Arte de La Guerra - Jomini

The
Art
of
WAR
Antoine
Henri de
Jomini
Translated by
G. H. Mendell
&
W. P. Craighill
Introduction &
Commentary by
Military Analyst
Horace E. Cocroft, Jr.

Ref or mat ted
Edi t i on wi t h New
Int roduct i on &
Comment ar y
CONGRATULATIONS!
You Have Downloaded Tis E-Book
How To Save a Copy On Your Computer
Click File > Save As in your browser window
or
Click Save a Copy on your PDF tool bar
Tank you for downloading this great classic
www.ArcManor.com
8uy thc Complctc The Art of WAR at:
(click hcrc)
BUYING OPTIONS FOR PAPERBACK
(click hcrc)
You may also buy this book at othcr nc storcs by scarcing lor
!S8N 0978653637
The Art of War
by
Antoine Henri de Jomini
(Baron de Jomini)
General & Aide-de-Camp of the Emperor of Russia
Originally Published in French in 1836
Tranlated from the French by
Capt. G. H. Mendell
Corps of Topographical Engineers
U.S. Army
&
Lieut. W. P. Craighill
Corps of Engineers
U.S. Army
1862
Tis Edition by
Arc Manor, Rockville, MD
2007
With an Introduction and Commentary by
Horace E. Cocrof, Jr.

The Art of War by Antoine Henri (Baron) de Jomini. Originally published in French,
1836. Translation by G. H. Mendell and W. P. Craighill (Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott),
1862. This edition of The Art of War (also known as Summary Of The Art of War), in
its current format, copyright Arc Manor 2007. Original introduction and commentary
by Horace E. Cocroft, Jr., copyright Arc Manor, 2007. This book, in whole or in
part, may not be copied or reproduced in its current format by any means, electronic,
mechanical or otherwise without permission from the publisher. Permission is granted
for the quotation of short excerpts used solely for literary critique or scholarly purposes.
Contact info@ArcManor.com for more information.
The Original text has been reformatted for clarity and to ft this edition. Illustrations are
taken from the 1862 edition of the translation.

Arc Manor, Arc Manor Classic Reprints and the Arc Manor logo are trademarks or
registered trademarks of Arc Manor Publishers, Rockville, Maryland. All other trademarks
are properties of their respective owners.

Library of Congress Control Number: 2006936549
ISBN-10: 0-9786536-3-7
ISBN-13: 978-0-9786536-3-7
2007
P. O. Box 10339
Rockville, MD 20849-0339
United States of America
MANOR
Ordering Information
Singlc Copics or 8ulk rdcrs may bc ordcrcd by
contacting Sales@ArcManor.com. 8ulk ordcrs,
as wcll as ordcrs lor librarics and cductional
institutions arc cligiblc lor discounts.
Table of Contents
Preface to the 1862 Edition 1
Introduction 3
SUMMARY OF THE ART OF WAR - DEFINITION OF THE ART OF WAR 7
CHAPTER I - STATESMANSHIP IN ITS RELATION TO WAR 9
ARTICLE I - Offensive Wars to Reclaim Rights 10
ARTICLE II - Of Wars Defensive Politically, and Offensive in a
Military Point of View 11
ARTICLE III - Wars of Expediency 12
ARTICLE IV - Of Wars with or without Allies 12
ARTICLE V - Wars of Intervention 13
ARTICLE VI - Aggressive Wars for Conquest and other Reasons 15
ARTICLE VII - Wars of Opinion 17
ARTICLE VIII - National Wars 20
ARTICLE IX - Civil Wars, and Wars of Religion 24
ARTICLE X - Double Wars, and the Danger of Undertaking Two
Wars at Once 25

CHAPTER II - MILITARY POLICY 28
ARTICLE XI - Military Statistics and Geography 29
ARTICLE XII - Other Causes which exercise an Influence upon the
Success of a War 30
ARTICLE XIII - Military Institutions 32
ARTICLE XIV - The Command of Armies, and the Chief Control over
Operations 38
ARTICLE XV - The Military Spirit of Nations, and the Morale of
Armies 43
CHAPTER III - STRATEGY - DEFINITION OF STRATEGY AND THE
FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLE OF WAR 49
ARTICLE XVI - Of the System of Operations 53
ARTICLE XVII - Of the Theater of Operations 55
ARTICLE XVIII - Bases of Operations 58
ARTICLE XIX - Strategic lines and Points, Decisive Points of the
Theater of War, and Objective Points of Operations 63
ARTICLE XX - Fronts of Operations, Strategic Fronts, Lines of
Defense, and Strategic Positions 68
ARTICLE XXI - Zones and Lines of Operations 73
ARTICLE XXII - Strategic Lines 93
ARTICLE XXIII - Means of protecting a Line of Operations by
Temporary Bases or Strategic Reserves 96
ARTICLE XXIV - The Old System of Wars of Position and the Modern
System of Marches 98
ARTICLE XXV - Depots of Supplies, and their Relation to
Marches 102
ARTICLE XXVI - The Defense of Frontiers by Forts and Intrenched
Lines.Wars of Sieges 106
ARTICLE XXVII - The Connection of Intrenched Camps and Tetes de
Ponts with Strategy 112
ARTICLE XXVIII - Strategic Operations in Mountains 116
ARTICLE XXIX - Grand Invasions and Distant Expeditions 122

CHAPTER IV - GRAND TACTICS AND BATTLES 131
ARTICLE XXX - Positions and Defensive Battles 132
ARTICLE XXXI - Offensive Battles, and Different Orders of
Battle 136
ARTICLE XXXII - Turning Maneuvers, and too extended Movement
in Battles 150
ARTICLE XXXIII - Unexpected Meeting of Two Armies on the
March 153
ARTICLE XXXIV - Of Surprises of Armies 154
ARTICLE XXXV - Of the Attack by Main Force of Fortified Places,
Intrenched Camps or Lines.Of Coups de Main in General 155
CHAPTER V - OF SEVERAL MIXED OPERATIONS, WHICH ARE IN
CHARACTER PARTLY STRATEGICAL AND PARTLY TACTICAL 162
ARTICLE XXXVI - Of Diversions and Great Detachments 162
ARTICLE XXXVII - Passage of Rivers and Other Streams 167
ARTICLE XXXVIII - Retreats and Pursuits 172
ARTICLE XXXIX - Of Cantonments, either when on the March, or
when established in Winter Quarters 182
ARTICLE XL - Descents 184
CHAPTER VI - LOGISTICS; OR, THE PRACTICAL ART OF MOVING
ARMIES 188
ARTICLE XLI - A few Remarks on Logistics in General 188
ARTICLE XLII - Of Reconnoissances and other Means of gaining
Correct Information of the Movements of the Enemy 199

CHAPTER VII - OF THE FORMATION OF TROOPS FOR BATTLE, AND THE
SEPARATE OR COMBINED USE OF THE THREE ARMS 207
ARTICLE XLIII - Posting Troops in Line of Battle 207
ARTICLE XLIV - Formation and Employment of Infantry 220
ARTICLE XLV - Cavalry 230
ARTICLE XLVI - Employment of Artillery 238
ARTICLE XLVII - Of the Combined Use of the Three Arms 241

SUPPLEMENT TO THE SUMMARY OF THE ART OF WAR 247
NOTE UPON THE MEANS OF ACQUIRING A GOOD STRATEGIC COUP-
DOEIL 250
SECOND APPENDIX TO THE SUMMARY OF THE ART OF WAR - ON THE
FORMATION OF TROOPS FOR BATTLE 257
SKETCH OF THE PRINCIPAL MARITIME EXPEDITIONS 267
Commentaries
commentary on Chapter I 27
commentary on Chapter II 48
Commentary on Chapter III 129
Commentary on Chapter IV 161
commentary on Chapter V 187
Commentary on Chapter VI 206
commentary on Chapter Vii 246
Concluding commentary 288
Publishers note on illustrations and text
Vc havc rctaincd thc original illustrations to maintain thc avor ol thc original
translation. Howcvcr tcxt has bccn rclormattcd and typcsct lor clarity and casy
rcadability
Preface to the 1862 Edition
I
n thc cxccution ol any undcrtaking thcrc arc cxtrcmcs on cithcr hand which
arc alikc to bc avoidcd. Tc rulc holds in a spccial manncr in making a
translation. Tcrc is, on thc onc sidc, thc cxtrcmc ol too rigid adhcrcncc, word
lor word and linc lor linc, to thc original, and on thc othcr is thc dangcr ol
using too lrcc a pcn. !n cithcr casc thc scnsc ol thc author may not bc truly
givcn. !t is not always casy to prcscrvc a propcr mcan bctwccn thcsc cxtrcmcs.
Tc translators ol Jominis Summary ol thc Principlcs ol thc Art ol Var havc
cndcavorcd to rcndcr thcir author into plain nglish, without mutilating or
adding to his idcas, attcmpting no display and making no criticisms.
To pcrsons accustomcd to rcad lor instruction in military mattcrs, it is not
ncccssary to say a word with rclcrcncc to wthc mcrits ol Jomini. To thosc not
thus accustomcd hcrctolorc, but who arc bccoming morc intcrcstcd in such
subjccts, (and this class must includc thc grcat mass ol thc Amcrican public,)
it is sucicnt to say, and it may bc said with cntirc truth, that Gcncral Jomini
is admittcd by all compctcnt judgcs to bc onc ol thc ablcst military critics and
historians ol this or any othcr day.
Tc translation now prcscntcd to thc pcoplc has bccn madc with thc carncst
hopc and thc sinccrc cxpcctation ol its proving usclul. As thc cxistcncc ol
a largc, wcllinstructcd standing army is dccmcd incompatiblc with our
institutions, it bccomcs thc morc important that military inlormation bc as
cxtcnsivcly diuscd as possiblc among thc pcoplc. !l by thc prcscnt work thc
translators shall nd thcy havc contributcd, cvcn in an inconsidcrablc dcgrcc,
to this important objcct, thcy will bc amply rcpaid lor thc carc and labor
cxpcndcd upon it.
To thosc pcrsons to whom thc study ol thc art ol war is a ncw onc, it is
rccommcndcd to bcgin at thc articlc Stratcgy, Chaptcr !!!., lrom that point
to rcad to thc cnd ol thc Sccond Appcndix, and thcn to rcturn to Chaptcrs
a
Jomini Tc Art ol Var
!. and !!. !t should bc bornc in mind that this subjcct, to bc apprcciatcd,
must bc studicd, map in hand: this rcmark is cspccially truc ol stratcgy. An
acquaintancc with thc campaigns ol Napolcon !. is quitc important, as thcy
arc constantly rclcrrcd to by Jomini and by all othcr rcccnt writcrs on thc
military art.
U.S. Military Acadcmy,
Vcst Point, N.Y.
January, 1862.
Introduction
by Horace E. Cocrof, Jr.
I
n .., Gcncral Norman Schwarzkopl drovc Saddam Husscin out ol
Kuwait using scvcral spccic stratcgics. Schwarzkopl cstablishcd a
tcmporary supply basc in thc Saudi Arabian dcscrt to lorm a basc ol opcrations
lor thc U.S. Scvcnth Corps and thcn uscd Marinc and Arab coalition allics in
a pinning opcration against !raqi troops in Kuwait whilc thc Scvcnth Corps
madc a turning movcmcnt into thc !raqi rcar. Having capturcd its limitcd,
gcographic objcctivc, thc coalition callcd a halt to thc war. Schwarzkopl s
stratcgics camc straight lrom AntoincHcnri Jominis Te Art of War, which
is thc loundation ol prolcssional military cducation in thc Vcstcrn world.
Although scvcral military writcrs prcccdcd Jomini, such as Marshal Saxc
in thc .th ccntury, and somc may bc bcttcr known today, likc Carl \on
Clauscwitz, no othcr military thcorctician has had quitc thc impact on
prolcssional military thinking, doctrinc, and vocabulary as thc Swissborn
sta occr Jomini, whosc work rcmains rclcvant cvcn today.
Jomini (March 6, .,,March a, .6) was born at Paycrnc in thc canton
ol \aud, Switzcrland, whcrc his lathcr was a minor ocial. Jominis carly
military lilc was spcnt in thc armics ol thc Frcnch Rcvolution and thc Hclvctic
Rcpublic (thc Swiss clicnt statc ol thc Frcnch Rcpublic). Altcr thc .c. Trcaty
ol Luncvillc cndcd hostilitics bctwccn Hapsburg Austria and Francc, Jomini
rclocatcd to Paris, ostcnsibly to rcsumc thc busincss carccr intcrruptcd by war
and rcvolution. Morc importantly, hc wrotc his rst work on military thcory,
Trcatisc on Grand Military pcrations. Tis carly work brought him to
thc attcntion ol Marshal Ncy, who placcd Jomini on his sta, as wcll as thc
attcntion ol Napolcon himscll, who cnsurcd Jominis promotion to coloncl
and Gcncral dc 8rigadc and awardcd him thc Lcgion ol Honor. Altcr thc
.c6.c, campaigns in Prussia and Poland, Jomini rcjoincd Ncy as his chicl
ol sta, an arrangcmcnt that lastcd until ...
Altcr Napolcons victory ovcr thc Russians and Prussians at 8autzcn, Jomini
quarrclcd with Napolcons Chicl ol Sta, Louis Alcxandrc 8crthicr, and quit
thc Frcnch army. uring thc armisticc that lollowcd 8autzcn, Jomini joincd
thc Russian scrvicc, whcrc hc rcccivcd thc rank ol licutcnantgcncral, bascd
on thc rcputation ol his writings, hc won thc appointmcnt ol an aidcdccamp
to Czar Alcxandcr. Jominis postwar carccr was primarily in thc Russian army.
Hc was cmploycd in thc military cducation ol Princc Nicholas and playcd a
principlc part in thc organization ol thc Russian sta collcgc. Hc rctircd lrom
activc scrvicc in .a and spcnt his long rctircmcnt writing and commcnting
on military aairs. Te Art of War comcs lrom thc carly part ol his rctircmcnt.
Te Art of War is a book with a purposc to cducatc. !t is not a work ol
philosophy or history, although it contains usclul military history and
intcrcsting commcnts on thc philosophy ol thc usc ol armcd lorcc to achicvc
national goals. !ts purposc locuscs primarily on cducating scrving occrs
on military mattcrs outsidc thc rcgimcntal routincs that wcrc thc brcad and
buttcr ol most .th ccntury linc occrs livcs. A sccondary goal ol thc book
was to givc instruction in military mattcrs to a morc gcncral audicncc. Jomini
succccdcd in producing a book that is practical and casily comprchcndcd.
Te Art of War is bascd on simplc, casily undcrstood maxims or principlcs. 8y
providing commandcrs with a clcar lramcwork by which to plan opcrations,
Jomini wantcd to hclp his studcnts climinatc thc unprcdictablc variablcs
involvcd in making war. Clauscwitz, in contrast, sought to undcrstand thc log
ol war rathcr than climinatc it.
Te Art of War opcns with a largc pcrspcctivc and thcn narrows it down to thc
dctails. Jominis vicwpoint progrcssivcly narrows through thc gcncral military
policy ol a statc and grand stratcgics uscd in thc ghting ol a war down to thc
dcploymcnt ol individual battalions in thc linc ol battlc. Tis progrcssion
lrom thc grand to thc minutc and lrom thc gcncral to thc spccicallows
him to touch upon cvcry lcvcl ol military policy in a way that managcs to bc
both comprchcnsivc and dctailcd.
Tc military schooling ol young occrs in thc .th ccntury was an on
thcjob cducation, usually rcstrictcd to problcms at thc rcgimcntal lcvcl and
gcncrally limitcd to lcadcrship problcms, such as kccping up troops moralc
and maintaining disciplinc in thc ranks. 8attlccld tactics tcndcd to bc lclt to
thc cxpcricncc and imagination ol thc commanding gcncral, supplcmcntcd by
any indcpcndcnt study in military history thc gcncral may havc undcrtakcn.
Vhat was nccdcd was a guidcbook on tactics, stratcgy, and logistics that
providcd clcar, casytoundcrstand principlcs covcring most cvcntualitics.
Jominis Art of War ocrcd a simplc, practical guidcbook lor using troops in
land opcrations in war. His lcssons wcrc writtcn in such a way so as to bc rcadily
undcrstood and copicd. Considcrations that wcrc dicult to quantily, such as
thc moralc ol troops or thc pcrsonalitics ol allicd or opposing commandcrs,
wcrc mcntioncd in passing, but wcrc gcncrally ignorcda lact that has
rcccivcd thc brunt ol thc criticism dircctcd at Jomini. Jomini is accuscd ol
crcating an instruction manual lor warjust lollow thc chccklist to cnsurc

that thc campaign will prospcr. Yct an instruction manual lor thc stratcgic and
opcrational lcvcls ol war was cxactly what carly .th ccntury uropc nccdcd.
!n thc Unitcd Statcs, Jomini is bcst known lor thc inucncc hc had on prc
Civil Var military studics at Vcst Point. His idcas wcrc ltcrcd through
Amcrican military intcrprctcrs likc cnnis Hart Mahan and Hcnry Hallcck.
Jominis rcputation sucrcd at thc hands ol carly war Union commandcrs as a
rcsult ol thc ovcrsimplication ol his thinking. vcrcautious gcncrals such as
Hallcck and McClcllan, who uscd Jominian vocabulary to providc cxcuscs lor
thcir inactivity, havc bccn dcscribcd as Jominian in thcir rcliancc on lormal
principlcs ol war and cautious mancuvcring lor gcographical advantagc. Tc
irony is that Jominian warlarc was practiccd by gcncrals likc Shcrman, who
carclully cmploycd turning movcmcnts to mancuvcr Joc Johnston out ol
position altcr positioning his succcsslul campaign to takc Atlanta, and Grant,
who rcalizcd that Pctcrsburg was thc nodal point that hcld thc kcy to Richmond
and thc army ol Northcrn \irginia. Clcarly Jominian principlcs in thc hands ol
imaginativc gcncrals won thc war. Tc only major commandcr who could not
bc callcd Jominian was Stoncwall Jackson who, in his indcpcndcnt opcrations,
sccmingly ignorcd his own lincs ol communication and bascs ol opcration,
rclying instcad on spccd and surprisc to crcatc chaos in thc Union army.
!ntroduction
,
SUMMARY OF THE ART OF WAR
DEFINITION OF THE ART OF WAR
T
hc art ol war, as gcncrally considcrcd, consists ol vc purcly military
branchcs,viz.: Stratcgy, Grand Tactics, Logistics, nginccring, and
Tactics. A sixth and csscntial branch, hithcrto unrccognizcd, might bc tcrmcd
Diplomacy in its relation to War. Although this branch is morc naturally and
intimatcly conncctcd with thc prolcssion ol a statcsman than with that ol a
soldicr, it cannot bc dcnicd that, il it bc usclcss to a subordinatc gcncral, it
is indispcnsablc to cvcry gcncral commanding an army: it cntcrs into all thc
combinations which may lcad to a war, and has a conncction with thc various
opcrations to bc undcrtakcn in this war, and, in this vicw, it should havc a
placc in a work likc this.
To rccapitulatc, thc art ol war consists ol six distinct parts:
.. Statcsmanship in its rclation to war.
a. Stratcgy, or thc art ol propcrly dirccting masscs upon thc thcatcr ol
war, cithcr lor dclcnsc or lor invasion.
. Grand Tactics.
. Logistics, or thc art ol moving armics.
. nginccring,thc attack and dclcnsc ol lortications.
6. Minor Tactics.
!t is proposcd to analyzc thc principal combinations ol thc rst lour branchcs,
omitting thc considcration ol tactics and ol thc art ol cnginccring.
Familiarity with all thcsc parts is not csscntial in ordcr to bc a good inlantry,
cavalry, or artillcry occr, but lor a gcncral, or lor a sta occr, this knowlcdgc
is indispcnsablc.
CHAPTER I
STATESMANSHIP IN ITS RELATION TO WAR
U
ndcr this hcad arc includcd thosc considcrations lrom which a statcsman
concludcs whcthcr a war is propcr, opportunc, or indispcnsablc, and
dctcrmincs thc various opcrations ncccssary to attain thc objcct ol thc war.
A govcrnmcnt gocs to war,
To rcclaim ccrtain rights or to dclcnd thcm,
To protcct and maintain thc grcat intcrcsts ol thc statc, as commcrcc,
manulacturcs, or agriculturc,
To uphold ncighboring statcs whosc cxistcncc is ncccssary cithcr lor thc
salcty ol thc govcrnmcnt or thc balancc ol powcr,
To lulll thc obligations ol ocnsivc and dclcnsivc allianccs,
To propagatc political or rcligious thcorics, to crush thcm out, or to
dclcnd thcm,
To incrcasc thc inucncc and powcr ol thc statc by acquisitions ol
tcrritory,
To dclcnd thc thrcatcncd indcpcndcncc ol thc statc,
To avcngc insultcd honor, or,
From a mania lor conqucst.
!t may bc rcmarkcd that thcsc dicrcnt kinds ol war inucncc in somc
dcgrcc thc naturc and cxtcnt ol thc corts and opcrations ncccssary lor thc
proposcd cnd. Tc party who has provokcd thc war may bc rcduccd to thc
dclcnsivc, and thc party assailcd may assumc thc ocnsivc, and thcrc may bc
othcr circumstanccs which will acct thc naturc and conduct ol a war, as,
.c
.. A statc may simply makc war against anothcr statc.
a. A statc may makc war against scvcral statcs in alliancc with cach
othcr.
. A statc in alliancc with anothcr may makc war upon a singlc cncmy.
. A statc may bc cithcr thc principal party or an auxiliary.
. !n thc lattcr casc a statc may join in thc strugglc at its bcginning or
altcr it has commcnccd.
6. Tc thcatcr ol war may bc upon thc soil ol thc cncmy, upon that ol an
ally, or upon its own.
,. !l thc war bc onc ol invasion, it may bc upon adjaccnt or distant tcrritory:
it may bc prudcnt and cautious, or it may bc bold and advcnturous.
. !t may bc a national war, cithcr against oursclvcs or against thc
cncmy.
. Tc war may bc a civil or a rcligious war.
Var is always to bc conductcd according to thc grcat principlcs ol thc art,
but grcat discrction must bc cxcrciscd in thc naturc ol thc opcrations to bc
undcrtakcn, which should dcpcnd upon thc circumstanccs ol thc casc.
For cxamplc: two hundrcd thousand Frcnch wishing to subjugatc thc
Spanish pcoplc, unitcd to a man against thcm, would not mancuvcr as thc
samc numbcr ol Frcnch in a march upon \icnna, or any othcr capital, to
compcl a pcacc, nor would a Frcnch army ght thc gucrrillas ol Mina as thcy
lought thc Russians at 8orodino, nor would a Frcnch army vcnturc to march
upon \icnna without considcring what might bc thc tonc and tcmpcr ol thc
govcrnmcnts and communitics bctwccn thc Rhinc and thc !nn, or bctwccn
thc anubc and thc lbc. A rcgimcnt should always ght in ncarly thc samc
way, but commanding gcncrals must bc guidcd by circumstanccs and cvcnts.
To thcsc dicrcnt combinations, which bclong morc or lcss to statcsmanship,
may bc addcd othcrs which rclatc solcly to thc managcmcnt ol armics. Tc
namc Military Policy is givcn to thcm, lor thcy bclong cxclusivcly ncithcr to
diplomacy nor to stratcgy, but arc still ol thc highcst importancc in thc plans
both ol a statcsman and a gcncral.
ARTICLE I
Offensive Wars to Reclaim Rights
Vhcn a statc has claims upon anothcr, it may not always bc bcst to cnlorcc
thcm by arms. Tc public intcrcst must bc consultcd bclorc action.
Tc most just war is onc which is loundcd upon undoubtcd rights, and which,
in addition, promiscs to thc statc advantagcs commcnsuratc with thc sacriccs
rcquircd and thc hazards incurrcd. Unlortunatcly, in our timcs thcrc arc so
..
Chaptcr !. Statcsmanship in !ts Rclation to Var
many doubtlul and contcstcd rights that most wars, though apparcntly bascd
upon bcqucsts, or wills, or marriagcs, arc in rcality but wars ol cxpcdicncy.
Tc qucstion ol thc succcssion to thc Spanish crown undcr Louis X!\. was
vcry clcar, sincc it was plainly scttlcd by a solcmn will, and was supportcd
by lamily tics and by thc gcncral conscnt ol thc Spanish nation, yct it was
stoutly contcstcd by all uropc, and produccd a gcncral coalition against thc
lcgitimatc lcgatcc.
Frcdcrick !!., whilc Austria and Francc wcrc at war, brought lorward an old
claim, cntcrcd Silcsia in lorcc and scizcd this provincc, thus doubling thc powcr
ol Prussia. Tis was a strokc ol gcnius, and, cvcn il hc had lailcd, hc could not
havc bccn much ccnsurcd, lor thc grandcur and importancc ol thc cntcrprisc
justicd him in his attcmpt, as lar as such attcmpts can bc justicd.
!n wars ol this naturc no rulcs can bc laid down. To watch and to prot by
cvcry circumstancc covcrs all that can bc said. cnsivc movcmcnts should
bc suitablc to thc cnd to bc attaincd. Tc most natural stcp would bc to occupy
thc disputcd tcrritory: thcn ocnsivc opcrations may bc carricd on according
to circumstanccs and to thc rcspcctivc strcngth ol thc partics, thc objcct bcing
to sccurc thc ccssion ol thc tcrritory by thc cncmy, and thc mcans bcing to
thrcatcn him in thc hcart ol his own country. vcry thing dcpcnds upon
thc allianccs thc partics may bc ablc to sccurc with othcr statcs, and upon
thcir military rcsourccs. !n an ocnsivc movcmcnt, scrupulous carc must bc
cxcrciscd not to arousc thc jcalousy ol any othcr statc which might comc to thc
aid ol thc cncmy. !t is a part ol thc duty ol a statcsman to lorcscc this chancc,
and to obviatc it by making propcr cxplanations and giving propcr guarantccs
to othcr statcs.
ARTICLE II
Of Wars Defensive Politically, and Offensive in a Military
Point of View
A statc attackcd by anothcr which rcncws an old claim rarcly yiclds it without
a war: it prclcrs to dclcnd its tcrritory, as is always morc honorablc. 8ut it may
bc advantagcous to takc thc ocnsivc, instcad ol awaiting thc attack on thc
lronticrs.
Tcrc arc oltcn advantagcs in a war ol invasion: thcrc arc also advantagcs in
awaiting thc cncmy upon oncs own soil. A powcr with no intcrnal disscnsions,
and undcr no apprchcnsion ol an attack by a third party, will always nd it
advantagcous to carry thc war upon hostilc soil. Tis coursc will sparc its
tcrritory lrom dcvastation, carry on thc war at thc cxpcnsc ol thc cncmy, cxcitc
thc ardor ol its soldicrs, and dcprcss thc spirits ol thc advcrsary. Ncvcrthclcss,
in a purcly military scnsc, it is ccrtain that an army opcrating in its own
tcrritory, upon a thcatcr ol which all thc natural and articial lcaturcs arc wcll
.a
known, whcrc all movcmcnts arc aidcd by a knowlcdgc ol thc country, by thc
lavor ol thc citizcns, and thc aid ol thc constitutcd authoritics, posscsscs grcat
advantagcs.
Tcsc plain truths havc thcir application in all dcscriptions ol war, but, il
thc principlcs ol stratcgy arc always thc samc, it is dicrcnt with thc political
part ol war, which is modicd by thc tonc ol communitics, by localitics, and
by thc charactcrs ol mcn at thc hcad ol statcs and armics. Tc lact ol thcsc
modications has bccn uscd to provc that war knows no rulcs. Military scicncc
rcsts upon principlcs which can ncvcr bc salcly violatcd in thc prcscncc ol an
activc and skilllul cncmy, whilc thc moral and political part ol war prcscnts
thcsc variations. Plans ol opcrations arc madc as circumstanccs may dcmand:
to cxccutc thcsc plans, thc grcat principlcs ol war must bc obscrvcd.
For instancc, thc plan ol a war against Francc, Austria, or Russia would
dicr widcly lrom onc against thc bravc but undisciplincd bands ol Turks,
which cannot bc kcpt in ordcr, arc not ablc to mancuvcr wcll, and posscss no
stcadincss undcr mislortuncs.
ARTICLE III
Wars of Expediency
Tc invasion ol Silcsia by Frcdcrick !!., and thc war ol thc Spanish Succcssion,
wcrc wars ol cxpcdicncy.
Tcrc arc two kinds ol wars ol cxpcdicncy: rst, whcrc a powcrlul statc
undcrtakcs to acquirc natural boundarics lor commcrcial and political
rcasons, sccondly, to lcsscn thc powcr ol a dangcrous rival or to prcvcnt his
aggrandizcmcnt. Tcsc last arc wars ol intcrvcntion, lor a statc will rarcly
singly attack a dangcrous rival: it will cndcavor to lorm a coalition lor that
purposc.
Tcsc vicws bclong rathcr to statcsmanship or diplomacy than to war.
ARTICLE IV
Of Wars with or without Allies
l coursc, in a war an ally is to bc dcsircd, all othcr things bcing cqual.
Although a grcat statc will morc probably succccd than two wcakcr statcs in
alliancc against it, still thc alliancc is strongcr than cithcr scparatcly. Tc ally
not only lurnishcs a contingcnt ol troops, but, in addition, annoys thc cncmy
to a grcat dcgrcc by thrcatcning portions ol his lronticr which othcrwisc would
havc bccn sccurc. All history tcachcs that no cncmy is so insignicant as to bc
dcspiscd and ncglcctcd by any powcr, howcvcr lormidablc.
.
ARTICLE V
Wars of Intervention
To intcrlcrc in a contcst alrcady bcgun promiscs morc advantagcs to a statc than
war undcr any othcr circumstanccs, and thc rcason is plain. Tc powcr which
intcrlcrcs throws upon onc sidc ol thc scalc its wholc wcight and inucncc, it
intcrlcrcs at thc most opportunc momcnt, whcn it can makc dccisivc usc ol
its rcsourccs.
Tcrc arc two kinds ol intcrvcntion: .. !ntcrvcntion in thc intcrnal aairs ol
ncighboring statcs, a. !ntcrvcntion in cxtcrnal rclations.
Vhatcvcr may bc said as to thc moral charactcr ol intcrvcntions ol thc
rst class, instanccs arc lrcqucnt. Tc Romans acquircd powcr by thcsc
intcrlcrcnccs, and thc cmpirc ol thc nglish !ndia Company was assurcd in a
similar manncr. Tcsc intcrvcntions arc not always succcsslul. Vhilc Russia
has addcd to hcr powcr by intcrlcrcncc with Poland, Austria, on thc contrary,
was almost ruincd by hcr attcmpt to intcrlcrc in thc intcrnal aairs ol Francc
during thc Rcvolution.
!ntcrvcntion in thc cxtcrnal rclations ol statcs is morc lcgitimatc, and
pcrhaps morc advantagcous. !t may bc doubtlul whcthcr a nation has thc right
to intcrlcrc in thc intcrnal aairs ol anothcr pcoplc, but it ccrtainly has a
right to opposc it whcn it propagatcs disordcr which may rcach thc adjoining
statcs.
Tcrc arc thrcc rcasons lor intcrvcntion in cxtcrior lorcign wars,viz.: ., by
virtuc ol a trcaty which binds to aid, a, to maintain thc political cquilibrium, ,
to avoid ccrtain cvil conscqucnccs ol thc war alrcady commcnccd, or to sccurc
ccrtain advantagcs lrom thc war not to bc obtaincd othcrwisc.
History is llcd with cxamplcs ol powcrs which havc lallcn by ncglcct ol
thcsc principlcs. A statc bcgins to dcclinc whcn it pcrmits thc immodcratc
aggrandizcmcnt ol a rival, and a sccondary powcr may bccomc thc arbitcr ol
nations il it throw its wcight into thc balancc at thc propcr timc.
!n a military vicw, it sccms plain that thc suddcn appcarancc ol a ncw and
largc army as a third party in a wcllcontcstcd war must bc dccisivc. Much will
dcpcnd upon its gcographical position in rclcrcncc to thc armics alrcady in
thc cld. For cxamplc, in thc wintcr ol .c, Napolcon crosscd thc \istula and
vcnturcd to thc walls ol Kocnigsbcrg, lcaving Austria on his rcar and having
Russia in lront. !l Austria had launchcd an army ol onc hundrcd thousand
mcn lrom 8ohcmia upon thc dcr, it is probablc that thc powcr ol Napolcon
would havc bccn cndcd, thcrc is cvcry rcason to think that his army could not
havc rcgaincd thc Rhinc. Austria prclcrrcd to wait till shc could raisc lour
hundrcd thousand mcn. Two ycars altcrward, with this lorcc shc took thc
cld, and was bcatcn, whilc onc hundrcd thousand mcn wcll cmploycd at thc
propcr timc would havc dccidcd thc latc ol uropc.
.
Tcrc arc scvcral kinds ol war rcsulting lrom thcsc two dicrcnt
intcrvcntions:
.. Vhcrc thc intcrvcntion is mcrcly auxiliary, and with a lorcc spccicd
by lormcr trcatics.
a. Vhcrc thc intcrvcntion is to uphold a lccblc ncighbor by dclcnding his
tcrritory, thus shilting thc sccnc ol war to othcr soil.
. A statc intcrlcrcs as a principal party whcn ncar thc thcatcr ol war,
which supposcs thc casc ol a coalition ol scvcral powcrs against onc.
. A statc intcrlcrcs cithcr in a strugglc alrcady in progrcss, or intcrlcrcs
bclorc thc dcclaration ol war.
Vhcn a statc intcrvcncs with only a small contingcnt, in obcdicncc to trcaty
stipulations, it is simply an acccssory, and has but littlc voicc in thc main
opcrations, but whcn it intcrvcncs as a principal party, and with an imposing
lorcc, thc casc is quitc dicrcnt.
Tc military chanccs in thcsc wars arc varicd. Tc Russian army in thc
Scvcn Ycars Var was in lact auxiliary to that ol Austria and Francc: still, it
was a principal party in thc North until its occupation ol Prussia. 8ut whcn
Gcncrals Fcrmor and Soltiko conductcd thc army as lar as 8randcnburg it
actcd solcly in thc intcrcst ol Austria: thc latc ol thcsc troops, lar lrom thcir
basc, dcpcndcd upon thc good or bad mancuvcring ol thcir allics.
Such distant cxcursions arc dangcrous, and gcncrally dclicatc opcrations.
Tc campaigns ol ., and .c lurnish sad illustrations ol this, to which wc
shall again rclcr in Articlc XX!X., in discussing thc military charactcr ol
thcsc cxpcditions.
!t lollows, thcn, that thc salcty ol thc army may bc cndangcrcd by thcsc
distant intcrvcntions. Tc countcrbalancing advantagc is that its own tcrritory
cannot thcn bc casily invadcd, sincc thc sccnc ol hostilitics is so distant, so that
what may bc a mislortunc lor thc gcncral may bc, in a mcasurc, an advantagc
to thc statc.
!n wars ol this charactcr thc csscntials arc to sccurc a gcncral who is both
a statcsman and a soldicr, to havc clcar stipulations with thc allics as to thc
part to bc takcn by cach in thc principal opcrations, nally, to agrcc upon an
objcctivc point which shall bc in harmony with thc common intcrcsts. 8y thc
ncglcct ol thcsc prccautions, thc grcatcr numbcr ol coalitions havc lailcd, or
havc maintaincd a dicult strugglc with a powcr morc unitcd but wcakcr than
thc allics.
Tc third kind ol intcrvcntion, which consists in intcrlcring with thc wholc
lorcc ol thc statc and ncar to its lronticrs, is morc promising than thc othcrs.
Austria had an opportunity ol this charactcr in .c,, but lailcd to prot by it:
shc again had thc opportunity in ... Napolcon had just collcctcd his lorccs
in Saxony, whcn Austria, taking his lront ol opcrations in rcvcrsc, thrcw
hcrscll into thc strugglc with two hundrcd thousand mcn, with almost pcrlcct
.
ccrtainty ol succcss. Shc rcgaincd in two months thc !talian cmpirc and hcr
inucncc in Gcrmany, which had bccn lost by ltccn ycars ol disastcr. !n this
intcrvcntion Austria had not only thc political but also thc military chanccs in
hcr lavor,a doublc rcsult, combining thc highcst advantagcs.
Hcr succcss was rcndcrcd morc ccrtain by thc lact that whilc thc thcatcr was
sucicntly ncar hcr lronticrs to pcrmit thc grcatcst possiblc display ol lorcc,
shc at thc samc timc intcrlcrcd in a contcst alrcady in progrcss, upon which
shc cntcrcd with thc wholc ol hcr rcsourccs and at thc timc most opportunc
lor hcr.
Tis doublc advantagc is so dccisivc that it pcrmits not only powcrlul
monarchics, but cvcn small statcs, to cxcrcisc a controlling inucncc whcn
thcy know how to prot by it.
Two cxamplcs may cstablish this. !n .a, thc lcctor Mauricc ol Saxony
boldly dcclarcd war against Charlcs \., who was mastcr ol Spain, !taly, and
thc Gcrman cmpirc, and had bccn victorious ovcr Francis !. and hcld Francc
in his grasp. Tis movcmcnt carricd thc war into thc Tyrol, and arrcstcd thc
grcat conqucror in his carccr.
!n .,c6, thc ukc ol Savoy, \ictor Amadcus, by dcclaring himscll hostilc
to Louis X!\., changcd thc statc ol aairs in !taly, and causcd thc rccall ol
thc Frcnch army lrom thc banks ol thc Adigc to thc walls ol Turin, whcrc it
cncountcrcd thc grcat catastrophc which immortalizcd Princc ugcnc.
nough has bccn said to illustratc thc importancc and ccct ol thcsc
opportunc intcrvcntions: morc illustrations might bc givcn, but thcy could not
add to thc conviction ol thc rcadcr.
ARTICLE VI
Aggressive Wars for Conquest and other Reasons
Tcrc arc two vcry dicrcnt kinds ol invasion: onc attacks an adjoining statc,
thc othcr attacks a distant point, ovcr intcrvcning tcrritory ol grcat cxtcnt
whosc inhabitants may bc ncutral, doubtlul, or hostilc.
Vars ol conqucst, unhappily, arc oltcn prospcrous,as Alcxandcr, Cacsar,
and Napolcon during a portion ol his carccr, havc lully provcd. Howcvcr, thcrc
arc natural limits in thcsc wars, which cannot bc passcd without incurring grcat
disastcr. Cambyscs in Nubia, arius in Scythia, Crassus and thc mpcror
Julian among thc Parthians, and Napolcon in Russia, lurnish bloody prools
ol thcsc truths.Tc lovc ol conqucst, howcvcr, was not thc only motivc with
Napolcon: his pcrsonal position, and his contcst with ngland, urgcd him to
cntcrpriscs thc aim ol which was to makc him suprcmc. !t is truc that hc lovcd
war and its chanccs, but hc was also a victim to thc ncccssity ol succccding in
his corts or ol yiclding to ngland. !t might bc said that hc was scnt into this
world to tcach gcncrals and statcsmcn what thcy should avoid. His victorics
.6
tcach what may bc accomplishcd by activity, boldncss, and skill, his disastcrs,
what might havc bccn avoidcd by prudcncc.
A war ol invasion without good rcasonlikc that ol Gcnghis Khanis a
crimc against humanity, but it may bc cxcuscd, il not approvcd, whcn induccd
by grcat intcrcsts or whcn conductcd with good motivcs.
Tc invasions ol Spain ol .c and ol .a dicrcd cqually in objcct and
in rcsults: thc rst was a cunning and wanton attack, which thrcatcncd thc
cxistcncc ol thc Spanish nation, and was latal to its author, thc sccond, whilc
combating dangcrous principlcs, lostcrcd thc gcncral intcrcsts ol thc country,
and was thc morc rcadily brought to a succcsslul tcrmination bccausc its
objcct mct with thc approval ol thc majority ol thc pcoplc whosc tcrritory was
invadcd.
Tcsc illustrations show that invasions arc not ncccssarily all ol thc samc
charactcr. Tc rst contributcd largcly to thc lall ol Napolcon, thc sccond
rcstorcd thc rclation bctwccn Francc and Spain, which ought ncvcr to havc
bccn changcd.
Lct us hopc that invasions may bc rarc. Still, it is bcttcr to attack than to
bc invadcd, and lct us rcmcmbcr that thc surcst way to chcck thc spirit ol
conqucst and usurpation is to opposc it by intcrvcntion at thc propcr timc.
An invasion, to bc succcsslul, must, bc proportioncd in magnitudc to thc
cnd to bc attaincd and to thc obstaclcs to bc ovcrcomc.
An invasion against an cxaspcratcd pcoplc, rcady lor all sacriccs and likcly
to bc aidcd by a powcrlul ncighbor, is a dangcrous cntcrprisc, as was wcll
provcd by thc war in Spain, (.c,) and by thc wars ol thc Rcvolution in .,a,
.,, and .,. !n thcsc lattcr wars, il Francc was bcttcr prcparcd than Spain,
shc had no powcrlul ally, and shc was attackcd by all uropc upon both land
and sca.
Although thc circumstanccs wcrc dicrcnt, thc Russian invasion ol Turkcy
dcvclopcd, in somc rcspccts, thc samc symptoms ol national rcsistancc. Tc
rcligious hatrcd ol thc ttoman powcrlully incitcd him to arms, but thc samc
motivc was powcrlcss among thc Grccks, who wcrc twicc as numcrous as thc
Turks. Had thc intcrcsts ol thc Grccks and Turks bccn harmonizcd, as wcrc
thosc ol Alsacc with Francc, thc unitcd pcoplc would havc bccn strongcr, but
thcy would havc lackcd thc clcmcnt ol rcligious lanaticism. Tc war ol .a
provcd that Turkcy was lormidablc only upon thc lronticrs, whcrc hcr bravcst
troops wcrc lound, whilc in thc intcrior all was wcakncss.
Vhcn an invasion ol a ncighboring tcrritory has nothing to lcar lrom thc
inhabitants, thc principlcs ol stratcgy shapc its coursc. Tc popular lccling
rcndcrcd thc invasions ol !taly, Austria, and Prussia so prompt. (Tcsc military
points arc trcatcd ol in Articlc XX!X.) 8ut whcn thc invasion is distant and
cxtcnsivc tcrritorics intcrvcnc, its succcss will dcpcnd morc upon diplomacy
than upon stratcgy. Tc rst stcp to insurc succcss will bc to sccurc thc
sinccrc and dcvotcd alliancc ol a statc adjoining thc cncmy, which will aord
.,
rcinlorccmcnts ol troops, and, what is still morc important, givc a sccurc basc
ol opcrations, dcpots ol supplics, and a salc rclugc in casc ol disastcr. Tc
ally must havc thc samc intcrcst in succcss as thc invadcrs, to rcndcr all this
possiblc.
iplomacy, whilc almost dccisivc in distant cxpcditions, is not powcrlcss
in adjaccnt invasions, lor hcrc a hostilc intcrvcntion may arrcst thc most
brilliant succcsscs. Tc invasions ol Austria in .c and .c might havc cndcd
dicrcntly il Prussia had intcrlcrcd. Tc invasion ol thc North ol Gcrmany in
.c, was, so to spcak, pcrmittcd by Austria. Tat ol Rumclia in .a might
havc cndcd in disastcr, had not a wisc statcsmanship by ncgotiation obviatcd
all chancc ol intcrvcntion.
ARTICLE VII
Wars of Opinion
Although wars ol opinion, national wars, and civil wars arc somctimcs
conloundcd, thcy dicr cnough to rcquirc scparatc noticc.
Vars ol opinion may bc intcstinc, both intcstinc and lorcign, and, lastly,
(which, howcvcr, is rarc,) thcy may bc lorcign or cxtcrior without bcing
intcstinc or civil.
Vars ol opinion bctwccn two statcs bclong also to thc class ol wars ol
intcrvcntion, lor thcy rcsult cithcr lrom doctrincs which onc party dcsircs to
propagatc among its ncighbors, or lrom dogmas which it dcsircs to crush,
in both cascs lcading to intcrvcntion. Although originating in rcligious or
political dogmas, thcsc wars arc most dcplorablc, lor, likc national wars, thcy
cnlist thc worst passions, and bccomc vindictivc, crucl, and tcrriblc.
Tc wars ol !slamism, thc Crusadcs, thc Tirty Ycars Var, thc wars ol
thc Lcaguc, prcscnt ncarly thc samc charactcristics. ltcn rcligion is thc
prctcxt to obtain political powcr, and thc war is not rcally onc ol dogmas. Tc
succcssors ol Mohammcd carcd morc to cxtcnd thcir cmpirc than to prcach
thc Koran, and Philip !!., bigot as hc was, did not sustain thc Lcaguc in
Francc lor thc purposc ol advancing thc Roman Church. Vc agrcc with M.
Ancclot that Louis !X., whcn hc wcnt on a crusadc in gypt, thought morc ol
thc commcrcc ol thc !ndics than ol gaining posscssion ol thc Holy Scpulchcr.
Tc dogma somctimcs is not only a prctcxt, but is a powcrlul ally, lor it
cxcitcs thc ardor ol thc pcoplc, and also crcatcs a party. For instancc, thc
Swcdcs in thc Tirty Ycars Var, and Philip !!. in Francc, had allics in thc
country morc powcrlul than thcir armics. !t may, howcvcr, happcn, as in thc
Crusadcs and thc wars ol !slamism, that thc dogma lor which thc war is wagcd,
instcad ol lricnds, nds only bittcr cncmics in thc country invadcd, and thcn
thc contcst bccomcs lcarlul.
.
Tc chanccs ol support and rcsistancc in wars ol political opinions arc about
cqual. !t may bc rccollcctcd how in .,a associations ol lanatics thought it
possiblc to propagatc throughout uropc thc lamous dcclaration ol thc rights
ol man, and how govcrnmcnts bccamc justly alarmcd, and rushcd to arms
probably with thc intcntion ol only lorcing thc lava ol this volcano back into
its cratcr and thcrc cxtinguishing it. Tc mcans wcrc not lortunatc, lor war and
aggrcssion arc inappropriatc mcasurcs lor arrcsting an cvil which lics wholly
in thc human passions, cxcitcd in a tcmporary paroxysm, ol lcss duration as
it is thc morc violcnt. Timc is thc truc rcmcdy lor all bad passions and lor all
anarchical doctrincs. A civilizcd nation may bcar thc yokc ol a lactious and
unrcstraincd multitudc lor a short intcrval, but thcsc storms soon pass away,
and rcason rcsumcs hcr sway. To attcmpt to rcstrain such a mob by a lorcign
lorcc is to attcmpt to rcstrain thc cxplosion ol a minc whcn thc powdcr has
alrcady bccn ignitcd: it is lar bcttcr to await thc cxplosion and altcrward ll up
thc cratcr than to try to prcvcnt it and to pcrish in thc attcmpt.
Altcr a prolound study ol thc Rcvolution, ! am convinccd that, il thc
Girondists and National Asscmbly had not bccn thrcatcncd by lorcign
armamcnts, thcy would ncvcr havc darcd to lay thcir sacrilcgious hands upon
thc lccblc but vcncrablc hcad ol Louis X\!. Tc Girondists would ncvcr havc
bccn crushcd by thc Mountain but lor thc rcvcrscs ol umouricz and thc
thrcats ol invasion. And il thcy had bccn pcrmittcd to clash and quarrcl with
cach othcr to thcir hcarts contcnt, it is probablc that, instcad ol giving placc
to thc tcrriblc Convcntion, thc Asscmbly would slowly havc rcturncd to thc
rcstoration ol good, tcmpcratc, monarchical doctrincs, in accordancc with thc
ncccssitics and thc immcmorial traditions ol thc Frcnch.
!n a military vicw thcsc wars arc lcarlul, sincc thc invading lorcc not only is
mct by thc armics ol thc cncmy, but is cxposcd to thc attacks ol an cxaspcratcd
pcoplc. !t may bc said that thc violcncc ol onc party will ncccssarily crcatc
support lor thc invadcrs by thc lormation ol anothcr and oppositc onc, but,
il thc cxaspcratcd party posscsscs all thc public rcsourccs, thc armics, thc
lorts, thc arscnals, and il it is supportcd by a largc majority ol thc pcoplc, ol
what avail will bc thc support ol thc laction which posscsscs no such mcans:
Vhat scrvicc did onc hundrcd thousand \cndcans and onc hundrcd thousand
Fcdcralists do lor thc Coalition in .,:
History contains but a singlc cxamplc ol a strugglc likc that ol thc Rcvolution,
and it appcars to clcarly dcmonstratc thc dangcr ol attacking an intcnscly
cxcitcd nation. Howcvcr thc bad managcmcnt ol thc military opcrations was
onc causc ol thc uncxpcctcd rcsult, and bclorc dcducing any ccrtain maxims
lrom this war, wc should asccrtain what would havc bccn thc rcsult il altcr thc
ight ol umouricz, instcad ol dcstroying and capturing lortrcsscs, thc allics
had inlormcd thc commandcrs ol thosc lortrcsscs that thcy contcmplatcd no
wrong to Francc, to hcr lorts or hcr bravc armics, and had marchcd on Paris
with two hundrcd thousand mcn. Tcy might havc rcstorcd thc monarchy,
and, again, thcy might ncvcr havc rcturncd, at lcast without thc protcction
.
ol an cqual lorcc on thcir rctrcat to thc Rhinc. !t is dicult to dccidc this,
sincc thc cxpcrimcnt was ncvcr madc, and as all would havc dcpcndcd upon
thc coursc ol thc Frcnch nation and thc army. Tc problcm thus prcscnts two
cqually gravc solutions. Tc campaign ol ., gavc onc, whcthcr thc othcr
might havc bccn obtaincd, it is dicult to say. xpcrimcnt alonc could havc
dctcrmincd it.
Tc military prcccpts lor such wars arc ncarly thc samc as lor national
wars, dicring, howcvcr, in a vital point. !n national wars thc country should
bc occupicd and subjugatcd, thc lorticd placcs bcsicgcd and rcduccd, and
thc armics dcstroycd, whcrcas in wars ol opinion it is ol lcss importancc to
subjugatc thc country, hcrc grcat corts should bc madc to gain thc cnd
spccdily, without dclaying lor dctails, carc bcing constantly takcn to avoid any
acts which might alarm thc nation lor its indcpcndcncc or thc intcgrity ol its
tcrritory.
Tc war in Spain in .a is an cxamplc which may bc citcd in lavor ol this
coursc in opposition to that ol thc Rcvolution. !t is truc that thc conditions
wcrc slightly dicrcnt, lor thc Frcnch army ol .,a was madc up ol morc
solid clcmcnts than that ol thc Radicals ol thc !sla dc Lcon. Tc war ol thc
Rcvolution was at oncc a war ol opinion, a national war, and a civil war,
whilc, il thc rst war in Spain in .c was thoroughly a national war, that ol
.a was a partial strugglc ol opinions without thc clcmcnt ol nationality, and
hcncc thc cnormous dicrcncc in thc rcsults.
Morcovcr, thc cxpcdition ol thc ukc ol Angoulcmc was wcll carricd out.
!nstcad ol attacking lortrcsscs, hc actcd in conlormity to thc abovcmcntioncd
prcccpts. Pushing on rapidly to thc bro, hc thcrc dividcd his lorccs, to scizc,
at thcir sourccs, all thc clcmcnts ol strcngth ol thcir cncmics,which thcy
could salcly do, sincc thcy wcrc sustaincd by a majority ol thc inhabitants. !l
hc had lollowcd thc instructions ol thc Ministry, to procccd mcthodically to
thc conqucst ol thc country and thc rcduction ol thc lortrcsscs bctwccn thc
Pyrcnccs and thc bro, in ordcr to providc a basc ol opcrations, hc would
pcrhaps havc lailcd in his mission, or at lcast madc thc war a long and bloody
onc, by cxciting thc national spirit by an occupation ol thc country similar to
that ol .c,.
mboldcncd by thc hcarty wclcomc ol thc pcoplc, hc comprchcndcd that
it was a political opcration rathcr than a military onc, and that it bchoovcd
him to consummatc it rapidly. His conduct, so dicrcnt lrom that ol thc allics
in .,, dcscrvcs carclul attcntion lrom all chargcd with similar missions. !n
thrcc months thc army was undcr thc walls ol Cadiz.
!l thc cvcnts now transpiring in thc Pcninsula provc that statcsmanship
was not ablc to prot by succcss in ordcr to lound a suitablc and solid ordcr
ol things, thc lault was ncithcr in thc army nor in its commandcrs, but in thc
Spanish govcrnmcnt, which, yiclding to thc counscl ol violcnt rcactionarics,
was unablc to risc to thc hcight ol its mission. Tc arbitcr bctwccn two grcat
hostilc intcrcsts, Fcrdinand blindly thrcw himscll into thc arms ol thc party
ac
which prolcsscd a dccp vcncration lor thc thronc, but which intcndcd to usc thc
royal authority lor thc lurthcrancc ol its own cnds, rcgardlcss ol conscqucnccs.
Tc nation rcmaincd dividcd in two hostilc camps, which it would not havc
bccn impossiblc to calm and rcconcilc in timc. Tcsc camps camc ancw into
collision, as ! prcdictcd in \crona in .a,a striking lcsson, by which no onc
is disposcd to prot in that bcautilul and unhappy land, although history is not
wanting in cxamplcs to provc that violcnt rcactions, any morc than rcvolutions,
arc not clcmcnts with which to construct and consolidatc. May God grant
that lrom this lrightlul conict may cmcrgc a strong and rcspcctcd monarchy,
cqually scparatcd lrom all lactions, and bascd upon a disciplincd army as wcll
as upon thc gcncral intcrcsts ol thc country,a monarchy capablc ol rallying
to its support this incomprchcnsiblc Spanish nation, which, with mcrits not
lcss cxtraordinary than its laults, was always a problcm lor thosc who wcrc in
thc bcst position to know it.
ARTICLE VIII
National Wars
National wars, to which wc havc rclcrrcd in spcaking ol thosc ol invasion, arc
thc most lormidablc ol all. Tis namc can only bc applicd to such as arc wagcd
against a unitcd pcoplc, or a grcat majority ol thcm, llcd with a noblc ardor
and dctcrmincd to sustain thcir indcpcndcncc: thcn cvcry stcp is disputcd,
thc army holds only its campground, its supplics can only bc obtaincd at thc
point ol thc sword, and its convoys arc cvcrywhcrc thrcatcncd or capturcd.
Tc spcctaclc ol a spontancous uprising ol a nation is rarcly sccn, and, though
thcrc bc in it somcthing grand and noblc which commands our admiration,
thc conscqucnccs arc so tcrriblc that, lor thc sakc ol humanity, wc ought to
hopc ncvcr to scc it. Tis uprising must not bc conloundcd with a national
dclcnsc in accordancc with thc institutions ol thc statc and dircctcd by thc
govcrnmcnt.
Tis uprising may bc produccd by thc most oppositc causcs. Tc scrls may
risc in a body at thc call ol thc govcrnmcnt, and thcir mastcrs, acctcd by
a noblc lovc ol thcir sovcrcign and country, may sct thcm thc cxamplc and
takc thc command ol thcm, and, similarly, a lanatical pcoplc may arm undcr
thc appcal ol its pricsts, or a pcoplc cnthusiastic in its political opinions, or
animatcd by a sacrcd lovc ol its institutions, may rush to mcct thc cncmy in
dclcnsc ol all it holds most dcar.
Tc control ol thc sca is ol much importancc in thc rcsults ol a national
invasion. !l thc pcoplc posscss a long strctch ol coast, and arc mastcrs ol thc
sca or in alliancc with a powcr which controls it, thcir powcr ol rcsistancc is
quintuplcd, not only on account ol thc lacility ol lccding thc insurrcction and
ol alarming thc cncmy on all thc points hc may occupy, but still morc by thc
a.
dicultics which will bc thrown in thc way ol his procuring supplics by thc
sca.
Tc naturc ol thc country may bc such as to contributc to thc lacility ol
a national dclcnsc. !n mountainous countrics thc pcoplc arc always most
lormidablc, ncxt to thcsc arc countrics covcrcd with cxtcnsivc lorcsts.
Tc rcsistancc ol thc Swiss to Austria and to thc ukc ol 8urgundy, that ol
thc Catalans in .,.a and in .c, thc dicultics cncountcrcd by thc Russians
in thc subjugation ol thc tribcs ol thc Caucasus, and, nally, thc rcitcratcd
corts ol thc Tyrolcsc, clcarly dcmonstratc that thc inhabitants ol mountainous
rcgions havc always rcsistcd lor a longcr timc than thosc ol thc plains,which
is duc as much to thc dicrcncc in charactcr and customs as to thc dicrcncc
in thc natural lcaturcs ol thc countrics.
clcs and largc lorcsts, as wcll as rocky rcgions, lavor this kind ol dclcnsc,
and thc 8ocagc ol La \cndcc, so justly cclcbratcd, provcs that any country,
cvcn il it bc only travcrscd by largc hcdgcs and ditchcs or canals, admits ol a
lormidablc dclcnsc.
Tc dicultics in thc path ol an army in wars ol opinions, as wcll as in
national wars, arc vcry grcat, and rcndcr thc mission ol thc gcncral conducting
thcm vcry dicult. Tc cvcnts just mcntioncd, thc contcst ol thc Ncthcrlands
with Philip !!. and that ol thc Amcricans with thc nglish, lurnish cvidcnt
prools ol this, but thc much morc cxtraordinary strugglc ol La \cndcc with thc
victorious Rcpublic, thosc ol Spain, Portugal, and thc Tyrol against Napolcon,
and, nally, thosc ol thc Morca against thc Turks, and ol Navarrc against thc
armics ol Quccn Christina, arc still morc striking illustrations.
Tc dicultics arc particularly grcat whcn thc pcoplc arc supportcd by a
considcrablc nuclcus ol disciplincd troops. Tc invadcr has only an army:
his advcrsarics havc an army, and a pcoplc wholly or almost wholly in arms,
and making mcans ol rcsistancc out ol cvcry thing, cach individual ol whom
conspircs against thc common cncmy, cvcn thc noncombatants havc an
intcrcst in his ruin and accclcratc it by cvcry mcans in thcir powcr. Hc holds
scarccly any ground but that upon which hc cncamps, outsidc thc limits ol his
camp cvcry thing is hostilc and multiplics a thousandlold thc dicultics hc
mccts at cvcry stcp.
Tcsc obstaclcs bccomc almost insurmountablc whcn thc country is dicult.
ach armcd inhabitant knows thc smallcst paths and thcir conncctions, hc
nds cvcrywhcrc a rclativc or lricnd who aids him, thc commandcrs also
know thc country, and, lcarning immcdiatcly thc slightcst movcmcnt on thc
part ol thc invadcr, can adopt thc bcst mcasurcs to dclcat his projccts, whilc
thc lattcr, without inlormation ol thcir movcmcnts, and not in a condition to
scnd out dctachmcnts to gain it, having no rcsourcc but in his bayoncts, and
ccrtain salcty only in thc conccntration ol his columns, is likc a blind man:
his combinations arc lailurcs, and whcn, altcr thc most carclullyconccrtcd
movcmcnts and thc most rapid and latiguing marchcs, hc thinks hc is about
to accomplish his aim and dcal a tcrriblc blow, hc nds no signs ol thc cncmy
aa
but his camprcs: so that whilc, likc on Quixotc, hc is attacking windmills,
his advcrsary is on his linc ol communications, dcstroys thc dctachmcnts lclt
to guard it, surpriscs his convoys, his dcpots, and carrics on a war so disastrous
lor thc invadcr that hc must incvitably yicld altcr a timc.
!n Spain ! was a witncss ol two tcrriblc cxamplcs ol this kind. Vhcn Ncys
corps rcplaccd Soults at Corunna, ! had campcd thc companics ol thc artillcry
train bctwccn 8ctanzos and Corunna, in thc midst ol lour brigadcs distant
lrom thc camp lrom two to thrcc lcagucs, and no Spanish lorccs had bccn sccn
within lty milcs, Soult still occupicd Santiago dc Compostcla, thc division
MauriccMathicu was at Fcrrol and Lugo, Marchands at Corunna and
8ctanzos: ncvcrthclcss, onc nc night thc companics ol thc trainmcn and
horscsdisappcarcd, and wc wcrc ncvcr ablc to discovcr what bccamc ol thcm:
a solitary woundcd corporal cscapcd to rcport that thc pcasants, lcd by thcir
monks and pricsts, had thus madc away with thcm. Four months altcrward,
Ncy with a singlc division marchcd to conqucr thc Asturias, dcsccnding thc
vallcy ol thc Navia, whilc Kcllcrmann dcbouchcd lrom Lcon by thc vicdo
road. A part ol thc corps ol La Romana which was guarding thc Asturias
marchcd bchind thc vcry hcights which inclosc thc vallcy ol thc Navia, at
most but a lcaguc lrom our columns, without thc marshal knowing a word ol
it: whcn hc was cntcring Gijon, thc army ol La Romana attackcd thc ccntcr
ol thc rcgimcnts ol thc division Marchand, which, bcing scattcrcd to guard
Galicia, barcly cscapcd, and that only by thc prompt rcturn ol thc marshal to
Lugo. Tis war prcscntcd a thousand incidcnts as striking as this. All thc gold
ol Mcxico could not havc procurcd rcliablc inlormation lor thc Frcnch, what
was givcn was but a lurc to makc thcm lall morc rcadily into snarcs.
No army, howcvcr disciplincd, can contcnd succcsslully against such a systcm
applicd to a grcat nation, unlcss it bc strong cnough to hold all thc csscntial
points ol thc country, covcr its communications, and at thc samc timc lurnish
an activc lorcc sucicnt to bcat thc cncmy whcrcvcr hc may prcscnt himscll. !l
this cncmy has a rcgular army ol rcspcctablc sizc to bc a nuclcus around which
to rally thc pcoplc, what lorcc will bc sucicnt to bc supcrior cvcrywhcrc,
and to assurc thc salcty ol thc long lincs ol communication against numcrous
bodics:
Tc Pcninsular Var should bc carclully studicd, to lcarn all thc obstaclcs
which a gcncral and his bravc troops may cncountcr in thc occupation or
conqucst ol a country whosc pcoplc arc all in arms. Vhat corts ol paticncc,
couragc, and rcsignation did it not cost thc troops ol Napolcon, Masscna,
Soult, Ncy, and Suchct to sustain thcmsclvcs lor six ycars against thrcc or lour
hundrcd thousand armcd Spaniards and Portugucsc supportcd by thc rcgular
armics ol Vcllington, 8crcslord, 8lakc, La Romana, Cucsta, Castanos,
Rcding, and 8allastcros!
!l succcss bc possiblc in such a war, thc lollowing gcncral coursc will bc most
likcly to insurc it,viz.: makc a display ol a mass ol troops proportioncd to thc
obstaclcs and rcsistancc likcly to bc cncountcrcd, calm thc popular passions
a
in cvcry possiblc way, cxhaust thcm by timc and paticncc, display courtcsy,
gcntlcncss, and scvcrity unitcd, and, particularly, dcal justly. Tc cxamplcs
ol Hcnry !\. in thc wars ol thc Lcaguc, ol Marshal 8crwick in Catalonia, ol
Suchct in Aragon and \alcncia, ol Hochc in La \cndcc, arc modcls ol thcir
kind, which may bc cmploycd according to circumstanccs with cqual succcss.
Tc admirablc ordcr and disciplinc ol thc armics ol icbitsch and Paskcvitch
in thc latc war wcrc also modcls, and wcrc not a littlc conducivc to thc succcss
ol thcir cntcrpriscs.
Tc immcnsc obstaclcs cncountcrcd by an invading lorcc in thcsc wars havc
lcd somc spcculativc pcrsons to hopc that thcrc should ncvcr bc any othcr
kind, sincc thcn wars would bccomc morc rarc, and, conqucst bcing also morc
dicult, would bc lcss a tcmptation to ambitious lcadcrs. Tis rcasoning is
rathcr plausiblc than solid, lor, to admit all its conscqucnccs, it would bc
ncccssary always to bc ablc to inducc thc pcoplc to takc up arms, and it would
also bc ncccssary lor us to bc convinccd that thcrc would bc in thc luturc no
wars but thosc ol conqucst, and that all lcgitimatc though sccondary wars,
which arc only to maintain thc political cquilibrium or dclcnd thc public
intcrcsts, should ncvcr occur again: othcrwisc, how could it bc known whcn
and how to cxcitc thc pcoplc to a national war: For cxamplc, il onc hundrcd
thousand Gcrmans crosscd thc Rhinc and cntcrcd Francc, originally with thc
intcntion ol prcvcnting thc conqucst ol 8clgium by Francc, and without any
othcr ambitious projcct, would it bc a casc whcrc thc wholc populationmcn,
womcn, and childrcnol Alsacc, Lorrainc, Champagnc, and 8urgundy,
should rush to arms: to makc a Saragossa ol cvcry wallcd town, to bring
about, by way ol rcprisals, murdcr, pillagc, and inccndiarism throughout thc
country: !l all this bc not donc, and thc Gcrmans, in conscqucncc ol somc
succcss, should occupy thcsc provinccs, who can say that thcy might not
altcrward scck to appropriatc a part ol thcm, cvcn though at rst thcy had
ncvcr contcmplatcd it: Tc diculty ol answcring thcsc two qucstions would
sccm to arguc in lavor ol national wars. 8ut is thcrc no mcans ol rcpclling such
an invasion without bringing about an uprising ol thc wholc population and
a war ol cxtcrmination: !s thcrc no mcan bctwccn thcsc contcsts bctwccn thc
pcoplc and thc old rcgular mcthod ol war bctwccn pcrmancnt armics: Vill it
not bc sucicnt, lor thc ccicnt dclcnsc ol thc country, to organizc a militia,
or landwchr, which, unilormcd and callcd by thcir govcrnmcnts into scrvicc,
would rcgulatc thc part thc pcoplc should takc in thc war, and placc just limits
to its barbaritics:
! answcr in thc armativc, and, applying this mixcd systcm to thc cascs
statcd abovc, ! will guarantcc that lty thousand rcgular Frcnch troops,
supportcd by thc National Guards ol thc ast, would gct thc bcttcr ol this
Gcrman army which had crosscd thc \osgcs, lor, rcduccd to lty thousand
mcn by many dctachmcnts, upon ncaring thc Mcusc or arriving in Argonnc it
would havc onc hundrcd thousand mcn on its hands. To attain this mcan, wc
havc laid it down as a ncccssity that good national rcscrvcs bc prcparcd lor thc
army, which will bc lcss cxpcnsivc in pcacc and will insurc thc dclcnsc ol thc
a
country in war. Tis systcm was uscd by Francc in .,a, imitatcd by Austria in
.c, and by thc wholc ol Gcrmany in ...
! sum up this discussion by asscrting that, without bcing a utopian
philanthropist, or a condotticri, a pcrson may dcsirc that wars ol cxtcrmination
may bc banishcd lrom thc codc ol nations, and that thc dclcnscs ol nations by
disciplincd militia, with thc aid ol good political allianccs, may bc sucicnt
to insurc thcir indcpcndcncc.
As a soldicr, prclcrring loyal and chivalrous warlarc to organizcd assassination,
il it bc ncccssary to makc a choicc, ! acknowlcdgc that my prcjudiccs arc in
lavor ol thc good old timcs whcn thc Frcnch and nglish Guards courtcously
invitcd cach othcr to rc rst,as at Fontcnoy,prclcrring thcm to thc
lrightlul cpoch whcn pricsts, womcn, and childrcn throughout Spain plottcd
thc murdcr ol isolatcd soldicrs.
ARTICLE IX
Civil Wars, and Wars of Religion
!ntcstinc wars, whcn not conncctcd with a lorcign quarrcl, arc gcncrally
thc rcsult ol a conict ol opinions, ol political or rcligious scctarianism. !n
thc Middlc Agcs thcy wcrc morc lrcqucntly thc collisions ol lcudal partics.
Rcligious wars arc abovc all thc most dcplorablc.
Vc can undcrstand how a govcrnmcnt may nd it ncccssary to usc lorcc
against its own subjccts in ordcr to crush out lactions which would wcakcn thc
authority ol thc thronc and thc national strcngth, but that it should murdcr its
citizcns to compcl thcm to say thcir praycrs in Frcnch or Latin, or to rccognizc
thc suprcmacy ol a lorcign ponti, is dicult ol conccption. Ncvcr was a king
morc to bc piticd than Louis X!\., who pcrsccutcd a million ol industrious
Protcstants, who had put upon thc thronc his own Protcstant anccstor. Vars
ol lanaticism arc horriblc whcn minglcd with cxtcrior wars, and thcy arc also
lrightlul whcn thcy arc lamily quarrcls. Tc history ol Francc in thc timcs ol
thc Lcaguc should bc an ctcrnal lcsson lor nations and kings. !t is dicult to
bclicvc that a pcoplc so noblc and chivalrous in thc timc ol Francis !. should
in twcnty ycars havc lallcn into so dcplorablc a statc ol brutality.
To givc maxims in such wars would bc absurd. Tcrc is onc rulc upon which
all thoughtlul mcn will bc agrccd: that is, to unitc thc two partics or sccts to
drivc thc lorcigncrs lrom thc soil, and altcrward to rcconcilc by trcaty thc
conicting claims or rights. !ndccd, thc intcrvcntion ol a third powcr in a
rcligious disputc can only bc with ambitious vicws.
Govcrnmcnts may in good laith intcrvcnc to prcvcnt thc sprcading ol a
political discasc whosc principlcs thrcatcn social ordcr, and, although thcsc
lcars arc gcncrally cxaggcratcd and arc oltcn mcrc prctcxts, it is possiblc that
a statc may bclicvc its own institutions mcnaccd. 8ut in rcligious disputcs this
a
is ncvcr thc casc, and Philip !!. could havc had no othcr objcct in intcrlcring
in thc aairs ol thc Lcaguc than to subjcct Francc to his inucncc, or to
dismcmbcr it.
ARTICLE X
Double Wars, and the Danger of Undertaking Two
Wars at Once
Tc cclcbratcd maxim ol thc Romans, not to undcrtakc two grcat wars at thc
samc timc, is so wcll known and so wcll apprcciatcd as to sparc thc ncccssity
ol dcmonstrating its wisdom.
A govcrnmcnt maybc compcllcd to maintain a war against two ncighboring
statcs, but it will bc cxtrcmcly unlortunatc il it docs not nd an ally to comc
to its aid, with a vicw to its own salcty and thc maintcnancc ol thc political
cquilibrium. !t will scldom bc thc casc that thc nations allicd against it will
havc thc samc intcrcst in thc war and will cntcr into it with all thcir rcsourccs,
and, il onc is only an auxiliary, it will bc an ordinary war.
Louis X!\., Frcdcrick thc Grcat, thc mpcror Alcxandcr, and Napolcon,
sustaincd gigantic strugglcs against unitcd uropc. Vhcn such contcsts arisc
lrom voluntary aggrcssions, thcy arc prool ol a capital crror on thc part ol
thc statc which invitcs thcm, but il thcy arisc lrom impcrious and incvitablc
circumstanccs thcy must bc mct by sccking allianccs, or by opposing such
mcans ol rcsistancc as shall cstablish somcthing likc cquality bctwccn thc
strcngth ol thc partics.
Tc grcat coalition against Louis X!\., nominally arising lrom his dcsigns
on Spain, had its rcal origin in prcvious aggrcssions which had alarmcd his
ncighbors. To thc combincd lorccs ol uropc hc could only opposc thc laithlul
alliancc ol thc lcctor ol 8avaria, and thc morc cquivocal onc ol thc ukc ol
Savoy, who, indccd, was not slow in adding to thc numbcr ol his cncmics.
Frcdcrick, with only thc aid ol thc subsidics ol ngland, and lty thousand
auxiliarics lrom six dicrcnt statcs, sustaincd a war against thc thrcc most
powcrlul monarchics ol uropc: thc division and lolly ol his opponcnts wcrc
his bcst lricnds.
8oth thcsc wars, as wcll as that sustaincd by Alcxandcr in ..a, it was almost
impossiblc to avoid.
Francc had thc wholc ol uropc on its hands in .,, in conscqucncc ol
thc cxtravagant provocations ol thc Jacobins, and thc Utopian idcas ol thc
Girondists, who boastcd that with thc support ol thc nglish ccts thcy would
dcly all thc kings in thc world. Tc rcsult ol thcsc absurd calculations was a
lrightlul uphcaval ol uropc, lrom which Francc miraculously cscapcd.
Napolcon is, to a ccrtain dcgrcc, thc only modcrn sovcrcign who has
voluntarily at thc samc timc undcrtakcn two, and cvcn thrcc, lormidablc
a6
wars,with Spain, with ngland, and with Russia, but in thc last casc hc
cxpcctcd thc aid ol Austria and Prussia, to say nothing ol that ol Turkcy
and Swcdcn, upon which hc countcd with too much ccrtainty, so that thc
cntcrprisc was not so advcnturous on his part as has bccn gcncrally supposcd.
!t will bc obscrvcd that thcrc is a grcat distinction bctwccn a war madc
against a singlc statc which is aidcd by a third acting as an auxiliary, and two
wars conductcd at thc samc timc against two powcrlul nations in oppositc
quartcrs, who cmploy all thcir lorccs and rcsourccs. For instancc, thc doublc
contcst ol Napolcon in .c against Austria and Spain aidcd by ngland was
a vcry dicrcnt aair lrom a contcst with Austria assistcd by an auxiliary lorcc
ol a givcn strcngth. Tcsc lattcr contcsts bclong to ordinary wars.
!t lollows, thcn, in gcncral, that doublc wars should bc avoidcd il possiblc,
and, il causc ol war bc givcn by two statcs, it is morc prudcnt to dissimulatc or
ncglcct thc wrongs sucrcd lrom onc ol thcm, until a propcr opportunity lor
rcdrcssing thcm shall arrivc. Tc rulc, howcvcr, is not without cxccption: thc
rcspcctivc lorccs, thc localitics, thc possibility ol nding allics to rcstorc, in
a mcasurc, cquality ol strcngth bctwccn thc partics, arc circumstanccs which
will inucncc a govcrnmcnt so thrcatcncd. Vc now havc lulllcd our task, in
noting both thc dangcr and thc mcans ol rcmcdying it.
a,
commentary on Chapter I
C
haptcr . dcncs wars and thc rclationship ol diplomacy and statcsmanship
in thc conduct ol military opcrations, probably owing a grcat dcal to
Clauscwitz. Tcrc is no hint ol this brcadth ol thought in thc Trcatisc on Grand
Military pcrations ol Jominis carly carccr. His conccssion that dicrcnt
typcs ol wars nccd to bc lought in dicring lashions is an ccho ol Clauscwitzs
lamous writings in n Var about thc impact ol thc political sphcrc on thc
military. Tc catcgorization ol dicrcnt typcs ol wars is somcwhat arbitrary,
but thc advicc in cach articlc is ol importancc to both soldicr and statcsman.
!n this chaptcr, Jomini issucs warnings about paying propcr attcntion to thc
gcncral diplomatic situation and to intcrnational opinion, public opinion is not
ignorcd. Knowlcdgc ol domcstic opinion is important so that lcadcrs havc an
undcrstanding ol thc lcvcl ol sacricc thcir pcoplc will bc willing to acccpt.
According to Jomini, an accuratc asscssmcnt ol popular opinion in cncmy
statcs is vital in cvaluating thc lcvcl ol opposition that can bc cxpcctcd during
war. Tcsc warnings providc usclul rcmindcrs that wars arcnt lought in a
vacuum. Jomini givcs concrctc cxamplcs ol how dicring political situations
acct military opcrations. !n Articlc \!, hc contrasts Napolcons lutilc
attcmpt to conqucr Spain in .c with thc succcsslul Frcnch intcrvcntion
in Spains intcrnal aairs in .a to show how thc dicrcnt intcrnal political
climatc ol Spain rcquircd dicrcnt military stratcgics and produccd dicrcnt
outcomcs. Politicians and statcsmcn cannot simply hand ovcr thc conduct ol a
war to gcncrals without apprising thcm ol thc gcncral diplomatic and political
situation and cautioning thcm as to any rcstraints on military opcrations that
thc situation dcmands.
a
CHAPTER II
MILITARY POLICY
W
c havc alrcady cxplaincd what wc undcrstand by this titlc. !t cmbraccs
thc moral combinations rclating to thc opcrations ol armics. !l thc
political considcrations which wc havc just discusscd bc also moral, thcrc arc
othcrs which inucncc, in a ccrtain dcgrcc, thc conduct ol a war, which bclong
ncithcr to diplomacy, stratcgy, nor tactics. Vc includc thcsc undcr thc hcad
ol Military Policy.
Military policy may bc said to cmbracc all thc combinations ol any projcctcd
war, cxccpt thosc rclating to thc diplomatic art and stratcgy, and, as thcir
numbcr is considcrablc, a scparatc articlc cannot bc assigncd to cach without
cnlarging too much thc limits ol this work, and without dcviating lrom my
intcntion,which is, not to givc a trcatisc on thcscs subjccts, but to point out
thcir rclations to military opcrations.
!ndccd, in this class wc may placc thc passions ol thc nation to bc lought,
thcir military systcm, thcir immcdiatc mcans and thcir rcscrvcs, thcir nancial
rcsourccs, thc attachmcnt thcy bcar to thcir govcrnmcnt or thcir institutions,
thc charactcr ol thc cxccutivc, thc charactcrs and military abilitics ol thc
commandcrs ol thcir armics, thc inucncc ol cabinct councils or councils
ol war at thc capital upon thcir opcrations, thc systcm ol war in lavor with
thcir sta, thc cstablishcd lorcc ol thc statc and its armamcnt, thc military
gcography and statistics ol thc statc which is to bc invadcd, and, nally, thc
rcsourccs and obstaclcs ol cvcry kind likcly to bc mct with, all ol which arc
includcd ncithcr in diplomacy nor in stratcgy.
Tcrc arc no xcd rulcs on such subjccts, cxccpt that thc govcrnmcnt should
ncglcct nothing in obtaining a knowlcdgc ol thcsc dctails, and that it is
indispcnsablc to takc thcm into considcration in thc arrangcmcnt ol all plans.
Vc proposc to skctch thc principal points which ought to guidc in this sort ol
combinations.
a
Chaptcr !!. Military Policy
ARTICLE XI
Military Statistics and Geography
8y thc rst ol thcsc scicnccs wc undcrstand thc most thorough knowlcdgc
possiblc ol thc clcmcnts ol powcr and military rcsourccs ol thc cncmy with
whom wc arc callcd upon to contcnd, thc sccond consists in thc topographical
and stratcgic dcscription ol thc thcatcr ol war, with all thc obstaclcs, natural
or articial, to bc cncountcrcd, and thc cxamination ol thc pcrmancnt dccisivc
points which may bc prcscntcd in thc wholc cxtcnt ol thc lronticr or throughout
thc cxtcnt ol thc country. 8csidcs thc ministcr ol war, thc commanding gcncral
and his chicl ol sta should bc aordcd this inlormation, undcr thc pcnalty
ol crucl miscalculations in thcir plans, as happcns lrcqucntly in our day,
dcspitc thc grcat stridcs civilizcd nations havc takcn in statistical, diplomatic,
gcographical, and topographical scicnccs. ! will citc two cxamplcs ol which !
was cognizant. !n .,6, Morcaus army, cntcring thc 8lack Forcst, cxpcctcd to
nd tcrriblc mountains, lrightlul dclcs and lorcsts, and was grcatly surpriscd
to discovcr, altcr climbing thc dcclivitics ol thc platcau that slopc to thc Rhinc,
that thcsc, with thcir spurs, wcrc thc only mountains, and that thc country,
lrom thc sourccs ol thc anubc to onauwcrth, was a rich and lcvcl plain.
Tc sccond cxamplc was in ... Napolcon and his wholc army supposcd
thc intcrior ol 8ohcmia to bc vcry mountainous,whcrcas thcrc is no district
in uropc morc lcvcl, altcr thc girdlc ol mountains surrounding it has bccn
crosscd, which may bc donc in a singlc march.
All uropcan occrs hcld thc samc crroncous opinions in rclcrcncc to thc
8alkan and thc Turkish lorcc in thc intcrior. !t sccmcd that it was givcn out at
Constantinoplc that this provincc was an almost imprcgnablc barricr and thc
palladium ol thc cmpirc,an crror which !, having livcd in thc Alps, did not
cntcrtain. thcr prcjudiccs, not lcss dccply rootcd, havc lcd to thc bclicl that
a pcoplc all thc individuals ol which arc constantly armcd would constitutc
a lormidablc militia and would dclcnd thcmsclvcs to thc last cxtrcmity.
xpcricncc has provcd that thc old rcgulations which placcd thc clitc ol thc
Janissarics in thc lronticrcitics ol thc anubc madc thc population ol thosc
citics morc warlikc than thc inhabitants ol thc intcrior. !n lact, thc projccts ol
rclorm ol thc Sultan Mahmoud rcquircd thc ovcrthrow ol thc old systcm, and
thcrc was no timc to rcplacc it by thc ncw: so that thc cmpirc was dclcnsclcss.
xpcricncc has constantly provcd that a mcrc multitudc ol bravc mcn armcd
to thc tccth makc ncithcr a good army nor a national dclcnsc.
Lct us rcturn to thc ncccssity ol knowing wcll thc military gcography and
statistics ol an cmpirc. Tcsc scicnccs arc not sct lorth in trcatiscs, and arc
yct to bc dcvclopcd. Lloyd, who wrotc an cssay upon thcm, in dcscribing thc
lronticrs ol thc grcat statcs ol uropc, was not lortunatc in his maxims and
prcdictions. Hc saw obstaclcs cvcrywhcrc, hc rcprcscnts as imprcgnablc thc
Austrian lronticr on thc !nn, bctwccn thc Tyrol and Passau, whcrc Napolcon
c
and Morcau mancuvcrcd and triumphcd with armics ol onc hundrcd and lty
thousand mcn in .cc, .c, and .c.
8ut, il thcsc scicnccs arc not publicly taught, thc archivcs ol thc uropcan
sta must ncccssarily posscss many documcnts valuablc lor instruction in
thcm,at lcast lor thc spccial sta school. Awaiting thc timc whcn somc
studious occr, proting by thosc publishcd and unpublishcd documcnts, shall
prcscnt uropc with a good military and stratcgic gcography, wc may, thanks
to thc immcnsc progrcss ol topography ol latc ycars, partially supply thc want
ol it by thc cxccllcnt charts publishcd in all uropcan countrics within thc
last twcnty ycars. At thc bcginning ol thc Frcnch Rcvolution topography was
in its inlancy: cxccpting thc scmitopographical map ol Cassini, thc works ol
8akcnbcrg alonc mcritcd thc namc. Tc Austrian and Prussian sta schools,
howcvcr, wcrc good, and havc sincc bornc lruit. Tc charts publishcd rcccntly
at \icnna, at 8crlin, Munich, Stuttgart, and Paris, as wcll as thosc ol thc
institutc ol Hcrdcr at Fribourg, promisc to luturc gcncrals immcnsc rcsourccs
unknown to thcir prcdcccssors.
Military statistics is not much bcttcr known than gcography. Vc havc
but vaguc and supcrcial statcmcnts, lrom which thc strcngth ol armics and
navics is conjccturcd, and also thc rcvcnuc supposcd to bc posscsscd by a
statc,which is lar lrom bcing thc knowlcdgc ncccssary to plan opcrations.
ur objcct hcrc is not to discuss thoroughly thcsc important subjccts, but to
indicatc thcm, as lacilitating succcss in military cntcrpriscs.
ARTICLE XII
Other Causes which exercise an Influence upon the
Success of a War
As thc cxcitcd passions ol a pcoplc arc ol thcmsclvcs always a powcrlul cncmy,
both thc gcncral and his govcrnmcnt should usc thcir bcst corts to allay
thcm. Vc havc nothing to add to what has bccn said on this point undcr thc
hcad ol national wars.
n thc othcr hand, thc gcncral should do cvcry thing to clcctrily his own
soldicrs, and to impart to thcm thc samc cnthusiasm which hc cndcavors to
rcprcss in his advcrsarics. All armics arc alikc susccptiblc ol this spirit: thc
springs ol action and mcans, only, vary with thc national charactcr. Military
cloqucncc is onc mcans, and has bccn thc subjcct ol many a trcatisc. Tc
proclamations ol Napolcon and ol Paskcvitch, thc addrcsscs ol thc ancicnts
to thcir soldicrs, and thosc ol Suwaro to mcn ol still grcatcr simplicity, arc
modcls ol thcir dicrcnt kinds. Tc cloqucncc ol thc Spanish Juntas, and thc
miraclcs ol thc Madonna dcl Pilar, lcd to thc samc rcsults by vcry dicrcnt
mcans. !n gcncral, a chcrishcd causc, and a gcncral who inspircs condcncc by
prcvious succcss, arc powcrlul mcans ol clcctrilying an army and conducing
.
to victory. Somc disputc thc advantagcs ol this cnthusiasm, and prclcr
impcrturbablc coolncss in battlc. 8oth havc unmistakablc advantagcs and
disadvantagcs. nthusiasm impcls to thc pcrlormancc ol grcat actions: thc
diculty is in maintaining it constantly, and, whcn discouragcmcnt succccds
it, disordcr casily rcsults.
Tc grcatcr or lcss activity and boldncss ol thc commandcrs ol thc armics arc
clcmcnts ol succcss or lailurc, which cannot bc submittcd to rulcs. A cabinct
and a commandcr ought to considcr thc intrinsic valuc ol thcir troops, and
that rcsulting lrom thcir organization as comparcd with that ol thc cncmy. A
Russian gcncral, commanding thc most solidly organizcd troops in uropc,
nccd not lcar to undcrtakc any thing against undisciplincd and unorganizcd
troops in an opcn country, howcvcr bravc may bc its individuals.
|!|
Conccrt in
action makcs strcngth, ordcr produccs this conccrt, and disciplinc insurcs ordcr,
and without disciplinc and ordcr no succcss is possiblc. Tc Russian gcncral
would not bc so bold bclorc uropcan troops having thc samc instruction and
ncarly thc samc disciplinc as his own. Finally, a gcncral may attcmpt with a
Mack as his antagonist what it would bc madncss to do with a Napolcon.
Tc action ol a cabinct in rclcrcncc to thc control ol armics inucnccs thc
boldncss ol thcir opcrations. A gcncral whosc gcnius and hands arc ticd by an
Aulic council vc hundrcd milcs distant cannot bc a match lor onc who has
libcrty ol action, othcr things bcing cqual.
As to supcriority in skill, it is onc ol thc most ccrtain plcdgcs ol victory, all
othcr things bcing cqual. !t is truc that grcat gcncrals havc oltcn bccn bcatcn by
inlcrior oncs, but an cxccption docs not makc a rulc. An ordcr misundcrstood,
a lortuitous cvcnt, may throw into thc hands ol thc cncmy all thc chanccs ol
succcss which a skilllul gcncral had prcparcd lor himscll by his mancuvcrs.
8ut thcsc arc risks which cannot bc lorcsccn nor avoidcd. Vould it bc lair on
that account to dcny thc inucncc ol scicncc and principlcs in ordinary aairs:
Tis risk cvcn provcs thc triumph ol thc principlcs, lor it happcns that thcy arc
applicd accidcntally by thc army against which it was intcndcd to apply thcm,
and arc thc causc ol its succcss. 8ut, in admitting this truth, it may bc said
that it is an argumcnt against scicncc, this objcction is not wcll loundcd, lor a
gcncrals scicncc consists in providing lor his sidc all thc chanccs possiblc to
bc lorcsccn, and ol coursc cannot cxtcnd to thc capriccs ol dcstiny. vcn il thc
numbcr ol battlcs gaincd by skilllul mancuvcrs did not cxcccd thc numbcr duc
to accidcnt, it would not invalidatc my asscrtion.
!l thc skill ol a gcncral is onc ol thc surcst clcmcnts ol victory, it will rcadily
bc sccn that thc judicious sclcction ol gcncrals is onc ol thc most dclicatc
points in thc scicncc ol govcrnmcnt and onc ol thc most csscntial parts ol
thc military policy ol a statc. Unlortunatcly, this choicc is inucnccd by so
many pctty passions, that chancc, rank, agc, lavor, party spirit, jcalousy, will
!
!rrcgular troops supportcd by disciplincd troops may bc ol thc grcatcst valuc, in dcstroying
convoys, intcrccpting communication, &c., and mayas in thc casc ol thc Frcnch in ..amakc a rctrcat
vcry disastrous
a
havc as much to do with it as thc public intcrcst and justicc. Tis subjcct is so
important that wc will dcvotc to it a scparatc articlc.
ARTICLE XIII
Military Institutions
nc ol thc most important points ol thc military policy ol a statc is thc naturc
ol its military institutions. A good army commandcd by a gcncral ol ordinary
capacity may accomplish grcat lcats, a bad army with a good gcncral may
do cqually wcll, but an army will ccrtainly do a grcat dcal morc il its own
supcriority and that ol thc gcncral bc combincd.
Twclvc csscntial conditions concur in making a pcrlcct army:
.. To havc a good rccruitingsystcm,
a. A good organization,
. A wcllorganizcd systcm ol national rcscrvcs,
. Good instruction ol occrs and mcn in drill and intcrnal dutics as wcll
as thosc ol a campaign,
. A strict but not humiliating disciplinc, and a spirit ol subordination
and punctuality, bascd on conviction rathcr than on thc lormalitics ol
thc scrvicc,
6. A wclldigcstcd systcm ol rcwards, suitablc to cxcitc cmulation,
,. Tc spccial arms ol cnginccring and artillcry to bc wcll instructcd,
. An armamcnt supcrior, il possiblc, to that ol thc cncmy, both as to
dclcnsivc and ocnsivc arms,
. A gcncral sta capablc ol applying thcsc clcmcnts, and having an
organization calculatcd to advancc thc thcorctical and practical cducation
ol its occrs,
.c. A good systcm lor thc commissariat, hospitals, and ol gcncral
administration,
... A good systcm ol assignmcnt to command, and ol dirccting thc
principal opcrations ol war,
.a. xciting and kccping alivc thc military spirit ol thc pcoplc.
To thcsc conditions might bc addcd a good systcm ol clothing and cquipmcnt,
lor, il this bc ol lcss dircct importancc on thc cld ol battlc, it ncvcrthclcss has
a bcaring upon thc prcscrvation ol thc troops, and it is always a grcat objcct to
cconomizc thc livcs and hcalth ol vctcrans.
Nonc ol thc abovc twclvc conditions can bc ncglcctcd without gravc
inconvcnicncc. A nc army, wcll drillcd and disciplincd, but without national
rcscrvcs, and unskilllully lcd, sucrcd Prussia to lall in ltccn days undcr thc

attacks ol Napolcon. n thc othcr hand, it has oltcn bccn sccn ol how much
advantagc it is lor a statc to havc a good army. !t was thc carc and skill ol Philip
and Alcxandcr in lorming and instructing thcir phalanxcs and rcndcring thcm
casy to movc, and capablc ol thc most rapid mancuvcrs, which cnablcd thc
Maccdonians to subjugatc !ndia and Pcrsia with a handlul ol choicc troops. !t
was thc cxccssivc lovc ol his lathcr lor soldicrs which procurcd lor Frcdcrick
thc Grcat an army capablc ol cxccuting his grcat cntcrpriscs.
A govcrnmcnt which ncglccts its army undcr any prctcxt whatcvcr is thus
culpablc in thc cycs ol postcrity, sincc it prcparcs humiliation lor its standards
and its country, instcad ol by a dicrcnt coursc prcparing lor it succcss. Vc arc
lar lrom saying that a govcrnmcnt should sacricc cvcry thing to thc army, lor
this would bc absurd, but it ought to makc thc army thc objcct ol its constant
carc, and il thc princc has not a military cducation it will bc vcry dicult lor
him to lulll his duty in this rcspcct. !n this cascwhich is, unlortunatcly, ol
too lrcqucnt occurrcnccthc dclcct must bc supplicd by wisc institutions, at
thc hcad ol which arc to bc placcd a good systcm ol thc gcncral sta, a good
systcm ol rccruiting, and a good systcm ol national rcscrvcs.
Tcrc arc, indccd, lorms ol govcrnmcnt which do not always allow thc
cxccutivc thc powcr ol adopting thc bcst systcms. !l thc armics ol thc Roman
and Frcnch rcpublics, and thosc ol Louis X!\. and Frcdcrick ol Prussia, provc
that a good military systcm and a skilllul dircction ol opcrations may bc
lound in govcrnmcnts thc most oppositc in principlc, it cannot bc doubtcd
that, in thc prcscnt statc ol thc world, thc lorm ol govcrnmcnt cxcrciscs a grcat
inucncc in thc dcvclopmcnt ol thc military strcngth ol a nation and thc valuc
ol its troops.
Vhcn thc control ol thc public lunds is in thc hands ol thosc acctcd by
local intcrcst or party spirit, thcy may bc so ovcrscrupulous and pcnurious
as to takc all powcr to carry on thc war lrom thc cxccutivc, whom vcry many
pcoplc sccm to rcgard as a public cncmy rathcr than as a chicl dcvotcd to all
thc national intcrcsts.
Tc abusc ol badlyundcrstood public libcrtics may also contributc to
this dcplorablc rcsult. Tcn it will bc impossiblc lor thc most larsightcd
administration to prcparc in advancc lor a grcat war, whcthcr it bc dcmandcd
by thc most important intcrcsts ol thc country at somc luturc timc, or whcthcr
it bc immcdiatc and ncccssary to rcsist suddcn aggrcssions.
!n thc lutilc hopc ol rcndcring thcmsclvcs popular, may not thc mcmbcrs
ol an clcctivc lcgislaturc, thc majority ol whom cannot bc Richclicus, Pitts, or
Louvois, in a misconccivcd spirit ol cconomy, allow thc institutions ncccssary
lor a largc, wcllappointcd, and disciplincd army to lall into dccay: cccivcd
by thc scductivc lallacics ol an cxaggcratcd philanthropy, may thcy not cnd in
convincing thcmsclvcs and thcir constitucnts that thc plcasurcs ol pcacc arc
always prclcrablc to thc morc statcsmanlikc prcparations lor war:
! am lar lrom advising that statcs should always havc thc hand upon thc
sword and always bc cstablishcd on a warlooting: such a condition ol things

would bc a scourgc lor thc human racc, and would not bc possiblc, cxccpt
undcr conditions not cxisting in all countrics. ! simply mcan that civilizcd
govcrnmcnts ought always to bc rcady to carry on a war in a short timc,that
thcy should ncvcr bc lound unprcparcd. And thc wisdom ol thcir institutions
may do as much in this work ol prcparation as lorcsight in thcir administration
and thc pcrlcction ol thcir systcm ol military policy.
!l, in ordinary timcs, undcr thc rulc ol constitutional lorms, govcrnmcnts
subjcctcd to all thc changcs ol an clcctivc lcgislaturc arc lcss suitablc than
othcrs lor thc crcation or prcparation ol a lormidablc military powcr,
ncvcrthclcss, in grcat criscs thcsc dclibcrativc bodics havc somctimcs attaincd
vcry dicrcnt rcsults, and havc concurrcd in dcvcloping to thc lull cxtcnt thc
national strcngth. Still, thc small numbcr ol such instanccs in history makcs
rathcr a list ol cxccptional cascs, in which a tumultuous and violcnt asscmbly,
placcd undcr thc ncccssity ol conqucring or pcrishing, has protcd by thc
cxtraordinary cnthusiasm ol thc nation to savc thc country and thcmsclvcs
at thc samc timc by rcsorting to thc most tcrriblc mcasurcs and by calling to
its aid an unlimitcd dictatorial powcr, which ovcrthrcw both libcrty and law
undcr thc prctcxt ol dclcnding thcm. Hcrc it is thc dictatorship, or thc absolutc
and monstrous usurpation ol powcr, rathcr than thc lorm ol thc dclibcrativc
asscmbly, which is thc truc causc ol thc display ol cncrgy. Vhat happcncd
in thc Convcntion altcr thc lall ol Robcspicrrc and thc tcrriblc Committcc
ol Public Salcty provcs this, as wcll as thc Chambcrs ol ... Now, il thc
dictatorial powcr, placcd in thc hands ol a lcw, has always bccn a plank ol
salcty in grcat criscs, it sccms natural to draw thc conclusion that countrics
controllcd by clcctivc asscmblics must bc politically and militarily wcakcr than
purc monarchics, although in othcr rcspccts thcy prcscnt dccidcd advantagcs.
!t is particularly ncccssary to watch ovcr thc prcscrvation ol armics in thc
intcrval ol a long pcacc, lor thcn thcy arc most likcly to dcgcncratc. !t is
important to lostcr thc military spirit in thc armics, and to cxcrcisc thcm
in grcat mancuvcrs, which, though but laintly rcscmbling thosc ol actual
war, still arc ol dccidcd advantagc in prcparing thcm lor war. !t is not lcss
important to prcvcnt thcm lrom bccoming ccminatc, which may bc donc by
cmploying thcm in labors usclul lor thc dclcnsc ol thc country.
Tc isolation in garrisons ol troops by rcgimcnts is onc ol thc worst possiblc
systcms, and thc Russian and Prussian systcm ol divisions and pcrmancnt
corps darmcc sccms to bc much prclcrablc. !n gcncral tcrms, thc Russian
army now may bc prcscntcd as a modcl in many rcspccts, and il in many points
its customs would bc usclcss and impracticablc clscwhcrc, it must bc admittcd
that many good institutions might wcll bc copicd lrom it.
As to rcwards and promotion, it is csscntial to rcspcct long scrvicc, and at
thc samc timc to opcn a way lor mcrit. Trcclourths ol thc promotions in
cach gradc should bc madc according to thc rostcr, and thc rcmaining lourth
rcscrvcd lor thosc distinguishcd lor mcrit and zcal. n thc contrary, in timc
ol war thc rcgular ordcr ol promotion should bc suspcndcd, or at lcast rcduccd

to a third ol thc promotions, lcaving thc othcr twothirds lor brilliant conduct
and markcd scrviccs.
Tc supcriority ol armamcnt may incrcasc thc chanccs ol succcss in war: it
docs not, ol itscll, gain battlcs, but it is a grcat clcmcnt ol succcss. vcry onc
can rccall how ncarly latal to thc Frcnch at 8ylau and Marcngo was thcir
grcat inlcriority in artillcry. Vc may also rclcr to thc grcat gain ol thc hcavy
Frcnch cavalry in thc rcsumption ol thc cuirass, which thcy had lor so long
thrown asidc. vcry onc knows thc grcat advantagc ol thc lancc. oubtlcss,
as skirmishcrs lanccrs would not bc morc ccctual than hussars, but whcn
charging in linc it is a vcry dicrcnt aair. How many bravc cavalry soldicrs
havc bccn thc victims ol thc prcjudicc thcy borc against thc lancc bccausc it
was a littlc morc troublc to carry than a sabcr!
Tc armamcnt ol armics is still susccptiblc ol grcat improvcmcnts, thc statc
which shall takc thc lcad in making thcm will sccurc grcat advantagcs. Tcrc
is littlc lclt to bc dcsircd in artillcry, but thc ocnsivc and dclcnsivc arms ol
inlantry and cavalry dcscrvc thc attcntion ol a providcnt govcrnmcnt.
Tc ncw invcntions ol thc last twcnty ycars sccm to thrcatcn a grcat
rcvolution in army organization, armamcnt, and tactics. Stratcgy alonc will
rcmain unaltcrcd, with its principlcs thc samc as undcr thc Scipios and Cacsars,
Frcdcrick and Napolcon, sincc thcy arc indcpcndcnt ol thc naturc ol thc arms
and thc organization ol thc troops.
Tc mcans ol dcstruction arc approaching pcrlcction with lrightlul rapidity.
|!|

