Filipinas Engineering and Machine Shop v.

Ferrer 135 SCRA 25

Filipinas Engineering and Machine Shop Petitioner HON. JAIME N. FERRER Commission of elections Facts: In preparation for the national elections of November 11, 1969, then respondent Commissioners of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) issued an INVITATION TO BID on September 16, 1969 calling for the submission of sealed proposals for the manufacture and delivery of 1 1,000 units of voting booths, among the 17 bidders , two bidders responded to the said invitation the Filipinas and ACME steel , ACME steel bid was rejected by COMELEC bidding committee due to low quality of samples, hence the commission recommended to award to Filipinas the contract to manufacture and supply the voting boots, after final inspection of all the samples by COMELEC Commissioners ,they have note that ACME submitted lower bid and improves the sample submitted according to the specification required by COMELEC, COMELEC issued final resolution awarding the contract and issued purchase order to ACME. FILIPINAS filed an injunction suit with the court of the first instance of Manila against COMELEC and ACME The courts decision that lower court has no jurisdiction over the nature of the suit and complaint state no cause of action. Issue: Whether or not the lower court has jurisdiction to take cognizance of a suit involving an order of the COMELEC dealing with an award of contract arising from its invitation to bid Whether or not Filipinas, the losing bidder, has a cause of action under the premises against the COMELEC and Acme, the winning bidder, to enjoin them from complying with their contract. HELD: 1. That it is the Supreme Court, not the Court of First Instance, which has exclusive jurisdiction to review on certiorari final decisions, orders or rulings of the COMELEC relative to the conduct of elections and enforcement of election laws. COMELEC resolution awarding the contract in favor of Acme was not issued pursuant to its quasi-judicial functions but merely as an incident of its

inherent administrative functions over the conduct of elections, and hence, the said resolution may not be deemed as a "final order" reviewable by certiorari by the Supreme Court. Being non-judicial in character, no contempt may be imposed by the COMELEC from said order, and no direct and exclusive appeal by certiorari to this Tribunal lie from such order. Any question arising from said order may be well taken in an ordinary civil action before the trial courts. 2. Filipinas, the losing bidder, has no cause of action under the premises to enjoin the COMELEC from pursuing its contract with Acme, the winning bidder. While it may be true that the lower court has the jurisdiction over controversies dealing with the COMELEC's award of contracts, the same being purely administrative and civil in nature, nevertheless, herein petitioner has no cause of action on the basis of the allegations of its complaint. According to the condition on the invitation to BID, award shall be made to the lowest and responsible bidder whose offer will best serve the interest of the COMELEC; that the COMELEC had reserved the right, among others, to accept such bid, as may in its discretion, be considered most reasonable and advantageous; and that the invitation was merely a call for proposals. Consequently, the COMELEC was not under legal obligation to accept any bid since "Advertisements for bidders are simply invitation to make proposals and the advertiser is not bound to accept the highest or lowest bidder, unless the contrary appears." a bidder may have the right to demand damages, or unrealized or expected profits, only when his bid was accepted by resolution of the COMELEC. Filipinas' bid, although recommended for award of contract by the bidding committee, was not the winning bid. No resolution to that effect appeared to have been issued by the COMELEC. Decidedly then, Filipinas has no cause of action.

SSS Employees Association v. CA 124 SCRA 1

SSS Employees Petitioner CA . SSS, Judge Peralejo RTC branch 88 Respondent

In June 9, 1987, the officers and members of SSSEA staged an illegal strike and baricaded the entrances to the SSS Building, preventing non-striking employees from reporting for work and SSS members from transacting business with the SSS; that the strike was reported to the Public Sector Labor - Management Council, which ordered the strikers to return to work; that the strikers refused to return to work; and that the SSS suffered damages as a result of the strike. The complaint prayed that a writ of preliminary injunction be issued to enjoin the strike and that the

strikers be ordered to return to work; that the defendants (petitioners herein) be ordered to pay damages; and that the strike be declared illegal. Issue: 1. Do the employees of the SSS have the right to strike? 2. Does the Regional Trial Court have jurisdiction to hear the case initiated by the SSS and to enjoin the strikers from continuing with the strike and to order them to return to work?

