribes and the gov-
ernment organized into separate departments
of state. During the reign of Abd al-
Rahman’s son Habibullah (r. 1901–19) the
army was professionalized and modern
education introduced. Habibullah’s son
Amanullah (r. 1919–29) pushed the process of
modernization further by enacting sweeping
legislative changes, including the abolition of
slavery. He began to allow the education of
women and brought about changes in their
status including almost equal rights in mar-
riage, divorce, and inheritance. He also intro-
duced Western dress at court. The reforms
provoked a rebellion by the conservative
ulama and chieftains affiliated to the
Naqshbandi order and Amanullah was forced
into exile in 1929.
The Pushtun military leader Nadir Shah (r.
1929–33) took over from Amanullah and his
successor Zahir Shah (r. 1933–73) reinstated
the Sharia courts. He rewarded the Pushtun
tribes on which they depended by granting
their leaders government posts and allowing
rampant discrimination against non-
Pushtuns in the allocation of resources. At
the same time the program of modernization
was resumed in a modified form, with the
state taking the leading part in economic
development. Under the combined strategic
pressures of the Cold War and the regime’s
Pushtun-oriented nationalism (which gener-
ated tensions with neighboring Pakistan) an
influential part of the Pushtun elite moved
closer to Moscow. This process resulted in
the ousting of Zahir Shah by his cousin and
former prime minister, Muhammad Daud,
with support from Saudi Arabia, Pakistan,
and Iran. Daud abolished the monarchy and
proclaimed himself president of the republic
of Afghanistan. The Soviets responded by
sponsoring a coup by the communist People’s
Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA), a
move that resulted in direct Soviet interven-
tion in 1979 to prop up the Parcham (non-
 AFGHANISTAN 1840–2002

Pushtun) faction of the PDPA under Barbak
Kamal. The ensuing jihad—supported by
Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and the United
States—attracted volunteers from many
Muslim countries, including the wealthy
Saudi Islamist Osama bin Laden. With the
help of US-supplied Stinger missiles, the
dominated Taliban regime (supported by
Saudi Arabia and Pakistan) headed by Bin
Laden’s close ally Mullah Muhammad Omar.
After taking Kabul in 1994 the Taliban barred
women from schools and other workplaces,
massacred the Shiite Hazaras, and brought
Iran to the brink of military intervention by

The Afghanistan War 1979–86

and Soviet Retreat 1988–89 Samarkand

Soviet Advance 1979 Soviet airfields

U
Soviet Retreat Soviet infantry bases
S TA
Soviet airborne infantry base YI
Refugees Dusnanbe KI
ST
Soviet Campaigns 1981–86 Airfields constructed and Termez AN
enlarged after 1980 by USSR
S
Kuska
Mazar-i-Sharif

I R Maimana
Aug. 1981 Kunduz R
A N Heret
Faizabad
Airlift

A Bahlan
F
G Shamali Operation May 1982–

ft
H
Airli
Nov. 1983 May 1984
Shindand A May 1985
N Bagram
I Shamali eastern
S Kabul
Farah T offensive, 1985
A Jalalabad
N
Zhawar Campaign, 1986
Ghazni
Gardez Peshawar

Lashkar Gah
Srinagar
Kandahar
Kashmir
P A
K I
S T
A N
land over 2000m
200 m Quetta INDIA
Lahore Amritsar

mujahadin forced the Soviet Union to with-
draw its troops from Afghanistan in 1989. Far
from generating a sense of national unity,
however, the struggle against the Soviets
served to intensify interethnic strife, as the
central institutions of state disintegrated.
The factional fighting that followed the
Soviet withdrawal and the collapse of the
Marxist regime of General Najiballah in
1992 opened the way for the radical Pushtun-
murdering nine of its diplomats.
After the attacks on New York and
Washington in September 2001 by terrorists
allegedly belonging to Bin Laden’s al-Qaeda
network the Americans removed the Taliban
regime by a massive bombing campaign. The
new Pushtun leader Ahmad Karzai, installed
by the United States following an interna-
tional conference in Berlin, is a cousin of
Zahir Shah.

157
HISTORICAL ATLAS OF THE ISLAMIC WORLD
Arabia and the Gulf 1839–1950
The modern history of Arabia and the Per-
sian Gulf is a complex pattern of interac-
tions between the local forces on the ground
and regional and global powers. The stakes
are vastly increased through the presence of
oil and the growing dependence of Western
economies (including that of Japan) on reg-
ular affordable supplies. Until the discovery
of oil the region was mostly poor (except for
the pearling centers of Kuwait and Bahrain,
and trading port of Muscat) and of no great
interest to the outside world. Britain, how-
ever, needed to protect its Indian Empire
from potential rivals or competitors, includ-
ing Tsarist Russia, the Ottoman Empire, and
Iran. In 1839 it captured Aden, which
became a vital coaling station (and later oil
refueling depot) on the route to India.
The development of Aden initiated a
process whereby the whole of the South
Arabian littoral and its hinterland—includ-
ing the highlands of Lahej and the feuding
city states of the Wadi Hadhramaut—were
pacified by the British during the 1930s
using Royal Air Force bombers as the ulti-
mate sanction. The South Arabian protec-
torate (later renamed South Yemen, before
being united with Yemen in 1991) included
some twenty-three sultanates, emirates, and
tribal regimes under overall British control,
with the sultans dominating the cities and
the hereditary class of sayyids, who claimed
descent from the Prophet, holding land and
serving as mediators among the clans of the
interior.
Further east the Omani Albu Said dynasty
under its leader Sayyid Said bin Sultan
(1807–56), created an extensive Indian Ocean
empire that grew wealthy on the slave trade
and the export of ivory and spices from the
sultan’s domains in Zanzibar. Under a series
of treaties between 1838 and 1856 Sayyid
Said bowed to British demands to restrict
158
slavery—providing further pretexts for
British intervention. On his death in 1856 the
British resolved a dispute between his sons
Majid, and Thuwaini by decreeing that
Zanzibar, inherited by Majid should pay
Muscat, inherited by Thwaini, for the loss of
revenue resulting from the division of the
empire between them. British intervention in
the Gulf region north of Muscat was
prompted by the suppression of piracy as
well as slavery. Under a series of treaties
signed between 1835 and 1853 the shaikhs of
Arab seafaring tribes who lived by preying on
shipping (Arab as well as British) agreed to a
truce suspending all piratical activity (while
also agreeing to suppress the slave trade).
Compliance was supervised by the British
Indian Navy. The Trucial System protected
pearling and also benefited Arab shipping,
which had suffered most from the insecurity
caused by piracy, with local merchants send-
ing their goods via better-armed and protect-
ed British ships. The Trucial States (now the
United Arab Emirates) remained British pro-
tectorates until 1971, with Britain supplying
officers and controlling foreign policy.
Britain expanded its influence to include
Kuwait in 1896, where it established an infor-
mal protectorate to guard its client, Shaikh
Mubarak, from direct occupation by Turkey.
As the major power in the region Britain
intervened in many local disputes, regulating
contested frontiers and trying to guarantee
continuity of succession. The most notable
cases include the quarrel between Abu
Dhabi, Oman, and Saudi Arabia over the
Buraimi Oasis. This led to the expulsion of
Saudi forces by the British-led Trucial Oman
Scouts in 1955, and Iraq’s claim to Kuwait
(dating from Ottoman times when the shaikh
formally acknowledged Ottoman suzerain-
ty), which Britain resisted by sending troops
to guarantee its independence in 1961.
 ARABIA AND THE GULF 1839–1950

Tabriz
OT35°
Maras
40°
Diyarbakir Hakkari
45° 50° 55°

Adana TO
M Rasht Lahijan Arabia and the Gulf c. 1900

Qe
ze
Iskenderun A lO

Antakya Aleppo N Mosul

uz
an
SUBAY Major tribe
Qazvin
Latakia E
Euphr M Kirkuk Tehran Territory under British control
35° Hama
at
Sanandaj
Syria P

Tig
es

Territory under Italian control

Tripoli Homs IR

ris
Hamadan Qom
Beirut E I r a q Ottoman Empire c.1900
Kermanshah Kashan
Damascus Borujerd
Haifa Habbaniya Baghdad
Khorramabad
PAL E STINE Karbala al-Hilla Isfahan PER SIA
LA
Gaza
Amman RUWA Dezful
Jerusalem An Najaf
A N IZ A Yaid

’AN IAA RKA T Ahvaz

Abu Dhabi
Basra
30° Abadan Kerman
BANA
SAKHR al-Jawf Sakaka

BANA DAFIR K U WA I T Under British Protection Shiraz Sirjan

Kuwait 1899
ATIYA SHAMMAR
Firuzabad
ANIZA
H

Tabuk

P
U

e
W

r
A

Tayma H
Y

s
UJM AN a lil
TA

Hail
H

i
Bandar-Abbas

a
T

as

n
N E J D Bandar-e
HUTAYM al-Qatif BAH RAIN
HAR B Lengeh
a

al-Wajh BILLI Burayda Under British Protection

Hejaz Unayza Dhahran 1861 G (to Oman)
u l
’UTAYBA AWAZIM ul Jask

G
Q ATA R f
25° S U B AY t Sharjar
a s
fo
JUH

al-Hufuf Under British Protection

C o
fO
1916

3
AY N

85
t e Abu
ma
BANI P i r a Dhabi Prot

.1
Medina Riyadh
n
A

t. Khabura
B ri
R

Yanbual Bahr
TR
N

UC n d er
I A L O MAN U
T A

H A R B Wadi S
a h ba Muscat
H
e

M U
Q

OM A N
R R British Protectorate
d

SUB A 1891
ZAHRAN AY
H U

Jedda
Mecca
D

al-Taif GHAMID
H

DAWASIR
A
S

L
Y

20° i
ANGLO- l
EGYPTIAN a
e

h
SUDAN Suakin Asir K
e l
a

b
Abha R u
N
YAM
Khor Baraka

At
bara

Kassala Massawa Ye m e n
ERITREA H A D H R A M AU T
15° (to Italy 1899) Asmara British Protectorate 1888
Sana Ara bian Sea
al-Hudayda
T

ak
az
ze Mukalla 0 100 km
Aduwa Zabid
Taizz
ADEN
British Protectorate 1903 0 100 miles
ABYSSINIA Mocha Shuqra

Aden Captured by Britain 1839

159
HISTORICAL ATLAS OF THE ISLAMIC WORLD
Rise of the Saudi State
Abd al-Aziz Ibn Saud (seated
lower left) developed the Ihkwan
(brethren), recruited from
Bedouin tribes. With this
committed force, Ibn Saud built
the state that became Saudi
Arabia in 1932.
160
The establishment of military training and indoctrinated into strict
the Kingdom of Saudi Wahhabite tenets. With the Hijra colonies
Arabia in the twenti- located at strategic points all over the Nejd
eth century replicates plateau, the Ikhwan could be mobilized rapid-
many of the features ly, while Ibn Saud was spared the cost of a
of Muhammad’s origi- standing army.
nal movements and the Unlike the original Islamic movement,
jihad movements in however, the Saudi state’s outward momen-
North Africa as ana- tum was blocked by the European powers that
lyzed by the great held sway on Arabia’s perimeters. While
Arab philosopher of Britain collaborated with Saudi expansion
history Ibn Khaldun into al-Hasa, the Hijaz, and (with Italian con-
(1332–1406). The orig- nivance) Asir on the borders of Yemen,
inal Saudi state, Ikhwan raids into Transjordan and Iraq were
founded in the eigh- met with devastating fire from the Transjor-
teenth century, was danian Frontier Force and the British Royal
built on an alliance Air Force, since Britain had guaranteed the
between a religious integrity of the Hashemite kingdoms granted
reformer of the Han- to the sons of the Sharif Hussein of Mecca,
bali school, Muham- former ruler of the Hijaz.
mad Ibn Abd al-Wah- After winning recognition from the interna-
hab, and Muhammad tional powers, Ibn Saud faced an internal
al-Saud, a chief of the rebellion from disaffected Ikhwan who had
Aniza. After wreaking become resentful of Western influence and
devastation in Iraq technologies. He defeated them at the battle of
and the Hijaz, the Sabilla in 1929.
Saud’s sphere was greatly reduced by Egyptian
intervention in 1818 and was briefly eliminat-
ed in the 1890s when power passed to the pro- Territorial Growth of the Saudi State
1902–26
Ottoman al-Rashid family. In reviving his
ancestral state after raiding the Rashid strong- Territory under the control of Ibn Saud c. 1912
hold at Riyadh in 1902, Muhammad al-Saud’s Additions by 1920
descendent Abd al-Aziz (known as Ibn Saud) Additions by 1926
followed the same classical pattern of combin-
Major attacks and campaigns
ing the military power of the tribes with the
moral force of a religious revival. All who SUBAY Major tribe
failed to adhere to the Wahhabite code were Territory under British control
subject to persecution. Ibn Saud’s warriors, Territory under British influence
known simply as Ikhwan (brethren) were
Territory under French control
organized into agricultural settlements called
Territory under Russian influence
Hijras. These were inspired by the community
founded by the Prophet Muhammad at Medi- Territory under Italian control
na in 622. Here the former nomads were given
 RISE OF THE SAUDI STATE

35° yan 40° 45° Tabriz 50° 55° Ashkhabad

Maras Diyarbakir Hakkari
Sa

Adana TURKEY Quchan

Rasht Lahijan

Qe
el O

z
Iskenderun uz Gorgan
S.A . Mosul
an Babol
Antakya Aleppo Sharud Nayshabur
Qazvin Damghan
Latakia Damavan
TERR. OF
Eup Kirkuk Tehran Semnan
hr

35° Hama
at

ALAWITES Sanandaj Russian Sphere of Influence

es

SYRIA

Tig
Tripoli Homs (1907–21)

ris
French Mandate Hamadan Bejastan
L E BA NON 1920 Qom
Beirut I R A Q
British Mandate Kermanshah Ferdow
Kashan
Damascus 1920 Borujerd
Haifa Habbaniya Baghdad
Khorramabad
IRAN
PAL E STINE Karbala al-Hilla Isfahan
LA
Gaza
Amman RUWA Dezful
Jerusalem An Najaf
A N IZ A Yaid
26

TRANS-
19

J O R DA N ’AN IAA RKA T Ahvaz

19

Emirate under Brit.

13

Abu Dhabi
/1

Suzerainty, 1923
92

Basra
6

30° Abadan Kerman

BANA
1920 SAKHR al Jawf Sakaka

BANA DAFIR K U WA I T Shiraz Sirjan

N.Z. Kuwait British Sphere
ATIYA SHAMMAR
Tabuk 192 N.Z. (1920) Firuzabad of Influence
ANIZA 3 (1907–21)
H

P
U

e
W

r
A

Tayma H
1921
Y

s
UJM AN a lil
TA

Hail

i
Bandar-Abbas

a
T

n
N E J D
1902

HUTAYM Sabilla Bandar-e

al-Wajh HAR B 1929 al-Qatif Lengeh
BILLI
1913 Burayda BAH RAIN
HEJAZ Unayza 190 Dhahran G
13

4 (to Oman)
19

1926 to Nejd u l
’UTAYBA AWAZIM ul Jask

G
Q ATA R f
25° S U B AY Sharjar fo
JUH

al-Hufuf fO
AY N

Medina ma
Riyadh BANI Abu Dhabi n
A

AN Khabura
R

Yanbual Bahr Captured by Ibn Saud

N

1902 OM
TRUCIA L
T A

H A R B Wadi S
a hba Muscat
H
e

6
192

02
A
19

M U
Q

OM A N
1924 R R
d

SUB A
ZAHRAN AY
H U

Jedda
Mecca
D

1926 al-Taif GHAMID

H

DAWASIR
A
S

L 20
Y

20° – i
ANGLO- 19 l
19 a
EGYPTIAN
193
e

h
SUDAN ASIR
4

Suakin K
1920 to Nejd
e l
a

1919–20 1932
b
Abha R u
N
YAM
Khor Baraka

At
bara

1934
Kassala Massawa YEMEN
Independent 1919 H A D H R A M AU T
15° Asmara
Sana Ara bian Sea
ERITREA al-Hudayda
T

ak
az
ze Mukalla 0 100 km
Aduwa Zabid
Taizz
ADEN
0 100 miles
ABYSSINIA Mocha Shuqra

Aden
161
HISTORICAL ATLAS OF THE ISLAMIC WORLD

Flashpoint Israel–Palestine
The roots of the Arab–Israeli conflict lie in the
age-old yearning of Jews to return to Eretz Yis-
The Six-Day War –
Israeli Attack 36° rael, the land promised by God to the Prophet
N
14–30 May 1967 Abraham. Modern Zionism built on this tradi-
Pre-war borders Latakipia tion, seeing salvation from persecution in the
Main Israeli attacks acquisition of land where a Jewish sovereign
Israeli air strikes CYPRUS state could be created. In 1878, the first Jewish
Airborne landing settlement was established at Petah Tikva. Dur-
ing the First World War the British made contra-
Tripoli
dictory commitments to Arabs and Jews. They
LEBANON promised an independent state to the Sharif of
Beirut Mecca, whose sons Faisal and Abdullah led the
Arab Revolt against the Ottoman Turks, while
Damascus allowing the establishment of a national home-
Metulla land for the Jewish People in Palestine—a proj-
Me di t er ranean Sea
ect that met with increasing support among Jew-
Haifa Nazareth
ish communities in Europe after the Nazi acces-
Jordan

Hadera sion to power in Germany. A plan for dividing

Netanya
Nablus
Palestine into Arab and Jewish states, which fol-
Tel Aviv-Jaffa 32° lowed an uprising by Palestinian Arabs begin-
Amman
Jericho ning in 1936, was suspended on the outbreak of
Jerusalem
Lake Bethlehem
Burullus Gaza Hebron hostilities in 1939. After the Allied victory in the
Lake
Marzala Port Said Beersheba Second World War revealed the horrors of the
El Arîsh
JORDAN
Suez Canal

ISRAEL Nazi genocide, pressure for mass Jewish immi-

Tanta El Qantara gration became overwhelming. A 1947 UN par-
E G Y P T El Quseima
A rish

Ismailia tition plan providing for Arab and Jewish states

raba
el

Wadi A

Bitter
Lake Wa
d i “each entwined in an inimical embrace like two
Cairo fighting serpents,” in the words of one official,
El Giza Suez
Port Taufiq Ma’an
Nekhl was accepted by the Jewish leaders but rejected
adi Batat by the Arabs. On May 14 1948, the British with-
W

El Thamad Eilat
El Faiyûm S i n a i Aqaba drew and on the following day Israel’s independ-
Gu

ence was recognized by the major powers. The

Aqab

ba
lf

di Ara
new state survived simultaneous but poorly
e

Wa
Nil

of

SAU D I
f of

A R A BIA coordinated attacks by the armies of the sur-

Su

Gul

Dahab rounding Arab states, leaving it with more terri-

ez

Maqna
Tar
fa El Tur tory than had been awarded to it under the UN
El Minya Wadi
Nabq Haraiba
28° plan. Transjordan—later Jordan—gained con-
Sharm el Sheikh trol of a part of Palestine, including East
Jemsa
Jerusalem, which contains shrines sacred to
Red Sea
Jews, Christians, and Muslims. Attacks by Jew-
Wad

Asyût
ish irregulars, such as the massacre of Palestin-
i Qena

0 50 km

0 50 miles
ian villagers of Deir Yassin in 1948, prompted
32° 36°
the flight of thousands of Palestinians, creating

162
 FLASHPOINT ISRAEL–PALESTINE

the refugee problem which would fuel subse- and Jordan in 1994. The Palestinian problem,
quent wars in 1956, 1967, 1973, and 1982. however, remains unresolved. Although the Pales-
The third Arab-Israeli war, in June 1967, left tine Liberation Organization, under its chairman
Israel in control of Sinai, Gaza, the West Bank, Yasser Arafat, recognized Israel’s right to exist in
and the Golan Heights, with Israel subsequently 1988 and achieved limited autonomy for Pales-
annexing Arab East Jerusalem and planting Jew- tinians in Gaza, Jericho, and other parts of the
ish settlements in the Occupied Territories. Limit- West Bank under the 1993 Oslo accords, the
ed military success achieved by the Egyptians in Islamist organizations, including Hamas and
the fourth Arab-Israeli war in October 1973 Islamic Jihad, reject the peace process. Continu-
emboldened the Egyptian President Anwar Sadat ing Jewish settlements, terrorist attacks on civil-
to make his historic visit to Jerusalem in 1977. ians (including suicide bombings), and Israeli
This initiated the process that culminated in the measures such as the creation of a Berlin-style
signing of the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty at wall between Israel and the West Bank and the
Camp David in 1979, followed by disengagement targeted killings of Palestinian leaders, have made
agreements with Syria and a treaty between Israel the prospects for peace increasingly difficult.