Tc Congrcvc rockcts, thc ccct and dircction ol which it is said thc Austrians
can now rcgulatc,thc shrapncl howitzcrs, which throw a strcam ol canistcr
as lar as thc rangc ol a bullct,thc Pcrkins stcamguns, which vomit lorth as
many balls as a battalion,will multiply thc chanccs ol dcstruction, as though
thc hccatombs ol ylau, 8orodino, Lcipsic, and Vatcrloo wcrc not sucicnt
to dccimatc thc uropcan raccs.
!l govcrnmcnts do not combinc in a congrcss to proscribc thcsc invcntions
ol dcstruction, thcrc will bc no coursc lclt but to makc thc hall ol an army
consist ol cavalry with cuirasscs, in ordcr to capturc with grcat rapidity thcsc
machincs, and thc inlantry, cvcn, will bc obligcd to rcsumc its armor ol thc
Middlc Agcs, without which a battalion will bc dcstroycd bclorc cngaging
thc cncmy.
Vc may thcn scc again thc lamous mcnatarms all covcrcd with armor, and
horscs also will rcquirc thc samc protcction.
Vhilc thcrc is doubt about thc rcalization ol thcsc lcars, it is, howcvcr,
ccrtain that artillcry and pyrotcchny havc madc advanccs which should lcad
!
!t will bc rccollcctcd that thc author wrotc this many ycars ago, sincc which timc thc invcntivc
gcnius ol thc agc has bccn attcntivcly dircctcd to thc improvcmcnt ol rcarms. Artillcry, which hc rcgardcd
as almost pcrlcct, has ccrtainly undcrgonc important improvcmcnts, and thc improvcd ccicncy ol small
arms is no lcss markcd, whilc wc hcar nothing now ol Pcrkinss stcamguns, and as yct no civilizcd army
has bccn organizcd upon thc plan thc author suggcsts lor dcpriving thcsc dcstructivc machincs ol thcir
ccicncy.TRANSLATRS.
6
us to think ol modilying thc dccp lormation so much abuscd by Napolcon.
Vc will rccur to this in thc chaptcr on Tactics.
Vc will hcrc rccapitulatc, in a lcw words, thc csscntial bascs ol thc military
policy which ought to bc adoptcd by a wisc govcrnmcnt.
.. Tc princc should rcccivc an cducation both political and military. Hc will
morc probably nd mcn ol administrativc ability in his councils than good
statcsmcn or soldicrs, and hcncc hc should bc both ol thc lattcr himscll.
a. !l thc princc in pcrson docs not lcad his armics, it will bc his rst duty
and his ncarcst intcrcst to havc his placc wcll supplicd. Hc must condc thc
glory ol his rcign and thc salcty ol his statcs to thc gcncral most capablc ol
dirccting his armics.
. Tc pcrmancnt army should not only always bc upon a rcspcctablc looting,
but it should bc capablc ol bcing doublcd, il ncccssary, by rcscrvcs, which
should always bc prcparcd. !ts instruction and disciplinc should bc ol a high
charactcr, as wcll as its organization, its armamcnt should at lcast bc as good
as that ol its ncighbors, and supcrior il possiblc.
. Tc matcricl ol war should also bc upon thc bcst looting, and abundant.
Tc rcscrvcs should bc storcd in thc dcpots and arscnals. National jcalousy
should not bc allowcd to prcvcnt thc adoption ol all improvcmcnts in this
matcricl madc in othcr countrics.
. !t is ncccssary that thc study ol thc military scicnccs should bc cncouragcd
and rcwardcd, as wcll as couragc and zcal. Tc scicntic military corps should
bc cstccmcd and honorcd: this is thc only way ol sccuring lor thc army mcn
ol mcrit and gcnius.
6. Tc gcncral sta in timcs ol pcacc should bc cmploycd in labors prcparatory
lor all possiblc contingcncics ol war. !ts archivcs should bc lurnishcd with
numcrous historical dctails ol thc past, and with all statistical, gcographical,
topographical, and stratcgic trcatiscs and papcrs lor thc prcscnt and luturc.
Hcncc it is csscntial that thc chicl ol this corps, with a numbcr ol its occrs,
should bc pcrmancntly stationcd at thc capital in timc ol pcacc, and thc war
occ should bc simply that ol thc gcncral sta, cxccpt that thcrc should bc
a sccrct dcpartmcnt lor thosc documcnts to bc conccalcd lrom thc subaltcrns
ol thc corps.
,. Nothing should bc ncglcctcd to acquirc a knowlcdgc ol thc gcography and
thc military statistics ol othcr statcs, so as to know thcir matcrial and moral
capacity lor attack and dclcnsc, as wcll as thc stratcgic advantagcs ol thc two
partics. istinguishcd occrs should bc cmploycd in thcsc scicntic labors,
and should bc rcwardcd whcn thcy acquit thcmsclvcs with markcd ability.
. Vhcn a war is dccidcd upon, it bccomcs ncccssary to prcparc, not an cntirc
plan ol opcrations,which is always impossiblc,but a systcm ol opcrations
in rclcrcncc to a prcscribcd aim, to providc a basc, as wcll as all thc matcrial
mcans ncccssary to guarantcc thc succcss ol thc cntcrprisc.
,
. Tc systcm ol opcrations ought to bc dctcrmincd by thc objcct ol thc war,
thc kind ol lorccs ol thc cncmy, thc naturc and rcsourccs ol thc country, thc
charactcrs ol thc nations and ol thcir chicls, whcthcr ol thc army or ol thc
statc. !n nc, it should bc bascd upon thc moral and matcrial mcans ol attack
or dclcnsc which thc cncmy may bc ablc to bring into action, and it ought to
takc into considcration thc probablc allianccs that may obtain in lavor ol or
against cithcr ol thc partics during thc war.
.c. Tc nancial condition ol a nation is to bc wcighcd among thc chanccs
ol a war. Still, it would bc dangcrous to constantly attributc to this condition
thc importancc attachcd to it by Frcdcrick thc Grcat in thc history ol his
timcs. Hc was probably right at his cpoch, whcn armics wcrc chicy rccruitcd
by voluntary cnlistmcnt, whcn thc last crown brought thc last soldicr, but
whcn national lcvics arc wcll organiscd moncy will no longcr cxcrcisc thc
samc inucncc,at lcast lor onc or two campaigns. !l ngland has provcd
that moncy will procurc soldicrs and auxiliarics, Francc has provcd that lovc
ol country and honor arc cqually productivc, and that, whcn ncccssary, war
may bc madc to support war. Francc, indccd, in thc lcrtility ol hcr soil and thc
cnthusiasm ol hcr lcadcrs, posscsscd sourccs ol tcmporary powcr which cannot
bc adoptcd as a gcncral basc ol a systcm, but thc rcsults ol its corts wcrc nonc
thc lcss striking. vcry ycar thc numcrous rcports ol thc cabinct ol London,
and particularly ol M. dYvcrnois, announccd that Francc was about to brcak
down lor want ol moncy, whilc Napolcon had acc,ccc,ccc lrancs
|!|
in thc
vaults ol thc Tuilcrics, all thc whilc mccting thc cxpcnscs ol thc govcrnmcnt,
including thc pay ol his armics.
A powcr might bc ovcrrunning with gold and still dclcnd itscll vcry badly.
History, indccd, provcs that thc richcst nation is ncithcr thc strongcst nor thc
happicst. !ron wcighs at lcast as much as gold in thc scalcs ol military strcngth.
Still, wc must admit that a happy combination ol wisc military institutions,
ol patriotism, ol wcllrcgulatcd nanccs, ol intcrnal wcalth and public crcdit,
imparts to a nation thc grcatcst strcngth and makcs it bcst capablc ol sustaining
a long war.
A volumc would bc ncccssary to discuss all thc circumstanccs undcr which
a nation may dcvclop morc or lcss strcngth, cithcr by its gold or iron, and to
dctcrminc thc cascs whcn war may bc cxpcctcd to support war. Tis rcsult can
only bc obtaincd by carrying thc army into thc tcrritory ol thc cncmy, and all
countrics arc not cqually capablc ol lurnishing rcsourccs to an assailant.
Vc nccd not cxtcnd lurthcr thc invcstigation ol thcsc subjccts which arc
not dircctly conncctcd with thc art ol war. !t is sucicnt lor our purposc to
indicatc thcir rclations to a projcctcd war, and it will bc lor thc statcsman to
dcvclop thc modications which circumstanccs and localitics may makc in
thcsc rclations.
!
Tcrc was a dccit in thc nanccs ol Francc at thc lall ol Napolcon. !t was thc rcsult ol his
disastcrs, and ol thc stupcndous corts hc was obligcd to makc. Tcrc was no dccit in ....

ARTICLE XIV
The Command of Armies, and the Chief Control over
Operations
!s it an advantagc to a statc to havc its armics commandcd in pcrson by thc
monarch: Vhatcvcr may bc thc dccision on this point, it is ccrtain that il
thc princc posscss thc gcnius ol Frcdcrick, Pctcr thc Grcat, or Napolcon, hc
will bc lar lrom lcaving to his gcncrals thc honor ol pcrlorming grcat actions
which hc might do himscll, lor in this hc would bc untruc to his own glory
and to thc wcllbcing ol thc country.
As it is not our mission to discuss thc qucstion whcthcr it is morc lortunatc
lor a nation to havc a warlikc or a pcaccloving princc, (which is a philanthropic
qucstion, lorcign to our subjcct,) wc will only statc upon this point that, with
cqual mcrit and chanccs in othcr rcspccts, a sovcrcign will always havc an
advantagc ovcr a gcncral who is himscll not thc hcad ol a statc. Lcaving out
ol thc qucstion that hc is rcsponsiblc only to himscll lor his bold cntcrpriscs,
hc may do much by thc ccrtainty hc has ol bcing ablc to disposc ol all thc
public rcsourccs lor thc attainmcnt ol his cnd. Hc also posscsscs thc powcrlul
acccssory ol his lavor, ol rccompcnscs and punishmcnts, all will bc dcvotcd
to thc cxccution ol his ordcrs, and to insurc lor his cntcrpriscs thc grcatcst
succcss, no jcalousy will intcrlcrc with thc cxccution ol his projccts, or at lcast
its cxhibition will bc rarc and in sccondary opcrations. Hcrc arc, ccrtainly,
sucicnt motivcs to inducc a princc to lcad his armics, il hc posscss military
capacity and thc contcst bc ol a magnitudc worthy ol him. 8ut il hc posscss
no military ability, il his charactcr bc lccblc, and hc bc casily inucnccd, his
prcscncc with thc army, instcad ol producing good rcsults, will opcn thc way
lor all manncr ol intrigucs. ach onc will prcscnt his projccts to him, and,
as hc will not havc thc cxpcricncc ncccssary to cstimatc thcm according to
thcir mcrits, hc will submit his judgmcnt to that ol his intimatcs. His gcncral,
intcrlcrcd with and opposcd in all his cntcrpriscs, will bc unablc to achicvc
succcss, cvcn il hc havc thc rcquisitc ability. !t may bc said that a sovcrcign might
accompany thc army and not intcrlcrc with his gcncral, but, on thc contrary,
aid him with all thc wcight ol his inucncc. !n this casc his prcscncc might
bc productivc ol good rcsults, but it also might lcad to grcat cmbarrassmcnt.
!l thc army wcrc turncd and cut o lrom its communications, and obligcd
to cxtricatc itscll, sword in hand, what sad rcsults might not lollow lrom thc
prcscncc ol thc sovcrcign at hcadquartcrs!
Vhcn a princc lccls thc ncccssity ol taking thc cld at thc hcad ol his armics,
but lacks thc ncccssary scllcondcncc to assumc thc suprcmc dircction ol
aairs, thc bcst coursc will bc that adoptcd by thc Prussian govcrnmcnt with
8lucchcr,viz., hc should bc accompanicd by two gcncrals ol thc bcst capacity,
onc ol thcm a man ol cxccutivc ability, thc othcr a wcllinstructcd sta occr.
!l this trinity bc harmonious, it may yicld cxccllcnt rcsults, as in thc casc ol
thc army ol Silcsia in ...

Tc samc systcm might apply in thc casc whcrc thc sovcrcign judgcs it propcr
to intrust thc command to a princc ol his housc, as has lrcqucntly happcncd
sincc thc timc ol Louis X!\. !t has oltcn occurrcd that thc princc posscsscd
only thc titular command, and that an adviscr, who in rcality commandcd,
was imposcd upon him. Tis was thc casc with thc ukc ol rlcans and
Marsin at thc lamous battlc ol Turin, altcrward with thc ukc ol 8urgundy
and \cndomc at thc battlc ol Audcnardc, and, ! think, also at Ulm with thc
Archdukc Fcrdinand and Mack. Tis systcm is dcplorablc, sincc no onc is
rcsponsiblc lor what is donc. !t is known that at thc battlc ol Turin thc ukc
ol rlcans cxhibitcd morc sagacity than Marsin, and it bccamc ncccssary lor
thc lattcr to show lull sccrct authority lrom thc king bclorc thc princc would
yicld his judgmcnt and allow thc battlc to bc lost. So at Ulm thc archdukc
displaycd morc skill and couragc than Mack, who was to bc his mcntor.
!l thc princc posscss thc gcnius and cxpcricncc ol thc Archdukc Charlcs,
hc should bc invcstcd with thc untrammclcd command, and bc allowcd lull
sclcction ol his instrumcnts. !l hc havc not yct acquircd thc samc titlcs to
command, hc may thcn bc providcd with an cducatcd gcncral ol thc sta, and
anothcr gcncral distinguishcd lor his talcnt in cxccution, but in no casc will it
bc wisc to invcst cithcr ol thcsc counsclors with morc authority than a voicc
in consultation.
Vc havc alrcady said that il thc princc do not conduct his armics in pcrson,
his most important duty will bc to havc thc position ol commandcr wcll llcd,
which, unlortunatcly, is not always donc. Vithout going back to ancicnt timcs,
it will bc sucicnt to rccall thc morc modcrn cxamplcs undcr Louis X!\.
and Louis X\. Tc mcrit ol Princc ugcnc was cstimatcd by his dclormcd
gurc, and this drovc him (thc ablcst commandcr ol his timc) into thc ranks
ol thc cncmy. Altcr Louvois dcath, Tallard, Marsin, and \illcroi llcd thc
placcs ol Turcnnc, Condc, and Luxcmbourg, and subscqucntly Soubisc and
Clcrmont succccdcd Marshal Saxc. 8ctwccn thc lashionablc sclcctions madc
in thc Saloons ol thc Pompadours and ubarrys, and Napolcons prclcrcncc
lor mcrc soldicrs, thcrc arc many gradations, and thc margin is widc cnough to
aord thc lcast intclligcnt govcrnmcnt mcans ol making rational nominations,
but, in all agcs, human wcakncsscs will cxcrcisc an inucncc in onc way or
anothcr, and articc will oltcn carry o thc prizc lrom modcst or timid mcrit,
which awaits a call lor its scrviccs. 8ut, lcaving out ol considcration all thcsc
inucnccs, it will bc protablc to inquirc in what rcspccts this choicc ol a
commandcr will bc dicult, cvcn whcn thc cxccutivc shall bc most anxious to
makc it a judicious onc. !n thc rst placc, to makc choicc ol a skilllul gcncral
rcquircs cithcr that thc pcrson who makcs thc sclcction shall bc a military
man, ablc to lorm an intclligcnt opinion, or that hc should bc guidcd by thc
opinions ol othcrs, which opcns thc way to thc impropcr inucncc ol cliqucs.
Tc cmbarrassmcnt is ccrtainly lcss whcn thcrc is at hand a gcncral alrcady
illustrious by many victorics, but, outsidc ol thc lact that cvcry gcncral is not
a grcat lcadcr bccausc hc has gaincd a battlc, (lor instancc, Jourdan, Schcrcr,
and many othcrs,) it is not always thc casc that a victorious gcncral is at thc
c
disposition ol thc govcrnmcnt. !t may wcll happcn that altcr a long pcriod ol
pcacc, thcrc may not bc a singlc gcncral in uropc who has commandcd in
chicl. !n this casc, it will bc dicult to dccidc whcthcr onc gcncral is bcttcr
than anothcr. Tosc who havc scrvcd long in pcacc will bc at thc hcad ol thcir
arms or corps, and will havc thc rank appropriatc lor this position, but will thcy
always bc thc most capablc ol lling it: Morcovcr, thc intcrcoursc ol thc hcads
ol a govcrnmcnt with thcir subordinatcs is gcncrally so rarc and transicnt, that
it is not astonishing thcy should cxpcricncc diculty in assigning mcn to thcir
appropriatc positions. Tc judgmcnt ol thc princc, mislcd by appcaranccs, may
crr, and, with thc purcst intcntions, hc may wcll bc dcccivcd in his sclcctions.
nc ol thc surcst mcans ol cscaping this mislortunc would sccm to bc in
rcalizing thc bcautilul ction ol Fcnclon in Tclcmachus, by nding a laithlul,
sinccrc, and gcncrous Philoclcs, who, standing bctwccn thc princc and all
aspirants lor thc command, would bc ablc, by mcans ol his morc dircct
rclations to thc public, to cnlightcn thc monarch in rclcrcncc to sclcctions ol
individuals bcst rccommcndcd by thcir charactcr and abilitics. 8ut will this
laithlul lricnd ncvcr yicld to pcrsonal acctions: Vill hc bc always lrcc lrom
prcjudicc: Suwaro was rcjcctcd by Potcmkin on account ol his appcarancc,
and it rcquircd all thc art ol Cathcrinc to sccurc a rcgimcnt lor thc man who
altcrward shcd so much lustcr upon thc Russian arms.
!t has bccn thought that public opinion is thc bcst guidc, but nothing could
bc morc dangcrous. !t votcd umouricz to bc a Cacsar, whcn hc was ignorant
ol thc grcat opcrations ol war. Vould it havc placcd 8onapartc at thc hcad
ol thc army ol !taly, whcn hc was known only by two dircctors: Still, it must
bc admittcd that, il not inlalliblc, public scntimcnt is not to bc dcspiscd,
particularly il it survivc grcat criscs and thc cxpcricncc ol cvcnts.
Tc most csscntial qualitics lor a gcncral will always bc as lollow:First, A
high moral courage, capable of great resolutions, Sccondly, A physical courage which
takes no account of danger. His scicntic or military acquircmcnts arc sccondary
to thc abovcmcntioncd charactcristics, though il grcat thcy will bc valuablc
auxiliarics. !t is not ncccssary that hc should bc a man ol vast crudition. His
knowlcdgc may bc limitcd, but it should bc thorough, and hc should bc pcrlcctly
groundcd in thc principlcs at thc basc ol thc art ol war. Ncxt in importancc
comc thc qualitics ol his pcrsonal charactcr. A man who is gallant, just, rm,
upright, capablc ol cstccming mcrit in othcrs instcad ol bcing jcalous ol it, and
skilllul in making this mcrit conducc to his own glory, will always bc a good
gcncral, and may cvcn pass lor a grcat man. Unlortunatcly, thc disposition to
do justicc to mcrit in othcrs is not thc most common quality: mcdiocrc minds
arc always jcalous, and inclincd to surround thcmsclvcs with pcrsons ol littlc
ability, lcaring thc rcputation ol bcing lcd, and not rcalizing that thc nominal
commandcr ol an army always rcccivcs almost all thc glory ol its succcss, cvcn
whcn lcast cntitlcd to it.
Tc qucstion has oltcn bccn discusscd, whcthcr it is prclcrablc to assign to
thc command a gcncral ol long cxpcricncc in scrvicc with troops, or an occr
.
ol thc sta, having gcncrally but littlc cxpcricncc in thc managcmcnt ol troops.
!t is bcyond qucstion that war is a distinct scicncc ol itscll, and that it is quitc
possiblc to bc ablc to combinc opcrations skilllully without cvcr having lcd a
rcgimcnt against an cncmy. Pctcr thc Grcat, Condc, Frcdcrick, and Napolcon
arc instanccs ol it. !t cannot, thcn, bc dcnicd that an occr lrom thc sta
may as wcll as any othcr provc to bc a grcat gcncral, but it will not bc bccausc
hc has grown gray in thc dutics ol a quartcrmastcr that hc will bc capablc
ol thc suprcmc command, but bccausc hc has a natural gcnius lor war and
posscsscs thc rcquisitc charactcristics. So, also, a gcncral lrom thc ranks ol thc
inlantry or cavalry may bc as capablc ol conducting a campaign as thc most
prolound tactician. So this qucstion docs not admit ol a dcnitc answcr cithcr
in thc armativc or ncgativc, sincc almost all will dcpcnd upon thc pcrsonal
qualitics ol thc individuals, but thc lollowing rcmarks will bc usclul in lcading
to a rational conclusion:
.. A gcncral, sclcctcd lrom thc gcncral sta, cnginccrs, or artillcry, who
has commandcd a division or a corps darmcc, will, with cqual chanccs,
bc supcrior to onc who is lamiliar with thc scrvicc ol but onc arm or
spccial corps.
a. A gcncral lrom thc linc, who has madc a study ol thc scicncc ol war,
will bc cqually ttcd lor thc command.
. Tat thc charactcr ol thc man is abovc all othcr rcquisitcs in a
commandcrinchicl.
Finally, Hc will bc a good gcncral in whom arc lound unitcd thc rcquisitc
pcrsonal charactcristics and a thorough knowlcdgc ol thc principlcs ol thc art
ol war.
Tc diculty ol always sclccting a good gcncral has lcd to thc lormation ol
a good gcncral sta, which bcing ncar thc gcncral may advisc him, and thus
cxcrcisc a bcnccial inucncc ovcr thc opcrations. A wcllinstructcd gcncral
sta is onc ol thc most usclul ol organizations, but carc must bc obscrvcd to
prcvcnt thc introduction into it ol lalsc principlcs, as in this casc it might provc
latal.
Frcdcrick, whcn hc cstablishcd thc military school ol Potsdam, ncvcr thought
it would lcad to thc right shouldcr lorward ol Gcncral Ruchcl,
|!|
and to thc
tcaching that thc obliquc ordcr is thc inlalliblc rulc lor gaining all battlcs.
How truc it is that thcrc is but a stcp lrom thc sublimc to thc ridiculous!
Morcovcr, thcrc ought to cxist pcrlcct harmony bctwccn thc gcncral and his
chicl ol sta, and, il it bc truc that thc lattcr should bc a man ol rccognizcd
ability, it is also propcr to givc thc gcncral thc choicc ol thc mcn who arc to
bc his adviscrs. To imposc a chicl ol sta upon a gcncral would bc to crcatc
anarchy and want ol harmony, whilc to pcrmit him to sclcct a ciphcr lor that
position would bc still morc dangcrous, lor il hc bc himscll a man ol littlc
!
Gcncral Ruchcl thought at thc battlc ol Jcna that hc could savc thc army by giving thc command
to advancc thc right shouldcr in ordcr to lorm an obliquc linc.
a
ability, indcbtcd to lavor or lortunc lor his station, thc sclcction will bc ol vital
importancc. Tc bcst mcans to avoid thcsc dangcrs is to givc thc gcncral thc
option ol scvcral dcsignatcd occrs, all ol undoubtcd ability.
!t has bccn thought, in succcssion, in almost all armics, that lrcqucnt
councils ol war, by aiding thc commandcr with thcir advicc, givc morc wcight
and ccct to thc dircction ol military opcrations. oubtlcss, il thc commandcr
wcrc a Soubisc, a Clcrmont, or a Mack, hc might wcll nd in a council ol
war opinions morc valuablc than his own, thc majority ol thc opinions givcn
might bc prclcrablc to his, but what succcss could bc cxpcctcd lrom opcrations
conductcd by othcrs than thosc who havc originatcd and arrangcd thcm:
Vhat must bc thc rcsult ol an opcration which is but partially undcrstood by
thc commandcr, sincc it is not his own conccption:
! havc undcrgonc a pitiablc cxpcricncc as promptcr at hcadquartcrs, and
no onc has a bcttcr apprcciation ol thc valuc ol such scrviccs than myscll,
and it is particularly in a council ol war that such a part is absurd. Tc grcatcr
thc numbcr and thc highcr thc rank ol thc military occrs who composc thc
council, thc morc dicult will it bc to accomplish thc triumph ol truth and
rcason, howcvcr small bc thc amount ol disscnt.
Vhat would havc bccn thc action ol a council ol war to which Napolcon
proposcd thc movcmcnt ol Arcola, thc crossing ol thc Saint8crnard, thc
mancuvcr at Ulm, or that at Gcra and Jcna: Tc timid would havc rcgardcd
thcm as rash, cvcn to madncss, othcrs would havc sccn a thousand dicultics
ol cxccution, and all would havc concurrcd in rcjccting thcm, and il, on
thc contrary, thcy had bccn adoptcd, and had bccn cxccutcd by any onc but
Napolcon, would thcy not ccrtainly havc provcd lailurcs:
!n my opinion, councils ol war arc a dcplorablc rcsourcc, and can bc usclul
only whcn concurring in opinion with thc commandcr, in which casc thcy may
givc him morc condcncc in his own judgmcnt, and, in addition, may assurc
him that his licutcnants, bcing ol his opinion, will usc cvcry mcans to insurc
thc succcss ol thc movcmcnt. Tis is thc only advantagc ol a council ol war,
which, morcovcr, should bc simply consultativc and havc no lurthcr authority,
but il, instcad ol this harmony, thcrc should bc dicrcncc ol opinion, it can
only producc unlortunatc rcsults.
Accordingly, ! think it salc to concludc that thc bcst mcans ol organizing
thc command ol an army, in dclault ol a gcncral approvcd by cxpcricncc, is
.st. To givc thc command to a man ol tricd bravcry, bold in thc ght, and ol
unshakcn rmncss in dangcr.
ad. To assign, as his chicl ol sta, a man ol high ability, ol opcn and laithlul
charactcr, bctwccn whom and thc commandcr thcrc may bc pcrlcct harmony.
Tc victor will gain so much glory that hc can sparc somc to thc lricnd who
has contributcd to his succcss. !n this way 8lucchcr, aidcd by Gnciscnau and
Muing, gaincd glory which probably hc would not havc bccn ablc to do ol
himscll. !t is truc that this doublc command is morc objcctionablc than an

undividcd onc whcn a statc has a Napolcon, a Frcdcrick, or a Suwaro to
ll it, but whcn thcrc is no grcat gcncral to lcad thc armics it is ccrtainly thc
prclcrablc systcm.
8clorc lcaving this important branch ol thc subjcct, anothcr mcans ol
inucncing military opcrationsviz.: that ol a council ol war at thc scat ol
govcrnmcntdcscrvcs noticc. Louvois lor a long timc dircctcd lrom Paris
thc armics ol Louis X!\., and with succcss. Carnot, also, lrom Paris dircctcd
thc armics ol thc Rcpublic: in ., hc did wcll, and savcd Francc, in .,
his action was at rst vcry unlortunatc, but hc rcpaircd his laults altcrward
by chancc, in .,6 hc was complctcly at lault. !t is to bc obscrvcd, howcvcr,
that both Louvois and Carnot individually controllcd thc armics, and that
thcrc was no council ol war. Tc Aulic council, sitting in \icnna, was oltcn
intrustcd with thc duty ol dirccting thc opcrations ol thc armics, and thcrc has
ncvcr bccn but onc opinion in uropc as to its latal inucncc. Vhcthcr this
opinion is right or wrong, thc Austrian gcncrals alonc arc ablc to dccidc. My
own opinion is that thc lunctions ol such a body in this conncction should bc
limitcd to thc adoption ol a gcncral plan ol opcrations. 8y this ! do not mcan
a plan which should tracc out thc campaign in dctail, rcstricting thc gcncrals
and compclling thcm to givc battlc without rcgard to circumstanccs, but a
plan which should dctcrminc thc objcct ol thc campaign, thc naturc ol thc
opcrations, whcthcr ocnsivc or dclcnsivc, thc matcrial mcans to bc applicd
to thcsc rst cntcrpriscs, altcrward lor thc rcscrvcs, and nally lor thc lcvics
which may bc ncccssary il thc country bc invadcd. Tcsc points, it is truc,
should bc discusscd in a council ol both gcncrals and ministcrs, and to thcsc
points should thc control ol thc council bc limitcd, lor il it should not only
ordcr thc gcncral in command to march to \icnna or to Paris, but should also
havc thc prcsumption to indicatc thc manncr in which hc should mancuvcr
to attain this objcct, thc unlortunatc gcncral would ccrtainly bc bcatcn, and
thc wholc rcsponsibility ol his rcvcrscs should lall upon thc shouldcrs ol thosc
who, hundrcds ol milcs distant, took upon thcmsclvcs thc duty ol dirccting
thc army,a duty so dicult lor any onc, cvcn upon thc sccnc ol opcrations.
ARTICLE XV
The Military Spirit of Nations, and the Morale of Armies
Tc adoption ol thc bcst rcgulations lor thc organization ol an army would bc
in vain il thc govcrnmcnt did not at thc samc timc cultivatc a military spirit
in its citizcns. !t may wcll bc thc casc in London, situatcd on an island and
protcctcd lrom invasion by its immcnsc ccts, that thc titlc ol a rich bankcr
should bc prclcrrcd to a military dccoration, but a contincntal nation imbucd
with thc scntimcnts and habits ol thc tradcsmcn ol London or thc bankcrs
ol Paris would sooncr or latcr lall a prcy to its ncighbors. !t was to thc union
ol thc civic virtucs and military spirit lostcrcd by thcir institutions that thc

Romans wcrc indcbtcd lor thcir grandcur, and whcn thcy lost thcsc virtucs,
and whcn, no longcr rcgarding thc military scrvicc as an honor as wcll as a
duty, thcy rclinquishcd it to mcrccnary Goths and Gauls, thc lall ol thc cmpirc
bccamc incvitablc. !t is doubtlcss truc that whatcvcr incrcascs thc prospcrity
ol thc country should bc ncithcr ncglcctcd nor dcspiscd, it is also ncccssary
to honor thc branchcs ol industry which arc thc rst instrumcnts ol this
prospcrity, but thcy should always bc sccondary to thc grcat institutions which
makc up thc strcngth ol statcs in cncouraging thc cultivation ol thc manly
and hcroic virtucs. Policy and justicc both agrcc on this point, lor, whatcvcr
8oilcau may say, it is ccrtainly morc glorious to conlront dcath in thc lootstcps
ol thc Cacsars than to lattcn upon thc public miscrics by gambling on thc
vicissitudcs ol thc national crcdit. Mislortunc will ccrtainly lall upon thc land
whcrc thc wcalth ol thc taxgathcrcr or thc grccdy gamblcr in stocks stands, in
public cstimation, abovc thc unilorm ol thc bravc man who sacriccs his lilc,
hcalth, or lortunc to thc dclcnsc ol his country.
Tc rst mcans ol cncouraging thc military spirit is to invcst thc army
with all possiblc social and public considcration. Tc sccond mcans is to givc
thc prclcrcncc to thosc who havc rcndcrcd scrviccs to thc statc, in lling
any vacancics in thc administrativc dcpartmcnts ol thc govcrnmcnt, or cvcn
to rcquirc a ccrtain lcngth ol military scrvicc as a qualication lor ccrtain
occs. A comparison ol thc ancicnt military institutions ol Romc with thosc
ol Russia and Prussia, is a subjcct worthy ol scrious attcntion, and it would
also bc intcrcsting to contrast thcm with thc doctrincs ol modcrn thcorists,
who dcclarc against thc cmploymcnt ol occrs ol thc army in othcr public
lunctions, and who wish lor nonc but rhctoricians in thc important occs ol
administration.
|!|
!t is truc that many public cmploymcnts dcmand a spccial
coursc ol study, but cannot thc soldicr, in thc abundant lcisurc ol pcacc,
prcparc himscll lor thc carccr hc would prclcr altcr having lulllcd his dcbt
to his country in thc prolcssion ol arms: !l thcsc administrativc occs wcrc
conlcrrcd upon occrs rctircd lrom thc army in a gradc not lowcr than that ol
captain, would it not bc a stimulant lor occrs to attain that rank, and would
it not lcad thcm, whcn in garrisons, to nd thcir rccrcations clscwhcrc than in
thc thcatcrs and public clubs:
!t may bc possiblc that this lacility ol translcr lrom thc military to thc civil
scrvicc would bc rathcr injurious than lavorablc to a high military spirit, and
that to cncouragc this spirit it would bc cxpcdicnt to placc thc prolcssion ol
thc soldicr abovc all othcrs. Tis was thc carly practicc ol thc Mamclukcs
and Janissarics. Tcir soldicrs wcrc bought at thc agc ol about scvcn ycars,
and wcrc cducatcd in thc idca that thcy wcrc to dic by thcir standards. vcn
thc nglishso jcalous ol thcir rightscontract, in cnlisting as soldicrs, thc
obligation lor thc wholc lcngth ol thcir livcs, and thc Russian, in cnlisting
lor twcntyvc ycars, docs what is almost cquivalcnt. !n such armics, and in
!
For instancc, in Francc, instcad ol cxcluding all occrs lrom thc privilcgc ol thc clcctivc
lranchisc, it should bc givcn to all coloncls, and thc gcncrals should bc cligiblc to thc lcgislaturc. Tc most
vcnal dcputics will not bc thosc lrom military lilc.

thosc rccruitcd by voluntary cnlistmcnts, pcrhaps it would not bc advisablc to
tolcratc this lusion ol military and civil occs, but whcrc thc military scrvicc
is a tcmporary duty imposcd upon thc pcoplc, thc casc is dicrcnt, and thc
old Roman laws which rcquircd a prcvious military scrvicc ol tcn ycars in any
aspirant lor thc public cmploymcnts, sccm to bc bcst calculatcd to prcscrvc
thc military spirit,particularly in this agc, whcn thc attainmcnt ol matcrial
comlort and prospcrity appcars to bc thc dominant passion ol thc pcoplc.
Howcvcr this may bc, still, in my opinion, undcr all lorms ol govcrnmcnt,
it will bc a wisc part to honor thc military prolcssion, in ordcr to cncouragc
thc lovc ol glory and all thc warlikc virtucs, undcr thc pcnalty ol rccciving thc
rcproachcs ol postcrity and sucring insult and dcpcndcncy.
!t is not sucicnt to lostcr thc military spirit among thc pcoplc, but, morc
than that, it is ncccssary to cncouragc it in thc army. l what avail would
it bc il thc unilorm bc honorcd in thc land and it bc rcgardcd as a duty to
scrvc in thc army, whilc thc military virtucs arc wanting: Tc lorccs would bc
numcrous but without valor.
Tc cnthusiasm ol an army and its military spirit arc two quitc dicrcnt
things, and should not bc conloundcd, although thcy producc thc samc cccts.
Tc rst is thc ccct ol passions morc or lcss ol a tcmporary charactcr,ol a
political or rcligious naturc, lor instancc, or ol a grcat lovc ol country, whilc
thc lattcr, dcpcnding upon thc skill ol thc commandcr and rcsulting lrom
military institutions, is morc pcrmancnt and dcpcnds lcss upon circumstanccs,
and should bc thc objcct ol thc attcntion ol cvcry larsccing govcrnmcnt.
|!|

Couragc should bc rccompcnscd and honorcd, thc dicrcnt gradcs in rank
rcspcctcd, and disciplinc should cxist in thc scntimcnts and convictions rathcr
than in cxtcrnal lorms only.
Tc occrs should lccl thc conviction that rcsignation, bravcry, and
laithlul attcntion to duty arc virtucs without which no glory is possiblc, no
army is rcspcctablc, and that rmncss amid rcvcrscs is morc honorablc than
cnthusiasm in succcss,sincc couragc alonc is ncccssary to storm a position,
whilc it rcquircs hcroism to makc a dicult rctrcat bclorc a victorious and
cntcrprising cncmy, always opposing to him a rm and unbrokcn lront. A nc
rctrcat should mcct with a rcward cqual to that givcn lor a grcat victory.
8y inuring armics to labor and latiguc, by kccping thcm lrom stagnation
in garrison in timcs ol pcacc, by inculcating thcir supcriority ovcr thcir
cncmics, without dcprcciating too much thc lattcr, by inspiring a lovc lor
grcat cxploits,in a word, by cxciting thcir cnthusiasm by cvcry mcans in
harmony with thcir tonc ol mind, by honoring couragc, punishing wcakncss,
and disgracing cowardicc,wc may cxpcct to maintain a high military spirit.
cminacy was thc chicl causc ol thc ruin ol thc Roman lcgions: thosc
lormidablc soldicrs, who had bornc thc casquc, bucklcr, and cuirass in thc
!
!t is particularly important that this spirit should pcrvadc thc occrs and noncommissioncd
occrs: il thcy bc capablc, and thc nation bravc, thcrc nccd bc no lcar lor thc mcn.
6
timcs ol thc Scipios undcr thc burning sun ol Alrica, lound thcm too hcavy in
thc cool climatcs ol Gcrmany and Gaul, and thcn thc cmpirc was lost.
! havc rcmarkcd that it is not wcll to crcatc a too grcat contcmpt lor thc
cncmy, lcst thc morale ol thc soldicr should bc shakcn il hc cncountcr an
obstinatc rcsistancc. Napolcon at Jcna, addrcssing Lanncs troops, praiscd thc
Prussian cavalry, but promiscd that thcy would contcnd in vain against thc
bayoncts ol his gyptians.
Tc occrs and troops must bc warncd against thosc suddcn panics which
oltcn scizc thc bravcst armics whcn thcy arc not wcll controllcd by disciplinc,
and hcncc whcn thcy do not rccognizc that in ordcr is thc surcst hopc ol
salcty. !t was not lrom want ol couragc that onc hundrcd thousand Turks wcrc
bcatcn at Pctcrwardcin by Princc ugcnc, and at Kagoul by Romanzo: it was
bccausc, oncc rcpulscd in thcir disordcrly chargcs, cvcry onc yicldcd to his
pcrsonal lcclings, and bccausc thcy lought individually, but not in masscs and
in ordcr. An army scizcd with panic is similarly in a statc ol dcmoralization,
bccausc whcn disordcr is oncc introduccd all conccrtcd action on thc part
ol individuals bccomcs impossiblc, thc voicc ol thc occrs can no longcr bc
hcard, no mancuvcr lor rcsuming thc battlc can bc cxccutcd, and thcrc is no
rcsourcc but in ignominious ight.
Nations with powcrlul imaginations arc particularly liablc to panics, and
nothing short ol strong institutions and skilllul lcadcrs can rcmcdy it. vcn
thc Frcnch, whosc military virtucs whcn wcll lcd havc ncvcr bccn qucstioncd,
havc oltcn pcrlormcd somc quick movcmcnts ol this kind which wcrc highly
ridiculous. Vc may rclcr to thc unbccoming panic which pcrvadcd thc inlantry
ol Marshal \illars altcr having gaincd thc battlc ol Fricdlingcn, in .,c. Tc
samc occurrcd to Napolcons inlantry altcr thc victory ol Vagram and whcn
thc cncmy was in lull rctrcat. A still morc cxtraordinary casc was thc ight ol
thc ,th scmibrigadc, ltccn hundrcd strong, at thc sicgc ol Gcnoa, bclorc a
platoon ol cavalry. Two days altcrward thcsc samc mcn took Fort iamond by
onc ol thc most vigorous assaults mcntioncd in modcrn history.
Still, it would sccm to bc casy to convincc bravc mcn that dcath comcs morc
quickly and morc surcly to thosc who y in disordcr than to thosc who rcmain
togcthcr and prcscnt a rm lront to thc cncmy, or who rally promptly whcn
thcir lincs havc bccn lor thc instant brokcn.
!n this rcspcct thc Russian army may bc takcn as a modcl by all othcrs.
Tc rmncss which it has displaycd in all rctrcats is duc in cqual dcgrccs to
thc national charactcr, thc natural instincts ol thc soldicrs, and thc cxccllcnt
disciplinary institutions. !ndccd, vivacity ol imagination is not always thc
causc ol thc introduction ol disordcr: thc want ol thc habit ol ordcr oltcn
causcs it, and thc lack ol prccautions on thc part ol thc gcncrals to maintain
this ordcr contributcs to it. ! havc oltcn bccn astonishcd at thc indicrcncc ol
most gcncrals on this point. Not only did thcy not dcign to takc thc slightcst
prccaution to givc thc propcr dircction to small dctachmcnts or scattcrcd mcn,
and lail to adopt any signals to lacilitatc thc rallying in cach division ol thc
,
lractions which may bc scattcrcd in a momcntary panic or in an irrcsistiblc
chargc ol thc cncmy, but thcy wcrc ocndcd that any onc should think ol
proposing such prccautions. Still, thc most undoubtcd couragc and thc most
scvcrc disciplinc will oltcn bc powcrlcss to rcmcdy a grcat disordcr, which
might bc in a grcat dcgrcc obviatcd by thc usc ol rallyingsignals lor thc
dicrcnt divisions. Tcrc arc, it is truc, cascs whcrc all human rcsourccs arc
insucicnt lor thc maintcnancc ol ordcr, as whcn thc physical sucrings ol
thc soldicrs havc bccn so grcat as to rcndcr thcm dcal to all appcals, and whcn
thcir occrs nd it impossiblc to do any thing to organizc thcm,which was
thc casc in thc rctrcat ol ..a. Lcaving out thcsc cxccptional cascs, good habits
ol ordcr, good logistical prccautions lor rallying, and good disciplinc will most
lrcqucntly bc succcsslul, il not in prcvcnting disordcr, at lcast in promptly
rcmcdying it.
!t is now timc to lcavc this branch, ol which ! havc only dcsircd to tracc
an outlinc, and to procccd to thc cxamination ol subjccts which arc purcly
military.
commentary on Chapter II
T
hc chaptcr on military policc cmphasizcs thc importancc ol good
intclligcncc or, as Jomini puts it, military statistics. Accuratc knowlcdgc
ol thc gcography, dcmographics, and military strcngth ol an opponcnt
arc obviously ncccssary in ordcr to prosccutc a war succcsslully, but such
inlormation has oltcn bccn ignorcd by gcncrals and policymakcrs. Napolcon
!!! had no idca ol thc military strcngth ol Prussia in .,c, morc rcccntly,
Mussolini ignorcd thc ccct that thc ruggcd Grcck tcrrain would havc on
!talian opcrations in .c. thcr articlcs in Chaptcr a bcgin narrowing thc
cmphasis ol thc book to morc purcly military subjccts. Jomini discusscs thc
lorm that national military institutions should takc, thc rclationship bctwccn
thc hcad ol statc and thc principal military commandcr, and thc organization
ol military hcadquartcrs. Articlc X\ is Jominis nod to moralc in this book, a
subjcct hc gcncrally ignorcs in thc chaptcrs locusing morc dircctly on military
opcrations.
CHAPTER III
STRATEGY
DEFINITION OF STRATEGY AND THE FUNDAMENTAL
PRINCIPLE OF WAR
T
hc art ol war, indcpcndcntly ol its political and moral rclations, consists
ol vc principal parts, viz.: Stratcgy, Grand Tactics, Logistics, Tactics ol
thc dicrcnt arms, and thc Art ol thc nginccr. Vc will trcat ol thc rst thrcc
branchcs, and bcgin by dcning thcm. !n ordcr to do this, wc will lollow thc
ordcr ol proccdurc ol a gcncral whcn war is rst dcclarcd, who commcnccs with
thc points ol thc highcst importancc, as a plan ol campaign, and altcrward
dcsccnds to thc ncccssary dctails. Tactics, on thc contrary, bcgins with dctails,
and asccnds to combinations and gcncralization ncccssary lor thc lormation
and handling ol a grcat army.
Vc will supposc an army taking thc cld: thc rst carc ol its commandcr
should bc to agrcc with thc hcad ol thc statc upon thc charactcr ol thc war:
thcn hc must carclully study thc thcatcr ol war, and sclcct thc most suitablc
basc ol opcrations, taking into considcration thc lronticrs ol thc statc and
thosc ol its allics.
Tc sclcction ol this basc and thc proposcd aim will dctcrminc thc zonc
ol opcrations. Tc gcncral will takc a rst objcctivc point: hc will sclcct thc
linc ol opcrations lcading to this point, cithcr as a tcmporary or pcrmancnt
linc, giving it thc most advantagcous dircction, namcly, that which promiscs
thc grcatcst numbcr ol lavorablc opportunitics with thc lcast dangcr. An
army marching on this linc ol opcrations will havc a lront ol opcrations and a
stratcgic lront. Tc tcmporary positions which thc corps darmcc will occupy
upon this lront ol opcrations, or upon thc linc ol dclcnsc, will bc stratcgic
positions.
Vhcn ncar its rst objcctivc point, and whcn it bcgins to mcct rcsistancc,
thc army will cithcr attack thc cncmy or mancuvcr to compcl him to rctrcat,
and lor this cnd it will adopt onc or two stratcgic lincs ol mancuvcrs, which,
c
bcing tcmporary, may dcviatc to a ccrtain dcgrcc lrom thc gcncral linc ol
opcrations, with which thcy must not bc conloundcd.
To conncct thc stratcgic lront with thc basc as thc advancc is madc, lincs ol
supply, dcpots, &c. will bc cstablishcd.
!l thc linc ol opcrations bc long, and thcrc bc hostilc troops in annoying
proximity to it, thcsc bodics may cithcr bc attackcd and dispcrscd or bc mcrcly
obscrvcd, or thc opcrations against thc cncmy may bc carricd on without
rclcrcncc to thcm. !l thc sccond ol thcsc courscs bc pursucd, a doublc stratcgic
lront and largc dctachmcnts will bc thc rcsult.
Tc army bcing almost within rcach ol thc rst objcctivc point, il thc cncmy
opposc him thcrc will bc a battlc, il indccisivc, thc ght will bc rcsumcd, il thc
army gains thc victory, it will sccurc its objcctivc point or will advancc to attain
a sccond. Should thc rst objcctivc point bc thc posscssion ol an important lort,
thc sicgc will bc commcnccd. !l thc army bc not strong cnough to continuc its
march, altcr dctaching a sucicnt lorcc to maintain thc sicgc, it will takc a
stratcgic position to covcr it, as did thc army ol !taly in .,6, which, lcss than
lty thousand strong, could not pass Mantua to cntcr Austria, lcaving twcnty
vc thousand cncmics within its walls, and having lorty thousand morc in
lront on thc doublc linc ol thc Tyrol and Frioul.
!l thc army bc strong cnough to makc thc bcst usc ol its victory, or il it havc
no sicgc to makc, it will opcratc toward a sccond and morc important objcctivc
point.
!l this point bc distant, it will bc ncccssary to cstablish an intcrmcdiatc point
ol support. nc or morc sccurc citics alrcady occupicd will lorm an cvcntual
basc: whcn this cannot bc donc, a small stratcgic rcscrvc may bc cstablishcd,
which will protcct thc rcar and also thc dcpots by tcmporary lortications.
Vhcn thc army crosscs largc strcams, it will construct tetes de pont, and, il thc
bridgcs arc within wallcd citics, carthworks will bc thrown up to incrcasc thc
mcans ol dclcnsc and to sccurc thc salcty ol thc cvcntual basc or thc stratcgic
rcscrvc which may occupy thcsc posts.
Should thc battlc bc lost, thc army will rctrcat toward its basc, in ordcr
to bc rcinlorccd thcrclrom by dctachmcnts ol troops, or, what is cquivalcnt,
to strcngthcn itscll by thc occupation ol lorticd posts and camps, thus
compclling thc cncmy to halt or to dividc his lorccs.
Vhcn wintcr approachcs, thc armics will cithcr go into quartcrs, or thc cld
will bc kcpt by thc army which has obtaincd dccisivc succcss and is dcsirous
ol proting to thc utmost by its supcriority. Tcsc wintcr campaigns arc
vcry trying to both armics, but in othcr rcspccts do not dicr lrom ordinary
campaigns, unlcss it bc in dcmanding incrcascd activity and cncrgy to attain
prompt succcss.
Such is thc ordinary coursc ol a war, and as such wc will considcr it, whilc
discussing combinations which rcsult lrom thcsc opcrations.
.
Chaptcr !!!. Stratcgy: cnition ol Stratcgy
and thc Fundamcntal Principlc ol Var
Stratcgy cmbraccs thc lollowing points, viz.:
.. Tc sclcction ol thc thcatcr ol war, and thc discussion ol thc dicrcnt
combinations ol which it admits.
a. Tc dctcrmination ol thc dccisivc points in thcsc combinations, and
thc most lavorablc dircction lor opcrations.
. Tc sclcction and cstablishmcnt ol thc xcd basc and ol thc zonc ol
opcrations.
. Tc sclcction ol thc objcctivc point, whcthcr ocnsivc or dclcnsivc.
. Tc stratcgic lronts, lincs ol dclcnsc, and lronts ol opcrations.
6. Tc choicc ol lincs ol opcrations lcading to thc objcctivc point or
stratcgic lront.
,. For a givcn opcration, thc bcst stratcgic linc, and thc dicrcnt
mancuvcrs ncccssary to cmbracc all possiblc cascs.
. Tc cvcntual bascs ol opcrations and thc stratcgic rcscrvcs.
. Tc marchcs ol armics, considcrcd as mancuvcrs.
.c. Tc rclation bctwccn thc position ol dcpots and thc marchcs ol thc
army.
... Fortrcsscs rcgardcd as stratcgical mcans, as a rclugc lor an army, as an
obstaclc to its progrcss: thc sicgcs to bc madc and to bc covcrcd.
.a. Points lor intrcnchcd camps, tetes de pont, &c.
.. Tc divcrsions to bc madc, and thc largc dctachmcnts ncccssary.
Tcsc points arc principally ol importancc in thc dctcrmination ol thc rst
stcps ol a campaign, but thcrc arc othcr opcrations ol a mixcd naturc, such
as passagcs ol strcams, rctrcats, surpriscs, discmbarkations, convoys, wintcr
quartcrs, thc cxccution ol which bclongs to tactics, thc conccption and
arrangcmcnt to stratcgy.
Tc mancuvcring ol an army upon thc battlccld, and thc dicrcnt
lormations ol troops lor attack, constitutc Grand Tactics. Logistics is thc art ol
moving armics. !t compriscs thc ordcr and dctails ol marchcs and camps, and
ol quartcring and supplying troops, in a word, it is thc cxccution ol stratcgical
and tactical cntcrpriscs.
To rcpcat. Stratcgy is thc art ol making war upon thc map, and comprchcnds
thc wholc thcatcr ol opcrations. Grand Tactics is thc art ol posting troops
upon thc battlccld according to thc accidcnts ol thc ground, ol bringing
thcm into action, and thc art ol ghting upon thc ground, in contradistinction
to planning upon a map. !ts opcrations may cxtcnd ovcr a cld ol tcn or twclvc
milcs in cxtcnt. Logistics compriscs thc mcans and arrangcmcnts which work
out thc plans ol stratcgy and tactics. Stratcgy dccidcs whcrc to act, logistics
brings thc troops to this point, grand tactics dccidcs thc manncr ol cxccution
and thc cmploymcnt ol thc troops.
a
!t is truc that many battlcs havc bccn dccidcd by stratcgic movcmcnts,
and havc bccn, indccd, but a succcssion ol thcm, but this only occurs in thc
cxccptional casc ol a dispcrscd army: lor thc gcncral casc ol pitchcd battlcs thc
abovc dcnition holds good.
Grand Tactics, in addition to acts ol local cxccution, rclatcs to thc lollowing
objccts:
.. Tc choicc ol positions and dclcnsivc lincs ol battlc.
a. Tc ocnsivc in a dclcnsivc battlc.
. Tc dicrcnt ordcrs ol battlc, or thc grand mancuvcrs propcr lor thc
attack ol thc cncmys linc.
. Tc collision ol two armics on thc march, or uncxpcctcd battlcs.
. Surpriscs ol armics in thc opcn cld.
6. Tc arrangcmcnts lor lcading troops into battlc.
,. Tc attack ol positions and intrcnchcd camps.
. Coups de main.
All othcr opcrations, such as rclatc to convoys, loragingpartics, skirmishcs ol
advanccd or rcar guards, thc attack ol small posts, and any thing accomplishcd
by a dctachmcnt or singlc division, may bc rcgardcd as dctails ol war, and not
includcd in thc grcat opcrations.
TH FUNAMNTAL PR!NC!PL F VAR
!t is proposcd to show that thcrc is onc grcat principlc undcrlying all
thc opcrations ol war,a principlc which must bc lollowcd in all good
combinations. !t is cmbraccd in thc lollowing maxims:
.. To throw by stratcgic movcmcnts thc mass ol an army, succcssivcly, upon
thc dccisivc points ol a thcatcr ol war, and also upon thc communications
ol thc cncmy as much as possiblc without compromising oncs own.
a. To mancuvcr to cngagc lractions ol thc hostilc army with thc bulk ol
oncs lorccs.
. n thc battlccld, to throw thc mass ol thc lorccs upon thc dccisivc
point, or upon that portion ol thc hostilc linc which it is ol thc rst
importancc to ovcrthrow.
. To so arrangc that thcsc masscs shall not only bc thrown upon thc
dccisivc point, but that thcy shall cngagc at thc propcr timcs and with
cncrgy.

Tis principlc has too much simplicity to cscapc criticism: onc objcction is
that it is casy to rccommcnd throwing thc mass ol thc lorccs upon thc dccisivc
points, but that thc diculty lics in rccognizing thosc points.
Tis truth is cvidcnt, and it would bc littlc short ol thc ridiculous to cnunciatc
such a gcncral principlc without accompanying it with all ncccssary cxplanations
lor its application upon thc cld. !n Articlc X!X. thcsc dccisivc points will
bc dcscribcd, and in Articlcs lrom X\!!!. to XX!!. will bc discusscd thcir
rclations to thc dicrcnt combinations. Tosc studcnts who, having attcntivcly
considcrcd what is thcrc statcd, still rcgard thc dctcrmination ol thcsc points
as a problcm without a solution, may wcll dcspair ol cvcr comprchcnding
stratcgy.
Tc gcncral thcatcr ol opcrations scldom contains morc than thrcc zoncs,
thc right, thc lclt, and thc ccntcr, and cach zonc, lront ol opcrations, stratcgic
position, and linc ol dclcnsc, as wcll as cach linc ol battlc, has thc samc
subdivisions,two cxtrcmitics and thc ccntcr. A dircction upon onc ol thcsc
thrcc will always bc suitablc lor thc attainmcnt ol thc dcsircd cnd. A dircction
upon onc ol thc two rcmaining will bc lcss advantagcous, whilc thc third
dircction will bc wholly inapplicablc. !n considcring thc objcct proposcd in
conncction with thc positions ol thc cncmy and thc gcography ol thc country, it
will appcar that in cvcry stratcgic movcmcnt or tactical mancuvcr thc qucstion
lor dccision will always bc, whcthcr to mancuvcr to thc right, to thc lclt, or
dircctly in lront. Tc sclcction ol onc ol thcsc thrcc simplc altcrnativcs cannot,
surcly, bc considcrcd an cnigma. Tc art ol giving thc propcr dircction to thc
masscs is ccrtainly thc basis ol stratcgy, although it is not thc wholc ol thc art
ol war. xccutivc talcnt, skill, cncrgy, and a quick apprchcnsion ol cvcnts arc
ncccssary to carry out any combinations prcviously arrangcd.
Vc will apply this grcat principlc to thc dicrcnt cascs ol stratcgy and tactics,
and thcn show, by thc history ol twcnty cclcbratcd campaigns, that, with lcw
cxccptions, thc most brilliant succcsscs and thc grcatcst rcvcrscs rcsultcd lrom
an adhcrcncc to this principlc in thc onc casc, and lrom a ncglcct ol it in thc
othcr.
F STRATG!C CM8!NAT!NS
ARTICLE XVI
Of the System of Operations
Var oncc dctcrmincd upon, thc rst point to bc dccidcd is, whcthcr it shall bc
ocnsivc or dclcnsivc, and wc will rst cxplain what is mcant by thcsc tcrms.
Tcrc arc scvcral phascs ol thc ocnsivc: il against a grcat statc, thc wholc or
a largc portion ol whosc tcrritory is attackcd, it is an invasion, il a provincc

only, or a linc ol dclcnsc ol modcratc cxtcnt, bc assailcd, it is thc ordinary
ocnsivc, nally, il thc ocnsivc is but an attack upon thc cncmys position,
and is conncd to a singlc opcration, it is callcd thc taking thc initiative. !n a
moral and political vicw, thc ocnsivc is ncarly always advantagcous: it carrics
thc war upon lorcign soil, savcs thc assailants country lrom dcvastation,
incrcascs his rcsourccs and diminishcs thosc ol his cncmy, clcvatcs thc morale
ol his army, and gcncrally dcprcsscs thc advcrsary. !t somctimcs happcns that
invasion cxcitcs thc ardor and cncrgy ol thc advcrsary,particularly whcn hc
lccls that thc indcpcndcncc ol his country is thrcatcncd.
!n a military point ol vicw, thc ocnsivc has its good and its bad sidc.
Stratcgically, an invasion lcads to dccp lincs ol opcrations, which arc always
dangcrous in a hostilc country. All thc obstaclcs in thc cncmys country, thc
mountains, rivcrs, dclcs, and lorts, arc lavorablc lor dclcnsc, whilc thc
inhabitants and authoritics ol thc country, so lar lrom bcing thc instrumcnts ol
thc invading army, arc gcncrally hostilc. Howcvcr, il succcss bc obtaincd, thc
cncmy is struck in a vital point: hc is dcprivcd ol his rcsourccs and compcllcd
to scck a spccdy tcrmination ol thc contcst.
For a singlc opcration, which wc havc callcd thc taking thc initiative, thc
ocnsivc is almost always advantagcous, particularly in stratcgy. !ndccd, il
thc art ol war consists in throwing thc masscs upon thc dccisivc points, to do
this it will bc ncccssary to takc thc initiativc. Tc attacking party knows what
hc is doing and what hc dcsircs to do, hc lcads his masscs to thc point whcrc
hc dcsircs to strikc. Hc who awaits thc attack is cvcrywhcrc anticipatcd: thc
cncmy lall with largc lorcc upon lractions ol his lorcc: hc ncithcr knows whcrc
his advcrsary proposcs to attack him nor in what manncr to rcpcl him.
Tactically, thc ocnsivc also posscsscs advantagcs, but thcy arc lcss positivc,
sincc, thc opcrations bcing upon a limitcd cld, thc party taking thc initiativc
cannot conccal thcm lrom thc cncmy, who may dctcct his dcsigns and by thc
aid ol good rcscrvcs causc thcm to lail.
Tc attacking party labors undcr thc disadvantagcs arising lrom thc
obstaclcs to bc crosscd bclorc rcaching thc cncmys linc, on which account
thc advantagcs and disadvantagcs ol thc tactical ocnsivc arc about cqually
balanccd.
Vhatcvcr advantagcs may bc cxpcctcd cithcr politically or stratcgically lrom
thc ocnsivc, it may not bc possiblc to maintain it cxclusivcly throughout thc
war, lor a campaign ocnsivc in thc bcginning may bccomc dclcnsivc bclorc
it cnds.
A dclcnsivc war is not without its advantagcs, whcn wiscly conductcd. !t
may bc passivc or activc, taking thc ocnsivc at timcs. Tc passivc dclcnsc is
always pcrnicious, thc activc may accomplish grcat succcsscs. Tc objcct ol
a dclcnsivc war bcing to protcct, as long as possiblc, thc country thrcatcncd
by thc cncmy, all opcrations should bc dcsigncd to rctard his progrcss, to
annoy him in his cntcrpriscs by multiplying obstaclcs and dicultics, without,
howcvcr, compromising oncs own army. Hc who invadcs docs so by rcason ol

somc supcriority, hc will thcn scck to makc thc issuc as promptly as possiblc:
thc dclcnsc, on thc contrary, dcsircs dclay till his advcrsary is wcakcncd by
scnding o dctachmcnts, by marchcs, and by thc privations and latigucs
incidcnt to his progrcss.
An army is rcduccd to thc dclcnsivc only by rcvcrscs or by a positivc inlcriority.
!t thcn sccks in thc support ol lorts, and in natural or articial barricrs, thc
mcans ol rcstoring cquality by multiplying obstaclcs in thc way ol thc cncmy.
Tis plan, whcn not carricd to an cxtrcmc, promiscs many chanccs ol succcss,
but only whcn thc gcncral has thc good scnsc not to makc thc dclcnsc passivc:
hc must not rcmain in his positions to rcccivc whatcvcr blows may bc givcn by
his advcrsary, hc must, on thc contrary, rcdoublc his activity, and bc constantly
upon thc alcrt to improvc all opportunitics ol assailing thc wcak points ol thc
cncmy. Tis plan ol war may bc callcd thc dclcnsivcocnsivc, and may havc
stratcgical as wcll as tactical advantagcs.. !t combincs thc advantagcs ol both
systcms, lor onc who awaits his advcrsary upon a prcparcd cld, with all his
own rcsourccs in hand, surroundcd by all thc advantagcs ol bcing on his own
ground, can with hopc ol succcss takc thc initiativc, and is lully ablc to judgc
whcn and whcrc to strikc.
uring thc rst thrcc campaigns ol thc Scvcn Ycars Var Frcdcrick was
thc assailant, in thc rcmaining lour his conduct was a pcrlcct modcl ol thc
dclcnsivcocnsivc. Hc was, howcvcr, wondcrlully aidcd in this by his
advcrsarics, who allowcd him all thc timc hc dcsircd, and many opportunitics
ol taking thc ocnsivc with succcss. Vcllingtons coursc was mainly thc
samc in Portugal, Spain, and 8clgium, and it was thc most suitablc in his
circumstanccs. !t sccms plain that onc ol thc grcatcst talcnts ol a gcncral is to
know how to usc (it may bc altcrnatcly) thcsc two systcms, and particularly to
bc ablc to takc thc initiativc during thc progrcss ol a dclcnsivc war.
ARTICLE XVII
Of the Theater of Operations
Tc thcatcr ol a war compriscs all thc tcrritory upon which thc partics may
assail cach othcr, whcthcr it bclong to thcmsclvcs, thcir allics, or to wcakcr
statcs who may bc drawn into thc war through lcar or intcrcst. Vhcn thc war is
also maritimc, thc thcatcr may cmbracc both hcmisphcrcs,as has happcncd
in contcsts bctwccn Francc and ngland sincc thc timc ol Louis X!\. Tc
thcatcr ol a war may thus bc undcncd, and must, not bc conloundcd with
thc thcatcr ol opcrations ol onc or thc othcr army. Tc thcatcr ol a contincntal
war bctwccn Francc and Austria may bc conncd to !taly, or may, in addition,
comprisc Gcrmany il thc Gcrman Statcs takc part thcrcin.
Armics may act in conccrt or scparatcly: in thc rst casc thc wholc thcatcr
ol opcrations may bc considcrcd as a singlc cld upon which stratcgy dirccts
6
thc armics lor thc attainmcnt ol a dcnitc cnd. !n thc sccond casc cach army
will havc its own indcpcndcnt thcatcr ol opcrations. Tc theater of operations
ol an army cmbraccs all thc tcrritory it may dcsirc to invadc and all that it
may bc ncccssary to dclcnd. !l thc army opcratcs indcpcndcntly, it should not
attcmpt any mancuvcr bcyond its own thcatcr, (though it should lcavc it il it
bc in dangcr ol bcing surroundcd,) sincc thc supposition is that no conccrt ol
action has bccn arrangcd with thc armics opcrating on thc othcr clds. !l, on
thc contrary, thcrc bc conccrt ol action, thc thcatcr ol opcrations ol cach army
takcn singly is but a zonc ol opcrations ol thc gcncral cld, occupicd by thc
masscs lor thc attainmcnt ol a common objcct.
!ndcpcndcntly ol its topographical lcaturcs, cach thcatcr upon which onc or
morc armics opcratc is composcd, lor both partics, as lollows:
.. l a xcd basc ol opcrations.
a. l a principal objcctivc point.
. l lronts ol opcrations, stratcgic lronts, and lincs ol dclcnsc.
. l zoncs and lincs ol opcrations.
. l tcmporary stratcgic lincs and lincs ol communications.
6. l natural or articial obstaclcs to bc ovcrcomc or to opposc to thc
cncmy.
,. l gcographical stratcgic points, whosc occupation is important, cithcr
lor thc ocnsivc or dclcnsivc.
. l accidcntal intcrmcdiatc bascs ol opcrations bctwccn thc objcctivc
point and thc primary basc.
. l points ol rclugc in casc ol rcvcrsc.
For illustration, lct us supposc thc casc ol Francc invading Austria with
two or thrcc armics, to bc conccntratcd undcr onc commandcr, and starting
lrom Maycncc, lrom thc Uppcr Rhinc, lrom Savoy or thc Maritimc Alps,
rcspcctivcly. Tc scction ol country which cach ol thcsc armics travcrscs may
bc considcrcd as a zonc ol thc gcncral cld ol opcrations. 8ut il thc army ol
!taly gocs but to thc Adigc without conccrtcd action with thc army ol thc
Rhinc, thcn what was bclorc but a zonc bccomcs lor that army a thcatcr ol
opcrations.
!n cvcry casc, cach thcatcr must havc its own basc, its own objcctivc point,
its zoncs and lincs ol opcrations connccting thc objcctivc point with thc basc,
cithcr in thc ocnsivc or thc dclcnsivc.
!t has bccn taught and publishcd that rivcrs arc lincs ol opcrations par
excellence. Now, as such a linc must posscss two or thrcc roads to movc thc
army within thc rangc ol its opcrations, and at lcast onc linc ol rctrcat, rivcrs
havc bccn callcd lincs ol rctrcat, and cvcn lincs ol mancuvcr. !t would bc much
morc accuratc to say that rivcrs arc cxccllcnt lincs ol supply, and powcrlul
,
auxiliarics in thc cstablishmcnt ol a good linc ol opcrations, but ncvcr thc linc
itscll.
!t has also bccn maintaincd that, could onc crcatc a country cxprcssly to
bc a good thcatcr ol war, convcrging roads would bc avoidcd, bccausc thcy
lacilitatc invasion. vcry country has its capital, its rich citics lor manulacturcs
or tradc, and, in thc vcry naturc ol things, thcsc points must bc thc ccntcrs
ol convcrging routcs. Could Gcrmany bc madc a dcscrt, to bc moldcd into a
thcatcr ol war at thc plcasurc ol an individual, commcrcial citics and ccntcrs ol
tradc would spring up, and thc roads would again ncccssarily convcrgc to thcsc
points. Morcovcr, was not thc Archdukc Charlcs cnablcd to bcat Jourdan in
.,6 by thc usc ol convcrging routcs: 8csidcs, thcsc routcs arc morc lavorablc
lor dclcnsc than attack, sincc two divisions rctrcating upon thcsc radial lincs
can ccct a junction morc quickly than two armics which arc pursuing, and
thcy may thus unitcd dclcat cach ol thc pursuing masscs scparatcly.
Somc authors havc armcd that mountainous countrics abound in stratcgic
positions, othcrs havc maintaincd that, on thc contrary, thcsc points arc morc
rarc among thc Alps than in thc plains, but also that il morc rarc thcy arc
morc important and morc dccisivc.
Somc authors havc rcprcscntcd that high rangcs ol mountains arc, in war,
inacccssiblc barricrs. Napolcon, on thc contrary, in spcaking ol thc Rhctian
Alps, said that an army could pass whcrcvcr a man could put his loot.
Gcncrals no lcss cxpcricnccd than himscll in mountainwarlarc havc unitcd
with him in this opinion, in admitting thc grcat diculty ol carrying on a
dclcnsivc war in such localitics unlcss thc advantagcs ol partisan and rcgular
warlarc can bc combincd, thc rst to guard thc hcights and to harass thc
cncmy, thc sccond to givc battlc at thc dccisivc points,thc junctions ol thc
largc vallcys.
Tcsc dicrcnccs ol opinion arc hcrc noticcd mcrcly to show thc rcadcr
that, so lar lrom thc art having rcachcd pcrlcction, thcrc arc many points that
admit ol discussion.
Tc most important topographical or articial lcaturcs which makc up thc
thcatcr ol a war will, in succccding portions ol this chaptcr, bc cxamincd as to
thcir stratcgic valuc, but hcrc it may bc propcr to rcmark that this valuc will
dcpcnd much upon thc spirit and skill ol thc gcncral. Tc grcat lcadcr who
crosscd thc Saint8crnard and ordcrcd thc passagc ol thc Splugcn was lar
lrom bclicving in thc imprcgnability ol thcsc chains, but hc was also lar lrom
thinking that a muddy rivulct and a wallcd inclosurc could changc his dcstiny
at Vatcrloo.

ARTICLE XVIII
Bases of Operations
A basc ol opcrations is thc portion ol country lrom which thc army obtains its
rcinlorccmcnts and rcsourccs, lrom which it starts whcn it takcs thc ocnsivc,
to which it rctrcats whcn ncccssary, and by which it is supportcd whcn it takcs
position to covcr thc country dclcnsivcly.
Tc basc ol opcrations is most gcncrally that ol supply,though not
ncccssarily so, at lcast as lar as lood is conccrncd, as, lor instancc, a Frcnch
army upon thc lbc might bc subsistcd lrom Vcstphalia or Franconia, but its
rcal basc would ccrtainly bc upon thc Rhinc.
Vhcn a lronticr posscsscs good natural or articial barricrs, it may bc
altcrnatcly cithcr an cxccllcnt basc lor ocnsivc opcrations, or a linc ol dclcnsc
whcn thc statc is invadcd. !n thc lattcr casc it will always bc prudcnt to havc a
sccond basc in rcar, lor, although an army in its own country will cvcrywhcrc
nd a point ol support, thcrc is still a vast dicrcncc bctwccn thosc parts
ol thc country without military positions and mcans, as lorts, arscnals, and
lorticd dcpots, and thosc othcr portions whcrc thcsc military rcsourccs arc
lound, and thcsc lattcr alonc can bc considcrcd as salc bascs ol opcrations. An
army may havc in succcssion a numbcr ol bascs: lor instancc, a Frcnch army
in Gcrmany will havc thc Rhinc lor its rst basc, it may havc othcrs bcyond
this, whcrcvcr it has allics or pcrmancnt lincs ol dclcnsc, but il it is drivcn
back across thc Rhinc it will havc lor a basc cithcr thc Mcusc or thc Moscllc:
it might havc a third upon thc Scinc, and a lourth upon thc Loirc.
Tcsc succcssivc bascs may not bc cntircly or ncarly parallcl to thc rst. n
thc contrary, a total changc ol dircction may bccomc ncccssary. A Frcnch army
rcpulscd bcyond thc Rhinc might nd a good basc on 8clort or 8csancon, on
Mczicrcs or Scdan, as thc Russian army altcr thc cvacuation ol Moscow lclt
thc basc on thc north and cast and cstablishcd itscll upon thc linc ol thc ka
and thc southcrn provinccs. Tcsc latcral bascs pcrpcndicular to thc lront ol
dclcnsc arc oltcn dccisivc in prcvcnting thc cncmy lrom pcnctrating to thc
hcart ol thc country, or at lcast in rcndcring it impossiblc lor him to maintain
himscll thcrc. A basc upon a broad and rapid rivcr, both banks bcing hcld by
strong works, would bc as lavorablc as could bc dcsircd.
Tc morc cxtcndcd thc basc, thc morc diculty will thcrc bc in covcring
it, but it will also bc morc dicult to cut thc army o lrom it. A statc whosc
capital is too ncar thc lronticr cannot havc so lavorablc a basc in a dclcnsivc
war as onc whosc capital is morc rctircd.
A basc, to bc pcrlcct, should havc two or thrcc lorticd points ol sucicnt
capacity lor thc cstablishmcnt ol dcpots ol supply. Tcrc should bc a tete de
pont upon cach ol its unlordablc strcams.
All arc now agrccd upon thcsc principlcs, but upon othcr points opinions
havc varicd. Somc havc asscrtcd that a pcrlcct basc is onc parallcl to that ol

thc cncmy. My opinion is that bascs pcrpcndicular to thosc ol thc cncmy arc
morc advantagcous, particularly such as havc two sidcs almost pcrpcndicular
to cach othcr and lorming a rccntrant anglc, thus aording a doublc basc il
rcquircd, and which, by giving thc control ol two sidcs ol thc stratcgic cld,
assurc two lincs ol rctrcat widcly apart, and lacilitatc any changc ol thc linc ol
opcrations which an unlorcsccn turn ol aairs may ncccssitatc.
Tc quotations which lollow arc lrom my trcatisc on Grcat Military
pcrations:
Tc gcncral conguration ol thc thcatcr ol war may also havc a grcat
inucncc upon thc dircction ol thc lincs ol opcrations, and, conscqucntly,
upon thc dircction ol thc bascs.
Figurc .
!l cvcry thcatcr ol war lorms a gurc prcscnting lour laccs morc or lcss
rcgular, onc ol thc armics, at thc opcning ol thc campaign, may hold onc ol
thcsc laccs,pcrhaps two,whilc thc cncmy occupics thc othcr, thc lourth
bcing closcd by insurmountablc obstaclcs. Tc dicrcnt ways ol occupying
this thcatcr will lcad to widcly dicrcnt combinations. To illustratc, wc will
citc thc thcatcr ol thc Frcnch armics in Vcstphalia lrom .,, to .,6a, and
that ol Napolcon in .c6, both ol which arc rcprcscntcd in Fig. ., p. ,. !n thc
rst casc, thc sidc A 8 was thc North Sca, 8 thc linc ol thc Vcscr and thc
basc ol ukc Fcrdinand, C thc linc ol thc Main and thc basc ol thc Frcnch
army, A C thc linc ol thc Rhinc, also guardcd by Frcnch troops. Tc Frcnch
hcld two laccs, thc North Sca bcing thc third, and hcncc it was only ncccssary
lor thcm, by mancuvcrs, to gain thc sidc 8 to bc mastcrs ol thc lour laccs,
including thc basc and thc communications ol thc cncmy. Tc Frcnch army,
starting lrom its basc C and gaining thc lront ol opcrations F G H, could
cut o thc allicd army ! lrom its basc 8 , thc lattcr would bc thrown upon
thc anglc A, lormcd by thc lincs ol thc Rhinc, thc ms, and thc sca, whilc thc
army could communicatc with its bascs on thc Main and Rhinc.
6c
Tc movcmcnt ol Napolcon in .c6 on thc Saalc was similar. Hc occupicd
at Jcna and Naumburg thc linc F G H, thcn marchcd by Hallc and cssau to
lorcc thc Prussian army ! upon thc sca, rcprcscntcd by thc sidc A 8. Tc rcsult
is wcll known.
Tc art, thcn, ol sclccting lincs ol opcrations is to givc thcm such dircctions
as to scizc thc communications ol thc cncmy without losing oncs own. Tc
linc F G H, by its cxtcndcd position, and thc bcnd on thc ank ol thc cncmy,
always protccts thc communications with thc basc C , and this is cxactly thc
mancuvcrs ol Marcngo, Ulm, and Jcna.
Vhcn thc thcatcr ol war docs not bordcr upon thc sca, it is always boundcd
by a powcrlul ncutral statc, which guards its lronticrs and closcs onc sidc ol thc
squarc. Tis may not bc an obstaclc insurmountablc likc thc sca, but gcncrally
it may bc considcrcd as an obstaclc upon which it would bc dangcrous to
rctrcat altcr a dclcat: hcncc it would bc an advantagc to lorcc thc cncmy upon
it. Tc soil ol a powcr which can bring into thc cld onc hundrcd and lty
or two hundrcd thousand troops cannot bc violatcd with impunity, and il a
dclcatcd army madc thc attcmpt, it would bc nonc thc lcss cut o lrom its basc.
!l thc boundary ol thc thcatcr ol war should bc thc tcrritory ol a wcak statc,
it would bc absorbcd in this thcatcr, and thc squarc would bc cnlargcd till it
rcachcd thc lronticrs ol a powcrlul statc, or thc sca. Tc outlinc ol thc lronticrs
may modily thc shapc ol thc quadrilatcral so as to makc it approach thc gurc
ol a parallclogram or trapczoid, as in Figurc a. !n cithcr casc, thc advantagc
ol thc army which has control ol two laccs ol thc gurc, and posscsscs thc
powcr ol cstablishing upon thcm a doublc basc, will bc still morc dccidcd,
sincc it will bc ablc morc casily to cut thc cncmy o lrom thc shortcncd sidc,
as was thc casc with thc Prussian army in .c6, with thc sidc 8 J ol thc
parallclogram lormcd by thc lincs ol thc Rhinc, thc dcr, thc North Sca, and
thc mountainous lronticr ol Franconia.
Figurc a
Tc sclcction ol 8ohcmia as a basc in .. gocs to provc thc truth ol my
opinion, lor it was thc pcrpcndicularity ol this basc to that ol thc Frcnch
army which cnablcd thc allics to ncutralizc thc immcnsc advantagcs which
thc linc ol thc lbc would othcrwisc havc aordcd Napolcon, and turncd thc
6.
advantagcs ol thc campaign in thcir lavor. Likcwisc, in ..a, by cstablishing
thcir basc pcrpcndicularly upon thc ka and Kalouga, thc Russians wcrc ablc
to cxccutc thcir ank march upon Viazma and Krasnoi.
!l any thing lurthcr bc rcquircd to cstablish thcsc truths, it will only bc
ncccssary to considcr that, il thc basc bc pcrpcndicular to that ol thc cncmy,
thc lront ol opcrations will bc parallcl to his linc ol opcrations, and that hcncc
it will bc casy to attack his communications and linc ol rctrcat.
!t has bccn statcd that pcrpcndicular bascs arc particularly lavorablc in thc
casc ol a doublc lronticr, as in thc last gurcs. Critics may objcct to this that
it docs not agrcc with what is clscwhcrc said in lavor ol lronticrs which arc
salicnt toward thc cncmy, and against doublc lincs ol opcrations with cquality
ol lorcc. (Art. XX!.) Tc objcction is not wcll loundcd, lor thc grcatcst
advantagc ol a pcrpcndicular basc consists in thc lact that it lorms such a
salicnt, which takcs in rcvcrsc a portion ol thc thcatcr ol opcrations. n thc
othcr hand, a basc with two laccs by no mcans rcquircs that both should bc
occupicd in lorcc: on thc contrary, upon onc ol thcm it will bc sucicnt to
havc somc lorticd points garrisoncd by small bodics, whilc thc grcat bulk ol
thc lorcc rcsts upon thc othcr lacc,as was donc in thc campaigns ol .cc and
.c6. Tc anglc ol ncarly nincty dcgrccs lormcd by thc portion ol thc Rhinc
lrom Constancc to 8ascl, and thcncc to Kchl, gavc Gcncral Morcau onc basc
parallcl and anothcr pcrpcndicular to that ol his antagonist. Hc thrcw two
divisions by his lclt toward Kchl on thc rst basc, to attract thc attcntion
ol thc cncmy to that point, whilc hc movcd with ninc divisions upon thc
cxtrcmity ol thc pcrpcndicular lacc toward Schahauscn, which carricd him
in a lcw days to thc gatcs ol Augsburg, thc two dctachcd divisions having
alrcady rcjoincd him.
!n .c6, Napolcon had also thc doublc basc ol thc Rhinc and Main, lorming
almost a right rccntrant anglc. Hc lclt Morticr upon thc rst and parallcl onc,
whilc with thc mass ol his lorccs hc gaincd thc cxtrcmity ol thc pcrpcndicular
basc, and thus intcrccptcd thc Prussians at Gcra and Naumburg by rcaching
thcir linc ol rctrcat.
!l so many imposing lacts provc that bascs with two laccs, onc ol thcm bcing
almost pcrpcndicular to that ol thc cncmy, arc thc bcst, it is wcll to rccollcct
that, in dclault ol such a basc, its advantagcs may bc partially supplicd by a
changc ol stratcgic lront, as will bc sccn in Articlc XX.
Anothcr vcry important point in rclcrcncc to thc propcr dircction ol bascs
rclatcs to thosc cstablishcd on thc scacoast. Tcsc bascs may bc lavorablc in
somc circumstanccs, but arc cqually unlavorablc in othcrs, as may bc rcadily
sccn lrom what prcccdcs. Tc dangcr which must always cxist ol an army
bcing drivcn to thc sca sccms so clcar, in thc casc ol thc cstablishmcnt ol thc
basc upon it, (which bascs can only bc lavorablc to naval powcrs,) that it is
astonishing to hcar in our day praiscs ol such a basc. Vcllington, coming with
a cct to thc rclicl ol Spain and Portugal, could not havc sccurcd a bcttcr basc
than that ol Lisbon, or rathcr ol thc pcninsula ol Torrcs\cdras, which covcrs
6a
all thc avcnucs to that capital on thc land sidc. Tc sca and thc Tagus not only
protcctcd both anks, but sccurcd thc salcty ol his only possiblc linc ol rctrcat,
which was upon thc cct.
8lindcd by thc advantagcs which thc intrcnchcd camp ol Torrcs\cdras
sccurcd lor thc nglish, and not tracing cccts to thcir rcal causcs, many
gcncrals in othcr rcspccts wisc contcnd that no bascs arc good cxccpt such
as rcst on thc sca and thus aord thc army lacilitics ol supply and rclugc
with both anks sccurcd. Fascinatcd by similar notions, Coloncl Carion
Nizas asscrtcd that in .. Napolcon ought to havc postcd hall ol his army in
8ohcmia and thrown onc hundrcd and lty thousand mcn on thc mouths ol
thc lbc toward Hamburg, lorgctting that thc rst prcccpt lor a contincntal
army is to cstablish its basc upon thc lront larthcst from thc sca, so as to sccurc
thc bcnct ol all its clcmcnts ol strcngth, lrom which it might nd itscll cut
o il thc basc wcrc cstablishcd upon thc coast.
An insular and naval powcr acting on thc contincnt would pursuc a
diamctrically oppositc coursc, but rcsulting lrom thc samc principlc, viz.: to
establish the base upon those points where it can be sustained by all the resources of the
country, and at the same time insure a safe retreat.
A statc powcrlul both on land and sca, whosc squadrons control thc sca
adjaccnt to thc thcatcr ol opcrations, might wcll basc an army ol lorty or lty
thousand mcn upon thc coast, as its rctrcat by sca and its supplics could bc wcll
assurcd, but to cstablish a contincntal army ol onc hundrcd and lty thousand
mcn upon such a basc, whcn opposcd by a disciplincd and ncarly cqual lorcc,
would bc an act ol madncss.
Howcvcr, as cvcry maxim has its cxccptions, thcrc is a casc in which it
may bc admissiblc to basc a contincntal army upon thc sca: it is, whcn your
advcrsary is not lormidablc upon land, and whcn you, bcing mastcr ol thc sca,
can supply thc army with morc lacility than in thc intcrior. Vc rarcly scc thcsc
conditions lulllcd: it was so, howcvcr, during thc Turkish war ol .a and
.a. Tc wholc attcntion ol thc Russians was givcn to \arna and 8ourghas,
whilc Shumla was mcrcly obscrvcd, a plan which thcy could not havc pursucd
in thc prcscncc ol a uropcan army (cvcn with thc control ol thc sca) without
grcat dangcr ol ruin.
cspitc all that has bccn said by tricrs who prctcnd to dccidc upon thc latc
ol cmpircs, this war was, in thc main, wcll conductcd. Tc army covcrcd itscll
by obtaining thc lortrcsscs ol 8railo, \arna, and Silistria, and altcrward by
prcparing a dcpot at Sizcboli. As soon as its basc was wcll cstablishcd it movcd
upon Adrianoplc, which prcviously would havc bccn madncss. Had thc scason
bccn a couplc ol months longcr, or had thc army not comc so grcat a distancc
in .a, thc war would havc tcrminatcd with thc rst campaign.
8csidcs pcrmancnt bascs, which arc usually cstablishcd upon our own
lronticrs, or in thc tcrritory ol a laithlul ally, thcrc arc cvcntual or tcmporary
bascs, which rcsult lrom thc opcrations in thc cncmys country, but, as thcsc
6
arc rathcr tcmporary points ol support, thcy will, to avoid conlusion, bc
discusscd in Articlc XX!!!.
ARTICLE XIX
Strategic lines and Points, Decisive Points of the Theater
of War, and Objective Points of Operations
Stratcgic lincs and points arc ol dicrcnt kinds. Somc rcccivc this titlc simply
lrom thcir position, which givcs thcm all thcir importancc: thcsc arc pcrmancnt
gcographical stratcgic points. thcrs havc a valuc lrom thc rclations thcy bcar
to thc positions ol thc masscs ol thc hostilc troops and to thc cntcrpriscs likcly
to bc dircctcd against thcm: such arc stratcgic points ol mancuvcr, and arc
cvcntual. Finally, thcrc arc points which havc only a sccondary importancc,
and othcrs whosc importancc is constant and immcnsc: thc lattcr arc callcd
C!S!\ stratcgic points.
vcry point ol thc thcatcr ol war which is ol military importancc, whcthcr
lrom its position as a ccntcr ol communication, or lrom thc prcscncc ol military
cstablishmcnts or lortications, is a gcographical stratcgic point.
A distinguishcd gcncral arms that such a point would not ncccssarily
bc a stratcgic point, unlcss situatcd lavorably lor a contcmplatcd opcration. !
think dicrcntly, lor a stratcgic point is such csscntially and by naturc, and, no
mattcr how lar distant it may bc lrom thc sccnc ol thc rst cntcrpriscs, it may
bc includcd in thc cld by somc unlorcsccn turn ol cvcnts, and thus acquirc
its lull importancc. !t would, thcn, bc morc accuratc to statc that all stratcgic
points arc not ncccssarily dccisivc points.
Lincs arc stratcgic cithcr lrom thcir gcographical position or lrom thcir
rclation to tcmporary mancuvcrs. Tc rst class may bc subdividcd as
lollows,viz.: gcographic lincs which by thcir pcrmancnt importancc bclong
to thc dccisivc points
|!|
ol thc thcatcr ol war, and thosc which havc valuc mcrcly
bccausc thcy conncct two stratcgic points.
To prcvcnt conlusion, wc will clscwhcrc trcat ol stratcgic lincs in thcir
rclations to mancuvcrs,conning oursclvcs hcrc to what rclatcs to thc
decisive and objective points ol thc zonc ol opcrations upon which cntcrpriscs
occur.
Although thcsc arc most intimatcly conncctcd, sincc cvcry objcctivc point
ought ncccssarily to bc onc ol thc dccisivc points ol thc thcatcr ol war, thcrc
is ncvcrthclcss a distinction bctwccn thcm, lor all dccisivc points cannot bc at
thc samc timc thc objcctivc ol opcrations. Vc will, thcn, dcnc thc rst, in
ordcr to bc morc casily guidcd in our sclcction ol thc sccond.
!
! may bc rcproachcd with inaccuracy ol cxprcssion,sincc a linc cannot bc a point, and yct !
apply to lincs thc namc ol dccisivc or objcctivc points. !t sccms almost usclcss to rcmark that objective points
arc not gcomctric points, but that thc namc is a lorm ol cxprcssion uscd to dcsignatc thc objcct which an army
dcsircs to attain.
6
! think thc namc ol decisive strategic point should bc givcn to all thosc which
arc capablc ol cxcrcising a markcd inucncc cithcr upon thc rcsult ol thc
campaign or upon a singlc cntcrprisc. All points whosc gcographical position
and whosc natural or articial advantagcs lavor thc attack or dclcnsc ol a lront
ol opcrations or ol a linc ol dclcnsc arc includcd in this numbcr, and largc,
wclllocatcd lortrcsscs occupy in importancc thc rst rank among thcm.
Tc dccisivc points ol a thcatcr ol war arc ol scvcral kinds. Tc rst arc
thc gcographic points and lincs whosc importancc is pcrmancnt and a
conscqucncc ol thc conguration ol thc country. For cxamplc, takc thc casc ol
thc Frcnch in 8clgium: whocvcr is mastcr ol thc linc ol thc Mcusc will havc
thc grcatcst advantagcs in taking posscssion ol thc country, lor his advcrsary,
bcing outankcd and incloscd bctwccn thc Mcusc and thc North Sca, will
bc cxposcd to thc dangcr ol total ruin il hc givc battlc parallcl to that sca.
|!|