Held: The 1987 Constitution, in the Article on Social Justice and Human Rights, provides that the State "shall guarantee the rights of all workers to self-organization, collective bargaining and negotiations, and peaceful concerted activities, including the right to strike in accordance with law" [Art. XIII, Sec. 31]. It provides, after defining the scope of the civil service as "all branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities, and agencies of the Government, including government-owned or controlled corporations with original charters," that "[t]he right to self-organization shall not be denied to government employees" [Art. IX(B), Sec. 2(l) and (50)]. A reading of the proceedings of the Constitutional Commission that drafted the 1987 Constitution would show that in recognizing the right of government employees to organize, the commissioners intended to limit the right to the formation of unions or associations only, without including the right to strike. Considering that under the 1987 Constitution "[t]he civil service embraces all branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities, and agencies of the Government, including government-owned or controlled corporations with original charters" [Art. IX(B), Sec. .2(l) see also Sec. 1 of E.O. No. 180 where the employees in the civil service are denominated as "government employees"] and that the SSS is one such government-controlled corporation with an original charter, having been created under R.A. No. 1161, its employees are part of the civil service [NASECO v. NLRC, G.R. Nos. 69870 & 70295, November 24,1988] and are covered by the Civil Service Commission's memorandum prohibiting strikes. This being the case, the strike staged by the employees of the SSS was illegal. The Labor Code itself provides that terms and conditions of employment of government employees shall be governed by the Civil Service Law, rules and regulations [Art. 276]. More importantly, E.O. No. 180 vests the Public Sector Labor Management Council with jurisdiction over unresolved labor disputes involving government employees [Sec. 16]. Clearly, the NLRC has no jurisdiction over the dispute.

This being the case, the Regional Trial Court was not precluded, in the exercise of its general jurisdiction under B.P. Blg. 129, as amended, from assuming jurisdiction over the SSS's complaint for damages and issuing the injunctive writ prayed for therein. Unlike the NLRC, the Public Sector Labor - Management Council has not been granted by law authority to issue writs of injunction in labor disputes within its jurisdiction. Thus, since it is the Council, and not the NLRC, that has jurisdiction over the instant labor dispute, resort to the general courts of law for the issuance of a writ of injunction to enjoin the strike is appropriate.

Puyat v. De Guzman 113 SCRA 31 Eugenio Puyat ,Petitioner Ho. Sixto T. De Guzman Commisioner of Securities and exchange commission Respondent Fact: An election for the eleven Directors of the International Pipe Industries Corporation (IPI) a private corporation was held for which the puyat group win to control of the Board and management of IPI Acero Group instituted at the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) quo warranto proceedings against the Acero Group that stockholders were not properly accounted. Justice Estanislao A. Fernandez, then a member of the Interim Batasang Pambansa, orally entered his appearance as counsel for respondent Acero to which the Puyat Group objected on Constitutional grounds. Section 11, Article VIII, of the 1973 Constitution, then in force, provided that no Assemblyman could "appear as counsel before ... any administrative body", and SEC was an administrative body On July 17, 1979 SEC granted Atty Fernandez motion for intervention on the basis of ownerships of ten shares of stocks which he purchased as requested from Acero for which he as a legal interest in the matter. Issue: Whether Assemblyman Fernandez, as a then stockholder of IPI may intervene in the SEC Case without violating Section 11, Article VIII of the Constitution that No Member of the Batasang Pambansa shall appear as counsel before any court

Held: The court ruled that that there has been an indirect "appearance as counsel before ... an administrative body" that is a circumvention of the Constitutional prohibition, the intervention was sought to enable him to appear actively in the proceedings in some other capacity A ruling upholding the "intervention" would make the constitutional provision ineffective. All an Assemblyman need do, if he wants to influence an administrative body is to acquire a minimal participation in the "interest" of the client and then "intervene" in the proceedings. That which the Constitution directly prohibits may not be done by indirection or by a general legislative act which is intended to accomplish the objects specifically or impliedly prohibited. SC hold that the intervention of Assemblyman Fernandez falls within the ambit of the prohibition contained in Section 11, Article VIII of the Constitution.

Filipinas Engineering and Machine Shop v. Ferrer 135 SCRA 25