35° Tripoli 36° 35°

0 50 km
The October War LEBANON 33° The Intifada Granot
0 50 miles
6 October 1973 February – December 1992
Acre
Beirut
Zahle Rayak Major incidents
N Sea of
Occupied by Israel Hamas-Jihad terror bombings Haifa
Damascus Galilee
at outbreak of war
SYRIA c. 1994
Arab attacks Metulla
Nazareth
Kibbutz
Furthest Arab advance Galed
Afula
Israeli counterattacks Haifa
6–24 October Nazareth
Jordan

Hadera Hadera Jenin

Netanya
Mediterranean Sea Nablus M e d i te r ra n e a n
Deir el
32° Tel Aviv-Jaffa S e a Ghusan

Jordan
Amman Netanya
Rehovot Jericho West
Jerusalem N Tulkarm
Bethlehem Nablus
Dumyât Gaza Hebron Kalkiya Balata
refugee camp
Port Said
Beersheba Nl’llin
al-Mahalla al-Arîsh Tel Aviv
Suez Canal

al-Kubra ISRAEL Bank

El Qantara J O R DA N 32°
Lod
raba

Ismailia El Quseima A-Ram

Wadi A

E G Y P T Bitter
Lake Ashdod
Cairo Geneife Sore
q Jerusalem
Kuntilla
Suez
Nekhl Bethlehem
fi
q

Beit Omar
Ta u Sudr
Port Ashkelon
S i n a i Eilat Aqaba Sheikh Radwan Jabaliya S h i q Dead
Hebron
G ul

Gaza refugee camp m a

Haqal Shati
Sea
f of

ba Gaz a Strip
refugee camp
a ba

di Ara Nusseirat
S ue

Wa
of Aq

Abu S A U D I
z

Rudeis Khan Yunis

A R A B I A Rafah
Gu lf

Abu Durba
Bes

Dahab
Maqna Beersheba N
o

r
fa
ar al-Tur Keziot
Wa d i T
30° Nabq I S R A E L
0 50 km

Jemsa Red Sea 0 50 miles

31°

163
HISTORICAL ATLAS OF THE ISLAMIC WORLD

Flashpoint Gulf 1950–2003

There were several wars fought in the Gulf in expulsion from Kuwait in 1990–91, and the
the second half of the twentieth century. The war which began in 2003 with the US-led inva-
three major wars were the Iran-Iraq war of sion of Iraq.
1979–89, the Iraqi invasion of and subsequent In each of these wars the motives of the
combatants remain in dispute. There is con-
0 75 km
siderable underlying evidence that oil was an
43°
The Advance to Baghdad important contributory factor. In the centuries
0 75 miles
Tikrit March 20–30, 2003 prior to the discovery of oil the region was not
3rd Infantry Division attacks
the focus of major war between local states or
1st Marine Division attacks
the European powers. In contrast, the rich
Task Force Tarawa attacks

British attacks
sugar-producing islands of the Caribbean
lah
Diya
27 Road number were fought over frequently in the eighteenth
and early nineteenth centuries. Oil provided
the money for states in the region to acquire
BAGHDAD very large quantities of armaments in the sec-
Eu
I R A N
ph

ond half of the twentieth century and these

ra
tes

made large-scale war more possible. Saddam

Ti
Karbala gr
is
Hussein’s exact motivation in attacking first
Al-Numaniya
33° Iran and then Kuwait a decade later may never
al Hilla
27 Al Kut be known. However, in both cases the prospect
An Najaf of a quick victory resulting in the acquisition
al Diwaniya
of oil-producing areas seems to have had a
X part to play. Some allege that the US actively
X
1 RCT al-Amara
5 RCT
7
encouraged the attack on Iran as a means of
1 X
7 RCT curbing the recent Iranian revolution. Both
As Samawah states proved remarkably resilient despite the
strains of war. And against Iranian expecta-
al-Nasiriya
tions, Shiite citizens of Iraq put their Arab or
Suq al Shuyukh
As Salman al-Qurna
Iraqi identity before their allegiance to their
31°
Jaliba co-religionists in Iran.
XX
I R A Q 1 Marine The Iran–Iraq war resulted in hundreds of
X
Basra
TF Tarawa
thousands of casualties on both sides and last-
N
XX ed for almost ten years. It was a war that
3 Safwan Umm
XX III Qasr involved all the characteristics of major indus-
1 Armored R Marines
trialized warfare as it developed during the
KUWAIT First and Second World Wars, including mass
infantry attacks, trench warfare, combined
1000
200 Kuwait
Persian arms battles involving tanks, aircraft, artillery,
100
SAUDI ARABIA
0m Gulf missiles, and poison gas. Although the Irani-
45° 47°
ans protested at the illegal use by Iraq of

164
 FLASHPOINT GULF 1950–2003

chemical weapons the international communi-
ty remained silent on the matter. This issue
continues to influence Iranian attitudes to
what it regards as Western double standards
on weapons of mass destruction (WMD).
The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in August
1991 was probably triggered by Iraq’s poor
financial condition and a misreading of the
likely international reaction. Not only was the
attack on a UN member state (and a member
place and the extent to which the Iraqi regular
army fought against overwhelming odds
remains unclear. Despite the success of the
Americans in capturing Saddam Hussein in
December 2003, the coalition forces continued
to be subject to sporadic guerrilla attacks.
0 75 km
43°
The Advance to Baghdad
0 75 miles
Tikrit March 30 – April 12, 2003

of the Arab League), it was also a blatant vio- Army attacks

1st Marine Division attacks

lation of international law. If unopposed it
Task Force Tarawa advances
would have left Iraq in control of a far larger h
y ala 27 Road number
proportion of the world’s oil reserves than it Di

had already. From an Iraqi perspective it is

possible to argue that borders and states hand-
ed down by colonial rulers and without his- Eu
p BAGHDAD
I R A N
hr

torical basis do not deserve to be respected.

at
es

XX
However Iraq had formally recognized 3
Ti
Kuwait’s sovereignty within its present borders Karbala gr
is

in 1963. In any event the UN-backed coalition, Al-Numaniya

33°
al-Hilla
including large army units from Egypt and X 27 Al Kut
5 RCT X
1 RCT
Syria, expelled Iraq from Kuwait early in 1991. An Najaf X
7 RCT
In 2003, the US and UK attacked Iraq. III
XX al-Diwaniya
15 MEU
They claimed to be implementing UN resolu- 101

7 al-Amara
tions that the UN itself had failed to carry out III
1 24 MEU
and that Iraq presented a regional and indeed
global threat from weapons of mass destruc- As Samawah

tion (including nuclear, biological, and chem- X

al-Nasiriya
82
ical weaponry). Most of the world regarded
Suq al Shuyukh
the attack as a breach of the UN’s founding As Salman al-Qurna 31°
principle of outlawing aggressive war. The US Jaliba

was supported by neither Mexico nor Canada I R A Q

Basra
XX
despite both nations’ economic dependence
N 1 Armored
on the US. Safwan Umm
No operational weapons were found in the Qasr

Iraqi armed forces and as of late 2003 no man-

ufacturing programs of WMD were found KUWAIT
either. The first phase of the war was complet- 1000

ed in a few weeks as US armored forces drove to 200

100
Kuwait
SAUDI ARABIA
and occupied Baghdad and Iraq’s other major 0m
45° 47°
cities. The exact nature of the battles that took

165
HISTORICAL ATLAS OF THE ISLAMIC WORLD

Muslims in Western Europe

32
° 24° 16° 8° 0° 8° 16° 24° 32° 40°
themselves there. Originally
68°
most migrants were male
Muslim Migration into sojourners who sent remit-
the European Union
tances home, but from the
Signature of the
Treaty of Rome, 1957 1980s the gender balance has
Ar c t i c C i r cl e

64°
EEC member added 1973 been settled as families were
ICELAND N

Y
EEC member added 1986
Norwegian
Sea
established. Although there

N
A
Became part of the EEC after
unification of Germany, 1990
are significant communities

E
of Muslims in Marseilles,

W
EEC member added 1995 F I N L A N D

D
60° EEC membership approved R Lyons, and Lille, Paris is the
May 2004
primary city of settlement.

E
O

Membership pending
Directions and the sources
W
RUSSIAN The main Paris mosque was
N

of immigration ESTONIA FEDERATION

established in 1926, but the
S

56° LATVIA main Muslim areas of the

a
Se
North
city were populated in the
c
Sea i
Glasgow lt LITHUANIA
DENMARK Ba period after the 1950s. Mus-
UNITED RUSSIA
KINGDOM BELORUSSIA lims in France still tend to be
Dublin Bradford Hamburg
Liverpool focused on their countries of
DS

52°
Manchester
LA N

IRELAND
Birmingham Amsterdam Berlin
GERMANY origin with many mosques
ER

Utrecht P O L A N D
The Hague
H

Pakistan Cardiff Rotterdam N E T

London representing this diversity.
Brussels
Rh

India Calais UKRAINE

BEL Sufi groups are particularly
ine

Lille
Indonesia Frankfurt
48°
L. CZECH REP.
Paris SLOVAKIA active in Paris, especially
ATLANTIC Munich those from the North
F R A N C E
OCEAN
Bern AUSTRIA HUNGARY R O M A N I A African traditions such as
SWITZERLAND
the Darqawiyya and
Sea

SLOVENIA
44°
Lyon Trieste
Milan
Bordeaux CR Alawiyya. These groups
ack

Turin BOSNIA
D anube
Genoa Venice O HERZEG.
AT
attract some French con-
Bl

I A IA SERBIA BULGARIA
Marseille Monaco T
dr
ANDORRA A
ia
ti
c MONTE-
verts to Islam.
S e ALBANIA NEGRO
L
AL

Rome a
TU

40° Barcelona
TUG

Madrid Germany (Hamburg,

RK

Lisbon Naples Aegean

S P A I N Is.
ric
EY

Sea
POR

Ba
lea
G R E E C E
Munich, Frankfurt)
Andalucia
Alicante Muslim migration to Ger-
36°
Cádiz Almeria
M e d i t e r r a
many is dominated by
n
Tangier e
a
n
Turks. During the 1950s,
TUNISIA
MALTA S e a Germany actively encour-
MOROCCO A L G E R I A 0 200 km aged the migration of
workers from Turkey.
0 200 miles LIBYA
Most of the employment
France (Paris) opportunities on offer
The majority of migration to France from Muslim were unskilled or semiskilled. During the 1970s,
countries has been from Algeria, prior to the 1960s. there was an increased movement of Turkish
Increasingly, other Moroccan and Tunisian Muslims, workers to Germany that led to the development
as well as those from western Africa, have established of particular focused communities. During this

166

period, families joined the original migrants.
Most workers were accorded the status of “guest
worker,” which emphasized the official notion of
the settlement being temporary. During the
1980s, the Muslim communities began to estab-
lish social and religious provision by building
mosques and forming religious associations,
many linked to groups based in Turkey. Like-
wise, Sufi groups, such as the Naqshbandiyya,
have been very active and often through these
groups, converts to Islam have played a signifi-
cant role in the Muslim communities.
United Kingdom (London, Glasgow,
Manchester, Birmingham, Bradford)
Muslim migration to the UK began from the mid-
nineteenth century with settlement of Yemeni
seamen in the ports of Cardiff, South Shields,
Liverpool, and London, and eventually in Birm-
ingham. However most Muslim migration to the
UK has been from southern Asia (Pakistan and
Bangladesh), where, during the 1950s and early
1960s, many economic migrants arrived to take
up employment by invitation. During the 1960s,
the arrival of families led to the establishment of
various provisions of religious and cultural servic-
es, as happened in most migrant communities in
Europe. London, in particular, has attracted
diverse communities. This has led to a more liber-
al cultural and religious perspective than among
other Muslim communities in the UK. Significant
numbers of Arabs, as well as Pakistanis and
Bangladeshis, mix with more recent Muslim
refugees and overseas Muslim students. Bradford
has a more homogeneous community of Pak-
istani origin, which has led to a less diverse reli-
gious focus. Birmingham, on the other hand,
though constituting a community predominantly
of Pakistani origin, has a far more diverse Muslim
community that includes a significant number of
converts of Afro-Caribbean origin. Increasingly,
Muslim youth in the UK are rediscovering Islam
as a part of their personal identity. Young Muslim
women are adopting the use of hijab as a means
of asserting their own identity based on self-
MUSLIMS IN WESTERN EUROPE
exploration rather than accepting the religious
assumptions and practices of the previous gener-
ation. As in other European contexts, Sufism
plays a significant role as a religious movement,
especially in attracting converts.
The Netherlands (Amsterdam, Rotterdam,
The Hague, Utrecht)
The Netherlands has a diverse Muslim communi-
ty made up of Turks and North Africans as well as
Moluccans from the former Dutch East Indies. As
the communities established themselves, there has
been an increase in the number of mosques since
the 1980s. Many of these mosques are linked to
the countries of origin, especially those of Turkish
origin, where imams are provided by Turkey. The
Dutch state provides the teaching of home lan-
guages in schools, but as in other parts of Europe,
religious education is provided by the mosques.
Italy (Rome, Milan, Turin)
Italy has a diverse Muslim community, pre-
dominantly made up of Moroccans and
Tunisians with increasing numbers from the
former Yugoslavia. During the 1980s and 90s
the Moroccan community in particular estab-
lished mosques and the provision of religious Built around 1750, the mosque in
educational needs. the castle garden of
Schwetzingen, Germany, blends
Spain Islamic motifs with European
Spain, with its Muslim history, is significant as a baroque influences.
European country developing a resurgence of
engagement with Islam, especially in the south.
The majority of migrant Muslims to Spain have
been from North Africa, the majority from
Morocco. There are also communities from Sub-
saharan Africa and the Middle East. There has
been an increasing number of mosques established
and the provision of religious education. General-
ly, Spanish attitudes to Islam are quite sympathet-
ic and there is a significant convert movement of
Spaniards, in particular in Andalusia. Here the
assertion of regional autonomy and conversion to
Islam may be experienced as the rediscovery of an
identity suppressed for many centuries.
167
HISTORICAL ATLAS OF THE ISLAMIC WORLD
Muslims in North America
Muslim populations in the US originate
from an early period. There is evidence to
suggest that the first Muslims arrived with
Spanish explorers in the sixteenth century.
But the initial substantial communities
resulted from immigration from Syria and
Lebanon during the 1860s with further
influxes in subsequent decades. The period
following the Second World War saw signif-
icant numbers arriving in response to the
economic and political constraints in their
Late 19th and Early land of origin, including Europe, southwest-
20th Centuries
ern Asia, East Africa, India, and Pakistan.
Area of Islam The main states where Muslim communi-
Migration
Cedar Rapids
Detroit BALKANS
Buffalo
Dearborn OTTOMAN EMPIRE
1 89 0 – SYRIA
e a r l y 1 9 20
s
LEBANON
JORDAN
INDIA
pre-W
orld War II
1 90
6
ties settled
were Michigan,
Ohio, Indiana, Illi-
nois, Massachusetts,
Iowa, Louisiana, New York, and
Pennsylvania. In Canada, Muslim com-
munities have not been so concentrated in
particular locations and are more geograph-
ically mobile. The countries of origin have
also contrasted with the US with the major-
ity of Muslim migrants to Canada originat-
ing from Arab countries, North Africa, Sub-
saharan Africa, southeastern Europe,
Turkey, Iran, Afghanistan, the Far East, and
East Africa. Some originated from countries
of the British Commonwealth. In both the
168
US and Canada, conversion has been a fac-
tor in the emergence of Muslim communi-
ties. African-American converts in the US, in
particular, have been very significant.
The Nation of Islam (NOI), a separatist
movement among African-Americans, has
not been considered part of Islam by the
majority of Muslims. It remains a signifi-
cant force, although since since 1976, when
Warith Deen Muhammad, the son of the
NOI founder Elijah Muhammad, took over
part of the movement, an increasing pro-
portion of African-American Muslims have
aligned themselves with mainstream Sunni
Muslim belief and practice. African-Ameri-
can Muslims make up a significant propor-
tion of the Muslim community in the US.
Conversion in prison among black inmates
is particularly significant as a response to
racism and institutionalized brutality, and
draws on the Muslim ancestral origins of
many African-Americans. White converts
are not as significant in numbers, but are,
nonetheless, vocal exponents of the faith,
often, as in Europe, associated with Sufi
movements. The early establishment of
Muslims in North America has led to a
period of assimilation in which, with excep-
tion of the African-American Muslims,
issues of religious identity have been sub-
sumed in cultural integration. With the
arrival of overseas Muslim students and
more recent migrants who were practicing
Muslims, for example from Pakistan, there
has been an increase in the assertion of reli-
gious identity. There is generally a wide
spectrum of religious practice in North
American communities. Although many
Muslim associations and mosques are ethni-
cally based, there are also Muslim organiza-
tions that are trans-ethnic.
The Muslim Students’ Association, found-
ed in 1963 by Muslim students at the Univer-
 MUSLIMS IN NORTH AMERICA

sity of Illinois-Urbana,
has been particularly
significant in assert-
ing a Muslim iden-
HAWAII
tity in contradis- YUGOSLAVIA
PAKISTAN
tinction to an eth- ALBANIA
TUNISIA
SYRIA
BANGLADESH
P a l e s ti n ia ns IRAQ IRAN
nic identity. Other after 1948 KUWAIT
ALGERIA EGYPT SAUDI INDIA
umbrella organizations ARABIA
SUDAN YEMEN
in the US and the Council
MALAYSIA
of Muslim Communities of
Canada have made significant INDONESIA

contributions in the shift toward

a collective Muslim identity. At a
local level, most concentrations of
Muslims in cities such as Detroit,
New York, and Chicago, have provision
for halal food, funerary facilities,
mosques, and community halls, as well as
organized educational provision for reli-
gious instruction for children. In terms of
relationships with the wider community,
Muslims in North America, in the US in par-
ticular, have experienced significant chal-
lenges over the last twenty-five years. After
the Iranian Revolution in 1979, when Ameri-
cans were held hostage in the Tehran
embassy, public opinion concerning Islam
and Muslims began to shift in a negative
direction. The events of September 11th
After World War II
area of Islam
migration
2001, other attacks on Americans, and the
country sending
killing of Israeli civilians (with whom Evan- students
gelical Christians as well as Jews tend to
empathize strongly) have had a massive
impact on Muslim communities in the West
generally, but especially in the US. Communi-
ty and religious leaders have had to counter
the negative stereotyping of Islam as a reli-
gion of violence, while addressing the politi-
cizing of Islam in their own communities.

The Black Muslim leader

Malcolm X began his life as a
petty criminal before his
conversion to the separatist
Nation of Islam (NOI). His
pilgrimage to Mecca in 1964,
however, persuaded him that
separatism was wrong, and that
true Islam included people of all
races. Three NOI members were
convicted for his murder
following his assassination in
February 1965.

169
HISTORICAL ATLAS OF THE ISLAMIC WORLD
Mosques and Places of Worship in North America
The Islamic Society of North
America’s Headquarters Mosque,
near Indianapolis, Indiana.
Designed by architects Gulzar
Haider and Mukhtar Khalil, and
completed in 1981, it displays a
progressive, modern profile for
the faith of up to 8 million
Americans and Canadians. As
well as a prayer hall, the building
contains a library and
administrative offices.
170
Following the establishment of communities
in the US, the 1920s saw the first appearance
of mosque buildings to serve the religious
and social needs of Muslims. As in Europe,
homes initially functioned as mosques,
followed by the conversion of existing houses
to serve as mosques. The construction of
mosques built specifically for the purpose
came at a later phase. Most mosques were
originally established to serve ethnically
defined communities and were not sectarian
as such, the buildings being used for both
social and religious purposes. Often for larg-
er events, such as the Id prayers, public and
private halls have been hired to accommodate
worshippers—this has been the case in
Toronto, Montreal, and Edmonton in
Canada. The first African-American mosque,
of the Nation of Islam, was established in
Harlem in 1950.
However, up until the 1960s, there were
insufficient mosques to serve the growing
Muslim community who instead used private
prayer rooms and spaces to fulfill religious
obligations. There are now over 1,000 formal
mosques in the US.
One of the largest mosques built in the US
is the Detroit Islamic Center, which was
erected between 1962 and 1968. The con-
struction was paid for by the local Muslim
community who formed its congregation.
Grants coming from the Egyptian, Saudi Ara-
bian, Iranian, and Lebanese governments
revealed the shift toward mosques becoming
less ethnically focused in terms of congrega-
tions. In the US, the Council of Masjids has
been established to facilitate the provision of
mosques to serve the Muslim community. A
report in 2001 showed that mosque atten-
dance, based on ethnic analysis, included
southern Asians (33 percent), African-
Americans (30 percent), and Arabs (25 per-
cent). Imams still tend to be recruited from
overseas from countries including Egypt,
Turkey, and Pakistan, but increasingly there
are US-trained imams as more provision for
imamate training is established. Some imams
are also funded from overseas but most have
their salaries paid for by local communities.
A Council of Imams was established in 1972.
Mosques are, in the main, managed by local
consultative councils.
Mosques and other buildings used by Mus-
lims in North America including Ithna Ashari
Husayniyyes, Ismaili Jamat-khanas and
Nation of Islam temples serve a range of func-
tions besides being places of worship. They are
used for educational purposes, such as week-
end schools, children’s classes, lectures, and
adult education. They provide libraries, book-
stores, and small publishing facilities for Islam-
ic materials as well as granting facilities for
social events such as weddings and funerals.
Crucially, they present a point of contact for
non-Muslims to learn about Islam and to meet
Muslims—an issue of vital importance in the
aftermath of the attacks on New York and
Washington in 2001. As the Muslim communi-
ties of North America are evolving, mosques
and other congregational centers are becoming
the focal point for community initiatives.
 MOSQUES AND PLACES OF WORSHIP IN NORTH AMERICA

Attendance at places of worship should The Islamic Cultural Center,

not necessarily be equated with the develop- constructed in 1984 at Tempe,

ment of the Muslim-American community in Arizona.

its broader aspects. A 1987 study found that

only 10–20 percent of Muslim-Americans
attended mosques regularly (as compared to
about 40 percent church attendance for the
Christian population). While some younger
Muslims may be reaffirming their Islamic
identities by observing religious rituals and
practices, the majority of recent immigrants
from South and Central Asia may be more
concerned with integrating themselves into
mainstream American society.
Mosques
by State 2000

over 200
100–199
50–99
10–49
1–9

WAS
HING
TON
MONTA
NA NE
MINNESOTA MAI
NORTH DAKOTA MI
OREG C VT
ON H
IG
IDAHO A NH
SOUTH DAKOTA WISCONSIN
RK MA
N

WYOMIN N EW YO
G CT RI
NIA
SYLVA NEW
IOWA PENN Y
NEVA NEBRASKA JERSE
A

DA OHIO
WARE
IAN

M D
UTAH ILLINOIS DELA
IA
RG ST
IND

IN

COLORADO
VI WE

CALI
FO IA
RNIA KANSAS MISSOURI VIRGIN
Y
KENTUCK
OLINA
R T H CAR
ARIZO TENNESSEE N O
N A NEW MEXICO
OKLAHOMA ARKANSAS SOUTH A
IN
CAROL
PPI
SSI