Similarly, thc vallcy ol thc anubc prcscnts a scrics ol important points which
havc causcd it to bc lookcd upon as thc kcy ol Southcrn Gcrmany.
Tosc points thc posscssion ol which would givc thc control ol thc junction
ol scvcral vallcys and ol thc ccntcr ol thc chicl lincs ol communication in a
country arc also decisive geographic points. For instancc, Lyons is an important
stratcgic point, bccausc it controls thc vallcys ol thc Rhonc and Saonc, and
is at thc ccntcr ol communications bctwccn Francc and !taly and bctwccn
thc South and ast, but it would not bc a decisive point unlcss wcll lorticd
or posscssing an cxtcndcd camp with tetes de pont. Lcipsic is most ccrtainly a
stratcgic point, inasmuch as it is at thc junction ol all thc communications ol
Northcrn Gcrmany. Vcrc it lorticd and did it occupy both banks ol thc rivcr,
it would bc almost thc kcy ol thc country,il a country has a kcy, or il this
cxprcssion mcans morc than a dccisivc point.
All capitals arc stratcgic points, lor thc doublc rcason that thcy arc not only
ccntcrs ol communications, but also thc scats ol powcr and govcrnmcnt.
!n mountainous countrics thcrc arc dclcs which arc thc only routcs ol
cxit practicablc lor an army, and thcsc may bc dccisivc in rclcrcncc to any
cntcrprisc in this country. !t is wcll known how grcat was thc importancc ol
thc dclc ol 8ard, protcctcd by a singlc small lort, in .cc.
Tc sccond kind ol dccisivc points arc accidcntal points ol mancuvcr, which
rcsult lrom thc positions ol thc troops on both sidcs.
Vhcn Mack was at Ulm, in .c, awaiting thc approach ol thc Russian army
through Moravia, thc dccisivc point in an attack upon him was onauwcrth
or thc Lowcr Lcch, lor il his advcrsarics gaincd it bclorc him hc was cut o
lrom his linc ol rctrcat, and also lrom thc army intcndcd to support him. n
thc contrary, Kray, who, in .cc, was in thc samc position, cxpcctcd no aid
lrom 8ohcmia, but rathcr lrom thc Tyrol and lrom thc army ol Mclas in !taly:
hcncc thc dccisivc point ol attack upon him was not onauwcrth, but on thc
oppositc sidc, by Schahauscn, sincc this would takc in rcvcrsc his lront ol
!
Tis only applics to contincntal armics, and not to thc nglish, who, having thcir basc on
Antwcrp or stcnd, would havc nothing to lcar lrom an occupation ol thc linc ol thc Mcusc.
6
opcrations, cxposc his linc ol rctrcat, cut him o lrom his supporting army as
wcll as lrom his basc, and lorcc him upon thc Main. !n thc samc campaign
thc rst objcctivc point ol Napolcon was to lall upon thc right ol Mclas by thc
Saint8crnard, and to scizc his linc ol communications: hcncc Saint8crnard,
!vrca, and Piaccnza wcrc dccisivc points only by rcason ol thc march ol Mclas
upon Nicc.
!t may bc laid down as a gcncral principlc that thc dccisivc points ol
mancuvcr arc on that ank ol thc cncmy upon which, il his opponcnt opcratcs,
hc can morc casily cut him o lrom his basc and supporting lorccs without
bcing cxposcd to thc samc dangcr. Tc ank oppositc to thc sca is always to bc
prclcrrcd, bccausc it givcs an opportunity ol lorcing thc cncmy upon thc sca.
Tc only cxccption to this is in thc casc ol an insular and inlcrior army, whcrc
thc attcmpt, although dangcrous, might bc madc to cut it o lrom thc cct.
!l thc cncmys lorccs arc in dctachmcnts, or arc too much cxtcndcd, thc
dccisivc point is his ccntcr, lor by picrcing that, his lorccs will bc morc dividcd,
thcir wcakncss incrcascd, and thc lractions may bc crushcd scparatcly.
Tc dccisivc point ol a battlccld will bc dctcrmincd by,
.. Tc lcaturcs ol thc ground.
a. Tc rclation ol thc local lcaturcs to thc ultimatc stratcgic aim.
. Tc positions occupicd by thc rcspcctivc lorccs.
Tcsc considcrations will bc discusscd in thc chaptcr on battlcs.
8JCT!\ P!NTS
Tcrc arc two classcs ol objcctivc points,objcctivc points of maneuver,
and geographical objective points. A gcographical objcctivc point may bc an
important lortrcss, thc linc ol a rivcr, a lront ol opcrations which aords good
lincs ol dclcnsc or good points ol support lor ultcrior cntcrpriscs. Objective
points of maneuver, in contradistinction to geographical objectives, dcrivc thcir
importancc lrom, and thcir positions dcpcnd upon, thc situation ol thc hostilc
masscs.
!n stratcgy, thc objcct ol thc campaign dctcrmincs thc objcctivc point. !l
this aim bc ocnsivc, thc point will bc thc posscssion ol thc hostilc capital,
or that ol a provincc whosc loss would compcl thc cncmy to makc pcacc. !n
a war ol invasion thc capital is, ordinarily, thc objcctivc point. Howcvcr, thc
gcographical position ol thc capital, thc political rclations ol thc bclligcrcnts
with thcir ncighbors, and thcir rcspcctivc rcsourccs, arc considcrations lorcign
in thcmsclvcs to thc art ol ghting battlcs, but intimatcly conncctcd with
plans ol opcrations, and may dccidc whcthcr an army should attcmpt or not
to occupy thc hostilc capital. !l it bc concludcd not to scizc thc capital, thc
66
objcctivc point might bc a part ol thc lront ol opcrations or linc ol dclcnsc
whcrc an important lort is situatcd, thc posscssion ol which would rcndcr salc
thc occupation ol thc ncighboring tcrritory. For instancc, il Francc wcrc to
invadc !taly in a war against Austria, thc rst objcctivc point would bc thc linc
ol thc Ticino and Po, thc sccond, Mantua and thc linc ol thc Adigc. !n thc
dclcnsivc, thc objcctivc point, instcad ol bcing that which it is dcsirablc to gain
posscssion ol, is that which is to bc dclcndcd. Tc capital, bcing considcrcd
thc scat ol powcr, bccomcs thc principal objcctivc point ol thc dclcnsc, but
thcrc may bc othcr points, as thc dclcnsc ol a rst linc and ol thc rst basc
ol opcrations. Tus, lor a Frcnch army rcduccd to thc dclcnsivc bchind thc
Rhinc, thc rst objcctivc would bc to prcvcnt thc passagc ol thc rivcr, it would
cndcavor to rclicvc thc lorts in Alsacc il thc cncmy succccdcd in cccting a
passagc ol thc rivcr and in bcsicging thcm: thc sccond objcctivc would bc to
covcr thc rst basc ol opcrations upon thc Mcusc or Moscllc,which might
bc attaincd by a latcral dclcnsc as wcll as onc in lront.
As to thc objcctivc points ol maneuvers,that is, thosc which rclatc
particularly to thc dcstruction or dccomposition ol thc hostilc lorccs,thcir
importancc may bc sccn by what has alrcady bccn said. Tc grcatcst talcnt ol a
gcncral, and thc surcst hopc ol succcss, lic in somc dcgrcc in thc good choicc
ol thcsc points. Tis was thc most conspicuous mcrit ol Napolcon. Rcjccting
old systcms, which wcrc satiscd by thc capturc ol onc or two points or with
thc occupation ol an adjoining provincc, hc was convinccd that thc bcst mcans
ol accomplishing grcat rcsults was to dislodgc and dcstroy thc hostilc army,
sincc statcs and provinccs lall ol thcmsclvcs whcn thcrc is no organizcd lorcc
to protcct thcm. To dctcct at a glancc thc rclativc advantagcs prcscntcd by thc
dicrcnt zoncs ol opcrations, to conccntratc thc mass ol thc lorccs upon that
onc which gavc thc bcst promisc ol succcss, to bc indclatigablc in asccrtaining
thc approximatc position ol thc cncmy, to lall with thc rapidity ol lightning
upon his ccntcr il his lront was too much cxtcndcd, or upon that ank by
which hc could morc rcadily scizc his communications, to outank him, to cut
his linc, to pursuc him to thc last, to dispcrsc and dcstroy his lorccs,such
was thc systcm lollowcd by Napolcon in his rst campaigns. Tcsc campaigns
provcd this systcm to bc onc ol thc vcry bcst.
Vhcn thcsc mancuvcrs wcrc applicd, in latcr ycars, to thc long distanccs and
thc inhospitablc rcgions ol Russia, thcy wcrc not so succcsslul as in Gcrmany:
howcvcr, it must bc rcmcmbcrcd that, il this kind ol war is not suitablc to all
capacitics, rcgions, or circumstanccs, its chanccs ol succcss arc still vcry grcat,
and it is bascd upon principlc. Napolcon abuscd thc systcm, but this docs not
disprovc its rcal advantagcs whcn a propcr limit is assigncd to its cntcrpriscs
and thcy arc madc in harmony with thc rcspcctivc conditions ol thc armics
and ol thc adjoining statcs.
Tc maxims to bc givcn on thcsc important stratcgic opcrations arc almost
cntircly includcd in what has bccn said upon dccisivc points, and in what will
bc statcd in Articlc XX!. in discussing thc choicc ol lincs ol opcrations.
6,
As to thc choicc ol objcctivc points, cvcry thing will gcncrally dcpcnd upon
thc aim ol thc war and thc charactcr which political or othcr circumstanccs
may givc it, and, nally, upon thc military lacilitics ol thc two partics.
!n cascs whcrc thcrc arc powcrlul rcasons lor avoiding all risk, it may
bc prudcnt to aim only at thc acquisition ol partial advantagcs,such as
thc capturc ol a lcw towns or thc posscssion ol adjaccnt tcrritory. !n othcr
cascs, whcrc a party has thc mcans ol achicving a grcat succcss by incurring
grcat dangcrs, hc may attcmpt thc dcstruction ol thc hostilc army, as did
Napolcon.
Tc mancuvcrs ol Ulm and Jcna cannot bc rccommcndcd to an army whosc
only objcct is thc sicgc ol Antwcrp. For vcry dicrcnt rcasons, thcy could
not bc rccommcndcd to thc Frcnch army bcyond thc Nicmcn, vc hundrcd
lcagucs lrom its lronticrs, bccausc thcrc would bc much morc to bc lost by
lailurc than a gcncral could rcasonably hopc to gain by succcss.
Tcrc is anothcr class ol dccisivc points to bc mcntioncd, which arc
dctcrmincd morc lrom political than lrom stratcgic considcrations: thcy play
a grcat part in most coalitions, and inucncc thc opcrations and plans ol
cabincts. Tcy may bc callcd political objective points.
!ndccd, bcsidcs thc intimatc conncction bctwccn statcsmanship and war in
its prcliminarics, in most campaigns somc military cntcrpriscs arc undcrtakcn
to carry out a political cnd, somctimcs quitc important, but oltcn vcry irrational.
Tcy lrcqucntly lcad to thc commission ol grcat crrors in stratcgy. Vc citc two
cxamplcs. First, thc cxpcdition ol thc ukc ol York to unkirk, suggcstcd by
old commcrcial vicws, gavc to thc opcrations ol thc allics a divcrgcnt dircction,
which causcd thcir lailurc: hcncc this objcctivc point was bad in a military
vicw. Tc cxpcdition ol thc samc princc to Holland in .,likcwisc duc to
thc vicws ol thc nglish cabinct, sustaincd by thc intcntions ol Austria on
8clgiumwas not lcss latal, lor it lcd to thc march ol thc Archdukc Charlcs
lrom Zurich upon Manhcim,a stcp quitc contrary to thc intcrcsts ol thc
allicd armics at thc timc it was undcrtakcn. Tcsc illustrations provc that
political objcctivc points should bc subordinatc to stratcgy, at lcast until altcr
a grcat succcss has bccn attaincd.
Tis subjcct is so cxtcnsivc and so complicatcd that it would bc absurd to
attcmpt to rcducc it to a lcw rulcs. Tc only onc which can bc givcn has just
bccn alludcd to, and is, that cithcr thc political objcctivc points should bc
sclcctcd according to thc principlcs ol stratcgy, or thcir considcration should
bc postponcd till altcr thc dccisivc cvcnts ol thc campaign. Applying this
rulc to thc cxamplcs just givcn, it will bc sccn that it was at Cambray or in
thc hcart ol Francc that unkirk should havc bccn conqucrcd in ., and
Holland dclivcrcd in .,, in othcr words, by uniting all thc strcngth ol thc
allics lor grcat attcmpts on thc dccisivc points ol thc lronticrs. xpcditions
ol this kind arc gcncrally includcd in grand divcrsions,to bc trcatcd ol in a
scparatc articlc.
6
ARTICLE XX
Fronts of Operations, Strategic Fronts, Lines of Defense,
and Strategic Positions
Tcrc arc somc parts ol thc military scicncc that so closcly rcscmblc cach othcr,
and arc so intimatcly allicd, that thcy arc lrcqucntly conloundcd, although
thcy arc dccidcdly distinct. Such arc fronts of operations, strategic fronts, lines
of defense, and strategic positions. !t is proposcd in this articlc to show thc
distinction bctwccn thcm and to cxposc thcir rclations to cach othcr.
FRNTS F PRAT!NS AN STRATG!C FRNTS
Vhcn thc masscs ol an army arc postcd in a zonc ol opcrations, thcy gcncrally
occupy stratcgic positions. Tc cxtcnt ol thc lront occupicd toward thc cncmy
is callcd thc strategic front. Tc portion ol thc thcatcr ol war lrom which an
cncmy can probably rcach this lront in two or thrcc marchcs is callcd thc front
of operations.
Tc rcscmblancc bctwccn thcsc two lronts has causcd many military mcn to
conlound thcm, somctimcs undcr onc namc and somctimcs undcr thc othcr.
Rigorously spcaking, howcvcr, thc stratcgic lront dcsignatcs that lormcd
by thc actual positions occupicd by thc masscs ol thc army, whilc thc othcr
cmbraccs thc spacc scparating thc two armics, and cxtcnds onc or two marchcs
bcyond cach cxtrcmity ol thc stratcgic lront, and includcs thc ground upon
which thc armics will probably comc in collision.
Vhcn thc opcrations ol a campaign arc on thc cvc ol commcncing, onc ol
thc armics will dccidc to await thc attack ol thc othcr, and will undcrtakc to
prcparc a linc ol dclcnsc, which may bc cithcr that ol thc stratcgic lront or
morc to thc rcar. Hcncc thc stratcgic lront and linc ol dclcnsc may coincidc, as
was thc casc in ., and .,6 upon thc Rhinc, which was thcn a linc ol dclcnsc
lor both Austrians and Frcnch, and at thc samc timc thcir stratcgic lront and
lront ol opcrations. Tis occasional coincidcncc ol thcsc lincs doubtlcss lcads
pcrsons to conlound thcm, whilc thcy arc rcally vcry dicrcnt. An army has
not ncccssarily a linc ol dclcnsc, as, lor cxamplc, whcn it invadcs: whcn its
masscs arc conccntratcd in a singlc position, it has no stratcgic lront, but it is
ncvcr without a lront ol opcrations.
Tc two lollowing cxamplcs will illustratc thc dicrcncc bctwccn thc
dicrcnt tcrms.
At thc rcsumption ol hostilitics in .., Napolcons lront ol opcrations
cxtcndcd at rst lrom Hamburg to Vittcnbcrg, thcncc it ran along thc linc
ol thc allics toward Glogau and 8rcslau, (his right bcing at Locwcnbcrg,) and
lollowcd along thc lronticr ol 8ohcmia to rcsdcn. His lorccs wcrc stationcd
on this grand lront in lour masscs, whosc stratcgic positions wcrc intcrior and
6
ccntral and prcscntcd thrcc dicrcnt laccs. Subscqucntly, hc rctircd bchind thc
lbc. His rcal linc ol dclcnsc thcn cxtcndcd only lrom Vittcnbcrg to rcsdcn,
with a bcnd to thc rcar toward Maricnbcrg, lor Hamburg and Magdcburg
wcrc bcyond thc stratcgic cld, and it would havc bccn latal lor him to havc
cxtcndcd his opcrations to thcsc points.
Tc othcr cxamplc is his position about Mantua in .,6. His lront ol
opcrations hcrc rcally cxtcndcd lrom thc mountains ol 8crgamo to thc
Adriatic Sca, whilc his rcal linc ol dclcnsc was upon thc Adigc, bctwccn Lakc
Garda and Lcgnago: altcrward it was upon thc Mincio, bctwccn Pcschicra
and Mantua, whilc his stratcgic lront varicd according to his positions.
Tc lront ol opcrations bcing thc spacc which scparatcs thc two armics, and
upon which thcy may ght, is ordinarily parallcl to thc basc ol opcrations. Tc
stratcgic lront will havc thc samc dircction, and ought to bc pcrpcndicular
to thc principal linc ol opcrations, and to cxtcnd lar cnough on cithcr ank
to covcr this linc wcll. Howcvcr, this dircction may vary, cithcr on account
ol projccts that arc lormcd, or on account ol thc attacks ol thc cncmy, and
it quitc lrcqucntly happcns that it is ncccssary to havc a lront pcrpcndicular
to thc basc and parallcl to thc original linc ol opcrations. Such a changc ol
stratcgic lront is onc ol thc most important ol all grand mancuvcrs, lor by this
mcans thc control ol two laccs ol thc stratcgic cld may bc obtaincd, thus
giving thc army a position almost as lavorablc as il it posscsscd a basc with
two laccs. (Scc Art. X\!!!.)
Tc stratcgic lront ol Napolcon in his march on ylau illustratcs thcsc
points. His pivots ol opcrations wcrc at Varsaw and Torn, which madc thc
\istula a tcmporary basc: thc lront bccamc parallcl to thc Narcw, lrom whcncc
hc sct out, supportcd by Sicrock, Pultusk, and strolcnka, to mancuvcr by
his right and throw thc Russians on lbing and thc 8altic. !n such cascs, il
a point ol support in thc ncw dircction can bc obtaincd, thc stratcgic lront
givcs thc advantagcs rclcrrcd to abovc. !t ought to bc bornc in mind in such
mancuvcrs that thc army should always bc surc ol rcgaining its tcmporary
basc il ncccssary, in othcr words, that this basc should bc prolongcd bchind
thc stratcgic lront, and should bc covcrcd by it. Napolcon, marching lrom
thc Narcw by Allcnstcin upon ylau, had bchind his lclt Torn, and larthcr
lrom thc lront ol thc army thc tete de pont ol Praga and Varsaw, so that his
communications wcrc salc, whilc 8cnningscn, lorccd to lacc him and to
makc his linc parallcl to thc 8altic, might bc cut o lrom his basc, and bc
thrown back upon thc mouths ol thc \istula. Napolcon cxccutcd anothcr
vcry rcmarkablc changc ol stratcgic lront in his march lrom Gcra upon Jcna
and Naumburg in .c6. Morcau madc anothcr in moving by his right upon
Augsburg and illingcn, lronting thc anubc and Francc, and thcrcby lorcing
Kray to cvacuatc thc intrcnchcd camp at Ulm.
Tc changc ol thc stratcgic lront to a position pcrpcndicular to thc basc may
bc a tcmporary movcmcnt lor an opcration ol a lcw days duration, or it may
bc lor an indcnitc timc, in ordcr to prot by important advantagcs aordcd
,c
by ccrtain localitics, to strikc dccisivc blows, or to procurc lor thc army a
good linc ol dclcnsc and good pivots ol opcrations, which would bc almost
cquivalcnt to a rcal basc.
!t oltcn happcns that an army is compcllcd to havc a doublc stratcgic lront,
cithcr by thc lcaturcs ol thc thcatcr ol war, or bccausc cvcry linc ol ocnsivc
opcrations rcquircs protcction on its anks. As an cxamplc ol thc rst, thc
lronticrs ol Turkcy and Spain may bc citcd. !n ordcr to cross thc 8alkan or thc
bro, an army would bc obligcd to prcscnt a doublc lront,in thc rst casc, to
lacc thc vallcy ol thc anubc, in thc sccond, to conlront lorccs coming lrom
Saragossa or Lcon.
All cxtcnsivc countrics ncccssitatc, to a grcatcr or lcss dcgrcc, thc samc
prccaution. A Frcnch army in thc vallcy ol thc anubc will rcquirc a doublc
lront as soon as thc Austrians havc thrown sucicnt troops into thc Tyrol or
8ohcmia to givc risc to any anxicty. Tosc countrics which prcscnt a narrow
lronticr to thc cncmy arc thc only cxccption, sincc thc troops lclt on thc
lronticr to harass thc anks ol thc cncmy could thcmsclvcs bc cut o and
capturcd. Tis ncccssity ol doublc stratcgic lronts is onc ol thc most scrious
inconvcnicnccs ol an ocnsivc war, sincc it rcquircs largc dctachmcnts, which
arc always dangcrous. (Scc Articlc XXX\!.)
l coursc, all that prcccdcs rclatcs to rcgular warlarc. !n a national or
intcstinc war thc wholc country is thc sccnc ol hostilitics. Ncvcrthclcss, cach
largc lraction ol an army having a dcncd aim would havc its own stratcgic
lront dctcrmincd by thc lcaturcs ol thc country and thc positions occupicd
by thc largc bodics ol thc cncmy. Tus, Suchct in Catalonia and Masscna in
Portugal cach had a stratcgic lront, whilc thc lront ol somc othcr corps ol thc
army was not clcarly dcncd.
L!NS F FNS
Lincs ol dclcnsc arc classicd as stratcgical and tactical. Stratcgical lincs ol
dclcnsc arc subdividcd into two classcs: .. Pcrmancnt lincs ol dclcnsc, which
arc a part ol thc dclcnsivc systcm ol a statc, such as thc linc ol a lorticd
lronticr, a. vcntual lincs ol dclcnsc, which rclatc only to thc tcmporary
position ol an army.
Tc lronticr is a pcrmancnt linc ol dclcnsc whcn it prcscnts a wcllconncctcd
systcm ol obstaclcs, natural and articial, such as rangcs ol mountains,
broad rivcrs, and lortrcsscs. Tus, thc rangc ol thc Alps bctwccn Francc and
Picdmont is a linc ol dclcnsc, sincc thc practicablc passcs arc guardcd by lorts
which would provc grcat obstaclcs in thc way ol an army, and sincc thc outlcts
ol thc gorgcs in thc vallcys ol Picdmont arc protcctcd by largc lortrcsscs. Tc
Rhinc, thc dcr, and thc lbc may also bc considcrcd as pcrmancnt lincs ol
dclcnsc, on account ol thc important lorts lound upon thcm.
,.
vcry rivcr ol any considcrablc width, cvcry rangc ol mountains, and cvcry
dclc, having thcir wcak points covcrcd by tcmporary lortications, may bc
rcgardcd as eventual lines of defense, both stratcgic and tactical, sincc thcy may
arrcst lor somc timc thc progrcss ol thc cncmy, or may compcl him to dcviatc
to thc right or lclt in scarch ol a wcakcr point,in which casc thc advantagc
is cvidcntly stratcgic. !l thc cncmy attack in lront, thc lincs prcscnt an cvidcnt
tactical advantagc, sincc it is always morc dicult to drivc an army lrom its
position bchind a rivcr, or lrom a point naturally and articially strong, than
to attack it on an opcn plain. n thc othcr hand, this advantagc must not bc
considcrcd unqualicd, lcst wc should lall into thc systcm ol positions which
has bccn thc ruin ol so many armics, lor, whatcvcr may bc thc lacilitics ol
a position lor dclcnsc, it is quitc ccrtain that thc party which rcmains in it
passivc and rccciving all thc attacks ol his advcrsary will nally yicld.
|!|
!n
addition to this, sincc a position naturally vcry strong
|!!|
is dicult ol acccss it
will bc as dicult ol cgrcss, thc cncmy may bc ablc with an inlcrior lorcc to
connc thc army by guarding all thc outlcts. Tis happcncd to thc Saxons in
thc camp ol Pirna, and to Vurmscr in Mantua.
STRATG!C PS!T!NS
Tcrc is a disposition ol armics to which thc namc ol stratcgic position may bc
applicd, to distinguish lrom tactical positions or positions lor battlc.
Stratcgic positions arc thosc takcn lor somc timc and which arc intcndcd to
covcr a much grcatcr portion ol thc lront ol opcrations than would bc covcrcd
in an actual battlc. All positions bchind a rivcr or upon a linc ol dclcnsc, thc
divisions ol thc army bcing scparatcd by considcrablc distanccs, arc ol this
class, such as thosc ol Napolcon at Rivoli, \crona, and Lcgnago to ovcrlook
thc Adigc. His positions in .. in Saxony and Silcsia in advancc ol his linc
ol dclcnsc wcrc stratcgic. Tc positions ol thc AngloPrussian armics on thc
lronticr ol 8clgium bclorc thc battlc ol Ligny, (..,) and that ol Masscna
on thc Limmat and Aar in .,, wcrc also stratcgic. vcn wintcr quartcrs,
whcn compact and in lacc ol thc cncmy and not protcctcd by an armisticc,
arc stratcgic positions,lor instancc, Napolcon on thc Passargc in .c,. Tc
daily positions takcn up by an army bcyond thc rcach ol thc cncmy, which arc
somctimcs sprcad out cithcr to dcccivc him or to lacilitatc movcmcnts, arc ol
this class.
Tis class also includcs positions occupicd by an army to covcr scvcral points
and positions hcld by thc masscs ol an army lor thc purposcs ol obscrvation. Tc
dicrcnt positions takcn up on a linc ol dclcnsc, thc positions ol dctachmcnts
on a doublc lront ol opcrations, thc position ol a dctachmcnt covcring a sicgc,
!
Tis docs not rclcr to intrcnchcd camps, which makc a grcat dicrcncc. Tcy arc trcatcd ol in
Articlc XX\!!.
!!
!t is a qucstion hcrc ol positions ol camps, and not ol positions lor battlc. Tc lattcr will bc trcatcd
ol in thc chaptcr dcvotcd to Grand Tactics, (Articlc XXX.)
,a
thc main army in thc mcanwhilc opcrating on anothcr point, arc all stratcgic.
!ndccd, all largc dctachmcnts or lractions ol an army may bc considcrcd as
occupying stratcgic positions.
Tc maxims to bc givcn on thc prcccding points arc lcw, sincc lronts, lincs
ol dclcnsc, and stratcgic positions gcncrally dcpcnd upon a multitudc ol
circumstanccs giving risc to innitc varicty.
!n cvcry casc, thc rst gcncral rulc is that thc communications with thc
dicrcnt points ol thc linc ol opcrations bc thoroughly assurcd.
!n thc dclcnsc it is dcsirablc that thc stratcgic lronts and lincs ol dclcnsc
should prcscnt both upon thc anks and lront lormidablc natural or articial
obstaclcs to scrvc as points ol support. Tc points ol support on thc stratcgic
lront arc callcd pivots of operations, and arc practical tcmporary bascs, but
quitc dicrcnt lrom pivots ol mancuvcr. For cxamplc, in .,6 \crona was an
cxccllcnt pivot ol opcrations lor all Napolcons cntcrpriscs about Mantua lor
cight months. !n .. rcsdcn was his pivot.
Pivots ol mancuvcr arc dctachmcnts ol troops lclt to guard points which it
is csscntial to hold, whilc thc bulk ol thc army procccds to thc lulllmcnt ol
somc important cnd, and whcn this is accomplishcd thc pivot ol mancuvcr
ccascs to cxist. Tus, Ncys corps was thc pivot ol Napolcons mancuvcr by
onauwcrth and Augsburg to cut Mack lrom his linc ol rctrcat. A pivot ol
opcrations, on thc contrary, is a matcrial point ol both stratcgical and tactical
importancc, scrvcs as a point ol support and cndurcs throughout a campaign.
Tc most dcsirablc quality ol a linc ol dclcnsc is that it should bc as short
as possiblc, in ordcr to bc covcrcd with lacility by thc army il it is compcllcd
to takc thc dclcnsivc. !t is also important that thc cxtcnt ol thc stratcgic lront
should not bc so grcat as to prcvcnt thc prompt conccntration ol thc lractions
ol thc army upon an advantagcous point.
Tc samc docs not altogcthcr apply to thc lront ol opcrations, lor il it bc
too contractcd it would bc dicult lor an army on thc ocnsivc to makc
stratcgic mancuvcrs calculatcd to producc grcat rcsults, sincc a short lront
could bc casily covcrcd by thc dclcnsivc army. Ncithcr should thc lront ol
opcrations bc too cxtcndcd. Such a lront is unsuitablc lor ocnsivc opcrations,
as it would givc thc cncmy, il not a good linc ol dclcnsc, at lcast amplc spacc
to cscapc lrom thc rcsults ol a stratcgic mancuvcr cvcn il wcll planncd. Tus,
thc bcautilul opcrations ol Marcngo, Ulm, and Jcna could not havc produccd
thc samc rcsults upon a thcatcr ol thc magnitudc ol that ol thc Russian Var in
..a, sincc thc cncmy, cvcn il cut o lrom his linc ol rctrcat, could havc lound
anothcr by adopting a ncw zonc ol opcrations.
Tc csscntial conditions lor cvcry stratcgic position arc that it should bc
morc compact than thc lorccs opposcd, that all lractions ol thc army should
havc surc and casy mcans ol conccntrating, lrcc lrom thc intcrvcntion ol thc
cncmy. Tus, lor lorccs ncarly cqual, all ccntral or intcrior positions would bc
prclcrablc to cxtcrior oncs, sincc thc lront in thc lattcr casc would ncccssarily
,
bc morc cxtcndcd and would lcad to a dangcrous division ol lorcc. Grcat
mobility and activity on thc part ol thc troops occupying thcsc positions will
bc a strong clcmcnt ol sccurity or ol supcriority ovcr thc cncmy, sincc it rcndcrs
possiblc rapid conccntration at dicrcnt and succcssivc points ol thc lront.
An army should ncvcr long occupy any stratcgic point without making
sclcction ol onc or two tactical positions, lor thc purposc ol thcrc conccntrating
all thc disposablc lorcc, and giving battlc to thc cncmy whcn hc shall havc
unvcilcd his dcsigns. !n this manncr Napolcon prcparcd thc clds ol Rivoli
and Austcrlitz, Vcllington that ol Vatcrloo, and thc Archdukc Charlcs that
ol Vagram.
Vhcn an army cithcr camps or gocs into quartcrs, thc gcncral should bc
carclul that thc lront bc not too cxtcndcd. A disposition which might bc
callcd thc stratcgic squarc sccms bcst, prcscnting thrcc ncarlycqual laccs, so
that thc distancc to bc passcd ovcr would bc about cqual lor all thc divisions in
conccntrating upon thc common ccntcr to rcccivc an attack.
vcry stratcgic linc ol dclcnsc should always posscss a tactical point upon
which to rally lor dclcnsc should thc cncmy cross thc stratcgic lront. For
instancc, an army guarding a bank ol a rivcr, not bcing ablc to occupy in lorcc
thc wholc linc, ought always to havc a position in rcar ol thc ccntcr sclcctcd,
upon which to collcct all his divisions, so as to opposc thcm unitcd to thc
cncmy whcn hc has succccdcd in cccting a passagc.
For an army cntcring a country with thc purposc cithcr ol subjugation or
ol tcmporary occupation, it would always bc prudcnt, howcvcr brilliant may
havc bccn its carlicr succcsscs, to prcparc a linc ol dclcnsc as a rclugc in casc ol
rcvcrsc. Tis rcmark is madc to complctc thc subjcct: thc lincs thcmsclvcs arc
intimatcly conncctcd with tcmporary bascs, and will bc discusscd in a luturc
articlc, (XX!!!.)
ARTICLE XXI
Zones and Lines of Operations
A zonc ol opcrations is a ccrtain lraction ol thc wholc thcatcr ol war, which
may bc travcrscd by an army in thc attainmcnt ol its objcct, whcthcr it act
singly or in conccrt with othcr and sccondary armics. For cxamplc, in thc plan
ol campaign ol .,6, !taly was thc zonc ol thc right, 8avaria that ol thc ccntcr,
Franconia that ol thc lclt army.
A zonc ol opcrations may somctimcs prcscnt but a singlc line of operations,
cithcr on account ol thc conguration ol thc country, or ol thc small numbcr
ol practicablc routcs lor an army lound thcrcin. Gcncrally, howcvcr, a zonc
prcscnts scvcral lines of operations, dcpcnding partly upon thc plans ol thc
campaign, partly upon thc numbcr ol grcat routcs ol communication cxisting
in thc thcatcr ol opcrations.
,
!t is not to bc undcrstood lrom this that cvcry road is ol itscll a line of
operations,though doubtlcss it may happcn that any good road in a ccrtain
turn ol aairs may bccomc lor thc timcbcing such a linc, but as long as it is
only travcrscd by dctachmcnts, and lics bcyond thc sphcrc ol thc principal
cntcrpriscs, it cannot truly bc callcd thc rcal linc ol opcrations. Morcovcr, thc
cxistcncc ol scvcral routcs lcading to thc samc lront ol opcrations, and scparatcd
by onc or two marchcs, would not constitutc so many lincs ol opcrations, but,
bcing thc communications ol thc dicrcnt divisions ol thc samc army, thc
wholc spacc boundcd by thcm would constitutc but a singlc linc.
Tc tcrm zone of operations is applicd to a largc lraction ol thc gcncral thcatcr
ol war, thc tcrm lines of operations will dcsignatc thc part ol this lraction
cmbraccd by thc cntcrpriscs ol thc army. Vhcthcr it lollow a singlc or scvcral
routcs, thc tcrm strategic lines will apply to thosc important lincs which conncct
thc dccisivc points ol thc thcatcr ol opcrations cithcr with cach othcr or with
thc lront ol opcrations, and, lor thc samc rcason, wc givc this namc to thosc
lincs which thc army would lollow to rcach onc ol thcsc dccisivc points, or
to accomplish an important mancuvcr which rcquircs a tcmporary dcviation
lrom thc principal linc ol opcrations. Lines of communications dcsignatc thc
practicablc routcs bctwccn thc dicrcnt portions ol thc army occupying
dicrcnt positions throughout thc zonc ol opcrations.
For cxamplc, in .., altcr thc acccssion ol Austria to thc Grand Coalition,
thrcc allicd armics wcrc to invadc Saxony, onc 8avaria, and anothcr !taly: so
that Saxony, or rathcr thc country bctwccn rcsdcn, Magdcburg, and 8rcslau,
lormcd thc zonc ol opcrations ol thc mass ol thc lorccs. Tis zonc had thrcc
lines of operations lcading to Lcipsic as an objcctivc: thc rst was thc linc ol thc
army ol 8ohcmia, lcading lrom thc mountains ol rzgcbirgc by rcsdcn and
Chcmnitz upon Lcipsic, thc sccond was thc linc ol thc army ol Silcsia, going
lrom 8rcslau by rcsdcn or by Vittcnbcrg upon Lcipsic, thc third was that ol
8crnadottc lrom 8crlin by cssau to thc samc objcctivc point. ach ol thcsc
armics marchcd upon two or morc adjaccnt parallcl routcs, but it could not bc
said that thcrc wcrc as many lincs ol opcrations as roads. Tc principal linc ol
opcrations is that lollowcd by thc bulk ol thc army, and upon which dcpots
ol provisions, munitions, and othcr supplics arc cchcloncd, and ovcr which, il
compcllcd, it would rctrcat.
!l thc choicc ol a zonc ol opcrations involvcs no cxtcnsivc combinations,
sincc thcrc can ncvcr bc morc than two or thrcc zoncs on cach thcatcr, and thc
advantagcs gcncrally rcsult lrom thc localitics, it is somcwhat dicrcnt with
lincs ol opcrations, as thcy arc dividcd into dicrcnt classcs, according to thcir
rclations to thc dicrcnt positions ol thc cncmy, to thc communications upon
thc stratcgic cld, and to thc cntcrpriscs projcctcd by thc commandcr.
Simple lines of operations arc thosc ol an army acting lrom a lronticr whcn it
is not subdividcd into largc indcpcndcnt bodics.
Double lines of operations arc thosc ol two indcpcndcnt armics procccding
lrom thc samc lronticr, or thosc ol two ncarly cqual armics which arc
,
commandcd by thc samc gcncral but arc widcly scparatcd in distancc and lor
long intcrvals ol timc.
|!|
Interior lines of operations arc thosc adoptcd by onc or two armics to
opposc scvcral hostilc bodics, and having such a dircction that thc gcncral
can conccntratc thc masscs and mancuvcr with his wholc lorcc in a shortcr
pcriod ol timc than it would rcquirc lor thc cncmy to opposc to thcm a grcatcr
lorcc.
|!!|
Exterior lines lcad to thc oppositc rcsult, and arc thosc lormcd by an
army which opcratcs at thc samc timc on both anks ol thc cncmy, or against
scvcral ol his masscs.
Concentric lines of operations arc thosc which dcpart lrom widclyscparatcd
points and mcct at thc samc point, cithcr in advancc ol or bchind thc basc.
Divergent lines arc thosc by which an army would lcavc a givcn point to movc
upon scvcral distinct points. Tcsc lincs, ol coursc, ncccssitatc a subdivision
ol thc army.
Tcrc arc also deep lines, which arc simply long lines.
Tc tcrm maneuver-lines ! apply to momcntary stratcgic lincs, oltcn adoptcd
lor a singlc tcmporary mancuvcr, and which arc by no mcans to bc conloundcd
with thc rcal lines of operations.
Secondary lines arc thosc ol two armics acting so as to aord cach othcr mutual
support,as, in .,6, thc army ol thc Sambrc and Mcusc was sccondary to
thc army ol thc Rhinc, and, in ..a, thc army ol 8agration was sccondary to
that ol 8arclay.
Accidental lines arc thosc brought about by cvcnts which changc thc
original plan and givc a ncw dircction to opcrations. Tcsc arc ol thc highcst
importancc. Tc propcr occasions lor thcir usc arc lully rccognizcd only by a
grcat and activc mind.
Tcrc may bc, in addition, provisional and denitive lines of operations. Tc
rst dcsignatc thc linc adoptcd by an army in a prcliminary, dccisivc cntcrprisc,
altcr which it is at libcrty to sclcct a morc advantagcous or dircct linc. Tcy
sccm to bclong as much to thc class ol tcmporary or cvcntual stratcgic lincs as
to thc class ol lincs ol opcrations.
!
Tis dcnition has bccn criticizcd, and, as it has givcn risc to misapprchcnsion, it bccomcs
ncccssary to cxplain it.
!n thc rst placc, it must bc bornc in mind that it is a qucstion ol maneuver-lines, (that is, ol stratcgic
combinations,) and not ol grcat routcs. !t must also bc admittcd that an army marching upon two or thrcc
routcs, ncar cnough to cach othcr to admit ol thc conccntration ol thc dicrcnt masscs within lortycight
hours, would not havc two or thrcc lincs ol opcrations. Vhcn Morcau and Jourdan cntcrcd Gcrmany with
two armics ol ,c,ccc mcn cach, bcing indcpcndcnt ol cach othcr, thcrc was a doublc linc ol opcrations, but a
Frcnch army ol which only a dctachmcnt starts lrom thc Lowcr Rhinc to march on thc Main, whilc thc vc or
six othcr corps sct out lrom thc Uppcr Rhinc to march on Ulm, would not havc a doublc linc ol opcrations in
thc scnsc in which ! usc thc tcrm to dcsignatc a mancuvcr. Napolcon, whcn hc conccntratcd scvcn corps and
sct thcm in motion by 8ambcrg to march on Gcra, whilc Morticr with a singlc corps marchcd on Casscl to
occupy Hcssc and ank thc principal cntcrprisc, had but a singlc gcncral linc ol opcrations, with an acccssory
dctachmcnt. Tc tcrritorial linc was composcd ol two arms or radii, but thc opcration was not doublc.
!!
Somc Gcrman writcrs havc said that ! conlound ccntral positions with thc linc ol opcrations,
in which asscrtion thcy arc mistakcn. An army may occupy a ccntral position in thc prcscncc ol two masscs
ol thc cncmy, and not havc intcrior lincs ol opcrations: thcsc arc two vcry dicrcnt things. thcrs havc
thought that ! would havc donc bcttcr to usc thc tcrm radii of operations to cxprcss thc idca ol doublc lincs. Tc
rcasoning in this casc is plausiblc il wc conccivc thc thcatcr ol opcrations to bc a circlc, but, as cvcry radius is,
altcr all, a linc, it is simply a disputc about words.
,6
Tcsc dcnitions show how ! dicr lrom thosc authors who havc prcccdcd
mc. Lloyd and 8ulow attributc to thcsc lincs no othcr importancc than that
arising lrom thcir rclations to thc dcpots ol thc army: thc lattcr has cvcn
asscrtcd that whcn an army is cncampcd ncar its dcpots it has no lincs ol
opcrations.
Tc lollowing cxamplc will disprovc this paradox. Lct us supposc two armics,
thc rst on thc Uppcr Rhinc, thc sccond in advancc ol usscldorl or any
othcr point ol this lronticr, and that thcir largc dcpots arc immcdiatcly bchind
thc rivcr,ccrtainly thc salcst, ncarcst, and most advantagcous position lor
thcm which could possibly bc adoptcd. Tcsc armics will havc an ocnsivc
or dclcnsivc objcct: hcncc thcy will ccrtainly havc lincs ol opcrations, arising
lrom thc dicrcnt proposcd cntcrpriscs.
.. Tcir dclcnsivc tcrritorial linc, starting lrom thcir positions, will
cxtcnd to thc sccond linc which thcy arc to covcr, and thcy would both
bc cut o lrom this sccond linc should thc cncmy cstablish himscll in
thc intcrval which scparatcs thcm lrom it. vcn il Mclas
|!|
had posscsscd
a ycars supplics in Alcssandria, hc would nonc thc lcss havc bccn cut o
lrom his basc ol thc Mincio as soon as thc victorious cncmy occupicd thc
linc ol thc Po.
a. Tcir linc would bc doublc, and thc cncmys singlc il hc conccntratcd
his lorccs to dclcat thcsc armics succcssivcly, it would bc a doublc cxtcrior
linc, and thc cncmys a doublc intcrior, il thc lattcr dividcd his lorccs into
two masscs, giving thcm such dircctions as to cnablc him to conccntratc
all his lorccs bclorc thc two armics rst rclcrrcd to could unitc.
8ulow would havc bccn morc ncarly right had hc asscrtcd that an army on
its own soil is lcss dcpcndcnt on its primitivc linc ol opcrations than whcn on
lorcign ground, lor it nds in cvcry dircction points ol support and somc ol thc
advantagcs which arc sought lor in thc cstablishmcnt ol lincs ol opcrations, it
may cvcn losc its linc ol opcrations without incurring grcat dangcr, but that is
no rcason why it has no linc ol opcrations.
8SR\AT!NS UPN TH L!NS F PRAT!NS !N TH
VARS F TH FRNCH R\LUT!N
At thc bcginning ol this tcrriblc and cvcrvarying strugglc, Prussia and Austria
wcrc thc only avowcd cncmics ol Francc, and !taly was includcd in thc thcatcr
ol war only lor purposcs ol rcciprocal obscrvation, it bcing too rcmotc lor
dccisivc cntcrpriscs in vicw ol thc cnd proposcd. Tc rcal thcatcr cxtcndcd
!
Tis asscrtion has bccn disputcd. ! think it is corrcct, lor Mclas, conncd bctwccn thc 8ormida,
thc Tanaro, and thc Po, was unablc to rccruit lor his army, barcly ablc to maintain a communication by
couricrs with his basc, and hc ccrtainly would havc bccn obligcd to cut his way out or to surrcndcr in casc hc
had not bccn rcinlorccd.
,,
lrom Huninguc to unkirk, and compriscd thrcc zoncs ol opcrations,thc
rst rcaching along thc Rhinc lrom Huninguc to Landau, and thcncc to thc
Moscllc, thc ccntcr consisting ol thc intcrval bctwccn thc Mcusc and Moscllc,
thc third and lclt was thc lronticr lrom Givct to unkirk.
Vhcn Francc dcclarcd war, in April, .,a, hcr intcntion was to prcvcnt a
union ol hcr cncmics, and shc had thcn onc hundrcd thousand mcn in thc
zoncs just dcscribcd, whilc Austria had but thirtyvc thousand in 8clgium. !t
is quitc impossiblc to undcrstand why thc Frcnch did not conqucr this country,
whcn no ccctual rcsistancc could havc bccn madc. Four months intcrvcncd
bctwccn thc dcclaration ol war and thc conccntration ol thc allicd troops.
Vas it not probablc that an invasion ol 8clgium would havc prcvcntcd that ol
Champagnc, and havc givcn thc King ol Prussia a conccption ol thc strcngth
ol Francc, and induccd him not to sacricc his armics lor thc sccondary objcct
ol imposing upon Francc anothcr lorm ol govcrnmcnt:
Vhcn thc Prussians arrivcd at Coblcntz, toward thc cnd ol July, thc Frcnch
wcrc no longcr ablc to invadc. Tis role was rcscrvcd lor thc allics, and it is wcll
known how thcy acquittcd thcmsclvcs.
Tc wholc lorcc ol thc Frcnch was now about onc hundrcd and ltccn
thousand mcn. !t was scattcrcd ovcr a lronticr ol onc hundrcd and lorty
lcagucs and dividcd into vc corps darmcc, and could not makc a good
dclcnsc, lor to paralyzc thcm and prcvcnt thcir conccntration it was only
ncccssary to attack thc ccntcr. Political rcasons wcrc also in lavor ol this plan
ol attack: thc cnd proposcd was political, and could only bc attaincd by rapid
and vigorous mcasurcs. Tc linc bctwccn thc Moscllc and Mcusc, which was
thc ccntcr, was lcss lorticd than thc rcst ol thc lronticr, and, bcsidcs, gavc
thc allics thc advantagc ol thc cxccllcnt lortrcss ol Luxcmbourg as a basc.
Tcy wiscly adoptcd this plan ol attack, but thc cxccution was not cqual to thc
conccption.
Tc court ol \icnna had thc grcatcst intcrcst in thc war, lor lamily rcasons,
as wcll as on account ol thc dangcrs to which a rcvcrsc might subjcct hcr
provinccs. For somc rcason, dicult to undcrstand, Austria coopcratcd only
to thc cxtcnt ol thirty battalions: lortyvc thousand mcn rcmaincd as an army
ol obscrvation in 8risgau, on thc Rhinc, and in Flandcrs. Vhcrc wcrc thc
imposing armics shc altcrward displaycd: and what morc usclul disposition
could havc bccn madc ol thcm than to protcct thc anks ol thc invading army:
Tis rcmarkablc conduct on thc part ol Austria, which cost hcr so much, may
account lor thc rcsolution ol Prussia to rctirc at a latcr pcriod, and quit thc cld,
as shc did, at thc vcry momcnt whcn shc should havc cntcrcd it. uring thc
campaign thc Prussians did not cxhibit thc activity ncccssary lor succcss. Tcy
spcnt cight days usclcssly in camp at Kons. !l thcy had anticipatcd umouricz
at thc Littlc !slands, or had cvcn madc a morc scrious cort to drivc him
lrom thcm, thcy would still havc had all thc advantagc ol a conccntratcd lorcc
against scvcral scattcrcd divisions, and could havc prcvcntcd thcir junction
and ovcrthrown thcm scparatcly. Frcdcrick thc Grcat would havc justicd thc
,
rcmark ol umouricz at Grandprc,that, il his antagonist had bccn thc grcat
king, hc (umouricz) would alrcady havc bccn drivcn bchind Chalons.
Tc Austrians in this campaign provcd that thcy wcrc still imbucd with
thc lalsc systcm ol aun and Lascy, ol covcring cvcry point in ordcr to guard
cvcry point.
Tc lact ol having twcnty thousand mcn in 8risgau whilc thc Moscllc and
Sarrc wcrc uncovcrcd, shows thc lcar thcy had ol losing a villagc, and how thcir
systcm lcd to largc dctachmcnts, which arc lrcqucntly thc ruin ol armics.
Forgctting that thc surcst hopc ol victory lics in prcscnting thc strongcst
lorcc, thcy thought it ncccssary to occupy thc wholc lcngth ol a lronticr to
prcvcnt invasion,which was cxactly thc mcans ol rcndcring invasion upon
cvcry point lcasiblc.
! will lurthcr obscrvc that, in thin campaign, umouricz loolishly abandoncd
thc pursuit ol thc allics in ordcr to translcr thc thcatcr lrom thc ccntcr to thc
cxtrcmc lclt ol thc gcncral cld. Morcovcr, hc was unablc to pcrccivc thc grcat
rcsults rcndcrcd possiblc by this movcmcnt, but attackcd thc army ol thc ukc
ol SaxcTcschcn in lront, whilc by dcsccnding thc Mcusc to Namur hc might
havc thrown it back upon thc North Sca toward Mcuport or stcnd, and havc
dcstroycd it cntircly in a morc succcsslul battlc than that ol Jcmmapcs.
Tc campaign ol ., aords a ncw instancc ol thc ccct ol a laulty dircction
ol opcrations. Tc Austrians wcrc victorious, and rccovcrcd 8clgium, bccausc
umouricz unskilllully cxtcndcd his lront ol opcrations to thc gatcs ol
Rottcrdam. Tus lar thc conduct ol thc allics dcscrvcs praisc: thc dcsirc ol
rcconqucring thcsc rich provinccs justicd this cntcrprisc, which, morcovcr,
was judiciously dircctcd against thc cxtrcmc right ol thc long lront ol
umouricz. 8ut altcr thc Frcnch had bccn drivcn back undcr thc guns ol
\alcncicnncs, and wcrc disorganizcd and unablc to rcsist, why did thc allics
rcmain six months in lront ol a lcw towns and pcrmit thc Committcc ol Public
Salcty to organizc ncw armics: Vhcn thc dcplorablc condition ol Francc and
thc dcstitution ol thc wrcck ol thc army ol ampicrrc arc considcrcd, can thc
paradcs ol thc allics in lront ol thc lortrcsscs in Flandcrs bc undcrstood:
!nvasions ol a country whosc strcngth lics mainly in thc capital arc
particularly advantagcous. Undcr thc govcrnmcnt ol a powcrlul princc, and
in ordinary wars, thc most important point is thc hcadquartcrs ol thc army,
but undcr a wcak princc, in a rcpublic, and still morc in wars ol opinion, thc
capital is gcncrally thc ccntcr ol national powcr.
|!|
!l this is cvcr doubtlul, it
was not so on this occasion. Paris was Francc, and this to such an cxtcnt that
twothirds ol thc nation had riscn against thc govcrnmcnt which opprcsscd
thcm. !l, altcr having bcatcn thc Frcnch army at Famars, thc allics had lclt
thc utch and Hanovcrians to obscrvc what rcmaincd ol it, whilc thc nglish
and thc Austrians dircctcd thcir opcrations upon thc Mcusc, thc Sarrc, and
!
Tc capturc ol Paris by thc allics dccidcd thc latc ol Napolcon, but hc had no army, and was
attackcd by all uropc, and thc Frcnch pcoplc had, in addition, scparatcd thcir causc lrom his. !l hc had
posscsscd lty thousand morc old soldicrs, hc would havc shown that thc capital was at his hcadquartcrs.
,
thc Moscllc, in conccrt with thc Prussians and a part ol thc usclcss army ol
thc Uppcr Rhinc, a lorcc ol onc hundrcd and twcnty thousand mcn, with its
anks protcctcd by othcr troops, could havc bccn pushcd lorward. !t is cvcn
probablc that, without changing thc dircction ol thc war or running grcat
risks, thc utch and Hanovcrians could havc pcrlormcd thc duty ol obscrving
Maubcugc and \alcncicnncs, whilc thc bulk ol thc army pursucd thc rcmains
ol ampicrrcs lorccs. Altcr gaining scvcral victorics, howcvcr, two hundrcd
thousand mcn wcrc cngagcd in carrying on a lcw sicgcs and wcrc not gaining
a loot ol ground. Vhilc thcy thrcatcncd Francc with invasion, thcy placcd
ltccn or sixtccn bodics ol troops, dclcnsivcly, to covcr thcir own lronticr!
Vhcn \alcncicnncs and Maycncc capitulatcd, instcad ol lalling with all thcir
lorccs upon thc camp at Cambray, thcy cw o, cxccntrically, to unkirk on
onc sidc and Landau on thc othcr.
!t is not lcss astonishing that, altcr making thc grcatcst corts in thc
bcginning ol thc campaign upon thc right ol thc gcncral cld, thcy should
havc shiltcd thcm altcrward to thc cxtrcmc lclt, so that whilc thc allics wcrc
opcrating in Flandcrs thcy wcrc in no manncr sccondcd or aidcd by thc
imposing army upon thc Rhinc, and whcn, in its turn, this army took up
thc ocnsivc, thc allics rcmaincd inactivc upon thc Sambrc. o not thcsc
lalsc combinations rcscmblc thosc ol Soubisc and 8roglic in .,6., and all thc
opcrations ol thc Scvcn Ycars Var:
!n ., thc phasc ol aairs is wholly changcd. Tc Frcnch lrom a painlul
dclcnsivc pass to a brilliant ocnsivc. Tc combinations ol this campaign wcrc
doubtlcss wcll considcrcd, but it is wrong to rcprcscnt thcm as lorming a ncw
systcm ol war. To bc convinccd ol this, it is only ncccssary to obscrvc that thc
rcspcctivc positions ol thc armics in this campaign and in that ol .,, wcrc
almost idcntical, and thc dircction ol thc opcrations is quitc thc samc. Tc
Frcnch had lour corps, which constitutcd two armics, as thc King ol Prussia
had lour divisions, which composcd two armics.
Tcsc two largc bodics took a conccntric dircction lcading on 8russcls, as
Frcdcrick and Schwcrin had adoptcd in .,, on Praguc. Tc only dicrcncc
bctwccn thc two plans is that thc Austrian troops in Flandcrs wcrc not so
much scattcrcd as thosc ol 8rown in 8ohcmia, but this dicrcncc is ccrtainly
not lavorablc to thc plan ol .,. Tc position ol thc North Sca was also
unlavorablc lor thc lattcr plan. To outank thc Austrian right, Pichcgru was
thrown bctwccn thc sca and thc mass ol thc cncmy,a dircction as dangcrous
and laulty as could bc givcn to grcat opcrations. Tis movcmcnt was thc samc
as that ol 8cnningscn on thc Lowcr \istula which almost lost thc Russian
army in .c,. Tc latc ol thc Prussian army, cut o lrom its communications
and lorccd upon thc 8altic, is anothcr prool ol this truth.
!l thc Princc ol Coburg had actcd with ability, hc could casily havc madc
Pichcgru sucr lor this audacious mancuvcr, which was pcrlormcd a month
bclorc Jourdan was prcparcd to lollow it up.
c
Tc ccntcr ol thc grand Austrian army intcndcd to act upon thc ocnsivc
was bclorc Landrccics, thc army was composcd ol onc hundrcd and six
battalions and onc hundrcd and lty squadrons, upon its right ank Flandcrs
was covcrcd by thc corps darmcc ol Clairlayt, and upon thc lclt Charlcroi
was covcrcd by that ol thc Princc dc Kaunitz. Tc gain ol a battlc bclorc
Landrccics opcncd its gatcs, and upon Gcncral Chapuis was lound a plan ol
thc divcrsion in Flandcrs: only twelve battalions wcrc scnt to Clairlayt. A long
timc altcrward, and altcr thc Frcnch wcrc known to havc bccn succcsslul, thc
corps ol thc ukc ol York marchcd to Clairlayts rclicl, but what was thc usc
ol thc rcmaindcr ol thc army bclorc Landrccics, altcr it was obligcd by a loss
ol lorcc to dclay invasion: Tc Princc ol Coburg thrcw away all thc advantagcs
ol his ccntral position, by allowing thc Frcnch to conccntratc in 8clgium and
to bcat all his largc dctachmcnts in dctail.
Finally, thc army movcd, lcaving a division at Catcau, and a part having bccn
scnt to thc Princc dc Kaunitz at Charlcroi. !l, instcad ol dividing this grand
army, it had bccn dircctcd upon Turcoing, thcrc would havc bccn conccntratcd
thcrc onc hundrcd battalions and onc hundrcd and lorty squadrons, and what
must thcn havc bccn thc rcsult ol this lamous divcrsion ol Pichcgru, cut o
lrom his own lronticrs and shut up bctwccn thc sca and two lortrcsscs:
Tc plan ol invasion adoptcd by thc Frcnch had not only thc radical crror ol
cxtcrior lincs: it also lailcd in cxccution. Tc divcrsion on Courtray took placc
on April a6, and Jourdan did not arrivc at Charlcroi till thc d ol Junc,morc
than a month altcrward. Hcrc was a splcndid opportunity lor thc Austrians
to prot by thcir ccntral position. !l thc Prussian army had mancuvcrcd by its
right and thc Austrian army by its lclt,that is, both upon thc Mcusc,thc
statc ol aairs would havc bccn dicrcnt. 8y cstablishing thcmsclvcs in thc
ccntcr ol a linc ol scattcrcd lorccs thcy could havc prcvcntcd thc junction ol
thc dicrcnt lractions. !t may bc dangcrous in a battlc to attack thc ccntcr ol
a closc linc ol troops whcn it can bc simultancously sustaincd by thc wings
and thc rcscrvcs, but it is quitc dicrcnt on a linc ol thrcc hundrcd milcs in
cxtcnt.
!n ., Prussia and Spain rctircd lrom thc coalition, and thc principal thcatcr
ol war was shiltcd lrom thc Rhinc to !taly,which opcncd a ncw cld ol glory
lor thc Frcnch arms. Tcir lincs ol opcrations in this campaign wcrc doublc,
thcy dcsircd to opcratc by usscldorl and Manhcim. Clairlayt, wiscr than his
prcdcccssors, conccntratcd his lorccs altcrnatcly upon thcsc points, and gaincd
victorics at Manhcim and in thc lincs ol Maycncc so dccisivc that thcy causcd
thc army ol thc Sambrc and Mcusc to rccross thc Rhinc to covcr thc Moscllc,
and brought Pichcgru back to Landau.
!n .,6 thc lincs ol opcrations on thc Rhinc wcrc copicd lrom thosc ol .,,
and thosc in Flandcrs in .,, but with dicrcnt rcsults. Tc armics ol thc
Rhinc, and ol thc Sambrc and Mcusc, sct out lrom thc cxtrcmitics ol thc basc,
on routcs convcrging to thc anubc. As in .,, thcy wcrc cxtcrior lincs. Tc
Archdukc Charlcs, morc skilllul than thc Princc ol Coburg, protcd by his
.
intcrior lincs by conccntrating his lorccs at a point ncarcr than that cxpcctcd
by thc Frcnch. Hc thcn scizcd thc instant whcn thc anubc covcrcd thc corps
ol Latour, to stcal scvcral marchcs upon Morcau and attack and ovcrwhclm
Jourdan: thc battlc ol Vurzburg dccidcd thc latc ol Gcrmany and compcllcd
thc army ol Morcau to rctrcat.
8onapartc now commcnccs in !taly his cxtraordinary carccr. His plan is
to scparatc thc Picdmontcsc and Austrian armics. Hc succccds by thc battlc
ol Millcsimo in causing thcm to takc two cxtcrior stratcgic lincs, and bcats
thcm succcssivcly at Mondovi and Lodi. A lormidablc army is collcctcd in thc
Tyrol to raisc thc sicgc ol Mantua: it commits thc crror ol marching thcrc in
two bodics scparatcd by a lakc. Tc lightning is not quickcr than Napolcon.
Hc raiscs thc sicgc, abandons cvcry thing bclorc Mantua, throws thc grcatcr
part ol his lorcc upon thc rst column, which dcbouchcs by 8rcscia, bcats it
and lorccs it back upon thc mountains: thc sccond column arrivcs upon thc
samc ground, and is thcrc bcatcn in its turn, and compcllcd to rctirc into thc
Tyrol to kccp up its communications with thc right. Vurmscr, upon whom
thcsc lcssons arc lost, dcsircs to covcr thc two lincs ol Rovcrcdo and \iccnza,
Napolcon, altcr having ovcrwhclmcd and thrown thc rst back upon thc Lavis,
changcs dircction by thc right, dcbouchcs by thc gorgcs ol thc 8rcnta upon
thc lclt, and lorccs thc rcmnant ol this nc army to takc rclugc in Mantua,
whcrc it is nally compcllcd to surrcndcr.
!n ., hostilitics rccommcncc: thc Frcnch, punishcd lor having lormcd
two cxtcrior lincs in .,6, ncvcrthclcss, havc thrcc upon thc Rhinc and thc
anubc. Tc army on thc lclt obscrvcs thc Lowcr Rhinc, that ol thc ccntcr
marchcs upon thc anubc, Switzcrland, anking !taly and Swabia, bcing
occupicd by a third army as strong as both thc othcrs. Te three armies could
be concentrated only in the valley of the Inn, cighty lcagucs lrom thcir basc ol
opcrations. Tc archdukc has cqual lorccs: hc unitcs thcm against thc ccntcr,
which hc dclcats at Stockach, and thc army ol Switzcrland is compcllcd to
cvacuatc thc Grisons and astcrn Switzcrland. Tc allics in turn commit thc
samc lault: instcad ol lollowing up thcir succcss on this ccntral linc, which
cost thcm so dcarly altcrward, thcy lormcd a doublc linc in Switzcrland and
on thc Lowcr Rhinc. Tc army ol Switzcrland is bcatcn at Zurich, whilc thc
othcr trics at Manhcim.
!n !taly thc Frcnch undcrtakc a doublc cntcrprisc, which lcavcs thirtytwo
thousand mcn usclcssly cmploycd at Naplcs, whilc upon thc Adigc, whcrc thc
vital blows wcrc to bc givcn or rcccivcd, thcir lorcc is too wcak and mccts with
tcrriblc rcvcrscs. Vhcn thc army ol Naplcs rcturns to thc North, it commits
thc crror ol adopting a stratcgic dircction opposcd to Morcaus, and Suwaro,
by mcans ol his ccntral position, lrom which hc dcrivcs lull prot, marchcs
against this army and bcats it, whilc somc lcagucs lrom thc othcr.
!n .cc, Napolcon has rcturncd lrom gypt, and cvcry thing is again
changcd, and this campaign prcscnts a ncw combination ol lincs ol opcrations,
onc hundrcd and lty thousand mcn march upon thc two anks ol Switzcrland,
a
and dcbouch, onc upon thc anubc and thc othcr upon thc Po. Tis insurcs thc
conqucst ol vast rcgions. Modcrn history aords no similar combination. Tc
Frcnch armics arc upon intcrior lincs, aording rcciprocal support, whilc thc
Austrians arc compcllcd to adopt an cxtcrior linc, which rcndcrs it impossiblc
lor thcm to communicatc. 8y a skilllul arrangcmcnt ol its progrcss, thc army
ol thc rcscrvc cuts o thc cncmy lrom his linc ol opcrations, at thc samc timc
prcscrving its own rclations with its basc and with thc army ol thc Rhinc,
which lorms its sccondary linc.
Fig. dcmonstratcs this truth, and shows thc rcspcctivc situations ol thc
two partics. A and A A indicatc thc lront ol opcrations ol thc armics ol thc
Rhinc and ol thc rcscrvc, 8 and 8 8, that ol Kray and Mclas, C C C C, thc
passcs ol thc Saint8crnard, ol thc Simplon, ol thc SaintGothard, and ol thc
Splugcn, indicatcs thc two lincs ol opcrations ol thc army ol thc rcscrvc, ,
thc two lincs ol rctrcat ol Mclas, H J K, thc Frcnch divisions prcscrving thcir
linc ol rctrcat. !t may thus bc sccn that Mclas is cut o lrom his basc, and that,
on thc contrary, thc Frcnch gcncral runs no risk, sincc hc prcscrvcs all his
communications with thc lronticrs and with his sccondary lincs.
Tc analysis ol thc mcmorablc cvcnts just skctchcd shows clcarly thc
importancc ol a propcr sclcction ol lincs ol mancuvcr in military opcrations.
!ndccd, discrction on this point may rcpair thc disastcrs ol dclcat, dcstroy thc
advantagcs ol an advcrsarys victory, rcndcr his invasion lutilc, or assurc thc
conqucst ol a provincc.
8y a comparison ol thc combinations and rcsults ol thc most notcd campaigns,
it will bc sccn that thc lincs ol opcrations which havc lcd to succcss havc bccn
cstablishcd in conlormity to thc lundamcntal principlc alrcady alludcd to,
viz.: that simple and interior lines enable a general to bring into action, by strategic
movements, upon the important point, a stronger force than the enemy. Tc studcnt
may also satisly himscll that thosc which havc lailcd containcd laults opposcd
to this principlc. An unduc numbcr ol lincs dividcs thc lorccs, and pcrmits
lractions to bc ovcrwhclmcd by thc cncmy.

Figurc . Tc Stratigic Ficld ol .c6
To illustrtatc Maxim on thc ircction ol Lincs ol pcrations
MAX!MS N L!NS F PRAT!NS.
From thc analysis ol all thc cvcnts hcrcin rclcrrcd to, as wcll as lrom that ol
many othcrs, thc lollowing maxims rcsult:
.. !l thc art ol war consists in bringing into action upon thc dccisivc point
ol thc thcatcr ol opcrations thc grcatcst possiblc lorcc, thc choicc ol thc linc
ol opcrations, bcing thc primary mcans ol attaining this cnd, may bc rcgardcd
as thc lundamcntal idca in a good plan ol a campaign. Napolcon provcd this
by thc dircction hc gavc his armics in .c on onauwcrth and in .c6 on
Gcra,mancuvcrs that cannot bc too much studicd by military mcn.
l coursc, it is impossiblc to skctch in advancc thc wholc campaign. Tc
objcctivc point will bc dctcrmincd upon in advancc, thc gcncral plan to bc

lollowcd to attain it, and thc rst cntcrprisc to bc undcrtakcn lor this cnd:
what is to lollow will dcpcnd upon thc rcsult ol this rst opcration and thc
ncw phascs it may dcvclop.
a. Tc dircction to bc givcn to this linc dcpcnds upon thc gcographical
situation ol thc thcatcr ol opcrations, but still morc upon thc position ol thc
hostilc masscs upon this stratcgic cld. In every case, however, it must be directed
upon the center or upon one of the extremities. Only when the assailing forces are
vastly preponderating would it be otherwise than a fatal error to act upon the center
and the two extremities at the same time.
|!|
!t may bc laid down as a gcncral principlc, that, il thc cncmy dividc his
lorccs on an cxtcndcd lront, thc bcst dircction ol thc mancuvcrlinc will bc
upon his ccntcr, but in cvcry othcr casc, whcn it is possiblc, thc bcst dircction
will bc upon onc ol thc anks, and thcn upon thc rcar ol his linc ol dclcnsc or
lront ol opcrations.
Tc advantagc ol this mancuvcr ariscs morc lrom thc opportunity it aords
ol taking thc linc ol dclcnsc in rcvcrsc than lrom thc lact that by using it thc
assailant has to contcnd with but a part ol thc cncmys lorcc. Tus, thc army
ol thc Rhinc in .cc, gaining thc cxtrcmc lclt ol thc linc ol dclcnsc ol thc
8lack Forcst, causcd it to yicld almost without an cort. Tis army lought
two battlcs on thc right bank ol thc anubc, which, although not dccisivc,
yct, lrom thc judicious dircction ol thc linc ol opcrations, brought about thc
invasion ol Swabia and 8avaria. Tc rcsults ol thc march ol thc army ol thc
rcscrvc by thc Saint8crnard and Milan upon thc cxtrcmc right ol Mclas wcrc
still morc brilliant.
. vcn whcn thc cxtrcmity ol thc cncmys lront ol opcrations is gaincd, it
is not always salc to act upon his rcar, sincc by so doing thc assailant in many
cascs will losc his own communications. To avoid this dangcr, thc linc ol
opcrations should havc a gcographic and stratcgic dircction, such that thc
army will always nd cithcr to its rcar or to thc right or lclt a salc linc ol
rctrcat. !n this casc, to takc advantagc ol cithcr ol thcsc ank lincs ol rctrcat
would rcquirc a changc ol dircction ol thc linc ol opcrations, (Maxim .a.)
Tc ability to dccidc upon such a dircction is among thc most important
qualitics ol a gcncral. Tc importancc ol a dircction is illustratcd by thcsc
cxamplcs.
!l Napolcon in .cc, altcr passing thc Saint8crnard, had marchcd upon
Asti or Alcssandria, and had lought at Marcngo without having prcviously
protcctcd himscll on thc sidc ol Lombardy and ol thc lclt bank ol thc Po, hc
would havc bccn morc thoroughly cut o lrom his linc ol rctrcat than Mclas
lrom his, but, having in his posscssion thc sccondary points ol Casalc and
Pavia on thc sidc ol thc Saint8crnard, and Savona and Tcnda toward thc
Apcnnincs, in casc ol rcvcrsc hc had cvcry mcans ol rcgaining thc \ar or thc
\alais.
!
Tc inlcriority ol an army docs not dcpcnd cxclusivcly upon thc numbcr ol soldicrs: thcir military
qualitics, thcir morale, and thc ability ol thcir commandcr arc also vcry important clcmcnts.

!n .c6, il hc had marchcd lrom Gcra dircctly upon Lcipsic, and had thcrc
awaitcd thc Prussian army rcturning lrom Vcimar, hc would havc bccn cut
o lrom thc Rhinc as much as thc ukc ol 8runswick lrom thc lbc, whilc by
lalling back to thc wcst in thc dircction ol Vcimar hc placcd his lront bclorc
thc thrcc roads ol Saallcld, Schlciz, and Hol, which thus bccamc wcllcovcrcd
lincs ol communication. !l thc Prussians had cndcavorcd to cut him o lrom
thcsc lincs by moving bctwccn Gcra and 8aircuth, thcy would havc opcncd to
him his most natural linc,thc cxccllcnt road lrom Lcipsic to Franklort,as
wcll as thc two roads which lcad lrom Saxony by Casscl to Coblcntz, Colognc,
and cvcn Vcscl.
. Two indcpcndcnt armics should not bc lormcd upon thc samc lronticr:
such an arrangcmcnt could bc propcr only in thc casc ol largc coalitions, or
whcrc thc lorccs at disposal arc too numcrous to act upon thc samc zonc ol
opcrations, and cvcn in this casc it would bc bcttcr to havc all thc lorccs undcr
thc samc commandcr, who accompanics thc principal army.
. As a conscqucncc ol thc lastmcntioncd principlc, with cqual lorccs on
thc samc lronticr, a singlc linc ol opcrations will bc morc advantagcous than
a doublc onc.
6. !t may happcn, howcvcr, that a doublc linc will bc ncccssary, cithcr lrom
thc topography ol thc scat ol war, or bccausc a doublc linc has bccn adoptcd
by thc cncmy, and it will bc ncccssary to opposc a part ol thc army to cach ol
his masscs.
,. !n this casc, intcrior or ccntral lincs will bc prclcrablc to cxtcrior lincs,
sincc in thc lormcr casc thc lractions ol thc army can bc conccntratcd bclorc
thosc ol thc cncmy, and may thus dccidc thc latc ol thc campaign.
|!|
Such
an army may, by a wcllcombincd stratcgic plan, unitc upon and ovcrwhclm
succcssivcly thc lractions ol thc advcrsarys lorccs. To bc assurcd ol succcss in
thcsc mancuvcrs, a body ol obscrvation is lclt in lront ol thc army to bc hcld in
chcck, with instructions to avoid a scrious cngagcmcnt, but to dclay thc cncmy
as much as possiblc by taking advantagc ol thc ground, continually lalling
back upon thc principal army.
. A doublc linc is applicablc in thc casc ol a dccidcd supcriority ol lorcc,
whcn cach army will bc a match lor any lorcc thc cncmy can bring against it.
!n this casc this coursc will bc advantagcous,sincc a singlc linc would crowd
thc lorccs so much as to prcvcnt thcm all lrom acting to advantagc. Howcvcr,
it will always bc prudcnt to support wcll thc army which, by rcason ol thc
naturc ol its thcatcr and thc rcspcctivc positions ol thc partics, has thc most
important duty to pcrlorm.
Tc principal cvcnts ol modcrn wars dcmonstratc thc truth ol two othcr
maxims. Tc rst is, that two armics opcrating on intcrior lincs and sustaining
cach othcr rcciprocally, and opposing two armics supcrior in numbcrs, should
!
Vhcn thc lractions ol an army arc scparatcd lrom thc main body by only a lcw marchcs, and
particularly whcn thcy arc not intcndcd to act scparatcly throughout thc campaign, thcsc arc ccntral stratcgic
positions, and not lincs ol opcrations.
6
not allow thcmsclvcs to bc crowdcd into a too contractcd spacc, whcrc thc
wholc might bc ovcrwhclmcd at oncc. Tis happcncd to Napolcon at Lcipsic.
|!|

Tc sccond is, that intcrior lincs should not bc abuscd by cxtcnding thcm
too lar, thus giving thc cncmy thc opportunity ol ovcrcoming thc corps ol
obscrvation. Tis risk, howcvcr, may bc incurrcd il thc cnd pursucd by thc
main lorccs is so dccisivc as to concludc thc war,whcn thc latc ol thcsc
sccondary bodics would bc vicwcd with comparativc indicrcncc.
.c. For thc samc rcason, two convcrging lincs arc morc advantagcous than
two divcrgcnt. Tc rst conlorm bcttcr to thc principlcs ol stratcgy, and
posscss thc advantagc ol covcring thc lincs ol communication and supply, but
to bc lrcc lrom dangcr thcy should bc so arrangcd that thc armics which
pass ovcr thcm shall not bc scparatcly cxposcd to thc combincd masscs ol thc
cncmy, bclorc bcing ablc to ccct thcir junction.
... ivcrgcnt lincs, howcvcr, may bc advantagcous whcn thc ccntcr ol thc
cncmy has bccn brokcn and his lorccs scparatcd cithcr by a battlc or by a
stratcgic movcmcnt,in which casc divcrgcnt opcrations would add to thc
dispcrsion ol thc cncmy. Such divcrgcnt lincs would bc intcrior, sincc thc
pursucrs could conccntratc with morc lacility than thc pursucd.
.a. !t somctimcs happcns that an army is obligcd to changc its linc ol opcrations
in thc middlc ol a campaign. Tis is a vcry dclicatc and important stcp, which
may lcad to grcat succcsscs, or to cqually grcat disastcrs il not applicd with
sagacity, and is uscd only to cxtricatc an army lrom an cmbarrassing position.
Napolcon projcctcd scvcral ol thcsc changcs, lor in his bold invasions hc was
providcd with ncw plans to mcct unlorcsccn cvcnts.
At thc battlc ol Austcrlitz, il dclcatcd, hc had rcsolvcd to adopt a linc ol
opcrations through 8ohcmia on Passau or Ratisbon, which would havc opcncd
a ncw and rich country to him, instcad ol rcturning by \icnna, which routc
lay through an cxhaustcd country and lrom which thc Archdukc Charlcs was
cndcavoring to cut him o. Frcdcrick cxccutcd onc ol thcsc changcs ol thc linc
ol opcrations altcr thc raising ol thc sicgc ol lmutz.
!n .. Napolcon commcnccd thc cxccution ol a boldcr mancuvcr, but onc
which was lavorcd by thc localitics. !t was to basc himscll upon thc lortrcsscs
ol Alsacc and Lorrainc, lcaving thc routc to Paris opcn to thc allics. !l Morticr
and Marmont could havc joincd him, and had hc posscsscd lty thousand
morc mcn, this plan would havc produccd thc most dccisivc rcsults and havc
put thc scal on his military carccr.
.. As bclorc statcd, thc outlinc ol thc lronticrs, and thc gcographical charactcr
ol thc thcatcr ol opcrations, cxcrcisc a grcat inucncc on thc dircction to bc
givcn to thcsc lincs, as wcll as upon thc advantagcs to bc obtaincd. Ccntral
positions, salicnt toward thc cncmy, likc 8ohcmia and Switzcrland, arc thc
most advantagcous, bccausc thcy naturally lcad to thc adoption ol intcrior
!
!n thc movcmcnts immcdiatcly prcccding thc battlc ol Lcipsic, Napolcon, strictly spcaking, had
but a singlc linc ol opcrations, and his armics wcrc simply in ccntral stratcgic positions, but thc principlc is
thc samc, and hcncc thc cxamplc is illustrativc ol lincs ol opcrations.
,
lincs and lacilitatc thc projcct ol taking thc cncmy in rcvcrsc. Tc sidcs ol this
salicnt anglc bccomc so important that cvcry mcans should bc takcn to rcndcr
thcm imprcgnablc. !n dclault ol such ccntral positions, thcir advantagcs may
bc gaincd by thc rclativc dircctions ol mancuvcrlincs, as thc lollowing gurc
will cxplain. C mancuvcring upon thc right ol thc lront ol thc army A 8,
and H ! upon thc lclt ank ol G F, will lorm two intcrior lincs ! K and C K
upon an cxtrcmity ol thc cxtcrior lincs A 8, F G, which thcy may ovcrwhclm
scparatcly by combining upon thcm. Such was thc rcsult ol thc opcrations ol
.,6, .cc, and .c.
Figurc
.. Tc gcncral conguration ol thc bascs ought also to inucncc thc dircction
to bc givcn to thc lincs ol opcrations, thcsc lattcr bcing naturally dcpcndcnt
upon thc lormcr. !t has alrcady bccn shown that thc grcatcst advantagc that
can rcsult lrom a choicc ol bascs is whcn thc lronticrs allow it to bc assumcd
parallcl to thc linc ol opcrations ol thc cncmy, thus aording thc opportunity
ol scizing this linc and cutting him lrom his basc.
8ut il, instcad ol dirccting thc opcrations upon thc dccisivc point, thc linc
ol opcrations bc badly choscn, all thc advantagcs ol thc pcrpcndicular basc
may bc lost, as will bc sccn by rclcrring to thc gurc on pagc ,. Tc army ,
having thc doublc basc A C and C , il it marchcd toward F, instcad ol to thc
right toward G H, would losc all thc stratcgic advantagcs ol its basc C .
Tc grcat art, thcn, ol propcrly dirccting lincs ol opcrations, is so to cstablish
thcm in rclcrcncc to thc bascs and to thc marchcs ol thc army as to scizc thc
communications ol thc cncmy without impcriling oncs own, and is thc most
important and most dicult problcm in stratcgy.
.. Tcrc is anothcr point which cxcrciscs a manilcst inucncc ovcr thc
dircction to bc givcn to thc linc ol opcrations, it is whcn thc principal cntcrprisc
ol thc campaign is to cross a largc rivcr in thc prcscncc ol a numcrous and wcll
appointcd cncmy. !n this casc, thc choicc ol this linc dcpcnds ncithcr upon
thc will ol thc gcncral nor thc advantagcs to bc gaincd by an attack on onc or

anothcr point, lor thc rst considcration will bc to asccrtain whcrc thc passagc
can bc most ccrtainly ccctcd, and whcrc arc to bc lound thc mcans lor this
purposc. Tc passagc ol thc Rhinc in .,, by Jourdan, was ncar usscldorl,
lor thc samc rcason that thc \istula in .. was crosscd by Marshal Paskcvitch
ncar ssick,viz., that in ncithcr casc was thcrc thc bridgctrain ncccssary
lor thc purposc, and both wcrc obligcd to procurc and takc up thc rivcrs largc
boats, bought by thc Frcnch in Holland, and by thc Russians at Torn and
antzic. Tc ncutrality ol Prussia pcrmittcd thc asccnt ol thc rivcr in both
cascs, and thc cncmy was not ablc to prcvcnt it. Tis apparcntly incalculablc
advantagc lcd thc Frcnch into thc doublc invasions ol ., and .,6, which
lailcd bccausc thc doublc linc ol opcrations causcd thc dclcat ol thc armics
scparatcly. Paskcvitch was wiscr, and passcd thc Uppcr \istula with only a
small dctachmcnt and altcr thc principal army had alrcady arrivcd at Lowicz.
Vhcn an army is sucicntly providcd with bridgctrains, thc chanccs ol
lailurc arc much lcsscncd, but thcn, as always, it is ncccssary to sclcct thc
point which may, cithcr on account ol its topography or thc position ol thc
cncmy, bc most advantagcous. Tc discussion bctwccn Napolcon and Morcau
on thc passagc ol thc Rhinc in .cc is onc ol thc most curious cxamplcs ol
thc dicrcnt combinations prcscntcd by this qucstion, which is both stratcgic
and tactical.
Sincc it is ncccssary to protcct thc bridgcs, at lcast until a victory is gaincd,
thc point ol passagc will cxcrcisc an inucncc upon thc dircctions ol a lcw
marchcs immcdiatcly subscqucnt to thc passagc. Tc point sclcctcd in cvcry
casc lor thc principal passagc will bc upon thc ccntcr or onc ol thc anks ol
thc cncmy.
A unitcd army which has lorccd a passagc upon thc ccntcr ol an cxtcndcd
linc might altcrward adopt two divcrgcnt lincs to complctc thc dispcrsion ol
thc cncmy, who, bcing unablc to conccntratc, would not think ol disturbing
thc bridgcs.
!l thc linc ol thc rivcr is so short that thc hostilc army is morc conccntratcd, and
thc gcncral has thc mcans ol taking up altcr thc passagc a lront pcrpcndicular
to thc rivcr, it would bc bcttcr to pass it upon onc ol thc cxtrcmitics, in ordcr
to throw o thc cncmy lrom thc bridgcs. Tis will bc rclcrrcd to in thc articlc
upon thc passagc ol rivcrs.
.6. Tcrc is yct anothcr combination ol lincs ol opcrations to bc noticcd. !t
is thc markcd dicrcncc ol advantagc bctwccn a linc at homc and onc in a
hostilc country. Tc naturc ol thc cncmys country will also inucncc thcsc
chanccs. Lct us supposc an army crosscs thc Alps or thc Rhinc to carry on war
in !taly or Gcrmany. !t cncountcrs statcs ol thc sccond rank, and, cvcn il thcy
arc in alliancc, thcrc arc always rivalrics or collisions ol intcrcst which will
dcprivc thcm ol that unity and strcngth posscsscd by a singlc powcrlul statc.
n thc othcr hand, a Gcrman army invading Francc would opcratc upon a
linc much morc dangcrous than that ol thc Frcnch in !taly, bccausc upon thc
rst could bc thrown thc consolidatcd strcngth ol Franco, unitcd in lccling

and intcrcst. An army on thc dclcnsivc, with its linc ol opcrations on its own
soil, has rcsourccs cvcrywhcrc and in cvcry thing: thc inhabitants, authoritics,
productions, towns, public dcpots and arscnals, and cvcn privatc storcs, arc all
in its lavor. !t is not ordinarily so abroad.
Lincs ol opcrations in rich, lcrtilc, manulacturing rcgions ocr to thc
assailants much grcatcr advantagcs than whcn in barrcn or dcscrt rcgions,
particularly whcn thc pcoplc arc not unitcd against thc invadcr. !n provinccs
likc thosc rst namcd thc army would nd a thousand ncccssary supplics,
whilc in thc othcr huts and straw arc about thc only rcsourccs. Horscs probably
may obtain pasturagc, but cvcry thing clsc must bc carricd by thc army,thus
innitcly incrcasing thc cmbarrassmcnts and rcndcring bold opcrations much
morc rarc and dangcrous. Tc Frcnch armics, so long accustomcd to thc
comlorts ol Swabia and Lombardy, almost pcrishcd in .c6 in thc bogs ol
Pultusk, and actually did pcrish in ..a in thc marshy lorcsts ol Lithuania.
.,. Tcrc is anothcr point in rclcrcncc to thcsc lincs which is much insistcd
upon by somc, but which is morc spccious than important. !t is that on cach
sidc ol thc linc ol opcrations thc country should bc clcarcd ol all cncmics lor
a distancc cqual to thc dcpth ol this linc: othcrwisc thc cncmy might thrcatcn
thc linc ol rctrcat. Tis rulc is cvcrywhcrc bclicd by thc cvcnts ol war. Tc
naturc ol thc country, thc rivcrs and mountains, thc moralc ol thc armics,
thc spirit ol thc pcoplc, thc ability and cncrgy ol thc commandcrs, cannot bc
cstimatcd by diagrams on papcr. !t is truc that no considcrablc bodics ol thc
cncmy could bc pcrmittcd on thc anks ol thc linc ol rctrcat, but a compliancc
with this dcmand would dcprivc an army ol cvcry mcans ol taking a stcp in
a hostilc country, and thcrc is not a campaign in rcccnt wars, or in thosc ol
Marlborough and ugcnc, which docs not contradict this asscrtion. Vas not
Gcncral Morcau at thc gatcs ol \icnna whcn Fusscn, Scharnitz, and all thc
Tyrol wcrc in posscssion ol thc Austrians: Vas not Napolcon at Piaccnza whcn
Turin, Gcnoa, and thc ColdiTcnda wcrc occupicd by thc army ol Mclas: id
not ugcnc march by way ol Stradclla and Asti to thc aid ol Turin, lcaving thc
Frcnch upon thc Mincio but a lcw lcagucs lrom his basc:
8SR\AT!NS UPN !NTR!R L!NSVHAT HAS 8N
SA! AGA!NST THM
Somc ol my critics havc disputcd as to thc mcaning ol words and upon
dcnitions, othcrs havc ccnsurcd whcrc thcy but impcrlcctly undcrstood, and
othcrs havc, by thc light ol ccrtain important cvcnts, takcn it upon thcmsclvcs
to dcny my lundamcntal principlcs, without inquiring whcthcr thc conditions
ol thc casc which might modily thc application ol thcsc principlcs wcrc such as
wcrc supposcd, or without rcccting that, cvcn admitting what thcy claimcd
to bc truc, a singlc cxccption cannot disprovc a rulc bascd upon thc cxpcricncc
ol agcs and upon natural principlcs.
c
!n opposition to my maxims upon intcrior lincs, somc havc quotcd thc
lamous and succcsslul march ol thc allics upon Lcipsic. Tis rcmarkablc cvcnt,
at rst glancc, sccms to staggcr thc laith ol thosc who bclicvc in principlcs. At
bcst, howcvcr, it is but onc ol thosc cxccptional cascs lrom which nothing can
bc inlcrrcd in thc lacc ol thousands ol opposcd instanccs. Morcovcr, it is casy
to show that, lar lrom ovcrthrowing thc maxims it has bccn brought to opposc,
it will go to cstablish thcir soundncss. !ndccd, thc critics had lorgottcn that
in casc ol a considcrablc numcrical supcriority ! rccommcndcd doublc lincs ol
opcrations as most advantagcous, particularly whcn conccntric and arrangcd
to combinc an cort against thc cncmy at thc dccisivc momcnt. Now, in thc
allicd armics ol Schwarzcnbcrg, 8lucchcr, 8crnadottc, and 8cnningscn, this
casc ol dccidcd supcriority is lound. Tc inlcrior army, to conlorm to thc
principlcs ol this chaptcr, should havc dircctcd its corts against onc ol thc
cxtrcmitics ol his advcrsary, and not upon thc ccntcr as it did: so that thc
cvcnts quotcd against mc arc doubly in my lavor.
Morcovcr, il thc ccntral position ol Napolcon bctwccn rcsdcn and thc dcr
was disastrous, it must bc attributcd to thc mislortuncs ol Culm, Katzbach,
and cnncwitz,in a word, to laults ol cxccution, cntircly lorcign to thc
principlcs in qucstion.
Vhat ! proposc is, to act ocnsivcly upon thc most important point with
thc grcatcr part ol thc lorccs, but upon thc sccondary points to rcmain on
thc dclcnsivc, in strong positions or bchind a rivcr, until thc dccisivc blow is
struck, and thc opcration cndcd by thc total dclcat ol an csscntial part ol thc
army. Tcn thc combincd corts ol thc wholc army may bc dircctcd upon
othcr points. Vhcncvcr thc sccondary armics arc cxposcd to a dccisivc shock
during thc abscncc ol thc mass ol thc army, thc systcm is not undcrstood, and
this was what happcncd in ...
!l Napolcon, altcr his victory at rcsdcn, had vigorously pursucd thc allics
into 8ohcmia, hc would havc cscapcd thc disastcr at Culm, havc thrcatcncd
Praguc, and pcrhaps havc dissolvcd thc Coalition. To this crror may bc addcd
a lault quitc as grcat,that ol ghting dccisivc battlcs whcn hc was not prcscnt
with thc mass ol his lorccs. At Katzbach his instructions wcrc not obcycd. Hc
ordcrcd Macdonald to wait lor 8lucchcr, and to lall upon him whcn hc should
cxposc himscll by hold movcmcnts. Macdonald, on thc contrary, crosscd his
dctachmcnts ovcr torrcnts which wcrc hourly bccoming morc swollcn, and
advanccd to mcct 8lucchcr. !l hc had lulllcd his instructions and Napolcon
had lollowcd up his victory, thcrc is no doubt that his plan ol opcrations,
bascd upon intcrior stratcgic lincs and positions and upon a conccntric linc ol
opcrations, would havc mct with thc most brilliant succcss. Tc study ol his
campaigns in !taly in .,6 and in Francc in .. shows that hc kncw how to
apply this systcm.
Tcrc is anothcr circumstancc, ol cqual importancc, which shows thc
injusticc ol judging ccntral lincs by thc latc ol Napolcon in Saxony,viz.: that
his front of operations was outanked on the right, and even taken in reverse, by the
.
geographical position of the frontiers of Bohemia. Such a casc is ol rarc occurrcncc.
A ccntral position with such laults is not to bc comparcd to onc without thcm.
Vhcn Napolcon madc thc application ol thcsc principlcs in !taly, Poland,
Prussia, and Francc, hc was not cxposcd to thc attack ol a hostilc cncmy on
his anks and rcar. Austria could havc thrcatcncd him in .c,, but shc was
thcn at pcacc with him and unarmcd. To judgc ol a systcm ol opcrations, it
must bc supposcd that accidcnts and chanccs arc to bc as much in lavor ol as
against it,which was by no mcans thc casc in .., cithcr in thc gcographic
positions or in thc statc ol thc rcspcctivc lorccs. !ndcpcndcntly ol this, it is
absurd to quotc thc rcvcrscs at Katzbach and cnncwitz, sucrcd by his
licutcnants, as prool capablc ol dcstroying a principlc thc simplcst application
ol which rcquircd thcsc occrs not to allow thcmsclvcs to bc drawn into a
scrious cngagcmcnt. !nstcad ol avoiding thcy sought collisions. !ndccd, what
advantagc can bc cxpcctcd lrom thc systcm ol ccntral lincs, il thc parts ol thc
army which havc bccn wcakcncd in ordcr to strikc dccisivc blows clscwhcrc,
shall thcmsclvcs scck a disastrous contcst, instcad ol bcing contcntcd with
bcing bodics ol obscrvation:
|!|
!n this casc it is thc cncmy who applics thc
principlc, and not hc who has thc intcrior lincs. Morcovcr, in thc succccding
campaign, thc dclcnsc ol Napolcon in Champagnc, lrom thc battlc ol 8ricnnc
to that ol Paris, dcmonstratcs lully thc truth ol thcsc maxims.
Tc analysis ol thcsc two cclcbratcd campaigns raiscs a stratcgic qucstion
which it would bc dicult to answcr by simplc asscrtions loundcd upon thcorics.
!t is, whcthcr thc systcm ol ccntral lincs loscs its advantagcs whcn thc masscs
arc vcry largc. Agrccing with Montcsquicu, that thc grcatcst cntcrpriscs lail
lrom thc magnitudc ol thc arrangcmcnts ncccssary to consummatc thcm, !
am disposcd to answcr in thc armativc. !t is vcry clcar to mc that an army
ol onc hundrcd thousand mcn, occupying a ccntral zonc against thrcc isolatcd
armics ol thirty or thirtyvc thousand mcn, would bc morc surc ol dclcating
thcm succcssivcly than il thc ccntral mass wcrc lour hundrcd thousand strong
against thrcc armics ol onc hundrcd and thirtyvc thousand cach, and lor
scvcral good rcasons:
.. Considcring thc diculty ol nding ground and timc ncccssary to
bring a vcry largc lorcc into action on thc day ol battlc, an army ol onc
hundrcd and thirty or onc hundrcd and lorty thousand mcn may casily
rcsist a much largcr lorcc.
a. !l drivcn lrom thc cld, thcrc will bc at lcast onc hundrcd thousand
mcn to protcct and insurc an ordcrly rctrcat and ccct a junction with
onc ol thc othcr armics.
. Tc ccntral army ol lour hundrcd thousand mcn rcquircs such a quantity
ol provisions, munitions, horscs, and materiel ol cvcry kind, that it will
posscss lcss mobility and lacility in shilting its corts lrom onc part ol
!
! am wcll awarc that it is not always possiblc to avoid a combat without running grcatcr risks
than would rcsult lrom a chcck, but Macdonald might havc lought 8lucchcr to advantagc il hc had bcttcr
undcrstood Napolcons instructions.
a
thc zonc to anothcr, to say nothing ol thc impossibility ol obtaining
provisions lrom a rcgion too rcstrictcd to support such numbcrs.
. Tc bodics ol obscrvation dctachcd lrom thc ccntral mass to hold in
chcck two armics ol onc hundrcd and thirtyvc thousand cach must
bc vcry strong, (lrom cighty to nincty thousand cach,) and, bcing
ol such magnitudc, il thcy arc drawn into a scrious cngagcmcnt thcy
will probably sucr rcvcrscs, thc cccts ol which might outwcigh thc
advantagcs gaincd by thc principal army.
! havc ncvcr advocatcd cxclusivcly cithcr a conccntric or ccccntric systcm. All
my works go to show thc ctcrnal inucncc ol principlcs, and to dcmonstratc
that opcrations to bc succcsslul must bc applications ol principlcs.
ivcrgcnt or convcrgcnt opcrations may bc cithcr vcry good or vcry bad:
all dcpcnds on thc situation ol thc rcspcctivc lorccs. Tc ccccntric lincs, lor
instancc, arc good whcn applicd to a mass starting lrom a givcn point, and
acting in divcrgcnt dircctions to dividc and scparatcly dcstroy two hostilc
lorccs acting upon cxtcrior lincs. Such was thc mancuvcr ol Frcdcrick which
brought about, at thc cnd ol thc campaign ol .,6,, thc nc battlcs ol Rossbach
and Lcuthcn. Such wcrc ncarly all thc opcrations ol Napolcon, whosc lavoritc
mancuvcr was to unitc, by closclycalculatcd marchcs, imposing masscs on thc
ccntcr, and, having picrccd thc cncmys ccntcr or turncd his lront, to givc thcm
ccccntric dircctions to dispcrsc thc dclcatcd army.
|!|
n thc othcr hand, conccntric opcrations arc good in two cascs: .. Vhcn
thcy tcnd to conccntratc a scattcrcd army upon a point whcrc it will bc surc
to arrivc bclorc thc cncmy, a. Vhcn thcy dircct to thc samc cnd thc corts
ol two armics which arc in no dangcr ol bcing bcatcn scparatcly by a strongcr
cncmy.
Conccntric opcrations, which just now sccm to bc so advantagcous, may
bc most pcrnicious,which should tcach us thc ncccssity ol dctccting thc
principlcs upon which systcms arc bascd, and not to conlound principlcs and
systcms, as, lor instancc, il two armics sct out lrom a distant basc to march
convcrgcntly upon an cncmy whosc lorccs arc on intcrior lincs and morc
conccntratcd, it lollows that thc lattcr could ccct a union bclorc thc lormcr,
and would incvitably dclcat thcm, as was thc casc with Morcau and Jourdan
in .,6, opposcd to thc Archdukc Charlcs.
!n starting lrom thc samc points, or lrom two points much lcss scparatcd
than usscldorl and Strasbourg, an army may bc cxposcd to this dangcr.
Vhat was thc latc ol thc conccntric columns ol Vurmscr and Quasdanovitch,
wishing to rcach thc Mincio by thc two banks ol Lakc Garda: Can thc rcsult
ol thc march ol Napolcon and Grouchy on 8russcls bc lorgottcn: Lcaving
Sombrcl, thcy wcrc to march conccntrically on this city,onc by Quatrc8ras,
!
!t will not bc thought strangc that ! somctimcs approvc ol conccntric, and at othcr timcs
divcrgcnt, mancuvcrs, whcn wc rccct that among thc ncst opcrations ol Napolcon thcrc arc somc in which
hc cmploycd thcsc two systcms altcrnatcly within twcntylour hours, lor cxamplc, in thc movcmcnts about
Ratisbon in .c.

thc othcr by Vavrc. 8lucchcr and Vcllington, taking an intcrior stratcgic linc,
ccctcd a junction bclorc thcm, and thc tcrriblc disastcr ol Vatcrloo provcd
to thc world that thc immutablc principlcs ol war cannot bc violatcd with
impunity.
Such cvcnts provc bcttcr than any argumcnts that a systcm which is not in
accordancc with thc principlcs ol war cannot bc good. ! lay no claim to thc
crcation ol thcsc principlcs, lor thcy havc always cxistcd, and wcrc applicd by
Cacsar, Scipio, and thc Consul Ncro, as wcll as by Marlborough and ugcnc,
but ! claim to havc bccn thc rst to point thcm out, and to lay down thc
principal chanccs in thcir various applications.
ARTICLE XXII
Strategic Lines
Mcntion has alrcady bccn madc ol stratcgic lincs ol mancuvcrs, which dicr
csscntially lrom lincs ol opcrations, and it will bc wcll to dcnc thcm, lor many
conlound thcm. Vc will not considcr thosc stratcgic lincs which havc a grcat
and pcrmancnt importancc by rcason ol thcir position and thcir rclation to thc
lcaturcs ol thc country, likc thc lincs ol thc anubc and thc Mcusc, thc chains
ol thc Alps and thc 8alkan. Such lincs can bcst bc studicd by a dctailcd and
minutc cxamination ol thc topography ol uropc, and an cxccllcnt modcl lor
this kind ol study is lound in thc Archdukc Charlcss dcscription ol Southcrn
Gcrmany.
Tc tcrm strategic is also applicd to all communications which lcad by thc
most dircct or advantagcous routc lrom onc important point to anothcr, as wcll
as lrom thc stratcgic lront ol thc army to all ol its objcctivc points. !t will bc
sccn, thcn, that a thcatcr ol war is crosscd by a multitudc ol such lincs, but that
at any givcn timc thosc only which arc conccrncd in thc projcctcd cntcrprisc
havc any rcal importancc. Tis rcndcrs plain thc distinction bctwccn thc
gcncral linc ol opcrations ol a wholc campaign, and thcsc strategic lincs, which
arc tcmporary and changc with thc opcrations ol thc army.
8csidcs tcrritorial stratcgic lincs, thcrc arc strategic lines of maneuvers.
An army having Gcrmany as its gcncral cld might adopt as its zonc ol
opcrations thc spacc bctwccn thc Alps and thc anubc, or that bctwccn thc
anubc and thc Main, or that bctwccn thc mountains ol Franconia and thc
sca. !t would havc upon its zonc a singlc linc ol opcrations, or, at most, a
doublc conccntric linc, upon intcrior, or pcrhaps cxtcrior, dircctions,whilc
it would havc succcssivcly pcrhaps twcnty stratcgic lincs as its cntcrpriscs
wcrc dcvclopcd: it would havc at rst onc lor cach wing which would join thc
gcncral linc ol opcrations. !l it opcratcd in thc zonc bctwccn thc anubc and
thc Alps, it might adopt, according to cvcnts, thc stratcgic linc lcading lrom

Ulm on onauwcrth and Ratisbon, or that lrom Ulm to thc Tyrol, or that
which connccts Ulm with Nurcmbcrg or Maycncc.
!t may, thcn, bc assumcd that thc dcnitions applicd to lincs ol opcrations,
as wcll as thc maxims rclcrring to thcm, arc ncccssarily applicablc to stratcgic
lincs. Tcsc may bc concentric, to inict a dccisivc blow, or eccentric, altcr
victory. Tcy arc rarcly simple, sincc an army docs not connc its march to a
singlc road, but whcn thcy arc doublc or triplc, or cvcn quadruplc, thcy should
bc interior il thc lorccs bc cqual, or exterior in thc casc ol grcat numcrical
supcriority. Tc rigorous application ol this rulc may pcrhaps somctimcs bc
rcmittcd in dctaching a body on an cxtcrior linc, cvcn whcn thc lorccs arc
cqual, to attain an important rcsult without running much risk, but this is an
aair ol dctachmcnts, and docs not rclcr to thc important masscs.
Stratcgic lincs cannot bc intcrior whcn our corts arc dircctcd against onc
ol thc cxtrcmitics ol thc cncmys lront ol opcrations.
Tc maxims abovc givcn in rclcrcncc to lincs ol opcrations holding good lor
stratcgic lincs, it is not ncccssary to rcpcat thcm, or to apply thcm to particular
cxamplcs, but thcrc is onc, howcvcr, which dcscrvcs mcntion,viz.: that it is
important gcncrally, in thc sclcction ol thcsc tcmporary stratcgic lincs, not to
lcavc thc linc ol opcrations cxposcd to thc assaults ol thc cncmy. vcn this
may, howcvcr, bc donc, to cxtricatc thc army lrom grcat dangcr, or to attain a
grcat succcss, but thc opcration must bc ol short duration, and carc must havc
bccn takcn to prcparc a plan ol salc rctrcat, by a suddcn changc ol thc linc ol
opcrations, il ncccssary, as has alrcady bccn rclcrrcd to.
Vc will illustratc this by thc campaign ol Vatcrloo. Tc Prussian army
was bascd upon thc Rhinc, its linc ol opcrations cxtcndcd lrom Colognc
and Coblcntz on Luxcmbourg and Namur, Vcllingtons basc was Antwcrp,
and his linc ol opcrations thc short road to 8russcls. Tc suddcn attack by
Napolcon on Flandcrs dccidcd 8lucchcr to rcccivc battlc parallcl to thc nglish
basc, and not to his own, about which hc sccmcd to havc no uncasincss. Tis
was pardonablc, bccausc hc could always havc a good chancc ol rcgaining
Vcscl or Nimcgucn, and cvcn might scck a rclugc in Antwcrp in thc last
cxtrcmity, but il thc army had not had its powcrlul maritimc allics it would
havc bccn dcstroycd. 8catcn at Ligny, and sccking rclugc at Gcmbloux and
thcn at Vavrc, 8lucchcr had but thrcc stratcgic lincs to choosc lrom: that
which lcd dircctly to Macstricht, that larthcr north on \cnloo, or thc onc
lcading to thc nglish army ncar Mont St. Jcan. Hc audaciously took thc last,
and triumphcd by thc application ol intcrior stratcgic lincs,which Napolcon
hcrc, pcrhaps lor thc rst timc in his lilc, ncglcctcd. !t will rcadily bc sccn that
thc linc lollowcd lrom Gcmbloux by Vavrc to Mont St. Jcan was ncithcr a
linc ol opcrations ol thc Prussian army nor a linc ol battlc, but a strategic line
of maneuver, and was intcrior. !t was bold, bccausc hc cxposcd lully his own
natural linc ol opcrations. Tc lact that hc sought a junction with thc nglish
madc his movcmcnt accord with thc principlcs ol war.

A lcss succcsslul cxamplc was that ol Ncy at cnncwitz. Lcaving Vittcnbcrg,
and going in thc dircction ol 8crlin, hc movcd to thc right to gain thc cxtrcmc
lclt ol thc allics, but in so doing hc lclt his primitivc linc ol rctrcat cxposcd to
thc attacks ol an cncmy supcrior in lorcc. His objcct was to gain communication
with Napolcon, whosc intcntion was to join him by Hcrzbcrg or Luckau, but
Ncy should lrom thc bcginning havc takcn all logistic and tactical mcans ol
accomplishing this changc ol stratcgic linc and ol inlorming his army ol it.
Hc did nothing ol this kind,cithcr lrom lorgctlulncss, or on account ol thc
lccling ol avcrsion hc had to any thing likc a rctrcat,and thc scvcrc losscs at
cnncwitz wcrc thc rcsult.
Napolcon in .,6 gavc onc ol thc bcst illustrations ol thcsc dicrcnt
combinations ol stratcgic lincs. His gcncral linc ol opcrations cxtcndcd lrom
thc Apcnnincs to \crona. Vhcn hc had drivcn Vurmscr upon Rovcrcdo and
dctcrmincd to pursuc him into thc Tyrol, hc pushcd on in thc vallcy ol thc
Adigc to Trcnt and thc Lavis, whcrc hc lcarncd that Vurmscr had movcd by
thc 8rcnta on thc Frioul, doubtlcss to takc him in rcvcrsc. Tcrc wcrc but thrcc
courscs opcn to him,to rcmain in thc narrow vallcy ol thc Adigc at grcat
risk, to rctrcat by \crona to mcct Vurmscr, or thc last,which was sublimc,
but rash,to lollow him into thc vallcy ol thc 8rcnta, which was cncirclcd
by ruggcd mountains whosc two passagcs might bc hcld by thc Austrians.
Napolcon was not thc man to hcsitatc bctwccn thrcc such altcrnativcs. Hc
lclt \aubois on thc Lavis to covcr Trcnt, and marchcd with thc rcmaindcr ol
his lorccs on 8assano. Tc brilliant rcsults ol this bold stcp arc wcll known.
Tc routc lrom Trcnt to 8assano was not thc linc ol opcrations ol thc army,
but a strategic line of maneuver still boldcr than that ol 8lucchcr on Vavrc.
Howcvcr, it was an opcration ol only thrcc or lour days duration, at thc cnd
ol which timc Napolcon would cithcr bcat or bc bcatcn at 8assano: in thc
rst casc, hc would opcn dircct communication with \crona and his linc
ol opcrations, in thc sccond, hc could rcgain in grcat hastc Trcnt, whcrc,
rcinlorccd by \aubois, hc could lall back cithcr upon \crona or Pcschicra. Tc
dicultics ol thc country, which madc this march audacious in onc rcspcct,
wcrc lavorablc in anothcr, lor cvcn il Vurmscr had bccn victorious at 8assano
hc could not havc intcrlcrcd with thc rcturn to Trcnt, as thcrc was no road to
cnablc him to anticipatc Napolcon. !l avidovitch on thc Lavis had drivcn
\aubois lrom Trcnt, hc might havc cmbarrasscd Napolcon, but this Austrian
gcncral, prcviously bcatcn at Rovcrcdo, and ignorant ol what thc Frcnch
army was doing lor scvcral days, and thinking it was all upon him, would
scarccly havc thought ol rcsuming thc ocnsivc bclorc Napolcon bcatcn at
8assano would havc bccn on his rctrcat. !ndccd, il avidovitch had advanccd
as lar as Rovcrcdo, driving \aubois bclorc him, hc would thcrc havc bccn
surroundcd by two Frcnch armics, who would havc inictcd upon him thc
latc ol \andammc at Culm.
! havc dwclt on this cvcnt to show that a propcr calculation ol timc and
distanccs, joincd to grcat activity, may lcad to thc succcss ol many advcnturcs
which may sccm vcry imprudcnt. ! concludc lrom this that it may bc wcll
6
somctimcs to dircct an army upon a routc which cxposcs its linc ol opcrations,
but that cvcry mcasurc must bc takcn to prcvcnt thc cncmy lrom proting
by it, both by grcat rapidity ol cxccution and by dcmonstrations which will
dcccivc him and lcavc him in ignorancc ol what is taking placc. Still, it is a
vcry hazardous mancuvcr, and only to bc adoptcd undcr an urgcnt ncccssity.
ARTICLE XXIII
Means of protecting a Line of Operations by Temporary
Bases or Strategic Reserves
Vhcn a gcncral cntcrs a country ocnsivcly, hc should lorm cvcntual or
tcmporary bascs,which, ol coursc, arc ncithcr so salc nor so strong as his
own lronticrs. A rivcr with tetes de ponts, and onc or two largc towns sccurc
lrom a coup de main to covcr thc dcpots ol thc army and to scrvc as points ol
asscmbling lor thc rcscrvc troops, would bc an cxccllcnt basc ol this kind.
l coursc, such a linc could not bc a tcmporary basc il a hostilc lorcc wcrc
ncar thc linc ol opcrations lcading to thc rcal basc on thc lronticrs. Napolcon
would havc had a good rcal basc on thc lbc in .. il Austria had rcmaincd
ncutral, but, shc having joincd his cncmics, this linc was takcn in rcvcrsc, and
bccamc but a pivot ol opcrations, lavorablc indccd lor thc cxccution ol a singlc
cntcrprisc, but dangcrous lor a prolongcd occupation, particularly in casc ol
a scrious rcvcrsc. As cvcry army which is bcatcn in an cncmys country is
cxposcd to thc dangcr ol bcing cut o lrom its own lronticrs il it continucs to
occupy thc country, thcsc distant tcmporary bascs arc rathcr tcmporary points
ol support than rcal bascs, and arc in a mcasurc cvcntual lincs ol dclcnsc. !n
gcncral, wc cannot cxpcct to nd in an cncmys country salc positions suitablc
cvcn lor a tcmporary basc, and thc dccicncy must bc supplicd by a stratcgic
rcscrvc,which is purcly a modcrn invcntion. !ts mcrits and dcmcrits dcscrvc
noticc.
STRATG!C RSR\S
Rcscrvcs play an important part in modcrn warlarc. From thc cxccutivc, who
prcparcs national rcscrvcs, down to thc chicl ol a platoon ol skirmishcrs, cvcry
commandcr now dcsircs a rcscrvc. A wisc govcrnmcnt always providcs good
rcscrvcs lor its armics, and thc gcncral uscs thcm whcn thcy comc undcr his
command. Tc statc has its rcscrvcs, thc army has its own, and cvcry corps
darmcc or division should not lail to providc onc.
Tc rcscrvcs ol an army arc ol two kinds,thosc on thc battlccld, and
thosc which arc intcndcd to rccruit and support thc army: thc lattcr, whilc
organizing, may occupy important points ol thc thcatcr ol war, and scrvc cvcn
as stratcgic rcscrvcs, thcir positions will dcpcnd not only on thcir magnitudc,
but also on thc naturc ol thc lronticrs and thc distancc lrom thc basc to thc
,
lront ol opcrations. Vhcncvcr an army takcs thc ocnsivc, it should always
contcmplatc thc possibility ol bcing compcllcd to act on thc dclcnsivc, and
by thc posting ol a rcscrvc bctwccn thc basc and lront ol opcrations thc
advantagc ol an activc rcscrvc on thc cld ol battlc is gaincd: it can y to
thc support ol mcnaccd points without wcakcning thc activc army. !t is truc
that to lorm a rcscrvc a numbcr ol rcgimcnts must bc withdrawn lrom activc
scrvicc, but thcrc arc always rcinlorccmcnts to arrivc, rccruits to bc instructcd,
and convalcsccnts to bc uscd, and by organizing ccntral dcpots lor prcparation
ol munitions and cquipmcnts, and by making thcm thc rcndczvous ol all
dctachmcnts going to and coming lrom thc army, and adding to thcm a lcw
good rcgimcnts to givc tonc, a rcscrvc may bc lormcd capablc ol important
scrvicc.
Napolcon ncvcr lailcd to organizc thcsc rcscrvcs in his campaigns. vcn in
.,,, in his bold march on thc Noric Alps, hc had rst Joubcrt on thc Adigc,
altcrward \ictor (rcturning lrom thc Roman Statcs) in thc ncighborhood ol
\crona. !n .c Ncy and Augcrcau playcd thc part altcrnatcly in thc Tyrol and
8avaria, and Morticr and Marmont ncar \icnna.
!n .c6 Napolcon lormcd likc rcscrvcs on thc Rhinc, and Morticr uscd thcm
to rcducc Hcssc. At thc samc timc, othcr rcscrvcs wcrc lorming at Maycncc
undcr Kcllcrmann, which took post, as last as organizcd, bctwccn thc Rhinc
and lbc, whilc Morticr was scnt into Pomcrania. Vhcn Napolcon dccidcd
to push on to thc \istula in thc samc ycar, hc dircctcd, with much ostcntation,
thc conccntration ol an army on thc lbc sixty thousand strong, its objcct
bcing to protcct Hamburg against thc nglish and to inucncc Austria, whosc
disposition was as manilcst as hcr intcrcsts.
Tc Prussians cstablishcd a similar rcscrvc in .c6 at Hallc, but it was badly
postcd: il it had bccn cstablishcd upon thc lbc at Vittcnbcrg or cssau, and
had donc its duty, it might havc savcd thc army by giving Princc Hohcnlohc
and 8lucchcr timc to rcach 8crlin, or at lcast Stcttin.
Tcsc rcscrvcs arc particularly usclul whcn thc conguration ol thc country
lcads to doublc lronts ol opcrations: thcy thcn lulll thc doublc objcct ol
obscrving thc sccond lront, and, in casc ol ncccssity, ol aiding thc opcrations
ol thc main army whcn thc cncmy thrcatcns its anks or a rcvcrsc compcls it
to lall back toward this rcscrvc.
l coursc, carc must bc takcn not to crcatc dangcrous dctachmcnts, and
whcncvcr thcsc rcscrvcs can bc dispcnscd with, it should bc donc, or thc troops
in thc dcpots only bc cmploycd as rcscrvcs. !t is only in distant invasions and
somctimcs on our own soil that thcy arc usclul: il thc sccnc ol hostilitics bc
but vc or six marchcs distant lrom thc lronticr, thcy arc quitc supcruous. At
homc thcy may gcncrally bc dispcnscd with: it is only in thc casc ol a scrious
invasion, whcn ncw lcvics arc organizing, that such a rcscrvc, in an intrcnchcd
camp, undcr thc protcction ol a lortrcss which scrvcs as a grcat dcpot, will bc
indispcnsablc.

Tc gcncrals talcnts will bc cxcrciscd in judging ol thc usc ol thcsc rcscrvcs
according to thc statc ol thc country, thc lcngth ol thc linc ol opcrations, thc
naturc ol thc lorticd points, and thc proximity ol a hostilc statc. Hc also
dccidcs upon thcir position, and cndcavors to usc lor this purposc troops
which will not wcakcn his main army so much as thc withdrawal ol his good
troops.
Tcsc rcscrvcs ought to hold thc most important points bctwccn thc basc
and lront ol opcrations, occupy thc lorticd placcs il any havc bccn rcduccd,
obscrvc or invcst thosc which arc hcld by thc cncmy, and il thcrc bc no lortrcss
as a point ol support, thcy should throw up intrcnchcd camps or tetes de ponts
to protcct thc dcpots and to incrcasc thc strcngth ol thcir positions.
All that has bccn said upon pivots ol opcrations is applicablc to tcmporary
bascs and to stratcgic rcscrvcs, which will bc doubly valuablc il thcy posscss
such wclllocatcd pivots.
ARTICLE XXIV
The Old System of Wars of Position and the Modern System
of Marches
By the system of positions is undcrstood thc old manncr ol conducting a
mcthodical war, with armics in tcnts, with thcir supplics at hand, cngagcd in
watching cach othcr, onc bcsicging a city, thc othcr covcring it, onc, pcrhaps,
cndcavoring to acquirc a small provincc, thc othcr countcracting its corts by
occupying strong points. Such was war lrom thc Middlc Agcs to thc cra ol thc
Frcnch Rcvolution. uring this rcvolution grcat changcs transpircd, and many
systcms ol morc or lcss valuc sprang up. Var was commcnccd in .,a as it had
bccn in .,6a: thc Frcnch cncampcd ncar thcir strong placcs, and thc allics
bcsicgcd thcm. !t was not till .,, whcn assailcd lrom without and within,
that this systcm was changcd. Toroughly arouscd, Francc thrcw onc million
mcn in lourtccn armics upon hcr cncmics. Tcsc armics had ncithcr tcnts,
provisions, nor moncy. n thcir marchcs thcy bivouackcd or wcrc quartcrcd
in towns, thcir mobility was incrcascd and bccamc a mcans ol succcss. Tcir
tactics changcd also: thc troops wcrc put in columns, which wcrc morc casily
handlcd than dcploycd lincs, and, on account ol thc brokcn charactcr ol thc
country ol Flandcrs and thc \osgcs, thcy thrcw out a part ol thcir lorcc as
skirmishcrs to protcct and covcr thc columns. Tis systcm, which was thus
thc rcsult ol circumstanccs, at rst mct with a succcss bcyond all cxpcctation:
it disconccrtcd thc mcthodical Austrian and Prussian troops as wcll as thcir
gcncrals. Mack, to whom was attributcd thc succcss ol thc Princc ol Coburg,
incrcascd his rcputation by dirccting thc troops to cxtcnd thcir lincs to opposc
an opcn ordcr to thc rc ol skirmishcrs. !t had ncvcr occurrcd to thc poor man
that whilc thc skirmishcrs madc thc noisc thc columns carricd thc positions.

Tc rst gcncrals ol thc Rcpublic wcrc ghtingmcn, and nothing morc. Tc
principal dircction ol aairs was in thc hands ol Carnot and ol thc Committcc
ol Public Salcty: it was somctimcs judicious, but oltcn bad. Carnot was thc
author ol onc ol thc ncst stratcgic movcmcnts ol thc war. !n ., hc scnt
a rcscrvc ol nc troops succcssivcly to thc aid ol unkirk, Maubcugc, and
Landau, so that this small lorcc, moving rapidly lrom point to point, and
aidcd by thc troops alrcady collcctcd at thcsc dicrcnt points, compcllcd thc
cncmy to cvacuatc Francc.
Tc campaign ol ., opcncd badly. !t was thc lorcc ol circumstanccs, and
not a prcmcditatcd plan, which brought about thc stratcgic movcmcnt ol thc
army ol thc Moscllc on thc Sambrc, and it was this which lcd to thc succcss ol
Flcurus and thc conqucst ol 8clgium.
!n ., thc mistakcs ol thc Frcnch wcrc so grcat that thcy wcrc imputcd to
trcachcry. Tc Austrians, on thc contrary, wcrc bcttcr commandcd by Clairlayt,
Chatclcr, and Schmidt than thcy had bccn by Mack and thc Princc ol Coburg.
Tc Archdukc Charlcs, applying thc principlc ol intcrior lincs, triumphcd ovcr
Morcau and Jourdan in .,6 by a singlc march.
Up to this timc thc lronts ol thc Frcnch armics had bccn largc,cithcr to
procurc subsistcncc morc casily, or bccausc thc gcncrals thought it bcttcr to
put all thc divisions in linc, lcaving it to thcir commandcrs to arrangc thcm
lor battlc. Tc rcscrvcs wcrc small dctachmcnts, incapablc ol rcdccming thc
day cvcn il thc cncmy succccdcd in ovcrwhclming but a singlc division. Such
was thc statc ol aairs whcn Napolcon madc his debut in !taly. His activity
lrom thc bcginning worstcd thc Austrians and Picdmontcsc: lrcc lrom
usclcss incumbranccs, his troops surpasscd in mobility all modcrn armics.
Hc conqucrcd thc !talian pcninsula by a scrics ol marchcs and stratcgic
combats. His march on \icnna in .,, was rash, but justicd by thc ncccssity
ol ovcrcoming thc Archdukc Charlcs bclorc hc could rcccivc rcinlorccmcnts
lrom thc Rhinc.
Tc campaign ol .cc, still morc charactcristic ol thc man, markcd a ncw
cra in thc conccption ol plans ol campaign and lincs ol opcrations. Hc adoptcd
bold objcctivc points, which lookcd to nothing lcss than thc capturc or
dcstruction ol wholc armics. Tc ordcrs ol battlc wcrc lcss cxtcndcd, and thc
morc rational organization ol armics in largc bodics ol two or thrcc divisions
was adoptcd. Tc systcm ol modcrn stratcgy was hcrc lully dcvclopcd, and
thc campaigns ol .c and .c6 wcrc mcrcly corollarics to thc grcat problcm
solvcd in .cc. Tactically, thc systcm ol columns and skirmishcrs was too wcll
adaptcd to thc lcaturcs ol !taly not to mcct with his approval.
!t may now bc a qucstion whcthcr thc systcm ol Napolcon is adaptcd to all
capacitics, cpochs, and armics, or whcthcr, on thc contrary, thcrc can bc any
rcturn, in thc light ol thc cvcnts ol .cc and .c, to thc old systcm ol wars
ol position. Altcr a comparison ol thc marchcs and camps ol thc Scvcn Ycars
Var with thosc ol thc seven weeks war,as Napolcon callcd thc campaign ol
.c6,or with thosc ol thc thrcc months which clapscd lrom thc dcparturc
.cc
ol thc army lrom 8oulognc in .c till its arrival in thc plains ol Moravia, thc
rcadcr may casily dccidc as to thc rclativc mcrits ol thc two systcms.
Tc systcm ol Napolcon was to march twenty-ve miles a day, to ght, and
then to camp in quiet. Hc told mc that hc kncw no othcr mcthod ol conducting
a war than this.
!t may bc said that thc advcnturous charactcr ol this grcat man, his pcrsonal
situation, and thc tonc ol thc Frcnch mind, all concurrcd in urging him to
undcrtakings which no othcr pcrson, whcthcr born upon a thronc, or a gcncral
undcr thc ordcrs ol his govcrnmcnt, would cvcr darc to adopt. Tis is probably
truc, but bctwccn thc cxtrcmcs ol vcry distant invasions, and wars ol position,
thcrc is a propcr mcan, and, without imitating his impctuous audacity, wc may
pursuc thc linc hc has markcd out. !t is probablc that thc old systcm ol wars ol
positions will lor a long timc bc proscribcd, or that, il adoptcd, it will bc much
modicd and improvcd.
!l thc art ol war is cnlargcd by thc adoption ol thc systcm ol marchcs,
humanity, on thc contrary, loscs by it, lor thcsc rapid incursions and bivouacs ol
considcrablc masscs, lccding upon thc rcgions thcy ovcrrun, arc not matcrially
dicrcnt lrom thc dcvastations ol thc barbarian hordcs bctwccn thc lourth
and thirtccnth ccnturics. Still, it is not likcly that thc systcm will bc spccdily
rcnounccd, lor a grcat truth has bccn dcmonstratcd by Napolcons wars,viz.:
that rcmotcncss is not a ccrtain salcguard against invasion,that a statc to bc
sccurc must havc a good systcm ol lortrcsscs and lincs ol dclcnsc, ol rcscrvcs
and military institutions, and, nally, a good systcm ol govcrnmcnt. Tcn
thc pcoplc may cvcrywhcrc bc organizcd as militia, and may scrvc as rcscrvcs
to thc activc armics, which will rcndcr thc lattcr morc lormidablc, and thc
grcatcr thc strcngth ol thc armics thc morc ncccssary is thc systcm ol rapid
opcrations and prompt rcsults.
!l, in timc, social ordcr assumcs a calmcr statc,il nations, instcad ol ghting
lor thcir cxistcncc, ght only lor thcir intcrcsts, to acquirc a natural lronticr
or to maintain thc political cquilibrium,thcn a ncw right ol nations may bc
agrccd upon, and pcrhaps it will bc possiblc to havc armics on a lcss cxtcnsivc
scalc. Tcn also wc may scc armics ol lrom cighty to onc hundrcd thousand
mcn rcturn to a mixcd systcm ol war,a mcan bctwccn thc rapid incursions
ol Napolcon and thc slow systcm ol positions ol thc last ccntury. Until thcn
wc must cxpcct to rctain this systcm ol marchcs, which has produccd so grcat
rcsults, lor thc rst to rcnouncc it in thc prcscncc ol an activc and capablc
cncmy would probably bc a victim to his indiscrction.
Tc scicncc ol marchcs now includcs morc than dctails, likc thc lollowing,
viz.: thc ordcr ol thc dicrcnt arms in column, thc timc ol dcparturc and arrival,
thc prccautions to bc obscrvcd in thc march, and thc mcans ol communication
bctwccn thc columns, all ol which is a part ol thc dutics ol thc sta ol an army.
utsidc and bcyond thcsc vcry important dctails, thcrc is a scicncc ol marchcs
in thc grcat opcrations ol stratcgy. For instancc, thc march ol Napolcon by thc
Saint8crnard to lall upon thc communications ol Mclas, thosc madc in .c
.c.
by onauwcrth to cut o Mack, and in .c6 by Gcra to turn thc Prussians,
thc march ol Suwaro lrom Turin to thc Trcbbia to mcct Macdonald, that ol
thc Russian army on Taroutin, thcn upon Krasnoi, wcrc dccisivc opcrations,
not bccausc ol thcir rclation to Logistics, but on account ol thcir stratcgic
rclations.
!ndccd, thcsc skilllul marchcs arc but applications ol thc grcat principlc
ol throwing thc mass ol thc lorccs upon thc dccisivc point, and this point is
to bc dctcrmincd lrom thc considcrations givcn in Articlc X!X. Vhat was
thc passagc ol thc Saint8crnard but a linc ol opcrations dircctcd against an
cxtrcmity ol thc stratcgic lront ol thc cncmy, and thcncc upon his linc ol
rctrcat: Tc marchcs ol Ulm and Jcna wcrc thc samc mancuvcrs, and what was
8lucchcrs march at Vatcrloo but an application ol intcrior stratcgic lincs:
From this it may bc concludcd that all stratcgic movcmcnts which tcnd
to throw thc mass ol thc army succcssivcly upon thc dicrcnt points ol thc
lront ol opcrations ol thc cncmy, will bc skilllul, as thcy apply thc principlc ol
ovcrwhclming a smallcr lorcc by a supcrior onc. Tc opcrations ol thc Frcnch
in ., lrom unkirk to Landau, and thosc ol Napolcon in .,6, .c, and
.., arc modcls ol this kind.
nc ol thc most csscntial points in thc scicncc ol modcrn marchcs, is to
so combinc thc movcmcnts ol thc columns as to covcr thc grcatcst stratcgic
lront, whcn bcyond thc rcach ol thc cncmy, lor thc triplc objcct ol dccciving
him as to thc objcctivc in vicw, ol moving with casc and rapidity, and ol
procuring supplics with morc lacility. Howcvcr, it is ncccssary in this casc to
havc prcviously arrangcd thc mcans ol conccntration ol thc columns in ordcr
to inict a dccisivc blow.
Tis altcrnatc application ol cxtcndcd and conccntric movcmcnts is thc truc
tcst ol a grcat gcncral.
Tcrc is anothcr kind ol marchcs, dcsignatcd as ank marches, which
dcscrvcs noticc. Tcy havc always bccn hcld up as vcry dangcrous, but nothing
satislactory has cvcr bccn writtcn about thcm. !l by thc tcrm ank marches arc
undcrstood tactical mancuvcrs madc upon thc cld ol battlc in vicw ol thc
cncmy, it is ccrtain that thcy arc vcry dclicatc opcrations, though somctimcs
succcsslul, but il rclcrcncc is madc to ordinary stratcgic marchcs, ! scc nothing
particularly dangcrous in thcm, unlcss thc most common prccautions ol
Logistics bc ncglcctcd. !n a stratcgic movcmcnt, thc two hostilc armics ought
to bc scparatcd by about two marchcs, (counting thc distancc which scparatcs
thc advanccd guards lrom thc cncmy and lrom thcir own columns.) !n such a
casc thcrc could bc no dangcr in a stratcgic march lrom onc point to anothcr.
Tcrc arc, howcvcr, two cascs whcrc such a march would bc altogcthcr
inadmissiblc: thc rst is whcrc thc systcm ol thc linc ol opcrations, ol thc
stratcgic lincs, and ol thc lront ol opcrations is so choscn as to prcscnt thc
ank to thc cncmy during a wholc opcration. Tis was thc lamous projcct ol
marching upon Lcipsic, lcaving Napolcon and rcsdcn on thc ank, which
.ca
would, il carricd out, havc provcd latal to thc allics. !t was modicd by thc
mpcror Alcxandcr upon thc solicitations ol thc author.
Tc sccond casc is whcrc thc linc ol opcrations is vcry long, (as was thc casc
with Napolcon at 8orodino,) and particularly il this linc aords but a singlc
suitablc routc lor rctrcat: thcn cvcry ank movcmcnt cxposing this linc would
bc a grcat lault.
!n countrics abounding in sccondary communications, ank movcmcnts
arc still lcss dangcrous, sincc, il rcpulscd, salcty may bc lound in a changc
ol thc linc ol opcrations. Tc physical and moral condition ol thc troops and
thc morc or lcss cncrgctic charactcrs ol thc commandcrs will, ol coursc, bc
clcmcnts in thc dctcrmination ol such movcmcnts.
Tc oltcnquotcd marchcs ol Jcna and Ulm wcrc actual ank mancuvcrs, so
was that upon Milan altcr thc passagc ol thc Chiusclla, and that ol Marshal
Paskcvitch to cross thc \istula at ssick, and thcir succcsslul issuc is wcll
known.
A tactical mancuvcr by thc ank in thc prcscncc ol thc cncmy is quitc a
dicrcnt aair. Ncy sucrcd lor a movcmcnt ol this kind at cnncwitz, and
so did Marmont at Salamanca and Frcdcrick at Kolin.
Ncvcrthclcss, thc cclcbratcd mancuvcr ol Frcdcrick at Lcuthcn was a truc
ank movcmcnt, but it was covcrcd by a mass ol cavalry conccalcd by thc
hcights, and applicd against an army which lay motionlcss in its camp, and it
was so succcsslul bccausc at thc timc ol thc dccisivc shock aun was takcn in
ank, and not Frcdcrick.
!n thc old systcm ol marching in column at platoon distancc, whcrc linc ol
battlc could bc lormcd to thc right or lclt without dcploymcnt, (by a right or
lclt into linc,) movcmcnts parallcl to thc cncmys linc wcrc not ank marches,
bccausc thc ank ol thc column was thc rcal lront ol thc linc ol battlc.
Tc lamous march ol ugcnc within vicw ol thc Frcnch army, to turn thc
lincs ol Turin, was still morc cxtraordinary than that ol Lcuthcn, and no lcss
succcsslul.
!n thcsc dicrcnt battlcs, thc mancuvcrs wcrc tactical and not stratcgic.
Tc march ol ugcnc lrom Mantua to Turin was onc ol thc grcatcst stratcgic
opcrations ol thc agc, but thc casc abovc rclcrrcd to was a movcmcnt madc to
turn thc Frcnch camp thc cvcning bclorc thc battlc.
ARTICLE XXV
Depots of Supplies, and their Relation to Marches
Tc subjcct most ncarly conncctcd with thc systcm ol marchcs is thc
commissariat, lor to march quickly and lor a long distancc lood must bc
supplicd, and thc problcm ol supporting a numcrous army in an cncmys
.c
country is a vcry dicult onc. !t is proposcd to discuss thc rclation bctwccn
thc commissariat and stratcgy.
!t will always bc dicult to imaginc how arius and Xcrxcs subsistcd thcir
immcnsc armics in Tracc, whcrc now it would bc a hard task to supply thirty
thousand mcn. uring thc Middlc Agcs, thc Grccks, barbarians, and morc
latcly thc Crusadcrs, maintaincd considcrablc bodics ol mcn in that country.
Cacsar said that war should support war, and hc is gcncrally bclicvcd to havc
livcd at thc cxpcnsc ol thc countrics hc ovcrran.
Tc Middlc Agcs wcrc rcmarkablc lor thc grcat migrations ol all kinds, and
it would bc intcrcsting to know thc numbcrs ol thc Huns, \andals, Goths,
and Mongols who succcssivcly travcrscd uropc, and how thcy livcd during
thcir marchcs. Tc commissariat arrangcmcnts ol thc Crusadcrs would also bc
an intcrcsting subjcct ol rcscarch.
!n thc carly pcriods ol modcrn history, it is probablc that thc armics ol
Francis !., in crossing thc Alps into !taly, did not carry with thcm largc storcs
ol provisions, lor armics ol thcir magnitudc, ol lorty or lty thousand mcn,
could casily nd provisions in thc rich vallcys ol thc Ticino and Po.
Undcr Louis X!\. and Frcdcrick !!. thc armics wcrc largcr, thcy lought on
thcir own lronticrs, and livcd lrom thcir storchouscs, which wcrc cstablishcd
as thcy movcd. Tis intcrlcrcd grcatly with opcrations, rcstricting thc troops
within a distancc lrom thc dcpots dcpcndcnt upon thc mcans ol transportation,
thc rations thcy could carry, and thc numbcr ol days ncccssary lor wagons to
go to thc dcpots and rcturn to camp.
uring thc Rcvolution, dcpots ol supply wcrc abandoncd lrom ncccssity.
Tc largc armics which invadcd 8clgium and Gcrmany livcd somctimcs in thc
houscs ol thc pcoplc, somctimcs by rcquisitions laid upon thc country, and oltcn
by plundcr and pillagc. To subsist an army on thc granarics ol 8clgium, !taly,
Swabia, and thc rich banks ol thc Rhinc and anubc, is casy,particularly il
it marchcs in a numbcr ol columns and docs not cxcccd onc hundrcd or onc
hundrcd and twcnty thousand mcn, but this would bc vcry dicult in somc
othcr countrics, and quitc impossiblc in Russia, Swcdcn, Poland, and Turkcy.
!t may rcadily bc conccivcd how grcat may bc thc rapidity and impctuosity ol
an army whcrc cvcry thing dcpcnds only on thc strcngth ol thc soldicrs lcgs.
Tis systcm gavc Napolcon grcat advantagcs, but hc abuscd it by applying it on
too largc a scalc and to countrics whcrc it was impracticablc.
A gcncral should bc capablc ol making all thc rcsourccs ol thc invadcd
country contributc to thc succcss ol his cntcrpriscs: hc should usc thc local
authoritics, il thcy rcmain, to rcgulatc thc asscssmcnts so as to makc thcm
unilorm and lcgal, whilc hc himscll should scc to thcir lulllmcnt. !l thc
authoritics do not rcmain, hc should crcatc provisional oncs ol thc lcading mcn,
and cndow thcm with cxtraordinary powcrs. Tc provisions thus acquircd
should bc collcctcd at thc points most convcnicnt lor thc opcrations ol thc
army. !n ordcr to husband thcm, thc troops may bc quartcrcd in thc towns
and villagcs, taking carc to rcimbursc thc inhabitants lor thc cxtra chargc thus
.c
laid upon thcm. Tc inhabitants should also bc rcquircd to lurnish wagons to
convcy thc supplics to thc points occupicd by thc troops.
!t is impossiblc to dcsignatc prcciscly what it will bc prudcnt to undcrtakc
without having prcviously cstablishcd thcsc dcpots, as much dcpcnds upon
thc scason, country, strcngth ol thc armics, and spirit ol thc pcoplc, but thc
lollowing may bc considcrcd as gcncral maxims:
.. Tat in lcrtilc and populous rcgions not hostilc, an army ol onc hundrcd
to onc hundrcd and twcnty thousand mcn, whcn so lar distant lrom thc cncmy
as to bc ablc salcly to rccovcr a considcrablc cxtcnt ol country, may draw its
rcsourccs lrom it, during thc timc occupicd by any singlc opcration.
As thc rst opcration ncvcr rcquircs morc than a month, during which timc
thc grcat body ol thc troops will bc in motion, it will bc sucicnt to providc,
by dcpots ol provisions, lor thc cvcntual wants ol thc army, and particularly
lor thosc ol thc troops obligcd to rcmain at a particular point. Tus, thc army
ol Napolcon, whilc hall ol it was bcsicging Ulm, would nccd brcad until thc
surrcndcr ol thc city, and il thcrc had bccn a scarcity thc opcration might havc
lailcd.
a. uring this timc cvcry cort should bc madc to collcct thc supplics
obtaincd in thc country, and to lorm dcpots, in ordcr to subscrvc thc wants ol
thc army altcr thc succcss ol thc opcration, whcthcr it takc a position to rccruit
or whcthcr it undcrtakc a ncw cntcrprisc.
. Tc dcpots lormcd cithcr by purchasc or lorccd rcquisitions should bc
cchcloncd as much as possiblc upon thrcc dicrcnt lincs ol communication,
in ordcr to supply with morc lacility thc wings ol thc army, and to cxtcnd
as much as possiblc thc arca lrom which succcssivc supplics arc to bc drawn,
and, lastly, in ordcr that thc dcpots should bc as wcll covcrcd as possiblc. To
this cnd, it would bc wcll to havc thc dcpots on lincs convcrging toward thc
principal linc ol opcrations, which will bc gcncrally lound in thc ccntcr. Tis
arrangcmcnt has two rcal advantagcs: rst, thc dcpots arc lcss cxposcd to
thc attcmpts ol thc cncmy, as his distancc lrom thcm is thcrcby incrcascd,
sccondly, it lacilitatcs thc movcmcnts ol thc army in conccntrating upon a
singlc point ol thc linc ol opcrations to thc rcar, with a vicw ol rctaking thc
initiativc lrom thc cncmy, who may havc tcmporarily assumcd thc ocnsivc
and gaincd somc advantagc.
. !n thinlyscttlcd and unproductivc rcgions thc army will lack its most
ncccssary supplics: it will bc prudcnt, in this casc, not to advancc too lar lrom
its dcpots, and to carry with it sucicnt provisions to cnablc it, il compcllcd to
do so, to lall back upon its lincs ol dcpots.
. !n national wars whcrc thc inhabitants y and dcstroy cvcry thing in thcir
path, as was thc casc in Spain, Portugal, Russia, and Turkcy, it is impossiblc
to advancc unlcss attcndcd by trains ol provisions and without having a surc
basc ol supply ncar thc lront ol opcrations. Undcr thcsc circumstanccs a war ol
invasion bccomcs vcry dicult, il not impossiblc.
.c
6. !t is not only ncccssary to collcct largc quantitics ol supplics, but it is
indispcnsablc to havc thc mcans ol convcying thcm with or altcr thc army,
and this is thc grcatcst diculty, particularly on rapid cxpcditions. To
lacilitatc thcir transportation, thc rations should consist ol thc most portablc
articlcs,as biscuit, ricc, &c.: thc wagons should bc both light and strong, so
as to pass ovcr all kinds ol roads. !t will bc ncccssary to collcct all thc vchiclcs
ol thc country, and to insurc good trcatmcnt to thcir owncrs or drivcrs, and
thcsc vchiclcs should bc arrangcd in parks at dicrcnt points, so as not to takc
thc drivcrs too lar lrom thcir homcs and in ordcr to husband thc succcssivc
rcsourccs. Lastly, thc soldicr must hc habituatcd to carry with him scvcral
days rations ol brcad, ricc, or cvcn ol our.
,. Tc vicinity ol thc sca is invaluablc lor thc transportation ol supplics, and
thc party which is mastcr on this clcmcnt can supply himscll at will. Tis
advantagc, howcvcr, is not absolutc in thc casc ol a largc contincntal army, lor,
in thc dcsirc to maintain communications with its dcpots, it may bc drawn
into opcrations on thc coast, thus cxposing itscll to thc grcatcst risks il thc
cncmy mancuvcr with thc mass ol his lorccs upon thc cxtrcmity oppositc
thc sca. !l thc army advancc too lar lrom thc coast, thcrc will bc dangcr ol
its communications bcing intcrccptcd, and this dangcr incrcascs with thc
progrcss ol thc army.
. A contincntal army using thc sca lor transportation should basc itscll on
thc land, and havc a rcscrvc ol provisions indcpcndcnt ol its ships, and a linc ol
rctrcat prcparcd on thc cxtrcmity ol its stratcgic lront opposcd to thc sca.
. Navigablc strcams and canals, whcn parallcl to thc linc ol opcrations ol
thc army, rcndcr thc transportation ol supplics much casicr, and also lrcc thc
roads lrom thc incumbranccs ol thc numcrous vchiclcs othcrwisc ncccssary.
For this rcason, lincs ol opcrations thus situatcd arc thc most lavorablc. Tc
watcrcommunications thcmsclvcs arc not in this casc thc lincs ol opcrations,
as has bccn asscrtcd: on thc contrary, it is csscntial that thc troops should bc
ablc to movc at somc distancc lrom thc rivcr, in ordcr to prcvcnt thc cncmy
lrom throwing back thc cxtcrior ank upon thc rivcr,which might bc as
dangcrous as il it wcrc thc sca.
!n thc cncmys country thc rivcrs can scarccly cvcr bc uscd lor transportation,
sincc thc boats will probably bc dcstroycd, and sincc a small body ol mcn may
casily cmbarrass thc navigation. To rcndcr it surc, it is ncccssary to occupy
both banks,which is hazardous, as Morticr cxpcricnccd at irnstcin. !n a
lricndly country thc advantagcs ol rivcrs arc morc substantial.
.c. !n dclault ol brcad or biscuit, thc prcssing wants ol an army may bc lcd
by cattlc on thc hool, and thcsc can gcncrally bc lound, in populous countrics,
in numbcrs to last lor somc littlc timc. Tis sourcc ol supply will, howcvcr, bc
soon cxhaustcd, and, in addition, this plan lcads to plundcr. Tc rcquisitions
lor cattlc should bc wcll rcgulatcd, and thc bcst plan ol all is to supply thc
army with cattlc purchascd clscwhcrc.
.c6
! will cnd this articlc by rccording a rcmark ol Napolcon which may appcar
whimsical, but which is still not without rcason. Hc said that in his rst
campaigns thc cncmy was so wcll providcd that whcn his troops wcrc in want
ol supplics hc had only to lall upon thc rcar ol thc cncmy to procurc cvcry
thing in abundancc. Tis is a rcmark upon which it would bc absurd to lound a
systcm, but which pcrhaps cxplains thc succcss ol many a rash cntcrprisc, and
provcs how much actual war dicrs lrom narrow thcory.
ARTICLE XXVI
The Defense of Frontiers by Forts and Intrenched Lines.
Wars of Sieges
Forts scrvc two principal purposcs: rst, to covcr thc lronticrs, sccondly, to aid
thc opcrations ol thc campaign.
Tc dclcnsc ol lronticrs is a problcm gcncrally somcwhat indctcrminatc. !t
is not so lor thosc countrics whosc bordcrs arc covcrcd with grcat natural
obstaclcs, and which prcscnt but lcw acccssiblc points, and thcsc admitting
ol dclcnsc by thc art ol thc cnginccr. Tc problcm hcrc is simplc, but in opcn
countrics it is morc dicult. Tc Alps and thc Pyrcnccs, and thc lcsscr rangcs
ol thc Crapacks, ol Ricscngcbirgc, ol rzgcbirgc, ol thc 8ochmcrwald, ol thc
8lack Forcst, ol thc \osgcs, and ol thc Jura, arc not so lormidablc that thcy
cannot bc madc morc so by a good systcm ol lortrcsscs.
l all thcsc lronticrs, that scparating Francc and Picdmont was bcst covcrcd.
Tc vallcys ol thc Stura and Suza, thc passcs ol Argcntinc, ol MontGcncvrc,
and ol MontCcnis,thc only oncs considcrcd practicablc,wcrc covcrcd by
masonry lorts, and, in addition, works ol considcrablc magnitudc guardcd thc
issucs ol thc vallcys in thc plains ol Picdmont. !t was ccrtainly no casy mattcr
to surmount thcsc dicultics.
Tcsc cxccllcnt articial dclcnscs will not always prcvcnt thc passagc ol an
army, bccausc thc small works which arc lound in thc gorgcs may bc carricd,
or thc cncmy, il hc bc bold, may nd a passagc ovcr somc othcr routc hithcrto
dccmcd impracticablc. Tc passagc ol thc Alps by Francis !.,which is so
wcll dcscribcd by Gaillard,Napolcons passagc ol thc Saint8crnard, and
thc Splugcn cxpcdition, provc that thcrc is truth in thc rcmark ol Napolcon,
that an army can pass wherever a titan can set his foot,a maxim not strictly truc,
but charactcristic ol thc man, and applicd by him with grcat succcss.
thcr countrics arc covcrcd by largc rivcrs, cithcr as a rst linc or as a sccond.
!t is, howcvcr, rcmarkablc that such lincs, apparcntly so wcll calculatcd to
scparatc nations without intcrlcring with tradc and communication, arc
gcncrally not part ol thc rcal lronticr. !t cannot bc said that thc anubc dividcs
8cssarabia lrom thc ttoman cmpirc as long as thc Turks havc a loothold
in Moldavia. Tc Rhinc was ncvcr thc rcal lronticr ol Francc and Gcrmany,
.c,
lor thc Frcnch lor long pcriods hcld points upon thc right bank, whilc thc
Gcrmans wcrc in posscssion ol Maycncc, Luxcmbourg, and thc tetes de ponts
ol Manhcim and Vcscl on thc lclt bank.
!l, howcvcr, thc anubc, thc Rhinc, Rhonc, lbc, dcr, \istula, Po, and
Adigc bc not cxtcrior lincs ol thc lronticr, thcrc is no rcason why thcy should
not bc lorticd as lincs ol pcrmancnt dclcnsc, whcrcvcr thcy pcrmit thc usc ol
a systcm suitablc lor covcring a lront ol opcrations.
An cxamplc ol this kind is thc !nn, which scparatcs 8avaria lrom Austria:
ankcd on thc south by thc Tyrolcsc Alps, on thc north by 8ohcmia and thc
anubc, its narrow lront is covcrcd by thc thrcc lorticd placcs ol Passau,
8raunau, and Salzburg. Lloyd, with somc poctic liccnsc, comparcs this
lronticr to two imprcgnablc bastions whosc curtain is lormcd ol thrcc nc
lorts and whosc ditch is onc ol thc most rapid ol rivcrs. Hc has cxaggcratcd
thcsc advantagcs, lor his cpithct ol imprcgnablc was dccidcdly disprovcd by
thc bloody cvcnts ol .cc, .c, and .c.
Tc majority ol thc uropcan statcs havc lronticrs by no mcans so
lormidablc as that ol thc Alps and thc !nn, bcing gcncrally opcn, or consisting
ol mountains with practicablc passcs at a considcrablc numbcr ol points. Vc
proposc to givc a sct ol gcncral maxims cqually applicablc to all cascs.
Vhcn thc topography ol a lronticr is opcn, thcrc should bc no attcmpt to
makc a complctc linc ol dclcnsc by building too many lortrcsscs, rcquiring
armics to garrison thcm, and which, altcr all, might not prcvcnt an cncmy
lrom pcnctrating thc country. !t is much wiscr to build lcwcr works, and to
havc thcm propcrly locatcd, not with thc cxpcctation ol absolutcly prcvcnting
thc ingrcss ol thc cncmy, but to multiply thc impcdimcnts to his progrcss, and,
at thc samc timc, to support thc movcmcnts ol thc army which is to rcpcl
him.
!l it bc rarc that a lorticd placc ol itscll absolutcly prcvcnts thc progrcss
ol an army, it is, ncvcrthclcss, an cmbarrassmcnt, and compcls thc army to
dctach a part ol its lorcc or to makc detours in its march, whilc, on thc othcr
hand, it imparts corrcsponding advantagcs to thc army which holds it, covcrs
his dcpots, anks, and movcmcnts, and, nally, is a placc ol rclugc in casc ol
nccd.
Fortrcsscs thus cxcrcisc a manilcst inucncc ovcr military opcrations, and
wc now proposc to cxaminc thcir rclations to stratcgy.
Tc rst point to bc considcrcd is thcir location, thc sccond lics in thc
distinction bctwccn thc cascs whcrc an army can aord to pass thc lorts
without a sicgc, and thosc whcrc it will bc ncccssary to bcsicgc, thc third
point is in rclcrcncc to thc rclations ol an army to a sicgc which it proposcs to
covcr.
As lortrcsscs propcrly locatcd lavor military opcrations, in thc samc dcgrcc
thosc which arc unlortunatcly placcd arc disadvantagcous. Tcy arc an incubus
upon thc army which is compcllcd to garrison thcm and thc statc whosc mcn
.c
and moncy arc wastcd upon thcm. Tcrc arc many in uropc in this catcgory.
!t is bad policy to covcr a lronticr with lortrcsscs vcry closc togcthcr. Tis
systcm has bccn wrongly imputcd to \auban, who, on thc contrary, had a
controvcrsy with Louvois about thc grcat numbcr ol points thc lattcr dcsircd
to lortily. Tc maxims on this point arc as lollow:
.. Tc lorticd placcs should bc in cchclon, on thrcc lincs, and should cxtcnd
lrom thc lronticrs toward thc capital.
|!|
Tcrc should bc thrcc in thc rst linc,
as many in thc sccond, and a largc placc in thc third, ncar thc ccntcr ol thc
statc. !l thcrc bc lour lronts, this would rcquirc, lor a complctc systcm, lrom
twcntylour to thirty placcs.
!t will bc objcctcd that this numbcr is largc, and that cvcn Austria has not
so many. !t must bc rccollcctcd that Francc has morc than lorty upon only a
third ol its lronticrs, (lrom 8csancon to unkirk,) and still has not cnough on
thc third linc in thc ccntcr ol thc country. A 8oard convcncd lor thc purposc
ol considcring thc systcm ol lortrcsscs has dccidcd quitc rcccntly that morc
wcrc rcquircd. Tis docs not provc that thcrc wcrc not alrcady too many, but
that ccrtain points in addition should bc lorticd, whilc thosc on thc rst linc,
although too much crowdcd, may bc maintaincd sincc thcy arc alrcady in
cxistcncc. Admitting that Francc has two lronts lrom unkirk to 8ascl, onc
lrom 8ascl to Savoy, onc lrom Savoy to Nicc, in addition to thc totally distinct
linc ol thc Pyrcnccs and thc coastlinc, thcrc arc six lronts, rcquiring lorty to
lty placcs. vcry military man will admit that this is cnough, sincc thc Swiss
and coast lronts rcquirc lcwcr than thc northcast. Tc systcm ol arrangcmcnt
ol thcsc lortrcsscs is an important clcmcnt ol thcir usclulncss. Austria has a lcss
numbcr, bccausc shc is bordcrcd by thc small Gcrman statcs, which, instcad
ol bcing hostilc, placc thcir own lorts at hcr disposal. Morcovcr, thc numbcr
abovc givcn is what was considcrcd ncccssary lor a statc having lour lronts
ol ncarly cqual dcvclopmcnt. Prussia, bcing long and narrow, and cxtcnding
lrom Kocnigsbcrg almost to thc gatcs ol Mctz, should not bc lorticd upon
thc samc systcm as Francc, Spain, or Austria. Tus thc gcographical position
and cxtcnt ol statcs may cithcr diminish or incrcasc thc numbcr ol lortrcsscs,
particularly whcn maritimc lorts arc to bc includcd.
a. Fortrcsscs should always occupy thc important stratcgic points alrcady
dcsignatcd in Articlc X!X. As to thcir tactical qualitics, thcir sitcs should not
bc commandcd, and cgrcss lrom thcm should bc casy, in ordcr to incrcasc thc
diculty ol blockading thcm.
. Tosc which posscss thc grcatcst advantagcs, cithcr as to thcir own dclcnsc
or lor scconding thc opcrations ol an army, arc ccrtainly thosc situatcd on
grcat rivcrs and commanding both banks. Maycncc, Coblcntz, and Strasbourg,
including Kchl, arc truc illustrations and modcls ol this kind. Placcs situatcd at
thc conucncc ol two grcat rivcrs command thrcc dicrcnt lronts, and hcncc
arc ol incrcascd importancc. Takc, lor instancc, Modlin. Maycncc, whcn it
!
Tc mcmorablc campaign ol .a is cvidcncc ol thc valuc ol such a systcm. !l thc Portc had
posscsscd masonry lorts in thc dclcs ol thc 8alkan and a good lortrcss toward Faki, thc Russians would not
havc rcachcd Adrianoplc, and thc aair would not havc bccn so simplc.
.c
had on thc lclt bank ol thc Main thc lort ol Gustavusburg, and Casscl on
thc right, was thc most lormidablc placc in uropc, but it rcquircd a garrison
ol twcntyvc thousand mcn: so that works ol this cxtcnt must bc lcw in
numbcr.
. Largc lorts, whcn cncompassing populous and commcrcial citics, arc
prclcrablc to small oncs,particularly whcn thc assistancc ol thc citizcns can
bc rclicd on lor thcir dclcnsc. Mctz arrcstcd thc wholc powcr ol Charlcs \, and
Lillc lor a wholc ycar dclaycd ugcnc and Marlborough. Strasbourg has many
timcs provcd thc sccurity ol Frcnch armics. uring thc last wars thcsc placcs
wcrc passcd without bcing bcsicgcd by thc invading lorccs, bccausc all uropc
was in arms against Francc, but onc hundrcd and lty thousand Gcrmans
having in thcir lront onc hundrcd thousand Frcnch could not pcnctratc to thc
Scinc with impunity, lcaving bchind thcm thcsc wclllorticd points.
. Formcrly thc opcrations ol war wcrc dircctcd against towns, camps, and
positions, rcccntly thcy havc bccn dircctcd only against organizcd armics,
lcaving out ol considcration all natural or articial obstaclcs. Tc cxclusivc usc
ol cithcr ol thcsc systcms is laulty: thc truc coursc is a mcan bctwccn thcsc
cxtrcmcs. oubtlcss, it will always bc ol thc rst importancc to dcstroy and
disorganizc all thc armics ol thc cncmy in thc cld, and to attain this cnd it
may bc allowablc to pass thc lortrcsscs, but il thc succcss bc only partial it
will bc unwisc to push thc invasion too lar. Hcrc, also, vcry much dcpcnds
upon thc situation and rcspcctivc strcngth ol thc armics and thc spirit ol thc
nations.
!l Austria wcrc thc solc antagonist ol Francc, shc could not lollow in thc
lootstcps ol thc allics in .., ncithcr is it probablc that lty thousand Frcnch
will vcry soon risk thcmsclvcs bcyond thc Noric Alps, in thc vcry hcart ol
Austria, as Napolcon did in .,,.
|!|
Such cvcnts only occur undcr cxccptional
circumstanccs.
6. !t may bc concludcd lrom what prcccdcs,.st, that, whilc lorticd placcs
arc csscntial supports, abusc in thcir application may, by dividing an army,
wcakcn it instcad ol adding to its ccicncy, ad, that an army may, with thc
vicw ol dcstroying thc cncmy, pass thc linc ol thcsc lorts,always, howcvcr,
lcaving a lorcc to obscrvc thcm, d, that an army cannot pass a largc rivcr,
likc thc anubc or thc Rhinc, without rcducing at lcast onc ol thc lortrcsscs
on thc rivcr, in ordcr to sccurc a good linc ol rctrcat. ncc mastcr ol this
placc, thc army may advancc on thc ocnsivc, lcaving dctachmcnts to bcsicgc
othcr placcs, and thc chanccs ol thc rcduction ol thosc placcs incrcasc as thc
army advanccs, sincc thc cncmys opportunitics ol hindcring thc sicgc arc
corrcspondingly diminishcd.
,. Vhilc largc placcs arc much thc most advantagcous among a lricndly
pcoplc, smallcr works arc not without importancc, not to arrcst an cncmy, who
!
Still, Napolcon was right in taking thc ocnsivc in thc Frioul, sincc thc Austrians wcrc cxpccting
a rcinlorccmcnt lrom thc Rhinc ol twcnty thousand mcn, and ol coursc it was highly important to bcat thc
Archdukc Charlcs bclorc this lorcc joincd him. !n vicw ol thc circumstanccs ol thc casc, Napolcons conduct
was in accordancc with thc principlcs ol war.
..c
might mask thcm, but as thcy may matcrially aid thc opcrations ol an army
in thc cld. Tc lort ol Kocnigstcin in .. was as usclul to thc Frcnch as thc
lortrcss ol rcsdcn, bccausc it procurcd a tete de pont on thc lbc.
!n a mountainous country, small, wclllocatcd lorts arc cqual in valuc to
lorticd placcs, bccausc thcir provincc is to closc thc passcs, and not to aord
rclugc to armics: thc littlc lort ol 8ard, in thc vallcy ol Aosta, almost arrcstcd
Napolcons army in .cc.
. !t lollows that cach lronticr should havc onc or two largc lortrcsscs as
placcs ol rclugc, bcsidcs sccondary lorts and small posts to lacilitatc military
opcrations. Vallcd citics with a shallow ditch may bc vcry usclul in thc intcrior
ol a country, to contain dcpots, hospitals, &c, whcn thcy arc strong cnough to
rcsist thc attacks ol any small bodics that may travcrsc thc vicinity. Tcy will
bc particularly scrviccablc il thcy can bc dclcndcd by thc militia, so as not to
wcakcn thc activc army.
. Largc lorticd placcs which arc not in propcr stratcgic positions arc a
positivc mislortunc lor both thc army and statc.
.c. Tosc on thc scacoast arc ol importancc only in a maritimc war, cxccpt
lor dcpots: thcy may cvcn provc disastrous lor a contincntal army, by holding
out to it a dclusivc promisc ol support. 8cnningscn almost lost thc Russian
armics by basing thcm in .c, on Kocnigsbcrg,which hc did bccausc it was
convcnicnt lor supply. !l thc Russian army in ..a, instcad ol conccntrating on
Smolcnsk, had supportcd itscll on unaburg and Riga, it would havc bccn in
dangcr ol bcing lorccd into thc sca and ol bcing cut o lrom all its bascs.
Tc rclations bctwccn sicgcs and thc opcrations ol activc armics arc ol two
kinds. An invading army may pass by lorticd placcs without attacking thcm,
but it must lcavc a lorcc to invcst thcm, or at lcast to watch thcm, and whcn
thcrc arc a numbcr ol thcm adjaccnt to cach othcr it will bc ncccssary to lcavc
an cntirc corps darmcc, undcr a singlc commandcr, to invcst or watch thcm
as circumstanccs may rcquirc. Vhcn thc invading army dccidcs to attack a
placc, a sucicnt lorcc to carry on thc sicgc will bc assigncd to this duty, thc
rcmaindcr may cithcr continuc its march or takc a position to covcr thc sicgc.
Formcrly thc lalsc systcm prcvailcd ol cncircling a city by a wholc army,
which buricd itscll in lincs ol circumvallation and contravallation. Tcsc lincs
cost as much in labor and cxpcnsc as thc sicgc itscll. Tc lamous casc ol thc
lincs ol Turin, which wcrc ltccn milcs in lcngth, and, though guardcd by
scvcntycight thousand Frcnch, wcrc lorccd by Princc ugcnc with lorty
thousand mcn in .,c6, is cnough to condcmn this ridiculous systcm.
Much as thc rccital ol thc immcnsc labors ol Cacsar in thc invcstmcnt ol
Alisc may cxcitc our admiration, it is not probablc that any gcncral in our timcs
will imitatc his cxamplc. Ncvcrthclcss, it is vcry ncccssary lor thc invcsting
lorcc to strcngthcn its position by dctachcd works commanding thc routcs
by which thc garrison might issuc or by which thc sicgc might bc disturbcd
...
lrom without. Tis was donc by Napolcon at Mantua, and by thc Russians at
\arna.
xpcricncc has provcd that thc bcst way to covcr a sicgc is to bcat and pursuc
as lar as possiblc thc cncmys lorccs which could intcrlcrc. !l thc bcsicging
lorcc is numcrically inlcrior, it should takc up a stratcgic position covcring all
thc avcnucs by which succor might arrivc, and whcn it approachcs, as much
ol thc bcsicging lorcc as can bc sparcd should unitc with thc covcring lorcc to
lall upon thc approaching army and dccidc whcthcr thc sicgc shall continuc
or not.
8onapartc in .,6, at Mantua, was a modcl ol wisdom and skill lor thc
opcrations ol an army ol obscrvation.
!NTRNCH L!NS
8csidcs thc lincs ol circumvallation and contravallation rclcrrcd to abovc, thcrc
is anothcr kind, which is morc cxtcndcd than thcy arc, and is in a mcasurc
allicd to pcrmancnt lortications, bccausc it is intcndcd to protcct a part ol
thc lronticrs.
As a lortrcss or an intrcnchcd camp may, as a tcmporary rclugc lor an army,
bc highly advantagcous, so to thc samc dcgrcc is thc systcm ol intrcnchcd
lincs absurd. ! do not now rclcr to lincs ol small cxtcnt closing a narrow gorgc,
likc Fusscn and Scharnitz, lor thcy may bc rcgardcd as lorts, but ! spcak ol
cxtcndcd lincs many lcagucs in lcngth and intcndcd to wholly closc a part
ol thc lronticrs. For instancc, thosc ol Visscmbourg, which, covcrcd by thc
Lautcr owing in lront, supportcd by thc Rhinc on thc right and thc \osgcs
on thc lclt, sccmcd to lulll all thc conditions ol salcty, and yct thcy wcrc
lorccd on cvcry occasion whcn thcy wcrc assailcd.
Tc lincs ol Stollholcn, which on thc right ol thc Rhinc playcd thc samc
part as thosc ol Visscmbourg on thc lclt, wcrc cqually unlortunatc, and thosc
ol thc Qucich and thc Kinzig had thc samc latc.
Tc lincs ol Turin, (.,c6,) and thosc ol Maycncc, (.,,) although intcndcd
as lincs ol circumvallation, wcrc analogous to thc lincs in qucstion in thcir
cxtcnt and in thc latc which bclcll thcm. Howcvcr wcll thcy may bc supportcd
by natural obstaclcs, thcir grcat cxtcnt paralyzcs thcir dclcndcrs, and thcy arc
almost always susccptiblc ol bcing turncd. To bury an army in intrcnchmcnts,
whcrc it may bc outankcd and surroundcd, or lorccd in lront cvcn il sccurc
lrom a ank attack, is manilcst lolly, and it is to bc hopcd that wc shall ncvcr
scc anothcr instancc ol it. Ncvcrthclcss, in our chaptcr on Tactics wc will trcat
ol thcir attack and dclcnsc.
!t may bc wcll to rcmark that, whilc it is absurd to usc thcsc cxtcndcd
lincs, it would bc cqually loolish to ncglcct thc advantagcs to bc dcrivcd lrom
..a
dctachcd works in incrcasing thc strcngth ol a bcsicging lorcc, thc salcty ol a
position, or thc dclcnsc ol a dclc.
ARTICLE XXVII
The Connection of Intrenched Camps and Tetes de Ponts
with Strategy
!t would bc out ol placc hcrc to go into dctails as to thc sitcs ol ordinary
camps and upon thc mcans ol covcring thcm by advanccd guards, or upon thc
advantagcs ol cldlortications in thc dclcnsc ol posts. nly lorticd camps
cntcr into thc combinations ol grand tactics, and cvcn ol stratcgy, and this
thcy do by thc tcmporary support thcy aord an army.
!t may bc sccn by thc cxamplc ol thc camp ol 8untzclwitz, which savcd
Frcdcrick in .,6., and by thosc ol Kchl and usscldorl in .,6, that such
a rclugc may provc ol thc grcatcst importancc. Tc camp ol Ulm, in .cc,
cnablcd Kray to arrcst lor a wholc month thc army ol Morcau on thc anubc,
and Vcllington dcrivcd grcat advantagcs lrom his camp ol Torrcs\cdras.
Tc Turks wcrc grcatly assistcd in dclcnding thc country bctwccn thc anubc
and thc 8alkan Mountains by thc camp ol Shumla.
Tc principal rulc in this conncction is that camps should bc cstablishcd on
stratcgic points which should also posscss tactical advantagcs. !l thc camp ol
rissa was usclcss to thc Russians in ..a, it was bccausc it was not in a propcr
position in rclcrcncc to thcir dclcnsivc systcm, which should havc rcstcd upon
Smolcnsk and Moscow. Hcncc thc Russians wcrc compcllcd to abandon it
altcr a lcw days.
Tc maxims which havc bccn givcn lor thc dctcrmination ol thc grcat
dccisivc stratcgic points will apply to all intrcnchcd camps, bccausc thcy ought
only to bc placcd on such points. Tc inucncc ol thcsc camps is variablc: thcy
may answcr cqually wcll as points ol dcparturc lor an ocnsivc opcration, as
tetes de ponts to assurc thc crossing ol a largc rivcr, as protcction lor wintcr
quartcrs, or as a rclugc lor a dclcatcd army.
Howcvcr good may bc thc sitc ol such a camp, it will always bc dicult to
locatc it so that it may not bc turncd, unlcss, likc thc camp ol Torrcs\cdras,
it bc upon a pcninsula backcd by thc sca. Vhcncvcr it can bc passcd cithcr
by thc right or thc lclt, thc army will bc compcllcd to abandon it or run thc
risk ol bcing invcstcd in it. Tc camp ol rcsdcn was an important support
to Napolcon lor two months, but as soon as it was outankcd by thc allics it
had not thc advantagcs cvcn ol an ordinary lortrcss, lor its cxtcnt lcd to thc
sacricc ol two corps within a lcw days lor want ol provisions.
cspitc all this, thcsc camps, whcn only intcndcd to aord tcmporary
support to an army on thc dclcnsivc, may still lulll this cnd, cvcn whcn thc
cncmy passcs by thcm, providcd thcy cannot bc takcn in rcvcrsc,that is,
..
providcd all thcir laccs arc cqually salc lrom a coup de main. !t is also important
that thcy bc cstablishcd closc to a lortrcss, whcrc thc dcpots may bc salc, or
which may covcr thc lront ol thc camp ncarcst to thc linc ol rctrcat.
!n gcncral tcrms, such a camp on a rivcr, with a largc tete de pont on thc othcr
sidc to command both banks, and ncar a largc lorticd city likc Maycncc
or Strasbourg, is ol undoubtcd advantagc, but it will ncvcr bc morc than a
tcmporary rclugc, a mcans ol gaining timc and ol collccting rcinlorccmcnts.
Vhcn thc objcct is to drivc away thc cncmy, it will bc ncccssary to lcavc thc
camp and carry on opcrations in thc opcn country.
Tc sccond maxim as to thcsc camps is, that thcy arc particularly advantagcous
to an army at homc or ncar its basc ol opcrations. !l a Frcnch army occupicd
an intrcnchcd camp on thc lbc, it would bc lost whcn thc spacc bctwccn thc
Rhinc and lbc was hcld by thc cncmy, but il it wcrc invcstcd in an intrcnchcd
camp ncar Strasbourg, it might with a littlc assistancc rcsumc its supcriority
and takc thc cld, whilc thc cncmy in thc intcrior ol Francc and bctwccn
thc rclicving lorcc and thc intrcnchcd army would havc grcat diculty in
rccrossing thc Rhinc.
Vc havc hcrctolorc considcrcd thcsc camps in a stratcgic light, but scvcral
Gcrman gcncrals havc maintaincd that thcy arc suitablc to covcr placcs or
to prcvcnt sicgcs,which appcars to mc to bc a littlc sophistical. oubtlcss,
it will bc morc dicult to bcsicgc a placc whcn an army is cncampcd on
its glacis, and it maybc said that thc lorts and camps arc a mutual support,
but, according to my vicw, thc rcal and principal usc ol intrcnchcd camps is
always to aord, il ncccssary, a tcmporary rclugc lor an army, or thc mcans ol
dcbouching ocnsivcly upon a dccisivc point or bcyond a largc rivcr. To bury
an army in such a camp, to cxposc it to thc dangcr ol bcing outankcd and
cut o, simply to rctard a sicgc, would bc lolly. Tc cxamplc ol Vurmscr, who
prolongcd thc dclcnsc ol Mantua, will bc citcd in opposition to this, but did
not his army pcrish: And was this sacricc rcally usclul: ! do not think so,
lor, thc placc having bccn oncc rclicvcd and rcvictualcd, and thc sicgctrain
having lallcn into thc hands ol thc Austrians, thc sicgc was ncccssarily changcd
into a blockadc, and thc town could only bc takcn by rcason ol laminc, and,
this bcing thc casc, Vurmscrs prcscncc ought rathcr to havc hastcncd than
rctardcd its surrcndcr.
Tc intrcnchcd camp ol thc Austrians bclorc Maycncc in ., would, indccd,
havc prcvcntcd thc sicgc ol thc placc, il thc Frcnch had posscsscd thc mcans
ol carrying on a sicgc, as long as thc Rhinc had not bccn crosscd, but as soon
as Jourdan appcarcd on thc Lahn, and Morcau in thc 8lack Forcst, it bccamc
ncccssary to abandon thc camp and lcavc thc placc to its own mcans ol dclcnsc.
!t would only bc in thc cvcnt ol a lortrcss occupying a point such that it would
bc impossiblc lor an army to pass it without taking it, that an intrcnchcd camp,
with thc objcct ol prcvcnting an attack upon it, would bc cstablishcd, and what
placc in uropc is upon such a sitc:
..
So lar lrom agrccing with thcsc Gcrman authors, on thc contrary, it sccms
to mc that a vcry important qucstion in thc cstablishmcnt ol thcsc camps ncar
lorticd placcs on a rivcr, is whcthcr thcy should bc on thc samc bank as thc
placc, or upon thc othcr. Vhcn it is ncccssary to makc a choicc, by rcason
ol thc lact that thc placc cannot bc locatcd to covcr both banks, ! should
dccidcdly prclcr thc lattcr.
To scrvc as a rclugc or to lavor a dcbouch, thc camp should bc on thc bank
ol thc rivcr toward thc cncmy, and in this, casc thc principal dangcr to bc
lcarcd is that thc cncmy might takc thc camp in rcvcrsc by passing thc rivcr
at somc othcr point, and il thc lortrcss wcrc upon thc samc bank us thc camp,
it would bc ol littlc scrvicc, whilc il upon thc othcr bank, oppositc to thc
camp, it would bc almost impossiblc to takc thc lattcr in rcvcrsc. For instancc,
thc Russians, who could not hold lor twcntylour hours thcir camp ol rissa,
would havc dccd thc cncmy lor a long timc il thcrc had bccn a lortication
on thc right bank ol thc wina, covcring thc rcar ol thc camp. So Morcau
lor thrcc months, at Kchl, withstood all thc corts ol thc Archdukc Charlcs,
whilc il Strasbourg had not bccn thcrc upon thc oppositc bank his camp would
casily havc bccn turncd by a passagc ol thc Rhinc.
!ndccd, it would bc dcsirablc to havc thc protcction ol thc lorticd placc
upon thc othcr bank too, and a placc holding both banks would lulll this
condition. Tc lortication ol Coblcntz, rcccntly constructcd, sccms to
introducc a ncw cpoch. Tis systcm ol thc Prussians, combining thc advantagcs
ol intrcnchcd camps and pcrmancnt works, dcscrvcs attcntivc considcration,
but, whatcvcr may bc its dclccts, it is ncvcrthclcss ccrtain that it would aord
immcnsc advantagcs to an army intcndcd to opcratc on thc Rhinc. !ndccd, thc
inconvcnicncc ol intrcnchcd camps on largc rivcrs is that thcy arc only vcry
usclul whcn bcyond thc rivcr, and in this casc thcy arc cxposcd to thc dangcrs
arising lrom dcstruction ol bridgcs (as happcncd to Napolcon at ssling,)to
say nothing ol thc dangcr ol losing thcir provisions and munitions, or cvcn ol
a lront attack against which thc works might not avail. Tc systcm ol dctachcd
pcrmancnt works ol Coblcntz has thc advantagc ol avoiding thcsc dangcrs,
by protccting thc dcpots on thc samc bank as thc army, and in guarantccing
to thc army lrccdom lrom attack at lcast until thc bridgcs bc rccstablishcd.
!l thc city wcrc upon thc right bank ol thc Rhinc, and thcrc wcrc only an
intrcnchcd camp ol cldworks on thc lclt bank, thcrc would bc no ccrtainty
ol sccurity cithcr lor thc dcpots or thc army. So, il Coblcntz wcrc a good
ordinary lortrcss without dctachcd lorts, a largc army could not so rcadily
makc it a placc ol rclugc, nor would thcrc bc such lacilitics lor dcbouching
lrom it in thc prcscncc ol an cncmy. Tc lortrcss ol hrcnbrcitstcin, which is
intcndcd to protcct Coblcntz on thc right bank, is so dicult ol acccss that it
would bc quitc casy to blockadc it, and thc cgrcss ol a lorcc ol any magnitudc
might bc vigorously disputcd.
Much has bccn rcccntly said ol a ncw systcm uscd by thc Archdukc
Maximilian to lortily thc intrcnchcd camp ol Linz,by masonry towcrs. As
..
! only know ol it by hcarsay and thc dcscription by Captain Allard in thc
Spectateur Militaire, ! cannot discuss it thoroughly. ! only know that thc systcm
ol towcrs uscd at Gcnoa by thc skilllul Coloncl Andrcis appcarcd to mc to
bc usclul, but still susccptiblc ol improvcmcnts,which thc archdukc sccms
to havc addcd. Vc arc told that thc towcrs ol Linz, situatcd in ditchcs and
covcrcd by thc glacis, havc thc advantagc ol giving a conccntratcd horizontal
rc and ol bcing shcltcrcd lrom thc dircct shot ol thc cncmy. Such towcrs,
il wcll ankcd and conncctcd by a parapct, may makc a vcry advantagcous
camp,always, howcvcr, with somc ol thc inconvcnicnccs ol closcd lincs.
!l thc towcrs arc isolatcd, and thc intcrvals carclully covcrcd by cldworks,
(to bc thrown up whcn rcquircd,) thcy will makc a camp prclcrablc to onc
covcrcd by ordinary rcdoubts, but not so advantagcous as aordcd by thc largc
dctachcd lorts ol Coblcntz. Tcsc towcrs numbcr thirtytwo, cight ol which
arc on thc lclt bank, with a squarc lort commanding thc Pcrlingsbcrg. l
thcsc twcntylour on thc right bank, somc scvcn or cight arc only halltowcrs.
Tc circumlcrcncc ol this linc is about twclvc milcs. Tc towcrs arc bctwccn
vc hundrcd and six hundrcd yards apart, and will bc conncctcd, in casc ol
war, by a palisadcd covcrcd way. Tcy arc ol masonry, ol thrcc ticrs ol guns,
with a barbcttc battcry which is thc principal dclcnsc, mounting clcvcn twcnty
lour poundcrs. Two howitzcrs arc placcd in thc uppcr ticr. Tosc towcrs arc
placcd in a widc and dccp ditch, thc deblais ol which lorms a high glacis which
protccts thc towcr lrom dircct shot, but ! should think it would bc dicult to
protcct thc artillcry lrom dircct rc.
Somc say that this has cost about thrcclourths ol what a complctc bastioncd
cnccintc, ncccssary to makc Linz a lortrcss ol thc rst rank, would havc
cost, othcrs maintain that it has not cost morc than a quartcr as much as a
bastioncd work, and that it subscrvcs, bcsidcs, an cntircly dicrcnt objcct. !l
thcsc works arc to rcsist a rcgular sicgc, thcy arc ccrtainly vcry dclcctivc, but,
rcgardcd as an intrcnchcd camp to givc rclugc and an outlct upon both banks
ol thc anubc lor a largc army, thcy arc appropriatc, and would bc ol grcat
importancc in a war likc that ol .c, and, il cxisting thcn, would probably
havc savcd thc capital.
To complctc a grand systcm, it would pcrhaps havc bccn bcttcr to cncirclc
Linz with a rcgular bastioncd linc, and thcn to havc built scvcn or cight towcrs
bctwccn thc castcrn salicnt and thc mouth ol thc Traun, within a dircct
distancc ol about two and a hall milcs, so as to havc includcd lor thc camp
only thc curvcd spacc bctwccn Linz, thc Traun, and thc anubc. Tcn thc
doublc advantagc ol a lortrcss ol thc rst rank and a camp undcr its guns
would havc bccn unitcd, and, cvcn il not quitc so largc, would havc answcrcd
lor a largc army, particularly il thc cight towcrs on thc lclt bank and thc lort
ol Pcrlingsbcrg had bccn prcscrvcd.
..6
TTS PNTS
tetes de ponts arc thc most important ol all cldworks. Tc dicultics ol
crossing a rivcr, particularly a largc onc, in thc lacc ol thc cncmy, dcmonstratc
abundantly thc immcnsc utility ol such works, which can bc lcss casily
dispcnscd with than intrcnchcd camps, sincc il thc bridgcs arc salc an army
is insurcd lrom thc disastrous cvcnts which may attcnd a rapid rctrcat across
a largc rivcr.
tetes de ponts arc doubly advantagcous whcn thcy arc as it wcrc keeps lor a
largc intrcnchcd camp, and will bc triply so il thcy also covcr thc bank oppositc
to thc location ol thc camp, sincc thcn thcy will mutually support cach othcr.
!t is nccdlcss to statc that thcsc works arc particularly important in an cncmys
country and upon all lronts whcrc thcrc arc no pcrmancnt works. !t may
bc obscrvcd that thc principal dicrcncc bctwccn thc systcm ol intrcnchcd
camps and that ol tetes de ponts is that thc bcst intrcnchcd camps arc composcd
ol dctachcd and closcd works, whilc tetes de ponts usually consist ol contiguous
works not closcd. An intrcnchcd linc to admit ol dclcnsc must bc occupicd
in lorcc throughout its wholc cxtcnt, which would gcncrally rcquirc a largc
army, il, on thc contrary, thc intrcnchmcnts arc dctachcd closcd works, a
comparativcly small lorcc can dclcnd thcm.
Tc attack and dclcnsc ol thcsc works will bc discusscd in a subscqucnt part
ol this volumc.
ARTICLE XXVIII
Strategic Operations in Mountains
A mountainous country prcscnts itscll, in thc combinations ol war, undcr lour
dicrcnt aspccts. !t may bc thc wholc thcatcr ol thc war, or it may bc but a
zonc, it may bc mountainous throughout its wholc cxtcnt, or thcrc may bc a
linc ol mountains, upon cmcrging lrom which thc army may dcbouch into
largc and rich plains.
!l Switzcrland, thc Tyrol, thc Noric provinccs, somc parts ol Turkcy and
Hungary, Catalonia and Portugal, bc cxccptcd, in thc uropcan countrics thc
mountains arc in singlc rangcs. !n thcsc cascs thcrc is but a dicult dclc to
cross,a tcmporary obstaclc, which, oncc ovcrcomc, is an advantagc rathcr
than an objcction. !n lact, thc rangc oncc crosscd and thc war carricd into
thc plains, thc chain ol mountains may bc rcgardcd as an cvcntual basc, upon
which thc army may lall back and nd a tcmporary rclugc. Tc only csscntial
prccaution to bc obscrvcd is, not to allow thc cncmy to anticipatc thc army
on this linc ol rctrcat. Tc part ol thc Alps bctwccn Francc and !taly, and thc
Pyrcnccs, (which arc not so high, though cqually broad,) arc ol this naturc.
Tc mountains ol 8ohcmia and ol thc 8lack Forcst, and thc \osgcs, bclong to
..,
this class. !n Catalonia thc mountains covcr thc wholc country as lar as thc
bro: il thc war wcrc limitcd to this provincc, thc combinations would not
bc thc samc as il thcrc wcrc but a linc ol mountains. Hungary in this rcspcct
dicrs littlc lrom Lombardy and Castilc, lor il thc Crapacks in thc castcrn
and northcrn part arc as markcd a lcaturc as thc Pyrcnccs, thcy arc still but
a tcmporary obstaclc, and an army ovcrcoming it, whcthcr dcbouching in
thc basin ol thc Vaag, ol thc Ncytra, or ol thc Tciss, or in thc clds ol
Mongatsch, would havc thc vast plains bctwccn thc anubc and thc Tciss lor
a cld ol opcrations. Tc only dicrcncc would bc in thc roads, which in thc
Alps, though lcw in numbcr, arc cxccllcnt, whilc in Hungary thcrc arc nonc
ol much valuc. !n its northcrn part, this chain, though not so high, bccomcs
broadcr, and would sccm to bclong to that class ol clds ol opcrations which
arc wholly mountainous, but, as its cvacuation may bc compcllcd by dccisivc
opcrations in thc vallcys ol thc Vaag or thc Tciss, it must bc rcgardcd as a
tcmporary barricr. Tc attack and dclcnsc ol this country, howcvcr, would bc
a stratcgic study ol thc most intcrcsting charactcr.
Vhcn an cxtrcmcly mountainous country, such as thc Tyrol or Switzcrland,
is but a zonc ol opcrations, thc importancc ol thcsc mountains is sccondary, and
thcy must bc obscrvcd likc a lortrcss, thc armics dcciding thc grcat contcsts in
thc vallcys. !t will, ol coursc, bc othcrwisc il this bc thc wholc cld.
!t has long bccn a qucstion whcthcr posscssion ol thc mountains gavc
control ol thc vallcys, or whcthcr posscssion ol thc vallcys gavc control ol thc
mountains. Tc Archdukc Charlcs, a vcry intclligcnt and compctcnt judgc,
has dcclarcd lor thc lattcr, and has dcmonstratcd that thc vallcy ol thc anubc
is thc kcy ol Southcrn Gcrmany. Howcvcr, in this kind ol qucstions much
dcpcnds upon thc rclativc lorccs and thcir arrangcmcnt in thc country. !l sixty
thousand Frcnch wcrc advancing on 8avaria in prcscncc ol an cqual lorcc ol
Austrians, and thc lattcr should throw thirty thousand mcn into thc Tyrol,
intcnding to rcplacc thcm by rcinlorccmcnts on its arrival on thc !nn, it would
bc dicult lor thc Frcnch to push on as lar as this linc, lcaving so largc a lorcc
on its anks mastcrs ol thc outlcts ol Scharnitz, Fusscn, Kulstcin, and Lolcrs.
8ut il thc Frcnch lorcc wcrc onc hundrcd and twcnty thousand mcn, and had
gaincd such succcsscs as to cstablish its supcriority ovcr thc army in its lront,
thcn it might lcavc a sucicnt dctachmcnt to mask thc passcs ol thc Tyrol and
cxtcnd its progrcss as lar as Linz,as Morcau did in .cc.
Tus lar wc havc considcrcd thcsc mountainous districts as only acccssory
zoncs. !l wc rcgard thcm as thc principal clds ol opcrations, thc stratcgic
problcm sccms to bc morc complicatcd. Tc campaigns ol ., and .cc arc
cqually rich in instruction on this branch ol thc art. !n my account ol thcm !
havc cndcavorcd to bring out thcir tcachings by a historical cxposition ol thc
cvcnts, and ! cannot do bcttcr than rclcr my rcadcrs to it.
Vhcn wc considcr thc rcsults ol thc imprudcnt invasion ol Switzcrland by
thc Frcnch ircctory, and its latal inucncc in doubling thc cxtcnt ol thc
thcatcr ol opcrations and making it rcach lrom thc Tcxcl to Naplcs, wc cannot
..
too much applaud thc wisdom ol Francc and Austria in thc transactions which
had lor thrcc ccnturics guarantccd thc ncutrality ol Switzcrland. vcry onc
will bc convinccd ol this by carclully studying thc intcrcsting campaigns
ol thc Archdukc Charlcs, Suwaro, and Masscna in .,, and thosc ol
Napolcon and Morcau in .cc. Tc rst is a modcl lor opcrations upon an
cntircly mountainous cld, thc sccond is a modcl lor wars in which thc latc ol
mountainous countrics is dccidcd on thc plains.
! will hcrc statc somc ol thc dcductions which sccm to lollow lrom this
study.
Vhcn a country whosc wholc cxtcnt is mountainous is thc principal thcatcr
ol opcrations, thc stratcgic combinations cannot bc cntircly bascd upon
maxims applicablc in an opcn country.
Transvcrsal mancuvcrs to gain thc cxtrcmity ol thc lront ol opcrations ol
thc cncmy hcrc bccomc always vcry dicult, and oltcn impossiblc. !n such
a country a considcrablc army can bc mancuvcrcd only in a small numbcr ol
vallcys, whcrc thc cncmy will takc carc to post advanccd guards ol sucicnt
strcngth to dclay thc army long cnough to providc mcans lor dclcating thc
cntcrprisc, and, as thc ridgcs which scparatc thcsc vallcys will bc gcncrally
crosscd only by paths impracticablc lor thc passagc ol an army, transvcrsal
marchcs can only bc madc by small bodics ol light troops.
Tc important natural stratcgic points will bc at thc junction ol thc largcr
vallcys or ol thc strcams in thosc vallcys, and will bc lcw in numbcr, and, il
thc dclcnsivc army occupy thcm with thc mass ol its lorccs, thc invadcr will
gcncrally bc compcllcd to rcsort to dircct attacks to dislodgc it.
Howcvcr, il grcat stratcgic mancuvcrs in thcsc cascs bc morc rarc and
dicult, it by no mcans lollows that thcy arc lcss important. n thc contrary,
il thc assailant succccd in gaining posscssion ol onc ol thcsc ccntcrs ol
communication bctwccn thc largc vallcys upon thc linc ol rctrcat ol thc cncmy,
it will bc morc scrious lor thc lattcr than it would bc in an opcn country, sincc
thc occupation ol onc or two dicult dclcs will oltcn bc sucicnt to causc
thc ruin ol thc wholc army.
!l thc attacking party havc dicultics to ovcrcomc, it must bc admittcd
that thc dclcnsc has quitc as many, on account ol thc ncccssity ol covcring all
thc outlcts by which an attack in lorcc may bc madc upon thc dccisivc points,
and ol thc dicultics ol thc transvcrsal marchcs which it would bc compcllcd
to makc to covcr thc mcnaccd points. !n ordcr to complctc what ! havc said
upon this kind ol marchcs and thc dicultics ol dirccting thcm, ! will rclcr
to what Napolcon did in .c to cut o Mack lrom Ulm. !l this opcration
was lacilitatcd by thc hundrcd roads which cross Swabia in all dircctions, and
il it would havc bccn impracticablc in a mountainous country, lor want ol
transvcrsal routcs, to makc thc long circuit lrom onauwcrth by Augsburg to
Mcmmingcn, it is also truc that Mack could by thcsc samc hundrcd roads havc
ccctcd his rctrcat with much grcatcr lacility than il hc had bccn cntrappcd
..
in onc ol thc vallcys ol Switzcrland or ol thc Tyrol, lrom which thcrc was but
a singlc outlct.
n thc othcr hand, thc gcncral on thc dclcnsivc may in a lcvcl country
conccntratc a largc part ol his lorccs, lor, il thc cncmy scattcr to occupy all thc
roads by which thc dclcnsivc army may rctirc, it will bc casy lor thc lattcr to
crush thcsc isolatcd bodics, but in a vcry mountainous country, whcrc thcrc
arc ordinarily but onc or two principal routcs into which othcr vallcys opcn,
cvcn lrom thc dircction ol thc cncmy, thc conccntration ol lorccs bccomcs
morc dicult, sincc scrious inconvcnicnccs may rcsult il cvcn onc ol thcsc
important vallcys bc not obscrvcd.
Nothing can bcttcr dcmonstratc thc diculty ol stratcgic dclcnsc in
mountainous rcgions than thc pcrplcxity in which wc arc involvcd whcn wc
attcmpt simply to givc advicc in such cascs,to say nothing ol laying down
maxims lor thcm. !l it wcrc but a qucstion ol thc dclcnsc ol a singlc dcnitc
lront ol small cxtcnt, consisting ol lour or vc convcrging vallcys, thc common
junction ol which is at a distancc ol two or thrcc short marchcs lrom thc
summits ol thc rangcs, it would bc casicr ol solution. !t would thcn bc sucicnt
to rccommcnd thc construction ol a good lort at thc narrowcst and lcastcasily
turncd point ol cach ol thcsc vallcys. Protcctcd by thcsc lorts, a lcw brigadcs
ol inlantry should bc stationcd to disputc thc passagc, whilc hall thc army
should bc hcld in rcscrvc at thc junction, whcrc it would bc in position cithcr
to sustain thc advanccd guards most scriously thrcatcncd, or to lall upon thc
assailant with thc wholc lorcc whcn hc dcbouchcs. !l to this bc addcd good
instructions to thc commandcrs ol thc advanccd guards, whcthcr in assigning
thcm thc bcst point lor rcndczvous whcn thcir linc ol lorts is picrccd, or in
dirccting thcm to continuc to act in thc mountains upon thc ank ol thc
cncmy, thc gcncral on thc dclcnsivc may rcgard himscll as invinciblc, thanks
to thc many dicultics which thc country ocrs to thc assailant. 8ut, il thcrc
bc othcr lronts likc this upon thc right and lclt, all ol which arc to bc dclcndcd,
thc problcm is changcd: thc dicultics ol thc dclcnsc incrcasc with thc cxtcnt
ol thc lronts, and this systcm ol a cordon ol lorts bccomcs dangcrous,whilc
it is not casy to adopt a bcttcr onc.
Vc cannot bc bcttcr convinccd ol thcsc truths than by thc considcration
ol thc position ol Masscna in Switzcrland in .,. Altcr Jourdans dclcat at
Stockach, hc occupicd thc linc lrom 8ascl by Schahauscn and Rhcincck
to SaintGothard, and thcncc by La Furca to Mont8lanc. Hc had cncmics
in lront ol 8ascl, at Valdshut, at Schahauscn, at Fcldkirch, and at Chur,
8cllcgardc thrcatcncd thc SaintGothard, and thc !talian army mcnaccd thc
Simplon and thc Saint8crnard. How was hc to dclcnd such a circumlcrcncc:
and how could hc lcavc opcn onc ol thcsc grcat vallcys, thus risking cvcry
thing: From Rhcinlcldcn to thc Jura, toward Solcurc, it was but two short
marchcs, and thcrc was thc mouth ol thc trap in which thc Frcnch army
was placcd. Tis was, thcn, thc pivot ol thc dclcnsc. 8ut how could hc lcavc
Schahauscn unprotcctcd: how abandon Rhcincck and thc SaintGothard:
.ac
how opcn thc \alais and thc approach by 8crnc, without surrcndcring thc
wholc ol Switzcrland to thc Coalition: And il hc covcrcd cach point cvcn by
a brigadc, whcrc would bc his army whcn hc would nccd it to givc battlc to an
approaching lorcc: !t is a natural systcm on a lcvcl thcatcr to conccntratc thc
masscs ol an army, but in thc mountains such a coursc would surrcndcr thc
kcys ol thc country, and, bcsidcs, it is not casy to say whcrc an inlcrior army
could bc conccntratcd without compromising it.
Altcr thc lorccd cvacuation ol thc linc ol thc Rhinc and Zurich, it sccmcd
that thc only stratcgic point lor Masscna to dclcnd was thc linc ol thc Jura.
Hc was rash cnough to stand upon thc Albis,a linc shortcr than that ol thc
Rhinc, it is truc, but cxposcd lor an immcnsc distancc to thc attacks ol thc
Austrians. !l 8cllcgardc, instcad ol going into Lombardy by thc \altcllina, had
marchcd to 8crnc or madc a junction with thc archdukc, Masscna would havc
bccn ruincd. Tcsc cvcnts sccm to provc that il a country covcrcd with high
mountains bc lavorablc lor dclcnsc in a tactical point ol vicw, it is dicrcnt
in a stratcgic scnsc, bccausc it ncccssitatcs a division ol thc troops. Tis can
only bc rcmcdicd by giving thcm grcatcr mobility and by passing oltcn to thc
ocnsivc.
Gcncral Clauscwitz, whosc logic is lrcqucntly dclcctivc, maintains, on thc
contrary, that, movcmcnts bcing thc most dicult part in this kind ol war, thc
dclcnsivc party should avoid thcm, sincc by such a coursc hc might losc thc
advantagcs ol thc local dclcnscs. Hc, howcvcr, cnds by dcmonstrating that a
passivc dclcnsc must yicld undcr an activc attack,which gocs to show that
thc initiativc is no lcss lavorablc in mountains than in plains. !l thcrc could
bc any doubt on this point, it ought to bc dispcllcd by Masscnas campaign in
Switzcrland, whcrc hc sustaincd himscll only by attacking thc cncmy at cvcry
opportunity, cvcn whcn hc was obligcd to scck him on thc Grimscl and thc
SaintGothard. Napolcons coursc was similar in .,6 in thc Tyrol, whcn hc
was opposcd to Vurmscr and Alvinzi.
As lor dctailcd stratcgic mancuvcrs, thcy may bc comprchcndcd by rcading
thc cvcnts ol Suwaros cxpcdition by thc SaintGothard upon thc Muttcnthal.
Vhilc wc must approvc his mancuvcrs in cndcavoring to capturc Lccourbc in
thc vallcy ol thc Rcuss, wc must also admirc thc prcscncc ol mind, activity,
and unyiclding rmncss which savcd that gcncral and his division. Altcrward,
in thc Schachcnthal and thc Muttcnthal, Suwaro was placcd in thc samc
position as Lccourbc had bccn, and cxtricatcd himscll with cqual ability. Not
lcss cxtraordinary was thc tcn days campaign ol Gcncral Molitor, who with
lour thousand mcn was surroundcd in thc canton ol Glaris by morc than thirty
thousand allics, and yct succccdcd in maintaining himscll bchind thc Linth
altcr lour admirablc ghts. Tcsc cvcnts tcach us thc vanity ol all thcory in
details, and also that in such a country a strong and hcroic will is worth morc
than all thc prcccpts in thc world. Altcr such lcssons, nccd ! say that onc ol
thc principal rulcs ol this kind ol war is, not to risk oncs scll in thc vallcys
without sccuring thc hcights: Shall ! say also that in this kind ol war, morc
.a.
than in any othcr, opcrations should bc dircctcd upon thc communications ol
thc cncmy: And, nally, that good tcmporary bascs or lincs ol dclcnsc at thc
conucncc ol thc grcat vallcys, covcrcd by stratcgic rcscrvcs, combincd with
grcat mobility and lrcqucnt ocnsivc movcmcnts, will bc thc bcst mcans ol
dclcnding thc country:
! cannot tcrminatc this articlc without rcmarking that mountainous
countrics arc particularly lavorablc lor dclcnsc whcn thc war is a national onc,
in which thc wholc pcoplc risc up to dclcnd thcir homcs with thc obstinacy
which cnthusiasm lor a holy causc imparts: cvcry advancc is thcn dcarly bought.
8ut to bc succcsslul it is always ncccssary that thc pcoplc bc sustaincd by a
disciplincd lorcc, morc or lcss numcrous: without this thcy must nally yicld,
likc thc hcrocs ol Stanz and ol thc Tyrol.
Tc ocnsivc against a mountainous country also prcscnts a doublc casc: it
may cithcr bc dircctcd upon a bclt ol mountains bcyond which arc cxtcnsivc
plains, or thc wholc thcatcr may bc mountainous.
!n thc rst casc thcrc is littlc morc to bc donc than this,viz.: makc
dcmonstrations upon thc wholc linc ol thc lronticr, in ordcr to lcad thc cncmy
to cxtcnd his dclcnsc, and thcn lorcc a passagc at thc point which promiscs thc
grcatcst rcsults. Tc problcm in such a casc is to brcak through a cordon which
is strong lcss on account ol thc numbcrs ol thc dclcndcrs than lrom thcir
position, and il brokcn at onc point thc wholc linc is lorccd. Tc history ol
8ard in .cc, and thc capturc ol Lcutasch and Scharnitz in .c by Ncy, (who
thrcw lourtccn thousand mcn on !nnspruck in thc midst ol thirty thousand
Austrians, and by scizing this ccntral point compcllcd thcm to rctrcat in all
dircctions,) show that with bravc inlantry and bold commandcrs thcsc lamous
mountainrangcs can gcncrally bc lorccd.
Tc history ol thc passagc ol thc Alps, whcrc Francis !. turncd thc army
which was awaiting him at Suza by passing thc stccp mountains bctwccn
MontCcnis and thc vallcy ol Qucyras, is an cxamplc ol thosc insurmountable
obstaclcs which can always bc surmountcd. To opposc him it would havc bccn
ncccssary to adopt a systcm ol cordon, and wc havc alrcady sccn what is to
bc cxpcctcd ol it. Tc position ol thc Swiss and !talians at Suza was cvcn lcss
wisc than thc cordonsystcm, bccausc it incloscd thcm in a contractcd vallcy
without protccting thc latcral issucs. Tcir stratcgic plan ought to havc bccn
to throw troops into thcsc vallcys to dclcnd thc dclcs, and to post thc bulk ol
thc army toward Turin or Carignano.
Vhcn wc considcr thc tactical dicultics ol this kind ol war, and thc
immcnsc advantagcs it aords thc dclcnsc, wc may bc inclincd to rcgard
thc conccntration ol a considcrablc lorcc to pcnctratc by a singlc vallcy as
an cxtrcmcly rash mancuvcr, and to think that it ought to bc dividcd into as
many columns as thcrc arc practicablc passcs. !n my opinion, this is onc ol thc
most dangcrous ol all illusions, and to conrm what ! say it is only ncccssary
to rclcr to thc latc ol thc columns ol Championnct at thc battlc ol Fossano.
!l thcrc bc vc or six roads on thc mcnaccd lront, thcy should all, ol coursc,
.aa
bc thrcatcncd, but thc army should cross thc chain in not morc than two
masscs, and thc routcs which thcsc lollow should not bc divcrgcnt, lor il thcy
wcrc, thc cncmy might bc ablc to dclcat thcm scparatcly. Napolcons passagc
ol thc Saint8crnard was wiscly planncd. Hc lormcd thc bulk ol his army on
thc ccntcr, with a division on cach ank by MontCcnis and thc Simplon, to
dividc thc attcntion ol thc cncmy and ank his march.
Tc invasion ol a country cntircly covcrcd with mountains is a much grcatcr
and morc dicult task than whcrc a dcnoucmcnt may bc accomplishcd by a
dccisivc battlc in thc opcn country, lor clds ol battlc lor thc dcploymcnt ol
largc masscs arc rarc in a mountainous rcgion, and thc war bccomcs a succcssion
ol partial combats. Hcrc it would bc imprudcnt, pcrhaps, to pcnctratc on a
singlc point by a narrow and dccp vallcy, whosc outlcts might bc closcd by
thc cncmy and thus thc invading army bc cndangcrcd: it might pcnctratc by
thc wings on two or thrcc latcral lincs, whosc outlcts should not bc too widcly
scparatcd, thc marchcs bcing so arrangcd that thc masscs may dcbouch at thc
junction ol thc vallcys at ncarly thc samc instant. Tc cncmy should bc drivcn
lrom all thc ridgcs which scparatc thcsc vallcys.
l all mountainous countrics, thc tactical dclcnsc ol Switzcrland would bc
thc casicst, il all hcr inhabitants wcrc unitcd in spirit, and with thcir assistancc
a disciplincd lorcc might hold its own against a triplc numbcr.
To givc spccic prcccpts lor complications which vary innitcly with
localitics, thc rcsourccs and thc condition ol thc pcoplc and armics, would bc
absurd. History, wcll studicd and undcrstood, is thc bcst school lor this kind
ol warlarc. Tc account ol thc campaign ol ., by thc Archdukc Charlcs,
that ol thc campaigns which ! havc givcn in my History ol thc Vars ol
thc Rcvolution, thc narrativc ol thc campaign ol thc Grisons by Scgur and
Mathicu umas, that ol Catalonia by SaintCyr and Suchct, thc campaign
ol thc ukc dc Rohan in \altcllina, and thc passagc ol thc Alps by Gaillard,
(Francis !.,) arc good guidcs in this study.
ARTICLE XXIX
Grand Invasions and Distant Expeditions
Tcrc arc scvcral kinds ol distant cxpcditions. Tc rst arc thosc which arc
mcrcly auxiliary and bclong to wars ol intcrvcntion. Tc sccond arc grcat
contincntal invasions, through cxtcnsivc tracts ol country, which may bc
cithcr lricndly, ncutral, doubtlul, or hostilc. Tc third arc ol thc samc naturc,
but madc partly on land, partly by sca by mcans ol numcrous ccts. Tc lourth
class compriscs thosc bcyond thc scas, to lound, dclcnd, or attack distant
colonics. Tc lth includcs thc grcat dcsccnts, whcrc thc distancc passcd ovcr
is not vcry grcat, but whcrc a powcrlul statc is attackcd.
.a
As to thc rst, in a stratcgic point ol vicw, a Russian army on thc Rhinc or
in !taly, in alliancc with thc Gcrman Statcs, would ccrtainly bc strongcr and
morc lavorably situatcd than il it had rcachcd cithcr ol thcsc points by passing
ovcr hostilc or cvcn ncutral tcrritory, lor its basc, lincs ol opcrations, and
cvcntual points ol support will bc thc samc as thosc ol its allics, it may nd
rclugc bchind thcir lincs ol dclcnsc, provisions in thcir dcpots, and munitions
in thcir arscnals,whilc in thc othcr casc its rcsourccs would bc upon thc
\istula or thc Nicmcn, and it might aord anothcr cxamplc ol thc sad latc ol
many ol thcsc grcat invasions.
!n spitc ol thc important dicrcncc bctwccn a war in which a statc is mcrcly
an auxiliary, and a distant invasion undcrtakcn lor its own intcrcst and with
its own rcsourccs, thcrc arc, ncvcrthclcss, dangcrs in thc way ol thcsc auxiliary
armics, and pcrplcxity lor thc commandcr ol all thc armics,particularly il hc
bclong to thc statc which is not a principal party, as may bc lcarncd lrom thc
campaign ol .c. Gcncral Koutouso advanccd on thc !nn to thc boundarics ol
8avaria with thirty thousand Russians, to ccct a junction with Mack, whosc
army in thc mcan timc had bccn dcstroycd, with thc cxccption ol cightccn
thousand mcn brought back lrom onauwcrth by Kicnmaycr. Tc Russian
gcncral thus lound himscll with lty thousand mcn cxposcd to thc impctuous
activity ol Napolcon with onc hundrcd and lty thousand, and, to complctc
his mislortunc, hc was scparatcd lrom his own lronticrs by a distancc ol about
scvcn hundrcd and lty milcs. His position would havc bccn hopclcss il lty
thousand mcn had not arrivcd to rcinlorcc him. Tc battlc ol Austcrlitzduc
to a lault ol Vcyrothcrcndangcrcd thc Russian army ancw, sincc it was so
lar lrom its basc. !t almost bccamc thc victim ol a distant alliancc, and it was
only pcacc that gavc it thc opportunity ol rcgaining its own country.
Tc latc ol Suwaro altcr thc victory ol Novi, cspccially in thc cxpcdition to
Switzcrland, and that ol Hcrmanns corps at 8crgcn in Holland, arc cxamplcs
which should bc wcll studicd by cvcry commandcr undcr such circumstanccs.
Gcncral 8cnningscns position in .c, was lcss disadvantagcous, bccausc,
bcing bctwccn thc \istula and thc Nicmcn, his communications with his basc
wcrc prcscrvcd and his opcrations wcrc in no rcspcct dcpcndcnt upon his allics.
Vc may also rclcr to thc latc ol thc Frcnch in 8ohcmia and 8avaria in .,a,
whcn Frcdcrick thc Grcat abandoncd thcm and madc a scparatc pcacc. !n this
casc thc partics wcrc allics rathcr than auxiliarics, but in thc lattcr rclation thc
political tics arc ncvcr wovcn so closcly as to rcmovc all points ol disscnsion
which may compromisc military opcrations. xamplcs ol this kind havc bccn
citcd in Articlc X!X., on political objcctivc points.
History alonc lurnishcs us instruction in rclcrcncc to distant invasions across
cxtcnsivc tcrritorics. Vhcn hall ol uropc was covcrcd with lorcsts, pasturagcs,
and ocks, and whcn only horscs and iron wcrc ncccssary to transplant wholc
nations lrom onc cnd ol thc contincnt to thc othcr, thc Goths, Huns, \andals,
Normans, Arabs, and Tartars ovcrran cmpircs in succcssion. 8ut sincc thc
invcntion ol powdcr and artillcry and thc organization ol lormidablc standing
.a
armics, and particularly sincc civilization and statcsmanship havc brought
nations closcr togcthcr and havc taught thcm thc ncccssity ol rcciprocally
sustaining cach othcr, no such cvcnts havc takcn placc.
8csidcs thcsc migrations ol nations, thcrc wcrc othcr cxpcditions in thc
Middlc Agcs, which wcrc ol a morc military charactcr, as thosc ol Charlcmagnc
and othcrs. Sincc thc invcntion ol powdcr thcrc havc bccn scarccly any, cxccpt
thc advancc ol Charlcs \!!!. to Naplcs, and ol Charlcs X!!. into thc Ukrainc,
which can bc callcd distant invasions, lor thc campaigns ol thc Spaniards
in Flandcrs and ol thc Swcdcs in Gcrmany wcrc ol a particular kind. Tc
rst was a civil war, and thc Swcdcs wcrc only auxiliarics to thc Protcstants
ol Gcrmany, and, bcsidcs, thc lorccs conccrncd in both wcrc not largc. !n
modcrn timcs no onc but Napolcon has darcd to transport thc armics ol hall
ol uropc lrom thc Rhinc to thc \olga, and thcrc is littlc dangcr that hc will
bc imitatcd.
Apart lrom thc modications which rcsult lrom grcat distanccs, all invasions,
altcr thc armics arrivc upon thc actual thcatcr, prcscnt thc samc opcrations as
all othcr wars. As thc chicl diculty ariscs lrom thcsc grcat distanccs, wc
should rccall our maxims on dccp lincs ol opcrations, stratcgic rcscrvcs, and
cvcntual bascs, as thc only oncs applicablc, and hcrc it is that thcir application
is indispcnsablc, although cvcn that will not avcrt all dangcr. Tc campaign
ol ..a, although so ruinous to Napolcon, was a modcl lor a distant invasion.
His carc in lcaving Princc Schwarzcnbcrg and Rcynicr on thc 8ug, whilc
Macdonald, udinot, and Vrcdc guardcd thc wina, \ictor covcrcd
Smolcnsk, and Augcrcau was bctwccn thc dcr and \istula, provcs that hc
had ncglcctcd no humanly possiblc prccaution in ordcr to basc himscll salcly,
but it also provcs that thc grcatcst cntcrpriscs may lail simply on account ol thc
magnitudc ol thc prcparations lor thcir succcss.
!l Napolcon crrcd in this contcst, it was in ncglccting diplomatic prccautions,
in not uniting undcr onc commandcr thc dicrcnt bodics ol troops on thc
wina and nicpcr, in rcmaining tcn days too long at Vilna, in giving thc
command ol his right to his brothcr, who was uncqual to it, and in conding
to Princc Schwarzcnbcrg a duty which that gcncral could not pcrlorm with
thc dcvotcdncss ol a Frcnchman. ! do not spcak now ol his crror in rcmaining
in Moscow altcr thc conagration, sincc thcn thcrc was no rcmcdy lor thc
mislortunc, although it would not havc bccn so grcat il thc rctrcat had takcn
placc immcdiatcly. Hc has also bccn accuscd ol having too much dcspiscd
distanccs, dicultics, and mcn, in pushing on as lar as thc Krcmlin. 8clorc
passing judgmcnt upon him in this mattcr, howcvcr, wc ought to know thc
rcal motivcs which induccd him to pass Smolcnsk, instcad ol wintcring thcrc
as hc had intcndcd, and whcthcr it would havc bccn possiblc lor him to rcmain
bctwccn that city and \itcbsk without having prcviously dclcatcd thc Russian
army.
!t is doubtlcss truc that Napolcon ncglcctcd too much thc rcscntmcnt ol
Austria, Prussia, and Swcdcn, and countcd too surcly upon a denouement
.a
bctwccn Vilna and thc wina. Although hc lully apprcciatcd thc bravcry
ol thc Russian armics, hc did not rcalizc thc spirit and cncrgy ol thc pcoplc.
Finally, and chicy, instcad ol procuring thc hcarty and sinccrc concurrcncc
ol a military statc, whosc tcrritorics would havc givcn him a surc basc lor his
attack upon thc colossal powcr ol Russia, hc loundcd his cntcrprisc upon thc
coopcration ol a bravc and cnthusiastic but cklc pcoplc, and bcsidcs, hc
ncglcctcd to turn to thc grcatcst advantagc this cphcmcral cnthusiasm.
Tc latc ol all such cntcrpriscs makcs it cvidcnt that thc capital point lor
thcir succcss, and, in lact, thc only maxim to bc givcn, is ncvcr to attcmpt
thcm without having sccurcd thc hcarty and constant alliancc ol a rcspcctablc
powcr ncar cnough thc cld ol opcrations to aord a propcr basc, whcrc
supplics ol cvcry kind may bc accumulatcd, and which may also in casc ol
rcvcrsc scrvc as a rclugc and aord ncw mcans ol rcsuming thc ocnsivc. As
to thc prccautions to bc obscrvcd in thcsc opcrations, thc rcadcr is rclcrrcd
to Articlcs XX!. and XX!!., on thc salcty ol dccp lincs ol opcrations and thc
cstablishmcnt ol cvcntual bascs, as giving all thc military mcans ol lcsscning
thc dangcr, to thcsc should bc addcd a just apprcciation ol distanccs, obstaclcs,
scasons, and countrics,in short, accuracy in calculation and modcration in
succcss, in ordcr that thc cntcrprisc may not bc carricd too lar. Vc arc lar lrom
thinking that any purcly military maxims can insurc thc succcss ol rcmotc
invasions: in lour thousand ycars only vc or six havc bccn succcsslul, and in a
hundrcd instanccs thcy havc ncarly ruincd nations and armics.
xpcditions ol thc third class, partly on land, partly by sca, havc bccn
rarc sincc thc invcntion ol artillcry, thc Crusadcs bcing thc last in datc ol
occurrcncc, and probably thc causc is that thc control ol thc sca, altcr having
bccn hcld in succcssion by scvcral sccondary powcrs, has passcd into thc
hands ol ngland, an insular powcr, rich in ships, but without thc landlorccs
ncccssary lor such cxpcditions.
!t is cvidcnt that lrom both ol thcsc causcs thc condition ol things now
is vcry dicrcnt lrom that cxisting whcn Xcrxcs marchcd to thc conqucst
ol Grcccc, lollowcd by lour thousand vcsscls ol all dimcnsions, or whcn
Alcxandcr marchcd lrom Maccdonia ovcr Asia Minor to Tyrc, whilc his cct
coastcd thc shorc.
Ncvcrthclcss, il wc no longcr scc such invasions, it is vcry truc that thc
assistancc ol a cct ol mcnolwar and transports will always bc ol immcnsc
valuc to any army on shorc whcn thc two can act in conccrt. Still, sailingships
arc an unccrtain rcsourcc, lor thcir progrcss dcpcnds upon thc winds,which
may bc unlavorablc: in addition, any kind ol cct is cxposcd to grcat dangcrs
in storms, which arc not ol rarc occurrcncc.
Tc morc or lcss hostilc tonc ol thc pcoplc, thc lcngth ol thc linc ol opcrations,
and thc grcat distancc ol thc principal objcctivc point, arc thc only points
which rcquirc any dcviation lrom thc ordinary opcrations ol war.
!nvasions ol ncighboring statcs, il lcss dangcrous than distant oncs, arc still
not without grcat dangcr ol lailurc. A Frcnch army attacking Cadiz might
.a6
nd a tomb on thc Guadalquivir, although wcll bascd upon thc Pyrcnccs and
posscssing intcrmcdiatc bascs upon thc bro and thc Tagus. Likcwisc, thc
army which in .c bcsicgcd Komorn in thc hcart ol Hungary might havc
bccn dcstroycd on thc plains ol Vagram without going as lar as thc 8crcsina.
Tc antcccdcnts, thc numbcr ol disposablc troops, thc succcsscs alrcady gaincd,
thc statc ol thc country, will all bc clcmcnts in dctcrmining thc cxtcnt ol thc
cntcrpriscs to bc undcrtakcn, and to bc ablc to proportion thcm wcll to his
rcsourccs, in vicw ol thc attcndant circumstanccs, is a grcat talcnt in a gcncral.
Although diplomacy docs not play so important a part in thcsc invasions as in
thosc morc distant, it is still ol importancc, sincc, as statcd in Articlc \!., thcrc
is no cncmy, howcvcr insignicant, whom it would not bc usclul to convcrt
into an ally. Tc inucncc which thc changc ol policy ol thc ukc ol Savoy in
.,c6 cxcrciscd ovcr thc cvcnts ol that day, and thc cccts ol thc stand takcn by
Mauricc ol Saxony in .., and ol 8avaria in .., provc clcarly thc importancc
ol sccuring thc strict ncutrality ol all statcs adjoining thc thcatcr ol war, whcn
thcir coopcration cannot bc obtaincd.
P!TM F STRATGY
Tc task which ! undcrtook sccms to mc to havc bccn passably lulllcd by
what has bccn statcd in rclcrcncc to thc stratcgic combinations which cntcr
ordinarily into a plan ol campaign. Vc havc sccn, lrom thc dcnition at thc
bcginning ol this chaptcr, that, in thc most important opcrations in war,
strategy xcs thc dircction ol movcmcnts, and that wc dcpcnd upon tactics lor
thcir cxccution. Tcrclorc, bclorc trcating ol thcsc mixcd opcrations, it will bc
wcll to givc hcrc thc combinations ol grand tactics and ol battlcs, as wcll as
thc maxims by thc aid ol which thc application ol thc lundamcntal principlc
ol war may bc madc.
8y this mcthod thcsc opcrations, hall stratcgic and hall tactical, will bc
bcttcr comprchcndcd as a wholc, but, in thc rst placc, ! will givc a synopsis
ol thc contcnts ol thc prcccding chaptcr.
From thc dicrcnt articlcs which composc it, wc may concludc that thc
manncr ol applying thc gcncral principlc ol war to all possiblc thcatcrs ol
opcrations is lound in what lollows:
.. !n knowing how to makc thc bcst usc ol thc advantagcs which thc
rcciprocal dircctions ol thc two bascs ol opcrations may aord, in
accordancc with Articlc X\!!!.
a. !n choosing, lrom thc thrcc zoncs ordinarily lound in thc stratcgic
cld, that onc upon which thc grcatcst injury can bc donc to thc cncmy
with thc lcast risk to oncs scll.
.a,
. !n cstablishing wcll, and giving a good dircction to, thc lincs ol
opcrations, adopting lor dclcnsc thc conccntric systcm ol thc Archdukc
Charlcs in .,6 and ol Napolcon in .., or that ol Soult in .., lor
rctrcats parallcl to thc lronticrs.
n thc ocnsivc wc should lollow thc systcm which lcd to thc succcss
ol Napolcon in .cc, .c, and .c6, whcn hc dircctcd his linc upon
thc cxtrcmity ol thc stratcgic lront, or wc might adopt his plan which
was succcsslul in .,6, .c, and .., ol dirccting thc linc ol opcrations
upon thc ccntcr ol thc stratcgic lront: all ol which is to bc dctcrmincd
by thc rcspcctivc positions ol thc armics, and according to thc maxims
prcscntcd in Articlc XX!.
. !n sclccting judicious cvcntual lincs ol mancuvcr, by giving thcm
such dircctions as always to bc ablc to act with thc grcatcr mass ol thc
lorccs, and to prcvcnt thc parts ol thc cncmy lrom conccntrating or lrom
aording cach othcr mutual support.
. !n combining, in thc samc spirit ol ccntralization, all stratcgic positions,
and all largc dctachmcnts madc to covcr thc most important stratcgic
points ol thc thcatcr ol war.
6. !n imparting to thc troops thc grcatcst possiblc mobility and activity,
so as, by thcir succcssivc cmploymcnt upon points whcrc it may bc
important to act, to bring supcrior lorcc to bcar upon lractions ol thc
hostilc army.
Tc systcm ol rapid and continuous marchcs multiplics thc ccct ol an army,
and at thc samc timc ncutralizcs a grcat part ol that ol thc cncmys, and is oltcn
sucicnt to insurc succcss, but its ccct will bc quintuplcd il thc marchcs bc
skilllully dircctcd upon thc dccisivc stratcgic points ol thc zonc ol opcrations,
whcrc thc scvcrcst blows to thc cncmy can bc givcn.
Howcvcr, as a gcncral may not always bc prcparcd to adopt this dccisivc
coursc to thc cxclusion ol cvcry othcr, hc must thcn bc contcnt with attaining
a part ol thc objcct ol cvcry cntcrprisc, by rapid and succcssivc cmploymcnt
ol his lorccs upon isolatcd bodics ol thc cncmy, thus insuring thcir dclcat. A
gcncral who movcs his masscs rapidly and continually, and givcs thcm propcr
dircctions, may bc condcnt both ol gaining victorics and ol sccuring grcat
rcsults thcrclrom.
Tc oltcitcd opcrations ol .c and .. provc thcsc truths most satislactorily,
as also docs that ordcrcd by Carnot in .,, alrcady mcntioncd in Articlc
XX!\., and thc dctails ol which may bc lound in \olumc !\. ol my History
ol thc Vars ol thc Rcvolution. Forty battalions, carricd succcssivcly lrom
unkirk to Mcnin, Maubcugc, and Landau, by rcinlorcing thc armics alrcady
at thosc points, gaincd lour victorics and savcd Francc. Tc wholc scicncc ol
marchcs would havc bccn lound in this wisc opcration had it bccn dircctcd
upon thc dccisivc stratcgic point. Tc Austrian was thcn thc principal army
ol thc Coalition, and its linc ol rctrcat was upon Colognc: hcncc it was upon
.a
thc Mcusc that a gcncral cort ol thc Frcnch would havc inictcd thc most
scvcrc blow. Tc Committcc ol Public Salcty providcd lor thc most prcssing
dangcr, and thc mancuvcr contains hall ol thc stratcgic principlc, thc othcr
hall consists in giving to such corts thc most dccisivc dircction, as Napolcon
did at Ulm, at Jcna, and at Ratisbon. Tc wholc ol stratcgy is containcd in
thcsc lour cxamplcs.
!t is supcruous to add that onc ol thc grcat cnds ol stratcgy is to bc ablc
to assurc rcal advantagcs to thc army by prcparing thc thcatcr ol war most
lavorablc lor its opcrations, il thcy takc placc in its own country, by thc location
ol lorticd placcs, ol intrcnchcd camps, and ol tetes de ponts, and by thc
opcning ol communications in thc grcat dccisivc dircctions: thcsc constitutc
not thc lcast intcrcsting part ol thc scicncc. Vc havc alrcady sccn how wc
arc to rccognizc thcsc lincs and thcsc dccisivc points, whcthcr pcrmancnt or
tcmporary. Napolcon has aordcd instruction on this point by thc roads ol thc
Simplon and MontCcnis, and Austria sincc .. has protcd by it in thc roads
lrom thc Tyrol to Lombardy, thc SaintGothard, and thc Splugcn, as wcll as
by dicrcnt lorticd placcs projcctcd or complctcd.
.a
Commentary on Chapter III
C
haptcr is thc hcart ol Tc Summary ol thc Art ol Var and thc longcst
chaptcr in thc book. Tis chaptcr is what cstablishcd Jominis rcputation
and what has rcccivcd thc most criticism. !n thc introduction to this chaptcr,
Jomini providcs what hc rcgards as thc lundamcntal principlcs involvcd in
winning wars, rcpcatcd hcrc:
TH FUNAMNTAL PR!NC!PLS F VAR.
!t is proposcd to show that thcrc is onc grcat principlc undcrlying all thc
opcrations ol wara principlc which must bc lollowcd in all good combinations.
!t is cmbraccd in thc lollowing maxims:
.. To throw by stratcgic movcmcnts thc mass ol an army, succcssivcly, upon
thc dccisivc points ol a thcatcr ol war, and also upon thc communications
ol thc cncmy as much as possiblc without compromising oncs own.
a. To mancuvcr to cngagc lractions ol thc hostilc army with thc bulk ol
oncs lorccs.
. n thc battlccld, to throw thc mass ol thc lorccs upon thc dccisivc
point, or upon that portion ol thc hostilc linc which it is ol thc rst
importancc to ovcrthrow.
. To so arrangc that thcsc masscs shall not only bc thrown upon thc
dccisivc point, but that thcy shall cngagc at thc propcr timcs and with cncrgy
(citc sourcc).
Jomini thcn statcs that thc rcst ol thc chaptcr will rcvcal thc propcr
combinations ncccssary to apply thcsc principlcs. Most criticism ol Jomini
stcms lrom a bclicl that hc claims that a mcchanical application ol thc
.c
mancuvcrs in this chaptcr will automatically lcad to victory. To bc lair to his
critics, much ol Jominis rhctoric lcnds itscll to this intcrprctation. !n addition,
critics havc attackcd thc pcdantic way in which Jomini dcncs thc various
stratcgic lincs and points as wcll as bascs and objcctivcs in this chaptcr. Tc
amount ol timc givcn to thcsc mattcrs in this scction ol thc book has lcd
to thc accusation that Jomini was obscsscd with gcographical objcctivcs and
gcomctric movcmcnts, ignoring thc uidity inhcrcnt in a campaign against
cvcn a modcratcly activc loc. Tcrc is somc justicc in thcsc criticisms as wcll.
Jominis pcrlcct campaign would look likc Ulm, whcrc Napolcon dcstroycd
Mack by mancuvcr alonca lcat rarcly achicvcd by cvcn thc grcatcst lcadcrs.
A carclul rcading ol Chaptcr , howcvcr, rcvcals that Jominis pcnchant lor
mancuvcr had thc goal ol gaining a concrctc advantagc ovcr thc cncmy in
battlc, as thc lundamcntal principlcs listcd abovc dcmonstratc. Tis cmphasis
is rcinlorccd in thc postscript to this chaptcr, cntitlcd pitomc ol Stratcgy,
in which Jomini givcs propcr cmphasis to thc virtucs ol spccd and dccisivcncss
in ocnsivc mancuvcrs, dcmonstrating that dcspitc his gcomctrical diagrams,
Jomini was not cntircly an .th ccntury lormalist.
..
CHAPTER IV
GRAND TACTICS AND BATTLES
B
attlcs arc thc actual conicts ol armics contcnding about grcat qucstions
ol national policy and ol stratcgy. Stratcgy dirccts armics to thc dccisivc
points ol a zonc ol opcrations, and inucnccs, in advancc, thc rcsults ol battlcs,
but tactics, aidcd by couragc, by gcnius and lortunc, gains victorics.
Grand tactics is thc art ol making good combinations prcliminary to battlcs,
as wcll as during thcir progrcss. Tc guiding principlc in tactical combinations,
as in thosc ol stratcgy, is to bring thc mass ol thc lorcc in hand against a part
ol thc opposing army, and upon that point thc posscssion ol which promiscs
thc most important rcsults.
8attlcs havc bccn statcd by somc writcrs to bc thc chicl and dcciding lcaturcs
ol war. Tis asscrtion is not strictly truc, as armics havc bccn dcstroycd by
stratcgic opcrations without thc occurrcncc ol pitchcd battlcs, by a succcssion
ol inconsidcrablc aairs. !t is also truc that a complctc and dccidcd victory
may givc risc to rcsults ol thc samc charactcr whcn thcrc may havc bccn no
grand stratcgic combinations.
Tc rcsults ol a battlc gcncrally dcpcnd upon a union ol causcs which arc not
always within thc scopc ol thc military art: thc naturc ol thc ordcr ol battlc
adoptcd, thc grcatcr or lcss wisdom displaycd in thc plan ol thc battlc, as wcll
as thc manncr ol carrying out its dctails, thc morc or lcss loyal and cnlightcncd
coopcration ol thc occrs subordinatc to thc commandcrinchicl, thc causc
ol thc contcst, thc proportions and quality ol thc troops, thcir grcatcr or lcss
cnthusiasm, supcriority on thc onc sidc or thc othcr in artillcry or cavalry,
and thc manncr ol handling thcsc arms, but it is thc morale ol armics, as
wcll as ol nations, morc than any thing clsc, which makcs victorics and thcir
rcsults dccisivc. Clauscwitz commits a gravc crror in asscrting that a battlc not
charactcrizcd by a mancuvcr to turn thc cncmy cannot rcsult in a complctc
victory. At thc battlc ol Zama, Hannibal, in a lcw bricl hours, saw thc lruits
ol twcnty ycars ol glory and succcss vanish bclorc his cycs, although Scipio
ncvcr had a thought ol turning his position. At Rivoli thc turningparty
.a
was complctcly bcatcn, nor was thc mancuvcr morc succcsslul at Stockach
in .,, or at Austcrlitz in .c. As is cvidcnt lrom Articlc XXX!!., ! by no
mcans intcnd to discouragc thc usc ol that mancuvcr, bcing, on thc contrary, a
constant advocatc ol it, but it is vcry important to know how to usc it skilllully
and opportuncly, and ! am, morcovcr, ol opinion that il it bc a gcncrals dcsign
to makc himscll mastcr ol his cncmys communications whilc at thc samc
timc holding his own, hc would do bcttcr to cmploy stratcgic than tactical
combinations to accomplish it.
Tcrc arc thrcc kinds ol battlcs: .st, dclcnsivc battlcs, or thosc lought
by armics in lavorablc positions takcn up to await thc cncmys attack, ad,
ocnsivc battlcs, whcrc onc army attacks anothcr in position, d, battlcs
lought uncxpcctcdly, and rcsulting lrom thc collision ol two armics mccting
on thc march. Vc will cxaminc in succcssion thc dicrcnt combinations thcy
prcscnt.
ARTICLE XXX
Positions and Defensive Battles
Vhcn an army awaits an attack, it takcs up a position and lorms its linc ol battlc.
From thc gcncral dcnitions givcn at thc bcginning ol this work, it will appcar
that ! makc a distinction bctwccn lines of battle and orders of battle,things
which havc bccn constantly conloundcd. ! will dcsignatc as a line of battle thc
position occupicd by battalions, cithcr dcploycd or in columns ol attack, which
an army will takc up to hold a camp and a ccrtain portion ol ground whcrc it
will await attack, having no particular projcct in vicw lor thc luturc: it is thc
right namc to givc to a body ol troops lormcd with propcr tactical intcrvals and
distanccs upon onc or morc lincs, as will bc morc lully cxplaincd in Articlc
XL!!!. n thc contrary, ! will dcsignatc as an order of battle an arrangcmcnt ol
troops indicating an intcntion to cxccutc a ccrtain mancuvcr, as, lor cxamplc,
thc parallcl ordcr, thc obliquc ordcr, thc pcrpcndicular ordcr.
Tis nomcnclaturc, although ncw, sccms ncccssary to kccping up a propcr
distinction bctwccn two things which should by no mcans bc conloundcd.
|!|