A
ALABAM
SSI

IA
GEORG
MI

TEXAS

LOUISIANA FLORIDA
ALASKA

HAWAII

171
HISTORICAL ATLAS OF THE ISLAMIC WORLD
Islamic Arts
A vibrant tradition of the arts flourished in
Islamic lands. In contrast to other artistic tra-
ditions elsewhere, the most important arts in
Chinese porcelain was much
admired in the Islamic world and
its influence can clearly be seen in
this Saljuq jug.
Far right: Equally, in the portrait
of Selim III, European influences
can be seen in this personal
representation.
Islam are those considered “decorative,”
“minor,” or “portable” in other traditions,
such as textiles, calligraphy and the book
arts, ceramics, metalwork, glassware, and the
like. Most of them involved the transforma-
tion of humble materials, such as plant or
animal fibers, sand, clay, or metal ores, into
sublime works of art, characterized by lumi-
nous colors and intricate designs. Many of
the finest objects are ultimately utilitarian
pieces, such as bath buckets and serving
trays, to be used in everyday life.
It is often said that Islam prohibited figur-
al representation in its art, but that is not so.
Rather, Islam discouraged depictions in all
172
religious contexts probably out of the same
fear of idolatry that other religions had grap-
pled with in earlier times. In other contexts,
particularly private and courtly settings, a
lively tradition of pictorial art evolved. The
walls of palaces, for example, were often
painted with figural scenes; mosques were
not. There, nonrepresentational decoration
based on geometric, vegetal, and epigraphic
ornament reigned supreme. While all figural
art produced in the lands of Islam is, by def-
inition, not religious, the converse is not nec-
essarily true. Nonrepresentational art was
appropriate and esteemed in any setting,
whether secular or religious.
Textiles were the mainstay of economic
life in medieval Islamic times. Made of wool,
flax, silk, and cotton, they ranged from gos-
samer organdies and muslins (named after
the towns of Urgench in Central Asia and
Mosul in Iraq) to the sturdy rugs, felts, and
cloths used by nomads for their tents. Cloth
was not only used to dress individuals but
also served to define and furnish spaces in
this dry land of little wood where people nor-
mally sat on carpets and leaned against bol-
sters. People at all levels of society used tex-
tiles. The majority were plain, but wealthy
patrons, ranging from caliphs to merchants,
coveted exotic, brightly colored, elaborately
decorated cloths. Raw fibers were enlivened
with bright dyes made from a variety of
materials, which were themselves traded
widely. Artisans developed an amazing range
of techniques, from embroidery and tapestry
to drawloom weaving and ikat dyeing, to
make their fabrics beautiful.
The veneration of the word in Islam meant
that books and writing were highly valued
everywhere. The introduction of paper from
 ISLAMIC ARTS

Central Asia in the eighth century led to an and Muslim craftsmen took the art of fash-
explosion of books, book learning, and book ioning wares for daily use from copper alloys,
production, with the associated arts of callig- such as brass and bronze, to new heights.
raphy, illumination, binding, and ultimately, Many of these trays, basins, bowls, buckets,
illustration. The fanciest manuscripts were ewers, incense-burners, lamps, candlestands,
copies of the Koran, made first on parchment
and later on paper. They often had superb
nonfigural illumination but were never illus-
trated. Books with pictures, particularly
copies of Persian epic and lyric poetic litera-
ture, became popular in the Persianate world
from the fourteenth century, when Persian-
speaking rulers in Iran, Turkey, and India
established ateliers that produced some of the
most magnificent books ever made anywhere.
Many of the other arts associated with the
lands of Islam use fire to transform materials
taken from the earth. Muslims inherited ancient
traditions of pottery from the Near East but
transformed them through the development of
new ceramic bodies, colorful glazing tech-
niques, and decorative repertoires. Some of
these features, such as overglaze luster painting
developed in ninth-century Iraq, the artificial
paste (fritware) body developed in twelfth-
century Egypt and Iran, and underglaze paint-
ing developed in twelfth-century Iran, erupted
in a burst of creative ceramic activity unrivaled
until the eighteenth century in Britain.
Although the majority of production was
unglazed earthenware for storing and transport-
ing water and foodstuffs on a daily basis, fancy
dishes, bowls, jugs, bottles, and ewers made in
the Islamic lands were avidly collected and imi-
tated from China to Spain. Glassblowing, a
technique that had been invented in pre-Islamic candelabra, and the like were decorated with
Syria, remained a specialty of the Levant. Glass- inlays of precious metal to enliven their sur-
makers made thousands of gilded and enameled faces. Metalwares used in religious settings
lamps used to light the many mosques and differed from those used in domestic settings
schools erected to spread God’s word. only in their decoration, which tended to be
The Prophet Muhammad is said to have epigraphic, geometric, and vegetal, rather
discouraged the use of gold and silver vessels, than figural.

173
HISTORICAL ATLAS OF THE ISLAMIC WORLD

GERM.
15° 0° BEL. 15° 30°
LUX.
Islamic Arts CZECH. UKRAINE
Paris
Carpets
AUS. MOLD.
Ceramics FRANCE SWITZ. HUN.
ROMANIA
Textiles
45° Beograd
Metalwares
B.H.
Shumen
Glass IT YUG.
A BULGARIA
RomE
Ivory carving

LY
PORTUGAL
S PA I N ALB. Istanbul
Jade Iznik
Toledo Bursa

Book illustration/illumination
GREECE
Lisbon
Cordoba Murcia Palermo Athinai
Grenada
Tunis
Malaga

M
Kairouan

ed
it
TUNISIA Sfax er
Gafsa ra
Rabat Fez
ne
an
Sea

O
CC
AT L A N T I C Marrakesh Alexandria

30° RO Cairo
O
M
ALGERIA
OCEAN
L I B YA

Tropic of Cancer EGYPT

WESTERN
SAHARA

MAURITANIA

MALI NIGER

CHAD
15°
Dakar
SENEGAL
S U DA N

BURKINA
GUINEA
BENIN

Conakry
NIGERIA
GHANA

TOGO

IVORY CENTRAL
COAST AFRICAN
Lagos
REPUBLIC
LIBERIA Accra
N

Abidjan
O
O

ER
CA M
GO
CON

CONGO
0°
REP.

GABON

174
 ISLAMIC ARTS

45° 60° 75° 90°

K A Z A K H S TA N

Black Sea Urgench UZB

Ca

(14C) EK
IST
sp

GEORGIA AN
KYRGYZSTAN
ia
n
Sea

Amasya AZA. ARMENIA

Bukhara Samarkand
TURKEY TURKMENISTA
N
Kaiseri TAJIKSTAN
Konya Diyarbakir Tabriz C H I N A
Mashad Merv
Mosul (8–12C)
Raqqa Nishapur
Aleppo (9–13C) Kabul
SYRIA Kashan Herat
Kashmir
Isfahan
LEB. Baghdad Lahore
Damascus
IRAN AFGHANISTAN
IRAQ Yazd
ISRAEL
JORDAN Samarra Basra

N
Kirman TA
Shiraz
IS
Delhi
K NE
Pe PA PA
rs
Agra L BH.
Jaipur
ia
n
G

ul
Karachi
SAUDI f
Riyadh Ahmadabad
U. A. E.
Re

ARABIA Calcutta
d
Se

Mecca
a

INDIA BANGLA-
N

DESH
A

Bombay
M

O
Ara bian Sea Hyderabad

EN
Khartoum Sana YEM

Bangalore Madras

Addis
Ababa

ETHIOPIA SRI
LANKA
IA
AL

M
SO
INDIAN
UGANDA OCEAN

KENYA

175
HISTORICAL ATLAS OF THE ISLAMIC WORLD
Major Islamic Architectural Sites
The presence of Muslims in any given area is
marked by distinctive building types, most
notably the congregational or Friday mosque.
While the mosque can take many forms,
depending on local materials and
building practices, it is always a
structure oriented toward Mecca,
large enough to accommodate the
Muslim male population. Mosques
were generally built of brick or
stone and covered with vaults or
domes. Wood was often unavailable
or too expensive to use for roofing
in this largely arid region, although
it was used in heavily forested
regions such as Anatolia and South-
east Asia. Elsewhere, fine woods
were reserved for mosque furniture,
such as minbars (pulpits) and read-
ing-stands, which were often inlaid
with other woods, bone, ivory, and
mother-of-pearl. Mosques were
elaborately decorated in glazed tile
and carved stucco and strewn with
pile or flat-woven carpets. These
displayed vegetal, geometric, and
epigraphic designs. Figural depic-
tions were avoided in religious con-
texts and are found only in secular
settings. Virtually all mosques have
a mihrab or niche in the wall facing
Mecca, and many have one or
more attached minarets, towers
from which the call to prayer could
be given. Since mosques were nor-
mally constructed of the best qual-
ity materials available and were
regularly maintained over the cen-
turies, they are usually the best preserved build-
ings in any particular place.
176
Rulers often built lavish palaces as symbols
of their wealth and authority. These have not
survived as well as mosques, however, because
their design and construction were more
experimental. In addition, successors were
often reluctant to maintain the splendid
achievements of their rivals. Archaeological
investigations in the Islamic lands have
focused on deserted or abandoned palaces,
such as Khirbat al-Mafjar, the Umayyad
retreat near Jericho, and Samarra, the ninth-
century Abbasid capital in Iraq. Only a few
Islamic palaces have survived above ground,
such as the Alhambra in Granada, Topkapi
Saray in Istanbul, and the Red Fort in Delhi.
Islamic palaces are normally showy but poor-
ly-constructed buildings in which appearance
and display take precedence over form and
structure. Unlike Versailles or the Hermitage,
Islamic palaces are typically additive struc-
tures with small pavilions arranged around
internal courts and magnificent gardens.
Although the Prophet Muhammad is said to
have frowned on the construction of monu-
mental tombs over the graves of the deceased,
in many parts of the Islamic lands, building
tombs became a major form of architectural
patronage. Tombs were constructed over the
graves of particularly pious individuals as well
as those of rulers who were anxious to preserve
their memory in an uncertain world. Most
tombs are domed structures, either squares,
octagons, or circles, and range from the mod-
est marabouts of North Africa to the monu-
mental Taj Mahal. Many have a mihrab to
direct the prayers of worshippers who come to
venerate the deceased. Some have adjacent
structures to accommodate the expected visi-
tors and to provide public services ranging
from Koran schools to soup kitchens. In this

way, patrons were able to use a charitable foun-
dation to justify the construction of a tomb.
Muslims were buried directly in the
ground, wrapped only in plain white shrouds.
Thus, the burial goods that archaeologists
depend on for understanding other cultural
traditions do not exist in the Muslim lands.
The relative aridity of much of the region,
particularly Egypt and Central Asia, however,
has helped preserve fragile organic materials
that might otherwise have been lost through
burial. The most important of these are
textiles, which played the central role in the
medieval Islamic economy. Many of these
fragments appear so unprepossessing that
they are rarely displayed in the museums;
paradoxically, the best-known textiles from
the Islamic lands, many inscribed with
Arabic blessings, were preserved in European
MAJOR ISLAMIC ARCHITECTURAL SITES
churches, where they were used to wrap the
bones of Christian saints.
Archaeological finds attest to the broad
network of trade routes that crisscrossed
the Islamic lands, connecting China, India,
and tropical Africa with Europe. Thanks to
the domestication of the camel before the
rise of Islam, most trade went overland,
with caravanserais often erected at 15-mile
An enclosed courtyard of the
Qansuh al-Ghuri Caravanserai in
Cairo.
Far left: A relief plaque, part of a
palace built by al-Mamum,
Toledo’s most powerful taifa
ruler.
intervals to accommodate travelers, their
beasts, and their wares. Some trade went by
sea, following the Mediterranean coasts or the
monsoon winds around the Indian Ocean.
Recent advances in underwater archaeology
have allowed the exploration of shipwrecks,
such as the eleventh-century one found at Serçe
Limani off the coast of Turkey. This site
yielded a huge quantity of cullet, broken glass
collected for recycling.
177
HISTORICAL ATLAS OF THE ISLAMIC WORLD

Architectural and
Archaelogical
15° Sites 0° 15° 30° 45°

U. K . NETH. Berlin POLAND

Palace
Rotterdam Warsaw BELORUSSIA
Mosque or other London
religious building GERMANY
B.
Tomb LUX. CZEC
HOSL
OVAK UKRAINE
Paris IA
Housing

FRANCE AUSTRIA MOLD.

Castle/fortifications SWITZ. HUNGARY
ROMANIA
45° Bridge Beograd
B.H.
Shipwreck Mostar Shumen

Ca
Black Sea
IT YUG. BULGARIA
A

sp
Rome Plovdiv Edirne GEORGIA

ia
LY
Saragosa
PORTUGAL

n
S PA I N ALB. Istanbul
11C

Sea
Iznik Amasya AZA. ARMENIA
Toledo Bursa Erzurum
Dogubayezit
GREECE TURKEY Kaiseri Malatya
Lisbon
Palermo Athens Tabriz Ardabil
Cordoba Grenada Konya Dyiarbekr
13-15C Algiers Tunis
Bodrum Sultaniya 14-17C B
14C Damghan
AT L A N T I C Kairouan Sousse M Aleppo Raqqa Mosul Tehran
Tlemcen ed
it SYRIA IRAQ Qum
OCEAN
Sfax
er Hama
Rabat
ra
ne Tripoli
Fez Jerba
an Baghdad Isfahan
TUNISIA Sea LEB.
Meknes Damascus Ukhaidir 8-17C
Tripoli Bosra Kufa 8C
ISRAEL Jericho 7C Wasit
Alexandria Susa
Marrakesh O Gaza (Khirbat al-Mafjar) 8C 8-9C
CC Adjabiya Cairo
Amman
JORDAN Samarra Basra
30° RO 10C 9-10C 8-10C
O Shiraz
M Jerusalem
ALGERIA
L I B YA
EGYPT
Queseir Bahrain
WESTERN Qus to14C SAUDI QATAR
SAHARA Riyadh

Re
Aswan Medina
Tropic of Cancer

d
ARABIA

Se
a
Jedda Mecca
Chinguetti Taif

M A U R I TA N I A Suakin
MALI NIGER
Timbuuktu Agadez
Gao EN
CHAD YEM
15° Khartoum
Sanaa Shibam
SENEGAL Djenne Zabid
Daura S U DA N Ta’izz
BURKINA Kano
Bobo-Dioulasso Maska Zaria
GUINEA
Conakry
BENIN

Addis
Ababa
Larabanga
TOGO

IVORY NIGERIA ETHIOPIA

GHANA

COAST CENTRAL
IA
Lagos AFRICAN
REPUBLIC
AL
LIBERIA
N

Accra
O

Abidjan
M
O

ER SO
CA M
GO

Mogadishu
UGANDA
CON

Equator K E N YA
0°
REP.

GABON

CONGO Nairobi Lamu

Gedi
Kinshasa

TANZANIA Zanzibar
Dar es Salaam

Luanda Kilwa

178
 MAJOR ISLAMIC ARCHITECTURAL SITES

60° 75° 90° 105° 120°

K A Z A K H S TA N
MONGOLIA
Harbin
Aral
Sea
Urgench
14C Turkestan City
UZB 14-15C
EK
IST Shenyang
Khiva A KYRGYZSTAN
19C
N

Beijing
Bukhara
TURKMENI Samarqand Tianjin N. KOREA
ST
AN Termez TAJIKSTAN
10-14C Seoul
Bastam Mashad Balkh
Merv S. KOREA
8-12C C H I N A
Nishapur
(9-13C)
Herat Kabul Xian
Kashmir
Ghazni
Lahore Yangzhou
Yazd AFGHANISTAN
IRAN Chengdu Shanghai
Multan
N

Wuhan
TA

Chongqing
Kirman
Delhi N
IS

K Fatehpur
EP
Bam PA Agra AL
9-13C Jaipur Sikri BH.
16C
Ajmer
Jaunpur
U. A. E. Karachi Sasaram Pandua
Tatta
Guangzhou Taiwan
Ahmadabad Mandu Calcutta
Hong Kong
I ND I A BANGLA- BURMA
N

DESH
A

Bombay
M

O LA Hainan
Bijapur O
Ara bian Sea Gulbarga Hyderabad
S

Rangoon Luzón
VI

THAILAND
ET

Manila
NA M

Bangkok
Bangalore Madras CAMBODIA

Ho Chi
Minh P H I LI P P I NES

SRI Mindanao
LANKA

M A L A Y S I A

Malacca
INDIAN

OCEAN Borneo
Sumatra
Sulawesi

I N
Jakarta
D O
Demak Kudus N E S I A
Java

Timor

179
HISTORICAL ATLAS OF THE ISLAMIC WORLD
World Distribution of Muslims 2000
There are approximately twelve hundred mil-
lion Muslims in the world today, about one-
fifth of humanity. The vast majority reside in
the central belt of territories extending east-
ward from the Atlantic seaboard of North
Africa to Indonesia. Due to the historic spread
of Islam into the tropical regions of South and
Southeast Asia, where intensive cultivation per-
mits high population densities, the nation with
the largest number of Muslims (182 million) is
Indonesia. This is a country far removed from
the southwestern Asian matrix where Islam
180
originated. Next in order of magnitude is Pak-
istan with 134 million, followed by India (121
million), Bangladesh (114 million), Egypt (61
million), and Nigeria (61 million). Of the top
six Muslim countries containing more than
half the world’s Muslims, only one, namely
Egypt, is Arabic-speaking and became part of
the Islamic world close to the time of its ori-
gins. In one of them, India, Muslims live as a
large, but still vulnerable, minority. Demo-
graphically, the “old” Islam that came into
being in the course of the Arab conquests has
been overtaken by the newer and younger Islam
of the mainly tropical peripheries.
In terms of the legal and sectarian tradi-
tions about 85 percent of the world’s Muslims
belong to the Sunni mainstream and, formally
if not always in practice, subscribe to one of
the four Sunni madhhabs (legal schools). The
Hanafi school, the official school of the
Ottoman Empire, predominates in former
Ottoman domains, including Anatolia and the
Balkans, as well as in Transcaucasia,
Afghanistan, Pakistan, India, the Central
Asian republics, and China. The Maliki school
predominates in the Maghreb and West Africa;
the Shafis are represented in Egypt, Palestine,
Jordan, the coastlands of Yemen, and among
Muslims populations in Pakistan, India, and
Indonesia; the Hanbali in Saudi Arabia. How-
ever, different schools have long coexisted in
some places, and there is considerable overlap-
ping in countries such as Egypt, where legal
modernism has allowed the talfiq (piecing
together) of rulings from different schools.
Non-Sunni Muslims constitute about 15 per-
cent of the total population worldwide. The
Kharijis, who split with the main body of Islam
in 660, are represented through a modified
version known as Ibadism in Oman, Zanzibar,

and Tahert in southern Algeria. Shiite are con-
centrated in Iran, southern Iraq, Kuwait, and
Bahrain, with substantial minorities in
Afghanistan (3.8 million or 15 percent), India
(3 percent or 30 million), Lebanon (34 percent
or 1.2 million), Pakistan (20 percent or 28 mil-
lion), Syria (12 percent or 2 million), Turkey
(20 percent or 3 million), the United Arab Emi-
rates (16 percent or about half a million), and
Yemen (40 percent or 7 million) The great
majority of the Shiite—about 85 percent—
belong to the Imami or Ithashari (Twelver) tra-
dition. Most of the Imami Shiites adhere to
one or other of the senior religious leaders or
Grand Ayatullahs known as Marjas (“sources”
of emulation or legal judgement) who act as
the qualified interpreters of Islamic law. Other
Shiite communities include the Zaidis in
Yemen and the Ismailis or Seveners belonging
to two surviving traditions. These derive from
the Fatimid caliphate: the Mustalians (known
in South Asia and East Africa as Bohras) who
follow the Dai Mutlaq (chief missionary) of
the Imam-Caliph al-Mustali (d. 1101) and the
Nizaris, who follow the guidance of the
Aga Khan, a nobleman of Persian ancestry
descended from Muhammad b Ismail whom
they regard as their Living Imam. The Nizaris
lived in small communities in Syria, Persia,
inner Asia, and northwestern India until
migrations to Africa and the West, beginning
in the nineteenth century.
Many active Muslims whether Sunnis or
Shiites adhere to one of the legal traditions
outlined above. In many countries with Mus-
lim majorities, however, elements of Islamic
law (especially laws involving personal status,
such as marriage, divorce, and inheritance)
have been incorporated into the legal systems
of the state. In most Islamic countries the
modern state—starting with the Ottoman
Tanzimat reforms that brought Islamic institu-
WORLD DISTRIBUTION OF MUSLIMS 2000
tions under progressive state control—has
eroded the autonomy of the ulama who inter-
preted, diffused, or administered the Sharia in
the past. At the same time their religious
authority, based on the exclusive access to the
scriptures, has been undermined by the rise of
secondary education and the spread of litera-
cy. Many of the Islamist movements are led
and supported by the beneficiaries of modern
technical education who have come to Islamic
Far left: Calling the faithful to
teachings directly through primary or second- prayer, a sound that echoes
ary texts (the Koran, hadith, and the writings across the diverse Muslim world.
of modern ideologues and scholars) rather
than through the mediation of traditional
scholarship.
At first sight the trend toward what might
be called the laicization or democratization of
religious authority in Islam could lead to more
orthodox or standardized versions promoted
by such organizations as the Saudi-based
Muslim World League. However, despite the
attacks of reformers and the religious imperi-
alism emanating from wealthy but culturally
conservative oil-producing regions, the mysti-
cal traditions of Sufism have proved highly
resilient and adaptive. In Subsaharan Africa
and many regions of Asia (including the for-
mer Soviet territories) versions of Islam medi-
ated through charismatic leaders trained in dis-
ciplines that supplement (but do not necessari-
ly replace) the formal religious duties of prayer,
fasting, almsgiving, and pilgrimage are contin-
uing to make headway, building on traditions
that have long been communicated orally or
through interpersonal relationships. The vari-
eties of Islamic faith and practice embedded or
“frozen” in texts are only a part of its rich
symbolic vocabulary and repertory of mean-
ings. As the older forms of religious authority
decay or prove inadequate to address the chal-
lenges of modernity, other forms of spiritual
authority and social power emerge.
181
HISTORICAL ATLAS OF THE ISLAMIC WORLD

Baf
Vi c t o r i a I s l a n d fi
n
Is
l GR EENLA ND

a
Al as ka

nd
ICELAND

AY
Reykjavik

RW
Anchorage

NO
60° Oslo
C A N A D A
UNITED
KINGDOM DEN.
Copenhagen
Edmonton NETH. Berlin
IRELAND Rotterdam
Saskatoon London
Calgary GERMANY
Regina B. CZ.
Vancouver Winnipeg
Newfoundland Paris LUX. REP.
Seattle Quebec St-John’s
Duluth SWITZ. AUS.
Sault Ste-Marie
Portland Montreal S.
45° Minneapolis FRANCE
Toronto Halifax
Milwaukee ITALY
Detroit Boston Rome
Salt Lake City Chicago
Pittsbg. New York
U N I T E D S T A T E S Philadelphia PORTUGAL Madrid
Kansas City Cincinnati Baltimore SPAIN
San Francisco Lisbon
Washington Tunis
O F A M E R I C A Algiers
Los Angeles Rabat
Atlanta TUNISIA
San Diego Phoenix Casablanca O
CC Tripoli
New Orleans O
30°

R
O
Houston

M
ALGERIA
Miami
Monterey WESTERN
SAHARA
MEXICO
CUBA DOMINICAN
Mexico City
HAITI REPUBLIC MAURITANIA
Puebla MALI NIGER
BELIZE JAMAICA
15° GUAT. HONDURAS SENEGAL
Guatemala Dakar
EL SALVADOR NIC. THE GAMBIA BURKINA
Managua GUINEA-BISSAU FASO
San José Caracas GUINEA

BENIN
GHANA
COSTA RICA GUYANA Conakry NIGERIA
PANAMA VENEZUELA SIERRA-LEONE CÔTE
SURINAM D’IVOIRE Lagos
LIBERIA
FRENCH Abidjan Accra
Bogatá
GUIANA TOGO CAMEROON
COLOMBIA
EQU.
0° GUINEA
Quito
EQUADOR Belém GABON
REP. CONGO

Recife
B R A Z IL Luanda
PERU
Lima
Salvador
15°
La Paz Brasilia
BOLIVIA

NAMIBIA
PA R

AG Rio de Janeiro
Säo Paulo Muslim population
UA

in the World today

Y

30° Over 85%

C H I L E

Santiago
URUGUAY
Over 50%
Buenos Aires
Montevideo
ARGENTINA Over 20%

Over 5%

Over 1%
45°

Less than 1%

Predominantly Shia Muslims

120° 105° 90° 75° 60° Punta Arenas 45° 30° 30

15° 0° 15°

182
 WORLD DISTRIBUTION OF MUSLIMS 2000

Novaya
Zemlya
FI

SWEDEN
NLA

RU S S IA N FE DE R AT IO N
ND

Helsinki
St-Petersburg
Stockholm EST.
Nizhniy Perm
LAT. Novgorod Yekaterinburg
LITH. Moscow Chelyabinsk Omsk Novosibirsk
Minsk
POLAND BELORUSSIA Samara
Warsaw Sakhalin
Kiev
. UKRAINE Kharkov
SLOVAKIA Volgograd
MOLDOVA Rostov K A Z A K H S TA N
HUN. MONGOLIA
. C. ROM. Harbin
Belgrade
B.H.
YUG. UZBE
BULG. KI Shenyang
Hokkaido
ALB. M. Istanbul
GEORGIA S KYRGYZ.
Beijing
TA

Ankara ARMENIA AZER.