From thc naturc ol thc two things, it is cvidcnt that thc line of battle bclongs
cspccially to dclcnsivc arrangcmcnts, bccausc an army awaiting an attack
without knowing what or whcrc it will bc must ncccssarily lorm a rathcr
indcnitc and objcctlcss linc ol battlc. order of battle, on thc contrary, indicating
an arrangcmcnt ol troops lormcd with an intcntion ol ghting whilc cxccuting
somc mancuvcr prcviously dctcrmincd upon, bclongs morc particularly to
!
!t is lrom no dcsirc to makc innovations that ! havc modicd old tcrms or madc ncw. !n thc
dcvclopmcnt ol a scicncc, it is wrong lor thc samc word to dcsignatc two vcry dicrcnt things, and, il wc
continuc to apply thc tcrm order of battle to thc disposition ol troops in linc, it must bc impropcr to dcsignatc
ccrtain important mancuvcrs by thc tcrms oblique order of battle, concave order of battle, and it bccomcs ncccssary
to usc instcad thc tcrms oblique system of battle, &c. ! prclcr thc mcthod ol dcsignation ! havc adoptcd. Tc
order of battle on papcr may takc thc namc plan of organization, and thc ordinary lormation ol troops upon thc
ground will thcn bc callcd line of battle.
.
Chaptcr !\. Grand Tactics and 8attlcs
ocnsivc dispositions. Howcvcr, it is by no mcans prctcndcd that thc linc ol
battlc is cxclusivcly a dclcnsivc arrangcmcnt, lor a body ol troops may in this
lormation vcry wcll procccd to thc attack ol a position, whilc an army on thc
dclcnsivc may usc thc obliquc ordcr or any othcr. ! rclcr abovc only to ordinary
cascs.
Vithout adhcring strictly to what is callcd thc systcm ol a war ol positions,
an army may oltcn nd it propcr to await thc cncmy at a lavorablc point,
strong by naturc and sclcctcd bclorchand lor thc purposc ol thcrc ghting a
dclcnsivc battlc. Such a position may bc takcn up whcn thc objcct is to covcr an
important objcctivc point, such as a capital, largc dcpots, or a dccisivc stratcgic
point which controls thc surrounding country, or, nally, to covcr a sicgc.
Tcrc arc two kinds ol positions,thc strategic, which has bccn discusscd
in Articlc XX., and thc tactical. Tc lattcr, again, arc subdividcd. !n thc
rst placc, thcrc arc intrcnchcd positions occupicd to await thc cncmy undcr
covcr ol works morc or lcss conncctcd,in a word, intrcnchcd camps. Tcir
rclations to stratcgic opcrations havc bccn trcatcd in Articlc XX\!!., and
thcir attack and dclcnsc arc discusscd in Articlc XXX\. Sccondly, wc havc
positions naturally strong, whcrc armics cncamp lor thc purposc ol gaining a
lcw days timc. Tird and last arc opcn positions, choscn in advancc to ght
on thc dclcnsivc. Tc charactcristics to bc sought in thcsc positions vary
according to thc objcct in vicw: it is, howcvcr, a mattcr ol importancc not to
bc carricd away by thc mistakcn idca, which prcvails too cxtcnsivcly, ol giving
thc prclcrcncc to positions that arc vcry stccp and dicult ol acccss,quitc
suitablc placcs, probably, lor tcmporary camps, but not always thc bcst lor
battlcgrounds. A position ol this kind, to bc rcally strong, must bc not only
stccp and dicult ol acccss, but should bc adaptcd to thc cnd had in vicw
in occupying it, should ocr as many advantagcs as possiblc lor thc kind ol
troops lorming thc principal strcngth ol thc army, and, nally, thc obstaclcs
prcscntcd by its lcaturcs should bc morc disadvantagcous lor thc cncmy than
lor thc assailcd. For cxamplc, it is ccrtain that Masscna, in taking thc strong
position ol thc Albis, would havc madc a grcat crror il his chicl strcngth had
bccn in cavalry and artillcry, whilst it was cxactly what was wantcd lor his
cxccllcnt inlantry. For thc samc rcason, Vcllington, whosc wholc dcpcndcncc
was in thc rc ol his troops, madc a good choicc ol position at Vatcrloo, whcrc
all thc avcnucs ol approach wcrc wcll swcpt by his guns. Tc position ol thc
Albis was, morcovcr, rathcr a stratcgic position, that ol Vatcrloo bcing simply
a battlcground.
Tc rulcs to bc gcncrally obscrvcd in sclccting tactical positions arc thc
lollowing:
.. To havc thc communications to thc lront such as to makc it casicr to
lall upon thc cncmy at a lavorablc momcnt than lor him to approach thc
linc ol battlc.
a. To givc thc artillcry all its ccct in thc dclcnsc.
.
. To havc thc ground suitablc lor conccaling thc movcmcnts ol troops
bctwccn thc wings, that thcy may bc masscd upon any point dccmcd thc
propcr onc.
. To bc ablc to havc a good vicw ol thc cncmys movcmcnts.
. To havc an unobstructcd linc ol rctrcat.
6. To havc thc anks wcll protcctcd, cithcr by natural or articial obstaclcs,
so as to rcndcr impossiblc an attack upon thcir cxtrcmitics, and to obligc
thc cncmy to attack thc ccntcr, or at lcast somc point ol thc lront.
Tis is a dicult condition to lulll, lor, il an army rcsts on a rivcr, or a
mountain, or an impcnctrablc lorcst, and thc smallcst rcvcrsc happcns to
it, a grcat disastcr may bc thc rcsult ol thc brokcn linc bcing lorccd back
upon thc vcry obstaclcs which sccmcd to aord pcrlcct protcction. Tis
dangcrabout which thcrc can bc no doubtgivcs risc to thc thought
that points admitting an casy dclcnsc arc bcttcr on a battlccld than
insurmountablc obstaclcs.
|!|
,. Somctimcs a want ol propcr support lor thc anks is rcmcdicd by
throwing a crotchct to thc rcar. Tis is dangcrous, bccausc a crotchct
stuck on a linc hindcrs its movcmcnts, and thc cncmy may causc grcat
loss ol lilc by placing his artillcry in thc anglc ol thc two lincs prolongcd.
A strong rcscrvc in closc column bchind thc wing to bc guardcd lrom
assault sccms bcttcr to lulll thc rcquircd condition than thc crotchct,
but thc naturc ol thc ground must always dccidc in thc choicc bctwccn
thc two mcthods. Full dctails on this point arc givcn in thc dcscription
ol thc battlc ol Praguc, (Chaptcr !!. ol thc Scvcn Ycars Var.)
. Vc must cndcavor in a dclcnsivc position not only to covcr thc anks,
but it oltcn happcns that thcrc arc obstaclcs on othcr points ol thc
lront, ol such a charactcr as to compcl an attack upon thc ccntcr. Such
a position will always bc onc ol thc most advantagcous lor dclcnsc,as
was shown at Malplaquct and Vatcrloo. Grcat obstaclcs arc not csscntial
lor this purposc, as thc smallcst accidcnt ol thc ground is somctimcs
sucicnt: thus, thc insignicant rivulct ol Papclottc lorccd Ncy to attack
Vcllingtons ccntcr, instcad ol thc lclt as hc had bccn ordcrcd.
Vhcn a dclcnsc is madc ol such a position, carc must bc takcn to hold rcady
lor movcmcnt portions ol thc wings thus covcrcd, in ordcr that thcy may takc
part in thc action instcad ol rcmaining idlc spcctators ol it.
Tc lact cannot bc conccalcd, howcvcr, that all thcsc mcans arc but
palliativcs, and thc bcst thing lor an army standing on thc dclcnsivc is to know
how to takc thc ocnsivc at a propcr timc, and to take it. Among thc conditions
!
Tc park ol Hougoumont, thc hamlct ol La Hayc Saintc, and thc rivulct ol Papclottc wcrc lor
Ncy morc scrious obstaclcs than thc lamous position ol lchingcn, whcrc hc lorccd a passagc ol thc anubc,
in .c, upon thc ruins ol a burnt bridgc. !t may pcrhaps bc said that thc couragc ol thc dclcndcrs in thc two
cascs was not thc samc, but, throwing out ol considcration this chancc, it must bc grantcd that thc dicultics
ol a position, whcn propcrly takcn advantagc ol, nccd not bc insurmountablc in ordcr to rcndcr thc attack
abortivc. At lchingcn thc grcat hcight and stccpncss ol thc banks, rcndcring thc rc almost inccctual,
wcrc morc disadvantagcous than usclul in thc dclcnsc.
.
to bc satiscd by a dclcnsivc position has bccn mcntioncd that ol cnabling
an casy and salc rctrcat, and this brings us to an cxamination ol a qucstion
prcscntcd by thc battlc ol Vatcrloo. Vould an army with its rcar rcsting upon
a lorcst, and with a good road bchind thc ccntcr and cach wing, havc its rctrcat
compromiscd, as Napolcon imagincd, il it should losc thc battlc: My own
opinion is that such a position would bc morc lavorablc lor a rctrcat than an
cntircly opcn cld, lor a bcatcn army could not cross a plain without cxposurc
to vcry grcat dangcr. Undoubtcdly, il thc rctrcat bccomcs a rout, a portion ol
thc artillcry lclt in battcry in lront ol thc lorcst would, in all probability, bc
lost, but thc inlantry and cavalry and a grcat part ol thc artillcry could rctirc
just as rcadily as across a plain. Tcrc is, indccd, no bcttcr covcr lor an ordcrly
rctrcat than a lorcst,this statcmcnt bcing madc upon thc supposition that
thcrc arc at lcast two good roads bchind thc linc, that propcr mcasurcs lor
rctrcat havc bccn takcn bclorc thc cncmy has had an opportunity to prcss
too closcly, and, nally, that thc cncmy is not pcrmittcd by a ank movcmcnt
to bc bclorc thc rctrcating army at thc outlct ol thc lorcst, as was thc casc at
Hohcnlindcn. Tc rctrcat would bc thc morc sccurc il, as at Vatcrloo, thc
lorcst lormcd a concavc linc bchind thc ccntcr, lor this rccntcring would
bccomc a placc ol arms to rcccivc thc troops and givc thcm timc to pass o in
succcssion on thc main roads.
Vhcn discussing stratcgic opcrations, mcntion was madc ol thc varying
chanccs which thc two systcms, thc defensive and thc oensive, givc risc to,
and it was sccn that cspccially in stratcgy thc army taking thc initiativc has
thc grcat advantagc ol bringing up its troops and striking a blow whcrc it may
dccm bcst, whilst thc army which acts upon thc dclcnsivc and awaits an attack
is anticipatcd in cvcry dircction, is oltcn takcn unawarcs, and is always obligcd
to rcgulatc its movcmcnts by thosc ol thc cncmy. Vc havc also sccn that in
tactics thcsc advantagcs arc not so markcd, bccausc in this casc thc opcrations
occupy a smallcr cxtcnt ol ground, and thc party taking thc initiativc cannot
conccal his movcmcnts lrom thc cncmy, who, instantly obscrving, may at oncc
countcract thcm by thc aid ol a good rcscrvc. Morcovcr, thc party advancing
upon thc cncmy has against him all thc disadvantagcs arising lrom accidcnts
ol ground that hc must pass bclorc rcaching thc hostilc linc, and, howcvcr
at a country it may bc, thcrc arc always incqualitics ol thc surlacc, such as
small ravincs, thickcts, hcdgcs, larmhouscs, villagcs, &c., which must cithcr
bc takcn posscssion ol or bc passcd by. To thcsc natural obstaclcs may also
bc addcd thc cncmys battcrics to bc carricd, and thc disordcr which always
prcvails to a grcatcr or lcss cxtcnt in a body ol mcn cxposcd to a continucd rc
cithcr ol muskctry or artillcry. \icwing thc mattcr in thc light ol thcsc lacts,
all must agrcc that in tactical opcrations thc advantagcs rcsulting lrom taking
thc initiativc arc balanccd by thc disadvantagcs.
Howcvcr undoubtcd thcsc truths may bc, thcrc is anothcr, still morc manilcst,
which has bccn dcmonstratcd by thc grcatcst cvcnts ol history. vcry army
which maintains a strictly dclcnsivc attitudc must, il attackcd, bc at last drivcn
lrom its position, whilst by proting by all thc advantagcs ol thc dclcnsivc
.6
systcm, and holding itscll rcady to takc thc ocnsivc whcn occasion ocrs, it
may hopc lor thc grcatcst succcss. A gcncral who stands motionlcss to rcccivc
his cncmy, kccping strictly on thc dclcnsivc, may ght cvcr so bravcly, but hc
must givc way whcn propcrly attackcd. !t is not so, howcvcr, with a gcncral
who indccd waits to rcccivc his cncmy, but with thc dctcrmination to lall upon
him ocnsivcly at thc propcr momcnt, to wrcst lrom him and translcr to his
own troops thc moral ccct always produccd by an onward movcmcnt whcn
couplcd with thc ccrtainty ol throwing thc main strcngth into thc action at thc
most important point,a thing altogcthcr impossiblc whcn kccping strictly
on thc dclcnsivc. !n lact, a gcncral who occupics a wcllchoscn position, whcrc
his movcmcnts arc lrcc, has thc advantagc ol obscrving thc cncmys approach,
his lorccs, prcviously arrangcd in a suitablc manncr upon thc position, aidcd
by battcrics placcd so as to producc thc grcatcst ccct, may makc thc cncmy
pay vcry dcarly lor his advancc ovcr thc spacc scparating thc two armics, and
whcn thc assailant, altcr sucring scvcrcly, nds himscll strongly assailcd at
thc momcnt whcn thc victory sccmcd to bc in his hands, thc advantagc will,
in all probability, bc his no longcr, lor thc moral ccct ol such a countcrattack
upon thc part ol an advcrsary supposcd to bc bcatcn is ccrtainly cnough to
staggcr thc boldcst troops.
A gcncral may, thcrclorc, cmploy in his battlcs with cqual succcss cithcr
thc ocnsivc or dclcnsivc systcm, but it is indispcnsablc,.st, that, so lar
lrom limiting himscll to a passivc dclcnsc, hc should know how to takc thc
ocnsivc at lavorablc momcnts, ad, that his coup-doeil bc ccrtain and his
coolncss undoubtcd, d, that hc bc ablc to rcly surcly upon his troops, th,
that, in rctaking thc ocnsivc, hc should by no mcans ncglcct to apply thc
gcncral principlc which would havc rcgulatcd his ordcr ol battlc had hc donc
so in thc bcginning, th, that hc strikc his blows upon dccisivc points. Tcsc
truths arc dcmonstratcd by Napolcons coursc at Rivoli and Austcrlitz, as wcll
as by Vcllingtons at Talavcra, at Salamanca, and at Vatcrloo.
ARTICLE XXXI
Offensive Battles, and Different Orders of Battle
Vc undcrstand by ocnsivc battlcs thosc which an army ghts whcn assaulting
anothcr in position.
|!|
An army rcduccd to thc stratcgic dclcnsivc oltcn takcs
thc ocnsivc by making an attack, and an army rccciving an attack may,
during thc progrcss ol thc battlc, takc thc ocnsivc and obtain thc advantagcs
incidcnt to it. History lurnishcs numcrous cxamplcs ol battlcs ol cach ol thcsc
kinds. As dclcnsivc battlcs havc bccn discusscd in thc prcccding articlc, and
thc advantagcs ol thc dclcnsivc bccn pointcd out, wc will now procccd to thc
considcration ol ocnsivc movcmcnts.
!
!n cvcry battlc onc party must bc thc assailant and thc othcr assailcd. vcry battlc is hcncc
ocnsivc lor onc party and dclcnsivc lor thc othcr.
.,
!t must bc admittcd that thc assailant gcncrally has a moral advantagc ovcr
thc assailcd, and almost always acts morc undcrstandingly than thc lattcr, who
must bc morc or lcss in a statc ol unccrtainty.
As soon as it is dctcrmincd to attack thc cncmy, somc ordcr ol attack must
bc adoptcd, and that is what ! havc thought ought to bc callcd order of battle.
!t happcns also quitc lrcqucntly that a battlc must bc commcnccd without
a dctailcd plan, bccausc thc position ol thc cncmy is not cntircly known. !n
cithcr casc it should bc wcll undcrstood that thcrc is in cvcry battlccld a
dccisivc point, thc posscssion ol which, morc than ol any othcr, hclps to sccurc
thc victory, by cnabling its holdcr to makc a propcr application ol thc principlcs
ol war: arrangcmcnts should thcrclorc bc madc lor striking thc dccisivc blow
upon this point.
Tc dccisivc point ol a battlccld is dctcrmincd, as has bccn alrcady statcd,
by thc charactcr ol thc position, thc bcaring ol dicrcnt localitics upon thc
stratcgic objcct in vicw, and, nally, by thc arrangcmcnt ol thc contcnding
lorccs. For cxamplc, supposc an cncmys ank to rcst upon high ground lrom
which his wholc linc might bc attaincd, thc occupation ol this hcight sccms
most important, tactically considcrcd, but it may happcn that thc hcight in
qucstion is vcry dicult ol acccss, and situatcd cxactly so as to bc ol thc lcast
importancc, stratcgically considcrcd. At thc battlc ol 8autzcn thc lclt ol thc
allics rcstcd upon thc stccp mountains ol 8ohcmia, which provincc was at
that timc rathcr ncutral than hostilc: it sccmcd that, tactically considcrcd, thc
slopc ol thcsc mountains was thc dccisivc point to bc hcld, whcn it was just thc
rcvcrsc, bccausc thc allics had but onc linc ol rctrcat upon Rcichcnbach and
Gorlitz, and thc Frcnch, by lorcing thc right, which was in thc plain, would
occupy this linc ol rctrcat and throw thc allics into thc mountains, whcrc
thcy might havc lost all thcir materiel and a grcat part ol thc pcrsonncl ol
thcir army. Tis coursc was also casicr lor thcm on account ol thc dicrcncc
in thc lcaturcs ol thc ground, lcd to morc important rcsults, and would havc
diminishcd thc obstaclcs in thc luturc.
Tc lollowing truths may, ! think, bc dcduccd lrom what has bccn statcd:
.. Tc topographical kcy ol a battlccld is not always thc tactical kcy, a. Tc
dccisivc point ol a battlccld is ccrtainly that which combincs stratcgic with
topographical advantagcs, . Vhcn thc dicultics ol thc ground arc not too
lormidablc upon thc stratcgic point ol thc battlccld, this is gcncrally thc
most important point, . !t is ncvcrthclcss truc that thc dctcrmination ol this
point dcpcnds vcry much upon thc arrangcmcnt ol thc contcnding lorccs.
Tus, in lincs ol battlc too much cxtcndcd and dividcd thc ccntcr will always
bc thc propcr point ol attack, in lincs wcll closcd and conncctcd thc ccntcr is
thc strongcst point, sincc, indcpcndcntly ol thc rcscrvcs postcd thcrc, it is casy
to support it lrom thc anks: thc dccisivc point in this casc is thcrclorc onc
ol thc cxtrcmitics ol thc linc. Vhcn thc numcrical supcriority is considcrablc,
an attack may bc madc simultancously upon both cxtrcmitics, but not whcn
thc attacking lorcc is cqual or inlcrior numcrically to thc cncmys. !t appcars,
.
thcrclorc, that all thc combinations ol a battlc consist in so cmploying thc
lorcc in hand as to obtain thc most ccctivc action upon that onc ol thc thrcc
points mcntioncd which ocrs thc grcatcst numbcr ol chanccs ol succcss,a
point vcry casily dctcrmincd by applying thc analysis just mcntioncd.
Tc objcct ol an ocnsivc battlc can only bc to dislodgc thc cncmy or to
cut his linc, unlcss it is intcndcd by stratcgic mancuvcrs to ruin his army
complctcly. An cncmy is dislodgcd cithcr by ovcrthrowing him at somc point
ol his linc, or by outanking him so as to takc him in ank and rcar, or by
using both thcsc mcthods at oncc, that is, attacking him in lront whilc at thc
samc timc onc wing is cnvclopcd and his linc turncd.
To accomplish thcsc dicrcnt objccts, it bccomcs ncccssary to makc choicc
ol thc most suitablc ordcr ol battlc lor thc mcthod to bc uscd.
At lcast twclvc ordcrs ol battlc may bc cnumcratcd, viz.: .. Tc simplc parallcl
ordcr, a. Tc parallcl ordcr with a dclcnsivc or ocnsivc crotchct, . Tc ordcr
rcinlorccd upon onc or both wings, . Tc ordcr rcinlorccd in thc ccntcr, .
Tc simplc obliquc ordcr, or thc obliquc rcinlorccd on thc attacking wing, 6
and ,. Tc pcrpcndicular ordcr on onc or both wings, . Tc concavc ordcr,
. Tc convcx ordcr, .c. Tc ordcr by cchclon on onc or both wings, ... Tc
ordcr by cchclon on thc ccntcr, .a. Tc ordcr rcsulting lrom a strong combincd
attack upon thc ccntcr and onc cxtrcmity simultancously. (Scc Figs. to .6.)
Figurc
|!|
ach ol thcsc ordcrs may bc uscd cithcr by itscll or, as has bccn statcd,
in conncction with thc mancuvcr ol a strong column intcndcd to turn thc
cncmys linc. !n ordcr to a propcr apprcciation ol thc mcrits ol cach, it bccomcs
ncccssary to tcst cach by thc application ol thc gcncral principlcs which havc
bccn laid down. For cxamplc, it is manilcst that thc parallcl ordcr (Fig. ) is
worst ol all, lor it rcquircs no skill to ght onc linc against anothcr, battalion
against battalion, with cqual chanccs ol succcss on cithcr sidc: no tactical skill
is nccdcd in such a battlc.
Tcrc is, howcvcr, onc important casc whcrc this is a suitablc ordcr, which
occurs whcn an army, having takcn thc initiativc in grcat stratcgic opcrations,
shall havc succccdcd in lalling upon thc cncmys communications and cutting
o his linc ol rctrcat whilc covcring its own, whcn thc battlc takcs placc
!
Tc lcttcr A in this and othcr gurcs ol thc twclvc ordcrs indicatcs thc dclcnsivc army, and 8 thc
ocnsivc. Tc armics arc rcprcscntcd cach in a singlc linc, in ordcr not to complicatc thc gurcs too much,
but it should bc obscrvcd that cvcry ordcr ol battlc ought to bc in two lincs, whcthcr thc troops arc dcploycd
in columns ol attack, in squarcs, or chcckcrwisc.
.
bctwccn thcm, that army which has rcachcd thc rcar ol thc othcr may usc thc
parallcl ordcr, lor, having ccctcd thc dccisivc mancuvcr prcvious to thc battlc,
all its corts should now bc dircctcd toward thc lrustration ol thc cncmys
cndcavor to opcn a way through lor himscll. xccpt lor this singlc casc, thc
parallcl ordcr is thc worst ol all. ! do not mcan to say that a battlc cannot bc
gaincd whilc using this ordcr, lor onc sidc or thc othcr must gain thc victory
il thc contcst is continucd, and thc advantagc will thcn bc upon his sidc who
has thc bcst troops, who bcst knows whcn to cngagc thcm, who bcst managcs
his rcscrvc and is most lavorcd by lortunc.
Figurc 6.
Tc parallcl ordcr with a crotchct upon thc ank (Fig. 6) is most usually
adoptcd in a dclcnsivc position. !t may bc also thc rcsult ol an ocnsivc
combination, but thcn thc crotchct is to thc lront, whilst in thc casc ol dclcnsc
it is to thc rcar. Tc battlc ol Praguc is a vcry rcmarkablc cxamplc ol thc dangcr
to which such a crotchct is cxposcd il propcrly attackcd.
Figurc ,
Tc parallcl ordcr rcinlorccd upon onc wing, (Fig. ,,) or upon thc ccntcr, (Fig.
) to picrcc that ol thc cncmy, is much morc lavorablc than thc two prcccding
oncs, and is also much morc in accordancc with thc gcncral principlcs which
havc bccn laid down, although, whcn thc contcnding lorccs arc about cqual,
thc part ol thc linc which has bccn wcakcncd to rcinlorcc thc othcr may havc
its own salcty compromiscd il placcd in linc parallcl to thc cncmy.
Figurc
.c
Figurc
Tc obliquc ordcr (Fig. ) is thc bcst lor an inlcrior lorcc attacking a supcrior,
lor, in addition to thc advantagc ol bringing thc main strcngth ol thc lorccs
against a singlc point ol thc cncmys linc, it has two othcrs cqually important,
sincc thc wcakcncd wing is not only kcpt back lrom thc attack ol thc cncmy,
but pcrlorms also thc doublc duty ol holding in position thc part ol his linc
not attackcd, and ol bcing at hand as a rcscrvc lor thc support, il ncccssary,
ol thc cngagcd wing. Tis ordcr was uscd by thc cclcbratcd paminondas at
thc battlcs ol Lcuctra and Mantinca. Tc most brilliant cxamplc ol its usc in
modcrn timcs was givcn by Frcdcrick thc Grcat at thc battlc ol Lcuthcn. (Scc
Chaptcr \!!. ol Trcatisc on Grand pcrations.)
Figurc .c
Figurc ..
..
Tc pcrpcndicular ordcr on onc or both wings, as sccn in Figs. .c and .., can
only bc considcrcd an arrangcmcnt to indicatc thc dircction along which thc
primary tactical movcmcnts might bc madc in a battlc. Two armics will ncvcr
long occupy thc rclativc pcrpcndicular positions indicatcd in thcsc gurcs, lor
il thc army 8 wcrc to takc its rst position on a linc pcrpcndicular to onc or
both cxtrcmitics ol thc army A, thc lattcr would at oncc changc thc lront ol
a portion ol its linc, and cvcn thc army 8, as soon as it cxtcndcd itscll to or
bcyond thc cxtrcmity ol A, must ol ncccssity turn its columns cithcr to thc
right or thc lclt, in ordcr to bring thcm ncar thc cncmys linc, and so takc
him in rcvcrsc, as at C, thc rcsult bcing two obliquc lincs, as shown in Fig. .c.
Tc inlcrcncc is that onc division ol thc assailing army would takc a position
pcrpcndicular to thc cncmys wing, whilst thc rcmaindcr ol thc army would
approach in lront lor thc purposc ol annoying him, and this would always
bring us back to onc ol thc obliquc ordcrs shown in Figurcs and .6.
Tc attack on both wings, whatcvcr bc thc lorm ol attack adoptcd, may bc
vcry advantagcous, but it is only admissiblc whcn thc assailant is vcry dccidcdly
supcrior in numbcrs, lor, il thc lundamcntal principlc is to bring thc main
strcngth ol thc lorccs upon thc dccisivc point, a wcakcr army would violatc it
in dirccting a dividcd attack against a supcrior lorcc. Tis truth will bc clcarly
dcmonstratcd larthcr on.
Figurc .a
Tc ordcr concavc in thc ccntcr (Fig. .a) has lound advocatcs sincc thc day
whcn Hannibal by its usc gaincd thc battlc ol Cannac. Tis ordcr may indccd
bc vcry good whcn thc progrcss ol thc battlc itscll givcs risc to it, that is, whcn
thc cncmy attacks thc ccntcr, this rctircs bclorc him, and hc sucrs himscll
to bc cnvclopcd by thc wings. 8ut, il this ordcr is adoptcd bclorc thc battlc
bcgins, thc cncmy, instcad ol lalling on thc ccntcr, has only to attack thc
wings, which prcscnt thcir cxtrcmitics and arc in prcciscly thc samc rclativc
situation as il thcy had bccn assailcd in ank. Tis ordcr would, thcrclorc, bc
scarccly cvcr uscd cxccpt against an cncmy who had takcn thc convcx ordcr to
ght a battlc, as will bc sccn larthcr on.
.a
Figurc .a, bis
An army will rarcly lorm a scmicirclc, prclcrring rathcr a brokcn linc with
thc ccntcr rctircd, (Fig. .a, bis.) !l scvcral writcrs may bc bclicvcd, such an
arrangcmcnt gavc thc victory to thc nglish on thc lamous days ol Crccy
and Agincourt. Tis ordcr is ccrtainly bcttcr than a scmicirclc, sincc it docs
not so much prcscnt thc ank to attack, whilst allowing lorward movcmcnt
by cchclon and prcscrving all thc advantagcs ol conccntration ol rc. Tcsc
advantagcs vanish il thc cncmy, instcad ol loolishly throwing himscll upon
thc rctircd ccntcr, is contcnt to watch it lrom a distancc and makcs his grcatcst
cort upon onc wing. ssling, in .c, is an cxamplc ol thc advantagcous usc
ol a concavc linc, but it must not bc inlcrrcd that Napolcon committcd an
crror in attacking thc ccntcr, lor an army ghting with thc anubc bchind it
and with no way ol moving without uncovcring its bridgcs ol communication,
must not bc judgcd as il it had bccn lrcc to mancuvcr at plcasurc.
Figurc .
Tc convcx ordcr with thc ccntcr salicnt (Fig. .) answcrs lor an cngagcmcnt
immcdiatcly upon thc passagc ol a rivcr whcn thc wings must bc rctircd and
rcstcd on thc rivcr to covcr thc bridgcs, also whcn a dclcnsivc battlc is to bc
lought with a rivcr in rcar, which is to bc passcd and thc dclc covcrcd, as at
Lcipsic, and, nally, it may bccomc a natural lormation to rcsist an cncmy
lorming a concavc linc. !l an cncmy dirccts his corts against thc ccntcr or
against a singlc wing, this ordcr might causc thc ruin ol thc wholc army.
|!|
Tc Frcnch tricd it at Flcurus in .,, and wcrc succcsslul, bccausc thc Princc
ol Coburg, in placc ol making a strong attack upon thc ccntcr or upon a singlc
cxtrcmity, dividcd his attack upon vc or six divcrging lincs, and particularly
upon both wings at oncc. Ncarly thc samc convcx ordcr was adoptcd at ssling,
! An attack upon thc two cxtrcmitics might succccd also in somc cascs, cithcr whcn thc lorcc
was strong cnough to try it, or thc cncmy was unablc to wcakcn his ccntcr to support thc wings. As a rulc, a
lalsc attack to cngagc thc ccntcr, and a strong attack against onc cxtrcmity, would bc thc bcst mcthod to usc
against such a linc.
.
and during thc sccond and third days ol thc lamous battlc ol Lcipsic. n thc
last occasion it had just thc rcsult that might havc bccn cxpcctcd.
Figurc .
Tc ordcr by cchclon upon thc two wings Fig. . is ol thc samc naturc as thc
pcrpcndicular ordcr, (Fig. ..,) bcing, howcvcr, bcttcr than that, bccausc, thc
cchclons bcing ncarcst cach othcr in thc dircction whcrc thc rcscrvc would bc
placcd, thc cncmy would bc lcss ablc, both as rcgards room and timc, to throw
himscll into thc intcrval ol thc ccntcr and makc at that point a thrcatcning
countcrattack.
Figurc .
Tc ordcr by cchclon on thc ccntcr (Fig. .) may bc uscd with spccial succcss
against an army occupying a position too much cut up and too cxtcndcd,
bccausc, its ccntcr bcing thcn somcwhat isolatcd lrom thc wings and liablc
to ovcrthrow, thc army thus cut in two would bc probably dcstroycd. 8ut,
applying thc tcst ol thc samc lundamcntal principlc, this ordcr ol attack would
appcar to bc lcss ccrtain ol succcss against an army having a conncctcd and
closcd linc, lor thc rcscrvc bcing gcncrally ncar thc ccntcr, and thc wings
bcing ablc to act cithcr by conccntrating thcir rc or by moving against thc
lorcmost cchclons, might rcadily rcpulsc thcm.
!l this lormation to somc cxtcnt rcscmblcs thc lamous triangular wcdgc or
boars head ol thc ancicnts, and thc column ol Vinkclricd, it also dicrs lrom
thcm csscntially, lor, instcad ol lorming onc solid mass,an impracticablc
thing in our day, on account ol thc usc ol artillcry,it would havc a largc
opcn spacc in thc middlc, which would rcndcr movcmcnts morc casy. Tis
lormation is suitablc, as has bccn said, lor pcnctrating thc ccntcr ol a linc too
much cxtcndcd, and might bc cqually succcsslul against a linc unavoidably
immovablc, but il thc wings ol thc attackcd linc arc brought at a propcr timc
against thc anks ol thc lorcmost cchclons, disagrccablc conscqucnccs might
rcsult. A parallcl ordcr considcrably rcinlorccd on thc ccntcr might pcrhaps bc
.
a much bcttcr arrangcmcnt, (Figs. and .6,) lor thc parallcl linc in this casc
would havc at lcast thc advantagc ol dccciving thc cncmy as to thc point ol
attack, and would hindcr thc wings lrom taking thc cchclons ol thc ccntcr by
thc ank.
Tis ordcr by cchclons was adoptcd by Laudon lor thc attack ol thc
intrcnchcd camp ol 8untzclwitz. (Trcatisc on Grand pcrations, chaptcr
xxviii.) !n such a casc it is quitc suitablc, lor it is thcn ccrtain that thc dclcnsivc
army bcing lorccd to rcmain within its intrcnchmcnts, thcrc is no dangcr ol its
attacking thc cchclons in ank. 8ut, this lormation having thc inconvcnicncc
ol indicating to thc cncmy thc point ol his linc which it is dcsircd to attack,
lalsc attacks should bc madc upon thc wings, to mislcad him as to thc truc
point ol attack.
Figurc .6
Tc ordcr ol attack in columns on thc ccntcr and on onc cxtrcmity at thc
samc timc (Fig. .6) is bcttcr than thc prcccding, cspccially in an attack upon an
cncmys linc strongly arrangcd and wcll conncctcd. !t may cvcn bc callcd thc
most rcasonablc ol all thc ordcrs ol battlc. Tc attack upon thc ccntcr, aidcd
by a wing outanking thc cncmy, prcvcnts thc assailcd party lalling upon
thc assailant and taking him in ank, as was donc by Hannibal and Marshal
Saxc. Tc cncmys wing which is hcmmcd in bctwccn thc attacks on thc ccntcr
and at thc cxtrcmity, having to contcnd with ncarly thc cntirc opposing lorcc,
will bc dclcatcd and probably dcstroycd. !t was this mancuvcr which gavc
Napolcon his victorics ol Vagram and Ligny. Tis was what hc wishcd to
attcmpt at 8orodino,whcrc hc obtaincd only a partial succcss, on account
ol thc hcroic conduct ol thc Russian lclt and thc division ol Paskcvitch in thc
lamous ccntral rcdoubt, and on account ol thc arrival ol 8aggavouts corps
on thc wing hc hopcd to outank. Hc uscd it also at 8autzcn,whcrc an
unprcccdcntcd succcss would havc bccn thc rcsult, but lor an accidcnt which
intcrlcrcd with thc mancuvcr ol thc lclt wing intcndcd to cut o thc allics
lrom thc road to Vurschcn, cvcry arrangcmcnt having bccn madc with that
vicw.
!t should bc obscrvcd that thcsc dicrcnt ordcrs arc not to bc undcrstood
prcciscly as thc gcomctrical gurcs indicatc thcm. A gcncral who would
cxpcct to arrangc his linc ol battlc as rcgularly as upon papcr or on a drill
ground would bc grcatly mistakcn, and would bc likcly to sucr dclcat. Tis
.
is particularly truc as battlcs arc now lought. !n thc timc ol Louis X!\. or
ol Frcdcrick, it was possiblc to lorm lincs ol battlc almost as rcgular as thc
gcomctrical gurcs, bccausc armics campcd undcr tcnts, almost always closcly
collcctcd togcthcr, and wcrc in prcscncc ol cach othcr scvcral days, thus giving
amplc timc lor opcning roads and clcaring spaccs to cnablc thc columns to bc
at rcgular distanccs lrom cach othcr. 8ut in our day,whcn armics bivouac,
whcn thcir division into scvcral corps givcs grcatcr mobility, whcn thcy takc
position ncar cach othcr in obcdicncc to ordcrs givcn thcm whilc out ol rcach
ol thc gcncrals cyc, and oltcn whcn thcrc has bccn no timc lor thorough
cxamination ol thc cncmys position,nally, whcn thc dicrcnt arms ol thc
scrvicc arc intcrminglcd in thc linc ol battlc,undcr thcsc circumstanccs,
all ordcrs ol battlc which must bc laid out with grcat accuracy ol dctail arc
impracticablc. Tcsc gurcs havc ncvcr bccn ol any othcr usc than to indicatc
approximatc arrangcmcnts.
!l cvcry army wcrc a solid mass, capablc ol motion as a unit undcr thc
inucncc ol onc mans will and as rapidly as thought, thc art ol winning
battlcs would bc rcduccd to choosing thc most lavorablc ordcr ol battlc, and a
gcncral could rcckon with ccrtainty upon thc succcss ol mancuvcrs arrangcd
bclorchand. 8ut thc lacts arc altogcthcr dicrcnt, lor thc grcat diculty ol
thc tactics ol battlcs will always bc to rcndcr ccrtain thc simultancous cntcring
into action ol thc numcrous lractions whosc corts must combinc to makc
such an attack as will givc good ground to hopc lor victory: in othcr words,
thc chicl diculty is to causc thcsc lractions to unitc in thc cxccution ol thc
dccisivc mancuvcr which, in accordancc with thc original plan ol thc battlc, is
to rcsult in victory.
!naccuratc transmission ol ordcrs, thc manncr in which thcy will bc
undcrstood and cxccutcd by thc subordinatcs ol thc gcncralinchicl, cxccss
ol activity in somc, lack ol it in othcrs, a dclcctivc coup-doeil militaire,cvcry
thing ol this kind may intcrlcrc with thc simultancous cntcring into action ol
thc dicrcnt parts, without spcaking ol thc accidcntal circumstanccs which
may dclay or prcvcnt thc arrival ol a corps at thc appointcd placc.
Hcncc rcsult two undoubtcd truths: .. Tc morc simplc a dccisivc mancuvcr
is, thc morc surc ol succcss will it bc, a. Suddcn mancuvcrs scasonably cxccutcd
during an cngagcmcnt arc morc likcly to succccd than thosc dctcrmincd upon
in advancc, unlcss thc lattcr, rclating to prcvious stratcgic movcmcnts, will
bring up thc columns which arc to dccidc thc day upon thosc points whcrc
thcir prcscncc will sccurc thc cxpcctcd rcsult. Vatcrloo and 8autzcn arc
prools ol thc last. From thc momcnt whcn 8lucchcr and 8ulow had rcachcd
thc hcights ol Frichcrmont, nothing could havc prcvcntcd thc loss ol thc battlc
by thc Frcnch, and thcy could thcn only ght to makc thc dclcat lcss complctc.
!n likc manncr, at 8autzcn, as soon as Ncy had rcachcd Klix, thc rctrcat ol thc
allics during thc night ol thc acth ol May could alonc havc savcd thcm, lor on
thc a.st it was too latc, and, il Ncy had cxccutcd bcttcr what hc was adviscd to
do, thc victory would havc bccn a vcry grcat onc.
.6
As to mancuvcrs lor brcaking through a linc and calculations upon thc co
opcration ol columns procccding lrom thc gcncral lront ol thc army, with thc
intcntion ol cccting largc dctours around an cncmys ank, it may bc statcd
that thcir rcsult is always doubtlul, sincc it dcpcnds upon such an accuratc
cxccution ol carclullyarrangcd plans as is rarcly sccn. Tis subjcct will bc
considcrcd in Art. XXX!!.
8csidcs thc diculty ol dcpcnding upon thc cxact application ol an ordcr ol
battlc arrangcd in advancc, it oltcn happcns that battlcs bcgin without cvcn
thc assailant having a wclldcncd objcct, although thc collision may havc
bccn cxpcctcd. Tis unccrtainty rcsults cithcr lrom circumstanccs prior to thc
battlc, lrom ignorancc ol thc cncmys position and plans, or lrom thc lact that
a portion ol thc army may bc still cxpcctcd to arrivc on thc cld.
From thcsc things many pcoplc havc concludcd that it is impossiblc to rcducc
to dicrcnt systcms thc lormations ol ordcrs ol battlc, or that thc adoption ol
cithcr ol thcm can at all inucncc thc rcsult ol an cngagcmcnt,an crroncous
conclusion, in my opinion, cvcn in thc cascs citcd abovc. !ndccd, in battlcs
bcgun without any prcdctcrmincd plan it is probablc that at thc opcning
ol thc cngagcmcnt thc armics will occupy lincs ncarly parallcl and morc or
lcss strcngthcncd upon somc point, thc party acting upon thc dclcnsivc, not
knowing in what quartcr thc storm will burst upon him, will hold a largc part
ol his lorccs in rcscrvc, to bc uscd as occasion may rcquirc, thc assailant must
makc similar corts to havc his lorccs wcll in hand, but as soon as thc point
ol attack shall havc bccn dctcrmincd, thc mass ol his troops will bc dircctcd
against thc ccntcr or upon onc wing ol thc cncmy, or upon both at oncc.
Vhatcvcr may bc thc rcsulting lormation, it will always bcar a rcscmblancc
to onc ol thc gurcs prcviously cxhibitcd. vcn in uncxpcctcd cngagcmcnts
thc samc thing would happcn,which will, it is hopcd, bc a sucicnt prool
ol thc lact that this classication ol thc dicrcnt systcms or ordcrs ol battlc is
ncithcr lancilul nor usclcss.
Tcrc is nothing cvcn in Napolcons battlcs which disprovcs my asscrtion,
although thcy arc lcss susccptiblc than any othcrs ol bcing rcprcscntcd by
lincs accuratcly laid down. Vc scc him, howcvcr, at Rivoli, at Austcrlitz,
and at Ratisbon, conccntrating his lorccs toward thc ccntcr to bc rcady at
thc lavorablc momcnt to lall upon thc cncmy. At thc Pyramids hc lormcd an
obliquc linc ol squarcs in cchclon. At Lcipsic, ssling, and 8ricnnc hc uscd
a kind ol convcx ordcr vcry likc Fig. ... At Vagram his ordcr was altogcthcr
likc Fig. .6, bringing up two masscs upon thc ccntcr and right, whilc kccping
back thc lclt wing, and this hc wishcd to rcpcat at 8orodino and at Vatcrloo
bclorc thc Prussians camc up. At ylau, although thc collision was almost
cntircly unlorcsccn on account ol thc vcry uncxpcctcd rcturn and ocnsivc
movcmcnt ol thc Russians, hc outankcd thcir lclt almost pcrpcndicularly,
whilst in anothcr dircction hc was cndcavoring to brcak through thc ccntcr,
but thcsc attacks wcrc not simultancous, that on thc ccntcr bcing rcpulscd at
clcvcn oclock, whilst avoust did not attack vigorously upon thc lclt until
.,
toward onc. At rcsdcn hc attackcd by thc two wings, lor thc rst timc
probably in his lilc, bccausc his ccntcr was covcrcd by a lortication and an
intrcnchcd camp, and, in addition, thc attack ol his lclt was combincd with
that ol \andammc upon thc cncmys linc ol rctrcat. At Marcngo, il wc may
crcdit Napolcon himscll, thc obliquc ordcr hc assumcd, rcsting his right at
Castcl Ccriolc, savcd him lrom almost incvitablc dclcat. Ulm and Jcna wcrc
battlcs won by stratcgy bclorc thcy wcrc lought, tactics having but littlc to do
with thcm. At Ulm thcrc was not cvcn a rcgular battlc.
! think wc may hcncc concludc that il it sccms absurd to dcsirc to mark
out upon thc ground ordcrs ol battlc in such rcgular lincs as would bc uscd
in tracing thcm on a skctch, a skilllul gcncral may ncvcrthclcss bcar in mind
thc ordcrs which havc bccn indicatcd abovc, and may so combinc his troops
on thc battlccld that thc arrangcmcnt shall bc similar to onc ol thcm. Hc
should cndcavor in all his combinations, whcthcr dclibcratcly arrangcd or
adoptcd on thc spur ol thc momcnt, to lorm a sound conclusion as to thc
important point ol thc battlccld, and this hc can only do by obscrving wcll
thc dircction ol thc cncmys linc ol battlc, and not lorgctting thc dircction in
which stratcgy rcquircs him to opcratc. Hc will thcn givc his attcntion and
corts to this point, using a third ol his lorcc to kccp thc cncmy in chcck or
watch his movcmcnts, whilc throwing thc othcr twothirds upon thc point
thc posscssion ol which will insurc him thc victory. Acting thus, hc will havc
satiscd all thc conditions thc scicncc ol grand tactics can imposc upon him,
and will havc applicd thc principlcs ol thc art in thc most pcrlcct manncr. Tc
manncr ol dctcrmining thc dccisivc point ol a battlccld has bccn dcscribcd
in thc prcccding chaptcr, (Art. X!X.)
Having now cxplaincd thc twclvc ordcrs ol battlc, it has occurrcd to mc
that this would bc a propcr placc to rcply to scvcral statcmcnts madc in thc
Mcmoirs ol Napolcon publishcd by Gcncral Montholon.
Tc grcat captain sccms to considcr thc obliquc ordcr a modcrn invcntion, a
thcorists lancy,an opinion ! can by no mcans sharc, lor thc obliquc ordcr is
as old as Tcbcs and Sparta, and ! havc sccn it uscd with my own cycs. Tis
asscrtion ol Napolcons sccms thc morc rcmarkablc bccausc Napolcon himscll
boastcd ol having uscd, at Marcngo, thc vcry ordcr ol which hc thus dcnics
thc cxistcncc.
!l wc undcrstand that thc obliquc ordcr is to bc applicd in thc rigid and
prccisc manncr inculcatcd by Gcncral Ruchcl at thc 8crlin school. Napolcon
was ccrtainly right in rcgarding it as an absurdity, but ! rcpcat that a linc ol
battlc ncvcr was a rcgular gcomctrical gurc, and whcn such gurcs arc uscd in
discussing thc combinations ol tactics it can only bc lor thc purposc ol giving
dcnitc cxprcssion to an idca by thc usc ol a known symbol. !t is ncvcrthclcss
truc that cvcry linc ol battlc which is ncithcr parallcl nor pcrpcndicular to
thc cncmys must bc obliquc ol ncccssity. !l onc army attacks thc cxtrcmity
ol anothcr army, thc attacking wing bcing rcinlorccd by massing troops upon
it whilc thc wcakcncd wing is kcpt rctircd lrom attack, thc dircction ol thc
.
linc must ol ncccssity bc a littlc obliquc, sincc onc cnd ol it will bc ncarcr thc
cncmy than thc othcr. Tc obliquc ordcr is so lar lrom bcing a mcrc lancy that
wc scc it uscd whcn thc ordcr is that by cchclons on onc wing, (Fig. ..)
As to thc othcr ordcrs ol battlc cxplaincd abovc, it cannot bc dcnicd that at
ssling and Flcurus thc gcncral arrangcmcnt ol thc Austrians was a concavc
linc, and that ol thc Frcnch a convcx. !n thcsc ordcrs parallcl lincs may bc uscd
as in thc casc ol straight lincs, and thcy would bc classicd as bclonging to thc
parallcl systcm whcn no part ol thc linc was morc strongly occupicd or drawn
up ncarcr to thc cncmy than anothcr.
Laying asidc lor thc prcscnt lurthcr considcration ol thcsc gcomctrical
gurcs, it is to bc obscrvcd that, lor thc purposc ol ghting battlcs in a truly
scicntic manncr, thc lollowing points must bc attcndcd to:
.. An ocnsivc ordcr ol battlc should havc lor its objcct to lorcc thc cncmy
lrom his position by all rcasonablc mcans.
a. Tc mancuvcrs indicatcd by art arc thosc intcndcd to ovcrwhclm onc wing
only, or thc ccntcr and onc wing at thc samc timc. An cncmy may also bc
dislodgcd by mancuvcrs lor outanking and turning his position.
. Tcsc attcmpts havc a much grcatcr probability ol succcss il conccalcd
lrom thc cncmy until thc vcry momcnt ol thc assault.
. To attack thc ccntcr and both wings at thc samc timc, without having vcry
supcrior lorccs, would bc cntircly in opposition to thc rulcs ol thc art, unlcss
onc ol thcsc attacks can bc madc vcry strongly without wcakcning thc linc too
much at thc othcr points.
. Tc obliquc ordcr has no othcr objcct than to unitc at lcast hall thc lorcc
ol thc army in an ovcrwhclming attack upon onc wing, whilc thc rcmaindcr
is rctircd to thc rcar, out ol dangcr ol attack, bcing arrangcd cithcr in cchclon
or in a singlc obliquc linc.
6 Tc dicrcnt lormations, convcx, concavc, pcrpcndicular, or othcrwisc,
may all bc varicd by having thc lincs ol unilorm strcngth throughout, or by
massing troops at onc point.
,. Tc objcct ol thc dclcnsc bcing to dclcat thc plans ol thc attacking party,
thc arrangcmcnts ol a dclcnsivc ordcr should bc such as to multiply thc
dicultics ol approaching thc position, and to kccp in hand a strong rcscrvc,
wcll conccalcd, and rcady to lall at thc dccisivc momcnt upon a point whcrc
thc cncmy lcast cxpcct to mcct it.
. !t is dicult to statc with prccision what is thc bcst mcthod to usc in
lorcing a hostilc army to abandon its position. An ordcr ol battlc would bc
pcrlcct which unitcd thc doublc advantagcs ol thc rc ol thc arms and ol thc
moral ccct produccd by an onsct. A skilllul mixturc ol dcploycd lincs and
columns, acting altcrnatcly as circumstanccs rcquirc, will always bc a good
combination. !n thc practical usc ol this systcm many variations must arisc
lrom dicrcnccs in thc coup-doeil ol commandcrs, thc morale ol occrs and
.
soldicrs, thcir lamiliarity with mancuvcrs and rings ol all sorts, lrom varying
localitics, &c.
. As it is csscntial in an ocnsivc battlc to drivc thc cncmy lrom his position
and to cut him up as much as possiblc, thc bcst mcans ol accomplishing this is
to usc as much matcrial lorcc as can bc accumulatcd against him. !t somctimcs
happcns, howcvcr, that thc dircct application ol main lorcc is ol doubtlul
utility, and bcttcr rcsults may lollow lrom mancuvcrs to outank and turn
that wing which is ncarcst thc cncmys linc ol rctrcat. Hc may whcn thus
thrcatcncd rctirc, whcn hc would ght strongly and succcsslully il attackcd
by main lorcc.
History is lull ol cxamplcs ol thc succcss ol such mancuvcrs, cspccially whcn
uscd against gcncrals ol wcak charactcr, and, although victorics thus obtaincd
arc gcncrally lcss dccisivc and thc hostilc army is but littlc dcmoralizcd, such
incomplctc succcsscs arc ol sucicnt importancc not to bc ncglcctcd, and a
skilllul gcncral should know how to cmploy thc mcans to gain thcm whcn
opportunity ocrs, and cspccially should hc combinc thcsc turning movcmcnts
with attacks by main lorcc.
.c. Tc combination ol thcsc two mcthodsthat is to say, thc attack in lront
by main lorcc and thc turning mancuvcrwill rcndcr thc victory morc ccrtain
than thc usc ol cithcr scparatcly, but, in all cascs, too cxtcndcd movcmcnts
must bc avoidcd, cvcn in prcscncc ol a contcmptiblc cncmy.
... Tc manncr ol driving an cncmy lrom his position by main lorcc is thc
lollowing:Trow his troops into conlusion by a hcavy and wclldircctcd rc
ol artillcry, incrcasc this conlusion by vigorous chargcs ol cavalry, and lollow
up thc advantagcs thus gaincd by pushing lorward masscs ol inlantry wcll
covcrcd in lront by skirmishcrs and ankcd by cavalry.
8ut, whilc wc may cxpcct succcss to lollow such an attack upon thc rst
linc, thc sccond is still to bc ovcrcomc, and, altcr that, thc rcscrvc, and at
this pcriod ol thc cngagcmcnt thc attacking party would usually bc scriously
cmbarrasscd, did not thc moral ccct ol thc dclcat ol thc rst linc oltcn
occasion thc rctrcat ol thc sccond and causc thc gcncral in command to losc
his prcscncc ol mind. !n lact, thc attacking troops will usually bc somcwhat
disordcrcd, cvcn in victory, and it will oltcn bc vcry dicult to rcplacc thcm
by thosc ol thc sccond linc, bccausc thcy gcncrally lollow thc rst linc at such
a distancc as not to comc within muskctrangc ol thc cncmy, and it is always
cmbarrassing to substitutc onc division lor anothcr in thc hcat ol battlc, at
thc momcnt whcn thc cncmy is putting lorth all his strcngth in rcpclling thc
attack.
Tcsc considcrations lcad to thc bclicl that il thc gcncral and thc troops ol
thc dclcnsivc army arc cqually activc in thc pcrlormancc ol thcir duty, and
prcscrvc thcir prcscncc ol mind, il thcir anks and linc ol rctrcat arc not
thrcatcncd, thc advantagc will usually bc on thcir sidc at thc sccond collision
ol thc battlc, but to insurc that rcsult thcir sccond linc and thc cavalry must
bc launchcd against thc victorious battalions ol thc advcrsary at thc propcr
.c
instant, lor thc loss ol a lcw minutcs may bc irrcparablc, and thc sccond linc
may bc drawn into thc conlusion ol thc rst.
.a. From thc prcccding lacts may bc dcduccd thc lollowing truth: that thc
most dicult as wcll as thc most ccrtain ol all thc mcans thc assailant may usc
to gain thc victory consists in strongly supporting thc rst linc with thc troops
ol thc sccond linc, and thcsc with thc rcscrvc, and in a propcr cmploymcnt ol
masscs ol cavalry and ol battcrics, to assist in striking thc dccisivc blow at thc
sccond linc ol thc cncmy, lor hcrc is prcscntcd thc grcatcst ol all thc problcms
ol thc tactics ol battlcs.
!n this important crisis ol battlcs, thcory bccomcs an unccrtain guidc, lor
it is thcn uncqual to thc cmcrgcncy, and can ncvcr comparc in valuc with a
natural talcnt lor war, nor bc a sucicnt substitutc lor that intuitivc coup-doeil
impartcd by cxpcricncc in battlcs to a gcncral ol tricd bravcry and coolncss.
Tc simultancous cmploymcnt ol thc largcst numbcr ol troops ol all arms
combincd, cxccpt a small rcscrvc ol cach which should bc always hcld in hand,
|!|