TURKME N. KOREA
N

GREECE N TAJIK. Tianjin J A PA N

TURKEY Seoul
Athens Honshu
.

S. KOREA Tokyo
SYRIA Tehran Kabul C H I N A Pusan
AFGHAN. Yokohama
LEB. Baghdad Lahore
ISRAEL IRAN
AN

Alexandria
IRAQ Chengdu Shanghai
JORDAN
ST

Cairo Wuhan
NE
KUWAIT KI Delhi PA BHUTAN
L I B YA PA L
EGYPT SAUDI
QATAR
Riyadh Karachi Ahmadabad Dhaka Guangzhou
U.A.E Taiwan
Calcutta
N

ARABIA I N D IA BURMA Hong Kong

LA
A

BANGLA-
M Bombay DESH
Hainan
O
V
OS
IE

Hyderabad Rangoon Luzón

CHAD Khartoum ERITREA EN THAI.
TNA M

YEM Manila
S U DA N Bangkok
Bangalore Madras CAMB.
Addis DJIBOUTI
Ababa PHILIPPINES
Ho Chi
Minh
IA

CENTRAL SRI Mindanao

AFRICAN ETHIOPIA LANKA
AL

REPUBLIC BRUNEI
M M A L AY S I A
UGANDA SO
KENYA
Nairobi Sumatra Borneo
CONGO RWANDA Sulawesi
Kinshasa BURUNDI I N
D O PA PUA
Jakarta N E S I A NEW GU I N E A
Dar es Salaam Java
TANZANIA
EAST TIMOR
MALAWI
ANGOLA
IA

UE

B
R

ZAM
SCA

Q
BI
GA
O Z AM

ZIMBABWE
DA

A
AN
MA

SW
M

T AU S T R A L IA
BO Maputo
Johannesburg Brisbane
SWAZILAND

SOUTH Durban
LESOTHO Perth
AFRICA
Cape Town Sydney
Adelaide

Melbourne
NEW
ZEALAND

60° 75° 90° 105° 120° 135° 150° 165° 180°

0° 45°

183
HISTORICAL ATLAS OF THE ISLAMIC WORLD
World Terrorism 2003
Far right: The twin towers of the
World Trade Center in New York
burn before collapsing on
September 11th 2001, when two
hijacked airliners hit the towers
at the 80th and 95th floors. Most
of the 3,000 victims, who came
from more than 100 nations,
were trapped on the upper floors.
184
There are numerous definitions of terrorism but in
general usage the term refers to illegal armed
activity by “subnational groups” or “non-state
actors,” whether supported covertly by state spon-
sors or operating wholly as freelance guerrilla
organizations. It is also defined in terms of
method and purpose. The US, for example,
defines terrorism as “the calculated use or threat
of violence to inculcate fear, intended to coerce or
intimidate governments or societies.” While cer-
tain kinds of activity such as assassination, kid-
napping, and hijacking are associated with armed
insurgents in most parts of the world, the killing of
civilians by the use of explosive devices is far from
being confined to non-state agents. Although the
methods of delivery used by governments and
“terrorists” may differ, the results may be equally
brutal. Cluster bombs dropped from the air, for
example, resemble explosives placed in vehicles or
on human bodies in the indiscriminate way they
target civilians. Movements described as “terror-
ist” by governments typically contest the label and
usually the legitimacy of the party that uses it.
Rather than being a description of a type of activ-
ity, terrorism tends to be used as a term of abuse.
Governments everywhere denounce armed oppo-
nents who challenge their monopoly over the use
of violence as “terrorists,” while insurgents and
their supporters denounce as “state terrorism”
methods used by governments, such as “targeted
killings,” detentions without trial, the use of tor-
ture, and the destruction of homes belonging to
suspected insurgents or their families.
The attacks on New York and Washington on
September 11th 2001 by Islamists who hijacked
four civilian airliners and flew two of them into
the World Trade Center towers in Manhattan,
causing the death of some three thousand people
has inevitably created a climate in which terrorism
has come to be associated with Islamic militancy.
The impression was reinforced after the railway
attacks in Madrid in March 2004 which killed
some 200 people and would have killed many
more if the trains had been running on time. The
spectacular nature of the New York attacks—
shown live on television throughout the world—
placed other conflicts between governments and
armed insurgents in the shade. In the first years of
the 21st century, however, many of these conflicts
were occurring outside the Islamic world. They
included bloody campaigns against their respec-
tive governments by Maoists in Nepal, Tamils in
Sri Lanka (who perfected the technique of suicide
bombing), Basques in Spain (initally blamed for
the Madrid bombings), separatists in Corsica,
rebels belonging to LURD (Liberians United for
Reconciliation and Democracy) in Liberia, and
several other conflicts in Central Africa such as in
the Congo and Rwanda, not to mention the
decades-long struggle between the Colombian
government and the Revolutionary Armed Forces
of Colombia (FARC). However, the “war on ter-
rorism,” declared by President George W. Bush in
the aftermath of 9/11, seemed to target Islamic
groups particularly, along with the Muslim gov-
ernments (notably Syria, Iran, and Iraq), allegedly
sponsoring them. In the case of al-Qaeda, the mil-
itant Islamist network presided over by the Saudi
dissident Osama bin Laden which took responsi-
bility for the 9/11 attacks, as well as the attacks on
the US embassies in East Africa in 1998, and was
held responsible for several subsequent atrocities
after 9/11 (including the bombing of two night-
clubs in Bali, which killed more than 200 people,
mostly Australian tourists), the US responded with
military action aimed at “regime change” in two
countries—Afghanistan and Iraq—which it
accused of supporting al-Qaeda. While there was
no question that the Taliban regime in
Afghanistan, removed in the summer of 2002 after
 WORLD TERRORISM 2003

a massive US bombing campaign, had hosted bin

Laden and his inner circle of al-Qaeda operatives,
the case against the Iraqi leader, Saddam Hussein,
who fell from power after the Anglo-American
invasion of Iraq in March 2003 and was captured
in December, was much less certain. After the fall
of the regime no evidence was produced that Iraq
possessed weapons of mass destruction (the offi-
cial pretext for the war), or that the regime was
implicated in the attacks of 9/11 as claimed by sen-
ior members of the US administration.
Al-Qaeda is a global network with links to
Islamist movements in several Muslim countries
and as such has stimulated a global response by
the US and its allies. Britain and several other
countries, including Australia, Italy, Spain, and
Poland, sent military contingents to Iraq. The FBI
has assisted local security agencies in numerous
countries. US Special Forces and military advisors
have been sent to help government forces fight
Chechen insurgents in Georgia (to protect the
Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline), and the Philip-
pines, where Islamic separatists of the Moro
Islamic Liberation Front have been waging an
armed insurgency on the southern island of Min-
danao (with support from the al-Qaeda-connect-
ed Abu Sayyaf group). The US is heavily involved
in supporting Israel against Islamist Palestinian
insurgents and has so far failed to pressure Israel
into abandoning the illegal Jewish settlements in
the occupied territories for fear of antagonizing
influential lobbies (Jewish and Christian funda-
mentalist) in the US. In Uzbekistan the US has In general, Western countries led by the Unit-
given unqualified backing to the repressive govern- ed States are deploying their superior military
ment of President Islam Karimov who has found it resources to support existing states, based on
expedient to designate the political opposition as boundaries drawn up by the colonial powers in
Islamist “terrorists.” In contrast, in Sudan, where Africa and Asia, many of which are challenged
a Muslim government had faced a twenty-five year by armed insurgencies. Since a high proportion
insurgency by non-Muslim southerners, the US of these challenges come from Muslim groups,
had put its weight behind the rebels of the SPLA the “war on terrorism” is seen by many in the
(Sudan People’s Liberation Army) in order to pres- Muslim world as having a distinctively anti-
sure a Muslim government into reaching terms. Muslim bias.

185
HISTORICAL ATLAS OF THE ISLAMIC WORLD

Baf
Vi c t o r i a I s l a n d fi
n
Is
l GR EENLA ND

a
AL A SK A

nd
ICELAND

AY
Reykjavik

RW
Anchorage

NO
60° Oslo
C A N A D A
UNITED
KINGDOM DEN.
Copenhagen

IRELAND NETH. Berlin

Rotterdam
London GERMANY
Calgary B.
Winnipeg CZ.
Vancouver REP.
Newfoundland Paris LUX.
Seattle Quebec St-John’s
Duluth SWITZ. AUS.
Portland Montreal S.
45° Minneapolis FRANCE
Toronto Halifax
Milwaukee ITALY
Detroit Boston Rome
Salt Lake City Chicago Pittsbg.
U N I T E D S T A T E S New York Madrid
Philadelphia PORTUGAL
Kansas City Cincinnati Baltimore SPAIN
San Francisco Lisbon
Washington Tunis
O F A M E R I C A Algiers
Los Angeles Rabat
Atlanta TUNISIA
San Diego Phoenix Casablanca O
CC Tripoli
New Orleans O

R
30°

O
Houston

M
ALGERIA
Miami
Monterey WESTERN
SAHARA
MEXICO
CUBA DOMINICAN
Mexico City
HAITI REPUBLIC MAURITANIA
Puebla MALI NIGER
BELIZE JAMAICA
15° GUAT. HONDURAS SENEGAL
Guatemala Dakar
EL SALVADOR NIC. THE GAMBIA BURKINA
Managua GUINEA-BISSAU FASO
San José Caracas GUINEA

BENIN
GHANA
COSTA RICA GUYANA Conakry NIGERIA
PANAMA VENEZUELA SIERRA-LEONE CÔTE
SURINAM D’IVOIRE Lagos
LIBERIA
FRENCH Abidjan Accra
Bogatá
GUIANA TOGO CAMEROON
COLOMBIA
EQU.
GUINEA
0° Quito
EQUADOR Belém GABON
REP. CONGO

Recife
B R A Z IL Luanda
PERU
Lima
Salvador
15° Brasilia
La Paz
BOLIVIA NAMIBIA
Belo Horizonte
PA R

AG Rio de Janeiro
Säo Paulo
UA
Y

30°
C H I L E

Santiago
URUGUAY
Buenos Aires
Montevideo
ARGENTINA

World Terrorism 2003

Countries where terrorists or
45° terrorist groups operate

Attack by suicide bomber

Countries with Islam majority

75° 60° Punta Arenas

120° 105° 90° 45° 30° 15° 0° 30
15°

186
 WORLD TERRORISM 2003

Novaya
Zemlya
FI

SWEDEN
NLA

RU S S IA N FE DE R AT IO N
ND

Helsinki
St-Petersburg
Stockholm EST.
Nizhniy Perm
LAT. Novgorod Yekaterinburg
LITH. Moscow Chelyabinsk Omsk Novosibirsk
Minsk
POLAND BELORUSSIA Samara
Warsaw Sakhalin
Kiev
. UKRAINE Kharkov
SLOVAKIA Volgograd
MOLDOVA Rostov K A Z A K H S TA N
HUN. MONGOLIA
. C. ROM. Harbin
Belgrade
B.H.
YUG. UZBE
BULG. KI Shenyang
Hokkaido
ALB. M. Istanbul
GEORGIA S KYRGYZ.
Beijing
TA

Ankara ARMENIA AZER.

TURKME N. KOREA
N

GREECE N TAJIK. Tianjin J A PA N

TURKEY Seoul
Athens Honshu
.

S. KOREA Tokyo
SYRIA Tehran Kabul C H I N A Pusan
AFGHAN. Yokohama
LEB. Baghdad Lahore
ISRAEL IRAN
AN

Alexandria
IRAQ Chengdu Shanghai
JORDAN
ST

Cairo Wuhan
NE
KUWAIT KI Delhi PA BHUTAN
L I B YA PA L
EGYPT SAUDI
QATAR
Riyadh Karachi Ahmadabad Dhaka Guangzhou
U.A.E Taiwan
Calcutta
N

ARABIA I N D IA BURMA Hong Kong

LA
A

BANGLA-
M Bombay DESH
Hainan
O
V
OS
IE

Hyderabad Rangoon Luzón

CHAD Khartoum ERITREA EN THAI.
TNA M

YEM Manila
S U DA N Bangkok
Bangalore Madras CAMB.
Addis DJIBOUTI
Ababa PHILIPPINES
Ho Chi
Minh
IA

CENTRAL SRI Mindanao

AFRICAN ETHIOPIA LANKA
AL

REPUBLIC BRUNEI
M M A L AY S I A
UGANDA SO
KENYA
Nairobi Borneo
N CONGO Sumatra Sulawesi
RWANDA
Kinshasa I N
BURUNDI
D O PA PUA
Jakarta N E S I A NEW GU I N E A
Dar es Salaam Java
TANZANIA
EAST TIMOR
MALAWI
ANGOLA
IA

UE

B
R

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SCA

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GA
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ZIMBABWE
DA

A
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MA

SW
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T AU S T R A L IA
BO Maputo
Johannesburg Brisbane
SWAZILAND

SOUTH Durban
LESOTHO Perth
AFRICA
Cape Town Sydney
Adelaide

Melbourne
NEW
ZEALAND

60° 75° 90° 105° 120° 135° 150° 165° 180°

0° 45°

187
HISTORICAL ATLAS OF THE ISLAMIC WORLD
Muslim Cinema
Motion pictures entered Muslim societies soon
after their emergence in the West and were ini-
tially introduced to select audiences. Within a
few months of debuting in Europe in 1896, the
films of the Lumière brothers were screened in
the Arab world to a predominantly elite audi-
ence. In Egypt, for example, screenings were
held at the Tousson stock exchange in Alexan-
dria, and in Morocco at the Royal Palace in Fez.
In Turkey, private showings were held at the sul-
tan’s court, the Yildiz Palace in Istanbul. In
1900, the Iranian monarch Muaffar al-Din
Shah traveled to France to see the “cinemato-
graph” and “the magic lantern.” In the same
year Mirza Ibrahim Khan, his photographer,
filmed The Flower Ceremony in Belgium and
produced the first Iranian film.
The local film industry in these states
emerged from the efforts of foreigners or minor-
ity individuals. For example, it was a Romanian
citizen of Polish origin, Sigmund Weinberg, who
188
began public screenings of films at a beer hall in
Galatasaray Square in Istanbul. In Iran, Ovenes
Oganians, an Armenian-Iranian, began the
building of public cinemas in 1905, establishing
the first film school in 1929 and producing the
first Iranian feature film in 1930.
Most parts of Africa and Asia were exposed to
film as part of the colonial experience. Thus, the
Arab world provided largely an exotic backdrop
for Western films. As such, French audiences were
enamored with North Africa, Palestine attracted
great interest as the Holy Land, and Egypt was
intriguing for its ancient history. While the colo-
nial industry produced 200 films in North Africa,
only perhaps six starred Arab actors.
The introduction of sound in vernacular
languages boosted local film production, with
Egyptian cinema, for example, attracting both
local investors and audiences by including pop-
ular Egyptian musicians and singers such as
Umm Kulthum. Egyptian cinema not only
became a leading force in other Arab countries
but also influenced cinema further afield, such
as the film farsi genre of pre-Revolutionary
Iran. In most other Arab countries, however, a
native film industry failed to develop because of
financial constraints and colonial pressures.
Most of these countries entered the film indus-
try after their independence (Lebanon and
Syria in the 1940s, North Africa in the 1950s
and early 1960s).
During the colonial period, films imported
to the Arab countries were often used instru-
mentally to promote colonial interests. Even the
Japanese, during their occupation of Indonesia
(1942–45), used the burgeoning Indonesian film
industry to bolster their war efforts. At the same
time film assisted in the standardization of
Indonesian as a national language. In the Arab
world film production took on an increasingly

nationalist and socialist bent after independ-
ence, with states such as Syria, Algeria, and
Tunisia using the film industry to promote their
national identity on screen. In Iran, Daryush
Mehrjui’s prize winning film The Cow and
Massoud Kimiai’s Qeysar, both produced in
1969, mark the beginnings of the New Wave,
Iranian art cinema, after which Iranian films
gained increasing international acclaim.
Around the same time, in 1970, Yilmaz Guney’s
Umut (Hope), also a prize-winning film,
became a turning point in Turkish cinema and
marked the New Wave period of Turkish films.
In Iran, filmmakers faced an uncertain future
between 1978 and 1982 as a result of, among
other things, financial instability and govern-
ment’s lack of interest in cinema during the
transitional period. With a few exceptions, no
films of any quality were produced during this
time. Prior to the revolution, most of the ulama
either rejected cinema or ignored it. However,
after the revolution, the Islamists came to recog-
nize its power and decided to bring it under
their control. For Khomeini the adoption of
cinema became an ideological weapon with
which to combat the pro-Western and imperial-
ist culture of the Pahlavi regime. By 1989 (the
year of his death), films like Bayzai’s Bashu, The
Little Stranger, gained Iranian cinema interna-
tional acclaim once more. By providing the
space for an ongoing discourse within society,
Iranian cinema has become an important medi-
um in the discourse of change.
During the 1980s, the Arab states started to
withdraw from cinema production. The Alger-
ian film industry went bankrupt while the
Egyptian one faced a major economic crisis.
Television and mass video production com-
pounded this decline in filmmaking across the
regions. Films in North Africa, Syria, and espe-
cially Lebanon were coproduced with the West.
In 1980 the number of films produced in
MUSLIM CINEMA
Turkey suddenly dropped, though it rose again
toward the end of the 1980s.
Most of the states in the region maintain a
firm control on the film industry, recognizing its
importance as an agency for change and vehicle
for protest. In Turkey, for example, this strict
censorship operates at two levels: that of the
screenplay and of the finished film. A similar
process occurs in Indonesia, where censorship is
applied both before shooting and during editing.
Far left: Iranian director Samira
In Iranian cinema, screening of all final products Makhmalbaf poses for
requires state approval. With few exceptions, this photographers after being
approval is also required at the postscript stage. awarded the Jury prize for the
In most Arab countries, film projects must first film Panj E Asr (Five in the
obtain a shooting license before obtaining other Afternoon), during the closing
licenses from the Ministry of Information or ceremony of the 56th Cannes
other such censorship authority in order to film festival in May 2003. The
ensure their commercial viability. daughter of acclaimed director
Mention should be made of Bollywood, the Mohsen Makhmalbaf made her
first film, The Apple (1998),
Indian cinema industry based in Mumbhai, not
when she was only 18. The
only because it was heavily imitated in many
Blackboard (2000), a film about
Muslim countries, especially during the initial
Kurdish refugees on the Iran-Iraq
decades, but also because of the significant
border, also won a Jury prize at
presence of Muslims as scriptwriters, produc- Cannes.
ers, musicians, and actors. There is also a genre
known as the Shahenshah (king of kings),
which goes back to Pukar (1939), a film about
the Mughal emperor Jehangir. It is regarded as
the first notable “Muslim social film.” While
the latter continued to surface in other films
such as Mughal-e-Azam, in later productions
the Muslim social presence took on a less regal
character, dealing mainly with the North Indi-
an Muslim middle class. This genre gradually
declined after the 1970s. Finally, after a notable
absence, with less than forty full-length films
and shorts, Afghanistan rejoined the world cin-
ema stage with Osama (2003), a co-production
of Afghanistan, Japan, and Ireland. The first
feature from post-Taliban Afghanistan, it was
screened at various international film festivals
including Cannes and London.
189
HISTORICAL ATLAS OF THE ISLAMIC WORLD

Internet Use
Before the digital age Islamic questions were ings by living marjas (sources of imitation/
often addressed locally with the ulama, the emulation) such as Grand Ayatullah Sistani,
acknowledged interpreters of the tradition, the leading marja in Iraq. Web pages on this
acting as the primary agents of religious site cover contemporary concerns such as
authority. In the Sunni world the spread of credit cards, insurance, copyright, autop-
literacy and secondary education was erod- sies, and organ donation, as well as advice
ing this primacy even before the appearance about religious duties. Some Sufi orders
of the World Wide Web. The Internet is maintain websites detailing the spiritual lin-
accelerating this process by facilitating the eages of their shaikhs and transcripts of spe-
individual exercise of ijtihad (independent cial prayer and dhikr (rituals of remem-
judgment based on the primary sources of brance) practices. However, since many Sufi
Koran and hadith). Once the exclusive
GERM.
preserve of qualified scholars, this devel- B.
LUX. CZECH.
Paris
opment is eroding traditional hierarchies
FRANCE AUS.
HUN.
of learning. SWITZ.
Beograd
Muslim websurfers do not have to con- B.H.
YUG.
IT
A
sult Koranic concordances or weighty Roma
ALB.