will, thcrclorc, at thc critical momcnt ol thc battlc, bc thc problcm which cvcry
skilllul gcncral will attcmpt to solvc and to which hc should givc his wholc
attcntion. Tis critical momcnt is usually whcn thc rst linc ol thc partics is
brokcn, and all thc corts ol both contcstants arc put lorth,on thc onc sidc
to complctc thc victory, on thc othcr to wrcst it lrom thc cncmy. !t is scarccly
ncccssary to say that, to makc this dccisivc blow morc ccrtain and ccctual, a
simultancous attack upon thc cncmys ank would bc vcry advantagcous.
.. !n thc dclcnsivc thc rc ol muskctry can bc much morc ccctivcly uscd than
in thc ocnsivc, sincc whcn a position is to bc carricd it can bc accomplishcd
only by moving upon it, and marching and ring at thc samc timc can bc donc
only by troops as skirmishcrs, bcing an impossibility lor thc principal masscs.
Tc objcct ol thc dclcnsc bcing to brcak and throw into conlusion thc troops
advancing to thc attack, thc rc ol artillcry and muskctry will bc thc natural
dclcnsivc mcans ol thc rst linc, and whcn thc cncmy prcsscs too closcly thc
columns ol thc sccond linc and part ol thc cavalry must bc launchcd against
him. Tcrc will thcn bc a strong probability ol his rcpulsc.
ARTICLE XXXII
Turning Maneuvers, and too extended Movement in
Battles
Vc havc spokcn in thc prcccding articlc ol mancuvcrs undcrtakcn to turn
an cncmys linc upon thc battlccld, and ol thc advantagcs which may bc
cxpcctcd lrom thcm. A lcw words rcmain to bc said as to thc widc dctours
!
Tc grcat rcscrvcs must, ol coursc, bc also cngagcd whcn it is ncccssary, but it is always a good
plan to kccp back, as a nal rcscrvc, two or thrcc battalions and vc or six squadrons. Morcau dccidcd thc
battlc ol ngcn with lour companics ol inlantry, and what Kcllcrmanns cavalry accomplishcd at Marcngo
is known to cvcry rcadcr ol history.
..
which thcsc mancuvcrs somctimcs occasion, causing thc lailurc ol so many
plans sccmingly wcll arrangcd.
!t may bc laid down as a principlc that any movcmcnt is dangcrous which
is so cxtcndcd as to givc thc cncmy an opportunity, whilc it is taking placc,
ol bcating thc rcmaindcr ol thc army in position. Ncvcrthclcss, as thc dangcr
dcpcnds vcry much upon thc rapid and ccrtain coup-doeil ol thc opposing
gcncral, as wcll as upon thc stylc ol warlarc to which hc is accustomcd, it is not
dicult to undcrstand why so many mancuvcrs ol this kind havc lailcd against
somc commandcrs and succccdcd against othcrs, and why such a movcmcnt
which would havc bccn hazardous in prcscncc ol Frcdcrick, Napolcon, or
Vcllington might havc cntirc succcss against a gcncral ol limitcd capacity,
who had not thc tact to takc thc ocnsivc himscll at thc propcr momcnt, or
who might himscll havc bccn in thc habit ol moving in this manncr.
!t sccms, thcrclorc, dicult to lay down a xcd rulc on thc subjcct. Tc
lollowing dircctions arc all that can bc givcn. Kccp thc mass ol thc lorcc wcll
in hand and rcady to act at thc propcr momcnt, bcing carclul, howcvcr, to
avoid thc dangcr ol accumulating troops in too largc bodics. A commandcr
obscrving thcsc prccautions will bc always prcparcd lor any thing that may
happcn. !l thc opposing gcncral shows littlc skill and sccms inclincd to indulgc
in cxtcndcd movcmcnts, his advcrsary may bc morc daring.
A lcw cxamplcs drawn lrom history will scrvc to convincc thc rcadcr ol thc
truth ol my statcmcnts, and to show him how thc rcsults ol thcsc cxtcndcd
movcmcnts dcpcnd upon thc charactcrs ol thc gcncrals and thc armics
conccrncd in thcm.
!n thc Scvcn Ycars Var, Frcdcrick gaincd thc battlc ol Praguc bccausc thc
Austrians had lclt a lccblydclcndcd intcrval ol onc thousand yards bctwccn
thcir right and thc rcmaindcr ol thcir army,thc lattcr part rcmaining
motionlcss whilc thc right was ovcrwhclmcd. Tis inaction was thc morc
cxtraordinary as thc lclt ol thc Austrians had a much shortcr distancc to pass
ovcr in ordcr to support thcir right than Frcdcrick had to attack it, lor thc right
was in thc lorm ol a crotchct, and Frcdcrick was obligcd to movc on thc arc ol
a largc scmicirclc to rcach it.
n thc othcr hand, Frcdcrick camc ncar losing thc battlc ol Torgau, bccausc
hc madc with his lclt a movcmcnt cntircly too cxtcndcd and disconncctcd
(ncarly six milcs) with a vicw ol turning thc right ol Marshal aun.
|!|
Mollcndorl
brought up thc right by a conccntric movcmcnt to thc hcights ol Siptitz, whcrc
hc rcjoincd thc king, whosc linc was thus rclormcd.
Tc battlc ol Rivoli is a notcd instancc in point. All who arc lamiliar with that
battlc know that Alvinzi and his chicl ol sta Vcyrothcr wishcd to surround
Napolcons littlc army, which was conccntratcd on thc platcau ol Rivoli. Tcir
ccntcr was bcatcn,whilc thcir lclt was pilcd up in thc ravinc ol thc Adigc,
!
For an account ol thcsc two battlcs, scc Chaptcrs !!. and XX\. ol thc Trcatisc on Grand Military
pcrations.
.a
and Lusignan with thcir right was making a widc detour to gct upon thc rcar
ol thc Frcnch army, whcrc hc was spccdily surroundcd and capturcd.
No onc can lorgct thc day ol Stockach, whcrc Jourdan conccivcd thc
unlortunatc idca ol causing an attack to bc madc upon a unitcd army ol sixty
thousand mcn by thrcc small divisions ol scvcn thousand or cight thousand
mcn, scparatcd by distanccs ol scvcral lcagucs, whilst SaintCyr, with thc
third ol thc army, (thirtccn thousand mcn,) was to pass twclvc milcs bcyond
thc right ank and gct in rcar ol this army ol sixty thousand mcn, which could
not hclp bcing victorious ovcr thcsc dividcd lractions, and should ccrtainly
havc capturcd thc part in thcir rcar. SaintCyrs cscapc was indccd littlc lcss
than a miraclc.
Vc may call to mind how this samc Gcncral Vcyrothcr, who had dcsircd
to surround Napolcon at Rivoli, attcmptcd thc samc mancuvcr at Austcrlitz,
in spitc ol thc scvcrc lcsson hc had lormcrly rcccivcd. Tc lclt wing ol thc
allicd army, wishing to outank Napolcons right, to cut him o lrom \icnna,
(whcrc hc did not dcsirc to rcturn,) by a circular movcmcnt ol ncarly six milcs,
opcncd an intcrval ol a milc and a hall in thcir linc. Napolcon took advantagc
ol this mistakc, lcll upon thc ccntcr, and surroundcd thcir lclt, which was
complctcly shut up bctwccn Lakcs Tcllnitz and Mclnitz.
Vcllington gaincd thc battlc ol Salamanca by a mancuvcr vcry similar to
Napolcons, bccausc Marmont, who wishcd to cut o his rctrcat to Portugal,
lclt an opcning ol a milc and a hall in his linc,sccing which, thc nglish
gcncral cntircly dclcatcd his lclt wing, that had no support.
!l Vcyrothcr had bccn opposcd to Jourdan at Rivoli or at Austcrlitz, hc
might havc dcstroycd thc Frcnch army, instcad ol sucring in cach casc a total
dclcat, lor thc gcncral who at Stockach attackcd a mass ol sixty thousand mcn
with lour small bodics ol troops so much scparatcd as to bc unablc to givc
mutual aid would not havc known how to takc propcr advantagc ol a widc
dctour ccctcd in his prcscncc. !n thc samc way, Marmont was unlortunatc in
having at Salamanca an advcrsary whosc chicl mcrit was a rapid and practiccd
tactical coup-doeil. Vith thc ukc ol York or Moorc lor an antagonist,
Marmont would probably havc bccn succcsslul.
Among thc turning mancuvcrs which havc succccdcd in our day, Vatcrloo
and Hohcnlindcn had thc most brilliant rcsults. l thcsc thc rst was almost
altogcthcr a stratcgic opcration, and was attcndcd with a rarc concurrcncc
ol lortunatc circumstanccs. As to Hohcnlindcn, wc will scarch in vain in
military history lor anothcr cxamplc ol a singlc brigadc vcnturing into a lorcst
in thc midst ol lty thousand cncmics, and thcrc pcrlorming such astonishing
lcats as Richcpansc ccctcd in thc dclc ol Matcnpoct, whcrc hc might havc
cxpcctcd, in all probability, to lay down his arms.
At Vagram thc turning wing undcr avoust contributcd grcatly to thc
succcsslul issuc ol thc day, but, il thc vigorous attack upon thc ccntcr undcr
Macdonald, udinot, and 8crnadottc had not rcndcrcd opportunc assistancc,
it is by no mcans ccrtain that a likc succcss would havc bccn thc rcsult.
.
So many cxamplcs ol conicting rcsults might inducc thc conclusion that
no rulc on this subjcct can bc givcn, but this would bc crroncous, lor it sccms,
on thc contrary, quitc cvidcnt that, by adopting as a rulc an ordcr ol battlc
wcll closcd and wcll conncctcd, a gcncral will nd himscll prcparcd lor any
cmcrgcncy, and littlc will bc lclt to chancc, but it is spccially important lor
him to havc a corrcct cstimatc ol his cncmys charactcr and his usual stylc
ol warlarc, to cnablc him to rcgulatc his own actions accordingly. !n casc
ol supcriority in numbcrs or disciplinc, mancuvcrs may bc attcmptcd which
would bc imprudcnt wcrc thc lorccs cqual or thc commandcrs ol thc samc
capacity. A mancuvcr to outank and turn a wing should bc conncctcd with
othcr attacks, and opportuncly supportcd by an attcmpt ol thc rcmaindcr ol
thc army on thc cncmys lront, cithcr against thc wing turncd or against thc
ccntcr. Finally, stratcgic opcrations to cut an cncmys linc ol communications
bclorc giving battlc, and attack him in rcar, thc assailing army prcscrving its
own linc ol rctrcat, arc much morc likcly to bc succcsslul and ccctual, and,
morcovcr, thcy rcquirc no disconncctcd mancuvcr during thc battlc.
ARTICLE XXXIII
Unexpected Meeting of Two Armies on the March
Tc accidcntal and uncxpcctcd mccting ol two armics on thc march givcs risc
to onc ol thc most imposing sccncs in war.
!n thc grcatcr numbcr ol battlcs, onc party awaits his cncmy in a position
choscn in advancc, which is attackcd altcr a rcconnoissancc as closc and
accuratc as possiblc. !t oltcn happcns, howcvcr,cspccially as war is now
carricd on,that two armics approach cach othcr, cach intcnding to makc
an uncxpcctcd attack upon thc othcr. A collision cnsucs uncxpcctcd by both
armics, sincc cach nds thc othcr whcrc it docs not anticipatc a mccting. nc
army may also bc attackcd by anothcr which has prcparcd a surprisc lor it,as
happcncd to thc Frcnch at Rossbach.
A grcat occasion ol this kind calls into play all thc gcnius ol a skilllul gcncral
and ol thc warrior ablc to control cvcnts. !t is always possiblc to gain a battlc
with bravc troops, cvcn whcrc thc commandcr may not havc grcat capacity,
but victorics likc thosc ol Lutzcn, Luzzara, ylau, Abcnsbcrg, can only bc
gaincd by a brilliant gcnius cndowcd with grcat coolncss and using thc wiscst
combinations.
Tcrc is so much chancc in thcsc accidcntal battlcs that it is by no mcans
casy to lay down prccisc rulcs conccrning thcm, but thcsc arc thc vcry cascs
in which it is ncccssary to kccp clcarly bclorc thc mind thc lundamcntal
principlcs ol thc art and thc dicrcnt mcthods ol applying thcm, in ordcr to
a propcr arrangcmcnt ol mancuvcrs that must bc dccidcd upon at thc instant
and in thc midst ol thc crash ol rcsounding arms.
.
Two armics marching, as thcy lormcrly did, with all thcir campcquipagc,
and mccting uncxpcctcdly, could do nothing bcttcr at rst than causc thcir
advanccd guard to dcploy to thc right or lclt ol thc roads thcy arc travcrsing. !n
cach army thc lorccs should at thc samc timc bc conccntratcd so that thcy may
bc thrown in a propcr dircction considcring thc objcct ol thc march. A gravc
crror would bc committcd in dcploying thc wholc army bchind thc advanccd
guard, bccausc, cvcn il thc dcploymcnt wcrc accomplishcd, thc rcsult would bc
nothing morc than a badlyarrangcd parallcl ordcr, and il thc cncmy prcsscd
thc advanccd guard with considcrablc vigor thc conscqucncc might bc thc rout
ol thc troops which wcrc lorming. (Scc thc account ol thc battlc ol Rossbach,
Trcatisc on Grand pcrations.)
!n thc modcrn systcm, whcn armics arc morc casily movcd, marching upon
scvcral roads, and dividcd into masscs which may act indcpcndcntly, thcsc
routs arc not so much to bc lcarcd, but thc principlcs arc unchangcd. Tc
advanccd guard must always bc haltcd and lormcd, and thcn thc mass ol thc
troops conccntratcd in that dircction which is bcst suitcd lor carrying out thc
objcct ol thc march. Vhatcvcr mancuvcrs thc cncmy may thcn attcmpt, cvcry
thing will bc in rcadincss to mcct him.
ARTICLE XXXIV
Of Surprises of Armies
! shall not spcak hcrc ol surpriscs ol small dctachmcnts,thc chicl lcaturcs in
thc wars ol partisan or light troops, lor which thc light Russian and Turkish
cavalry arc so wcll adaptcd. ! shall connc myscll to an cxamination ol thc
surprisc ol wholc armics.
8clorc thc invcntion ol rcarms, surpriscs wcrc morc casily ccctcd than
at prcscnt, lor thc rcports ol artillcry and muskctry ring arc hcard to so grcat
a distancc that thc surprisc ol an army is now ncxt to an impossibility, unlcss
thc rst dutics ol cldscrvicc arc lorgottcn and thc cncmy is in thc midst ol
thc army bclorc his prcscncc is known bccausc thcrc arc no outposts to givc
thc alarm. Tc Scvcn Ycars Var prcscnts a mcmorablc cxamplc in thc surprisc
ol Hochkirch. !t shows that a surprisc docs not consist simply in lalling upon
troops that arc slccping or kccping a poor lookout, but that it may rcsult lrom
thc combination ol a suddcn attack upon, and a surrounding ol, onc cxtrcmity
ol thc army. !n lact, to surprisc an army it is not ncccssary to takc it so cntircly
unawarcs that thc troops will not cvcn havc cmcrgcd lrom thcir tcnts, but it is
sucicnt to attack it in lorcc at thc point intcndcd, bclorc prcparations can bc
madc to mcct thc attack.
As armics at thc prcscnt day scldom camp in tcnts whcn on a march,
prcarrangcd surpriscs arc rarc and dicult, bccausc in ordcr to plan onc it
bccomcs ncccssary to havc an accuratc knowlcdgc ol thc cncmys camp. At
.
Marcngo, at Lutzcn, and at ylau thcrc was somcthing likc a surprisc, but this
tcrm should only bc applicd to an cntircly uncxpcctcd attack. Tc only grcat
surprisc to bc citcd is thc casc ol Taroutin, in ..a, whcrc Murat was attackcd
and bcatcn by 8cnningscn. To cxcusc his imprudcncc, Murat prctcndcd that a
sccrct armisticc was in lorcc, but thcrc was rcally nothing ol thc kind, and hc
was surpriscd through his own ncgligcncc.
!t is cvidcnt that thc most lavorablc manncr ol attacking an army is to lall
upon its camp just bclorc daybrcak, at thc momcnt whcn nothing ol thc sort is
cxpcctcd. Conlusion in thc camp will ccrtainly takc placc, and, il thc assailant
has an accuratc knowlcdgc ol thc locality and can givc a suitablc tactical and
stratcgic dircction to thc mass ol his lorccs, hc may cxpcct a complctc succcss,
unlcss unlorcsccn cvcnts occur. Tis is an opcration by no mcans to bc dcspiscd
in war, although it is rarc, and lcss brilliant than a grcat stratcgic combination
which rcndcrs thc victory ccrtain cvcn bclorc thc battlc is lought.
For thc samc rcason that advantagc should bc takcn ol all opportunitics lor
surprising an advcrsary, thc ncccssary prccautions should bc uscd to prcvcnt
such attacks. Tc rcgulations lor thc govcrnmcnt ol any wcllorganizcd army
should point out thc mcans lor doing thc last.
ARTICLE XXXV
Of the Attack by Main Force of Fortified Places,
Intrenched Camps or Lines.Of Coups de Main in General
Tcrc arc many lorticd placcs which, although not rcgular lortrcsscs, arc
rcgardcd as sccurc against coups de main, but may ncvcrthclcss bc carricd by
cscaladc or assault, or through brcachcs not altogcthcr practicablc, but so stccp
as to rcquirc thc usc ol laddcrs or somc othcr mcans ol gctting to thc parapct.
Tc attack ol a placc ol this kind prcscnts ncarly thc samc combinations as
that ol an intrcnchcd camp, lor both bclong to thc class ol coups de main.
Tis kind ol attack will vary with circumstanccs: .st, with thc strcngth ol
thc works, ad, with thc charactcr ol thc ground on which thcy arc built, d,
with thc lact ol thcir bcing isolatcd or conncctcd, th, with thc moralc ol thc
rcspcctivc partics. History givcs us cxamplcs ol all ol thcsc varictics.
For cxamplcs, takc thc intrcnchcd camps ol Kchl, rcsdcn, and Varsaw, thc
lincs ol Turin and Maycncc, thc intrcnchmcnts ol Fcldkirch, Scharnitz, and
Assicttc. Hcrc ! havc mcntioncd scvcral cascs, cach with varying circumstanccs
and rcsults. At Kchl (.,6) thc intrcnchmcnts wcrc bcttcr conncctcd and bcttcr
constructcd than at Varsaw. Tcrc was, in lact, a tete de pont ncarly cqual to a
pcrmancnt lortication, lor thc archdukc thought himscll obligcd to bcsicgc it
in lorm, and it would havc bccn cxtrcmcly hazardous lor him to makc an opcn
attack upon it. At Varsaw thc works wcrc isolatcd, but ol considcrablc rclicl,
.6
and thcy had as a kccp a largc city surroundcd by loopholcd walls, armcd and
dclcndcd by a numbcr ol dcspcratc mcn.
rcsdcn, in .., had lor a kccp a bastioncd cnccintc, onc lront ol which,
howcvcr, was dismantlcd and had no othcr parapct than such as was suitcd to a
cldwork. Tc camp propcr was protcctcd by simplc rcdoubts, at considcrablc
distanccs apart, vcry poorly built, thc kccp giving it its solc strcngth.
|!|
At Maycncc and at Turin thcrc wcrc continuous lincs ol circumvallation, but
il in thc rst casc thcy wcrc strong, thcy wcrc ccrtainly not so at Turin, whcrc
upon onc ol thc important points thcrc was an insignicant parapct with a
command ol thrcc lcct, and a ditch proportionally dccp. !n thc lattcr casc,
also, thc lincs wcrc bctwccn two rcs, as thcy wcrc attackcd in rcar by a strong
garrison at thc momcnt whcn Princc ugcnc assailcd thcm lrom without. At
Maycncc thc lincs wcrc attackcd in lront, only a small dctachmcnt having
succccdcd in passing around thc right ank.
Tc tactical mcasurcs to bc takcn in thc attack ol cldworks arc lcw in
numbcr. !l it sccms probablc that a work may bc surpriscd il attackcd a littlc
bclorc day, it is altogcthcr propcr to makc thc attcmpt, but il this opcration
may bc rccommcndcd in casc ol an isolatcd work, it is by no mcans to bc
cxpcctcd that a largc army occupying an intrcnchcd camp will pcrmit itscll
to bc surpriscd,cspccially as thc rcgulations ol all scrviccs rcquirc armics to
stand to thcir arms at dawn. As an attack by main lorcc sccms likcly to bc thc
mcthod lollowcd in this casc, thc lollowing simplc and rcasonablc dircctions
arc laid down:
.. Silcncc thc guns ol thc work by a powcrlul artillcryrc, which at thc
samc timc has thc ccct ol discouraging thc dclcndcrs.
a. Providc lor thc troops all thc matcrials ncccssary (such as lascincs and
short laddcrs) to cnablc thcm to pass thc ditch and mount thc parapct.
. ircct thrcc small columns upon thc work to bc takcn, skirmishcrs
prcccding thcm, and rcscrvcs bcing at hand lor thcir support.
. Takc advantagc ol cvcry irrcgularity ol thc ground to gct covcr lor thc
troops, and kccp thcm shcltcrcd as long as possiblc.
. Givc dctailcd instructions to thc principal columns as to thcir dutics
whcn a work shall havc bccn carricd, and as to thc manncr ol attacking
thc troops occupying thc camp. csignatc thc bodics ol cavalry which arc
to assist in attacking thosc troops il thc ground pcrmits. Vhcn all thcsc
arrangcmcnts arc madc, thcrc is nothing morc to bc donc but to bring up
thc troops to thc attack as activcly as possiblc, whilc a dctachmcnt makcs
an attcmpt at thc gorgc. Hcsitancy and dclay in such a casc arc worsc
than thc most daring rashncss.
Tosc gymnastic cxcrciscs arc vcry usclul which prcparc soldicrs lor cscaladcs
and passing obstaclcs, and thc cnginccrs may with grcat advantagc givc thcir
!
Tc numbcr ol dclcndcrs at rcsdcn thc rst day (August a) was twcntylour thousand, thc ncxt
day, sixtyvc thousand, and thc third day, morc than onc hundrcd thousand.
.,
attcntion to providing mcans lor lacilitating thc passagc ol thc ditchcs ol cld
works and climbing thcir parapcts.
Among all thc arrangcmcnts in cascs ol this kind ol which ! havc rcad, nonc
arc bcttcr than thosc lor thc assault ol Varsaw and thc intrcnchcd camp ol
Maycncc. Ticlkc givcs a dcscription ol Laudons dispositions lor attacking
thc camp ol 8untzclwitz, which, although not cxccutcd, is an cxccllcnt
cxamplc lor instruction. Tc attack ol Varsaw may bc citcd as onc ol thc ncst
opcrations ol this sort, and docs honor to Marshal Paskcvitch and thc troops
who cxccutcd it. As an cxamplc not to bc lollowcd, no bcttcr can bc givcn than
thc arrangcmcnts madc lor attacking rcsdcn in ...
Among attacks ol this class may bc mcntioncd thc mcmorablc assaults or
cscaladcs ol Port Mahon in .,6, and ol 8crgopzoom in .,,,both prcccdcd
by sicgcs, but still brilliant coups de main, sincc in ncithcr casc was thc brcach
sucicntly largc lor a rcgular assault.
Continuous intrcnchcd lincs, although sccming to havc a bcttcr
intcrconncction than lincs ol dctachcd works, arc morc casily carricd, bccausc
thcy may bc scvcral lcagucs in cxtcnt, and it is almost impossiblc to prcvcnt an
cncmy lrom brcaking through thcm at somc point. Tc capturc ol thc lincs ol
Maycncc and Visscmbourg, which arc dcscribcd in thc History ol thc Vars
ol thc Rcvolution, (Chaptcrs XX!. and XX!!.,) and that ol thc lincs ol Turin
by ugcnc ol Savoy in .,c6, arc cxccllcnt lcssons lor study.
Tis lamous cvcnt at Turin, which has bccn so oltcn rclcrrcd to, is so lamiliar
to all rcadcrs that it is unncccssary to rccall thc dctails ol it, but ! cannot pass
it by without rcmarking how casily thc victory was bought and how littlc it
should havc bccn cxpcctcd. Tc stratcgic plan was ccrtainly admirablc, and
thc march lrom thc Adigc through Piaccnza to Asti by thc right bank ol
thc Po, lcaving thc Frcnch on thc Mincio, was bcautilully arrangcd, but its
cxccution was cxcccdingly slow. Vhcn wc cxaminc thc opcrations ncar Turin,
wc must conlcss that thc victors owcd morc to thcir good lortunc than to thcir
wisdom. !t rcquircd no grcat cort ol gcnius upon thc part ol Princc ugcnc
to prcparc thc ordcr hc issucd to his army, and hc must havc lclt a prolound
contcmpt lor his opponcnts to cxccutc a march with thirtyvc thousand
allicd troops ol tcn dicrcnt nations bctwccn cighty thousand Frcnchmcn on
thc onc sidc and thc Alps on thc othcr, and to pass around thcir camp lor
lortycight hours by thc most rcmarkablc ank march that was cvcr attcmptcd.
Tc ordcr lor thc attack was so bricl and so dcvoid ol instruction that any sta
occr ol thc prcscnt day ought to writc a bcttcr. irccting thc lormation ol
cight columns ol inlantry by brigadc in two lincs, giving thcm ordcrs to carry
thc intrcnchmcnts and to makc opcnings through thcm lor thc passagc ol thc
cavalry into thc camp, makc up thc sum total ol all thc scicncc cxhibitcd by
ugcnc in ordcr to carry out his rash undcrtaking !t is truc hc sclcctcd thc
wcak point ol thc intrcnchmcnt, lor it was thcrc so low that it covcrcd only
hall thc bodics ol its dclcndcrs.
.
8ut ! am wandcring lrom my subjcct, and must rcturn to thc cxplanation
ol thc mcasurcs most suitablc lor adoption in an attack on lincs. !l thcy havc
a sucicnt rclicl to makc it dicult to carry thcm by assault, and il on thc
othcr hand thcy may bc outankcd or turncd by stratcgic mancuvcrs, it is lar
bcttcr to pursuc thc coursc last indicatcd than to attcmpt a hazardous assault.
!l, howcvcr, thcrc is any rcason lor prclcrring thc attack by assault, it should
bc madc upon onc ol thc wings, bccausc thc ccntcr is thc point most casily
succorcd. Tcrc havc bccn cascs whcrc an attack on thc wing was cxpcctcd by
thc dclcndcrs, and thcy havc bccn dcccivcd by a lalsc attack madc at that point,
whilc thc rcal attack took placc at thc ccntcr, and succccdcd simply bccausc
uncxpcctcd. !n thcsc opcrations thc locality and thc charactcr ol thc gcncrals
cngagcd must dccidc as to thc propcr coursc to bc pursucd.
Tc attack may bc cxccutcd in thc manncr dcscribcd lor intrcnchcd camps.
!t has somctimcs happcncd, howcvcr, that thcsc lincs havc had thc rclicl and
proportions ol pcrmancnt works, and in this casc cscaladc would bc quitc
dicult, cxccpt ol old carthcn works whosc slopcs wcrc worn away lrom thc
lapsc ol timc and had bccomc acccssiblc lor inlantry ol modcratc activity. Tc
ramparts ol !smail and Praga wcrc ol this charactcr, so also was thc citadcl
ol Smolcnsk, which Paskcvitch so gloriously dclcndcd against Ncy, bccausc
hc prclcrrcd making his stand at thc ravincs in lront, rathcr than takc shcltcr
bchind a parapct with an inclination ol scarccly thirty dcgrccs.
!l onc cxtrcmity ol a linc rcsts upon a rivcr, it sccms absurd to think ol
pcnctrating upon that wing, bccausc thc cncmy collccting his lorccs, thc
mass ol which would bc ncar thc ccntcr, might dclcat thc columns advancing
bctwccn thc ccntcr and thc rivcr and complctcly dcstroy thcm. Tis absurdity,
howcvcr, has somctimcs bccn succcsslul, bccausc thc cncmy drivcn bchind
his lincs rarcly thinks ol making an ocnsivc rcturn upon thc assailant, no
mattcr how advantagcous it might sccm. A gcncral and soldicrs who scck
rclugc bchind lincs arc alrcady hall conqucrcd, and thc idca ol taking thc
ocnsivc docs not occur to thcm whcn thcir intrcnchmcnts arc attackcd.
Notwithstanding thcsc lacts, ! cannot advisc such a coursc, and thc gcncral
who would run such a risk and mcct thc latc ol Tallard at 8lcnhcim could havc
no just causc ol complaint.
\cry lcw dircctions can bc givcn lor thc dclcnsc ol intrcnchcd camps and
lincs. Tc rst is to bc surc ol having strong rcscrvcs placcd bctwccn thc ccntcr
and cach wing, or, to spcak morc accuratcly, on thc right ol thc lclt wing and
on thc lclt ol thc right wing. Vith this arrangcmcnt succor can bc casily and
rapidly carricd to a thrcatcncd point, which could not bc donc wcrc thcrc but
onc ccntral rcscrvc. !t has bccn suggcstcd that thrcc rcscrvcs would not bc
too many il thc intrcnchmcnt is vcry cxtcnsivc, but ! dccidcdly inclinc to thc
opinion that two arc quitc cnough. Anothcr rccommcndation may bc givcn,
and it is ol grcat importancc,that thc troops bc madc to undcrstand thcy
must by no mcans dcspair ol nally dclcnding a linc which may bc lorccd
at onc point, bccausc, il a good rcscrvc is at hand, it may takc thc ocnsivc,
.
attack thc assailant, and succccd in driving him out ol thc work hc may havc
supposcd in his powcr.
CUPS MA!N
Tcsc arc bold cntcrpriscs undcrtakcn by a dctachmcnt ol an army lor thc
capturc ol posts ol dicrcnt strcngth or importancc.
|!|
Tcy partakc ol thc
naturc both ol surpriscs and attacks by main lorcc, lor both thcsc mcthods may
bc cmploycd in carrying an attcmpt ol this sort to a succcsslul issuc. Although
coups de main sccm to bc cntircly tactical opcrations, thcir importancc ccrtainly
dcpcnds on thc rclations ol thc capturcd posts to thc stratcgic combinations in
hand. !t will bccomc ncccssary, thcrclorc, to say a lcw words with rclcrcncc to
coups dc main in Articlc XXX\!., whcn spcaking ol dctachmcnts. Howcvcr
tircsomc thcsc rcpctitions may sccm, ! am obligcd to statc hcrc thc manncr ol
cxccuting such opcrations, as it is cvidcntly a part ol thc subjcct ol thc attack
ol intrcnchmcnts.
! do not prctcnd to say that thc rulcs ol tactics apply to thcsc opcrations,
lor thcir namc, coups de main, implics that ordinary rulcs arc not applicablc
to thcm. ! dcsirc only to call attcntion to thcm, and rclcr my rcadcrs to thc
dicrcnt works, cithcr historical or didactic, whcrc thcy arc mcntioncd.
! havc prcviously statcd that important rcsults may oltcn lollow lrom thcsc
cntcrpriscs. Tc capturc ol Sizcboli in .a, thc unsucccsslul attack ol Gcncral
Pctrasch upon Kchl in .,6, thc rcmarkablc surpriscs ol Crcmona in .,ca, ol
Gibraltar in .,c, and ol 8crgopzoom in .., as wcll as thc cscaladcs ol Port
Mahon and 8adajos, givc an idca ol thc dicrcnt kinds ol coup de main. Somc
arc ccctcd by surprisc, othcrs by opcn lorcc. Skill, stratagcms, boldncss, on
thc part ol thc assailant, and lcar cxcitcd among thc assailcd, arc somc ol thc
things which havc an inucncc upon thc succcsslul issuc ol coups de main.
As war is now wagcd, thc capturc ol a post, howcvcr strong, is no longcr
ol thc samc importancc as lormcrly unlcss it has a dircct inucncc upon thc
rcsults ol a grcat stratcgic opcration.
Tc capturc or dcstruction ol a bridgc dclcndcd by intrcnchmcnts, that ol
a largc convoy, ol a small lort closing important passcs, likc thc two attacks
which wcrc madc in ., upon thc lort ol Lucistcig in thc Grisons, thc capturc
ol Lcutasch and Scharnitz by Ncy in .c, nally, thc capturc ol a post not
cvcn lorticd, but uscd as a grcat dcpot ol provisions and munitions much
nccdcd by thc cncmy,such arc thc cntcrpriscs which will justily thc risks to
which a dctachmcnt cngaging in thcm may bc cxposcd.
Posts havc bccn capturcd by lling up thc ditchcs somctimcs with lascincs,
somctimcs with bags ol wool, and manurc has bccn uscd lor thc samc purposc.
!
Tc distinction bctwccn thc importancc and thc strcngth ol a post must bc obscrvcd, lor it may
bc vcry strong and ol vcry littlc importancc, and vicc avcrsa.
.6c
Laddcrs arc gcncrally ncccssary, and should always bc prcparcd. Hooks havc
bccn uscd in thc hands and attachcd to thc shocs ol soldicrs, to hclp thcm in
climbing rocky hcights which commandcd thc intrcnchmcnt. An cntrancc
was ccctcd through thc scwcrs at Crcmona by Princc ugcnc.
!n rcading such lacts, wc must draw lrom thcm not rulcs, but hints, lor what
has bccn donc oncc may bc donc again.
.6.
Commentary on Chapter IV
T
hc chaptcr on grand tactics, which Jomini dcscribcs as thc tactical
combinations madc by thc commandcr in chicl ol an army, is a gold minc
lor historians. Jomini is quitc comprchcnsivc in his dcscription ol thc various
lormations an cxpcricnccd .th ccntury commandcr would havc in his bag
ol tricks, a scparatc articlc dcals with thc problcms associatcd with tactical
turning mancuvcrs. Tc primary cmphasis in this chaptcr is givcn ovcr to thc
ocnsivc sidc ol thc cld, as obviously a dclcnsivc gcncral is most likcly rcacting
to what his opponcnt is doing. Jomini, howcvcr, is carclul to cmphasizc that a
dclcnsc should ncvcr rcmain cntircly passivc, but at somc point should attcmpt
to wrcst thc initiativc away lrom his attackcr. Tc wcakcst part ol this chaptcr
is thc short scction on surprisc. Jomini sccmcd to think that, sincc surprisc
was an unrcliablc although dcsirablc clcmcnt in war, hc could not wholc
hcartcdly rccommcnd trying to surprisc an opponcnt. Hc was so dctcrmincd
to climinatc chaos and conlusion lrom thc battlccld that hc ncglcctcd to scc
how a gcncral could put surprisc to usc as an ally.
.6a
CHAPTER V
OF SEVERAL MIXED OPERATIONS, WHICH ARE IN
CHARACTER PARTLY STRATEGICAL AND PARTLY
TACTICAL
ARTICLE XXXVI
Of Diversions and Great Detachments
T
hc opcrations ol thc dctachmcnts an army may scnd out havc so important
a bcaring on thc succcss ol a campaign, that thc duty ol dctcrmining
thcir strcngth and thc propcr occasions lor thcm is onc ol thc grcatcst and
most dclicatc rcsponsibilitics imposcd upon a commandcr. !l nothing is morc
usclul in war than a strong dctachmcnt opportuncly scnt out and having a
good ensemble ol opcrations with thc main body, it is cqually ccrtain that no
cxpcdicnt is morc dangcrous whcn inconsidcratcly adoptcd. Frcdcrick thc
Grcat rcgardcd it as onc ol thc csscntial qualitics ol a gcncral to know how
to makc his advcrsary scnd out many dctachmcnts, cithcr with thc vicw ol
dcstroying thcm in dctail or ol attacking thc main body during thcir abscncc.
Tc division ol armics into numcrous dctachmcnts has somctimcs bccn
carricd to so grcat an cxtcnt, and with such poor rcsults, that many pcrsons
now bclicvc it bcttcr to havc nonc ol thcm. !t is undoubtcdly much salcr and
morc agrccablc lor an army to bc kcpt in a singlc mass, but it is a thing at
timcs impossiblc or incompatiblc with gaining a complctc or cvcn considcrablc
succcss. Tc csscntial point in this mattcr is to scnd out as lcw dctachmcnts
as possiblc.
Tcrc arc scvcral kinds ol dctachmcnts.
.. Tcrc arc largc corps dispatchcd to a distancc lrom thc zonc ol opcrations
ol thc main army, in ordcr to makc divcrsions ol grcatcr or lcss importancc.
a. Tcrc arc largc dctachmcnts madc in thc zonc ol opcrations to covcr
important points ol this zonc, to carry on a sicgc, to guard a sccondary basc,
or to protcct thc linc ol opcrations il thrcatcncd.
.6
Chaptcr \. l Scvcral Mixcd pcrations, Vhich Arc in
Charactcr Partly Stratcgical and Partly Tactical
. Tcrc arc largc dctachmcnts madc upon thc lront ol opcrations, in lacc ol
thc cncmy, to act in conccrt with thc main body in somc combincd opcration.
. Tcrc arc small dctachmcnts scnt to a distancc to try thc ccct ol surprisc
upon isolatcd points, whosc capturc may havc an important bcaring upon thc
gcncral opcrations ol thc campaign.
! undcrstand by divcrsions thosc sccondary opcrations carricd out at a
distancc lrom thc principal zonc ol opcrations, at thc cxtrcmitics ol a thcatcr
ol war, upon thc succcss ol which it is somctimcs loolishly supposcd thc
wholc campaign dcpcnds. Such divcrsions arc usclul in but two cascs, thc
rst ol which ariscs whcn thc troops thus cmploycd cannot convcnicntly act
clscwhcrc on account ol thcir distancc lrom thc rcal thcatcr ol opcrations, and
thc sccond is that whcrc such a dctachmcnt would rcccivc strong support lrom
thc population among which it was scnt,thc lattcr casc bclonging rathcr to
political than military combinations. A lcw illustrativc cxamplcs may not bc
out ol placc hcrc.
Tc unlortunatc rcsults lor thc allicd powcrs ol thc AngloRussian cxpcdition
to Holland, and ol that ol thc Archdukc Charlcs toward thc cnd ol thc last
ccntury, (which havc bccn rclcrrcd to in Articlc X!X.,) arc wcll known.
!n .c, Napolcon was occupying Naplcs and Hanovcr. Tc allics intcndcd
an AngloRussian army to drivc him out ol !taly, whilc thc combincd lorccs
ol ngland, Russia, and Swcdcn should drivc him lrom Hanovcr, ncarly sixty
thousand mcn bcing dcsigncd lor thcsc two widclyscparatcd points. 8ut,
whilc thcir troops wcrc collccting at thc two cxtrcmitics ol uropc, Napolcon
ordcrcd thc cvacuation ol Naplcs and Hanovcr, SaintCyr hastcncd to ccct a
junction with Masscna in thc Frioul, and 8crnadottc, lcaving Hanovcr, movcd
up to takc part in thc opcrations ol Ulm and Austcrlitz. Altcr thcsc astonishing
succcsscs, Napolcon had no diculty in rctaking Naplcs and Hanovcr. Tis is
an cxamplc ol thc lailurc ol divcrsions. ! will givc an instancc whcrc such an
opcration would havc bccn propcr.
!n thc civil wars ol .,, il thc allics had scnt twcnty thousand mcn to La
\cndcc, thcy would havc accomplishcd much morc than by incrcasing thc
numbcrs ol thosc who wcrc ghting lruitlcssly at Toulon, upon thc Rhinc, and
in 8clgium. Hcrc is a casc whcrc a divcrsion would havc bccn not only vcry
usclul, but dccisivc.
!t has alrcady bccn statcd that, bcsidcs divcrsions to a distancc and ol small
bodics, largc corps arc oltcn dctachcd in thc zonc ol opcrations ol thc main
army.
!l thc cmploymcnt ol thcsc largc corps thus dctachcd lor sccondary objccts
is morc dangcrous than thc divcrsions abovc rclcrrcd to, it is no lcss truc that
thcy arc oltcn highly propcr and, it may bc, indispcnsablc.
Tcsc grcat dctachmcnts arc chicy ol two kinds. Tc rst arc pcrmancnt
corps which must bc somctimcs thrown out in a dircction oppositc to thc
main linc ol opcrations, and arc to rcmain throughout a campaign. Tc sccond
.6
arc corps tcmporarily dctachcd lor thc purposc ol assisting in carrying out
somc spccial cntcrprisc.
Among thc rst should bc cspccially cnumcratcd thosc lractions ol an army
that arc dctachcd cithcr to lorm thc stratcgic rcscrvc, ol which mcntion has
bccn madc, or to covcr lincs ol opcration and rctrcat whcn thc conguration
ol thc thcatcr ol thc war cxposcs thcm to attack. For cxamplc, a Russian army
that wishcs to cross thc 8alkan is obligcd to lcavc a portion ol its lorccs to
obscrvc Shumla, Routchouk, and thc vallcy ol thc anubc, whosc dircction
is pcrpcndicular to its linc ol opcrations. Howcvcr succcsslul it may bc, a
rcspcctablc lorcc must always bc lclt toward Giurgcvo or Krajova, and cvcn on
thc right bank ol thc rivcr toward Routchouk.
Tis singlc cxamplc shows that it is somctimcs ncccssary to havc a doublc
stratcgic lront, and thcn thc dctachmcnt ol a considcrablc corps must bc madc
to ocr lront to a part ol thc cncmys army in rcar ol thc main army. thcr
localitics and othcr circumstanccs might bc mcntioncd whcrc this mcasurc
would bc cqually csscntial to salcty. nc casc is thc doublc stratcgic lront ol
thc Tyrol and thc Frioul lor a Frcnch army passing thc Adigc. n whichcvcr
sidc it may wish to dircct its main column, a dctachmcnt must bc lclt on thc
othcr lront sucicntly strong to hold in chcck thc cncmy thrcatcning to cut
thc linc ol communications. Tc third cxamplc is thc lronticr ol Spain, which
cnablcs thc Spaniards to cstablish a doublc lront,onc covcring thc road to
Madrid, thc othcr having Saragossa or Galicia as a basc. To whichcvcr sidc thc
invading army turns, a dctachmcnt must bc lclt on thc othcr proportioncd in
magnitudc to thc cncmys lorcc in that dircction.
All that can bc said on this point is that it is advantagcous to cnlargc as
much as possiblc thc cld ol opcrations ol such dctachmcnts, and to givc thcm
as much powcr ol mobility as possiblc, in ordcr to cnablc thcm by opportunc
movcmcnts to strikc important blows. A most rcmarkablc illustration ol this
truth was givcn by Napolcon in thc campaign ol .,,. bligcd as hc was to
lcavc a corps ol ltccn thousand mcn in thc vallcy ol thc Adigc to obscrvc
thc Tyrol whilc hc was opcrating toward thc Noric Alps, hc prclcrrcd to draw
this corps to his aid, at thc risk ol losing tcmporarily his linc ol rctrcat, rathcr
than lcavc thc parts ol his army disconncctcd and cxposcd to dclcat in dctail.
Pcrsuadcd that hc could bc victorious with his army unitcd, hc apprchcndcd
no particular dangcr lrom thc prcscncc ol a lcw hostilc dctachmcnts upon his
communications.
Grcat movablc and tcmporary dctachmcnts arc madc lor thc lollowing
rcasons:
.. To compcl your cncmy to rctrcat to covcr his linc ol opcrations, or clsc
to covcr your own.
a. To intcrccpt a corps and prcvcnt its junction with thc main body ol thc
cncmy, or to lacilitatc thc approach ol your own rcinlorccmcnts.
.6
. To obscrvc and hold in position a largc portion ol thc opposing army,
whilc a blow is struck at thc rcmaindcr.
. To carry o a considcrablc convoy ol provisions or munitions, on
rccciving which dcpcndcd thc continuancc ol a sicgc or thc succcss ol any
stratcgic cntcrprisc, or to protcct thc march ol a convoy ol your own.
. To makc a dcmonstration to draw thc cncmy in a dircction whcrc you
wish him to go, in ordcr to lacilitatc thc cxccution ol an cntcrprisc in
anothcr dircction.
6. To mask, or cvcn to invcst, onc or morc lorticd placcs lor a ccrtain
timc, with a vicw cithcr to attack or to kccp thc garrison shut up within
thc ramparts.
,. To takc posscssion ol an important point upon thc communications ol
an cncmy alrcady rctrcating.
Howcvcr grcat may bc thc tcmptation to undcrtakc such opcrations as
thosc cnumcratcd, it must bc constantly bornc in mind that thcy arc always
sccondary in importancc, and that thc csscntial thing is to bc succcsslul at thc
dccisivc points. A multiplication ol dctachmcnts must, thcrclorc, bc avoidcd.
Armics havc bccn dcstroycd lor no othcr rcason than that thcy wcrc not kcpt
togcthcr.
Vc will hcrc rclcr to scvcral ol thcsc cntcrpriscs, to show that thcir succcss
dcpcnds somctimcs upon good lortunc and somctimcs upon thc skill ol thcir
dcsigncr, and that thcy oltcn lail lrom laulty cxccution.
Pctcr thc Grcat took thc rst stcp toward thc dcstruction ol Charlcs X!!. by
causing thc scizurc, by a strong dctachmcnt, ol thc lamous convoy Lowcnhaupt
was bringing up. \illars cntircly dclcatcd at cnain thc largc dctachmcnt
Princc ugcnc scnt out in .,c undcr Albcrmalc.
Tc dcstruction ol thc grcat convoy Laudon took lrom Frcdcrick during
thc sicgc ol lmutz compcllcd thc king to cvacuatc Moravia. Tc latc ol thc
two dctachmcnts ol Fouquct at Landshut in .,6c, and ol Fink at Maxcn in
.,, dcmonstratcs how dicult it is at timcs to avoid making dctachmcnts,
and how dangcrous thcy may bc. To comc ncarcr our own timcs, thc disastcr
ol \andammc at Culm was a bloody lcsson, tcaching that a corps must not
bc thrust lorward too boldly: howcvcr, wc must admit that in this casc thc
opcration was wcll planncd, and thc lault was not so much in scnding out thc
dctachmcnt as in not supporting it propcrly, as might casily havc bccn donc.
Tat ol Fink was dcstroycd at Maxcn ncarly on thc samc spot and lor thc samc
rcason.
ivcrsions or dcmonstrations in thc zonc ol opcrations ol thc army arc
dccidcdly advantagcous whcn arrangcd lor thc purposc ol cngaging thc
cncmys attcntion in onc dircction, whilc thc mass ol thc lorccs is collcctcd upon
anothcr point whcrc thc important blow is to bc struck. !n such a casc, carc
must bc takcn not only to avoid cngaging thc corps making thc dcmonstration,
.66
but to rccall it promptly toward thc main body. Vc will mcntion two cxamplcs
as illustrations ol thcsc lacts.
!n .cc, Morcau, wishing to dcccivc Kray as to thc truc dircction ol his
march, carricd his lclt wing toward Rastadt lrom Kchl, whilst hc was rcally
ling o his army toward Stockach, his lclt, having simply shown itscll,
rcturncd toward thc ccntcr by Fribourg in 8risgau.
!n .c, Napolcon, whilc mastcr ol \icnna, dctachcd thc corps ol 8crnadottc
to !glau to ovcrawc 8ohcmia and paralyzc thc Archdukc Fcrdinand, who was
asscmbling an army in that tcrritory, in anothcr dircction hc scnt avoust to
Prcsburg to show himscll in Hungary, but hc withdrcw thcm to 8runn, to
takc part in thc cvcnt which was to dccidc thc issuc ol thc campaign, and a
grcat and dccisivc victory was thc rcsult ol his wisc mancuvcrs. pcrations ol
this kind, so lar lrom bcing in opposition to thc principlcs ol thc art ol war, arc
ncccssary to lacilitatc thcir application.
!t rcadily appcars lrom what gocs bclorc that prccisc rulcs cannot bc laid down
lor thcsc opcrations, so varicd in charactcr, thc succcss ol which dcpcnds on
so many minutc dctails. Gcncrals should run thc risk ol making dctachmcnts
only altcr carclul considcration and obscrvation ol all thc surrounding
circumstanccs. Tc only rcasonablc rulcs on thc subjcct arc thcsc: scnd out as
lcw dctachmcnts as possiblc, and rccall thorn immcdiatcly whcn thcir duty is
pcrlormcd. Tc inconvcnicnccs ncccssarily attcnding thcm may bc madc as
lcw as practicablc, by giving judicious and carclullyprcparcd instructions to
thcir commandcrs: hcrcin lics thc grcat talcnt ol a good chicl ol sta.
nc ol thc mcans ol avoiding thc disastrous rcsults to which dctachmcnts
somctimcs lcad is to ncglcct nonc ol thc prccautions prcscribcd by tactics lor
incrcasing thc strcngth ol any lorcc by posting it in good positions, but it is
gcncrally imprudcnt to cngagc in a scrious conict with too largc a body ol
troops. !n such cascs casc and rapidity ol motion will bc most likcly to insurc
salcty. !t scldom happcns that it is right lor a dctachmcnt to rcsolvc to conqucr
or dic in thc position it has takcn, whcthcr voluntarily or by ordcr.
!t is ccrtain that in all possiblc cascs thc rulcs ol tactics and ol cld
lortication must bc applicd by dctachmcnts as wcll as by thc army itscll.
Sincc wc havc includcd in thc numbcr ol usclul cascs ol dctachmcnts thosc
intcndcd lor coups de main, it is propcr to mcntion a lcw cxamplcs ol this
kind to cnablc thc rcadcr to judgc lor himscll. Vc may call to mind that onc
which was cxccutcd by thc Russians toward thc cnd ol .a with thc vicw ol
taking posscssion ol Sizcboli in thc Gull ol 8ourghas. Tc capturc ol this
lccblylorticd gull, which thc Russians rapidly strcngthcncd, procurcd lor
thcm in casc ol succcss an csscntial point dappui bcyond thc 8alkan, whcrc
dcpots could bc cstablishcd in advancc lor thc army intcnding to cross thosc
mountains: in casc ol lailurc, no onc was compromiscd,not cvcn thc small
corps which had bccn dcbarkcd, sincc it had a salc and ccrtain rctrcat to thc
shipping.
.6,
!n likc manncr, in thc campaign ol .,6, thc coup de main attcmptcd by
thc Austrians lor thc purposc ol taking posscssion ol Kchl and dcstroying
thc bridgc whilst Morcau was rcturning lrom 8avaria, would havc had vcry
important conscqucnccs il it had not lailcd.
!n attcmpts ol this kind a littlc is riskcd to gain a grcat dcal, and, as thcy
can in no wisc compromisc thc salcty ol thc main army, thcy may bc lrccly
rccommcndcd.
Small bodics ol troops thrown lorward into thc zonc ol thc cncmys
opcrations bclong to thc class ol dctachmcnts that arc judicious. A lcw hundrcd
horscmcn thus riskcd will bc no grcat loss il capturcd, and thcy may bc thc
mcans ol causing thc cncmy grcat injury. Tc small dctachmcnts scnt out by
thc Russians in .c,, ..a, and .. wcrc a grcat hindcrancc to Napolcons
opcrations, and scvcral timcs causcd his plans to lail by intcrccpting his
couricrs.
For such cxpcditions occrs should bc sclcctcd who arc bold and lull ol
stratagcms. Tcy ought to inict upon thc cncmy all thc injury thcy can
without compromising thcmsclvcs. Vhcn an opportunity ol striking a tclling
blow prcscnts itscll, thcy should not think lor a momcnt ol any dangcrs or
dicultics in thcir path. Gcncrally, howcvcr, addrcss and prcscncc ol mind,
which will lcad thcm to avoid usclcss dangcr, arc qualitics morc ncccssary
lor a partisan than cool, calculating boldncss. For lurthcr inlormation on
this subjcct ! rclcr my rcadcrs to Chaptcr XXX\. ol thc Trcatisc on Grand
pcrations, and to Articlc XL\. ol this work, on light cavalry.
ARTICLE XXXVII
Passage of Rivers and Other Streams
Tc passagc ol a small strcam, ovcr which a bridgc is alrcady in placc or might
bc casily constructcd, prcscnts nonc ol thc combinations bclonging to grand
tactics or stratcgy, but thc passagc ol a largc rivcr, such as thc anubc, thc
Rhinc, thc Po, thc lbc, thc dcr, thc \istula, thc !nn, thc Ticino, &c, is an
opcration worthy thc closcst study.
Tc art ol building military bridgcs is a spccial branch ol military scicncc,
which is committcd to pontonicrs or sappcrs. !t is not lrom this point ol vicw
that ! proposc to considcr thc passagc ol a strcam, but as thc attack ol a military
position and as a mancuvcr.
Tc passagc itscll is a tactical opcration, but thc dctcrmination ol thc point
ol passagc may havc an important conncction with all thc opcrations taking
placc within thc cntirc thcatcr ol thc war. Tc passagc ol thc Rhinc by Gcncral
Morcau in .cc is an cxccllcnt illustration ol thc truth ol this rcmark. Napolcon,
a morc skilllul stratcgist than Morcau, dcsircd him to cross at Schahauscn in
ordcr to takc Krays wholc army in rcvcrsc, to rcach Ulm bclorc him, to cut him
.6
o lrom Austria and hurl him back upon thc Main. Morcau, who had alrcady
a bridgc at 8ascl, prclcrrcd passing, with grcatcr convcnicncc to his army, in
lront ol thc cncmy, to turning his cxtrcmc lclt. Tc tactical advantagcs sccmcd
to his mind much morc surc than thc stratcgical: hc prclcrrcd thc ccrtainty
ol a partial succcss to thc risk attcnding a victory which would havc bccn a
dccisivc onc. !n thc samc campaign Napolcons passagc ol thc Po is anothcr
cxamplc ol thc high stratcgic importancc ol thc choicc ol thc point ol crossing.
Tc army ol thc rcscrvc, altcr thc cngagcmcnt ol thc Chiusclla, could cithcr
march by thc lclt bank ol thc Po to Turin, or cross thc rivcr at Crcsccntino and
march dircctly to Gcnoa. Napolcon prclcrrcd to cross thc Ticino, cntcr Milan,
ccct a junction with Monccy who was approaching with twcnty thousand
mcn by thc SaintGothard pass, thcn to cross thc Po at Piaccnza, cxpccting
to gct bclorc Mclas morc ccrtainly in that dircction than il hc camc down too
soon upon his linc ol rctrcat. Tc passagc ol thc anubc at onauwcrth and
!ngolstadt in .c was a vcry similar opcration. Tc dircction choscn lor thc
passagc was thc primc causc ol thc dcstruction ol Macks army.
Tc propcr stratcgic point ol passagc is casily dctcrmincd by rccollccting
thc principlcs laid down in Articlc X!X., and it is hcrc only ncccssary to
rcmind thc rcadcr that in crossing a rivcr, as in cvcry othcr opcration, thcrc
arc pcrmancnt or gcographical dccisivc points, and othcrs which arc rclativc or
cvcntual, dcpcnding on thc distribution ol thc hostilc lorccs.
!l thc point sclcctcd combincs stratcgic advantagcs with thc tactical, no othcr
point can bc bcttcr, but il thc locality prcscnts obstaclcs cxcccdingly dicult
to pass, anothcr must bc choscn, and in making thc ncw sclcction carc should
bc takcn to havc thc dircction ol thc movcmcnt as ncarly as possiblc coincidcnt
with thc truc stratcgic dircction. !ndcpcndcntly ol thc gcncral combinations,
which cxcrcisc a grcat inucncc in xing thc point ol passagc, thcrc is still
anothcr considcration, conncctcd with thc locality itscll. Tc bcst position
is that whcrc thc army altcr crossing can takc its lront ol opcrations and linc
ol battlc pcrpcndicular to thc rivcr, at lcast lor thc rst marchcs, without
bcing lorccd to scparatc into scvcral corps moving upon dicrcnt lincs. Tis
advantagc will also savc it thc dangcr ol ghting a battlc with a rivcr in rcar, as
happcncd to Napolcon at ssling.
nough has bccn said with rclcrcncc to thc stratcgical considcrations
inucncing thc sclcction ol thc point ol crossing a rivcr. Vc will now procccd
to spcak ol thc passagc itscll. History is thc bcst school in which to study thc
mcasurcs likcly to insurc thc succcss ol such opcrations. Tc ancicnts dccmcd
thc passagc ol thc Granicuswhich is a small strcama wondcrlul cxploit.
So lar as this point is conccrncd, thc pcoplc ol modcrn days can citc much
grcatcr.
Tc passagc ol thc Rhinc at Tolhuys by Louis X!\. has bccn grcatly
laudcd, and it was rcally rcmarkablc. !n our own timc, Gcncral cdon has
madc lamous thc two passagcs ol thc Rhinc at Kchl and ol thc anubc at
Hochstadt in .cc. His work is a modcl as lar as conccrns thc dctails, and in
.6
thcsc opcrations minutc attcntion to dctails is cvcry thing. Morc rcccntly, thrcc
othcr passagcs ol thc anubc, and thc cvcrlamous passagc ol thc 8crcsina,
havc cxcccdcd cvcry thing ol thc kind prcviously sccn. Tc two rst wcrc
cxccutcd by Napolcon at ssling and at Vagram, in prcscncc ol an army ol
onc hundrcd and twcnty thousand mcn providcd with lour hundrcd picccs ol
cannon, and at a point whcrc thc bcd ol thc strcam is broadcst. Gcncral Pclcts
intcrcsting account ol thcm should bc carclully rcad. Tc third was cxccutcd
by thc Russian army at Satounovo in .a, which, although not to bc comparcd
with thc two just mcntioncd, was vcry rcmarkablc on account ol thc grcat local
dicultics and thc vigorous cxcrtions madc to surmount thcm. Tc passagc
ol thc 8crcsina was truly wondcrlul. My objcct not bcing to givc historical
dctails on this subjcct, ! dircct my rcadcrs to thc spccial narrativcs ol thcsc
cvcnts. ! will givc scvcral gcncral rulcs to bc obscrvcd.
.. !t is csscntial to dcccivc thc cncmy as to thc point ol passagc, that hc
may not accumulatc an opposing lorcc thcrc. !n addition to thc stratcgic
dcmonstrations, lalsc attacks must bc madc ncar thc rcal onc, to dividc thc
attcntion and mcans ol thc cncmy. For this purposc hall ol thc artillcry should
bc cmploycd to makc a grcat dcal ol noisc at thc points whcrc thc passagc
is not to bc madc, whilst pcrlcct silcncc should bc prcscrvcd whcrc thc rcal
attcmpt is to bc madc.
a. Tc construction ol thc bridgc should bc covcrcd as much as possiblc
by troops scnt ovcr in boats lor thc purposc ol dislodging thc cncmy who
might intcrlcrc with thc progrcss ol thc work, and thcsc troops should takc
posscssion at oncc ol any villagcs, woods, or othcr obstaclcs in thc vicinity.
. !t is ol importancc also to arrangc largc battcrics ol hcavy calibcr, not only
to swccp thc oppositc bank, but to silcncc any artillcry thc cncmy might bring
up to battcr thc bridgc whilc building. For this purposc it is convcnicnt to havc
thc bank lrom which thc passagc is madc somcwhat highcr than thc othcr.
. Tc proximity ol a largc island ncar thc cncmys bank givcs grcat lacilitics
lor passing ovcr troops in boats and lor constructing thc bridgc. !n likc
manncr, a smallcr strcam cmptying into thc largcr ncar thc point ol passagc
is a lavorablc placc lor collccting and conccaling boats and matcrials lor thc
bridgc.
. !t is wcll to choosc a position whcrc thc rivcr makcs a rccntcring bcnd,
as thc battcrics on thc assailants sidc can cross thcir rc in lront ol thc point
whcrc thc troops arc to land lrom thc boats and whcrc thc cnd ol thc bridgc is
to rcst, thus taking thc cncmy in lront and ank whcn hc attcmpts to opposc
thc passagc.
6. Tc locality sclcctcd should bc ncar good roads on both banks, that thc
army may havc good communications to thc lront and rcar on both banks ol
thc rivcr. For this rcason, thosc points whcrc thc banks arc high and stccp
should bc usually avoidcd.
.,c
Tc rulcs lor prcvcnting a passagc lollow as a mattcr ol coursc lrom thosc
lor cccting it, as thc duty ol thc dclcndcrs is to countcract thc corts ol
thc assailants. Tc important thing is to havc thc coursc ol thc rivcr watchcd
by bodics ol light troops, without attcmpting to makc a dclcnsc at cvcry
point. Conccntratc rapidly at thc thrcatcncd point, in ordcr to ovcrwhclm thc
cncmy whilc a part only ol his army shall havc passcd. !mitatc thc ukc ol
\cndomc at Cassano, and thc Archdukc Charlcs at ssling in .c,thc last
cxamplc bcing particularly worthy ol praisc, although thc opcration was not
so dccidcdly succcsslul as might havc bccn cxpcctcd.
!n Articlc XX!. attcntion was callcd to thc inucncc that thc passagc ol a
rivcr, in thc opcning ol a campaign, may havc in giving dircction to thc lincs
ol opcrations. Vc will now scc what conncction it may havc with subscqucnt
stratcgic movcmcnts.
nc ol thc grcatcst dicultics to bc cncountcrcd altcr a passagc is to covcr
thc bridgc against thc cncmys corts to dcstroy it, without intcrlcring too
much with thc lrcc movcmcnt ol thc army. Vhcn thc army is numcrically
vcry supcrior to thc cncmy, or whcn thc rivcr is passcd just altcr a grcat
victory gaincd, thc diculty mcntioncd is triing, but whcn thc campaign
is just opcning, and thc two opposing armics arc about cqual, thc casc is vcry
dicrcnt.
!l onc hundrcd thousand Frcnchmcn pass thc Rhinc at Strasbourg or at
Manhcim in prcscncc ol onc hundrcd thousand Austrians, thc rst thing to
bc donc will bc to drivc thc cncmy in thrcc dircctions,rst, bclorc thcm as
lar as thc 8lack Forcst, sccondly, by thc right in ordcr to covcr thc bridgcs on
thc Uppcr Rhinc, and thirdly, by thc lclt to covcr thc bridgcs ol Maycncc and
thc Lowcr Rhinc. Tis ncccssity is thc causc ol an unlortunatc division ol thc
lorccs, but, to makc thc inconvcnicnccs ol this subdivision as lcw as possiblc,
thc idca must bc insistcd on that it is by no mcans csscntial lor thc army to bc
scparatcd into thrcc cqual parts, nor nccd thcsc dctachmcnts rcmain abscnt
longcr than thc lcw days rcquircd lor taking posscssion ol thc natural point ol
conccntration ol thc cncmys lorccs.
Tc lact cannot bc conccalcd, howcvcr, that thc casc supposcd is onc in
which thc gcncral nds his position a most trying onc, lor il hc dividcs his
army to protcct his bridgcs hc may bc obligcd to contcnd with onc ol his
subdivisions against thc wholc ol thc cncmys lorcc, and havc it ovcrwhclmcd,
and il hc movcs his army upon a singlc linc, thc cncmy may dividc his army
and rcasscmblc it at somc uncxpcctcd point, thc bridgcs may bc capturcd or
dcstroycd, and thc gcncral may nd himscll compromiscd bclorc hc has had
timc or opportunity to gain a victory.
Tc bcst coursc to bc pursucd is to placc thc bridgcs ncar a city which will
aord a strong dclcnsivc point lor thcir protcction, to inlusc all possiblc
vigor and activity into thc rst opcrations altcr thc passagc, to lall upon thc
subdivisions ol thc cncmys army in succcssion, and to bcat thcm in such a
way that thcy will havc no lurthcr dcsirc ol touching thc bridgcs. !n somc
.,.
cascs ccccntric lincs ol opcrations may bc uscd. !l thc cncmy has dividcd his
onc hundrcd thousand mcn into scvcral corps, occupying posts ol obscrvation,
a passagc may bc ccctcd with onc hundrcd thousand mcn at a singlc point
ncar thc ccntcr ol thc linc ol posts, thc isolatcd dclcnsivc corps at this position
may bc ovcrwhclmcd, and two masscs ol lty thousand mcn cach may thcn
bc lormcd, which, by taking divcrging lincs ol opcrations, can ccrtainly drivc
o thc succcssivc portions ol thc opposing army, prcvcnt thcm lrom rcuniting,
and rcmovc thcm larthcr and larthcr lrom thc bridgcs. 8ut il, on thc contrary,
thc passagc bc ccctcd at onc cxtrcmity ol thc cncmys stratcgic lront, by
moving rapidly along this lront thc cncmy may bc bcatcn throughout its wholc
cxtcnt,in thc samc manncr that Frcdcrick tactically bcat thc Austrian linc at
Lcuthcn throughout its lcngth,thc bridgcs will bc sccurc in rcar ol thc army,
and rcmain protcctcd during all thc lorward movcmcnts. !t was in this manncr
that Jourdan, having passcd thc Rhinc at usscldorl in .,, on thc cxtrcmc
right ol thc Austrians, could havc advanccd in pcrlcct salcty toward thc Main.
Hc was drivcn away bccausc thc Frcnch, having a doublc and cxtcrior linc
ol opcrations, lclt onc hundrcd and twcnty thousand mcn inactivc bctwccn
Maycncc and 8ascl, whilc Clairlayt rcpulscd Jourdan upon thc Lahn. 8ut
this cannot diminish thc importancc ol thc advantagcs gaincd by passing a
rivcr upon onc cxtrcmity ol thc cncmys stratcgic lront. A commandcrinchicl
should cithcr adopt this mcthod, or that prcviously cxplaincd, ol a ccntral
mass at thc momcnt ol passagc, and thc usc ol ccccntric lincs altcrward,
according to thc circumstanccs ol thc casc, thc situation ol thc lronticrs and
bascs ol opcrations, as wcll as thc positions ol thc cncmy. Tc mcntion ol thcsc
combinations, ol which somcthing has alrcady bccn said in thc articlc on lincs
ol opcrations, docs not appcar out ol placc hcrc, sincc thcir conncction with
thc location ol bridgcs has bccn thc chicl point undcr discussion.
!t somctimcs happcns that, lor cogcnt rcasons, a doublc passagc is attcmptcd
upon a singlc lront ol opcrations, as was thc casc with Jourdan and Morcau
in .,6. !l thc advantagc is gaincd ol having in casc ol nccd a doublc linc ol
rctrcat, thcrc is thc inconvcnicncc, in thus opcrating on thc two cxtrcmitics ol
thc cncmys lront, ol lorcing him, in a mcasurc, to conccntratc on his ccntcr,
and hc may bc placcd in a condition to ovcrwhclm scparatcly thc two armics
which havc crosscd at dicrcnt points. Such an opcration will always lcad to
disastrous rcsults whcn thc opposing gcncral has sucicnt ability to know
how to takc advantagc ol this violation ol principlcs.
!n such a casc, thc inconvcnicnccs ol thc doublc passagc may bc diminishcd
by passing ovcr thc mass ol thc lorccs at onc ol thc points, which thcn bccomcs
thc dccisivc onc, and by conccntrating thc two portions by intcrior lincs as
rapidly as possiblc, to prcvcnt thc cncmy lrom dcstroying thcm scparatcly. !l
Jourdan and Morcau had obscrvcd this rulc, and madc a junction ol thcir
lorccs in thc dircction ol onauwcrth, instcad ol moving ccccntrically, thcy
would probably havc achicvcd grcat succcsscs in 8avaria, instcad ol bcing
drivcn back upon thc Rhinc.
.,a
ARTICLE XXXVIII
Retreats and Pursuits
Rctrcats arc ccrtainly thc most dicult opcrations in war. Tis rcmark is so
truc that thc cclcbratcd Princc dc Lignc said, in his usual piquant stylc, that hc
could not conccivc how an army cvcr succccdcd in rctrcating. Vhcn wc think
ol thc physical and moral condition ol an army in lull rctrcat altcr a lost battlc,
ol thc diculty ol prcscrving ordcr, and ol thc disastcrs to which disordcr
may lcad, it is not hard to undcrstand why thc most cxpcricnccd gcncrals havc
hcsitatcd to attcmpt such an opcration.
Vhat mcthod ol rctrcat shall bc rccommcndcd: Shall thc ght bc continucd
at all hazards until nightlall and thc rctrcat cxccutcd undcr covcr ol thc
darkncss: or is it bcttcr not to wait lor this last chancc, but to abandon thc
cld ol battlc whilc it can bc donc and a strong opposition still madc to thc
pursuing army: Should a lorccd march bc madc in thc night, in ordcr to gct
as much start ol thc cncmy as possiblc: or is it bcttcr to halt altcr a hallmarch
and makc a show ol ghting again: ach ol thcsc mcthods, although cntircly
propcr in ccrtain cascs, might in othcrs provc ruinous to thc wholc army. !l
thc thcory ol war lcavcs any points unprovidcd lor, that ol rctrcats is ccrtainly
onc ol thcm.
!l you dctcrminc to ght vigorously until night, you may cxposc yourscll to
a complctc dclcat bclorc that timc arrivcs, and il a lorccd rctrcat must bcgin
whcn thc shadcs ol night arc shrouding cvcry thing in darkncss and obscurity,
how can you prcvcnt thc disintcgration ol your army, which docs not know
what to do, and cannot scc to do any thing propcrly: !l, on thc othcr hand,
thc cld ol battlc is abandoncd in broad daylight and bclorc all possiblc corts
havc bccn madc to hold it, you may givc up thc contcst at thc vcry momcnt
whcn thc cncmy is about to do thc samc thing, and this lact coming to thc
knowlcdgc ol thc troops, you may losc thcir condcncc,as thcy arc always
inclincd to blamc a prudcnt gcncral who rctrcats bclorc thc ncccssity lor so
doing may bc cvidcnt to thcmsclvcs. Morcovcr, who can say that a rctrcat
commcnccd in thc daylight in prcscncc ol an cntcrprising cncmy may not
bccomc a rout:
Vhcn thc rctrcat is actually bcgun, it is no lcss dicult to dccidc whcthcr a
lorccd march shall bc madc to gct as much thc start ol thc cncmy as possiblc,
sincc this hurricd movcmcnt might somctimcs causc thc dcstruction ol thc army,
and might, in othcr circumstanccs, bc its salvation. All that can bc positivcly
asscrtcd on this subjcct is that, in gcncral, with an army ol considcrablc
magnitudc, it is bcst to rctrcat slowly, by short marchcs, with a wcllarrangcd
rcarguard ol sucicnt strcngth to hold thc hcads ol thc cncmys columns in
chcck lor scvcral hours.
Rctrcats arc ol dicrcnt kinds, dcpcnding upon thc causc lrom which thcy
rcsult. A gcncral may rctirc ol his own accord bclorc ghting, in ordcr to
draw his advcrsary to a position which hc prclcrs to his prcscnt onc. Tis is
.,
rathcr a prudcnt mancuvcr than a rctrcat. !t was thus that Napolcon rctircd in
.c lrom Vischau toward 8runn to draw thc allics to a point which suitcd
him as a battlccld. !t was thus that Vcllington rctircd lrom Quatrc8ras to
Vatcrloo. Tis is what ! proposcd to do bclorc thc attack at rcsdcn, whcn
thc arrival ol Napolcon was known. ! rcprcscntcd thc ncccssity ol moving
toward ippoldiswaldc to choosc a lavorablc battlccld. !t was supposcd to
bc a rctrcat that ! was proposing, and a mistakcn idca ol honor prcvcntcd a
rctrogradc movcmcnt without ghting, which would havc bccn thc mcans ol
avoiding thc catastrophc ol thc ncxt day, (August a6, ...)
A gcncral may rctirc in ordcr to hastcn to thc dclcnsc ol a point thrcatcncd
by thc cncmy, cithcr upon thc anks or upon thc linc ol rctrcat. Vhcn an army
is marching at a distancc lrom its dcpots, in an cxhaustcd country, it may bc
obligcd to rctirc in ordcr to gct ncarcr its supplics. Finally, an army rctircs
involuntarily altcr a lost battlc, or altcr an unsucccsslul cntcrprisc.
Tcsc arc not thc only causcs having an inucncc in rctrcats. Tcir charactcr
will vary with that ol thc country, with thc distanccs to bc passcd ovcr and
thc obstaclcs to bc surmountcd. Tcy arc spccially dangcrous in an cncmys
country, and whcn thc points at which thc rctrcats bcgin arc distant lrom
thc lricndly country and thc basc ol opcrations, thcy bccomc painlul and
dicult.
From thc timc ol thc lamous rctrcat ol thc Tcn Tousand, so justly cclcbratcd,
until thc tcrriblc catastrophc which bclcll thc Frcnch army in ..a, history
docs not makc mcntion ol many rcmarkablc rctrcats. Tat ol Antony, drivcn
out ol Mcdia, was morc painlul than glorious. Tat ol thc mpcror Julian,
harasscd by thc samc Parthians, was a disastcr. !n morc rcccnt days, thc rctrcat
ol Charlcs \!!!. to Naplcs, whcn hc passcd by a corps ol thc !talian army at
Fornovo, was an admirablc onc. Tc rctrcat ol M. dc 8cllislc lrom Praguc
docs not dcscrvc thc praiscs it has rcccivcd. Tosc cxccutcd by thc King ol
Prussia altcr raising thc sicgc ol lmutz and altcr thc surprisc at Hochkirch
wcrc vcry wcll arrangcd, but thcy wcrc lor short distanccs. Tat ol Morcau in
.,6, which was magnicd in importancc by party spirit, was crcditablc, but
not at all cxtraordinary. Tc rctrcat ol Lccourbc lrom ngadin to Altorl, and
that ol Macdonald by Pontrcmoli altcr thc dclcat ol thc Trcbbia, as also that
ol Suwaro lrom thc Muttcnthal to Chur, wcrc glorious lcats ol arms, but
partial in charactcr and ol short duration. Tc rctrcat ol thc Russian army
lrom thc Nicmcn to Moscowa spacc ol two hundrcd and lorty lcagucs,in
prcscncc ol such an cncmy as Napolcon and such cavalry as thc activc and
daring Murat commandcd, was ccrtainly admirablc. !t was undoubtcdly
attcndcd by many lavorablc circumstanccs, but was highly dcscrving ol praisc,
not only lor thc talcnt displaycd by thc gcncrals who dircctcd its rst stagcs,
but also lor thc admirablc lortitudc and soldicrly bcaring ol thc troops who
pcrlormcd it. Although thc rctrcat lrom Moscow was a bloody catastrophc lor
Napolcon, it was also glorious lor him and thc troops who wcrc at Krasnoi and
thc 8crcsina,bccausc thc skclcton ol thc army was savcd, whcn not a singlc
.,
man should havc rcturncd. !n this cvcrmcmorablc cvcnt both partics covcrcd
thcmsclvcs with glory.
Tc magnitudc ol thc distanccs and thc naturc ol thc country to bc travcrscd,
thc rcsourccs it ocrs, thc obstaclcs to bc cncountcrcd, thc attacks to bc
apprchcndcd, cithcr in rcar or in ank, supcriority or inlcriority in cavalry, thc
spirit ol thc troops, arc circumstanccs which havc a grcat ccct in dcciding thc
latc ol rctrcats, lcaving out ol considcration thc skilllul arrangcmcnts which
thc gcncrals may makc lor thcir cxccution.
A gcncral lalling back toward his nativc land along his linc ol magazincs
and supplics may kccp his troops togcthcr and in good ordcr, and may ccct a
rctrcat with morc salcty than onc compcllcd to subsist his army in cantonmcnts,
nding it ncccssary to occupy an cxtcndcd position. !t would bc absurd to
prctcnd that a Frcnch army rctiring lrom Moscow to thc Nicmcn without
supplics ol provisions, in want ol cavalry and dralt horscs, could ccct thc
movcmcnt in thc samc good ordcr and with thc samc stcadincss as a Russian
army, wcll providcd with cvcry thing ncccssary, marching in its own country,
and covcrcd by an immcnsc numbcr ol light cavalry.
Tcrc arc vc mcthods ol arranging a rctrcat:
Tc rst is to march in a singlc mass and upon onc road.
Tc sccond consists in dividing thc army into two or thrcc corps, marching
at thc distancc ol a days march lrom cach othcr, in ordcr to avoid conlusion,
cspccially in thc materiel.
Tc third consists in marching upon a singlc lront by scvcral roads ncarly
parallcl and having a common point ol arrival.
Tc lourth consists in moving by constantly convcrging roads.
Tc lth, on thc contrary, consists in moving along divcrging roads.
! havc nothing to say as to thc lormation ol rcarguards, but it is takcn lor
grantcd that a good onc should always bc prcparcd and wcll sustaincd by a
portion ol thc cavalry rcscrvcs. Tis arrangcmcnt is common to all kinds ol
rctrcats, but has nothing to do with thc stratcgic rclations ol thcsc opcrations.
An army lalling back in good ordcr, with thc intcntion ol ghting as soon as
it shall havc rcccivcd cxpcctcd rcinlorccmcnts or as soon as it shall havc rcachcd
a ccrtain stratcgic position, should prclcr thc rst mcthod, as this particularly
insurcs thc compactncss ol thc army and cnablcs it to bc in rcadincss lor
battlc almost at any momcnt, sincc it is simply ncccssary to halt thc hcads
ol columns and lorm thc rcmaindcr ol thc troops undcr thcir protcction as
thcy succcssivcly arrivc. An army cmploying this mcthod must not, howcvcr,
connc itscll to thc singlc main road, il thcrc arc sidcroads sucicntly ncar to
bc occupicd which may rcndcr its movcmcnts morc rapid and sccurc.
Vhcn Napolcon rctircd lrom Smolcnsk, hc uscd thc sccond mcthod, having
thc portions ol his army scparatcd by an cntirc march. Hc madc thcrcin a grcat
mistakc, bccausc thc cncmy was not lollowing upon his rcar, but moving along
a latcral road which brought him in a ncarly pcrpcndicular dircction into thc
.,
midst ol thc scparatcd Frcnch corps. Tc thrcc latal days ol Krasnoi wcrc thc
rcsult. Tc cmploymcnt ol this mcthod bcing chicy to avoid incumbcring
thc road, thc intcrval bctwccn thc dcparturc ol thc scvcral corps is sucicntly
grcat whcn thc artillcry may rcadily lc o. !nstcad ol scparating thc corps by
a wholc march, thc army would bc bcttcr dividcd into two masscs and a rcar
guard, a hallmarch lrom cach othcr. Tcsc masscs, moving o in succcssion
with an intcrval ol two hours bctwccn thc dcparturc ol thcir scvcral armycorps,
may lc o without incumbcring thc road, at lcast in ordinary countrics. !n
crossing thc Saint8crnard or thc 8alkan, othcr calculations would doubtlcss
bc ncccssary.
! apply this idca to an army ol onc hundrcd and twcnty thousand or onc
hundrcd and lty thousand mcn, having a rcarguard ol twcnty thousand or
twcntyvc thousand mcn distant about a hallmarch in rcar. Tc army may
bc dividcd into two masscs ol about sixty thousand mcn cach, cncampcd at a
distancc ol thrcc or lour lcagucs lrom cach othcr. ach ol thcsc masscs will bc
subdividcd into two or thrcc corps, which may cithcr movc succcssivcly along
thc road or lorm in two lincs across thc road. !n cithcr casc, il onc corps ol
thirty thousand mcn movcs at vc A.M. and thc othcr at scvcn, thcrc will bc
no dangcr ol intcrlcrcncc with cach othcr, unlcss somcthing unusual should
happcn, lor thc sccond mass bcing at thc samc hours ol thc day about lour
lcagucs bchind thc rst, thcy can ncvcr bc occupying thc samc part ol thc road
at thc samc timc.
Vhcn thcrc arc practicablc roads in thc ncighborhood, suitablc at lcast lor
inlantry and cavalry, thc intcrvals may bc diminishcd. !t is scarccly ncccssary to
add that such an ordcr ol march can only bc uscd whcn provisions arc plcntilul,
and thc third mcthod is usually thc bcst, bccausc thc army is thcn marching in
battlcordcr. !n long days and in hot countrics thc bcst timcs lor marching arc
thc night and thc carly part ol thc day. !t is onc ol thc most dicult problcms
ol logistics to makc suitablc arrangcmcnts ol hours ol dcparturcs and halts lor
armics, and this is particularly thc casc in rctrcats.
Many gcncrals ncglcct to arrangc thc manncr and timcs ol halts, and grcat
disordcr on thc march is thc conscqucncc, as cach brigadc or division takcs
thc rcsponsibility ol halting whcncvcr thc soldicrs arc a littlc tircd and nd it
agrccablc to bivouac. Tc largcr thc army and thc morc compactly it marchcs,
thc morc important docs it bccomc to arrangc wcll thc hours ol dcparturcs
and halts, cspccially il thc army is to movc at night. An illtimcd halt ol part
ol a column may causc as much mischicl as a rout.
!l thc rcarguard is closcly prcsscd, thc army should halt in ordcr to rclicvc
it by a lrcsh corps takcn lrom thc sccond mass, which will halt with this
objcct in vicw. Tc cncmy sccing cighty thousand mcn in battlcordcr will
think it ncccssary to halt and collcct his columns, and thcn thc rctrcat should
rccommcncc at nightlall, to rcgain thc spacc which has bccn lost.
Tc third mcthod, ol rctrcating along scvcral parallcl roads, is cxccllcnt whcn
thc roads arc sucicntly ncar cach othcr. 8ut, il thcy arc quitc distant, onc
.,6
wing scparatcd lrom thc ccntcr and lrom thc othcr wing may bc compromiscd
il thc cncmy attacks it in lorcc and compcls it to stand on thc dclcnsivc. Tc
Prussian army moving lrom Magdcburg toward thc dcr, in .c6, givcs an
cxamplc ol this kind.
Tc lourth mcthod, which consists in lollowing conccntric roads, is
undoubtcdly thc bcst il thc troops arc distant lrom cach othcr whcn thc rctrcat
is ordcrcd. Nothing can bc bcttcr, in such a casc, than to unitc thc lorccs, and
thc conccntric rctrcat is thc only mcthod ol cccting this.
Tc lth mcthod indicatcd is nothing clsc than thc lamous systcm ol
ccccntric lincs, which ! havc attributcd to 8ulow, and havc opposcd so warmly
in thc carlicr cditions ol my works, bccausc ! thought ! could not bc mistakcn
cithcr as to thc scnsc ol his rcmarks on thc subjcct or as to thc objcct ol his
systcm. ! gathcrcd lrom his dcnition that hc rccommcndcd to a rctrcating
army, moving lrom any givcn position, to scparatc into parts and pursuc
divcrging roads, with thc doublc objcct ol withdrawing morc rcadily lrom
thc cncmy in pursuit and ol arrcsting his march by thrcatcning his anks
and his linc ol communications. ! lound grcat lault with thc systcm, lor thc
simplc rcason that a bcatcn army is alrcady wcak cnough, without absurdly
still lurthcr dividing its lorccs and strcngth in prcscncc ol a victorious cncmy.
8ulow has lound dclcndcrs who dcclarc that ! mistakc his mcaning, and that
by thc tcrm eccentric retreat hc did not undcrstand a rctrcat madc on scvcral
divcrging roads, but onc which, instcad ol bcing dircctcd toward thc ccntcr ol
thc basc ol opcrations or thc ccntcr ol thc country, should bc ccccntric to that
locus ol opcrations, and along thc linc ol thc lronticr ol thc country.
! may possibly havc takcn an incorrcct imprcssion lrom his languagc, and
in this casc my criticism lalls to thc ground, lor ! havc strongly rccommcndcd
that kind ol a rctrcat to which ! havc givcn thc namc ol thc parallcl rctrcat. !t
is my opinion that an army, lcaving thc linc which lcads lrom thc lronticrs to
thc ccntcr ol thc statc, with a vicw ol moving to thc right or thc lclt, may vcry
wcll pursuc a coursc ncarly parallcl to thc linc ol thc lronticrs, or to its lront
ol opcrations and its basc. !t sccms to mc morc rational to givc thc namc ol
parallcl rctrcat to such a movcmcnt as that dcscribcd, dcsignating as ccccntric
rctrcat that whcrc divcrging roads arc lollowcd, all lcading lrom thc stratcgic
lront.
Howcvcr this disputc about words may rcsult, thc solc causc ol which was
thc obscurity ol 8ulows tcxt, ! nd lault only with thosc rctrcats madc along
scvcral divcrging roads, undcr prctcnsc ol covcring a grcatcr cxtcnt ol lronticr
and ol thrcatcning thc cncmy on both anks.
8y using thcsc highsounding words anks, an air ol importancc may bc
givcn to systcms cntircly at variancc with thc principlcs ol thc art. An army in
rctrcat is always in a bad statc, cithcr physically or morally, bccausc a rctrcat
.,,
can only bc thc rcsult ol rcvcrscs or ol numcrical inlcriority. Shall such an army
bc still morc wcakcncd by dividing it: ! nd no lault with rctrcats cxccutcd
in scvcral columns, to incrcasc thc casc ol moving, whcn thcsc columns can
support cach othcr, but ! am spcaking ol thosc madc along divcrging lincs ol
opcrations. Supposc an army ol lorty thousand mcn rctrcating bclorc anothcr
ol sixty thousand. !l thc rst lorms lour isolatcd divisions ol about tcn thousand
mcn, thc cncmy may mancuvcr with two masscs ol thirty thousand mcn cach.
Can hc not turn his advcrsary, surround, dispcrsc, and ruin in succcssion all
his divisions: How can thcy cscapc such a latc: By concentration. Tis bcing in
dircct opposition to a divcrgcnt systcm, thc lattcr lalls ol itscll.
! invokc to my support thc grcat lcssons ol cxpcricncc. Vhcn thc lcading
divisions ol thc army ol !taly wcrc rcpulscd by Vurmscr, 8onapartc collcctcd
thcm all togcthcr at Rovcrbclla, and, although hc had only lorty thousand
mcn, hc lought and bcat sixty thousand, bccausc hc had only to contcnd
against isolatcd columns. !l hc had madc a divcrgcnt rctrcat, what would havc
bccomc ol his army and his victorics: Vurmscr, altcr his rst chcck, madc an
ccccntric rctrcat, dirccting his two wings toward thc cxtrcmitics ol thc linc ol
dclcnsc. Vhat was thc rcsult: His right, although supportcd by thc mountains
ol thc Tyrol, was bcatcn at Trcnt. 8onapartc thcn lcll upon thc rcar ol his lclt,
and dcstroycd that at 8assano and Mantua.
Vhcn thc Archdukc Charlcs gavc way bclorc thc rst corts ol thc Frcnch
armics in .,6, would hc havc savcd Gcrmany by an ccccntric movcmcnt: Vas
not thc salvation ol Gcrmany duc to his conccntric rctrcat: At last Morcau,
who had movcd with a vcry cxtcndcd linc ol isolatcd divisions, pcrccivcd that
this was an cxccllcnt systcm lor his own dcstruction, il hc stood his ground and
lought or adoptcd thc altcrnativc ol rctrcating. Hc conccntratcd his scattcrcd
troops, and all thc corts ol thc cncmy wcrc lruitlcss in prcscncc ol a mass
which it was ncccssary to watch throughout thc wholc lcngth ol a linc ol two
hundrcd milcs. Such cxamplcs must put an cnd to lurthcr discussion.
|!|
Tcrc arc two cascs in which divcrgcnt rctrcats arc admissiblc, and thcn
only as a last rcsourcc. First, whcn an army has cxpcricnccd a grcat dclcat
in its own country, and thc scattcrcd lragmcnts scck protcction within thc
walls ol lorticd placcs. Sccondly, in a war whcrc thc sympathics ol thc wholc
population arc cnlistcd, cach lraction ol thc army thus dividcd may scrvc as
a nuclcus ol asscmbly in cach provincc, but in a purcly mcthodical war, with
rcgular armics, carricd on according to thc principlcs ol thc art, divcrgcnt
rctrcats arc simply absurd.
Tcrc is still anothcr stratcgical considcration as to thc dircction ol a
rctrcat,to dccidc whcn it should bc madc pcrpcndicularly to thc lronticr
and toward thc intcrior ol thc country, or whcn it should bc parallcl to thc
lronticr. For cxamplc, whcn Marshal Soult gavc up thc linc ol thc Pyrcnccs in
.., hc had to choosc onc ol two dircctions lor his rctrcat,cithcr by way ol
!
Tcn ycars altcr this rst rclutation ol 8ulows idca, thc conccntric rctrcat ol 8arclay and 8agration
savcd thc Russian army. Although it did not prcvcnt Napolcons rst succcss, it was, in thc cnd, thc causc ol
his ruin.
.,
8ordcaux toward thc intcrior ol Francc, or by way ol Toulousc parallcl to thc
lronticr lormcd by thc Pyrcnccs. !n thc samc way, whcn Frcdcrick rctircd lrom
Moravia, hc marchcd toward 8ohcmia instcad ol rcturning to Silcsia.
Tcsc parallcl rctrcats arc oltcn to bc prclcrrcd, lor thc rcason that thcy divcrt
thc cncmy lrom a march upon thc capital ol thc statc and thc ccntcr ol its powcr.
Tc propricty ol giving such a dircction to a rctrcat must bc dctcrmincd by thc
conguration ol thc lronticrs, thc positions ol thc lortrcsscs, thc grcatcr or lcss
spacc thc army may havc lor its marchcs, and thc lacilitics lor rccovcring its
dircct communications with thc ccntral portions ol thc statc.
Spain is admirably suitcd to thc usc ol this systcm. !l a Frcnch army
pcnctratcs by way ol 8ayonnc, thc Spaniards may basc thcmsclvcs upon
Pampcluna and Saragossa, or upon Lcon and thc Asturias, and in cithcr casc
thc Frcnch cannot movc dircctly to Madrid, bccausc thcir linc ol opcrations
would bc at thc mcrcy ol thcir advcrsary.
Tc lronticr ol thc Turkish cmpirc on thc anubc prcscnts thc samc
advantagcs, il thc Turks kncw how to prot by thcm.
!n Francc also thc parallcl rctrcat may bc uscd, cspccially whcn thc nation
itscll is not dividcd into two political partics cach ol which is striving lor
thc posscssion ol thc capital. !l thc hostilc army pcnctratcs through thc Alps,
thc Frcnch can act on thc Rhonc and thc Saonc, passing around thc lronticr
as lar as thc Moscllc on onc sidc, or as lar as Provcncc on thc othcr. !l thc
cncmy cntcrs thc country by way ol Strasbourg, Maycncc, or \alcncicnncs,
thc samc thing can bc donc. Tc occupation ol Paris by thc cncmy would bc
impossiblc, or at lcast vcry hazardous, so long as a Frcnch army rcmaincd in
good condition and bascd upon its circlc ol lorticd towns. Tc samc is thc
casc lor all countrics having doublc lronts ol opcrations.
|!|
Austria is pcrhaps not so lortunatcly situatcd, on account ol thc dircctions
ol thc Rhctian and Tyrolcan Alps and ol thc rivcr anubc. Lloyd, howcvcr,
considcrs 8ohcmia and thc Tyrol as two bastions conncctcd by thc strong
curtain ol thc rivcr !nn, and rcgards this lronticr as cxcccdingly wcll suitcd lor
parallcl movcmcnts. Tis asscrtion was not wcll sustaincd by thc cvcnts ol thc
campaigns ol .cc, .c, and .c, but, as thc parallcl mcthod has not yct had
a lair trial on that ground, thc qucstion is still an opcn onc.
!t sccms to mc that thc propricty ol applying thc parallcl mcthod dcpcnds
mainly upon thc cxisting and thc antcccdcnt circumstanccs ol cach casc. !l a
Frcnch army should approach lrom thc Rhinc by way ol 8avaria, and should
nd allics in lorcc upon thc Lcch and thc !scr, it would bc a vcry dclicatc
opcration to throw thc wholc Austrian army into thc Tyrol and into 8ohcmia,
with thc cxpcctation ol arrcsting in this way thc lorward movcmcnt to \icnna.
!l hall thc Austrian army is lclt upon thc !nn to covcr thc approachcs to thc
capital, an unlortunatc division ol lorcc is thc conscqucncc, and il it is dccidcd
!
!n all thcsc calculations ! supposc thc contcnding lorccs ncarly cqual. !l thc invading army is
twicc as strong as thc dclcnsivc, it may bc dividcd into two cqual parts, onc ol which may movc dircctly upon
thc capital, whilc thc othcr may lollow thc army rctiring along thc lronticr. !l thc armics arc cqual, this is
impossiblc.
.,
to throw thc wholc army into thc Tyrol, lcaving thc way to \icnna opcn, thcrc
would bc grcat dangcr incurrcd il thc cncmy is at all cntcrprising. !n !taly,
bcyond thc Mincio, thc parallcl mcthod would bc ol dicult application on
thc sidc ol thc Tyrol, as wcll as in 8ohcmia against an cncmy approaching lrom
Saxony, lor thc rcason that thc thcatcr ol opcrations would bc too contractcd.
!n Prussia thc parallcl rctrcat may bc uscd with grcat advantagc against
an army dcbouching lrom 8ohcmia upon thc lbc or thc dcr, whilst its
cmploymcnt would bc impossiblc against a Frcnch army moving lrom thc
Rhinc, or a Russian army lrom thc \istula, unlcss Prussia and Austria wcrc
allics. Tis is a rcsult ol thc gcographical conguration ol thc country, which
allows and cvcn lavors latcral movcmcnts: in thc dircction ol its grcatcst
dimcnsion, (lrom Mcmcl to Maycncc,) but such a movcmcnt would bc
disastrous il madc lrom rcsdcn to Stcttin.
Vhcn an army rctrcats, whatcvcr may bc thc motivc ol thc opcration, a
pursuit always lollows.
A rctrcat, cvcn whcn cxccutcd in thc most skilllul manncr and by an army
in good condition, always givcs an advantagc to thc pursuing army, and this
is particularly thc casc altcr a dclcat and whcn thc sourcc ol supplics and
rcinlorccmcnts is at a grcat distancc, lor a rctrcat thcn bccomcs morc dicult
than any othcr opcration in war, and its dicultics incrcasc in proportion to
thc skill cxhibitcd by thc cncmy in conducting thc pursuit.
Tc boldncss and activity ol thc pursuit will dcpcnd, ol coursc, upon thc
charactcr ol thc commandcrs and upon thc physique and morale ol thc two
armics. !t is dicult to prcscribc xcd rulcs lor all cascs ol pursuits, but thc
lollowing points must bc rccollcctcd:
.. !t is gcncrally bcttcr to dircct thc pursuit upon thc ank ol thc rctrcating
columns, cspccially whcn it is madc in oncs own country and whcrc no
dangcr is incurrcd in moving pcrpcndicularly or diagonally upon thc
cncmys linc ol opcrations. Carc must, howcvcr, bc takcn not to makc
too largc a circuit, lor thcrc might thcn bc dangcr ol losing thc rctrcating
cncmy cntircly.
a. A pursuit should gcncrally bc as boldly and activcly cxccutcd as
possiblc, cspccially whcn it is subscqucnt to a battlc gaincd, bccausc thc
dcmoralizcd army may bc wholly dispcrscd il vigorously lollowcd up.
. Tcrc arc vcry lcw cascs whcrc it is wisc to makc a bridgc ol gold lor
thc cncmy, no mattcr what thc old Roman provcrb may say, lor it can
scarccly cvcr bc dcsirablc to pay an cncmy to lcavc a country, unlcss in
thc casc whcn an uncxpcctcd succcss shall havc bccn gaincd ovcr him by
an army much inlcrior to his in numbcrs.
Nothing lurthcr ol importancc can bc addcd to what has bccn said on thc
subjcct ol rctrcats, as lar as thcy arc conncctcd with grand combinations ol
.c
stratcgy. Vc may protably indicatc scvcral tactical mcasurcs which may
rcndcr thcm morc casy ol cxccution.
nc ol thc surcst mcans ol making a rctrcat succcsslully is to lamiliarizc thc
occrs and soldicrs with thc idca that an cncmy may bc rcsistcd quitc as wcll
whcn coming on thc rcar as on thc lront, and that thc prcscrvation ol ordcr
is thc only mcans ol saving a body ol troops harasscd by thc cncmy during
a rctrogradc movcmcnt. Rigid disciplinc is at all timcs thc bcst prcscrvativc
ol good ordcr, but it is ol spccial importancc during a rctrcat. To cnlorcc
disciplinc, subsistcncc must bc lurnishcd, that thc troops may not bc obligcd
to stragglc o lor thc purposc ol gctting supplics by marauding.
!t is a good plan to givc thc command ol thc rcarguard to an occr ol
grcat coolncss, and to attach to it sta occrs who may, in advancc ol its
movcmcnts, cxaminc and sclcct points suitablc lor occupation to hold thc
cncmy tcmporarily in chcck. Cavalry can rally so rapidly on thc main body
that it is cvidcntly dcsirablc to havc considcrablc bodics ol such troops, as thcy
grcatly lacilitatc thc cxccution ol a slow and mcthodical rctrcat, and lurnish
thc mcans ol thoroughly cxamining thc road itscll and thc ncighborhood,
so as to prcvcnt an uncxpcctcd onsct ol thc cncmy upon thc anks ol thc
rctrcating columns.
!t is gcncrally sucicnt il thc rcarguard kccp thc cncmy at thc distancc ol
hall a days march lrom thc main body. Tc rcarguard would run grcat risk ol
bcing itscll cut o, il larthcr distant. Vhcn, howcvcr, thcrc arc dclcs in its
rcar which arc hcld by lricnds, it may incrcasc thc sphcrc ol its opcrations and
rcmain a lull days march to thc rcar, lor a dclc, whcn hcld, lacilitatcs a rctrcat
in thc samc dcgrcc that it rcndcrs it morc dicult il in thc powcr ol thc cncmy.
!l thc army is vcry numcrous and thc rcarguard proportionally largc, it may
rcmain a days march in rcar. Tis will dcpcnd, howcvcr, upon its strcngth, thc
naturc ol thc country, and thc charactcr and strcngth ol thc pursuing lorcc.
!l thc cncmy prcsscs up closcly, it is ol importancc not to pcrmit him to do so
with impunity, cspccially il thc rctrcat is madc in good ordcr. !n such a casc
it is a good plan to halt lrom timc to timc and lall uncxpcctcdly upon thc
cncmys advanccd guard, as thc Archdukc Charlcs did in .,6 at Ncrcshcim,
Morcau at 8ibcrach, and Klcbcr at Ukcrath. Such a mancuvcr almost always
succccds, on account ol thc surprisc occasioncd by an uncxpcctcd ocnsivc
rcturn upon a body ol troops which is thinking ol littlc clsc than collccting
trophics and spoils.
Passagcs ol rivcrs in rctrcat arc also opcrations by no mcans dcvoid ol
intcrcst. !l thc strcam is narrow and thcrc arc pcrmancnt bridgcs ovcr it, thc
opcration is nothing morc than thc passagc ol a dclc, but whcn thc rivcr is
widc and is to bc crosscd upon a tcmporary military bridgc, it is a mancuvcr
ol cxtrcmc dclicacy. Among thc prccautions to bc takcn, a vcry important onc
is to gct thc parks wcll advanccd, so that thcy may bc out ol thc way ol thc
army, lor this purposc it is wcll lor thc army to halt a halldays march lrom
thc rivcr. Tc rcarguard should also kccp at morc than thc usual distancc
..
lrom thc main body,as lar, in lact, as thc locality and thc rcspcctivc lorccs
opposcd will pcrmit. Tc army may thus lc across thc bridgc without bcing
too much hurricd. Tc march ol thc rcarguard should bc so arrangcd that it
shall havc rcachcd a position in lront ol thc bridgc just as thc last ol thc main
body has passcd. Tis will bc a suitablc momcnt lor rclicving thc rcarguard
by lrcsh troops strongly postcd. Tc rcarguard will pass through thc intcrvals
ol thc lrcsh troops in position and will cross thc rivcr, thc cncmy, coming up
and nding lrcsh troops drawn up to givc him battlc, will makc no attcmpt to
prcss thcm too closcly. Tc ncw rcarguard will hold its position until night,
and will thcn cross thc rivcr, brcaking thc bridgcs altcr it.
!t is, ol coursc, undcrstood that as last as thc troops pass thcy lorm on thc
oppositc bank and plant battcrics, so as to protcct thc corps lclt to hold thc
cncmy in chcck.
Tc dangcrs ol such a passagc in rctrcat, and thc naturc ol thc prccautions
which lacilitatc it, indicatc that mcasurcs should always bc takcn to throw
up intrcnchmcnts at thc point whcrc thc bridgc is to bc constructcd and thc
passagc madc. Vhcrc timc is not allowcd lor thc construction ol a rcgular tete
de pont, a lcw wcllarmcd rcdoubts will bc lound ol grcat valuc in covcring thc
rctrcat ol thc last troops.
!l thc passagc ol a largc rivcr is so dicult whcn thc cncmy is only prcssing
on thc rcar ol thc column, it is lar morc so whcn thc army is thrcatcncd both
in lront and rcar and thc rivcr is guardcd by thc cncmy in lorcc.
Tc cclcbratcd passagc ol thc 8crcsina by thc Frcnch is onc ol thc most
rcmarkablc cxamplcs ol such an opcration. Ncvcr was an army in a morc
dcspcratc condition, and ncvcr was onc cxtricatcd morc gloriously and
skilllully. Prcsscd by laminc, bcnumbcd with cold, distant twclvc hundrcd
milcs lrom its basc ol opcrations, assailcd by thc cncmy in lront and in rcar,
having a rivcr with marshy banks in lront, surroundcd by vast lorcsts, how
could it hopc to cscapc: !t paid dcarly lor thc honor it gaincd. Tc mistakc ol
Admiral Tschitchago doubtlcss hclpcd its cscapc, but thc army pcrlormcd
hcroic dccds, lor which duc praisc should bc givcn. Vc do not know whcthcr to
admirc most thc plan ol opcrations which brought up thc Russian armics lrom
thc cxtrcmitics ol Moldavia, lrom Moscow, and lrom Polotzk to thc 8crcsina
as to a rcndczvous arrangcd in pcacc,a plan which camc ncar cccting thc
capturc ol thcir lormidablc advcrsary,or thc wondcrlul rmncss ol thc lion
thus pursucd, who succccdcd in opcning a way through his cncmics.
Tc only rulcs to bc laid down arc, not to pcrmit your army to bc closcly
prcsscd upon, to dcccivc thc cncmy as to thc point ol passagc, and to lall
hcadlong upon thc corps which bars thc way bclorc thc onc which is lollowing
thc rcar ol your column can comc up. Ncvcr placc yourscll in a position to bc
cxposcd to such dangcr, lor cscapc in such a casc is rarc.
!l a rctrcating army should strivc to protcct its bridgcs cithcr by rcgular tetes
de font, or at lcast by lincs ol rcdoubts to covcr thc rcarguard, it is natural, also,
that thc cncmy pursuing should usc cvcry cort to dcstroy thc bridgcs. Vhcn
.a
thc rctrcat is madc down thc bank ol a rivcr, woodcn houscs may bc thrown
into thc strcam, also rcships and mills,a mcans thc Austrians uscd in
.,6 against Jourdans army, ncar Ncuwicd on thc Rhinc, whcrc thcy ncarly
compromiscd thc army ol thc Sambrc and thc Mcusc. Tc Archdukc Charlcs
did thc samc thing at ssling in .c. Hc brokc thc bridgc ovcr thc anubc,
and brought Napolcon to thc brink ol ruin.
!t is dicult to sccurc a bridgc against attacks ol this charactcr unlcss thcrc
is timc lor placing a stockadc abovc it. 8oats may bc anchorcd, providcd
with ropcs and grapplinghooks to catch oating bodics and with mcans lor
cxtinguishing rcboats.
ARTICLE XXXIX
Of Cantonments, either when on the March, or when
established in Winter Quarters
So much has bccn writtcn on this point, and its conncction with my subjcct is
so indircct, that ! shall trcat it vcry bricy.
To maintain an army in cantonmcnts, in a war activcly carricd on, is
gcncrally dicult, howcvcr conncctcd thc arrangcmcnt may bc, and thcrc is
almost always somc point cxposcd to thc cncmys attacks. A country whcrc
largc towns abound, as Lombardy, Saxony, thc Ncthcrlands, Swabia, or old
Prussia, prcscnts morc lacilitics lor thc cstablishmcnt ol quartcrs than onc
whcrc towns arc lcw, lor in thc lormcr casc thc troops havc not only convcnicnt
supplics ol lood, but shcltcrs which pcrmit thc divisions ol thc army to bc kcpt
closcly togcthcr. !n Poland, Russia, portions ol Austria and Francc, in Spain
and in Southcrn !taly, it is morc dicult to put an army into wintcr quartcrs.
Formcrly, it was usual lor cach party to go into wintcr quartcrs at thc cnd ol
ctobcr, and all thc ghting altcr that timc was ol a partisan charactcr and
carricd on by thc advanccd troops lorming thc outposts.
Tc surprisc ol thc Austrian wintcr quartcrs in Uppcr Alsacc in .6,, by
Turcnnc, is a good cxamplc, lrom which may bc lcarncd thc bcst mcthod ol
conducting such an cntcrprisc, and thc prccautions to bc takcn on thc othcr
sidc to prcvcnt its succcss.
Tc bcst rulcs to bc laid down on this subjcct sccm to mc to bc thc lollowing.
stablish thc cantonmcnts vcry compactly and conncctcdly and occupying a
spacc as broad as long, in ordcr to avoid having a too cxtcndcd linc ol troops,
which is always casily brokcn through and cannot bc conccntratcd in timc,
covcr thcm by a rivcr, or by an outcr linc ol troops in huts and with thcir
position strcngthcncd by cldworks, x upon points ol asscmbly which may
bc rcachcd by all thc troops bclorc thc cncmy can pcnctratc so lar, kccp all
thc avcnucs by which an cncmy may approach constantly patrollcd by bodics
.
ol cavalry, nally, cstablish signals to givc warning il an attack is madc at any
point.
!n thc wintcr ol .c,, Napolcon cstablishcd his army in cantonmcnts bchind
thc Passargc in lacc ol thc cncmy, thc advanccd guard alonc bcing huttcd
ncar thc citics ol Gutstadt, stcrodc, &c. Tc army numbcrcd morc than
onc hundrcd and twcnty thousand mcn, and much skill was rcquisitc in
lccding it and kccping it othcrwisc comlortablc in this position until Junc.
Tc country was ol a lavorablc charactcr, but this cannot bc cxpcctcd to bc thc
casc cvcrywhcrc.
An army ol onc hundrcd thousand mcn may nd it not vcry dicult to havc
a compact and wcllconncctcd systcm ol wintcr quartcrs in countrics whcrc
largc towns arc numcrous. Tc diculty incrcascs with thc sizc ol thc army. !t
must bc obscrvcd, howcvcr, that il thc cxtcnt ol country occupicd incrcascs in
proportion to thc numbcrs in thc army, thc mcans ol opposing an irruption ol
thc cncmy incrcasc in thc samc proportion. Tc important point is to bc ablc
to asscmblc lty thousand or sixty thousand mcn in twcntylour hours. Vith
such an army in hand, and with thc ccrtainty ol having it rapidly incrcascd,
thc cncmy may bc hcld in chcck, no mattcr how strong hc may bc, until thc
wholc army is asscmblcd.
!t must bc admittcd, howcvcr, that thcrc will always bc a risk in going into
wintcr quartcrs il thc cncmy kccps his army in a body and sccms inclincd to
makc ocnsivc movcmcnts, and thc conclusion to bc drawn lrom this lact is,
that thc only mcthod ol giving sccurc rcposc to an army in wintcr or in thc
midst ol a campaign is to cstablish it in quartcrs protcctcd by a rivcr, or to
arrangc an armisticc.
!n thc stratcgic positions takcn up by an army in thc coursc ol a campaign,
whcthcr marching, or acting as an army ol obscrvation, or waiting lor a
lavorablc opportunity ol taking thc ocnsivc, it will probably occupy quitc
compact cantonmcnts. Tc sclcction ol such positions rcquircs grcat cxpcricncc
upon thc part ol a gcncral, in ordcr that hc may lorm corrcct conclusions as to
what hc may cxpcct thc cncmy to do. An army should occupy spacc cnough
to cnablc it to subsist rcadily, and it should also kccp as much conccntratcd
as possiblc, to bc rcady lor thc cncmy should hc show himscll, and thcsc two
conditions arc by no mcans casily rcconcilcd. Tcrc is no bcttcr arrangcmcnt
than to placc thc divisions ol thc army in a spacc ncarly a squarc, so that in
casc ol nccd thc wholc may bc asscmblcd at any point whcrc thc cncmy may
prcscnt himscll. Ninc divisions placcd in this way, a halldays march lrom
cach othcr, may in twclvc hours asscmblc on thc ccntcr. Tc samc rulcs arc to
bc obscrvcd in thcsc cascs as wcrc laid down lor wintcr quartcrs.
.
ARTICLE XL
Descents
Tcsc arc opcrations ol rarc occurrcncc, and may bc classcd as among thc most
dicult in war whcn ccctcd in prcscncc ol a wcllprcparcd cncmy.
Sincc thc invcntion ol gunpowdcr and thc changcs ccctcd by it in navics,
transports arc so hclplcss in prcscncc ol thc monstrous thrccdcckcrs ol thc
prcscnt day, armcd as thcy arc with a hundrcd cannon, that an army can makc
a dcsccnt only with thc assistancc ol a numcrous cct ol ships ol war which
can command thc sca, at lcast until thc dcbarkation ol thc army takcs placc.
8clorc thc invcntion ol gunpowdcr, thc transports wcrc also thc ships ol
war, thcy wcrc movcd along at plcasurc by using oars, wcrc light, and could
skirt along thc coasts, thcir numbcr was in proportion to thc numbcr ol troops
to bc cmbarkcd, and, asidc lrom thc dangcr ol tcmpcsts, thc opcrations ol a
cct could bc arrangcd with almost as much ccrtainty as thosc ol an army on
land. Ancicnt history, lor thcsc rcasons, givcs us cxamplcs ol morc cxtcnsivc
dcbarkations than modcrn timcs.
Vho docs not rccall to mind thc immcnsc lorccs transportcd by thc Pcrsians
upon thc 8lack Sca, thc 8osporus, and thc Archipclago,thc innumcrablc
hosts landcd in Grcccc by Xcrxcs and arius,thc grcat cxpcditions ol thc
Carthaginians and Romans to Spain and Sicily, that ol Alcxandcr into Asia
Minor, thosc ol Cacsar to ngland and Alrica, that ol Gcrmanicus to thc
mouths ol thc lbc,thc Crusadcs,thc cxpcditions ol thc Northmcn to
ngland, to Francc, and cvcn to !taly:
Sincc thc invcntion ol cannon, thc too cclcbratcd Armada ol Philip !!. was
thc only cntcrprisc ol this kind ol any magnitudc until that sct on loot by
Napolcon against ngland in .c. All othcr marinc cxpcditions wcrc ol no
grcat cxtcnt: as, lor cxamplc, thosc ol Charlcs \. and ol Scbastian ol Portugal
to thc coast ol Alrica, also thc scvcral dcsccnts ol thc Frcnch into thc Unitcd
Statcs ol Amcrica, into gypt and St. omingo, ol thc nglish to gypt,
Holland, Copcnhagcn, Antwcrp, Philadclphia. ! say nothing ol Hochcs
projcctcd landing in !rcland, lor that was a lailurc, and is, at thc samc timc, an
cxamplc ol thc dicultics to bc apprchcndcd in such attcmpts.
Tc largc armics kcpt on loot in our day by thc grcat statcs ol thc world
prcvcnt dcsccnts with thirty or lorty thousand mcn, cxccpt against sccond
ratc powcrs, lor it is cxtrcmcly dicult to nd transportation lor onc hundrcd
or onc hundrcd and lty thousand mcn with thcir immcnsc trains ol artillcry,
munitions, cavalry, &c.
Vc wcrc, howcvcr, on thc point ol sccing thc solution ol thc vast problcm ol
thc practicability ol dcsccnts in grcat lorcc, il it is truc that Napolcon scriously
contcmplatcd thc transportation ol onc hundrcd and sixty thousand vctcrans
lrom 8oulognc to thc 8ritish !slcs: unlortunatcly, his lailurc to cxccutc this
gigantic undcrtaking has lclt us cntircly in thc dark as to this gravc qucstion.
.
!t is not impossiblc to collcct lty Frcnch shipsolthclinc in thc Channcl
by mislcading thc nglish, this was, in lact, upon thc point ol bcing donc, it
is thcn no longcr impossiblc, with a lavorablc wind, to pass ovcr thc otilla in
two days and ccct a landing. 8ut what would bccomc ol thc army il a storm
should dispcrsc thc cct ol ships ol war and thc nglish should rcturn in lorcc
to thc Channcl and dclcat thc cct or obligc it to rcgain its ports:
Postcrity will rcgrct, as thc loss ol an cxamplc to all luturc gcncrations, that
this immcnsc undcrtaking was not carricd through, or at lcast attcmptcd.
oubtlcss, many bravc mcn would havc mct thcir dcaths, but wcrc not thosc
mcn mowcd down morc usclcssly on thc plains ol Swabia, ol Moravia, and ol
Castilc, in thc mountains ol Portugal and thc lorcsts ol Lithuania: Vhat man
would not glory in assisting to bring to a conclusion thc grcatcst trial ol skill
and strcngth cvcr sccn bctwccn two grcat nations: At any ratc, postcrity will
nd in thc prcparations madc lor this dcsccnt onc ol thc most valuablc lcssons
thc prcscnt ccntury has lurnishcd lor thc study ol soldicrs and ol statcsmcn.
Tc labors ol cvcry kind pcrlormcd on thc coasts ol Francc lrom .c to .c
will bc among thc most rcmarkablc monumcnts ol thc activity, lorcsight, and
skill ol Napolcon. !t is rccommcndcd to thc carclul attcntion ol young occrs.
8ut, whilc admitting thc possibility ol succcss lor a grcat dcsccnt upon a coast
so ncar as thc nglish to 8oulognc, what rcsults should bc cxpcctcd il this
armada had had a long scavoyagc to makc: How could so many small vcsscls
bc kcpt moving, cvcn lor two days and nights: To what chanccs ol ruin would
not so many lrail boats bc cxposcd in navigating thc opcn scas! Morcovcr, thc
artillcry, munitions ol war, cquipmcnts, provisions, and lrcsh watcr that must
bc carricd with this multitudc ol mcn rcquirc immcnsc labor in prcparation
and vast mcans ol transportation.
xpcricncc has shown clcarly thc dicultics attcnding such an cxpcdition,
cvcn lor thirty thousand mcn. From known lacts, it is cvidcnt that a dcsccnt can
bc madc with this numbcr ol mcn in lour cascs:.st, against colonics or isolatcd
posscssions, ad, against sccondratc powcrs which cannot bc immcdiatcly
supportcd lrom abroad, d, lor thc purposc ol cccting a tcmporary divcrsion,
or to capturc a position which it is important to hold lor a timc, th, to makc
a divcrsion, at oncc political and military, against a statc alrcady cngagcd in
a grcat war, whosc troops arc occupicd at a distancc lrom thc point ol thc
dcsccnt.
!t is dicult to lay down rulcs lor opcrations ol this charactcr. About thc
only rccommcndations ! can makc arc thc lollowing. cccivc thc cncmy as
to thc point ol landing, choosc a spot whcrc thc vcsscls may anchor in salcty
and thc troops bc landcd togcthcr, inlusc as much activity as possiblc into thc
opcration, and takc posscssion ol somc strong point to covcr thc dcvclopmcnt
ol thc troops as thcy land, put on shorc at oncc a part ol thc artillcry, to givc
condcncc and protcction to thc troops that havc landcd.
A grcat diculty in such an opcration is lound in thc lact that thc transports
can ncvcr gct ncar thc bcach, and thc troops must bc landcd in boats and
.6
ralts,which takcs timc and givcs thc cncmy grcat advantagcs. !l thc sca is
rough, thc mcn to bc landcd arc cxposcd to grcat risks, lor what can a body
ol inlantry do, crowdcd in boats, tosscd about by thc wavcs, and ordinarily
rcndcrcd unt by scasickncss lor thc propcr usc ol thcir arms:
! can only advisc thc party on thc dclcnsivc not to dividc his lorccs too much
by attcmpting to covcr cvcry point. !t is an impossibility to linc thc cntirc coast
with battcrics and battalions lor its dclcnsc, but thc approachcs to thosc placcs
whcrc largc cstablishmcnts arc to bc protcctcd must bc closcd. Signals should
bc arrangcd lor giving prompt noticc ol thc point whcrc thc cncmy is landing,
and all thc disposablc lorcc should bc rapidly conccntratcd thcrc, to prcvcnt
his gaining a rm loothold.
Tc conguration ol coasts has a grcat inucncc upon dcsccnts and thcir
prosccution. Tcrc arc countrics whcrc thc coasts arc stccp and prcscnt lcw
points ol casy acccss lor thc ships and thc troops to bc landcd: thcsc lcw placcs
may bc morc rcadily watchcd, and thc dcsccnt bccomcs morc dicult.
Finally, thcrc is a stratcgical considcration conncctcd with dcsccnts which
may bc usclully pointcd out. Tc samc principlc which lorbids a contincntal
army lrom intcrposing thc mass ol its lorccs bctwccn thc cncmy and thc sca
rcquircs, on thc contrary, that an army landing upon a coast should always
kccp its principal mass in communication with thc shorc, which is at oncc
its linc ol rctrcat and its basc ol supplics. For thc samc rcason, its rst carc
should bc to makc surc ol thc posscssion ol onc lorticd harbor/ or at lcast ol
a tonguc ol land which is convcnicnt to a good anchoragc and may bc casily
strcngthcncd by lortications, in ordcr that in casc ol rcvcrsc thc troops may
bc rccmbarkcd without hurry and loss.
.,
commentary on Chapter V
T
his chaptcr covcrs opcrations that lic somcwhcrc bctwccn thc stratcgic
and thc tacticala scalc thc acth ccntury has tcrmcd opcrational.
Jomini uscs this chaptcr as a holding pcn lor topics that do not sccm to t
in anywhcrc clsc, but which hc has includcd in his book in ordcr to makc it
comprchcnsivc. Although hc sccms to slight this chaptcr by not providing
it with an introductory statcmcnt, thc articlcs in this chaptcr arc cxccllcnt.
Articlc XXX\!!! on rctrcats and pursuits would havc bccn ol particular usc
to a cld commandcr as thc military mind tcnds to shy away lrom thc idca
ol dclcat, and so is lcast prcparcd and lcast practiccd in thc art ol rctrcat. A
succcsslul rctrcat can mitigatc a disastcr, whilc a poorly conductcd rctrcat can
turn a minor sctback into a calamity. Tis articlc at lcast lorccs gcncrals to
conlront lailurc, giving thcm rcsponscs to minimizc thc longtcrm damagc
ol a lost battlc.
.
CHAPTER VI
LOGISTICS; OR, THE PRACTICAL ART OF MOVING
ARMIES
ARTICLE XLI
A few Remarks on Logistics in General
I
s logistics simply a scicncc ol dctail: r, on thc contrary, is it a gcncral
scicncc, lorming onc ol thc most csscntial parts ol thc art ol war: or is
it but a tcrm, consccratcd by long usc, intcndcd to dcsignatc collcctivcly thc
dicrcnt branchcs ol sta duty,that is to say, thc dicrcnt mcans ol carrying
out in practicc thc thcorctical combinations ol thc art:
Tcsc qucstions will sccm singular to thosc pcrsons who arc rmly convinccd
that nothing morc rcmains to bc said about thc art ol war, and bclicvc it wrong
to scarch out ncw dcnitions whcrc cvcry thing sccms alrcady accuratcly
classicd. For my own part, ! am pcrsuadcd that good dcnitions lcad to clcar
idcas, and ! acknowlcdgc somc cmbarrassmcnt in answcring thcsc qucstions
which sccm so simplc.
!n thc carlicr cditions ol this work ! lollowcd thc cxamplc ol othcr military
writcrs, and callcd by thc namc ol logistics thc dctails ol sta dutics, which arc
thc subjcct ol rcgulations lor cldscrvicc and ol spccial instructions rclating
to thc corps ol quartcrmastcrs. Tis was thc rcsult ol prcjudiccs consccratcd
by timc. Tc word logistics is dcrivcd, as wc know, lrom thc titlc ol thc major
general des logis, (translatcd in Gcrman by Quartiermeister,) an occr whosc
duty it lormcrly was to lodgc and camp thc troops, to givc dircction to thc
marchcs ol columns, and to locatc thcm upon thc ground. Logistics was thcn
quitc limitcd. 8ut whcn war bcgan to bc wagcd without camps, movcmcnts
bccamc morc complicatcd, and thc sta occrs had morc cxtcndcd lunctions.
Tc chicl ol sta bcgan to pcrlorm thc duty ol transmitting thc conccptions ol
thc gcncral to thc most distant points ol thc thcatcr ol war, and ol procuring
lor him thc ncccssary documcnts lor arranging plans ol opcrations. Tc chicl
ol sta was callcd to thc assistancc ol thc gcncral in arranging his plans, to
.
Chaptcr \!. Logistics, or, thc Practical Art ol Moving Armics
givc inlormation ol thcm to subordinatcs in ordcrs and instructions, to cxplain
thcm and to supcrvisc thcir cxccution both in thcir ensemble and in thcir
minutc dctails: his dutics wcrc, thcrclorc, cvidcntly conncctcd with all thc
opcrations ol a campaign.
To bc a good chicl ol sta, it bccamc in this way ncccssary that a man
should bc acquaintcd with all thc various branchcs ol thc art ol war. !l thc
tcrm logistics includcs all this, thc two works ol thc Archdukc Charlcs, thc
voluminous trcatiscs ol Guibcrt, LarochcAymon, 8ousmard, and Tcrnay, all
takcn togcthcr, would hardly givc cvcn an incomplctc skctch ol what logistics
is, lor it would bc nothing morc nor lcss than thc scicncc ol applying all
possiblc military knowlcdgc.
!t appcars lrom what has bccn said that thc old tcrm logistics is insucicnt
to dcsignatc thc dutics ol sta occrs, and that thc rcal dutics ol a corps ol
such occrs, il an attcmpt bc madc to instruct thcm in a propcr manncr lor
thcir pcrlormancc, should bc accuratcly prcscribcd by spccial rcgulations in
accordancc with thc gcncral principlcs ol thc art. Govcrnmcnts should takc
thc prccaution to publish wcllconsidcrcd rcgulations, which should dcnc all
thc dutics ol sta occrs and should givc clcar and accuratc instructions as to
thc bcst mcthods ol pcrlorming thcsc dutics.
Tc Austrian sta lormcrly had such a codc ol rcgulations lor thcir
govcrnmcnt, but it was somcwhat bchind thc timcs, and was bcttcr adaptcd
to thc old mcthods ol carrying on war than thc prcscnt. Tis is thc only work
ol thc kind ! havc sccn. Tcrc arc, no doubt, othcrs, both public and sccrct,
but ! havc no knowlcdgc ol thcir cxistcncc. Scvcral gcncralsas, lor instancc,
Grimoard and Ticbauthavc prcparcd manuals lor sta occrs, and thc
ncw royal corps ol Francc has issucd scvcral partial scts ol instructions, but
thcrc is nowhcrc to bc lound a complctc manual on thc subjcct.
!l it is agrccd that thc old logistics had rclcrcncc only to dctails ol marchcs
and camps, and, morcovcr, that thc lunctions ol sta occrs at thc prcscnt day
arc intimatcly conncctcd with thc most important stratcgical combinations, it
must bc admittcd that logistics includcs but a small part ol thc dutics ol sta
occrs, and il wc rctain thc tcrm wc must undcrstand it to bc grcatly cxtcndcd
and dcvclopcd in signication, so as to cmbracc not only thc dutics ol ordinary
sta occrs, but ol gcncralsinchicl.
To convincc my rcadcrs ol this lact, ! will mcntion thc principal points that
must bc includcd il wc wish to cmbracc in onc vicw cvcry duty and dctail
rclating to thc movcmcnts ol armics and thc undcrtakings rcsulting lrom such
movcmcnts:
.. Tc prcparation ol all thc matcrial ncccssary lor sctting thc army in motion,
or, in othcr words, lor opcning thc campaign. rawing up ordcrs, instructions,
and itincrarics lor thc asscmblagc ol thc army and its subscqucnt launching
upon its thcatcr ol opcrations.
.c
a. rawing up in a propcr manncr thc ordcrs ol thc gcncralinchicl lor
dicrcnt cntcrpriscs, as wcll as plans ol attack in cxpcctcd battlcs.
. Arranging with thc chicls ol cnginccrs and artillcry thc mcasurcs to bc
takcn lor thc sccurity ol thc posts which arc to bc uscd as dcpots, as wcll as
thosc to bc lorticd in ordcr to lacilitatc thc opcrations ol thc army.
. rdcring and dirccting rcconnoissanccs ol cvcry kind, and procuring in
this way, and by using spics, as cxact inlormation as possiblc ol thc positions
and movcmcnts ol thc cncmy.
. Taking cvcry prccaution lor thc propcr cxccution ol movcmcnts ordcrcd
by thc gcncral. Arranging thc march ol thc dicrcnt columns, so that all may
movc in an ordcrly and conncctcd manncr. Asccrtaining ccrtainly that thc
mcans rcquisitc lor thc casc and.salcty ol marchcs arc prcparcd. Rcgulating
thc manncr and timc ol halts.
6. Giving propcr composition to advanccd guards, rcarguards, ankcrs,
and all dctachcd bodics, and prcparing good instructions lor thcir guidancc.
Providing all thc mcans ncccssary lor thc pcrlormancc ol thcir dutics.
,. Prcscribing lorms and instructions lor subordinatc commandcrs or thcir
sta occrs, rclativc to thc dicrcnt mcthods ol drawing up thc troops in
columns whcn thc cncmy is at hand, as wcll as thcir lormation in thc most
appropriatc manncr whcn thc army is to cngagc in battlc, according to thc
naturc ol thc ground and thc charactcr ol thc cncmy.
|!|
. !ndicating to advanccd guards and othcr dctachmcnts wcllchoscn points
ol asscmbly in casc ol thcir attack by supcrior numbcrs, and inlorming thcm
what support thcy may hopc to rcccivc in casc ol nccd.
. Arranging and supcrintcnding thc march ol trains ol baggagc, munitions,
provisions, and ambulanccs, both with thc columns and in thcir rcar, in such
manncr that thcy will not intcrlcrc with thc movcmcnts ol thc troops and will
still bc ncar at hand. Taking prccautions lor ordcr and sccurity, both on thc
march and whcn trains arc haltcd and parkcd.
.c. Providing lor thc succcssivc arrival ol convoys ol supplics. Collccting all
thc mcans ol transportation ol thc country and ol thc army, and rcgulating
thcir usc.
... irccting thc cstablishmcnt ol camps, and adopting rcgulations lor thcir
salcty, good ordcr, and policc.
.a. stablishing and organizing lincs ol opcrations and supplics, as wcll as
lincs ol communications with thcsc lincs lor dctachcd bodics. csignating
occrs capablc ol organizing and commanding in rcar ol thc army, looking out
lor thc salcty ol dctachmcnts and convoys, lurnishing thcm good instructions,
and looking out also lor prcscrving suitablc mcans ol communication ol thc
army with its basc.
!
! rclcr hcrc to gcncral instructions and lorms, which arc not to bc rcpcatcd cvcry day: such
rcpctition would bc impracticablc.
..
.. rganizing dcpots ol convalcsccnt, woundcd, and sickly mcn, movablc
hospitals, and workshops lor rcpairs, providing lor thcir salcty.
.. Kccping accuratc rccord ol all dctachmcnts, cithcr on thc anks or in
rcar, kccping an cyc upon thcir movcmcnts, and looking out lor thcir rcturn to
thc main column as soon as thcir scrvicc on dctachmcnt is no longcr ncccssary,
giving thcm, whcn rcquircd, somc ccntcr ol action, and lorming stratcgic
rcscrvcs.
.. rganizing marching battalions or companics to gathcr up isolatcd mcn
or small dctachmcnts moving in cithcr dircction bctwccn thc army and its
basc ol opcrations.
.6. !n casc ol sicgcs, ordcring and supcrvising thc cmploymcnt ol thc troops
in thc trcnchcs, making arrangcmcnts with thc chicls ol artillcry and cnginccrs
as to thc labors to bc pcrlormcd by thosc troops and as to thcir managcmcnt
in sortics and assaults.
.,. !n rctrcats, taking prccautionary mcasurcs lor prcscrving ordcr, posting
lrcsh troops to support and rclicvc thc rcarguard, causing intclligcnt occrs
to cxaminc and sclcct positions whcrc thc rcarguard may advantagcously halt,
cngagc thc cncmy, chcck hi pursuit, and thus gain timc, making provision in
advancc lor thc movcmcnt ol trains, that nothing shall bc lclt bchind, and that
thcy shall procccd in thc most pcrlcct ordcr, taking all propcr prccautions to
insurc salcty.
.. !n cantonmcnts, assigning positions to thc dicrcnt corps, indicating to
cach principal division ol thc army a placc ol asscmbly in casc ol alarm, taking
mcasurcs to scc that all ordcrs, instructions, and rcgulations arc implicitly
obscrvcd.
An cxamination ol this long listwhich might casily bc madc much longcr
by cntcring into grcatcr dctailwill lcad cvcry rcadcr to rcmark that thcsc
arc thc dutics rathcr ol thc gcncralinchicl than ol sta occrs. Tis truth
! announccd somc timc ago, and it is lor thc vcry purposc ol pcrmitting thc
gcncralinchicl to givc his wholc attcntion to thc suprcmc dircction ol thc
opcrations that hc ought to bc providcd with sta occrs compctcnt to rclicvc
him ol dctails ol cxccution. Tcir lunctions arc thcrclorc ncccssarily vcry
intimatcly conncctcd, and woc to an army whcrc thcsc authoritics ccasc to
act in conccrt! Tis want ol harmony is oltcn sccn,rst, bccausc gcncrals
arc mcn and havc laults, and sccondly, bccausc in cvcry army thcrc arc lound
individual intcrcsts and prctcnsions, producing rivalry ol thc chicls ol sta
and hindcring thcm in pcrlorming thcir dutics.
|!|
!t is not to bc cxpcctcd that this trcatisc shall contain rulcs lor thc guidancc
ol sta occrs in all thc dctails ol thcir multilarious dutics, lor, in thc rst
placc, cvcry dicrcnt nation has sta occrs with dicrcnt namcs and rounds
!
Tc chicls ol artillcry, ol cnginccrs, and ol thc administrativc dcpartmcnts all claim to havc
dircct conncction with thc gcncralinchicl, and not with thc chicl ol sta. Tcrc should, ol coursc, bc no
hindcrancc to thc lrccst intcrcoursc bctwccn thcsc high occrs and thc commandcr, but hc should work
with thcm in prcscncc ol thc chicl ol sta, and scnd him all thcir corrcspondcncc: othcrwisc, conlusion is
incvitablc.
.a
ol dutics,so that ! should bc obligcd to writc ncw rulcs lor cach army, in thc
sccond placc, thcsc dctails arc lully cntcrcd into in spccial books pcrtaining
to thcsc subjccts.
! will, thcrclorc, contcnt myscll with cnlarging a littlc upon somc ol thc rst
articlcs cnumcratcd abovc:
.. Tc mcasurcs to bc takcn by thc sta occrs lor prcparing thc army to
cntcr upon activc opcrations in thc cld includc all thosc which arc likcly to
lacilitatc thc succcss ol thc rst plan ol opcrations. Tcy should, as a mattcr
ol coursc, makc surc, by lrcqucnt inspcctions, that thc materiel ol all thc arms
ol thc scrvicc is in good ordcr: horscs, carriagcs, caissons, tcams, harncss,
shocs, &c. should bc carclully cxamincd and any dccicncics supplicd. 8ridgc
trains, cnginccrtool trains, materiel ol artillcry, sicgctrains il thcy arc to
movc, ambulanccs,in a word, cvcry thing which conics undcr thc hcad ol
materiel,should bc carclully cxamincd and placcd in good ordcr.
!l thc campaign is to bc opcncd in thc ncighborhood ol grcat rivcrs, gun
boats and ying bridgcs should bc prcparcd, and all thc small cralt should
bc collcctcd at thc points and at thc bank whcrc thcy will probably bc
uscd. !ntclligcnt occrs should cxaminc thc most lavorablc points both lor
cmbarkations and lor landings,prclcrring thosc localitics which prcscnt thc
grcatcst chanccs ol succcss lor a primary cstablishmcnt on thc oppositc bank.
Tc sta occrs will prcparc all thc itincrarics that will bc ncccssary lor thc
movcmcnt ol thc scvcral corps ol thc army to thc propcr points ol asscmblagc,
making cvcry cort to givc such dircction to thc marchcs that thc cncmy shall
bc unablc to lcarn lrom thcm any thing rclativc to thc projcctcd cntcrprisc.
!l thc war is to bc ocnsivc, thc sta occrs arrangc with thc chicl cnginccr
occrs what lortications shall bc crcctcd ncar thc basc ol opcrations, whcn
tetes de ponts or intrcnchcd camps arc to bc constructcd thcrc. !l thc war is
dclcnsivc, thcsc works will bc built bctwccn thc rst linc ol dclcnsc and thc
sccond basc.
a. An csscntial branch ol logistics is ccrtainly that which rclatcs to making
arrangcmcnts ol marchcs and attacks, which arc xcd by thc gcncral and
noticc ol thcm givcn to thc propcr pcrsons by thc chicls ol sta. Tc ncxt
most important qualication ol a gcncral, altcr that ol knowing how to lorm
good plans, is, unqucstionably, that ol lacilitating thc cxccution ol his ordcrs
by thcir clcarncss ol stylc. Vhatcvcr may bc thc rcal busincss ol a chicl ol sta,
thc grcatncss ol a commandcrinchicl will bc always manilcstcd in his plans,
but il thc gcncral lacks ability thc chicl ol sta should supply it as lar as hc can,
having a propcr undcrstanding with thc rcsponsiblc chicl.
! havc sccn two vcry dicrcnt mcthods cmploycd in this branch ol thc
scrvicc. Tc rst, which may bc stylcd thc old school, consists in issuing daily,
lor thc rcgulation ol thc movcmcnts ol thc army, gcncral instructions llcd
with minutc and somcwhat pcdantic dctails, so much thc morc out ol placc
.
as thcy arc usually addrcsscd to chicls ol corps, who arc supposcd to bc ol
sucicnt cxpcricncc not to rcquirc thc samc sort ol instruction as would bc
givcn to junior subaltcrns just out ol school.
Tc othcr mcthod is that ol thc dctachcd ordcrs givcn by Napolcon to his
marshals, prcscribing lor cach onc simply what conccrncd himscll, and only
inlorming him what corps wcrc to opcratc with him, cithcr on thc right or
thc lclt, but ncvcr pointing out thc conncction ol thc opcrations ol thc wholc
army.
|!|
! havc good rcasons lor knowing that hc did this dcsigncdly, cithcr to
surround his opcrations with an air ol mystcry, or lor lcar that morc spccic
ordcrs might lall into thc hands ol thc cncmy and assist him in thwarting his
plans.
!t is ccrtainly ol grcat importancc lor a gcncral to kccp his plans sccrct,
and Frcdcrick thc Grcat was right whcn hc said that il his nightcap kncw
what was in his hcad hc would throw it into thc rc. Tat kind ol sccrccy was
practicablc in Frcdcrick's timc, whcn his wholc army was kcpt closcly about
him, but whcn mancuvcrs ol thc vastncss ol Napolcon's arc cxccutcd, and war
is wagcd as in our day, what conccrt ol action can bc cxpcctcd lrom gcncrals
who arc uttcrly ignorant ol what is going on around thcm:
l thc two systcms, thc last sccms to mc prclcrablc. A judicious mcan may
bc adoptcd bctwccn thc ccccntric conciscncss ol Napolcon and thc minutc
vcrbosity which laid down lor cxpcricnccd gcncrals likc 8arclay, Klcist, and
Vittgcnstcin prccisc dircctions lor brcaking into companics and rclorming
again in linc ol battlc,a piccc ol nonscnsc all thc morc ridiculous bccausc
thc cxccution ol such an ordcr in prcscncc ol thc cncmy is impracticablc. !t
would bc sucicnt, ! think, in such cascs, to givc thc gcncrals spccial ordcrs
rclativc to thcir own corps, and to add a lcw lincs in ciphcr inlorming thcm
bricy as to thc wholc plan ol thc opcrations and thc part thcy arc to takc
individually in cxccuting it. Vhcn a propcr ciphcr is wanting, thc ordcr may
bc transmittcd vcrbally by an occr capablc ol undcrstanding it and rcpcating
it accuratcly. !ndiscrcct rcvclations nccd thcn bc no longcr lcarcd, and conccrt
ol action would bc sccurcd.
. Tc army bcing asscmblcd, and bcing in rcadincss to undcrtakc somc
cntcrprisc, thc important thing will bc to sccurc as much conccrt and
prccision ol action as possiblc, whilst taking all thc usual prccaution's to gain
accuratc inlormation ol thc routc it is to pursuc and to covcr its movcmcnts
thoroughly.
Tcrc arc two kinds ol marchcs,thosc which arc madc out ol sight ol
thc cncmy, and thosc which arc madc in his prcscncc, cithcr advancing or
rctiring. Tcsc marchcs particularly havc undcrgonc grcat changcs in latc ycars.
Formcrly, armics scldom camc in collision until thcy had bccn scvcral days in
prcscncc ol cach othcr, and thc attacking party had roads opcncd by pionccrs
lor thc columns to movc up parallcl to cach othcr. At prcscnt, thc attack is
!
! bclicvc that at thc passagc ol thc anubc bclorc Vagram, and at thc opcning ol thc sccond
campaign ol .., Napolcon dcviatcd lrom his usual custom by issuing a gcncral ordcr.
.
madc morc promptly, and thc cxisting roads usually answcr all purposcs. !t is,
howcvcr, ol importancc, whcn an army is moving, that pionccrs and sappcrs
accompany thc advanccd guard, to incrcasc thc numbcr ol practicablc roads,
to rcmovc obstructions, throw small bridgcs ovcr crccks, &c., il ncccssary, and
sccurc thc mcans ol casy communication bctwccn thc dicrcnt corps ol thc
army.
!n thc prcscnt manncr ol marching, thc calculation ol timcs and distanccs
bccomcs morc complicatcd: thc columns having cach a dicrcnt distancc
to pass ovcr, in dctcrmining thc hour ol thcir dcparturc and giving thcm
instructions thc lollowing particulars must bc considcrcd:., thc distanccs to
bc passcd ovcr, a, thc amount ol materiel in cach train, , thc naturc ol thc
country, , thc obstaclcs placcd in thc way by thc cncmy, , thc lact whcthcr or
not it is important lor thc march to bc conccalcd or opcn.
Undcr prcscnt circumstanccs, thc surcst and simplcst mcthod ol arranging
thc movcmcnts ol thc grcat corps lorming thc wings ol an army, or ol all thosc
corps not marching with thc column attachcd to thc gcncral hcadquartcrs,
will bc to trust thc dctails to thc cxpcricncc ol thc gcncrals commanding thosc
corps,bcing carclul, howcvcr, to lct thcm undcrstand that thc most cxact
punctuality is cxpcctcd ol thcm. !t will thcn bc cnough to indicatc to thcm
thc point to bc rcachcd and thc objcct to bc attaincd, thc routc to bc pursucd
and thc hour at which thcy will bc cxpcctcd to bc in position. Tcy should
bc inlormcd what corps arc marching cithcr on thc samc roads with thcm
or on sidcroads to thc right or lclt in ordcr that thcy may govcrn thcmsclvcs
accordingly, thcy should rcccivc whatcvcr ncws thcrc may bc ol thc cncmy,
and havc a linc ol rctrcat indicatcd to thcm.
|!|
All thosc dctails whosc objcct it is to prcscribc cach day lor thc chicls ol
corps thc mcthod ol lorming thcir columns and placing thcm in position arc
mcrc pcdantry,morc hurtlul than usclul. To scc that thcy march habitually
according to rcgulation or custom is ncccssary, but thcy should bc lrcc to
arrangc thcir movcmcnts so as to arrivc at thc appointcd placc and timc, at
thc risk ol bcing rcmovcd lrom thcir command il thcy lail to do so without
sucicnt rcason. !n rctrcats, howcvcr, which arc madc along a singlc road by
an army scparatcd into divisions, thc hours ol dcparturc and halts must bc
carclully rcgulatcd.
ach column should havc its own advanccd guard and ankcrs, that its
march may bc conductcd with thc usual prccautions: it is convcnicnt also,
cvcn whcn thcy lorm part ol a sccond linc, lor thc hcad ol cach column to
bc prcccdcd by a lcw pionccrs and sappcrs, providcd with tools lor rcmoving
obstaclcs or making rcpairs in casc ol accidcnts, a lcw ol thcsc workmcn should
also accompany cach train: in likc manncr, a light trcstlcbridgc train will bc
lound vcry usclul.
!
Napolcon ncvcr did this, bccausc hc maintaincd that no gcncral should cvcr think scriously ol thc
possibility ol bcing bcatcn. !n many marchcs it is ccrtainly a usclcss prccaution, but it is oltcn indispcnsablc.
.
. Tc army on thc march is oltcn prcccdcd by a gcncral advanccd guard, or,
as is morc lrcqucnt in thc modcrn systcm, thc ccntcr and cach wing may havc
its spccial advanccd guard. !t is customary lor thc rcscrvcs and thc ccntcr to
accompany thc hcadquartcrs, and thc gcncral advanccd guard, whcn thcrc is
onc, will usually lollow thc samc road: so that hall thc army is thus asscmblcd
on thc ccntral routc. Undcr thcsc circumstanccs, thc grcatcst carc is rcquisitc
to prcvcnt obstructing thc road. !t happcns somctimcs, howcvcr, whcn thc
important strokc is to bc madc in thc dircction ol onc ol thc wings, that thc
rcscrvcs, thc gcncral hcadquartcrs, and cvcn thc gcncral advanccd guard, may
bc movcd in that dircction: in this casc, all thc rulcs usually rcgulating thc
march ol thc ccntcr must bc applicd to that wing.
Advanccd guards should bc accompanicd by good sta occrs, capablc
ol lorming corrcct idcas as to thc cncmy's movcmcnts and ol giving an
accuratc account ol thcm to thc gcncral, thus cnabling him to makc his plans
undcrstandingly. Tc commandcr ol thc advanccd guard should assist thc
gcncral in thc samc way. A gcncral advanccd guard should bc composcd ol
light troops ol all arms, containing somc ol thc elite troops ol thc army as
a main body, a lcw dragoons prcparcd to ght on loot, somc horscartillcry,
pontonicrs, sappcrs, &c., with light trcstlcs and pontoons lor passing small
strcams. A lcw good marksmcn will not bc out ol placc. A topographical
occr should accompany it, to makc a skctch ol thc country a milc or two on
cach sidc ol thc road. A body ol irrcgular cavalry should always bc attachcd,
to sparc thc rcgular cavalry and to scrvc as scouts, bccausc thcy arc bcst suitcd
to such scrvicc.
. As thc army advanccs and rcmovcs larthcr lrom its basc, it bccomcs thc
morc ncccssary to havc a good linc ol opcrations and ol dcpots which may
kccp up thc conncction ol thc army with its basc. Tc sta occrs will dividc
thc dcpots into dcpartmcnts, thc principal dcpot bcing cstablishcd in thc town
which can lodgc and supply thc grcatcst numbcr ol mcn: il thcrc is a lortrcss
suitably situatcd, it should bc sclcctcd as thc sitc ol thc principal dcpot.
Tc sccondary dcpots may bc scparatcd by distanccs ol lrom ltccn to thirty
milcs, usually in thc towns ol thc country. Tc mcan distancc apart will bc
about twcnty to twcntyvc milcs. Tis will givc ltccn dcpots upon a linc ol
thrcc hundrcd milcs, which should bc dividcd into thrcc or lour brigadcs ol
dcpots. ach ol thcsc will havc a commandcr and a dctachmcnt ol troops or
ol convalcsccnt soldicrs, who rcgulatc thc arrangcmcnts lor accommodating
troops and givc protcction to thc authoritics ol thc country, (il thcy rcmain,)
thcy lurnish lacilitics lor transmitting thc mails and thc ncccssary cscorts, thc
commandcr sccs that thc roads and bridgcs arc kcpt in good ordcr. !l possiblc,
thcrc should bc a park ol scvcral carriagcs at cach dcpot, ccrtainly at thc
principal onc in cach brigadc. Tc command ol all thc dcpots cmbraccd within
ccrtain gcographical limits should bc intrustcd to prudcnt and ablc gcncral
occrs, lor thc sccurity ol thc communications ol thc army oltcn dcpcnds on
.6
thcir opcrations.
|!|
Tcsc commands may somctimcs bccomc stratcgic rcscrvcs,
as was cxplaincd in Art. XX!!!., a lcw good battalions, with thc assistancc ol
movablc dctachmcnts passing continually bctwccn thc army and thc basc, will
gcncrally bc ablc to kccp opcn thc communications.
6. Tc study ol thc mcasurcs, partly logistical and partly tactical, to bc
takcn by thc sta occrs in bringing thc troops lrom thc ordcr ol march to
thc dicrcnt ordcrs ol battlc, is vcry important, but rcquircs going into such
minutc dctail that ! must pass it ovcr ncarly in silcncc, contcnting myscll with
rclcrring my rcadcrs to thc numcrous works spccially dcvotcd to this branch
ol thc art ol war.
8clorc lcaving this intcrcsting subjcct, ! think a lcw cxamplcs should bc
givcn as illustrations ol thc grcat importancc ol a good systcm ol logistics.
nc ol thcsc cxamplcs is thc wondcrlul conccntration ol thc Frcnch army
in thc plains ol Gcra in .c6, anothcr is thc cntrancc ol thc army upon thc
campaign ol ...
!n cach ol thcsc cascs Napolcon posscsscd thc ability to makc such
arrangcmcnts that his columns, starting lrom points widcly scparatcd, wcrc
conccntratcd with wondcrlul prccision upon thc dccisivc point ol thc zonc ol
opcrations, and in this way hc insurcd thc succcsslul issuc ol thc campaign.
Tc choicc ol thc dccisivc point was thc rcsult ol a skilllul application ol thc
principlcs ol stratcgy, and thc arrangcmcnts lor moving thc troops givc us
an cxamplc ol logistics which originatcd in his own closct. !t has bccn long
claimcd that 8crthicr lramcd thosc instructions which wcrc conccivcd with so
much prccision and usually transmittcd with so much clcarncss, but ! havc had
lrcqucnt opportunitics ol knowing that such was not thc truth. Tc cmpcror
was his own chicl sta occr. Providcd with a pair ol dividcrs opcncd to
a distancc by thc scalc ol lrom scvcntccn to twcnty milcs in a straight linc,
(which madc lrom twcntytwo to twcntyvc milcs, taking into account thc
windings ol thc roads,) bcnding ovcr and somctimcs strctchcd at lull lcngth
upon his map, whcrc thc positions ol his corps and thc supposcd positions
ol thc cncmy wcrc markcd by pins ol dicrcnt colors, hc was ablc to givc
ordcrs lor cxtcnsivc movcmcnts with a ccrtainty and prccision which wcrc
astonishing. Turning his dividcrs about lrom point to point on thc map, hc
dccidcd in a momcnt thc numbcr ol marchcs ncccssary lor cach ol his columns
to arrivc at thc dcsircd point by a ccrtain day, thcn, placing pins in thc ncw
positions, and bcaring in mind thc ratc ol marching that hc must assign to
cach column, and thc hour ol its sctting out, hc dictatcd thosc instructions
which arc alonc cnough to makc any man lamous.
Ncy coming lrom thc shorcs ol Lakc Constancc, Lanncs lrom Uppcr Swabia,
Soult and avoust lrom 8avaria and thc Palatinatc, 8crnadottc and Augcrcau
lrom Franconia, and thc !mpcrial Guard lrom Paris, wcrc all thus arrangcd in
!
!t may bc objcctcd that in somc wars, as whcrc thc population is hostilc, it may bc vcry dicult,
or impracticablc, to organizc lincs ol dcpots. !n such cascs thcy will ccrtainly bc cxposcd to grcat dangcrs, but
thcsc arc thc vcry cascs whcrc thcy arc most ncccssary and should bc most numcrous. Tc linc lrom 8ayonnc
to Madrid was such a linc, which rcsistcd lor lour ycars thc attacks ol thc gucrrillas,although convoys wcrc
somctimcs scizcd. At onc timc thc linc cxtcndcd as lar as Cadiz.
.,
linc on thrcc parallcl roads, to dcbouch simultancously bctwccn Saallcld, Gcra,
and Plaucn, lcw pcrsons in thc army or in Gcrmany having any conccption ol
thc objcct ol thcsc movcmcnts which sccmcd so vcry complicatcd.
!n thc samc manncr, in .., whcn 8lucchcr had his army quictly in
cantonmcnts bctwccn thc Sambrc and thc Rhinc, and Vcllington was
attcnding fetes in 8russcls, both waiting a signal lor thc invasion ol Francc,
Napolcon, who was supposcd to bc at Paris cntircly cngrosscd with diplomatic
ccrcmonics, at thc hcad ol his guard, which had bccn but rcccntly rclormcd
in thc capital, lcll likc a thundcrbolt upon Charlcroi and 8lucchcr's quartcrs,
his columns arriving lrom all points ol thc compass, with rarc punctuality, on
thc .th ol Junc, in thc plains ol 8caumont and upon thc banks ol thc Sambrc.
(Napolcon did not lcavc Paris until thc .ath.)
Tc combinations dcscribcd abovc wcrc thc rcsults ol wisc stratcgic
calculations, but thcir cxccution was undoubtcdly a mastcrpiccc ol logistics.
!n ordcr to cxhibit morc clcarly thc mcrit ol thcsc mcasurcs, ! will mcntion, by
way ol contrast, two cascs whcrc laults in logistics camc vcry ncar lcading to
latal conscqucnccs. Napolcon having bccn rccallcd lrom Spain in .c by thc
lact ol Austria's taking up arms, and bcing ccrtain that this powcr intcndcd
war, hc scnt 8crthicr into 8avaria upon thc dclicatc duty ol conccntrating
thc army, which was cxtcndcd lrom 8raunau as lar as Strasbourg and rlurt.
avoust was rcturning lrom thc lattcr city, udinot lrom Franklort, Masscna,
who had bccn on his way to Spain, was rctiring toward Ulm by thc Strasbourg
routc, thc Saxons, 8avarians, and Vurtcmbcrgcrs wcrc moving lrom thcir
rcspcctivc countrics. Tc corps wcrc thus scparatcd by grcat distanccs, and
thc Austrians, who had bccn long conccntratcd, might casily brcak through
this spidcr's wcb or brush away its thrcads. Napolcon was justly uncasy, and
ordcrcd 8crthicr to asscmblc thc army at Ratisbon il thc war had not actually
bcgun on his arrival, but, il it had, to conccntratc it in a morc rctircd position
toward Ulm.
Tc rcason lor this altcrnativc ordcr was obvious. !l thc war had bcgun,
Ratisbon was too ncar thc Austrian lronticr lor a point ol asscmbly, as thc
corps might thus bc thrown scparatcly into thc midst ol two hundrcd thousand
cncmics, but by xing upon Ulm as thc point ol rcndczvous thc army would
bc conccntratcd sooncr, or, at any ratc, thc cncmy would havc vc or six
marchcs morc to makc bclorc rcachingit,which was a highlyimportant
considcration as thc partics wcrc thcn situatcd.
No grcat talcnt was nccdcd to undcrstand this. Hostilitics having commcnccd,
howcvcr, but a lcw days altcr 8crthicr's arrival at Munich, this too cclcbratcd
chicl ol sta was so loolish as to adhcrc to a litcral obcdicncc ol thc ordcr hc
had rcccivcd, without concciving its obvious intcntion: hc not only dcsircd
thc army to asscmblc at Ratisbon, but cvcn obligcd avoust to rcturn toward
that city, whcn that marshal had had thc good scnsc to lall back lrom Ambcrg
toward !ngolstadt.
.
Napolcon, having, by good lortunc, bccn inlormcd by tclcgraph ol thc
passagc ol thc !nn twcntylour hours altcr its occurrcncc, camc with thc
spccd ol lightning to Abcnsbcrg, just as avoust was on thc point ol bcing
surroundcd and his army cut in two or scattcrcd by a mass ol onc hundrcd and
cighty thousand cncmics. Vc know how wondcrlully Napolcon succccdcd
in rallying his army, and what victorics hc gaincd on thc glorious days ol
Abcnsbcrg, Sicgbcrg, Landshut, ckmuchl, and Ratisbon, that rcpaircd thc
laults committcd by his chicl ol sta with his contcmptiblc logistics.
Vc shall nish thcsc illustrations with a noticc ol thc cvcnts which prcccdcd
and wcrc simultancous with thc passagc ol thc anubc bclorc thc battlc ol
Vagram. Tc mcasurcs takcn to bring to a spccicd point ol thc island ol
Lobau thc corps ol thc \iccroy ol !taly lrom Hungary, that ol Marmont lrom
Styria, that ol 8crnadottc lrom Linz, arc lcss wondcrlul than thc lamous
impcrial dccrcc ol thirtyonc articlcs which rcgulatcd thc dctails ol thc passagc
and thc lormation ol thc troops in thc plains ol nzcrsdorl, in prcscncc ol
onc hundrcd and lorty thousand Austrians and vc hundrcd cannon, as il
thc opcration had bccn a military fete. Tcsc masscs wcrc all asscmblcd upon
thc island on thc cvcning ol thc th ol July, thrcc bridgcs wcrc immcdiatcly
thrown ovcr an arm ol thc anubc onc hundrcd and lty yards widc, on a vcry
dark night and amidst torrcnts ol rain, onc hundrcd and lty thousand mcn
passcd ovcr thc bridgcs, in prcscncc ol a lormidablc cncmy, and wcrc drawn
up bclorc midday in thc plain, thrcc milcs in advancc ol thc bridgcs which
thcy covcrcd by a changc ol lront, thc wholc bcing accomplishcd in lcss timc
than might havc bccn supposcd ncccssary had it bccn a simplc mancuvcr lor
instruction and altcr bcing scvcral timcs rcpcatcd. Tc cncmy had, it is truc,
dctcrmincd to ocr no scrious opposition to thc passagc, but Napolcon did not
know that lact, and thc mcrit ol his dispositions is not at all diminishcd by it.
Singularly cnough, howcvcr, thc chicl ol sta, although hc madc tcn copics
ol thc lamous dccrcc, did not obscrvc that by mistakc thc bridgc ol thc ccntcr
had bccn assigncd to avoust, who had thc right wing, whilst thc bridgc on
thc right was assigncd to udinot, who was in thc ccntcr. Tcsc two corps
passcd cach othcr in thc night, and, had it not bccn lor thc good scnsc ol thc
mcn and thcir occrs, a drcadlul sccnc ol conlusion might havc bccn thc
rcsult. Tanks to thc supincncss ol thc cncmy, thc army cscapcd all disordcr,
cxccpt that arising lrom a lcw dctachmcnts lollowing corps to which thcy did
not bclong. Tc most rcmarkablc lcaturc ol thc wholc transaction is lound in
thc lact that altcr such a blundcr 8crthicr should havc rcccivcd thc titlc ol
Princc ol Vagram.
Tc crror doubtlcss originatcd with Napolcon whilc dictating his dccrcc, but
should it not havc bccn dctcctcd by a chicl ol sta who madc tcn copics ol thc
ordcr and whosc duty it was to supcrvisc thc lormation ol thc troops:
Anothcr no lcss cxtraordinary cxamplc ol thc importancc ol good logistics
was aordcd at thc battlc ol Lcipsic. !n ghting this battlc, with a dclc in
rcar ol thc army as at Lcipsic, and in thc midst ol low ground, woodcd, and
.
cut up by small strcams and gardcns, it was highly important to havc a numbcr
ol small bridgcs, to prcparc thc banks lor approaching thcm with casc, and to
stakc out thc roads. Tcsc prccautions would not havc prcvcntcd thc loss ol a
dccisivc battlc, but thcy would havc savcd thc livcs ol a considcrablc numbcr
ol mcn, as wcll as thc guns and carriagcs that wcrc abandoncd on account ol
thc disordcr and ol thcrc bcing no roads ol cscapc. Tc unaccountablc blowing
up ol thc bridgc ol Lindcnau was also thc rcsult ol unpardonablc carclcssncss
upon thc part ol thc sta corps, which indccd cxistcd only in namc, owing to
thc manncr ol 8crthicr's managcmcnt ol it. Vc must also agrcc that Napolcon,
who was pcrlcctly convcrsant with thc logistical mcasurcs ol an ocnsivc
campaign, had thcn ncvcr scriously thought what would bc propcr prccautions
in thc cvcnt ol dclcat, and whcn thc cmpcror was prcscnt himscll no onc
thought ol making any arrangcmcnt lor thc luturc unlcss by his dircction.
To complctc what ! proposcd whcn ! commcnccd this articlc, it bccomcs
ncccssary lor mc to add somc rcmarks with rclcrcncc to rcconnoissanccs. Tcy
arc ol two kinds: thc rst arc cntircly topographical and statistical, and thcir
objcct is to gain a knowlcdgc ol a country, its accidcnts ol ground, its roads,
dclcs, bridgcs, &c., and to lcarn its rcsourccs and mcans ol cvcry kind. At thc
prcscnt day, whcn thc scicnccs ol gcography, topography, and statistics arc in
such an advanccd statc, thcsc rcconnoissanccs arc lcss ncccssary than lormcrly,
but thcy arc still vcry usclul, and it is not probablc that thc statistics ol any
country will cvcr bc so accuratc that thcy may bc cntircly dispcnscd with.
Tcrc arc many cxccllcnt books ol instruction as to thc art ol making thcsc
rcconnoissanccs, and ! must dircct thc attcntion ol my rcadcrs to thcm.
Rcconnoissanccs ol thc othcr kind arc ordcrcd whcn it is ncccssary to gain
inlormation ol thc movcmcnts ol thc cncmy. Tcy arc madc by dctachmcnts ol
grcatcr or lcss strcngth. !l thc cncmy is drawn up in battlcordcr, thc gcncrals
inchicl or thc chicls ol sta makc thc rcconnoissancc, il hc is on thc march,
wholc divisions ol cavalry may bc thrown out to brcak through his scrccn ol
posts.
ARTICLE XLII
Of Reconnoissances and other Means of gaining Correct
Information of the Movements of the Enemy
nc ol thc surcst ways ol lorming good combinations in war would bc to
ordcr movcmcnts only altcr obtaining pcrlcct inlormation ol thc cncmy's
procccdings. !n lact, how can any man say what hc should do himscll, il hc
is ignorant what his advcrsary is about: As it is unqucstionably ol thc highcst
importancc to gain this inlormation, so it is a thing ol thc utmost diculty, not
to say impossibility, and this is onc ol thc chicl causcs ol thc grcat dicrcncc
bctwccn thc thcory and thc practicc ol war.
acc
From this causc arisc thc mistakcs ol thosc gcncrals who arc simply
lcarncd mcn without a natural talcnt lor war, and who havc not acquircd that
practical coup-d'oeil which is impartcd by long cxpcricncc in thc dircction ol
military opcrations. !t is a vcry casy mattcr lor a schoolman to makc a plan
lor outanking a wing or thrcatcning a linc ol communications upon a map,
whcrc hc can rcgulatc thc positions ol both partics to suit himscll, but whcn
hc has opposcd to him a skilllul, activc, and cntcrprising advcrsary, whosc
movcmcnts arc a pcrlcct riddlc, thcn his dicultics bcgin, and wc scc an
cxhibition ol thc incapacity ol an ordinary gcncral with nonc ol thc rcsourccs
ol gcnius.
! havc sccn so many prools ol this truth in my long lilc, that, il ! had to put a
gcncral to thc tcst, ! should havc a much highcr rcgard lor thc man who could
lorm sound conclusions as to thc movcmcnts ol thc cncmy than lor him who
could makc a grand display ol thcorics,things so dicult to put in practicc,
but so casily undcrstood whcn oncc cxcmplicd.
Tcrc arc lour mcans ol obtaining inlormation ol thc cncmy's opcrations.
Tc rst is a wcllarrangcd systcm ol cspionagc, thc sccond consists in
rcconnoissanccs madc by skilllul occrs and light troops, thc third, in
qucstioning prisoncrs ol war, thc lourth, in lorming hypothcscs ol probabilitics.
Tis last idca ! will cnlargc upon larthcr on. Tcrc is also a lth mcthod,
that ol signals. Although this is uscd rathcr lor indicating thc prcscncc ol thc
cncmy than lor lorming conclusions as to his dcsigns, it may bc classcd with
thc othcrs.
Spics will cnablc a gcncral to lcarn morc surcly than by any othcr agcncy
what is going on in thc midst ol thc cncmy's camps, lor rcconnoissanccs,
howcvcr wcll madc, can givc no inlormation ol any thing bcyond thc linc ol
thc advanccd guard. ! do not mcan to say that thcy should not bc rcsortcd to,
lor wc must usc cvcry mcans ol gaining inlormation, but ! do say that thcir
rcsults arc small and not to bc dcpcndcd upon. Rcports ol prisoncrs arc oltcn
usclul, but it is gcncrally dangcrous to crcdit thcm. A skilllul chicl ol sta will
always bc ablc to sclcct intclligcnt occrs who can so lramc thcir qucstions as
to clicit important inlormation lrom prisoncrs and dcscrtcrs.
Tc partisans who arc scnt to hang around thc cncmy's lincs ol opcrations
may doubtlcss lcarn somcthing ol his movcmcnts, but it is almost impossiblc
to communicatc with thcm and rcccivc thc inlormation thcy posscss. An
cxtcnsivc systcm ol cspionagc will gcncrally bc succcsslul: it is, howcvcr,
dicult lor a spy to pcnctratc to thc gcncral's closct and lcarn thc sccrct plans
hc may lorm: it is bcst lor him, thcrclorc, to limit himscll to inlormation ol
what hc sccs with his own cycs or hcars lrom rcliablc pcrsons. vcn whcn
thc gcncral rcccivcs lrom his spics inlormation ol movcmcnts, hc still knows
nothing ol thosc which may sincc havc takcn placc, nor ol what thc cncmy is
going nally to attcmpt. Supposc, lor cxamplc, hc lcarns that such a corps has
passcd through Jcna toward Vcimar, and that anothcr has passcd through
Gcra toward Naumburg: hc must still ask himscll thc qucstions, Vhcrc arc
ac.
thcy going, and what cntcrprisc arc thcy cngagcd in: Tcsc things thc most
skilllul spy cannot lcarn.
Vhcn armics campcd in tcnts and in a singlc mass, inlormation ol thc
cncmy's opcrations was ccrtain, bccausc rcconnoitcringpartics could bc
thrown lorward in sight ol thc camps, and thc spics could rcport accuratcly
thcir movcmcnts, but with thc cxisting organization into corps d'armcc which
cithcr canton or bivouac, it is vcry dicult to lcarn any thing about thcm. Spics
may, howcvcr, bc vcry usclul whcn thc hostilc army is commandcd by a grcat
captain or a grcat sovcrcign who always movcs with thc mass ol his troops
or with thc rcscrvcs. Such, lor cxamplc, wcrc thc mpcrors Alcxandcr and
Napolcon. !l it was known whcn thcy movcd and what routc thcy lollowcd, it
was not dicult to concludc what projcct was in vicw, and thc dctails ol thc
movcmcnts ol smallcr bodics nccdcd not to bc attcndcd to particularly.
A skilllul gcncral may supply thc dclccts ol thc othcr mcthods by making
rcasonablc and wcllloundcd hypothcscs. ! can with grcat satislaction say that
this mcans hardly cvcr lailcd mc. Tough lortunc ncvcr placcd mc at thc hcad
ol an army, ! havc bccn chicl ol sta to ncarly a hundrcd thousand mcn, and
havc bccn many timcs callcd into thc councils ol thc grcatcst sovcrcigns ol thc
day, whcn thc qucstion undcr considcration was thc propcr dircction to givc to
thc combincd armics ol uropc, and ! was ncvcr morc than two or thrcc timcs
mistakcn in my hypothcscs and in my manncr ol solving thc dicultics thcy
ocrcd. As ! havc said bclorc, ! havc constantly noticcd that, as an army can
opcratc only upon thc ccntcr or onc cxtrcmity ol its lront ol opcrations, thcrc
arc scldom morc than thrcc or lour suppositions that can possibly bc madc.
A mind lully convinccd ol thcsc truths and convcrsant with thc principlcs ol
war will always bc ablc to lorm a plan which will providc in advancc lor thc
probablc contingcncics ol thc luturc. ! will citc a lcw cxamplcs which havc
comc undcr my own obscrvation.
!n .c6, whcn pcoplc in Francc wcrc still unccrtain as to thc war with
Prussia, ! wrotc a mcmoir upon thc probabilitics ol thc war and thc opcrations
which would takc placc.
! madc thc thrcc lollowing hypothcscs:.st. Tc Prussians will await
Napolcon's attack bchind thc lbc, and will ght on thc dclcnsivc as lar as thc
dcr, in cxpcctation ol aid lrom Russia and Austria, ad. r thcy will advancc
upon thc Saalc, rcsting thcir lclt upon thc lronticr ol 8ohcmia and dclcnding
thc passcs ol thc mountains ol Franconia, d. r clsc, cxpccting thc Frcnch by
thc grcat Maycncc road, thcy will advancc imprudcntly to rlurt.
! do not bclicvc any othcr suppositions could bc madc, unlcss thc Prussians
wcrc thought to bc so loolish as to dividc thcir lorccs, alrcady inlcrior to thc
Frcnch, upon thc two dircctions ol Vcscl and Maycncc,a usclcss mistakc,
sincc thcrc had not bccn a Frcnch soldicr on thc rst ol thcsc roads sincc thc
Scvcn Ycars' Var.
Tcsc hypothcscs having bccn madc as abovc statcd, il any onc should ask
what coursc Napolcon ought to pursuc, it was casy to rcply "that thc mass ol
aca
thc Frcnch army bcing alrcady asscmblcd in 8avaria, it should bc thrown upon
thc lclt ol thc Prussians by way ol Grcra and Hol, lor thc gordian knot ol thc
campaign was in that dircction, no mattcr what plan thcy should adopt."
!l thcy advanccd to rlurt, hc could movc to Gcra, cut thcir linc ol rctrcat,
and prcss thcm back along thc Lowcr lbc to thc North Sca. !l thcy rcstcd
upon thc Saalc, hc could attack thcir lclt by way ol Hol and Gcra, dclcat thcm
partially, and rcach 8crlin bclorc thcm by way ol Lcipsic. !l thcy stood last
bchind thc lbc, hc must still attack thcm by way ol Gcra and Hol.
Sincc Napolcon's dircction ol opcrations was so clcarly xcd, what mattcrcd it
to him to know thc dctails ol thcir movcmcnts: 8cing ccrtain ol thc corrcctncss
ol thcsc principlcs, ! did not hcsitatc to announcc, a month before the war, that
Napolcon would attcmpt just what hc did, and that il thc Prussians passcd thc
Saalc battlcs would takc placc at Jcna and Naumburg!
! rclatc this circumstancc not lrom a lccling ol vanity, lor il that wcrc my
motivc ! might mcntion many morc ol a similar charactcr. ! havc only bccn
anxious to show that in war a plan ol opcrations may bc oltcn arrangcd, simply
bascd upon thc gcncral principlcs ol thc art, without much attcntion bcing ol
ncccssity givcn to thc dctails ol thc cncmy's movcmcnts.
Rcturning to our subjcct, ! must statc that thc usc ol spics has bccn ncglcctcd
to a rcmarkablc dcgrcc in many modcrn armics. !n .. thc sta ol Princc
Schwarzcnbcrg had not a singlc sou lor cxpcnditurc lor such scrviccs, and
thc mpcror Alcxandcr was obligcd to lurnish thc sta occrs with lunds
lrom his own privatc pursc to cnablc thcm to scnd agcnts into Lusatia lor thc
purposc ol nding out Napolcon's whcrcabouts. Gcncral Mack at Ulm, and
thc ukc ol 8runswick in .c6, wcrc no bcttcr inlormcd, and thc Frcnch
gcncrals in Spain oltcn sucrcd scvcrcly, bccausc it was impossiblc to obtain
spics and to gct inlormation as to what was going on around thcm.
Tc Russian army is bcttcr providcd than any othcr lor gathcring inlormation,
by thc usc ol roving bodics ol Cossacks, and history conrms my asscrtion.
Tc cxpcdition ol Princc Koudachc, who was scnt altcr thc battlc ol
rcsdcn to thc Princc ol Swcdcn, and who crosscd thc lbc by swimming
and marchcd in thc midst ol thc Frcnch columns as lar, ncarly, as Vittcnbcrg,
is a rcmarkablc instancc ol this class. Tc inlormation lurnishcd by thc
partisan troops ol Gcncrals Czcrnichc, 8cnkcndorl, avido, and Scslawin
was cxcccdingly valuablc. Vc may rccollcct it was through a dispatch lrom
Napolcon to thc mprcss Maria Louisa, intcrccptcd ncar Chalons by thc
Cossacks, that thc allics wcrc inlormcd ol thc plan hc had lormcd ol lalling
upon thcir communications with his wholc disposablc lorcc, basing his
opcrations upon thc lorticd towns ol Lorrainc and Alsacc. Tis highly
important piccc ol inlormation dccidcd 8lucchcr and Schwarzcnbcrg to ccct
ac
a junction ol thcir armics, which thc plaincst principlcs ol stratcgy had ncvcr
prcviously brought to act in conccrt cxccpt at Lcipsic and 8ricnnc.
Vc know, also, that thc warning givcn by Scslawin to Gcncral octoro
savcd him lrom bcing crushcd at 8orovsk by Napolcon, who had just lclt
Moscow in rctrcat with his wholc army. octoro did not at rst crcdit this
ncws,which so irritatcd Scslawin that hc ccctcd thc capturc ol a Frcnch
occr and scvcral soldicrs ol thc guard lrom thc Frcnch bivouacs and scnt
thcm as prools ol its corrcctncss. Tis warning, which dccidcd thc march ol
Koutouso to MaloiYaroslavitz, prcvcntcd Napolcon lrom taking thc way by
Kalouga, whcrc hc would havc lound grcatcr lacilitics lor rctting his army
and would havc cscapcd thc disastrous days ol Krasnoi and thc 8crcsina. Tc
catastrophc which bclcll him would thus havc bccn lcsscncd, though not
cntircly prcvcntcd.
Such cxamplcs, rarc as thcy arc, givc us an cxccllcnt idca ol what good
partisan troops can accomplish whcn lcd by good occrs.
! will concludc this articlc with thc lollowing summary:
.. A gcncral should ncglcct no mcans ol gaining inlormation ol thc cncmy's
movcmcnts, and, lor this purposc, should makc usc ol rcconnoissanccs,
spics, bodics ol light troops commandcd by capablc occrs, signals, and
qucstioning dcscrtcrs and prisoncrs.
a. 8y multiplying thc mcans ol obtaining inlormation, lor, no mattcr how
impcrlcct and contradictory thcy may bc, thc truth may oltcn bc siltcd
lrom thcm.
. Pcrlcct rcliancc should bc placcd on nonc ol thcsc mcans.
. As it is impossiblc to obtain cxact inlormation by thc mcthods
mcntioncd, a gcncral should ncvcr movc without arranging scvcral
courscs ol action lor himscll, bascd upon probablc hypothcscs that thc
rclativc situation ol thc armics cnablcs him to makc, and ncvcr losing
sight ol thc principlcs ol thc art.
! can assurc a gcncral that, with such prccautions, nothing vcry uncxpcctcd
can bclall him and causc his ruin,as has so oltcn happcncd to othcrs, lor,
unlcss hc is totally unt to command an army, hc should at lcast bc ablc to
lorm rcasonablc suppositions as to what thc cncmy is going to do, and x lor
himscll a ccrtain linc ol conduct to suit cach ol thcsc hypothcscs.
|!|
!t cannot
bc too much insistcd upon that thc rcal sccrct ol military gcnius consists in thc
ability to makc thcsc rcasonablc suppositions in any casc, and, although thcir
numbcr is always small, it is wondcrlul how much this highlyusclul mcans ol
rcgulating onc's conduct is ncglcctcd.
!
! shall bc accuscd, ! supposc, ol saying that no cvcnt in war can cvcr occur which may not bc
lorcsccn and providcd lor. To provc thc lalsity ol this accusation, it is sucicnt lor mc to citc thc surpriscs
ol Crcmona, 8crgopzoom, and Hochkirch. ! am still ol thc opinion, howcvcr, that such cvcnts cvcn as
thcsc might always havc bccn anticipatcd, cntircly or in part, as at lcast within thc limits ol probability or
possibility.
ac
!n ordcr to makc this articlc complctc, ! must statc what is to bc gaincd by
using a systcm ol signals. l thcsc thcrc arc scvcral kinds. Tclcgraphic signals
may bc mcntioncd as thc most important ol all. Napolcon owcs his astonishing
succcss at Ratisbon, in .c, to thc lact ol his having cstablishcd a tclcgraphic
communication bctwccn thc hcadquartcrs ol thc army and Francc. Hc was
still at Paris whcn thc Austrian army crosscd thc !nn at 8raunau with thc
intcntion ol invading 8avaria and brcaking through his linc ol cantonmcnts.
!nlormcd, in twcntylour hours, ol what was passing at a distancc ol scvcn
hundrcd milcs, hc thrcw himscll into his travclingcarriagc, and a wcck
latcr hc had gaincd two victorics undcr thc walls ol Ratisbon. Vithout thc
tclcgraph, thc campaign would havc bccn lost. Tis singlc lact is sucicnt to
imprcss us with an idca ol its valuc.
!t has bccn proposcd to usc portablc tclcgraphs. Such a tclcgraphic
arrangcmcnt, opcratcd by mcn on horscback postcd on high ground, could
communicatc thc ordcrs ol thc ccntcr to thc cxtrcmitics ol a linc ol battlc, as
wcll as thc rcports ol thc wings to thc hcadquartcrs. Rcpcatcd trials ol it wcrc
madc in Russia, but thc projcct was givcn up,lor what rcason, howcvcr, !
havc not bccn ablc to lcarn. Tcsc communications could only bc vcry bricl,
and in misty wcathcr thc mcthod could not bc dcpcndcd upon. A vocabulary
lor such purposcs could bc rcduccd to a lcw short phrascs, which might casily
bc rcprcscntcd by signs. ! think it a mcthod by no mcans usclcss, cvcn il it
should bc ncccssary to scnd duplicatcs ol thc ordcrs by occrs capablc ol
transmitting thcm with accuracy. Tcrc would ccrtainly bc a gain ol rapidity.
|!|

attcmpt ol anothcr kind was madc in .,, at thc battlc ol Flcurus, whcrc
Gcncral Jourdan madc usc ol thc scrviccs ol a balloonist to obscrvc and givc
noticc ol thc movcmcnts ol thc Austrians. ! am not awarc that hc lound thc
mcthod a vcry usclul onc, as it was not again uscd, but it was claimcd at thc
timc that it assistcd in gaining him thc victory: ol this, howcvcr, ! havc grcat
doubts.
!t is probablc that thc diculty ol having a balloonist in rcadincss to makc
an asccnsion at thc propcr momcnt, and ol his making carclul obscrvations
upon what is going on bclow, whilst oating at thc mcrcy ol thc winds abovc,
has lcd to thc abandonmcnt ol this mcthod ol gaining inlormation. 8y giving
thc balloon no grcat clcvation, scnding up with it an occr capablc ol lorming
corrcct opinions as to thc cncmy's movcmcnts, and pcrlccting a systcm ol
signals to bc uscd in conncction with thc balloon, considcrablc advantagcs
might bc cxpcctcd lrom its usc. Somctimcs thc smokc ol thc battlc, and thc
diculty ol distinguishing thc columns, that look likc liliputians, so as to
know to which party thcy bclong, will makc thc rcports ol thc balloonists vcry
unrcliablc. For cxamplc, a balloonist would havc bccn grcatly cmbarrasscd in
dcciding, at thc battlc ol Vatcrloo, whcthcr it was Grouchy or 8lucchcr who
was sccn coming up by thc SaintLambcrt road, but this unccrtainty nccd
not cxist whcrc thc armics arc not so much mixcd. ! had ocular prool ol thc
advantagc to bc dcrivcd lrom such obscrvations whcn ! was stationcd in thc
!
Vhcn thc abovc was writtcn, thc magnctic tclcgraph was not known.Translators.
ac
spirc ol Gautsch, at thc battlc ol Lcipsic, and Princc Schwarzcnbcrg's aiddc
camp, whom ! had conductcd to thc samc point, could not dcny that it was
at my solicitation thc princc was prcvailcd upon to cmcrgc lrom thc marsh
bctwccn thc Plcissc and thc lstcr. An obscrvcr is doubtlcss morc at his casc
in a clocktowcr than in a lrail baskct oating in midair, but stccplcs arc not
always at hand in thc vicinity ol battlcclds, and thcy cannot bc transportcd
at plcasurc.
Tcrc is still anothcr mcthod ol signaling, by thc usc ol largc rcs kindlcd
upon clcvatcd points ol thc country. 8clorc thc invcntion ol thc tclcgraph,
thcy aordcd thc mcans ol transmitting thc ncws ol an invasion lrom onc
cnd ol thc country to thc othcr. Tc Swiss havc madc usc ol thcm to call
thc militia to arms. Tcy havc bccn also uscd to givc thc alarm to wintcr
quartcrs and to asscmblc thc troops morc rapidly. Tc signalrcs may bc
madc still morc usclul il arrangcd so as to indicatc to thc corps ol thc army
thc dircction ol thc cncmy's thrcatcning movcmcnts and thc point whcrc thcy
should conccntratc to mcct him. Tcsc signals may also scrvc on scacoasts to
givc noticc ol dcsccnts.
Finally, thcrc is a kind ol signals givcn to troops during an action, by mcans
ol military instrumcnts. Tis mcthod ol signals has bccn brought to grcatcr
pcrlcction in thc Russian army than in any othcr ! know ol. Vhilc ! am awarc
ol thc grcat importancc ol discovcring a surc mcthod ol sctting in motion
simultancously a largc mass ol troops at thc will ol thc commandcr, ! am
convinccd that it must bc a long timc bclorc thc problcm is solvcd. Signals
with instrumcnts arc ol littlc usc cxccpt lor skirmishcrs. A movcmcnt ol a
long linc ol troops may bc madc ncarly simultancous by mcans ol a shout
bcgun at onc point and passcd rapidly lrom man to man, but thcsc shouts sccm
gcncrally to bc a sort ol inspiration, and arc scldom thc rcsult ol an ordcr. !
havc sccn but two cascs ol it in thirtccn campaigns.
ac6
Commentary on Chapter VI
W
hcn Jomini writcs about logistics, as hc docs in this chaptcr, hc sccms
to mcan all thc planning dutics ol a sta occr. Arranging marchcs,
drawing up ordcrs and itincrarics, dirccting rcconnaissancc, coordinating
subordinatc units, and supplying an army all lall undcr logistics as Jomini
dcncs thc tcrm. Tis chaptcr is short, with only two articlcs, but providcs an
cxccllcnt ovcrvicw ol what was cxpcctcd ol a carly .th ccntury sta occr.
Altcr .,c, thc almost univcrsal cmulation ol thc morc ccicnt Prussian
Gcncral Sta systcm madc this modcl obsolctc. Sincc Jomini spcnt most ol
his carccr in sta positions, this chaptcr is thc onc with which hc would havc
had thc most pcrsonal cxpcricncc.
ac,
CHAPTER VII
OF THE FORMATION OF TROOPS FOR BATTLE, AND
THE SEPARATE OR COMBINED USE OF THE THREE
ARMS
ARTICLE XLIII
Posting Troops in Line of Battle
H
aving cxplaincd in Articlc XXX. what is to bc undcrstood by thc tcrm
line of battle, it is propcr to add in what manncr it is to bc lormcd, and
how thc dicrcnt troops arc to bc distributcd in it.
8clorc thc Frcnch Rcvolution, all thc inlantry, lormcd in rcgimcnts and
brigadcs, was collcctcd in a singlc battlccorps, drawn up in two lincs, cach
ol which had a right and a lclt wing. Tc cavalry was usually placcd upon
thc wings, and thc artillcrywhich at this pcriod was vcry unwicldywas
distributcd along thc lront ol cach linc. Tc army campcd togcthcr, marching
by lincs or by wings, and, as thcrc wcrc two cavalry wings and two inlantry
wings, il thc march was by wings lour columns wcrc thus lormcd. Vhcn thcy
marchcd by lincs, (which was spccially applicablc to ank movcmcnts,) two
columns wcrc lormcd, unlcss, on account ol local circumstanccs, thc cavalry or
a part ol thc inlantry had campcd in a third linc,which was rarc.
Tis mcthod simplicd logistics vcry much, sincc it was only ncccssary to
givc such ordcrs as thc lollowing:"Tc army will movc in such dircction, by
lincs or by wings, by thc right or by thc lclt." Tis monotonous but simplc
lormation was scldom dcviatcd lrom, and no bcttcr could havc bccn dcviscd
as war was carricd on in thosc days.
Tc Frcnch attcmptcd somcthing ncw at Mindcn, by lorming as many
columns as brigadcs, and opcning roads to bring thcm to thc lront in linc,a
simplc impossibility.
ac
!l thc labor ol sta occrs was diminishcd by this mcthod ol camping and
marching by lincs, it must bc cvidcnt that il such a systcm wcrc applicd to
an army ol onc hundrcd thousand or onc hundrcd and lty thousand mcn,
thcrc would bc no cnd to thc columns, and thc rcsult would bc thc lrcqucnt
occurrcncc ol routs likc that ol Rossbach.
Tc Frcnch Rcvolution introduccd thc systcm ol divisions, which brokc up
thc cxccssivc compactncss ol thc old lormation, and brought upon thc cld
lractions capablc ol indcpcndcnt movcmcnt on any kind ol ground. Tis changc
was a rcal improvcmcnt,although thcy wcnt lrom onc cxtrcmc to thc othcr,
by rcturning ncarly to thc lcgionary lormation ol thc Romans. Tcsc divisions,
composcd usually ol inlantry, artillcry, and cavalry, mancuvcrcd and lought
scparatcly. Tcy wcrc vcry much cxtcndcd, cithcr to cnablc thcm to subsist
without thc usc ol dcpots, or with an absurd cxpcctation ol prolonging thc
linc in ordcr to outank that ol thc cncmy. Tc scvcn or cight divisions ol
an army wcrc somctimcs sccn marching on thc samc numbcr ol roads, tcn or
twclvc milcs distant lrom cach othcr, thc hcadquartcrs was at thc ccntcr, with
no othcr support than vc or six small rcgimcnts ol cavalry ol thrcc hundrcd
or lour hundrcd mcn cach, so that il thc cncmy conccntratcd thc mass ol his
lorccs against onc ol thcsc divisions and bcat it, thc linc was picrccd, and thc
gcncralinchicl, having no disposablc inlantry rcscrvc, could do nothing but
ordcr a rctrcat to rally his scattcrcd columns.
8onapartc in his rst !talian campaign rcmcdicd this diculty, partly by
thc mobility ol his army and thc rapidity ol his mancuvcrs, and partly by
conccntrating thc mass ol his divisions upon thc point whcrc thc dccisivc blow
was to lall. Vhcn hc bccamc thc hcad ol thc govcrnmcnt, and saw thc sphcrc
ol his mcans and his plans constantly incrcasing in magnitudc, hc rcadily
pcrccivcd that a strongcr organization was ncccssary: hc avoidcd thc cxtrcmcs
ol thc old systcm and thc ncw, whilc still rctaining thc advantagcs ol thc
divisional systcm. 8cginning with thc campaign ol .cc, hc organizcd corps
ol two or thrcc divisions, which hc placcd undcr thc command ol licutcnant
gcncrals, and lormcd ol thcm thc wings, thc ccntcr, and thc rcscrvc ol his
army.
|!|
Tis systcm was nally dcvclopcd lully at thc camp ol 8oulognc, whcrc
hc organizcd pcrmancnt army corps undcr thc command ol marshals, who
had undcr thcir ordcrs thrcc divisions ol inlantry, onc ol light cavalry, lrom
thirtysix to lorty picccs ol cannon, and a numbcr ol sappcrs. ach corps was
thus a small army, ablc at nccd to act indcpcndcntly as an army. Tc hcavy
cavalry was collcctcd in a singlc strong rcscrvc, composcd ol two divisions
ol cuirassicrs, lour ol dragoons, and onc ol light cavalry. Tc grcnadicrs and
thc guard lormcd an admirablc inlantry rcscrvc. At a latcr pcriod..athc
cavalry was also organizcd into corps ol thrcc divisions, to givc grcatcr unity ol
action to thc constantlyincrcasing masscs ol this arm. Tis organization was
!
Tus, thc army ol thc Rhinc was composcd ol a right wing ol thrcc divisions undcr Lccourbc, ol
a ccntcr ol thrcc divisions undcr SaintCyr, and ol a lclt ol two divisions undcr SaintSuzannc, thc gcncral
inchicl having thrcc divisions morc as a rcscrvc undcr his own immcdiatc ordcrs.
ac
Chaptcr \!!. l thc Formation ol Troops lor 8attlc, and
thc Scparatc or Combincd Usc ol thc Trcc Arms
as ncar pcrlcction as possiblc, and thc grand army, that brought about such
grcat rcsults, was thc modcl which all thc armics ol uropc soon imitatcd.
Somc military mcn, in thcir attcmpts to pcrlcct thc art, havc rccommcndcd
that thc inlantry division, which somctimcs has to act indcpcndcntly, should
contain thrcc instcad ol two brigadcs, bccausc this numbcr will allow onc
lor thc ccntcr and cach wing. Tis would ccrtainly bc an improvcmcnt, lor
il thc division contains but two brigadcs thcrc is an opcn spacc lclt in thc
ccntcr bctwccn thc brigadcs on thc wings: thcsc brigadcs, having no common
ccntral support, cannot with salcty act indcpcndcntly ol cach othcr. 8csidcs
this, with thrcc brigadcs in a division, two may bc cngagcd whilc thc third is
hcld in rcscrvc,a manilcst advantagc. 8ut, il thirty brigadcs lormcd in tcn
divisions ol thrcc brigadcs arc bcttcr than whcn lormcd in ltccn divisions ol
two brigadcs, it bccomcs ncccssary, in ordcr to obtain this pcrlcct divisional
organization, to incrcasc thc numbcrs ol thc inlantry by oncthird, or to
rcducc thc divisions ol thc armycorps lrom thrcc to two,which last would
bc a scrious disadvantagc, bccausc thc armycorps is much morc lrcqucntly
callcd upon to act indcpcndcntly than a division, and thc subdivision into
thrcc parts is spccially bcst lor that.
|!|
Vhat is thc bcst organization to bc givcn an army just sctting out upon a
campaign will lor a long timc to comc bc a problcm in logistics, bccausc it is
cxtrcmcly dicult to maintain thc original organization in thc midst ol thc
opcrations ol war, and dctachmcnts must bc scnt out continually.
Tc history ol thc grand army ol 8oulognc, whosc organization sccmcd
to lcavc nothing larthcr to bc dcsircd, provcs thc asscrtion just madc. Tc
ccntcr undcr Soult, thc right undcr avoust, thc lclt undcr Ncy, and thc
rcscrvc undcr Lanncs, lormcd togcthcr a rcgular and lormidablc battlccorps
ol thirtccn divisions ol inlantry, without counting thosc ol thc guard and thc
grcnadicrs. 8csidcs thcsc, thc corps ol 8crnadottc and Marmont dctachcd
to thc right, and that ol Augcrcau to thc lclt, wcrc rcady lor action on thc
anks. 8ut altcr thc passagc ol thc anubc at onauwcrth cvcry thing was
changcd. Ncy, at rst rcinlorccd to vc divisions, was rcduccd to two, thc
battlccorps was dividcd partly to thc right and partly to thc lclt, so that this
nc arrangcmcnt was dcstroycd.
!t will always bc dicult to x upon a stablc organization. vcnts arc,
howcvcr, scldom so complicatcd as thosc ol .c, and Morcau's campaign ol
.cc provcs that thc original organization may somctimcs bc maintaincd, at
lcast lor thc mass ol thc army. Vith this vicw, it would sccm prudcnt to organizc
an army in lour parts,two wings, a ccntcr, and a rcscrvc. Tc composition
ol thcsc parts may vary with thc strcngth ol thc army, but in ordcr to rctain
this organization it bccomcs ncccssary to havc a ccrtain numbcr ol divisions
out ol thc gcncral linc in ordcr to lurnish thc ncccssary dctachmcnts. Vhilc
!
Tirty brigadcs lormcd in ltccn divisions ol two brigadcs cach will havc only ltccn brigadcs in
thc rst linc, whilc thc samc thirty brigadcs lormcd in tcn divisions ol thrcc brigadcs cach may havc twcnty
brigadcs in thc rst linc and tcn in thc sccond. 8ut it thcn bccomcs ncccssary to diminish thc numbcr ol
divisions and to havc but two in a corps,which would bc a laulty arrangcmcnt, bccausc thc corps is much
morc likcly to bc callcd upon lor indcpcndcnt action than thc division.
a.c
thcsc divisions arc with thc army, thcy may bc attachcd to that part which is
to rcccivc or givc thc hcavicst blows, or thcy may bc cmploycd on thc anks ol
thc main body, or to incrcasc thc strcngth ol thc rcscrvc. 8ach ol thc lour grcat
parts ol thc army may bc a singlc corps ol thrcc or lour divisions, or two corps
ol two divisions cach. !n this last casc thcrc would bc scvcn corps, allowing
onc lor thc rcscrvc, but this last corps should contain thrcc divisions, to givc a
rcscrvc to cach wing and to thc ccntcr.
Vith scvcn corps, unlcss scvcral morc arc kcpt out ol thc gcncral linc in
ordcr to lurnish dctachmcnts, it may happcn that thc cxtrcmc corps may bc
dctachcd, so that cach wing might contain but two divisions, and lrom thcsc a
brigadc might bc occasionally dctachcd to ank thc march ol thc army, lcaving
but thrcc brigadcs to a wing. Tis would bc a wcak ordcr ol battlc.
Tcsc lacts lcad mc to concludc that an organization ol thc linc ol battlc in
lour corps ol thrcc divisions ol inlantry and onc ol light cavalry, with thrcc or
lour divisions lor dctachmcnts, would bc morc stablc than onc ol scvcn corps,
cach ol two divisions.
8ut, as cvcry thing dcpcnds upon thc strcngth ol thc army and ol thc units
ol which it is composcd, as wcll as upon thc charactcr ol thc opcrations in
which it may bc cngagcd, thc arrangcmcnt may bc grcatly varicd. ! cannot
go into thcsc dctails, and shall simply cxhibit thc principal combinations that
may rcsult lrom lorming thc divisions in two or thrcc brigadcs and thc corps
in two or thrcc divisions. ! havc indicatcd thc lormation ol two inlantry corps
in two lincs, cithcr onc bchind thc othcr, or sidc by sidc. (Scc Figurcs lrom .,
to a inclusivc.)
Dierent Formations of Lines of Battle for Two Corps of Infantry.
Figurc ., Two Corps dcploycd, nc bchind thc thcr
a..
Figurc . Two Corps lormcd Sidc by Sidc
Figurc . Two Corps ol a ivisions ol 8rigadcs cach
a.a
Figurc ac a Corps ol a ivisions ol 8rigadcs cach
Figurc a. a Corps ol a ivisions ol 8rigadcs cach
a.
Figurc aa
Corps of Divisions of Brigades each,placed Side by Side
Formation of Two Corps of Tree Divisions of Two Brigades each.
Figurc a