LY
PORT. Madrid
books of fiqh (jurisprudence) to arrive at S PA I N
Lisbon
judgments but can simply access the Tunis
Algiers
sources online by scanning the Koran or Rabat
Casablanca
collections of hadith (reports of the C
CO
Tripoli
O

R
Prophet Muhammad’s sayings or actions)
O
M ALGERIA

using keywords. Alternatively they can e- L I B YA

mail their questions to the hundreds of WESTERN

SAHARA
websites offering social, moral, religious,
and in some cases, political guidance. MAURITANIA
With many of the best funded websites MALI NIGER
CHAD
based in Saudi Arabia or the Gulf, the SENEGAL
Dakar
answers often have a conservative charac- BURKINA
GUINEA
ter and may not always be sensitive to the Conakry
GHANA
IVORY NIGERIA
questioner’s social or economic circum- COAST Lagos CENTRAL
AFRICAN
ON

LIBERIA
stances. For example, the answers to ques- Accra REPUBLIC
RO

Abidjan
ME
TOGO CA
tions from young women living in North
O
NG

BENIN
CO

America about how to deal with abusive

REP.

GABON

parents may stress the importance of filial

ATLANTIC OCEAN
duty over their rights as citizens. Kinshasa

For Shiites in the Twelver or Ithnashari Luanda

tradition, for whom clerics rather than
ANGOLA
texts are the primary dispensers of
authority, the Web provides access to rul-

190
 INTERNET USE

practices are closed to outsiders, only the net spreading rapidly throughout the Mus-
more orthodox orders maintain sites. Politi- lim world, the long-term effects are ambigu-
cal Islam is widely represented, with most ous. On the one hand a “universal” Islamic
political parties, including Islamist ones, discourse is emerging that transcends the
accessible through their websites. Opposi- local traditions, including even the main-
tion forces are also represented, although in stream traditions represented by institutions
some cases access to banned groups is such as Cairo’s al-Azhar. On the other hand,
restricted by governmental controls. Islamic the emerging discourse cannot avoid accom-
women’s groups are active in cyberspace modating diversity and dissent, as minori-
countering patriarchal practices such as ties and splinter-groups are able to challenge
those promulgated by the former Taliban mainstream opinion in cultures where reli-
regime in Afghanistan in the name of “true” gious and political pluralism have often been
Islamic teachings. With access to the Inter- repressed.

UKRAINE Kharkov
Volgograd
MOLD. K A Z A K H S TA N
ROM. MONGOLIA
Harbin

UZBEK
BULG. IST
GEORG. A Shenyang
KYRGYZ.
N

Istanbul Beijing
Ankara AZA. ARM.
TURKMENIS Tianjin N. KOREA
TA TAJIK.
TURKEY
Seoul
N

Athens
S. KOREA
GREECE
SYRIA Tehran Kabul C H I N A Pusan
LEB. Baghdad AFGHANISTAN Lahore
IRAN
Alexandria ISRAEL IRAQ Chengdu Shanghai
N

JORDAN
TA

Cairo Chongqing Wuhan

Al Kuwayt
IS

K Delhi NE
PA PA
L BH.
EGYPT SAUDI

Riyadh Karachi
A.E. Ahmadabad Dhaka Guangzhou Taiwan
ARABIA Calcutta
Hong Kong
IN D IA BURMA
N

BANGLA-
A

DESH L PACIFIC
M

Bombay Hainan
A

O OCEAN
OS

Hyderabad Rangoon Luzón

IE

Khartoum N THAILAND
TNA M

Y EME Manila
S U DA N Bangkok
Bangalore Madras CAMB.
Addis Ho Chi PH ILIP P I N ES
Ababa Telephone Lines Minh
SRI
ETHIOPIA per 100 people 2001 Mindanao
IA

LANKA
AL

70 or more
M
SO M A L A Y S I A
UGANDA 50 – 69
KENYA
30 – 49 Sumatra Borneo Sulawesi
Nairobi
CONGO
10 – 29
INDIAN OCEAN
TANZANIA Jakarta I N D
Dar es Salaam 1–9 O N E S I A
Java
Under 1 Timor

No data
IA
B
ZAM

191
HISTORICAL ATLAS OF THE ISLAMIC WORLD
Democracy, Censorship, Human Rights, and Civil Society
Western scholars define democracy as a
method for protecting the civil and political
rights of the individual, providing for freedom
of speech, the press, faith, opinion, ownership,
and assembly, as well as the right to vote, nom-
inate and seek public office. Muslim traditions
of democracy exist in the Arabian concept of
shura (counsel based on participatory discus-
sion), harking back to the Bedouin system
where the shaikh was primus inter pares.
When the Ottoman Empire was divided into
separate nation-states after the First World
War, several attempts were made to introduce
systems of democratic rule. Most of them were
unsuccessful, discredited by rigged elections or
manipulation by powerful interest groups.
Multiparty systems were replaced by single
party systems, by military governments, or by a
combination of both. However, the revolution-
ary models borrowed from Eastern Europe
proved no less susceptible to manipulation by
vested interests or groups whose asabiyya (col-
lective solidarity) was rooted in combinations
of kinship and sectarian allegiance. In the Mus-
lim world lying beyond the former Ottoman
domains, the position is not greatly different.
Of the fifty-odd Muslim-majority states
belonging to the Organization of the Islamic
Conference only Turkey can be described as an
established democracy—although it has a his-
tory of political manipulation by the military
who regard themselves as guardians of the sec-
ular tradition bequeathed by the founder of
modern Turkey, Kemal Atatürk. Other coun-
tries, including Malaysia, Indonesia, and Jor-
dan, have been described as transitional or
uncertain democracies, and Pakistan has
enjoyed periods of democratic rule in between
bouts of military government.
In the context of human rights generally the
192
situation is broadly similar, given that two of
the fundamental human rights embedded in
such documents as the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights and the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights—the rights of
peaceful assembly and freedom or expression—
are prerequisites for all forms of democratic
government.
For example, in the Index of Human Rights
compiled by Charles Humana in 1991, Muslim
majority countries consistently scored below
the world average of 62 percent, with Iraq at 17
percent at the bottom of the world league table
(a distinction it shared with Myanmar) and
Sudan with 18 percent, a close second. At 65
percent Jordan alone remains above the world
average, though Tunisia (with 60 percent) and
Malaysia (61 percent) are close to it. Critics of
Humana’s system object that his methodology
is culturally loaded with Western liberal values,
that women in Islamic countries, for example,
do not require the same protection as women in
Western countries and that female inheritance
and property rights were instituted by the
Sharia more than a millennium before they
were introduced in the West. Such cultural rela-
tivism, however, is often opposed by women’s
organizations inside Muslim countries, which
campaign to eliminate discriminatory provi-
sions in personal status codes with respect to
legal status, marriage, divorce, child custody,
and inheritance. Women’s organizations have
also campaigned against the reduced sentences
passed by courts in cases of “honor killings”
where victims are held to have “provoked”
attacks by male relatives by transgressing tradi-
tional codes of sexual conduct, and against
laws that prevent them from passing on their
nationalities to their children.
Freedom of speech as exemplified by a free
 DEMOCRACY, CENSORSHIP, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND CIVIL SOCIETY

press is also conspicuously absent in most Mus- as Saudi Arabia, Iran, and Sudan, and the
lim countries, though restrictions vary from Islamists who sometimes oppose them, argue
one state to another. Opposition forces, includ- that safeguards enshrined in the Koran are just
ing Islamists, protest against measures which as valid as those protected by Western law.
muzzle them politically. Islamists themselves, They hold that the public and private spheres
however, have demonstrated their opposition to are both subject to the law and that secularism
unrestricted freedom of speech by attacks on is alien to their history. The proponents of
writers they regard as critical of Islam, includ- democracy, however, who include some leading
ing Farag Foda (assassinated in 1992), the Islamist thinkers as well as the advocates of sec-
Nobel laureate Neguib Mahfouz, Egypt’s fore- ular liberalism, believe that such arguments are
most novelist, physically attacked and injured simply being used as strategies for retaining
by the same assassin, and Nasr Abu Zaid, an power. In the aftermath of “9/11” and the wars
Egyptian scholar who was forced into exile for in Afghanistan and Iraq, avenues for peaceful
applying historical-critical methods in inter- political change have been closed off, leaving
preting the Koran. people to choose between tolerating the status
Islamic version of democracy
The “war on terrorism” launched by the US quo, exile (for those who can manage it), or dates back to the concept of the
administration in the wake of the September violence. Critics of the West point out that it shura (participatory discussion).
11 attacks on New York and Washington, has tacitly accepted this pattern of repression However, the Western ideal of
which overthrew the governments in Afghan- for reasons of expediency, and in the case of the the popular vote by the adult
istan and Iraq, led to a curtailment of civil oil-bearing regions of western Asia, to protect population is not available in
liberties in the United States. There the US its energy supplies. many Muslim majority states.
Patriot Act permitted the indefinite detention
of terrorist suspects and the administrative
detention of jihadis (some of them barely older
than children) accused of fighting for the Tal-
iban regime in Afghanistan. At the same time
the neoconservatives running the administra-
tion stated that their aim was to bring to coun-
tries such as Iraq and Afghanistan Western
standards of democracy, good governance, the
rule of law, human rights, and women’s rights.
Many people in the Muslim world, however,
doubted whether such standards could be insti-
tuted as a result of military action. Both in the
Arab and the wider Islamic world the incum-
bent regimes and their Islamist opponents
would argue that the indigenous tradition of
shura, combined with that of baya (obedience
to an established ruler) provided a better
model for stability, whereas Western-style plu-
ralism was a recipe for fitna (strife).
Both the ruling authorities in countries such

193
HISTORICAL ATLAS OF THE ISLAMIC WORLD
Modern Islamic Movements
Far right: In this computer
graphic illustration, Mamoun
Sakkal has produced an image
which reflects, through its lively
composition, the great variety of
Islamic religious ideas. In the 3-
dimensional Kufic script the
Islamic shahada (creed) reads,
“There is no god but God and
Muhammad is the messenger of
God.”
194
The terms “Islamism” and “Islamist” have
come to be used for political movements and
their supporters, which aim for the establish-
ment or restoration of Islamic states based on
the rule of the Islamic Sharia law. The term
“Islamists” is an English translation to the Ara-
bic word islamiyyun—a term the movement’s
advocates use to distinguish themselves from
muslimun—ordinary Muslim believers. All
Islamists believe that Islam is the solution to
contemporary problems of Muslim states.
Although the numerous Islamist groups that
mushroomed and spread throughout the Mus-
lim world during the last three decades of the
twentieth century differ among themselves on
the details of how Islamic states should be run,
nearly all are agreed that the return to God
includes the rejection of the cultures of Western
materialism and hedonism (exemplified by sex-
ual permissiveness) and the duty to support fel-
low Muslims in conflict with non-Muslims in
places such as Palestine or Kashmir, though not
all Islamists support terrorist actions.
The ground for the Islamist movements was
prepared by the reformist and salafiyya move-
ments in the eighteenth and nineteenth cen-
turies, which had sought to purge Islamic belief
and ritual from the accretions and innovations
acquired over the centuries, particularly the
cults surrounding the Sufi walis (saints), living
and dead. An Islam pruned of its medieval
accretions was better able to confront the chal-
lenge of foreign power than a local cult bound-
ed by the intercessionary power of a particular
saint or family of saints. The modern Islamist
movement, however, is usually traced back to
the Muslim Brotherhood, founded in 1928 by
Hasan al-Banna, an Egyptian schoolteacher.
The Brotherhood’s original aims were moral as
much as political: it sought to reform society by
encouraging Islamic observance and opposing
Western cultural influences, rather than by
attempting to capture the state by direct politi-
cal action. However, during the mounting cri-
sis over Palestine during and after the Second
World War, the Brotherhood became increas-
ingly radicalized. It played a leading part in the
disturbances that led to the overthrow of the
monarchy in 1952 but after the revolution it
came into increasing conflict with the national-
ist government of Jamal Abd al-Nasser. In
1954, after an attempt on Nasser’s life, the
Brotherhood was suppressed, its members
imprisoned, exiled, or driven underground.
(Banna himself had been murdered in 1949 by
the intelligence services of the old regime.)
After its suppression, the Brotherhood became
internationalized, with affiliated movements
springing up in Jordan, Syria, Sudan, Pakistan,
Indonesia, and Malaysia. The Brotherhood
found refuge in Saudi Arabia under the Amir
(later King) Faisal ibn Abd al-Aziz, as well as
political and financial support, with funds for
the Egyptian underground and salaried posts
for exiled intellectuals.
A radical member of the Brotherhood,
Sayyid Qutb, executed in 1966 for an alleged
plot to overthrow the Egyptian government,
proved to be the movement’s most influential
theorist, although some of his ideas were
influenced by the Indian scholar and journal-
ist Abu al-Ala al-Maududi (1906–79). One of
Maududi’s doctrines, in particular, would
have a major impact on Islamic political move-
ment. He believed that the struggle for Islam
was not for the restoration of an ideal past,
but for a principle vital to the here and now:
the vice-regency of man under God’s sover-
eignty. The jihad was not just a defensive war
for the protection of the Islamic territory. It
 MODERN ISLAMIC MOVEMENTS

might be waged against governments which jihad against the Soviet occupation in
prevented the preaching of true (i.e., the Afghanistan (1979–89) when thousands of vol-
Islamist version of) Islam. Taking his cue from unteers received training in methods of irregu-
Maududi, Qutb likened contemporary Islamic lar warfare. Fired by what they see as their
society to the jahiliyya, the “state of igno- divinely supported victory in Afghanistan, the
rance” prevailing in Arabia against which the militants aim to “liberate” all lands that were
Prophet himself inveighed and fought. once Islamic (including Spain) from rule by
In most Sunni countries the Brotherhood non-Muslims or by unjust “infidel” govern-
and its offshoots can be divided into a main- ments (by which they mean most existing
stream tendency that will work within the
frame of existing governmental systems,
where permitted, and is also engaged in social
welfare work, and a radical or extremists ten-
dency that seeks to achieve its aims by vio-
lence. However the lines dividing the extrem-
ists from the mainstream are not always clear.
Violence is interactive and in many cases, such
as the atrocities perpetrated by Islamist terror-
ists in India, Israel-Palestine, and Egypt, it
may be seen as a response to that inflicted on
the Islamists by governments which themselves
use violence, including torture and “targeted
killings,” to repress or destroy opposition.
Where opportunities for political participa-
tion have been available, as in Jordan, Yemen,
Kuwait, and Malaysia, the level of violence
has been notably less than, for example, in
Israel-Palestine or Algeria. In Egypt violence
by extremist factions of the Islamic Associa-
tions, including attacks on tourists, seriously
alienated the mass of public opinion, not least
because millions of Egyptians are dependent
on tourism for their livelihoods.
There remains, however, a hard core of
Islamist militants who are committed to the
“liberation” of Muslim lands from “infidel”
rule, regardless of circumstances. This arm of
the movement, inspired by the writings of Muslim states). Since they see Western finan-
Sayyid Qutb and the fiery rhetoric of Abdul- cial and military support as a primary factor
lah Azam—one time mentor of the Saudi dis- in the survival of “non-Islamic” regimes, they
sident Osama bin Laden—gained momentum have not hesitated to take their jihad into the
during the American- and Pakistani-backed heart of Western power.

195
HISTORICAL ATLAS OF THE ISLAMIC WORLD

Chronology
c. 570–622 Muhammad in Mecca. (present-day Tunisia).
622–632 Muhammad in Medina. 922 Execution of al-Hallaj for heresy, a martyr for later Sufis.
632–634 Caliphate of Abu Bakr. Muslims triumph in wars of 929–961 Umayyad ruler Abd al-Rahman III establishes
apostasy. Arabia unified. Umayyad caliphate at Cordoba (Spain).
634–644 Caliphate of Umar. Most of Fertile Crescent, Egypt, and 940 Beginning of the Greater ghayba (absence or
much of Iran conquered. Expansion into North Africa. occultation) when Twelvers lose contact with their
644–656 Caliphate of Uthman. Conquests continue Imam.
northward, eastward, and westward 945 Shii Buyids take Baghdad, making caliph a virtual
Text of the Koran collected and standardized. prisoner.
656–661 First fitna or civil war during caliphate of Ali. 969–1171 Fatimid (Ismaili) caliphate in Egypt.
660, 668, 712 Arabs fail to capture Constantinople. 998–1030 Mahmud of Ghazna (present-day Afghanistan)
661 Murder of Ali. Establishment of Umayyad caliphate invades northern India.
by Muawiya in Damascus. 1037–1220 Saljuq Turks, starting in central Iran and moving
680 Second fitna. Muawiya’s succession by his son Yazid westward, restore Sunni orthodoxy to the heartlands.
provokes rebellion by Hussein b. Ali. “Martyrdom” 1056–1167 Almoravid dynasty, originating in Subsaharan Africa,
of Hussein and followers at Karbala. halts Christian advance in Spain.
685–705 Reign of Abd al-Malik, builder of the Dome of the 1071 Saljuqs defeat Byzantines at Battle of Manzikert,
Rock in Jerusalem. opening Anatolia to Turkish settlement.
687–691 Kharijis prevail in much of Arabia. 1090–1118 Nizari Ismaili uprisings against Sunni caliphs.
711 Arabs advance into Spain. 1091 Saljuqs make Baghdad their capital.
712–713 Arabs conquer Transoxiana (Bukhara and 1096–1291 Crusaders hold parts of Syria and Palestine.
Samarkand). 1099 Crusaders take Jerusalem.
728 Death of Hasan al-Basri, early Sufi master. 1111 Death of al-Ghazali (b. 1058), Sunni mystic and
732 Battle of Poitiers: Charles Martel checks Arab theologian.
advance into France. 1130 Death of Ibn Tumart, founder of Almohad dynasty
744–750 Third fitna. Weakened by internal dissent, Umayyad in Spain.
dynasty overthrown by Abbasids (749). 1187 Saladin (Salah al-Din al-Ayyubi) expels Crusaders
756 Umayyad rule established in Spain. from Jerusalem.
765 Death of Jafar al-Sadiq, sixth Iman of the Shiite. 1198 Death of Ibn Rushd (Averroes) (b. 1126), philosopher.
Movement divided between Ismailis, Ithnaasharis 1205–87 Rise of Delhi Sultanate in India.
(“Twelvers”) and Zaidis. 1220–31 Mongol raids in Transoxiana and eastern Iran cause
767 Death of Abu Hanifa (b. 699), founder of the Hanafi massive destruction of cities
legal school. 1225 Almohads abandon Spain. Muslim presence reduced
786–809 Reign of Harun al-Rashid, model caliph of Islam’s to small kingdom of Granada (1232–1592).
“golden age.” 1227 Death of Chingiz Khan.
795 Death of Malik b. Anas (b. 713), founder of the 1240 Death of Ibn Arabi (b. 1165), Sufi theosophist.
Maliki school. 1256 Fall of Alamut, last Ismaili stronghold south of the
801 Death of Rabia of Basra, mystic and poet. Caspian Sea.
813–833 Caliphate of al-Mamun. Ascendancy of Mutazili 1258 Destruction of Baghdad by Mongols.
(“rationalist”) school of theologians. 1260 Mamluks (military slaves) who succeed the Ayyubids
820 Death of al-Shafi (b. 767), founder of the Shafi in Egypt, defeat the hitherto invincible Mongols at
school of law. the Battle of Ain Jalut in Syria.
847–861 Caliphate of al-Mutawakkil, who reverses pro- c. 1300 Emergence of Ottoman (Osmanli) dynasty in Bithynia
Mutazili policy. on the Byzantine frontier in western Anatolia.
861–945 Breakup of Abbasid Empire as provinces become 1326 Ottomans capture Bursa, their first real capital.
independent until caliphate government loses 1362 Ottomans capture Adrianople (Edirne) in Balkans.
territorial power completely. c. 1378 Emergence of Timur Lenk (Tamerlane) a Turk who
855 Death of Ahmad Ibn Hanbal (b. 780), founder of rose in the Mongol service in Transoxiana to conquer
Hanbali school. much of central and western Asia.
870 Death of al-Bukhari (b. 810), hadith collector. 1389 Ottomans defeat Serbs, assisted by Albanians,
873 Death of Muslim (hadith collector). Bulgarians, Bosnians, and Hungarians, at Kosovo in
“Disappearance” of 12th Imam of the Shiite, central Serbia.
Muhammad al-Muntazar (the “Awaited One”). 1405 Death of Timur.
873–940 Lesser ghaiba or Absence during which Imam of 1453 Mehmed “The Conqueror” (1451–81) captures
Twelver Shiite is represented by Four wakils Constantinople and subdues Byzantine Empire.
(deputies). 1498 Vasco da Gama rounds the Cape of Good Hope,
874 Death of Abu Yazid al-Bistami, first of the ending Muslim monopoly of Indian Ocean trade.
“drunken” Sufis. 1501 Rise of Safavid power in Iran. Twelver Shiism
909 Creation of first Ismaili Fatimid state in Ifriqiya becomes the state religion.

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1517 Ottomans conquer Egypt and Syria.
1526 Battle of Paniput (India) enables Babur, a Timurid
prince, to become founder of the Mughal Empire;
Battle of Mohacs makes Catholic Hungarians
tributaries of Ottomans.
1529 Ottomans besiege Vienna.
1552 Kazan Khanate annexed by Moscow.
1556–1605 Reign of Akbar, third Mughal emperor, who fosters
Hindu-Muslim cultural and religious rapprochement.
1682–99 Ottomans lose Hungary and Belgrade in war with
Austria and Poland.
1718 Peace of Passarowitz consolidates Ottoman losses to
Habsburgs.
1739 Delhi sacked by Iranian monarch Nadir Shah, ending
effective Mughal power.
1757 Wahhabis take al-Hasa in eastern Arabia. British
victory at Plassey opens India to British expansion.
1762 Death of Shah Wali Allah, Indian Sufi reformer in
Sirhindi tradition.
1774 Treaty of Kuchuk Kaynarji. Following defeat by
Russia, Ottomans lose Crimea. Tsar recognized as
protector of Orthodox Christians in Ottoman lands.
1779 Qajar dynasty established in Iran.
1789–1807 First Westernizing Ottoman reforms under Selim III.
1798 Napoleon Bonaparte lands in Egypt, defeats the
Mamluks at the Battle of the Pyramids, generates
interest in European culture.
1805–48 Muhammad (Mehmed) Ali begins modernizing
process in Egypt.
1806 Wahhabis sack Shiite shrines of Najaf and Karbala.
1815–17 Serbian revolt against Ottomans.
1818 Britain becomes paramount power in India.
1820 Muhammad Ali begins conquest of Sudan.
1821–30 Greek War of Independence.
1830 French occupation of Algeria begins. Khartoum
founded as British-Egyptian outpost on the Upper Nile.
1832–48 European powers save Ottoman Empire from
invasion by Egyptian Viceroy, Muhammad Ali.
c. 1839–61 Failure of Indian “Mutiny” leads to abolition of the
East India Company, opening the way for
incorporation of India into British Empire.
1859 Defeat of Imam Shamil in Caucasus followed by
Russian annexation of Chechnya and Daghestan.
1867 Foundation of the academy of Deoband in northern
India by a group of the reformers who eschew
contact with the British.
1868 Russian annexation of Kazakhstan completed.
Amirate of Bukhara becomes Russian protectorate.
1869 Opening of the Suez Canal.
1875 Collapse of Egyptian finances. Suez Canal sold to
British.
1876 First Ottoman constitution promulgated after palace
revolution.
1876–1909 Sultan Abd al-Hamid suspends constitution, enacting
major reforms in education, transportation, and
communications through dictatorial rule.
1881 French protectorate in Tunisia.
1882 British occupation of Egypt.
1885 General “Chinese” Gordon killed in Khartoum during
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Mahdist revolt against British-backed Egyptian rule.
1889 Return of Muhammad Abduh, al-Afghani’s disciple
to Egypt, who decides to collaborate with the British.
Military students in Istanbul found first “Young
Turk” revolutionary organization, Society of Union
and Progress.
1897 Death of Sayyid Jamal al-Din al-Afghani (b. 1838),
pan-Islamic reformer and activist.
1898 Defeat of the Mahdist movement by an Anglo-
Egyptian force under General Kitchener at the Battle
of Omdurman.
Death of Sir Sayyid Ahmed Khan (b. 1817), Islamic
modernist reformer and founder of Aligarh College
(1875).
1905 Death of Muhammad Abduh (b. 1849), founder of
the modern salafiyya reform movement.
1906 Muslim League founded in India.
1906–08 Constitutional Revolution in Iran.
1908 Young Turk revolution forces sultan to restore
constitution and reconvene parliament.
1909 Separate Muslim and Hindu provincial electorates in
India.
1911–13 Italy takes Tripoli from Ottomans.
1912 French protectorate in Morocco.
1914–18 Defeat of Ottoman Empire in First World War. Egypt
formally declared British Protectorate.
1916–18 British-backed Arab revolt against Turkish rule under
leadership of Sharif Hussein of Mecca, his son
Faisal, and Colonel T. E. Lawrence.
1917 Balfour Declaration opens the way for increased
European Jewish settlement in Palestine.
1917–20 Russian Revolution and civil war leads to
Soviet–Muslim conflicts in Central Asia. Muslims of
Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, and the Caucasus struggle
for regional independence. Overthrow of Autonomous
Republic of Turkestan by Russian forces (1918)
precipitates Basmachi revolt. Bukhara and Khiva
absorbed into Soviet states. Some leading Muslim
Jadidists (renovators) join the Communist Party.
1919 San Remo Conference. League of Nations Mandates
awarded to Britain in former Ottoman territories of
Palestine, Transjordan, and Iraq, and to France in
Syria and Lebanon.
Faisal b. Hussein expelled by French from Damascus
and established on throne of Iraq. His younger
brother, Abdullah, established on throne of
Transjordan.
Egyptian leader Saad Zaghlul leads wafd (delegation)
demanding independence for Egypt. His deportation
sparks nationalist “revolution.”
Ottoman suzerainty abolished in Egypt. Britain keeps
control of defense, foreign policy, Sudan, and the
Suez Canal.
1919–22 Turkish War of Independence: Mustafa Kemal
(Atatürk) rallies nationalist forces to defeat Greek
invaders and resist European dismemberment of
Anatolia.
1923 Treaty of Lausanne ensures Turkey’s territorial
integrity.
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1924 Soviet Central Asia reorganized under socialist
republics of Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan,
and Kirgizia.
Ottoman Caliphate abolished. Turkish Sharia courts
replaced by civil courts.
Khilafat movement in India blames British for
abolition. Ibn Saud conquers Hejaz, expelling the
Sharif Hussein and establishing neo-Wahhabi
kingdom.
1926 Lebanon enlarged and detached from Syria under
French auspices.
1928 Hasan al-Banna, Egyptian schoolteacher, founds the
Muslim Brotherhood.
1932 Iraq granted independence and admitted to League
of Nations.
1935 Death of Rashid Rida (b. 1865), Islamic reformer and
leader of the salafiyya movement.
1936 Palestinians revolt against British rule in Palestine
and the increase in Jewish immigration caused by
Nazi rule in Germany. Muhammad Ali Jinnah
assumes leadership of Muslim League, ending
Muslim backing for Congress.
New Soviet Constitution organizes Muslim Central
Asia into six Union Soviet Socialist Republics
(Uzbekishan, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan,
Turkmenistan, Tajikistan, and Kirgizia) and eight
Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republics including
Tataristan, Bashkitia, Daghestan, and other
Caucasian units under communist control.
1938 Death of Muhammad Iqbal, poet, philosopher, and
progenitor of Pakistan.
1940–47 Muslim League adopts idea of separate Muslim
states for Indian Muslims.
1941 British suppress pro-Axis revolt by Iraqi army officers.
1942 British force Egyptian King Farouq to replace pro-
Axis prime minister with one more amenable to the
Allied cause.
1943 Beginning of Zionist terror campaign against British
in Palestine
1945 Arab League founded.
1946 Transjordan, Lebanon, and Syria recognized as
independent. Widespread Hindu-Muslim rioting in
India.
1947 Indian independence. Creation of Pakistan out of
Muslim majority areas, excepting Kashmir.
1948 British end mandate in Palestine. Arab armies routed
following proclamation of Israel. Palestinian exodus
creates massive refugee problem. Amir Abdullah of
Transjordan annexes east Jerusalem (including the
Old City and the West Bank). Egyptian prime
minister Muhammad Nuqrashi assassinated.
1949 Hasan al-Banna assassinated by Egyptian security
agents in retaliation for the murder of Nuqrashi.
1952 Egyptian monarchy overthrown by Arab nationalist
army officers led by Gamal Abd al-Nasser with
support from the Muslim Brotherhood.
1956 Nasser nationalizes the Suez Canal, provoking
Anglo–French military intervention in secret
collusion with Israel.
198
1958 Pro-British Iraqi monarchy overthrown in bloody
coup d’état masterminded by General Abd al-Karim
Qasim.
1963 Execution in Egypt of Sayyid Qutb, writer and
Muslim Brotherhood’s most militant ideologist.
Iraq’s President Qasim overthrown in coup by
Baathist military officers under Abd al-Salam Arif.
1965 Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) founded.
1967 (June) The Six Day War leaves the whole of the Sinai
peninsula, the West Bank (including the Old City of
Jerusalem), and the Syrian Golan Heights under
Israeli military control.
Yassir Arafat (Abu Ammar), commander of al-Fatah,
the largest guerrilla organization, becomes leader of
the PLO.
1968 President Abd al-Rahman Arif (brother and
successor of Abd al-Salam) overthrown by General
Ahmad Hassan al-Bakr. Real power held by Saddam
Hussein al-Tikriti.
1969 Pro-British Sanusi monarchy in Libya overthrown in
Nasser-style coup d’état led by 27-year-old Colonel
Muammar al-Qadhafi.
Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC)
established to promote Islamic solidarity and foster
political, economic, social, and cultural cooperation
among Muslim states.
1970 Hafez al-Asad, an air force general from the Alawi
(Nusairi) minority, takes power in Syria at the head
of the Baath Party.
Civil war in Jordan between the army and Palestinian
guerrillas (“Black September”).
Anwar al-Sadat succeeds to the Egyptian presidency
following the death of Abd al-Nasser.
1972 Bangladesh, formerly East Pakistan, wins
independence with Indian army help.
1973 October (Ramadan/Yom Kippur) War. Egypt
establishes a bridgehead on the East Bank of the Suez
Canal—the first major success of Arab arms against
Israel.
Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries
(OPEC) under the leadership of Iran and Saudi
Arabia imposes a four-fold increase in the price of
crude oil, leading to massive “petrodollar” surpluses
for investment in industrialized economies and
support for Islamic movements (as well as worldwide
economic recession).
1975 Lebanese civil war provoked, in part, by presence of
militant Palestinian refugees and Israeli reprisals
against them.
1977 Beginning of negotiations between Egypt and Israel.
Zia ul-Haqq, Pakistani general, assumes presidency
and imposes martial law. Former President Zulfiqar
Ali Bhutto executed. Zia initiates Islamization
program.
Death of Ali Shariati (b. 1933), Islamist philosopher,
in Southampton, Britain.
1978–79 Growing unrest in Iran against dictatorship of Shah
Muhammad Reza Pahlavi.
1979 Ayatollah Khomeini returns from exile in Europe to

establish the Islamic Republic in Iran. Fifty-two US
diplomats taken hostage and held for 444 days.
Camp David peace accords between Egypt and Israel
begin the peace process between Arabs and Israelis.
Death of Abu al Ala al-Mawdudi (b. 1909), Indo-
Pakistani ideologue and founder of the Jamaati-i-Islami.
President Zia al-Haqq introduces Hudood ordinance,
prescribing Koranic penalties for certain categories of
theft, sexual misconduct, and drinking alcohol.
Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in support of ailing
communist regime. Western training and armaments
for the mujahidin (holy warriors) creates a well-
trained cadre of Islamist militants.
1980–88 Iran–Iraq war, provoked by Iraqi attack on Iran,
becomes the longest-lasting international conflict of
the twentieth century, leading to the loss of at least
half a million lives on the Iranian side and massive
economic dislocation.
1981 Assassination of Anwar al-Sadat by Islamic extremists.
1982 Israeli invasion of Lebanon and expulsion of PLO to
Tunisia. Up to 10,000 people killed in government
reprisals after failed Muslim Brotherhood rebellion
in Syrian city of Hama.
1987 Beginning of the intifada—a massive, popular
uprising of Palestinians against Israeli occupation,
spearheaded by stone-throwing children.
1988 Shaikh Ahmad Yasin, head of the Islamic Center in
Gaza and a member of the Muslim Brotherhood,
founds Hamas, the Islamic Resistance Movement.
Ayatollah Khomeini, Iran’s religious leader,
“swallows poison” and accepts a ceasefire with Iraq.
Death of President Zia al-Haqq of Pakistan in
suspicious air crash.
Publication of The Satanic Verses by British Muslim
author Salman Rushdie.
Muhammad Mahmud Taha, leader of the
Republican Brotherhood and a reformer with Sufi
leanings, hanged for “apostasy.”
1989 Fatwa pronounced against Rushdie by Khomeini
prevents detente between Iran and the West, despite
the presence of pragmatists in the government.
June: Khomeini dies and is succeeded as supreme
religious leader by Ali Khamenei.
In Algeria the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) wins 55
percent of the vote in the regional elections.
1990 Invasion of Kuwait by Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein.
1991 Operation Desert Storm, led by the United States
with military support from Britain, France, Italy,
Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Syria, and Pakistan, expels Iraqi
troops from Kuwait. Shiite revolt in Iraqi cities of
Najaf and Karbala brutally suppressed.
Disbanding of Soviet Union after failed anti-
Gorbachev coup leads to independence for the
former Soviet Republics of Central Asia (under the
leadership of ex-members of the Soviet
nomenklatura). In Tajikistan rivalry between the ex-
communist leadership and Islamist opposition leads
to a bitter and costly civil war.
In Algeria the FIS wins 49 percent of the vote in the
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first round of the general elections. The army
intervenes to prevent victory for the FIS in the second
round, provoking an eight-year civil war said to have
cost at least 100,000 lives.
1992 Farag Foda, the prominent Egyptian humanist and
writer, gunned down by Islamists in Cairo.
“No-Fly Zones” established in northern and
southern Iraq to prevent Iraqi attacks on Kurdish and
Shiite populations. UN sanctions imposed on Iraq
lead to significant hardship among vulnerable
groups, especially children.
1994 Cheb Hasni, a popular rai singer, murdered in
France. Tahar Djaout, award-winning novelist and
editor, shot outside his home in Algiers.
1995 More than 7,000 Muslims massacred at Srebrenica in
Bosnia after UN fails to protect enclave from Bosnian
Serb attack.
1996 Taliban movement based on madrasa-educated
students in rural Afghanistan captures Kabul. Its
program of pacification bears harshly on women and
minorities.
1997 More than 60 European tourists massacred near
Luxor by Islamists.
Muhammad Khatami, former minister of culture,
elected President of Iran.
1998 Taliban fighters murder between two and five
thousand members of the Shiite Hazara community
after the capture of Mazar-el-Sharif.
Al-Qaeda attacks the US Embassies in east Africa.
1999 In Algeria Abd al-Aziz Bouteflika, former foreign
minister, elected President on a program of
reconciliation.
Pro-democracy demonstrations in Iran suppressed by
police and street gangs under conservative control.
NATO bombing campaign forces Serbs to relinquish
Kosovo, reversing “ethnic cleansing” of mainly
Muslim Albanians.
Russia bombs Chechnya on pretext of suppressing
“Islamic terrorism.”
2000 (February) Russians occupy Grozni, the capital of
Chechnya.
In Pakistan, General Pervez Musharraf overthrows
democratically elected government of Nawaz Sharif.
2001 (September) Suicide hijackers linked to al-Qaeda attack
the World Trade Center in New York and the Pentagon
in Washington, killing approximately 3,000 people.
US bombs Afghanistan, removing Taliban regime.
2002 (October) Terrorist group linked to al-Qaeda kills
more than 200 people, mostly Australians, in
bombing of nightclub in Bali, Indonesia.
2003 (March) US and UK attack Iraq without UN support,
on pretext that Saddam Hussein is hiding weapons of
mass destruction. No such weapons found.
Islamist terrorists linked to al-Qaeda kill civilians in
Casablanca, Riyadh, Istanbul, and other cities.
(December) Saddam Hussein captured near his home
town of Tikrit.
2004 Reformists defeated in Iranian parliamentary
elections after clergy-dominated guardianship of
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Glossary
Abd “Servant” or “slave”; commonly used as a name rule, later applying to lands where Muslim institutions
when coupled with one of the names of Allah. See were established.
also Ibada. Dawa “Propaganda” or mission.
Adhan Call to prayer performed by muadhin (muezzin). Dervish “Mendicant”; member of a Sufi tariqa.
Ahl al-Bait “People of the household”; specifically used for the Dhikr “Mentioning” or “remembering”; specifically used for
Phrophet’s family. Sufi rituals designed to increase consciousness of God
Ahl al-Kitab “People of the book”; originally referred to Muslims, which include the repetition of his name(s).
Jews, and Christians but came to include Dhimmi Non-Muslim peoples afforded security of life and
Zoroastrians and other groups prossessing sacred property under the Sharia on payment of a jizya (poll
texts. tax).
Ahl al-Sunna “People of the Sunna” (Sunnis); those who uphold Din “Religion” or “belief” as opposed to dunya (worldly
customs based on the practice and authority of the existence).
Prophet and his Companions, as distinct from the Dua Prayer (additional to salat).
Shiites and Kharijis. See also Sunna. Fana The extinction of individual consciousness, and thus
Al “Clan” or “House”; as in Al Imran (3rd Sura of union with God, in Sufism.
Koran), Al Saud, etc. Not to be confused with al-, Faqih Exponent of fiqh.
the definite article. Faqir “Pauper”; term applied to ordinary member of Sufi
Alawi Member of ghulu (extremist) Nusairi sect in tariqa.
northeastern Syria which venerates Ali. Fatwa Legal decision of a mufti.
Alid Descendant of Ali, cousin and son-in-law of the Fidaiyyia Soldiers prepared to sacrifice their lives in the cause of
Prophet. Islam. Now used for guerrilla fighters. (Singular: fidai.)
Alim See Ulama. Fiqh “Understanding” of Sharia, the system of jurisprudence
Amir “Commander”; originally military commander but based on the usul al-fiqh.
subsequently applied to rulers and members of their Fitna “Temptation” or “trial”; the name given to the civil
families. Amir al-Muminin (“Commander of the wars which broke out within the expanding Muslim
Faithful”), a title held by caliphs and some sultans. empire during the first 200 years after Muhammad’s
Ansar “Helpers” of Muhammad native to Medina, as distinct death.
from the Muhajirun who accompanied him from Ghaib “Unseen” and “transcendent”; hence al-ghaiba, the
Mecca. “occultation” of the Hidden Imans in Shiite doctrine.
Asabiyya Tribal or group solidarity; a term used by philosopher Hadith “Tradition” or report of a saying or action of the
Ibn Khaldun in his theory on state formation in North Prophet. One of four roots of Islamic law. See also
Africa. Sharia, Usul al-fiqh.
Ashura The tenth of the month Muharram, when Shiite rituals Hajj The annual pilgrimage to Mecca. One of the five rukns
are held commemorating the death of the Prophet’s (duties) of Islam, required of every believer once in his
grandson Hussein. life if possible.
Aya “Sign” or “miracle”; used for verses of the Koran. Halal That which is “permissible”, particularly foods which
Baraka “Sanctity” or “blessing” vested in, and available from, comply with Islamic dietary rules.
holy people, places, or objects. Hanafi Referring to the Sunni legal madhhab ascribed to Abu
Bast “Twelver” Shiite institution of sanctuary in mosques Hanifa.
and other holy places. Hanbali Referring to the Sunni legal madhhab ascribed to Abu
Baya “Contract” or oath of allegiance binding members of Hanbal.
an Islamic sect or Sufi tariqa to their spiritual guide. Haram A sanctuary, “that which is forbidden” by the Sharia.
Chador Traditional Iranian garment covering women from head Hijab “Screen”, veil traditionally worn by Muslim women in
to foot. See also Hijab. public. Always covers the head, but not necessarily the
Dai “Propagandist” or missionary, especially in Shiite face and hands.
Ismaili movements. See also Dawa. Hijra “Emigration” of Muhammad from Mecca to Medina in
Dar al-Harb The “realm of war” or those lands not under Muslim AD 622, the base year of the Muslim calender.
rule, where, under certain circumstances, a war or jihad Ibada Religious worship.
can be sanctioned against unbelievers. Id al-Adha “The festival of the sacrifice” on the last day of the
Dar al-Islam “Realm of Islam”; originally those lands under Muslim Hajj.

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 GLOSSARY

Id al-Fitr “The festival of breaking the fast” at the end of
Ramadan.
Ijima Consensus of the Muslim community or scholars as a
basis for a legal decision. Shiites interpret it as a
consensus of Imams.
Ijtihad Individual judgement to establish a legal ruling by
creative interpretation of the existing body of law. See
also Muijtahid.
Ikhwan The “Brothers”, soldiers of Abd al-Aziz, founder of the
Saudi dynasty, and adherents of the Hanbali reformer,
Abd al-Wahhab.
Ikhwan al- Muslim Brotherhood, a society founded in 1929 by
Muslimin Hasan al-Banna; originally aimed at reestablishing a
Muslim polity in Egypt.
Ilm “Knowledge”; in particular, religious knowledge, of
ulama.
Imam “One who stands in front” to lead the salat, hence the
leader of the Muslim community. In Shiite tradition, Ali
and those of his descendants considered to be the
spiritual successors of Muhammad.
Iman “Faith” or religious conviction.
Intifada Uprising, especially of Palestinians against Israel in
1900s and after 2002.
Infitah The “opening up” of the Egyptian economy to the West
in 1972, in the hope of attracting foreign investment.
Islam “Self-surrender” or “submission”; reconcilliation to the
will of God as revealed to Muhammad. See also
Muslim.
Isnad “Support”; chain of authorities transmitting a hadith,
thus guaranteeing its validity.
Jafari Referring to the sole Shiite madhhab ascribed to the
Imam Jafar al-Sadiq.
Jahl “Ignorance”, hence jahiliyya (period of ignorance), or
pre-Islamic times.
Jihad War against unbelievers in accordance with Sharia.
Also applied to an individual’s struggle against baser
impulses.
Jizya Poll tax levied on dhimmis in a Muslim-ruled society.
Kaba Cubic building in Mecca containing the Black Stone,
believed by Muslims to be a fragment of the original
temple of Abraham. Focus of salat (prayer) and the
Hajj. See also Qibla.
Kafir “Disbeliever” or infidel who has rejected the message of
the Koran.
Khalifa Caliph, the “deputy” of God on earth. In the Koran
applied to Adam, and hence to all humanity in relation
to the rest of creation; specifically applied to the early
successors of the Prophet as leaders of the Islamic state
or khilafa, and to the successors of founders of Islamic
states or Sufi tariqas.
Khaniqa Sufi hospice, mainly in areas of Persian influence.
Kharijis “Those who go out”; members of a group of
puritanical Muslim sects during Umayyad and early
Abbasid times. (Arabic plural: Khawarij.)
Khums “Fifth’, a tax of one-fifth of all trading profits, payable
to mujtahids in Shiite areas.
Khutba Sermon preached at Friday prayers.
Kiswa Black clothing or covering of the Kaba, renewed
annually.
Kitab “The book”, or religious scriptures.
Koran (Quran) “Discourse” or “recitation”, the immutable body of
revelations received by Muhammad.
Kufr “Disbelief”, an ungrateful rejection of Islam. See also
Kafir.
Kuttab School at which the Koran is taught.
Madhhab “Adopted policy”, specifically applied to five recognized
systems of fiqh (jurisprudence).
Madrasa “College”, especially for religious studies.
Maghrib “Sunset”, hence the salat (prayer) at sunset. Also
Muslim “occident”, i.e., northeastern Africa, Morocco,
for which the French transliteration “Maghreb” is
commonly used.
Mahdi “Awaited One”; a Messiah and reformist leader who
aims to restore the original purity of the Islamic faith
and polity. In Shiite tradition the Twelfth Imam.
Maliki Referring to the Sunni legal madhhab ascribed to Malik
ibn Anas.
Maruf “Known”, term used in the Koran for familiar and
approved custom; hence, generally, “the good.”
Mashriq “Sunrise”; Levant.
Maslaha That which is “beneficial”; term used for the principle
of public interest in the Maliki madhhab, adopted by
modern legal reformers.
Mawlid “Birthday”; festival celebrating the anniversary of a
religious figure.
Mawali “Associates” or “clients”; status at first given to non-
Arab converts to Islam. (Singular: Mawla.)
Mihrab Niche in wall of mosque indicating Qibla.
Millet Non-Muslim religious community within the Dar al-
Islam.
Mufti Expert on the Sharia, qualified to give fatwas (rulings)
upon questions of law.
Muhajirin Those who emigrated from Mecca to Medina with
Muhammad. See also Hijra.
Mujahid Soldier fighting a holy war or jihad. (Plural:
mujadidun.)
Mujtahid Religious scholars sanctioned to make individual
interpretations to determine points of law, especially
among Shiite.
Mukhabarat Intelligence services, security police.

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Munkar “Unknown”; term used in the Koran for wrongful Sunni See Ahl al-Sunna.
action as distinct from maruf: hence evil generally. Sura Chapter of the Koran.
Murid “Aspirant”, or follower of a Sufi master. Sultan “Authority” or “power”; actual holder of power, as
Murshid Sufi master. distinct from the khalifa; later common term for
Muslim One who has submitted to God; a follower of the sovereign.
religion revealed to, and established by, Muhammad. Tahlil Prayer—la ilaha illa allah (there is no deity but God)—
See also Islam. particularly used in Sufi rituals.
Mutazilis “Those who stand aloof”; theologians belonging to the Taifa Organization of a Sufi order, as distinct from its
rationalist school which introduced speculative spiritual path.
dogmatism into Islam. Takbir The phrase “Allahu Akbar” (God is most great).
Nisab Minimum amount of wealth prior to assessment for Tanzimat Administrative decrees, reforms instituted by the
zakat. nineteenth-century Ottoman sultans.
Pir Persian Sufi master. Taqiyya Dissimultation of one’s beliefs in the face of danger,
Qadi Judge administering Sharia. especially among Shiites.
Qibla Direction of the Kaba to which Muslims turn while Taqlid “Imitation”, or the basing of legal decisions on the
praying, hence the recess in a mosque which shows it. existing judgments of the four Sunni madhhabs.
Qiyas “Analogy”; the principle in jurisprudence used to deal with Tariqa “Path” of mystical and spiritual guidance. A term
new situations not mentioned in the Koran or Sunna. which also came to be applied to the organization
Ribat Sufi hospice. through which a tariqa extends itself in Muslim society.
Risala “Report” or “epistle”. (Plural: rasail.) Tasawwuf See Sufi.
Rukn “Pillar’; one of the five religious duties prescribed for Tawaf Ritual circumambulation of the Kaba by a pilgrim
Muslims—hajj, salat, sawm, shahada, and zakat. during the Hajj or Umra.
Sadaqa Voluntary contribution of alms. Tawhid “Unity” of God. Central theological concept of Islam.
Salaf “Predecessors”; appellation of the first generation of Tawil Esoteric or allegorical interpretation of the Koran,
Muslims. Salafi: term describing the twentieth-century predominant among Shiites.
reform movement inspired by them. Tekkes Sufi centers in Turkish-speaking areas.
Salat Ritual worship performed five times daily, one of the Ulama “Learned men’, in particular the guardians of legal and
rukns (five pillars) of Islam. religious traditions. (Singular: alim.)
Sawm Annual fast and daylight abstinence during the month Umma Community of believers, in particular the community
of Ramadan, one of the rukns of Islam. of all Muslims.
Sayyid Descendent of Ali’s son Hussein. Sidi (local usage in the Umra Lesser pilgrimage to Mecca which can be performed at
Maghrib) is applied to members of saintly lineages. any time of the year.
Shahada Profession of faith whereby a Muslim declares his Usul (al-Fiqh) “Roots” or foundations of jurisprudence. In the Sunni
acceptance of God and his Prophet; one of the rukns of madhhabs they comprise: the Koran, the Sunna, ijma
Islam. (consensus) and qiyas (analogical deduction). See also
Shaikh “Elder”; head of a tribe or Sufi master. Fiqh.
Sharia “The path to a water-hole’; a name given to the sacred Wali “One who is near God”; a saint in popular Sufism.
law of Islam which governs all aspects of a Muslim’s Waqf Pious endowment, originally for a charitable purpose;
life. It is elaborated through the discipline of fiqh. sometimes used as a means of circumventing the
Shiites “Party” of Ali, comprising those groups of Muslims Sharia’s inheritance laws.
who uphold the rights of Ali and his descendants to Watan “Homeland” or “nation”.
leadership of the Umma. Wazir Administrator or bureaucrat apponted by the ruler.
Shirk “Association” of partners to the divinity; idolatry. Zakat “Purity”, a term used for a tax of fixed proportion of
Shura Consultation. Majlis al Shura Parliament. income and capital (normally 21/2 percent) payable
Silsila “Chain” of baraka (inherited sanctity) or kinship annually for charitable purposes; one of the “five
connecting the leaders of Sufi orders to their founders. pillars” of Islam.
Sufi Follower of Sufism, the Islamic mystic path, from suf Zawiya “Corner”; building for Sufi activities.
(wool) garments worn by early adepts. (Arabic: tasawwuf.)
Sunna Custom sanctioned by tradition, particularly that of the
Prophet enshrined in hadith.

202

Further Reading
Ahmed, Akbar S., Living Islam – From Samarkand to Stornoway,
London, 1993.
Ahmed, Akbar and Donnan, Hastings (eds.), Islam, Globalization
and Postmodernity, London, 1994.
Ahmed, Leila, Women and Gender in Islam: Historical Roots of a
Modern Debate, New Haven, CT, 1994.
Ali Abdallah Yusuf (tr.), The Holy Quran (with commentary),
Leicester, 1979.
Al-Qaradawi, Yusuf, The Lawful and the Prohibited in Islam,
Helbawy et.al. (tr.), Indianapolis, ID, 1985.
Arberry, A. J. The Koran Interpreted, Oxford, 1990.
Armstrong, Karen, Muhammad: A Western Attempt to
Understand Islam, London, 1991.
Asad, Muhammad, The Message of the Quran, Gibraltar, 1980.
Beinin, Joel and Stock, Joe (eds.), Political Islam: Essays from
Middle East Report, London, 1997.
Bell, Richard, Introduction to the Quran (1953), ed. and rev. W.M.
Watt, Edinburgh, 1978.
Blair, Sheila and Bloom, Jonathan, Islamic Art and Architecture
1250–1800, New Haven, CT, 1994.
Bouhdiba, Abdalwahab, Sexuality in Islam, Alan Sheridan (tr.),
London, 1985.
Cook, Michael, Muhammad, Oxford, 1983
Coon, Carleton S., Caravan: The Story of the Middle East, rev.
edn., New York, NY, 1961.
Coulson, N. J., A History of Islamic Law, Edinburgh, 1964.
Daftary, Farhad, A Short History of the Ismailis, Edinburgh, 1998.
Denny, Frederick Mathewson, An Introduction to Islam, New
York, NY, 1985
Donner, Fred, Early Islamic Conquests, Cambridge, MA, 1982.
Eickelman, Dale F., The Middle East: An Anthropological
Approach, Englewood Cliffs, NJ, 1981/1989.
Esposito, John L., (ed.), Oxford Encyclopedia of the Modern
Islamic World, 4 vol., NY, 1995.
Ettinghausen, Richard, et al., Islamic Art and Architecture
650–1250, New Haven, CT, 2002.
Geertz, Clifford, Islam Observed, New Haven, CT, 1968.
Gibb, H. A. R., Bernard Lewis, et al. (eds.), Encyclopaedia of
Islam, 6 vols., Leiden, 1962.
Gilsenan, Michael, Recognizing Islam, London, 1983.
GLOSSARY AND FURTHER READING
Guillaume, A. (tr.), The Life of Muhammad: A Translation of Ibn
Ishaq’s Sirat Rasul Attah, Karachi and London, 1955.
Hillenbrand, Robert, Islamic Art and Architecture, London, 1999.
Hodgson, Marshall G. S., The Venture of Islam: Conscience and
History in a World Civilization, 3 vols., Chicago, IL, 1974.
Hourani, Albert, Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age, Oxford, 1969.
Hourani, Albert, A History of the Arab Peoples, 2nd ed., London,
2000.
Ibn Khaldun, The Muqadimmah: An Introduction to History, F.
Rosenthal (tr.), 3 vols., New York, NY, 1958; ed. and abridged
by N. Dawood, London, 1978.
Keddie, N.R. (ed.), Scholars, Saints and Sufis: Muslim Religions
Institutions Since 1500, Berkeley, CA, 1973.
Lapidus, Ira, A History of the Islamic Peoples, 2nd ed.,
Cambridge, 2002.
Mayer, Ann Elizabeth, Islam and Human Rights: Tradition and
Politics, Boulder, CO, 1991.
Mernissi, Fatima, Women and Islam: An Historical and
Theological Enquiry, Mary Jo Lakeland (tr.), Oxford, 1991.
Momen, Moojan, An Introduction to Shi’i Islam, New Haven, CT,
1985.
Peters, F. E., Muhammad and the Origins of Islam, Albany, NY,
1994.
Rahman, Fazlur, Islam, Chicago, IL, 1979.
Richard, Yann, Shiite Islam, Antonia Nevill (tr.), Oxford, 1995.
Rodinson, M., Mohamed, Harmondsworth, 1971.
Rosen, Lawrence, The Anthropology of Justice – Law as Culture in
Islamic Society, Cambridge, 1989.
Roy, Olivier, The Failure of Political Islam, London, 1994.
Ruthven, Malise, Islam in the World, 2nd ed., London, 2000.
Ruthven, Malise, A Fury for God: The Islamist Attack on America,
London, 2002.
Said, Edward, Orientalism, London, 1978.
Schacht, Joseph, An Introduction to Islamic Law, Oxford, 1964.
Trimingham, J. S., The Sufi Orders in Islam, Oxford, 1971.
Waines, David, An Introduction to Islam, Cambridge, 1995.
Watt, W. M., Muhammad at Mecca, Oxford, 1953.
Watt, W. M., Muhammad at Medina, Oxford, 1956.
203
HISTORICAL ATLAS OF THE ISLAMIC WORLD

Acknowledgments Map List

Most of the essays accompanying the maps in this volume The World according to al-Idrisi The Balkans, Crete, and Cyprus 1912–13 120
were written by Malise Ruthven, with editorial overview pro- 549–1154 6/7 The Balkans, Crete, and Cyprus 1920–23 121
vided by Professor Azim Nanji (with contributions on pages Geography of the Muslim Lands 18/19 China under Manchu Dynasty 1840–1912 123
24–25, 66–69, 96–102), and Languages and Peoples of Islam 22/23 The Last Years of Turkish Rule 1882–1916
Professor Nur Yalman and Kathleen McDermott. In prepar- Arabia before the Muslim conquests 25 124
ing the texts and maps special mention should be made of the Sykes-Picot Plan May 1916 125
Muhammad’s Missions and Campaigns
works of two outstanding American scholars of Islam:
to 632 27 League of Nations Mandate 1921 126
Marshall G.S. Hodgson’s The Venture of Islam (3 volumes,
Expansion to 750 28/29 Pledges and Border Changes 1920–23 127
University of Chicago Press, 1974) and Ira Lapidus’s magiste-
rial A History of Islamic Societies (revised edn. Cambridge Expansion 750–1700 32/33 Invasion of Lebanon June 1982–September
University Press, 2002). Sheila Blair and Jonathan Bloom Abbasid Empire c. 850 36/37 1983 127
wrote the texts and kindly provided the cartographical infor- Post-Imperial Successor Regimes Nasir Khusraw’s Journeys c. 1040 129
mation for pp. 172–179. The following also contributed to the late 10thC 40/41 Travels of Ibn Jubair 1183–85 130
text: Dr Jonathan Meri (p. 36–37); Dr Nader El-Bizri (p. Post-Imperial Successor Regimes Travels of Ibn Battuta 1325–54 131
38–39), Farhad Daftari (p. 50–51); Dr Zulfikar Hirji (p. early 11thC 42 Ottoman Africa c. 1880 132
76–77, 152–153); Safaroz Niyozof (p. 94–95); Richard Gott (p. The Saljuq Era 44/45 Northeast Africa 1840–98 133
116–117); Dan Plesch (p. 150–151, 164–165); Trevor Mostyn Military Recruitment c. 1500 46/47 Africa after the Berlin Conference 1885 135
(p. 162–163, 192–193); Mustafa Draper (p. 166–169); Nacim Fatimid Empire and other States c. 1000 50/51 Africa c. 1830 136
Pak (p. 188–189). Dr Abdou Filali Ansari contributed to the Empires and Trade Routes c. 1500 54/55 Northwest Africa to 1914 137
initial discussions concerning the choice of subjects. Christian Crusades 56 Pilgrim Routes of Arabia 138
The Mamluk conquest of the Plan of Mecca 139
The publishers would like to thank the following picture
coast 1263–91 57 The Growth of the Hajj 140/141
libraries for their kind permission to use their pictures and
Sufi Orders 1145–1389 61 Early Baghdad 142
illustrations:
The Collection of Prince and Princess Sadruddin The Muslim Near East 1127–74 63 Cairo at the time of Sultan Al-Nasir 143
Aga Khan 10, 35, 173 Mongol Invasions 1206–59 64/65 Cairo at the time of Ismail 1869–70 143
Bodleian Library, Oxford 11 Muslim conquests in North Africa and Growth of Cairo 1800–1947 144
Werner Forman Archive 16 Europe 66/67 Tashkent 145
Hulton Getty Archive 17, 36, 44, 49, 53, 59, 62, 91, 101, Islamic Spain c. 1030 68 Oilfields and Pipelines in the Middle East
102, 111, 112, 114, 118, 132, 146, 150, 152, 156, 160, The Christian Reconquest 69 and Inner Asia 147
169, 180, 185, 188, 193 Plan of the Great Mosque at Kilwa 70 The Struggle for Water 1950–67 149
Corbis 21 East African Slave Trade to 1500 71 Military Spending and Service c. 2000 151
e.t. archive 24, 72, 82, 84 Ghana and Mali Empires 73 New States in Southeast Asia 1950–2000 153
Metropolitan Museum of Art 26 Jihad States c. 1800 74/75 Mesopotamia 1915–18 154
Deutsches Archaiologisches Institut, Madrid 28 Trade Routes to 1500 76/77 The Gulf War Phase 1 155
Aga Khan Trust for Culture, Geneva 30, 74, 80, 94, 122, The Gulf War Phase 2 155
Indian Ocean c. 1580 80/81
170
Indian Ocean c. 1650 80/81 The Gulf War Phase 3 155
Bibliothèque Nationale, Paris 31, 57, 64, 177
Indian Ocean 1800–1900 82/83 The Afghanistan War and Soviet Retreat 157
Bildarchiv Steffens 39, 147
Cartographica Limited 40, 43, 76 Expansion of Ottoman Empire 1328–1672 Arabia and the Gulf c. 1900 159
Bildarchiv Preußischer Kulturbasitz 51, 172 84/85 Territorial Growth of the Saudi State
David N. Kidd 69 Ottoman Empire 1683–1914 88/89 1902–26 161
Ianthe Ruthven 71 The Dominions of Timur 94/95 The Six-Day War—Israeli Attack 162
D. Dagli Orti, Paris 78, 88 Muslim India 97 October War 1973 163
Agence Rapho, Paris 87 The Mughal Empire 1526–1707 98 The Intifada February–December 1992 163
Institute of Oriental Studies of the Russian Academy of India, Invasions, and Regional Power The Advance to Baghdad 20–30 March 2003
Science 92 1739–60 99 164
Images Colour Library 128 British Conquest of India 100 The Advance to Baghdad March–April 2003
British Museum 131 Conflict over Kashmir 101 165
Foto-Thome, Germany 167 Expansion of Russia in Asia 1598–1914 Muslim Migration into the European
Dr Omar Khalidi 171 Union 166
104/105
Institut Amatller, Barcelona 176
Expansion of Islam in Southeast Asia Late 19th and Early 20th Centuries 168
Mamoun Sakkal 195
1500–1800 106/107 After World War II 169
For Cartographica Limited: Eurasian Empires c. 1700 109 Islam Mosques by State 2000 171
Illustration: Peter A.B. Smith The Balkans 1914–18 113 Islamic Arts 174/175
Cartography: Francesca Bridges, Peter Gamble, Isabelle The New Turkey 1926 115 Architectural and Archaelogical Sites 178/179
Lewis, Jeanne Radford, Malcolm Swanston and European Imperialism in the Muslim Population in the World Today
Jonathan Young Muslim World 116/117 182/183
Typesetting: Jeanne Radford The Balkans, Crete, and Cyprus World Terrorism 186/187
Picture Research: Annabel Merullo and Michéle Sabèse 1878–1912 119 Telephone Lines per 100 People 2001 190/191

204
 ACKNOWLEDGMENTS, MAP LIST, AND INDEX

Index
Abbas, Shah (1588–1629) 92 al-Mahdi, caliph 142 Bangladesh 153
Abbasid/s 42, 36, 38, 40, 46, 52, 53, 148 al-Mamun 37, 38 Baptist 13
Abbasid Empire 11 al-Mansur 50 Barelwi, Sayyid Ahmed (1786–1831) 108
Abbud, Ibrahim (r. 1954–64) 134 al-Mawsili, Ibrahim 36 Baring, Sir Evelyn (later Viscount Cromer) 132
Abdalla, Idris bin 40 Almohads 68 Barqa 50
Abduh, Muhammad (1849–1905) 110 Almoravids 68 Basra 52, 116, 154, 155
Abdul Hamid II 88 al-Maududi,Adu al-Ala (1906–79) 194 Batu (r. 1227–55) 94
Abdullah 162 al-Muizz, caliph 50 Bayazid I (r. 1389–1402) 94
Aboukir Bay, Battle of 108 al-Mustansir, Imam-caliph (1036–94) 50, 128 Baybars 62
Abraham 30 al-Mutawakil 39 Bektashi (Sufi order) 112, 118
Abu Bakr 8, 28, 34 al-Nasser, Jamal Abd 148, 194 Belgrade 86
Abu Dhabi 158 al-Qaeda 152, 184, 185 Belo, Muhammad 75
Abu Hamid al-Ghazali 15, 58 al-Qahira 50 Ben Badis 136
Abu Jafar al-Mansur 142 al-Qadir, Abd, shaikh 60, 109, 136 Bengal 96, 101, 108, 139
Acheh 107, 152 al-Rahman, Sayyid Abd 134 Bengalis 20
Acre 50 al-Rashid, Harun 36, 142, 160 Berber/s 20, 58, 72, 136
Aden 53, 77, 79, 116, 158 al-Saud, Muhammad 160 bin Laden, Osama 157, 184, 195
Adhan (call to prayer) 14 al-Siquilli, General Jawhar 143 Biqaa valley 127
Adrianople (Edirne) 115 al-Taishi, Abdullah, Khalifa 134 Bithynia 84
Afghanistan 12, 16, 96, 128, 156, 181 al-Wahhab, Muhammad Ibn Abd 160 Birmingham,UK 167
Aghlabids 50 Amanullah (1919–29) 116, 156 Black Sea 94
ahl al-dhimma (protected community) 31 Amboyna 81 Blue Nile 70
ahl al-kitab (Peoples of the Book) 10 Amin 41 Bolshevik Revolution (1917–18) 103
Ahmad, Khan 111 Amu Darya 64 Book production 173
Ahmad, Mahdi Muhammad 110 Anatolia 64, 86, 92, 114, 118 Bosnia-Herzegovina 118
Ahmad, Muhammad 109 Anatolian 56 Bradford 167
Aisha 34 Andalusia 68, 167 Britain 20, 53, 56, 80, 81, 91, 108, 109, 114, 116,
Akbar I (1556–1605) 99 Animist 107 125, 151, 158, 160, 162
al-Adid 51 Aniza 160 British Royal Air Force 160
al-Aghlab, Ibrahim 37 Amsterdam 167 Broach 77
al-Azhar 111, 143 Antioch Brunei, sultanate of 152
Albania 118 Arab/s 52, 64, 82, 107, 122, 137, 162 Buddhism 10, 94
Alhambra 68, 176 Arab League 165 Bugeaud, Robert 136
Almohads 68 Arabia 43, 106, 148, 158, 160 Bukhara 95, 103
Almoravids 68 Arabic 20, 38, 47 Buksar, Battle of (1764) 108
al-Amin 37 Arab-Israeli conflict 162 Bulgaria 84, 91, 94, 118
al-Andalus 68, 72, 108 Arafat, Chairman Yasser 163 Buraimi Oasis 158
al-Ashari, Abul Hasan 39 Aral Sea 103 Bursa 84, 86
Alawi/s (Shiite) 127 Architecture 176, 177 Buyids 43, 44, 46
al-Azhar 38, 111 Armenia/n 36, 46, 87 Byzantine 11, 28, 56, 57, 78, 84, 86, 88, 118
al-Aziz, Abd (known as Ibn Saud) 160, 194 Asabiyya (loyalties or group solidarity) 12, 13, 21, Byzantium 24
al-Bakri, General Hasan 154 104 Cairo 62, 128, 143
al-Banna, Hasan 194 Ascalon 50 Camp David (1979) 163
al-Barmaki 37 Ashura 93 Canada 15
al-Bashir, General Umar 134 Asir, province of 13 Cape Comorin 77
al-Dawla, Nawab Siraj 108 Askeri (ruler) 87 Casablanca 6
al-Din, al-Afghani, Jamal (1838–97) 110, 132 Astrakhan 102 Caspian Sea 94, 102
al-Din, al-Ayyubi, Salah (Saladin) 50, 62, 143 Aswan 70, 148 Catherine the Great 102
al-Din Aybeg, Qutb 96 Atlantic Ocean 11, 16, 21, 82 Catholic see Christian
al-Din, Jamal 60 Atlas Mountains 16 Caucasus 46, 102, 117
al-Din, Naqshband, Baha (d. 1389) 95 Atatürk, Mustafa Kemal 114, 115, 116 Ceramics 173
al-Din, Nur 62 Attila 64 Ceyhan 147
al-Din, Safi, Shaikh (1252–1334) 92 Aurungzeb (r. 1658–1707) 96, 99 Ceylon see Sri Lanka
al-Din, Salah (Saladin) 50, 62, 143 Austria 91, 114 Chaghatay 94
Al-e-Ahmed, Jalal 93 Axum 76 Chaghatay Khanate 64
Aleppo 50, 52, 128 Aydhab 53 Chaldiran, Battle of 86
Algeria/n 50, 90, 136, 137, 166, 180, 181 Ayn Jalut, Battle of 62 Charlemagne 36
al-Ghazal, Bahr 134 Ayodhya 101 Charles X (Bourbon monarch) 136
al-Ghazali, Abu Hamid 58 Ayyubids 62, 79 Chechen-Ingushiite 104
al-Ghazi-Ghumuqi 60 Azam, Abdullah 195 Chechnya 104
Algiers 86, 109 Azerbaijan 36, 147 China 52, 64, 76, 103, 129
al-Hadi 36 Azeris 20 Chinese emperors 64
al-Hamid, Abd bin Badis (Ben Badis) 136 Baath (Renaissance) Party 127, 154 Chistis 99
al-Hasa 92, 160 Babur 96 Chistiya 96
al-Hussien, Imam 38 Baghdad 44, 52, 142, 154, 165 Christendom 56
Ali 34, 40, 42, 50, 92 Bahasa Indonesia 20 Christian/s 10, 13, 20, 30, 47, 57, 84, 86, 90, 117,
Aligarh 110 Bahrain 43, 78, 92, 158, 181 118, 127, 151, 162
Ali, house of 30, 62 Balakot, Battle of 109 Christianity 8, 10
Ali, ibn Abi Talib 38 Bali 6, 152 Churchill, Winston 109
Ali, Mehmed (1805–48) 90 Balkans 47, 86, 87, 90, 118 Cinema 188, 189
Ali, Muhammad 132, 148 Balkh 128 Circassians 62
al-Karkhi, Maruf 37 Bamba, Amadu (c. 1850–1927) 60, 141 Civil liberties 192, 193
al-Khattab, Umar ibn 38 Bambuko 72 Cochin 77
al-Kisai 36 Banda 81 Communist Party 103, 117

205
HISTORICAL ATLAS OF THE ISLAMIC WORLD

Congress of Berlin 118 Gao 52 Ibn Tulun 43

Constantinople 24, 56, 86 Garang, Colonel 134 Id al Adha (Feast of sacrifice) 15, 138
Córdoba 38, 68 Gaza 163 Id al Fitr (Feast of fast breaking) 15
Council of Masjids 170 Gellner, Ernest 12, 21 Idris II 40
Council of Muslim Communities of Canada 169 Genoa 56, 86 Idris, Moulay 141
Crete 118 Genoese 82 Ifriqiya see Tunisia
Crimea 90, 91 Germany 56, 91, 114, 162 Ikhshids 43
Crimean War (1854–56) 91 Ghassanids 24 Ikhwan (brethren) 160
Crusader 38, 108 Ghaznavids 43, 44, 46 Imam Hussein 92
Crusades 56, 57, 129 Ghenghis Khan 64, 94 Imam Rida 140
Ctesiphon 28 Ghulams 43 Imam Sayid bin Sultan (1804–56) 70
Cyprus 28, 86, 118 Ghurids 96 Imam Shamil 60, 103
Cyrenaica see Libya Gizeh 148 Imam Yahya 116
Cyrenaican massif 16 Gladstone, William (British prime minister) 132 India 52, 95, 102, 106
da Gama, Vasco 70, 79, 80 Glasgow 167 Indian Councils Act of 1909 100
Dahlan, Ahmad 111 Goa 80 Indian Empire (British) 158
Dalmatia 90 Golan Heights 163 Indian Navy (British) 158
Damascus 38, 50, 114, 154 Golden Horde 64, 94 Indonesia 107, 151, 152
Dan Fodio, Uthman (1754–1817) 74, 110 Golden Square 154 Indus Valley 11, 16, 96
Danube 90 Gordon, General Charles George “Chinese” Inquisition 68
Dar es Salaam 6 (1833–85) 132, 134 Internet 190, 191
Daud, Muhammad 156 Gorno-Badakhshan 128 Iran 24, 31, 38, 92, 94, 96, 102, 107, 150, 154, 156,
Dayton accords 118 Granada 68, 129 181, 184
Deccan 96 Greece 24, 84, 86, 87, 91, 115, 118, 137 Iran-Iraq War 164
de Gaulle, General Charles 136, 137 Greek War of Independence (1821–29) 90 Iraq 20, 31, 36, 38, 43, 90, 92, 95, 117, 139, 146,
de Reuter, Baron 92 Green Mountain 16 148, 158, 160, 181, 184
Deir Yassin (1948) 162 Guangzhou (Canton) 52 Iraqi Petroleum Company (IPC) 154
Delhi 95, 96, 110 Guinea 72 Irtysh 102
Deng Xiaoping 123 Gujerat 96 Isfahan 92
Deoband 99, 110 Habbaniya 154 Islamization 10
Descartes, René 108 Habibullah (r. 1901–19) 156 Islamic Jihad 163
Devshirme (military levy) 48 Habsburg 90 Isly, Battle of (1844) 136
Dhikrs (ceremony) 14, 58 Hadith 9, 58, 110 Ismail, Shah (1487–1524) 92
Dhufar 16 Haidar Ali 108 Ismaili/s 65, 71, 128
Dinka 134 Hajj 15, 26, 138, 139 Ismaili Fatimids 43
Dipanegara, Prince 108 Hajj, Messali 136 Ismailism 96
Druze/s 125, 127 Hamas 163 Ismail Pasha (r. 1863–79) 132
Duas 14 Hanafi/s 38, 123, 132 Israel 162
Durrani, Ahmad, Shah (r. 1747–72) 156 Hanbali 38 Istanbul 6, 48, 90
Dutch 20, 53, 80, 81, 107, 108 Hanbali school 160 Italy 56, 91
East Africa 70 Hangzhou 52 Ithnashari Khojas 71
Ebro River 38 Hashemite kingdoms 160 Jadidists (advocates of reform) 103
Egypt 15, 16, 20, 36, 43, 86, 116, 139, 143, 148, Hausa 20, 72, 74 Jakarta 6, 107
151, 160 Hazaras 156 Janissaries 47, 48
Egyptians 163 Hejaz 50, 52, 70, 86 Java 20, 52, 79, 107, 117, 139
Elburz 16 Heliopolis 144 Javanese 20
England see British Herat 95 Jerba 86
English see British Hicks Pasha 134 Jericho 163
Eretz Yisrael 162 Hijaz 132, 160 Jerusalem 28, 56, 128, 149, 162
Ernst, Carl 9 Hijra/s (migration) 26, 160 Jewish 87, 90, 162
Eritrea 116 Hindu 96, 99, 101, 104, 106, 108 Jewish settlement 117
Ethiopia 70 Hinduism 10, 99 Jewish sovereign state 162
Euphrates River 16, 24, 52, 148 Holland see Dutch Jews 7, 30, 57, 86, 92, 117, 162
Europe 162 Hormuz 52, 80 Jidda 53, 139
European powers 160 Hourani, Albert 20 Jihad/s 13, 72, 74, 109, 160
European Union 149 Hui 122 Jizya (poll tax) 30, 99, 112
Faisal 126, 162 Hulegu 65 Jordan 148, 150, 162
Faqis (holy men) 70 Human Rights 192, 193 Jordan River 148
Farsi see Persian Hungary 86, 90, 94, 117 Judaism 10, 24
Fatima 40, 50 Hussein, Feisal bin 117, 154 Kaba 14, 138
Fatimid/s 15, 38, 41, 50, 56, 62, 79 Hussein, Imam 34, 62, 92 Kalmyks 145
Feisal 114 Hussein (al-Tikriti), Saddam 93, 142, 146, 154, 164 Kamal, Babrak 157
Fergana Valley 103 Ibadi sect 70 Karakaya 148
Fez 130 Ibadism 34 Karbala 38, 92, 140, 155
Fiqh (jurisprudence) 58 Ibn Aghlab, Ibrahim (Harun al-Rashid’s governor) 40 Karzai, Ahmad 157
First Crusade 45 Ibn al-Arabi 99 Kashmir 96, 101
First World War 162 Ibn Arabi 69 Kazakh/s 21, 102, 122, 145
FNL 136 Ibn Battuta 79, 129, 130, 131 Kazakhstan 103, 147
France 56, 81, 91, 114, 125, 136, 137, 151, 166 Ibn Hanbal, Ahmad 42 Kazan 102
Fulani 20, 74 Ibn Jubair (1145–1217) 129, 139 Keban 148
Fulfulde 72 Ibn Juzay (1321–c. 1356) 130 Kemal, Mustafa see Atatürk
Funj sultanate 70 Ibn Khaldun (1332–1406) 11, 12, 13, 160 Khalidiyya 60
Furu (revelation) 110 Ibn Majid 79 Khalwatiya 109
Futa Jallon 74 Ibn Muljam 34 Khamenei 93
Futa Toro 74 Ibn Rushd (Averroës) 69 Khan, Abd al-Rahman (r. 1880–1901) 156
Galiev, Mir Said, Sultan 103 Ibn Saud (Abd al-Aziz) 160 Khan (resting places) 53
Gansu 122 Ibn Saghir 41 Khaniqa (Sufi lodge) 53

206
 INDEX

Khan, Sir Sayyed Ahmed (1817–98) 110, 111 Mamluk/s 43, 46, 47, 62 Nejd Plateau 160
Kharijis 34, 70 Mamun 41, 42 Nelson, Admiral 108
Khartoum 132, 134 Manchester 167 Nestorian Christianity 94
Khatmiya 132 Mansuriyya 50 Netherlands 167
Khomein 93 Manzikert, Battle of 45, 56 New Sect 123
Khruschev, Nikita 103 Mao Zedong 123 New York 184
Khums (religious taxes) 92 Marabouts 58, 72 Nigeria 75
Khurasan 43, 44 Maronites 125, 127 Nile 16, 53, 148
Khusraw, Nasir (1004–c. 1072) 128 Marseilles 166 Ningxia Hui Autonomous Region 122
Khutba 14 Mashhad 38, 141 Nishapur 128
Khwarzim 94 McMahon, Sir Henry 117 Normans 50
Kilwa 70, 79, 80 McVeigh, Timothy 7 Norway 15
Kipchak 62 Mecca 9, 26, 34, 43, 52, 72, 74, 92, 129, 138, 139, Nuba Mountains 134
Kirghiz 156 160 Nuer 134
Kitchener, General Herbert Horatio 134 Medina 9, 26, 36, 72, 74, 114, 139, 160 Numairi, Jafar (r. 1969–85) 134
Koprulu, Ahmed (r. 1661–76) 90 Mehmet the Conqueror 86 Nurculuk 60
Koprulu, Mehmed (r. 1656–61) 90 Mesopotamia 16, 86, 148 Nursi, Said (1876–1960) 60
Koran 9, 10, 20, 26, 38, 39, 42, 110, 148, 193 Mesopotamian culture 24 Nuwas, Abu 36
Kosovo, Battle of 84 Mesopotamian cities 52 Oghuz 44
Kubrawiyya 122 Mesopotamian heritage 155 Oghuz Turks 56
Kuchuk Kaynarca, Treaty of (1774) 90 Messali Hajj 136 Oklahoma City 7
Kurdish 47, 154 Metalware 173 Oman 158
Kurds 20, 155 Mevlevis 118 Omani Albu Said dynasty 158
Kutama 50 Mihna (inquisition or test) 38 Omar, Mullah Muhammad 157
Kuwait/i 146, 155, 158, 164 Minangkabau 107 Omdurman 134
Kyrgyz 103, 122 Mindanao 153 Orthodox see Christian
Kyrgyzstan 103 Mocha 76 Oslo accords (1993) 163
Lahej 158 Mogadishu 79 Oslo negotiations 149
Lahore 96 Moldavia see Romania Oslo II negotiations 149
Lake Van 128 Mombasa 6, 70, 80 Osmanli see Ottoman
Lamtuna 72 Momens 71 Ottoman/s 45, 46, 47, 83, 84, 86, 88, 109, 112, 117,
Lamu 52 Mongol/s 58, 64, 84, 122 154, 158, 160
Latakia 127 Mongol Oirots 145 Ottoman Turks 162
Latin see Christian Mongolia 64 Oxus Valley 38
Latin kingdoms 57 Montenegro 91 Pahlavi 93
Lausanne, Treaty of 115 Morocco 20, 60, 151, 166 Pakistan 100, 101, 107, 151, 154, 156, 157
Lawrence, T. E. 114 Moros 153 Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) 127, 163
Lebanon 117, 127, 168, 181 Moses 30 Palestinians 127
Lenk, Timur 94, 95 Mount Arafat 139 Palestine 20, 50, 56, 117, 162
Lepanto, Battle of 86 Mount Lebanon 16 Palmyra 24
Libya 91, 109, 116, 151 Muadhdhin 14 Pan-Turkism 104
Lille 166 Muawiya 34 Parcham (non-Pushtun) 156
London 167 Mubarak, Shaikh 158 Paris 166
Lyons 166 Mughal India 83, 107 Patriot Act 193
Maan family 125 Muhammad 9, 26, 34, 42, 52, 58, 110, 160 Pemba 70, 76, 79, 80
Macedonia 84 Muizz, Caliph al- 143 People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) 156
Madhabs (schools of jurisprudence) 13 Multan 96 Persia 95 (also see Iran)
Madurese 20 Mumbhai (Bombay) 6 Persian/s 20, 38, 47, 122, 145
Mafia 79 Muqaddima 11 Persian Gulf 158
Maghreb 50, 72 Murabits 72 Petah Tikva 162
Mahdi (Muslim Messiah) 134 Muridiya 60 Peter the Great 90
Mahdiya 110 Murids (aspirants) 60 Peter the Hermit 56
Mahdiyya 50 Murshid 60 Petra 24
Mahmud II (r. 1807–39) 112 Musa, Ibrahim (d. 1751) 74 Philippines 153
Mahmud of Ghazna 96 Musa, Mansa (1307–32) 72 Pir (Sufi shaikh) 60, 95, 99
Mahmud of Ghazni 43 Muscat 158 Plassey, Battle of (1757) 108
Ma Hualong 123 Muslim Americans 170, 171 Podolia 90
Majid 158 Muslim Brotherhood 60, 134, 194 Poland 94
Malabar 52, 77, 80 Muslim populations 180, 181 Polo, Marco 129
Malacca 79, 80, 107 Muslim Students' Association 169 Pope Urban II 56
Malaya 139 Muslim World League 181 Portuguese 53, 79, 80, 82, 106
Malay peninsula 107 Mutazila 38 Prophet Abraham 162
Malay/s 20, 107 Muzdalifa 138 Protestant 108
Malay states 117 Myanmar (Burma) 153 Punjabis 20, 101
Malaysia 107, 152 Mysore 108 Pushtuns 20, 108, 156, 157
Mali 72, 131 Nabateans 24 Putin, Vladimir 109
Maliki/s 38, 132 Nairobi 6 Qadariyya 60, 122
Malindi 52 Najaf 38, 140, 155 Qadiri 103
Mallam (religious scholar) 74 Najiballah, General 157 Qajar dynasty (1779–1925) 92
Malta 86 Naples 86 Qaramatians 42
Maluku 152 Napoleon 90, 108 Qaraqanid dynasty 43, 44, 46
Ma Mingxin, shaikh (b. 1719) 122 Naqshbandi 95, 103, 104, 108, 111, 156 Qarawiyyin 38
Mamluk amirs 143 Naqshbandiyya 60, 122, 167 Qarluqs 43, 44
Mamluk Empire 86 Nasridas 68 Qizilbashis 92
Mamlukism 12 Nation of Islam (NOI) 168, 170 Quanzhou (Zaitun) 79
Mamluk soldiers 62 National Islamic Front (NIF) 134 Qulzum 53
Mamluk sultans 53 Nazis 162 Qumm 38

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HISTORICAL ATLAS OF THE ISLAMIC WORLD

Quraish, tribe 26, 79 Siquilliyya (Sicily) 50 Trucial System 158

Quraishi pedigrees 70 Sirhindi, Shaikh Ahmad (1564–1624) 99 Tsarist Russia 158
Qutb, Sayyid 194, 195 Slavery 158 Tuareg 21, 72
Reconquista 68 Slaves/slave trade 71, 74 Tughluq dynasty (1320–1413) 96
Ramadan 14, 15 Socotra 76 Tughril Beg, Sultan 44
Rayy 128 Sofala 53 Tunis 86
Red Sea 52 Sokoto 75 Tunisia 6, 36, 37, 50, 90, 137
Reza, Muhammad 93 Soviet Union 144 Turabi 134
Reza, Shah 93 South Arabian protectorate 158 Turkey 60, 91, 112, 147, 151, 154, 158, 181
Rhodes 28 Spain 38, 167, Spain 184 Turkish ghulams 46
Rida, Rashid, Imam 111, 141 Spanish Morocco 116 Turkish nomads 64
Riffian Mountain 16 Spanish Sahara 116 Turkish tribesmen 53
Riyadh 6, 160 Sri Lanka 81 Turkmen 156
Rome 167 Stalin 103, 104 Turkmenistan 103, 147
Roman Catholicism 7 Sudanese 20 Turks 20, 56, 118
Romania 90, 91, 118 Sudan People’s Liberation Movement 134 Tusi, Nasr al-Din 65
Rumi, Jalal al-Din (1207–73) 59 Suez crisis (1956) 154 Tyre 50
Russia 90, 91, 94, 101, 114, 149, 151 Sufi orders 58, 60, 72, 74, 87, 92, 94, 96, 104, 107, Uighurs 123
Sabah 152 110, 115, 118 Ukraine 94
Sabilla, Battle of (1929) 160 Sufism 37 Ulama 58, 74, 110
Sadaqa (voluntary charity) 14 Sufi tariqas 109 Ulugh Beg (r. 1404–49) 95
Sadat, Anwar 163 Suhrawardis 96 Umar 8, 28, 34
Safavid 83, 86, 92 Suhrawardiya 96 Umayyad 34, 38, 40, 68, 79, 176
Sahara 72 Sulawesi 152 Umayyad Caliphate 68
Sahil (shore) 72 Suleiman the Magnificent 86 Umma 13
Salafists 111 Sultan Mahmud II 48 United Kingdom 167
Salat 14 Sultan Muhammad V 137 United Nations (UN) 149, 162, 165
Saljuq/s 38, 44, 46, 50, 56, 64, 84, 118 Sultan Muhammad VI 137 United States (US) 149, 157, 164, 165, 168, 184,
Samanid 43 Sumatra 52, 79, 117 185
Samarra 42 Sunni/s 8, 34, 38, 95, 96, 127, 154 Urabi Pasha 132
Samarkand 95, 103 Sunnism 92 Urals 102
Sammaniya 132 Swahili 70 Urdu 20, 99
San Remo Conference (1920) 154 Sykes-Picot Agreement (1916) 117 Usul (fundamentals) 110
San Stefano, Treaty of (1878) 91 Syr Darya 145 Uthman, Caliph 8, 10, 26, 34
Sanusiyya 60, 109 Syria 20, 36, 43, 50, 53, 56, 86, 92, 95, 117, 139, Uzbekistan 103, 145, 147
Sarandib see Sri Lanka 148, 151, 163, 168, 184 Uzbek 103, 122, 145, 156
Sarawak 152 Tablighi Jamaat (preaching association) 110 Venetians see Venice
Sasanian 24, 78, 148 Tabriz 86, 92 Venetian-Habsburg coalition 86
Saudi Arabia, Kingdom of 15, 146, 156, 157, 158, Tafsir (hermeneutics) 58 Venice 82, 86, 118
160 Tahert 40 Vienna 86, 90
Sawm 14 Tahir 42 Volga River 52, 64, 94, 102
Sayyida Zainab 141 Tahirids 43, 46 Wadi Hadhramaut 158
Sayyids 158 Tajdid (reform) 110 Wahhabi 104, 110, 139
Sayyid Said bin Sultan (1807–56) 158 Tajikistan 103, 128 Wahhabism 8
Scandinavia 56 Tajiks 103, 122 Wahhabite 160
Second World War 104, 137, 150, 162, 164, 168 Taj Mahal 176 Wahhabi 60
Selim III (r. 1789–1807) 112 Takbir 14 Wallachia see Romania
Senegal River 74 Talbot, Major 92 Waliullah, Shah (1702–63) 99
Senegambia 74 Talha 34 Waqfs (charitable trusts/religious endowments) 92,
Serbia 86, 90, 91, 118 Taliban 157, 184 102
Serbian Revolt (1804–13) 90 Tanganyika 116 Wargala 40
Seville 68 Tangier 129 Washington 185
Sèvres, Treaty of (1920) 114 Tanzimat-i Hairiye (auspicious re-orderings) 112 Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) 165
Shaanxi 122 Tariqas 60 West Bank 163
Shafii 38 Tarmarshirin 94 Wilson, President Woodrow 117
Shahada 14 Tashkent 103, 144, 145 Xinjiang 122
Shamanism 94 Tatars 94, 102, 104, 122 Yahya, Zaidi Imam 116
Shamil, Imam 103, 109 Tel el Kebir 132 Yathrib see Medina
Sharia 12, 21, 44, 95, 99, 107, 110, 112, 115, 148, 194 Terrorism 184, 193 Yellow River 16
Shariati, Dr Ali 93 Textiles 172 Yeltsin, Boris 109
Sharif Hussein 160 Thailand 152, 153 Yemen 16, 70, 158, 160, 181
Sharif of Mecca 114, 154, 162 Thanawi, Maulana Asraf Ali 100 Yemeni 13, 167
Sheikhan 134 Thuwaini 158 Yihewani 123
Shiite Hazaras 157 Tigris River 16, 24, 52, 142, 148 Young Turks 114
Shihabs (1697–1840) 125 Tijaniya 60 Yunnan 122
Shiism 92, 154 Timbuktu 21, 52, 72 Zagros 16
Shiite/s 8, 9, 13, 34, 37, 90, 95, 96, 127, 140, 154, Timur 95 Zahir Shah (1933–73) 156, 157
155 Timurid Empire 92 Zakat (act of charity) 14, 92
Shiite Ismaili 50 Tipu Sultan (1705–99) 108 Zangi 62
Shuaiba 154 Toledo 68 Zanzibar 52, 70, 71, 79, 80, 158
Sidon 127 Torodbe (scholar) 74 Zaytuna 38
Zionism 162
Siffin, Battle of 34 Transjordan 117, 160, 162 Zirids 50
Sijilmassa 40 Transjordan Frontier Force 160 Ziyara (visitation) 140
Sikhism 10 Transoxiana 43, 46, 94, 102 Zoroastrian/s 10, 24, 30, 92
Sinai 163 Transylvania 86 Zoroastrianism 10, 94
Sindhis 20, 101 Tripoli 91, 116, 127 Zubaida 36
Singapore 139, 152 Trucial Oman Scouts 158 Zubayr 34

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