a.
Figurc a
Figurc a
a.
Two Corps of Tree Divisions of Tree Brigades each.
Figurc a6 Two ivisions in thc .st Linc, and onc in thc ad Linc

Figurc a, Samc rdcr with d 8rigadc as Rcscrvc, and thc a Corps Sidc by Sidc

a.6
Figurc a
Notc.!n all thcsc lormations thc unit is thc brigadc in linc, but thcsc lincs
may bc lormcd ol dcploycd battalions, or ol battalions in columns ol attack by
divisions ol two companics. Tc cavalry attachcd to thc corps will bc placcd
on thc anks. Tc brigadcs might bc so drawn up as to havc onc rcgimcnt in
thc rst linc and onc in thc sccond.
Tc qucstion hcrc prcscnts itscll, whcthcr it is cvcr propcr to placc two corps
onc bchind thc othcr, as Napolcon oltcn did, particularly at Vagram. ! think
that, cxccpt lor thc rcscrvcs, this arrangcmcnt may bc uscd only in a position ol
cxpcctation, and ncvcr as an ordcr ol battlc, lor it is much bcttcr lor cach corps
to havc its own sccond linc and its rcscrvc than to pilc up scvcral corps, onc
bchind thc othcr, undcr dicrcnt commandcrs. Howcvcr much onc gcncral
may bc disposcd to support a collcaguc, hc will always objcct to dividing up
his troops lor that purposc, and whcn in thc gcncral ol thc rst linc hc sccs
not a collcaguc, but a hatcd rival, as too lrcqucntly happcns, it is probablc hc
will bc vcry slow in lurnishing thc assistancc which may bc grcatly nccdcd.
Morcovcr, a commandcr whosc troops arc sprcad out in a long linc cannot
cxccutc his mancuvcrs with ncar so much lacility as il his lront was only hall
as grcat and was supportcd by thc rcmaindcr ol his own troops drawn up in
rcar.
Tc tablc bclow
|!|
will show that thc numbcr ol mcn in an army will havc
grcat inucncc in dctcrmining thc bcst lormation lor it, and that thc subjcct
is a complicatcd onc.
!
vcry army has two wings, a ccntcr, and a rcscrvc,in all, lour principal subdivisions,bcsidcs
accidcntal dctachmcnts.
8clow arc somc ol thc dicrcnt lormations that may bc givcn to inlantry.
.st. !n rcgimcnts ol two battalions ol cight hundrcd mcn cach:
iv's. 8rig's. 8att'ns. Mcn. Four corps ol two divisions cach, and thrcc divisions lor dctachmcnts.... .. - aa
- - ,a,ccc
Four corps ol thrcc divisions cach, and thrcc divisions lor dctachmcnts.... . - c - .ac - 6,ccc
Scvcn corps ol two divisions cach, and onc corps lor dctachmcnts.... .6 - a - .a - .c,ccc
ad. !n rcgimcnts ol thrcc battalions, brigadcs ol six battalions:
iv's. 8rig's. 8att'ns. Mcn. Four corps ol two divisions cach, bcsidcs dctachmcnts,.... .. - aa - .a .c,ccc
Four corps ol thrcc divisions cach, bcsidcs dctachmcnts.... . - c - .c - .,ccc
ight corps ol two divisions cach.... .6 - a - .a - .,ccc
!l to thcsc numbcrs wc add onclourth lor cavalry, artillcry, and cnginccrs, thc total lorcc lor thc abovc
lormations may bc known.
a.,
!n making our calculations, it is scarccly ncccssary to providc lor thc casc
ol such immcnsc masscs bcing in thc cld as wcrc sccn lrom ..a to ..,
whcn a singlc army containcd lourtccn corps varying in strcngth lrom two
to vc divisions. Vith such largc numbcrs nothing bcttcr can bc proposcd
than a subdivision into corps ol thrcc divisions cach. l thcsc corps, cight
would lorm thc main body, and thcrc would rcmain six lor dctachmcnts and
lor strcngthcning any point ol thc main linc that might rcquirc support. !l
this systcm bc applicd to an army ol onc hundrcd and lty thousand mcn, it
would bc hardly practicablc to cmploy divisions ol two brigadcs cach whcrc
Napolcon and thc allics uscd corps.
!l ninc divisions lorm thc main body,that is, thc wings and thc ccntcr,
and six othcrs lorm thc rcscrvc and dctachmcnts, ltccn divisions would bc
rcquircd, or thirty brigadcs,which would makc onc hundrcd and cighty
battalions, il cach rcgimcnt contains thrcc battalions. Tis supposition brings
our army up to onc hundrcd and lortyvc thousand lootsoldicrs and two
hundrcd thousand in all. Vith rcgimcnts ol two battalions thcrc would bc
rcquircd onc hundrcd and twcnty battalions, or ninctysix thousand inlantry,
but il cach rcgimcnt contains but two battalions, cach battalion should bc onc
thousand mcn strong, and this would incrcasc thc inlantry to onc hundrcd and
twcnty thousand mcn and thc cntirc army to onc hundrcd and sixty thousand
mcn. Tcsc calculations show that thc strcngth ol thc minor subdivisions must
bc carclully considcrcd in arranging into corps and divisions. !l an army docs
not contain morc than onc hundrcd thousand mcn, thc lormation by divisions
is pcrhaps bcttcr than by corps. An cxamplc ol this was Napolcon's army ol
.cc.
Having now cndcavorcd to cxplain thc bcst mcthod ol giving a somcwhat
pcrmancnt organization to thc main body ol an army, it will not bc out ol
placc lor mc to inquirc whcthcr this pcrmancncy is dcsirablc, and il it is not
advantagcous to dcccivc thc cncmy by lrcqucntly changing thc composition ol
corps and thcir positions.
! admit thc advantagc ol thus dccciving thc cncmy, but it may bc gaincd
whilc still rctaining a quitc constant organization ol thc main body. !l thc
divisions intcndcd lor dctachmcnts arc joincd to thc wings and thc ccntcr,
that is, il thosc parts contain cach lour divisions instcad ol thrcc,and il onc
or two divisions bc occasionally addcd to thc wing which is likcly to bcar thc
brunt ol an cngagcmcnt, cach wing will bc a corps propcrly ol lour divisions,
but dctachmcnts will gcncrally rcducc it to thrcc, and somctimcs two, whilc
it might, again, bc rcinlorccd by a portion ol thc rcscrvc until it rcachcd vc
divisions. Tc cncmy would thus ncvcr know cxactly thc strcngth ol thc
dicrcnt parts ol thc linc.
8ut ! havc dwclt sucicntly on thcsc dctails. !t is probablc that, whatcvcr bc
thc strcngth and numbcr ol thc subdivisions ol an army, thc organization into
!t is to bc obscrvcd that rcgimcnts ol two battalions il cight hundrcd mcn cach would bccomc vcry wcak at
thc cnd ol two or thrcc months' campaigning. !l thcy do not consist ol thrcc battalions, thcn cach battalion
should contain onc thousand mcn.
a.
corps will long bc rctaincd by all thc grcat powcrs ol uropc, and calculations
lor thc arrangcmcnt ol thc linc ol battlc must bc madc upon that basis.
Tc distribution ol thc troops in thc linc ol battlc has changcd in rcccnt
timcs, as wcll as thc manncr ol arranging thc linc. Formcrly it was usually
composcd ol two lincs, but now ol two lincs and onc or morc rcscrvcs. !n
rcccnt
|!|
conicts in uropc, whcn thc masscs brought into collision wcrc vcry
largc, thc corps wcrc not only lormcd in two lincs, but onc corps was placcd
bchind anothcr, thus making lour lincs, and, thc rcscrvc bcing drawn up in
thc samc manncr, six lincs ol inlantry wcrc oltcn thc rcsult, and scvcral ol
cavalry. Such a lormation may answcr wcll cnough as a prcparatory onc, but is
by no mcans thc bcst lor battlc, as it is cntircly too dccp.
Tc classical lormationil ! may cmploy that tcrmis still two lincs lor thc
inlantry. Tc grcatcr or lcss cxtcnt ol thc battlccld and thc strcngth ol an
army may ncccssarily producc grcatcr dcpth at timcs, but thcsc cascs arc thc
cxccptions, bccausc thc lormation ol two lincs and thc rcscrvcs givcs sucicnt
solidity, and cnablcs a grcatcr numbcr ol mcn to bc simultancously cngagcd.
Vhcn an army has a pcrmancnt advanccd guard, it may bc cithcr lormcd in
lront ol thc linc ol battlc or bc carricd to thc rcar to strcngthcn thc rcscrvc,
|!!|

but, as has bccn prcviously statcd, this will not oltcn happcn with thc prcscnt
mcthod ol lorming and moving armics. ach wing has usually its own
advanccd guard, and thc advanccd guard ol thc main or ccntral portion ol thc
army is naturally lurnishcd by thc lcading corps: upon coming into vicw ol thc
cncmy, thcsc advanccd bodics rcturn to thcir propcr positions in linc ol battlc.
ltcn thc cavalry rcscrvc is almost cntircly with thc advanccd guard, but this
docs not prcvcnt its taking, whcn ncccssary, thc placc xcd lor it in thc linc
ol battlc by thc charactcr ol thc position or by thc wishcs ol thc commanding
gcncral.
From what has bccn statcd abovc, my rcadcrs will gathcr that vcry grcat
changcs ol army organization took placc lrom thc timc ol thc rcvival ol thc
art ol war and thc invcntion ol gunpowdcr to thc Frcnch Rcvolution, and that
to havc a propcr apprcciation ol thc wars ol Louis X!\., ol Pctcr thc Grcat,
and ol Frcdcrick !!., thcy should considcr thcm lrom thc standpoint ol thosc
days.
nc portion ol thc old mcthod may still bc cmploycd, and il, by way ol
cxamplc, it may not bc rcgardcd as a lundamcntal rulc to post thc cavalry on
thc wings, it may still bc a vcry good arrangcmcnt lor an army ol lty or sixty
thousand mcn, cspccially whcn thc ground in thc ccntcr is not so suitablc lor
thc cvolutions ol cavalry as that ncar thc cxtrcmitics. !t is usual to attach onc
or two brigadcs ol light cavalry to cach inlantry corps, thosc ol thc ccntcr
bcing placcd in prclcrcncc to thc rcar, whilst thosc ol thc wings arc placcd
upon thc anks. !l thc rcscrvcs ol cavalry arc sucicntly numcrous to pcrmit
!
Tc tcrm recent hcrc rclcrs to thc latcr wars ol Napolcon !.Translators.
!!
As thc advanccd guard is in prcscncc ol thc cncmy cvcry day, and lorms thc rcarguard in rctrcat,
it sccms but lair at thc hour ol battlc to assign it a position morc rctircd than that in lront ol thc linc ol
battlc.
a.
thc organization ol thrcc corps ol this arm, giving onc as rcscrvc to thc ccntcr
and onc to cach wing, thc arrangcmcnt is ccrtainly a good onc. !l that is
impossiblc, this rcscrvc may bc lormcd in two columns, onc on thc right ol thc
lclt wing and thc othcr on thc lclt ol thc right wing. Tcsc columns may thus
rcadily movc to any point ol thc linc that may bc thrcatcncd.
|!|
Tc artillcry ol thc prcscnt day has grcatcr mobility, and may, as lormcrly, bc
distributcd along thc lront, that ol cach division rcmaining ncar it. !t may bc
obscrvcd, morcovcr, that, thc organization ol thc artillcry having bccn grcatly
improvcd, an advantagcous distribution ol it may bc morc rcadily madc, but
it is a grcat mistakc to scattcr it too much. Fcw prccisc rulcs can bc laid down
lor thc propcr distribution ol artillcry. Vho, lor cxamplc, would darc to advisc
as a rulc thc lling up ol a largc gap in a linc ol battlc with onc hundrcd
picccs ol cannon in a singlc battcry without adcquatc support, as Napolcon
did succcsslully at Vagram: ! do not dcsirc to go hcrc into much dctail with
rclcrcncc to thc usc ol this arm, but ! will givc thc lollowing rulcs:
.. Tc horscartillcry should bc placcd on such ground that it can movc
lrccly in cvcry dircction.
a. Footartillcry, on thc contrary, and cspccially that ol hcavy calibcr, will
bc bcst postcd whcrc protcctcd by ditchcs or hcdgcs lrom suddcn chargcs
ol cavalry. !t is hardly ncccssary lor mc to addwhat cvcry young occr
should know alrcadythat too clcvatcd positions arc not thosc to givc
artillcry its grcatcst ccct. Flat or gcntlysloping ground is bcttcr.
. Tc horscartillcry usually mancuvcrs with thc cavalry, but it is wcll
lor cach armycorps to havc its own horscartillcry, to bc rcadily thrown
into any dcsircd position. !t is, morcovcr, propcr to havc horscartillcry
in rcscrvc, which may bc carricd as rapidly as possiblc to any thrcatcncd
point. Gcncral 8cnningscn had grcat causc lor scllcongratulation at
ylau bccausc hc had lty light guns in rcscrvc, lor thcy had a powcrlul
inucncc in cnabling him to rccovcr himscll whcn his linc had bccn
brokcn through bctwccn thc ccntcr and thc lclt.
. n thc dclcnsivc, it is wcll to placc somc ol thc hcavy battcrics in
lront, instcad ol holding thcm in rcscrvc, sincc it is dcsirablc to attack
thc cncmy at thc grcatcst possiblc distancc, with a vicw ol chccking his
lorward movcmcnt and causing disordcr in his columns.
. n thc dclcnsivc, it sccms also advisablc to havc thc artillcry not
in rcscrvc distributcd at cqual intcrvals in battcrics along thc wholc
linc, sincc it is important to rcpcl thc cncmy at all points. Tis must
not, howcvcr, bc rcgardcd as an invariablc rulc, lor thc charactcr ol thc
position and thc dcsigns ol thc cncmy may obligc thc mass ol thc artillcry
to movc to a wing or to thc ccntcr.
!
Tis disposition ol thc cavalry, ol coursc, is madc upon thc supposition that thc ground is
lavorably situatcd lor it. Tis is thc csscntial condition ol cvcry wcllarrangcd linc ol battlc.
aac
6. !n thc ocnsivc, it is cqually advantagcous to conccntratc a vcry powcrlul
artillcryrc upon a singlc point whcrc it is dcsircd to makc a dccisivc strokc,
with a vicw ol shattcring thc cncmy's linc to such a dcgrcc that hc will bc
unablc to withstand an attack upon which thc latc ol thc battlc is to turn. !
shall at anothcr placc havc morc to say as to thc cmploymcnt ol artillcry in
battlcs.
ARTICLE XLIV
Formation and Employment of Infantry
!nlantry is undoubtcdly thc most important arm ol thc scrvicc, sincc it lorms
lourlths ol an army and is uscd both in thc attack and dclcnsc ol positions.
!l wc must admit that, ncxt to thc gcnius ol thc gcncral, thc inlantry arm
is thc most valuablc instrumcnt in gaining a victory, it is no lcss truc that
most important aid is givcn by thc cavalry and artillcry, and that without thcir
assistancc thc inlantry might at timcs bc vcry scriously compromiscd, and at
othcrs could achicvc only partial succcss.
Vc shall not hcrc introducc thosc old discussions about thc shallow and
thc dccp lormations, although thc qucstion, which was supposcd dccidcd, is
lar lrom bcing scttlcd absolutcly. Tc war in Spain and thc battlc ol Vatcrloo
havc again givcn risc to disputcs as to thc rclativc advantagcs ol rc and thc
shallow ordcr, and ol columns ol attack and thc dccp ordcr. ! will givc my own
opinion larthcr on.
Tcrc must, howcvcr, bc no misconccption on this subjcct. Tc qucstion
now is not whcthcr Lloyd was right in wishing to add a lourth rank, armcd
with pikcs, to thc inlantry lormation, with thc cxpcctation ol producing morc
ccct by thc shock whcn attacking, or opposing a grcatcr rcsistancc whcn
attackcd. vcry occr ol cxpcricncc knows thc diculty ol moving in an
ordcrly manncr scvcral dcploycd battalions in thrcc ranks at closc ordcr, and
that a lourth rank would incrcasc thc disordcr without adding any advantagc.
!t is astonishing that Lloyd, who had sccn scrvicc, should havc insistcd so
much upon thc matcrial advantagc to bc gaincd by thus incrcasing thc mass ol
a battalion, lor it vcry rarcly happcns that such a collision bctwccn opposing
troops takcs placc that mcrc wcight dccidcs thc contcst. !l thrcc ranks turn
thcir backs to thc cncmy, thc lourth will not chcck thcm. Tis incrcasc in thc
numbcr ol ranks diminishcs thc lront and thc numbcr ol mcn ring upon thc
dclcnsivc, whilst in thc ocnsivc thcrc is not ncar so much mobility as in thc
ordinary column ol attack. !t is much morc dicult to movc cight hundrcd
mcn in linc ol battlc in lour ranks than in thrcc: although in thc lormcr casc
thc cxtcnt ol lront is lcss, thc ranks cannot bc kcpt propcrly closcd.
Lloyd's proposal lor rcmcdying this diminution ol lront is so absurd that
it is wondcrlul how a man ol talcnts could havc imagincd it. Hc wishcs to
aa.
dcploy twcnty battalions, and lcavc bctwccn thcm onc hundrcd and lty yards,
or an intcrval cqual to thcir lront. Vc may wcll ask what would bclall thosc
battalions thus scparatcd. Tc cavalry may pcnctratc thc intcrvals and scattcr
thcm likc dust bclorc thc whirlwind.
8ut thc rcal qucstion now is, shall thc linc ol battlc consist ol dcploycd
battalions dcpcnding chicy upon thcir rc, or ol columns ol attack, cach
battalion bcing lormcd in column on thc ccntral division and dcpcnding on
its lorcc and impctuosity:
! will now procccd to sum up thc particulars bcaring upon a dccision ol thc
qucstion in hand.
Tcrc arc, in lact, only vc mcthods ol lorming troops to attack an cncmy:l,
as skirmishcrs, a, in dcploycd lincs, cithcr continuous or chcckcrwisc, , in
lincs ol battalions lormcd in column on thc ccntral divisions, , in dccp masscs,
, in small squarcs.
Tc skirmishingordcr is an acccssory, lor thc dutics ol skirmishcrs arc, not
to lorm thc linc ol battlc, but to covcr it by taking advantagc ol thc ground,
to protcct thc movcmcnts ol columns, to ll up intcrvals, and to dclcnd thc
skirts ol a position.
Tcsc dicrcnt manncrs ol lormation arc, thcrclorc, rcduciblc to lour: thc
shallow ordcr, whcrc thc linc is dcploycd in thrcc ranks, thc halldccp ordcr,
lormcd ol a linc ol battalions in columns doublcd on thc ccntcr or in battalion
squarcs, thc mixcd ordcr, whcrc rcgimcnts arc partly in linc and partly in
column, nally, thc dccp ordcr, composcd ol hcavy columns ol battalions
dcploycd onc bchind thc othcr.
Figurc a
|!|
Tc lormation into two dcploycd lincs with a rcscrvc was lormcrly uscd to a
grcat cxtcnt: it is particularly suitablc on thc dclcnsivc. Tcsc dcploycd lincs
may cithcr bc continuous, (Fig. a,) or chcckcrwisc, or in cchclons.
Figurc c Twclvc battalions in columns ol attack in two lincs, with skirmishcrs in thc
intcrvals
!
!n this and subscqucnt gurcs wc supposc a division ol twclvc battalions.
aaa
A morc compact ordcr is shown in Fig. c, whcrc cach battalion is lormcd
into a column ol attack, bcing by divisions upon thc ccntral division. !t is
rcally a linc ol small columns
!n thc thrccrank lormation, a battalion with lour divisions
|!|
will havc
twclvc ranks in such a column as shown abovc: thcrc arc in this way too many
noncombatants, and thc column prcscnts too good a mark lor thc artillcry. To
rcmcdy in part thcsc inconvcnicnccs, it has bccn proposcd, whcncvcr inlantry
is cmploycd in columns ol attack, to lorm it in two ranks, to placc only thrcc
divisions ol a battalion onc bchind thc othcr, and to sprcad out thc lourth as
skirmishcrs in thc intcrvals ol thc battalions and upon thc anks: whcn thc
cavalry chargcs, thcsc skirmishcrs may rally bchind thc othcr thrcc divisions.
(Scc Fig. ..) ach battalion would thus havc two hundrcd morc mcn to rc,
bcsidcs thosc thrown into thc two lront ranks lrom thc third. Tcrc would bc,
also, an incrcasc ol thc wholc lront. 8y this arrangcmcnt, whilc having rcally
a dcpth ol but six mcn, thcrc would bc a lront ol onc hundrcd mcn, and lour
hundrcd mcn who could dischargc thcir rcarms, lor cach battalion. Forcc
and mobility would both bc obtaincd.
|!!|
A battalion ol cight hundrcd mcn,
lormcd in thc ordinary manncr in a column ol lour divisions, has about sixty
lcs in cach division, ol which thc rst aloncand only two ranks ol that
dischargc thcir picccs. 8ach battalion would dclivcr, thcrclorc, onc hundrcd
and twcnty shots at a vollcy, whilst lormcd in thc manncr shown in Fig. . it
would dclivcr lour hundrcd.
Figurc .
Vhilc scarching altcr mcthods ol obtaining morc rc whcn ncccssary, wc
must not lorgct that a column ol attack is not intcndcd to rc, and that its
rc should bc rcscrvcd until thc last, lor il it bcgins to rc whilc marching,
thc wholc impulsivc ccct ol its lorward movcmcnt is lost. Morcovcr, this
shallowcr ordcr would only bc advantagcous against inlantry, as thc column ol
lour divisions in thrcc rankslorming a kind ol solid squarcwould bc bcttcr
against cavalry. Tc Archdukc Charlcs lound it advantagcous at ssling, and
particularly at Vagram, to adopt this last ordcr, which was proposcd by myscll
!
Tc word division bcing uscd to dcsignatc lour or vc rcgimcnts, as wcll as two companics ol a
battalion, thcrc is dangcr ol conlusion in its usc.
!!
!n thc Russian army thc skirmishcrs arc takcn lrom thc third rank ol cach division,which
makcs thc column cight mcn in dcpth, instcad ol twclvc, and givcs morc mobility. To lacilitatc rallying thc
skirmishcrs on thc columns, it would bc, pcrhaps, bcttcr to takc thc wholc lourth division lor that purposc,
thus giving ninc ranks, or thrcc divisions ol thrcc ranks, against inlantry, whilc against cavalry thcrc would
bc twclvc ranks.
aa
in my chaptcr on thc Gcncral Principlcs ol Var, publishcd in .c,. Tc bravc
cavalry ol 8cssicrcs could makc no imprcssion upon thcsc small masscs.
To givc morc solidity to thc column proposcd, thc skirmishcrs might, it is
truc, bc rccallcd, and thc lourth division rclormcd, but this would bc a two
rank lormation, and would ocr much lcss rcsistancc to a chargc than thc thrcc
rank lormation,particularly on thc anks. !l to rcmcdy this inconvcnicncc
it is proposcd to lorm squarcs, many military mcn bclicvc that whcn in two
ranks squarcs would not rcsist so wcll as columns. Tc nglish squarcs at
Vatcrloo wcrc, howcvcr, only in two ranks, and, notwithstanding thc hcroic
corts ol thc Frcnch cavalry, only onc battalion was brokcn. ! will obscrvc, in
conclusion, that, il thc tworank lormation bc uscd lor thc columns ol attack,
it will bc dicult to prcscrvc that in thrcc ranks lor dcploycd lincs, as it is
scarccly possiblc to havc two mcthods ol lormation, or, at any ratc, to cmploy
thcm altcrnatcly in thc samc cngagcmcnt. !t is not probablc that any uropcan
army, cxccpt thc nglish, will undcrtakc to usc dcploycd lincs in two ranks. !l
thcy do, thcy should ncvcr movc cxccpt in columns ol attack.
! concludc that thc systcm cmploycd by thc Russians and Prussians, ol
lorming columns ol lour divisions in thrcc ranks, ol which onc may bc
cmploycd as skirmishcrs whcn ncccssary, is morc gcncrally applicablc than any
othcr, whilst thc othcr, ol which mcntion has bccn madc, would bc suitablc
only in ccrtain cascs and would rcquirc a doublc lormation.
Figurc a
Tcrc is a mixcd ordcr, which was uscd by Napolcon at thc Tagliamcnto
and by thc Russians at ylau, whcrc, in rcgimcnts ol thrcc battalions, onc was
dcploycd to lorm thc rst linc, and two othcrs to thc rcar in columns. (Scc Fig.
a.) Tis arrangcmcntwhich bclongs also to thc halldccp ordcris suitablc
lor thc ocnsivcdclcnsivc, bccausc thc rst linc pours a powcrlul rc upon
thc cncmy, which must throw him into morc or lcss conlusion, and thc troops
lormcd in columns may dcbouch through thc intcrvals and lall with advantagc
upon him whilc in disordcr. Tis arrangcmcnt would probably bc improvcd by
placing thc lcading divisions ol thc two battalions ol thc wings upon thc samc
linc with thc ccntral dcploycd battalion. Tcrc would thus bc a hallbattalion
morc to cach rcgimcnt in thc rst linc,a by no mcans unimportant thing lor
thc dclivcry ol rc. Tcrc may bc rcason to lcar that, thcsc divisions bccoming
activcly cngagcd in ring, thcir battalions which arc lormcd in column to
bc rcadily launchcd against thc cncmy may not bc casily discngagcd lor that
purposc. Tc ordcr may bc usclul in many cascs. ! havc thcrclorc indicatcd it.
aa
Figurc
Figurc
Tc ordcr in vcry dccp masscs (scc Figs. and ) is ccrtainly thc most
injudicious. !n thc latcr wars ol Napolcon, twclvc battalions wcrc somctimcs
dcploycd and closcd onc upon thc othcr, lorming thirtysix ranks closcly
packcd togcthcr. Such masscs arc grcatly cxposcd to thc dcstructivc cccts ol
artillcry, thcir mobility and impulsion arc diminishcd, whilc thcir strcngth is
not incrcascd. Tc usc ol such masscs at Vatcrloo was onc causc ol thc Frcnch
bcing dclcatcd. Macdonald's column was morc lortunatc at Vagram, but at a
grcat sacricc ol lilc, and it is not probablc that this column would havc bccn
victorious had it not bccn lor thc succcsscs ol avoust and udinot on thc lclt
ol thc archdukc's linc.
Vhcn it is dccidcd to risk such a mass, thc prccaution should ccrtainly bc
takcn ol placing on cach ank a battalion marching in lc, so that il thc cncmy
should chargc thc mass in ank it nccd not bc arrcstcd in its progrcss. (Scc
Fig. .) Undcr thc protcction ol thcsc battalions, which may lacc toward thc
cncmy, thc column may continuc its march to thc point it is cxpcctcd to rcach:
othcrwisc, this largc mass, cxposcd to a powcrlul convcrging rc which it
has no mcans ol rcturning, will bc thrown into conlusion likc thc column at
Fontcnoy, or brokcn as was thc Maccdonian phalanx by Paulus milius.
Squarcs arc good in plains and to opposc an cncmy who has a supcriority in
cavalry. !t is agrccd that thc rcgimcntal squarc is bcst lor thc dclcnsivc, and
thc battalion squarc lor thc ocnsivc. (Scc Figs. , 6, ,.)
aa
Figurc ivision in battalion squarcs
Figurc 6 Tc samc division in long battalion squarcs
Figurc , Squarcd ol rcgimcnts ol thrcc battalions
Tc gurcs may bc pcrlcct squarcs, or clongatcd to givc a largc lront and
pour a hcavicr column ol rc in thc dircction ol thc cncmy. A rcgimcnt ol
thrcc battalions will thus lorm a long squarc, by whccling thc ccntcr battalion
hall to thc right and hall to thc lclt.
!n thc Turkish wars squarcs wcrc almost cxclusivcly uscd, bccausc hostilitics
wcrc carricd on in thc vast plains ol 8cssarabia, Moldavia, or Vallachia, and
thc Turks had an immcnsc lorcc ol cavalry. 8ut il thc scat ol war bc thc 8alkan
Mountains or bcyond thcm, and thcir irrcgular cavalry bc rcplaccd by an army
organizcd according to thc proportions usual in uropc, thc importancc ol
thc squarc will disappcar, and thc Russian inlantry will show its supcriority
in Rumclia.
Howcvcr this may bc, thc ordcr in squarcs by rcgimcnts or battalions sccms
suitablc lor cvcry kind ol attack, whcn thc assailant has not thc supcriority in
cavalry and mancuvcrs on lcvcl ground advantagcous lor thc cncmy's chargcs.
Tc clongatcd squarc, cspccially whcn applicd to a battalion ol cight companics,
thrcc ol which would march in lront and onc on cach sidc, would bc much
bcttcr to makc an attack than a dcploycd battalion. !t would not bc so good
as thc column proposcd abovc, but thcrc would bc lcss unstcadincss and morc
aa6
impulsion than il thc battalion marchcd in a dcploycd linc. !t would havc thc
advantagc, also, ol bcing prcparcd to rcsist cavalry.
Squarcs may also bc drawn up in cchclons, so as cntircly to unmask cach
othcr. All thc ordcrs ol battlc may bc lormcd ol squarcs as wcll as with
dcploycd lincs.
!t cannot bc statcd with truth that any onc ol thc lormations dcscribcd is
always good or always bad, but thcrc is onc rulc to thc corrcctncss ol which
cvcry onc will asscnt,that a lormation suitablc lor thc ocnsivc must posscss
thc charactcristics ol solidity, mobility, and momentum, whilst lor thc dclcnsivc
solidity is rcquisitc, and also thc powcr ol dclivcring as much re as possible.
Tis truth bcing admittcd, it rcmains yct to bc dccidcd whcthcr thc bravcst
troops, lormcd in columns but unablc to rc, can stand long in prcscncc ol a
dcploycd linc ring twcnty thousand muskctballs in onc round, and ablc to
rc two hundrcd thousand or thrcc hundrcd thousand in vc minutcs. !n thc
latcr wars in uropc, positions havc oltcn bccn carricd by Russian, Frcnch,
and Prussian columns with thcir arms at a shouldcr and without ring a
shot. Tis was a triumph ol momentum and thc moral ccct it produccs, but
undcr thc cool and dcadly rc ol thc nglish inlantry thc Frcnch columns
did not succccd so wcll at Talavcra, 8usaco, Fucntcsdcnorc, Albucra, and
Vatcrloo.
Vc must not, howcvcr, ncccssarily concludc lrom thcsc lacts that thc
advantagc is cntircly in lavor ol thc shallow lormation and ring, lor whcn thc
Frcnch lormcd thcir inlantry in thosc dcnsc masscs, it is not at all wondcrlul
that thc dcploycd and marching battalions ol which thcy wcrc composcd,
assailcd on all sidcs by a dcadly rc, should havc bccn rcpulscd. Vould thc
samc rcsult havc bccn witncsscd il thcy had uscd columns ol attack lormcd
cach ol a singlc battalion doublcd on thc ccntcr: ! think not. 8clorc dcciding
nally as to thc supcriority ol thc shallow ordcr, with its lacility lor ring,
ovcr thc halldccp ordcr and its momcntum, thcrc should bc scvcral trials to
scc how a dcploycd linc would stand an assault lrom a lormation likc Fig. .,
(pagc a.) Tcsc small columns havc always succccdcd whcrcvcr ! havc sccn
thcm tricd.
!s it indccd an casy mattcr to adopt any othcr ordcr whcn marching to attack
a position: Can an immcnsc dcploycd linc bc movcd up into action whilc
ring: ! think no onc will answcr armativcly. Supposc thc attcmpt madc
to bring up twcnty or thirty battalions in linc, whilc ring cithcr by lc or by
company, to thc assault ol a wclldclcndcd position: it is not vcry probablc thcy
would cvcr rcach thc dcsircd point, or, il thcy did, it would bc in about as good
ordcr as a ock ol shccp.
Vhat conclusions shall bc drawn lrom all that has bccn said: .. !l thc dccp
ordcr is dangcrous, thc halldccp is cxccllcnt lor thc ocnsivc. a. Tc column
ol attack ol singlc battalions is thc bcst lormation lor carrying a position by
assault, but its dcpth should bc diminishcd as much as possiblc, that it may
whcn ncccssary bc ablc to dclivcr as hcavy a column ol rc as possiblc, and
aa,
to diminish thc ccct ol thc cncmy's rc: it ought also to bc wcll covcrcd
by skirmishcrs and supportcd by cavalry. . Tc lormation having thc rst
linc dcploycd and thc sccond in columns is thc bcstsuitcd to thc dclcnsivc.
. ithcr ol thcm may bc succcsslul in thc hands ol a gcncral ol talcnt, who
knows how to usc his troops propcrly in thc manncr indicatcd in Articlcs X\!.
and XXX.
Sincc this chaptcr was rst writtcn, numcrous improvcmcnts havc bccn
madc in thc arms both ol inlantry and artillcry, making thcm much morc
dcstructivc. Tc ccct ol this is to inclinc mcn to prclcr thc shallowcr
lormations, cvcn in thc attack. Vc cannot, howcvcr, lorgct thc lcssons ol
cxpcricncc, and, notwithstanding thc usc ol rockctbattcrics, shrapnclshot,
and thc Pcrkins muskct, ! cannot imaginc a bcttcr mcthod ol lorming inlantry
lor thc attack than in columns ol battalions. Somc pcrsons may pcrhaps dcsirc
to rcstorc to inlantry thc hclmcts and brcastplatcs ol thc ltccnth ccntury,
bclorc lcading thcm to thc attack in dcploycd lincs. 8ut, il thcrc is a gcncral
rcturn to thc dcploycd systcm, somc bcttcr arrangcmcnt must bc dcviscd lor
marching to thc attack than long, continuous lincs, and cithcr columns must
bc uscd with propcr distanccs lor dcploymcnt upon arriving ncar thc cncmy's
position, or lincs drawn up chcckcrwisc, or thc march must bc by thc anks ol
companics,all ol which mancuvcrs arc hazardous in prcscncc ol an cncmy
who is capablc ol proting by thc advantagcs on his sidc. A skilllul commandcr
will usc cithcr, or a combination ol all, ol thcsc arrangcmcnts, according to
circumstanccs.
xpcricncc long ago taught mc that onc ol thc most dicult tactical
problcms is that ol dctcrmining thc bcst lormation ol troops lor battlc, but !
havc also lcarncd that to solvc this problcm by thc usc ol a singlc mcthod is
an impossibility.
!n thc rst placc, thc topography ol dicrcnt countrics is vcry various. !n
somc, as Champagnc, two hundrcd thousand mcn might bc mancuvcrcd in
dcploycd lincs. !n othcrs, as !taly, Switzcrland, thc vallcy ol thc Rhinc, hall ol
Hungary, it is barcly possiblc to dcploy a division ol tcn battalions. Tc dcgrcc
ol instruction ol thc troops, and thcir national charactcristics, may also havc
an inucncc upon thc systcm ol lormation.
wing to thc thorough disciplinc ol thc Russian army and its instruction in
mancuvcrs ol cvcry kind, it may maintain in movcmcnts in long lincs so much
ordcr and stcadincss as to cnablc it to adopt a systcm which would bc cntircly
out ol thc qucstion lor thc Frcnch or Prussian armics ol thc prcscnt day. My
long cxpcricncc has taught mc to bclicvc that nothing is impossiblc, and ! do
not bclong to thc class ol mcn who think that thcrc can bc but onc typc and
onc systcm lor all armics and all countrics.
To approximatc as ncarly as wc can to thc solution ol thc problcm, it sccms
to mc, wc ought to nd out:.. Tc bcst mcthod ol moving whcn in sight
ol thc cncmy, but bcyond his rcach, a. Tc bcst mcthod ol coming to closc
quartcrs with him, . Tc bcst dclcnsivc ordcr.
aa
!n whatcvcr manncr wc may scttlc thcsc points, it sccms dcsirablc in all cascs
to cxcrcisc thc troops.. !n marching in columns ol battalions doublcd on thc
ccntcr, with a vicw to dcploymcnt, il ncccssary, whcn coming into muskct
rangc, or cvcn to attack in column, a. !n marching in continuous dcploycd
lincs ol cight or tcn battalions, . !n marching in dcploycd battalions arrangcd
chcckcrwisc,as thcsc brokcn lincs arc morc casily movcd than continuous
lincs, . !n moving to thc lront by thc anks ol companics, . !n marching
to thc lront in small squarcs, cithcr in linc or chcckcrwisc, 6. !n changing
lront whilc using thcsc dicrcnt mcthods ol marching, ,. !n changcs ol lront
cxccutcd by columns ol companics at lull distancc, without dcploymcnt,a
morc cxpcditious mcthod than thc othcrs ol changing lront, and thc onc bcst
suitcd to all kinds ol ground.
l all thc mcthods ol moving to thc lront, that by thc anks ol companics
would bc thc bcst il it was not somcwhat dangcrous. !n a plain it succccds
admirably, and in brokcn ground is vcry convcnicnt. !t brcaks up a linc vcry
much, but by accustoming thc occrs and privatcs to it, and by kccping thc
guidcs and colorbcarcrs wcll aligncd, all conlusion can bc avoidcd. Tc only
objcction to it is thc dangcr to which thc scparatcd companics arc cxposcd ol
bcing riddcn down by cavalry. Tis dangcr may bc avoidcd by having good
cavalry scouts, and not using this lormation too ncar thc cncmy, but only in
gctting ovcr thc rst part ol thc largc intcrval scparating thc two armics. At
thc lcast sign ol thc cncmy's proximity thc linc could bc rclormcd instantly,
sincc thc companics can comc into linc at a run. Vhatcvcr prccautions may
bc takcn, this mancuvcr should only bc practiccd with wclldisciplincd troops,
ncvcr with militia or raw troops. ! havc ncvcr sccn it tricd in prcscncc ol an
cncmy,but lrcqucntly at drills, whcrc it has bccn lound to succccd wcll,
cspccially in changing lront.
! havc also sccn attcmpts madc to march dcploycd battalions in chcckcrwisc
ordcr. Tcy succccdcd wcll, whilst marchcs ol thc samc battalions in
continuous lincs did not. Tc Frcnch, particularly, havc ncvcr bccn ablc to
march stcadily in dcploycd lincs. Tis chcckcrcd ordcr would bc dangcrous
in casc ol an uncxpcctcd chargc ol cavalry. !t may bc cmploycd in thc rst
stagcs ol thc movcmcnt lorward, to makc it morc casy, and thc rcar battalions
would thcn comc into linc with thc lcading oncs bclorc rcaching thc cncmy.
Morcovcr, it is casy to lorm linc at thc momcnt ol thc chargc, by lcaving a
small distancc only bctwccn thc lcading and lollowing battalions, lor wc must
not lorgct that in thc chcckcrcd ordcr thcrc arc not two lincs, but a singlc onc,
which is brokcn, to avoid thc wavcring and disordcr obscrvcd in thc marchcs
ol continuous lincs.
!t is vcry dicult to dctcrminc positivcly thc bcst lormation lor making a
scrious and closc attack upon an cncmy. l all thc mcthods ! havc sccn tricd,
thc lollowing sccmcd to succccd bcst. Form twcntylour battalions in two
lincs ol battalions in columns doublcd on thc ccntcr rcady lor dcploymcnt:
thc rst linc will advancc at chargingpacc toward thc cncmy's linc to within
aa
twicc muskctrangc, and will thcn dcploy at a run, thc voltigcurcompanics ol
cach battalion will sprcad out in skirmishingordcr, thc rcmaining companics
lorming linc and pouring in a continucd rc by lc, thc sccond linc ol columns
lollows thc rst, and thc battalions composing it pass at chargingstcp through
thc intcrvals ol thc rst linc. Tis mancuvcr was cxccutcd whcn no cncmy was
prcscnt, but it sccms to mc an irrcsistiblc combination ol thc advantagcs ol
ring and ol thc column.
8csidcs thcsc lincs ol columns, thcrc arc thrcc othcr mcthods ol attacking
in thc halldccp ordcr.
Tc rst is that ol lincs composcd ol dcploycd battalions with othcrs in
column on thc wings ol thosc dcploycd, (Fig. a, pagc a.) Tc dcploycd
battalions and thc lcading divisions ol thosc in column would opcn rc at
hall muskctrangc, and thc assault would thcn bc madc. Tc sccond is that ol
advancing a dcploycd linc and ring until rcaching hall muskctrangc, thcn
throwing lorward thc columns ol thc sccond linc through thc intcrvals ol thc
rst. Tc third is thc ordcr in cchclons, mcntioncd on pagc ., and shown in
Fig. . on that pagc.
Finally, a last mcthod is that ol advancing altogcthcr in dcploycd lincs,
dcpcnding on thc supcriority ol rc alonc, until onc or thc othcr party takcs
to its hccls,a casc not likcly to happcn.
! cannot arm positivcly which ol thcsc mcthods is thc bcst, lor ! havc not
sccn thcm uscd in actual scrvicc. !n lact, in rcal combats ol inlantry ! havc
ncvcr sccn any thing but battalions dcploycd commcncing to rc by company,
and nally by lc, or clsc columns marching rmly against thc cncmy, who
cithcr rctircd without awaiting thc columns, or rcpulscd thcm bclorc an actual
collision took placc, or thcmsclvcs movcd out to mcct thc advancc. ! havc sccn
melees ol inlantry in dclcs and in villagcs, whcrc thc hcads ol columns camc
in actual bodily collision and thrust cach othcr with thc bayonct, but ! ncvcr
saw such a thing on a rcgular cld ol battlc.
!n whatcvcr manncr thcsc discussions tcrminatc, thcy arc usclul, and should
bc continucd. !t would bc absurd to discard as usclcss thc rc ol inlantry, as
it would bc to givc up cntircly thc halldccp lormation, and an army is ruincd
il lorccd to adhcrc to prcciscly thc samc stylc ol tactical mancuvcrs in cvcry
country it may cntcr and against cvcry dicrcnt nation. !t is not so much thc
modc ol lormation as thc propcr combincd usc ol thc dicrcnt arms which
will insurc victory. ! must, howcvcr, cxccpt vcry dccp masscs, as thcy should
bc cntircly abandoncd.
! will concludc this subjcct by stating that a most vital point to bc attcndcd
to in lcading inlantry to thc combat is to protcct thc troops as much as possiblc
lrom thc rc ol thc cncmy's artillcry, not by withdrawing thcm at inopportunc
momcnts, but by taking advantagc ol all incqualitics and accidcnts ol thc
ground to hidc thcm lrom thc vicw ol thc cncmy. Vhcn thc assaulting troops
havc arrivcd within muskctrangc, it is usclcss to calculatc upon shcltcring
ac
thcm longcr: thc assault is thcn to bc madc. !n such cascs covcrs arc only
suitablc lor skirmishcrs and troops on thc dclcnsivc.
!t is gcncrally quitc important to dclcnd villagcs on thc lront ol a position,
or to cndcavor to takc thcm whcn hcld by an cncmy who is assailcd, but thcir
importancc should not bc ovcrcstimatcd, lor wc must ncvcr lorgct thc notcd
battlc ol 8lcnhcim, whcrc Marlborough and ugcnc, sccing thc mass ol thc
Frcnch inlantry shut up in thc villagcs, brokc through thc ccntcr and capturcd
twcntylour battalions which wcrc sacriccd in dclcnding thcsc posts.
For likc rcasons, it is usclul to occupy clumps ol trccs or brushwood,
which may aord covcr to thc party holding thcm. Tcy shcltcr thc troops,
conccal thcir movcmcnts, covcr thosc ol cavalry, and prcvcnt thc cncmy lrom
mancuvcring in thcir ncighborhood. Tc casc ol thc park ol Hougoumont at
thc battlc ol Vatcrloo is a nc cxamplc ol thc inucncc thc posscssion ol such
a position, wcll choscn and strongly dclcndcd, may havc in dcciding thc latc
ol a battlc. At Hochkirch and Kolin thc posscssion ol thc woods was vcry
important.
ARTICLE XLV
Cavalry
Tc usc a gcncral should makc ol his cavalry dcpcnds, ol coursc, somcwhat
upon its numcrical strcngth as comparcd with that ol thc wholc army, and
upon its quality. vcn cavalry ol an inlcrior charactcr may bc so handlcd as to
producc vcry grcat rcsults, il sct in action at propcr momcnts.
Tc numcrical proportion ol cavalry to inlantry in armics has varicd grcatly.
!t dcpcnds on thc natural tastcs ol nations making thcir pcoplc morc or lcss t
lor good troopcrs. Tc numbcr and quality ol horscs, also, havc somcthing to
do with it. !n thc wars ol thc Rcvolution, thc Frcnch cavalry, although badly
organizcd and grcatly inlcrior to thc Austrian, pcrlormcd wondcrs. !n .,6 !
saw what was pompously callcd thc cavalry rcscrvc ol thc army ol thc Rhinc,
a wcak brigadc ol barcly ltccn hundrcd horscs! Tcn ycars latcr ! saw thc samc
rcscrvc consisting ol ltccn thousand or twcnty thousand horscs,so much
had idcas and mcans changcd.
As a gcncral rulc, it may bc statcd that an army in an opcn country should
contain cavalry to thc amount ol oncsixth its wholc strcngth, in mountainous
countrics onctcnth will succ.
Tc principal valuc ol cavalry is dcrivcd lrom its rapidity and casc ol motion.
To thcsc charactcristics may bc addcd its impctuosity, but wc must bc carclul
lcst a lalsc application bc madc ol this last.
Vhatcvcr may bc its importancc in thc ensemble ol thc opcrations ol war,
cavalry can ncvcr dclcnd a position without thc support ol inlantry. !ts chicl
duty is to opcn thc way lor gaining a victory, or to rcndcr it complctc by carrying
a.
o prisoncrs and trophics, pursuing thc cncmy, rapidly succoring a thrcatcncd
point, ovcrthrowing disordcrcd inlantry, covcring rctrcats ol inlantry and
artillcry. An army dccicnt in cavalry rarcly obtains a grcat victory, and nds
its rctrcats cxtrcmcly dicult.
Tc propcr timc and manncr ol bringing cavalry into action dcpcnd upon
thc idcas ol thc commandcrinchicl, thc plan ol thc battlc, thc cncmy's
movcmcnts, and a thousand othcr circumstanccs which cannot bc mcntioncd
hcrc. ! can only touch upon thc principal things to bc considcrcd in its usc.
All arc agrccd that a gcncral attack ol cavalry against a linc in good ordcr
cannot bc attcmptcd with much hopc ol succcss, unlcss it bc supportcd by
inlantry and artillcry. At Vatcrloo thc Frcnch paid dcarly lor having violatcd
this rulc, and thc cavalry ol Frcdcrick thc Grcat larcd no bcttcr at Kunncrsdorl.
A commandcr may somctimcs lccl obligcd to push his cavalry lorward alonc,
but gcncrally thc bcst timc lor charging a linc ol inlantry is whcn it is alrcady
cngagcd with opposing inlantry. Tc battlcs ol Marcngo, ylau, 8orodino,
and scvcral othcrs provc this.
Tcrc is onc casc in which cavalry has a vcry dccidcd supcriority ovcr
inlantry,whcn rain or snow dampcns thc arms ol thc lattcr and thcy cannot
rc. Augcrcau's corps lound this out, to thcir sorrow, at ylau, and so did thc
Austrian lclt at rcsdcn.
!nlantry that has bccn shakcn by a rc ol artillcry or in any othcr way may
bc chargcd with succcss. A vcry rcmarkablc chargc ol this kind was madc by
thc Prussian cavalry at Hohcnlricdbcrg in .,. A chargc against squarcs ol
good inlantry in good ordcr cannot succccd.
A gcncral cavalry chargc is madc to carry battcrics ol artillcry and cnablc
thc inlantry to takc thc position morc casily, but thc inlantry must thcn
bc at hand to sustain thc cavalry, lor a chargc ol this charactcr has only a
momcntary ccct, which must bc takcn advantagc ol bclorc thc cncmy can
rcturn ocnsivcly upon thc brokcn cavalry. Tc bcautilul chargc ol thc Frcnch
upon Gosa at thc battlc ol Lcipsic, ctobcr .6, is a nc cxamplc ol this kind.
Tosc cxccutcd at Vatcrloo with thc samc objcct in vicw wcrc admirablc, but
lailcd bccausc unsupportcd. Tc daring chargc ol Ncy's wcak cavalry upon
Princc Hohcnlohc's artillcry at Jcna is an cxamplc ol what may bc donc undcr
such circumstanccs.
Gcncral chargcs arc also madc against thc cncmy's cavalry, to drivc it lrom
thc cld ol battlc and rcturn morc lrcc to act against his inlantry.
Cavalry may bc succcsslully thrown against thc ank or rcar ol an cncmy's
linc at thc momcnt ol its bcing attackcd in lront by thc inlantry. !l rcpulscd, it
may rally upon thc army at a gallop, and, il succcsslul, it may causc thc loss ol
thc cncmy's army. Tis opcration is rarcly attcmptcd, but ! scc no rcason why
it should not bc vcry good, lor a body ol cavalry wcll handlcd cannot bc cut
o cvcn il it gcts in rcar ol thc cncmy. Tis is a duty lor which light cavalry is
particularly ttcd.
aa
!n thc dclcnsivc, cavalry may also producc vcry valuablc rcsults by opportunc
dashcs at a body ol thc cncmy which has cngagcd thc opposing linc and cithcr
brokcn it through or bccn on thc point ol doing so. !t may rcgain thc advantagcs
lost, changc thc lacc ol aairs, and causc thc dcstruction ol an cncmy ushcd
and disordcrcd by his own succcss. Tis was provcd at ylau, whcrc thc
Russians madc a nc chargc, and at Vatcrloo by thc nglish cavalry. Tc
spccial cavalry ol a corps d'armcc may chargc at opportunc momcnts, cithcr
to coopcratc in a combincd attack, or to takc advantagc ol a lalsc movcmcnt
ol thc cncmy, or to nish his dclcat by prcssing him whilc in rctrcat.
!t is not an casy mattcr to dctcrminc thc bcst modc ol attacking, as it
dcpcnds upon thc objcct in vicw and othcr circumstanccs. Tcrc arc but lour
mcthods ol charging,in columns, in lincs at a trot, in lincs at a gallop, and
in opcn ordcr,all ol which may bc succcsslully uscd. !n chargcs in linc, thc
lancc is vcry usclul, in melees, thc sabcr is much bcttcr: hcncc comcs thc idca
ol giving thc lancc to thc lront rank, which makcs thc rst onslaught, and thc
sabcr to thc sccond rank, which nishcs thc cncountcr usually in individual
combats. Pistolring is ol vcry littlc usc cxccpt lor outpostduty, in a chargc
as loragcrs, or whcn light cavalry dcsircs to annoy inlantry and draw its rc
prcvious to a chargc. ! do not know what thc carbinc is good lor, sincc a body
ol cavalry armcd with it must halt il thcy wish to rc with any accuracy, and
thcy arc thcn in a lavorablc condition lor thc cncmy to attack. Tcrc arc lcw
marksmcn who can with any accuracy rc a muskct whilc on horscback and
in rapid motion.
! havc just said that all thc mcthods ol charging may bc cqually good. !t
must not bc undcrstood, howcvcr, that impctuosity always givcs thc advantagc
in a shock ol cavalry against cavalry: thc last trot, on thc contrary, sccms to mc
thc bcst gait lor chargcs in linc, bccausc cvcry thing dcpcnds, in such a casc,
upon thc ensemble and good ordcr ol thc movcmcnt,things which cannot bc
obtaincd in chargcs at a last gallop. Galloping is propcr against artillcry whcn
it is important to gct ovcr thc ground as rapidly as possiblc. !n likc manncr, il
thc cavalry is armcd with sabcrs, it may takc thc gallop at two hundrcd yards
lrom thc cncmy's linc il it stands rmly to rcccivc thc attack. 8ut il thc cavalry
is armcd with thc lancc, thc last trot is thc propcr gait, sincc thc advantagcous
usc ol that wcapon dcpcnds upon thc prcscrvation ol good ordcr: in a melee
thc lancc is almost usclcss.
!l thc cncmy advanccs at a last trot, it docs not sccm prudcnt to gallop to
mcct him, lor thc galloping party will bc much disordcrcd, whilc thc trotting
party will not. Tc only advantagc ol thc gallop is its apparcnt boldncss and
thc moral ccct it produccs, but, il this is cstimatcd at its truc valuc by thc
cncmy, it is rcasonablc to cxpcct his rm and compact mass to bc victorious
ovcr a body ol horscmcn galloping in conlusion.
!n thcir chargcs against inlantry thc Turks and Mamclukcs showcd thc
small advantagc ol mcrc impctuosity. No cavalry will pcnctratc whcrc lanccrs
or cuirassicrs at a trot cannot. !t is only whcn inlantry is much disordcrcd, or
a
thcir rc poorly maintaincd, that thcrc is any advantagc in thc impctuous gallop
ovcr thc stcady trot. To brcak good squarcs, cannon and lanccrs arc rcquircd,
or, bcttcr still, cuirassicrs armcd with lanccs. For chargcs in opcn ordcr thcrc
arc no bcttcr modcls lor imitation than thc Turks and thc Cossacks.
Vhatcvcr mcthod bc adoptcd in charging, onc ol thc bcst ways ol using
cavalry is to throw scvcral squadrons opportuncly upon thc anks ol an
cncmy's linc which is also attackcd in lront. Tat this mancuvcr may bc
complctcly succcsslul, cspccially in chargcs ol cavalry against cavalry, it
should bc pcrlormcd at thc vcry momcnt whcn thc lincs comc in collision,
lor a minutc too soon or too latc its ccct may bc lost. !t is highly important,
thcrclorc, that a cavalry commandcr should havc a quick cyc, sound judgmcnt,
and a cool hcad.
Much discussion has takcn placc about thc propcr manncr ol arming and
organizing cavalry. Tc lancc is thc bcst arm lor ocnsivc purposcs whcn a
body ol horscmcn chargc in linc, lor it cnablcs thcm to strikc an cncmy who
cannot rcach thcm, but it is a vcry good plan to havc a sccond rank or a rcscrvc
armcd with sabcrs, which arc morc casily handlcd than thc lancc in handto
hand ghting whcn thc ranks bccomc brokcn. !t would bc, pcrhaps, bcttcr still
to support a chargc ol lanccrs by a dctachmcnt ol hussars, who can lollow up
thc chargc, pcnctratc thc cncmy's linc, and complctc thc victory.
Tc cuirass is thc bcst dclcnsivc armor. Tc lancc and thc cuirass ol strong
lcathcr doublcd sccm to mc thc bcst armamcnt lor light cavalry, thc sabcr and
iron cuirass thc bcst lor hcavy cavalry. Somc military mcn ol cxpcricncc arc
inclincd cvcn to arm thc cuirassicrs with lanccs, bclicving that such cavalry,
rcscmbling vcry much thc mcnatarms ol lormcr days, would bcar down
cvcry thing bclorc thcm. A lancc would ccrtainly suit thcm bcttcr than thc
muskctoon, and ! do not scc why thcy should not havc lanccs likc thosc ol thc
light cavalry.
pinions will bc always dividcd as to thosc amphibious animals callcd
dragoons. !t is ccrtainly an advantagc to havc scvcral battalions ol mountcd
inlantry, who can anticipatc an cncmy at a dclc, dclcnd it in rctrcat, or scour a
wood, but to makc cavalry out ol lootsoldicrs, or a soldicr who is cqually good
on horsc or on loot, is vcry dicult. Tis might havc bccn supposcd scttlcd by
thc latc ol thc Frcnch dragoons whcn ghting on loot, had it not bccn sccn
that thc Turkish cavalry lought quitc as wcll dismountcd as mountcd. !t has
bccn said that thc grcatcst inconvcnicncc rcsulting lrom thc usc ol dragoons
consists in thc lact ol bcing obligcd at onc momcnt to makc thcm bclicvc
inlantry squarcs cannot rcsist thcir chargcs, and thc ncxt momcnt that a loot
soldicr armcd with his muskct is supcrior to any horscman in thc world. Tis
argumcnt has morc plausibility than rcal lorcc, lor, instcad ol attcmpting to
makc mcn bclicvc such contradictory statcmcnts, it would bc much morc
rcasonablc to tcll thcm that il bravc cavalry may brcak a squarc, bravc loot
soldicrs may rcsist such a chargc, that victory docs not always dcpcnd upon
thc supcriority ol thc arm, but upon a thousand othcr things, that thc couragc
a
ol thc troops, thc prcscncc ol mind ol thc commandcrs, thc opportuncncss
ol mancuvcrs, thc ccct ol artillcry and muskctry rc, rain,mud, cvcn,
havc bccn thc causcs ol rcpulscs or ol victorics, and, nally, that a bravc man,
whcthcr on loot or mountcd, will always bc morc than a match lor a coward. 8y
imprcssing thcsc truths upon dragoons, thcy will bclicvc thcmsclvcs supcrior
to thcir advcrsarics whcthcr thcy ght on loot or on horscback. Tis is thc casc
with thc Turks and thc Circassians, whosc cavalry oltcn dismount to ght on
loot in a wood or bchind a covcr, muskct in hand, likc lootsoldicrs.
!t rcquircs, howcvcr, nc matcrial and nc commandcrs to bring soldicrs to
such pcrlcction in knowlcdgc ol thcir dutics.
Tc conviction ol what bravc mcn can accomplish, whcthcr on loot or
mountcd, doubtlcss induccd thc mpcror Nicholas to collcct thc largc numbcr
ol lourtccn or ltccn thousand dragoons in a singlc corps, whilc hc did not
considcr Napolcon's unlortunatc cxpcrimcnt with Frcnch dragoons, and was
not rcstraincd by thc lcar ol oltcn wanting a rcgimcnt ol thcsc troops at somc
particular point. !t is probablc that this conccntration was ordcrcd lor thc
purposc ol giving unilormity to thc instruction ol thc mcn in thcir dutics
as loot and mountcd soldicrs, and that in war thcy wcrc to bc distributcd to
thc dicrcnt grand divisions ol thc army. !t cannot bc dcnicd, howcvcr, that
grcat advantagcs might rcsult to thc gcncral who could rapidly movc up tcn
thousand mcn on horscback to a dccisivc point and bring thcm into action as
inlantry. !t thus appcars that thc mcthods ol conccntration and ol distribution
havc thcir rcspcctivc advantagcs and disadvantagcs. A judicious mcan bctwccn
thc cxtrcmcs would bc to attach a strong rcgimcnt to cach wing ol thc army
and to thc advanccd guard, (or thc rcarguard in a rctrcat,) and thcn to unitc
thc rcmaining troops ol this arm in divisions or corps.
vcry thing that was said with rclcrcncc to thc lormation ol inlantry is
applicablc to cavalry, with thc lollowing modications:
.. Lincs dcploycd chcckcrwisc or in cchclons arc much bcttcr lor cavalry
than lull lincs, whilst lor inlantry lincs drawn up chcckcrwisc arc too much
disconncctcd, and would bc in dangcr il thc cavalry should succccd in
pcnctrating and taking thc battalions in ank. Tc chcckcrwisc lormation
is only advantagcous lor inlantry in prcparatory movcmcnts bclorc rcaching
thc cncmy, or clsc lor lincs ol columns which can dclcnd thcmsclvcs in
cvcry dircction against cavalry. Vhcthcr chcckcrcd or lull lincs bc uscd, thc
distancc bctwccn thcm ought to bc such that il onc is chcckcd and thrown
into conlusion thc othcrs may not sharc it. !t is wcll to obscrvc that in thc
chcckcrcd lincs thc distancc may bc lcss than lor lull lincs. !n cvcry casc thc
sccond linc should not bc lull. !t should bc lormcd in columns by divisions, or
at lcast thcrc should bc lclt thc spaccs, il in linc, ol two squadrons, that may bc
in column upon thc ank ol cach rcgimcnt, to lacilitatc thc passagc through ol
thc troops which havc bccn brought up.
a. Vhcn thc ordcr ol columns ol attack doublcd on thc ccntcr is uscd, cavalry
should bc lormcd in rcgimcnts and inlantry only in battalions. Tc rcgimcnts
a
should contain six squadrons, in ordcr that, by doubling on thc ccntcr into
divisions, thrcc may bc lormcd. !l thcrc arc only lour squadrons, thcrc can bc
but two lincs.
. Tc cavalry column ol attack should ncvcr bc lormcd en masse likc that ol
inlantry, but thcrc should always bc lull or hall squadron distancc, that cach
may havc room to discngagc itscll and chargc scparatcly. Tis distancc will bc
so grcat only lor thosc troops cngagcd. Vhcn thcy arc at rcst bchind thc linc
ol battlc, thcy may bc closcd up, in ordcr to covcr lcss ground and diminish
thc spacc to bc passcd ovcr whcn brought into action. Tc masscs should, ol
coursc, bc kcpt bcyond cannonrangc.
. A ank attack bcing much morc to bc apprchcndcd by cavalry than in
a combat ol inlantry with inlantry, scvcral squadrons should bc lormcd in
cchclons by platoons on thc anks ol a linc ol cavalry, which may lorm to thc
right or lclt, to mcct an cncmy coming in that dircction.
. For thc samc rcason, it is important to throw scvcral squadrons against thc
anks ol a linc ol cavalry which is attackcd in lront. !rrcgular cavalry is quitc
as good as thc rcgular lor this purposc, and it may bc bcttcr.
6. !t is also ol importancc, cspccially in cavalry, that thc commandcrin
chicl incrcasc thc dcpth rathcr than thc cxtcnt ol thc lormation. For cxamplc,
in a dcploycd division ol two brigadcs it would not bc a good plan lor onc
brigadc to lorm in a singlc linc bchind thc othcr, but cach brigadc should
havc onc rcgimcnt in thc rst linc and onc in thc sccond. ach unit ol thc
linc will thus havc its own propcr rcscrvc bchind it,an advantagc not to bc
rcgardcd as triing, lor in a chargc cvcnts succccd cach othcr so rapidly that it
is impossiblc lor a gcncral to control thc dcploycd rcgimcnts.
8y adopting this arrangcmcnt, cach gcncral ol brigadc will bc ablc to disposc
ol his own rcscrvc, and it would bc wcll, also, to havc a gcncral rcscrvc lor thc
wholc division. Tis considcration lcads mc to think that vc rcgimcnts would
makc a good division. Tc chargc may thcn bc madc in linc by brigadcs ol two
rcgimcnts, thc lth scrving as a gcncral rcscrvc bchind thc ccntcr. r thrcc
rcgimcnts may lorm thc linc, and two may bc in column, onc bchind cach
wing. r it may bc prclcrablc to usc a mixcd ordcr, dcploying two rcgimcnts
and kccping thc othcrs in column. Tis is a good arrangcmcnt, bccausc thc
thrcc rcgimcnts, lormcd in columns by divisions bchind thc ccntcr and anks
ol thc linc, covcr thosc points, and can rcadily pass thc linc il it is bcatcn back.
(Scc Fig. .)
a6
Figurc Cavalry division ol vc rcgimcnts. Cavalry dcploycd should bc in chcckcrcd ordcr
rathcr than in lull lincs
,. Two csscntial points arc rcgardcd as gcncrally scttlcd lor all cncountcrs
ol cavalry against cavalry. nc is that thc rst linc must sooncr or latcr bc
chcckcd, lor, cvcn upon thc supposition ol thc rst chargc bcing cntircly
succcsslul, it is always probablc that thc cncmy will bring lrcsh squadrons
to thc contcst, and thc rst linc must at lcngth bc lorccd to rally bchind thc
sccond. Tc othcr point is that, with troops and commandcrs on both sidcs
cqually good, thc victory will rcmain with thc party having thc last squadrons
in rcscrvc in rcadincss to bc thrown upon thc ank ol thc cncmy's linc whilc
his lront is also cngagcd.
Attcntion to thcsc truths will bring us to a just conclusion as to thc propcr
mcthod ol lorming a largc mass ol cavalry lor battlc.
Vhatcvcr ordcr bc adoptcd, carc must bc takcn to avoid dcploying largc
cavalry corps in lull lincs, lor a mass thus drawn up is vcry unmanagcablc, and
il thc rst linc is chcckcd suddcnly in its carccr thc sccond is also, and that
without having an opportunity to strikc a blow. Tis has bccn dcmonstratcd
many timcs. Takc as an cxamplc thc attack madc by Nansouty in columns ol
rcgimcnts upon thc Prussian cavalry dcploycd in lront ol ChatcauTicrry.
!n opposing thc lormation ol cavalry in morc than two lincs, ! ncvcr intcndcd
to cxcludc thc usc ol scvcral lincs chcckcrwisc or in cchclons, or ol rcscrvcs
lormcd in columns. ! only mcant to say that whcn cavalry, cxpccting to makc
a chargc, is drawn up in lincs onc bchind thc othcr, thc wholc mass will bc
thrown into conlusion as soon as thc rst linc brcaks and turns.
|!|
Vith cavalry still morc than with inlantry thc morale is vcry important. Tc
quickncss ol cyc and thc coolncss ol thc commandcr, and thc intclligcncc and
bravcry ol thc soldicr, whcthcr in thc melee or in thc rally, will oltcncr bc thc
mcans ol assuring a victory than thc adoption ol this or that lormation. Vhcn,
!
To disprovc my statcmcnt, M. Vagncr citcs thc casc ol thc battlc ol Ramillics, whcrc Marlborough,
by a gcncral chargc ol cavalry in lall lincs, succccdcd in bcating thc Frcnch drawn up chcckcrwisc. Unlcss
my mcmory dcccivcs mc, thc allicd cavalry was at rst lormcd chcckcrcd in two lincs, but thc rcal causc
ol Marlborough's succcss was his sccing that \illcroi had paralyzcd hall his army bchind Andcrkirch and
Gcttc, and his having thc good scnsc to withdraw thirtycight squadrons lrom this wing to rcinlorcc his lclt,
which in this way had twicc as many cavalry as thc Frcnch, and outankcd thcm. 8ut ! chccrlully admit that
thcrc may bc many cxccptions to a rulc which ! havc not laid down morc absolutcly than all othcrs rclating to
cavalry tactics,a tactics, by thc way, as changcablc as thc arm itscll.
a,
howcvcr, a good lormation is adoptcd and thc advantagcs mcntioncd abovc arc
also prcscnt, thc victory is morc ccrtain, and nothing can cxcusc thc usc ol a
vicious lormation.
Tc history ol thc wars bctwccn ..a and .. has rcncwcd thc old disputcs
upon thc qucstion whcthcr rcgular cavalry will in thc cnd gct thc bcttcr ovcr
an irrcgular cavalry which will avoid all scrious cncountcrs, will rctrcat with
thc spccd ol thc Parthians and rcturn to thc combat with thc samc rapidity,
wcaring out thc strcngth ol its cncmy by continual skirmishing. Lloyd has
dccidcd in thc ncgativc, and scvcral cxploits ol thc Cossacks whcn cngagcd
with thc cxccllcnt Frcnch cavalry sccm to conrm his opinion. (Vhcn ! spcak
ol cxccllcnt Frcnch cavalry, ! rclcr to its impctuous bravcry, and not to its
pcrlcction, lor it docs not comparc with thc Russian or Gcrman cavalry cithcr
in horscmanship, organization, or in carc ol thc animals.) Vc must by no
mcans concludc it possiblc lor a body ol light cavalry dcploycd as skirmishcrs
to accomplish as much as thc Cossacks or othcr irrcgular cavalry. Tcy acquirc
a habit ol moving in an apparcntly disordcrly manncr, whilst thcy arc all thc
timc dirccting thcir individual corts toward a common objcct. Tc most
practiccd hussars can ncvcr pcrlorm such scrvicc as thc Cossacks, Tschcrkcsscs,
and Turks do instinctivcly.
xpcricncc has shown that irrcgular chargcs may causc thc dclcat ol thc
bcst cavalry in partial skirmishcs, but it has also dcmonstratcd that thcy arc
not to bc dcpcndcd upon in rcgular battlcs upon which thc latc ol a war may
dcpcnd. Such chargcs arc valuablc acccssorics to an attack in linc, but alonc
thcy can lcad to no dccisivc rcsults.
From thc prcccding lacts wc lcarn that it is always bcst to givc cavalry a
rcgular organization, and lurnish thcm long wcapons, not omitting, howcvcr,
to providc, lor skirmishing, &c., an irrcgular cavalry armcd with pistols,
lanccs, and sabcrs.
Vhatcvcr systcm ol organization bc adoptcd, it is ccrtain that a numcrous
cavalry, whcthcr rcgular or irrcgular, must havc a grcat inucncc in giving a
turn to thc cvcnts ol a war. !t may cxcitc a lccling ol apprchcnsion at distant
parts ol thc cncmy's country, it can carry o his convoys, it can cncirclc his
army, makc his communications vcry pcrilous, and dcstroy thc ensemble ol his
opcrations. !n a word, it produccs ncarly thc samc rcsults as a rising en masse
ol a population, causing troublc on thc lront, anks, and rcar ol an army, and
rcducing a gcncral to a statc ol cntirc unccrtainty in his calculations.
Any systcm ol organization, thcrclorc, will bc a good onc which providcs lor
grcat cnlargcmcnt ol thc cavalry in timc ol war by thc incorporation ol militia,
lor thcy may, with thc aid ol a lcw good rcgular squadrons, bc madc cxccllcnt
partisan soldicrs. Tcsc militia would ccrtainly not posscss all thc qualitics ol
thosc warlikc wandcring tribcs who livc on horscback and sccm born cavalry
soldicrs, but thcy could in a mcasurc supply thc placcs ol such. !n this rcspcct
Russia is much bcttcr o than any ol hcr ncighbors, both on account ol thc
a
numbcr and quality ol hcr horscmcn ol thc on, and thc charactcr ol thc
irrcgular militia shc can bring into thc cld at vcry short noticc.
Twcnty ycars ago ! madc thc lollowing statcmcnts in Chaptcr XXX\. ol thc
Trcatisc on Grand Military pcrations, whcn writing on this subjcct:
"Tc immcnsc advantagcs ol thc Cossacks to thc Russian army arc not to bc
cstimatcd. Tcsc light troops, which arc insignicant in thc shock ol a grcat
battlc, (cxccpt lor lalling upon thc anks,) arc tcrriblc in pursuits and in a war
ol posts. Tcy arc a most lormidablc obstaclc to thc cxccution ol a gcncral's
dcsigns,bccausc hc can ncvcr bc surc ol thc arrival and carrying out ol his
ordcrs, his convoys arc always in dangcr, and his opcrations unccrtain. !l an
army has had only a lcw rcgimcnts ol thcsc hallrcgular cavalrysoldicrs, thcir
rcal valuc has not bccn known, but whcn thcir numbcr incrcascs to ltccn
thousand or twcnty thousand, thcir usclulncss is lully rccognizcd,cspccially
in a country whcrc thc population is not hostilc to thcm.
"Vhcn thcy arc in thc vicinity, cvcry convoy must bc providcd with a strong
cscort, and no movcmcnt can bc cxpcctcd to bc undisturbcd. Much unusual
labor is thus madc ncccssary upon thc part ol thc opponcnt's rcgular cavalry,
which is soon brokcn down by thc unaccustomcd latiguc.
"\oluntccr hussars or lanccrs, raiscd at thc timc ol war brcaking out, may bc
ncarly as valuablc as thc Cossacks, il thcy arc wcll occrcd and movc lrccly
about lrom point to point."
!n thc Hungarians, Transylvanians, and Croats, Austria has rcsourccs
posscsscd by lcw othcr statcs. Tc scrviccs rcndcrcd by mountcd militia havc
provcd, howcvcr, that this kind ol cavalry may bc vcry usclul, il lor no othcr
purposc than rclicving thc rcgular cavalry ol thosc occasional and cxtra dutics
to bc pcrlormcd in all armics, such as lorming cscorts, acting as ordcrlics,
protccting convoys, scrving on outposts, &c. Mixcd corps ol rcgular and
irrcgular cavalry may oltcn bc morc rcally usclul than il thcy wcrc cntircly
composcd ol cavalry ol thc linc,bccausc thc lcar ol compromising a body
ol thcsc last oltcn rcstrains a gcncral lrom pushing thcm lorward in daring
opcrations whcrc hc would not hcsitatc to risk his irrcgulars, and hc may thus
losc cxccllcnt opportunitics ol accomplishing grcat rcsults.
ARTICLE XLVI
Employment of Artillery
Artillcry is an arm cqually lormidablc both in thc ocnsivc and dclcnsivc. As
an ocnsivc mcans, a grcat battcry wcll managcd may brcak an cncmy's linc,
throw it into conlusion, and prcparc thc way lor thc troops that arc to makc
an assault. As a dclcnsivc mcans, it doublcs thc strcngth ol a position, not only
on account ol thc matcrial injury it inicts upon thc cncmy whilc at a distancc,
and thc conscqucnt moral ccct upon his troops, but also by grcatly incrcasing
a
thc pcril ol approaching ncar, and spccially within thc rangc ol grapc. !t is
no lcss important in thc attack and dclcnsc ol lorticd placcs or intrcnchcd
camps, lor it is onc ol thc main rclianccs in modcrn systcms ol lortication.
! havc alrcady in a lormcr portion ol this book givcn somc dircctions as
to thc distribution ol artillcry in a linc ol battlc, but it is dicult to cxplain
dcnitcly thc propcr mcthod ol using it in thc battlc itscll. !t will not bc right
to say that artillcry can act indcpcndcntly ol thc othcr arms, lor it is rathcr an
acccssory. At Vagram, howcvcr, Napolcon thrcw a battcry ol onc hundrcd
picccs into thc gap lclt by thc withdrawal ol Masscna's corps, and thus hcld in
chcck thc Austrian ccntcr, notwithstanding thcir vigorous corts to advancc.
Tis was a spccial casc, and should not bc oltcn imitatcd.
! will contcnt myscll with laying down a lcw lundamcntal rulcs, obscrving
that thcy rclcr to thc prcscnt statc ol artillcry scrvicc, (..) Tc rcccnt
discovcrics not yct bcing lully tcstcd, ! shall say littlc with rclcrcncc to thcm.
.. !n thc ocnsivc, a ccrtain portion ol thc artillcry should conccntratc its rc
upon thc point whcrc a dccisivc blow is to bc struck. !ts rst usc is to shattcr
thc cncmy's linc, and thcn it assists with its rc thc attack ol thc inlantry and
cavalry.
a. Scvcral battcrics ol horscartillcry should lollow thc ocnsivc movcmcnts
ol thc columns ol attack, bcsidcs thc lootbattcrics intcndcd lor thc samc
purposc. Too much lootartillcry should not movc with an ocnsivc column.
!t may bc postcd so as to coopcratc with thc column without accompanying it.
Vhcn thc cannonccrs can mount thc boxcs, it may havc grcatcr mobility and
bc advanccd larthcr to thc lront.
. !t has alrcady bccn statcd that hall ol thc horscartillcry should bc hcld in
rcscrvc, that it may bc rapidly movcd to any rcquircd point.
|!|
For this purposc
it should bc placcd upon thc most opcn ground, whcncc it can movc rcadily
in cvcry dircction. ! havc alrcady indicatcd thc bcst positions lor thc hcavy
calibcrs.
. Tc battcrics, whatcvcr may bc thcir gcncral distribution along thc
dclcnsivc linc, should givc thcir attcntion particularly to thosc points whcrc
thc cncmy would bc most likcly to approach, cithcr on account ol thc lacility
or thc advantagc ol so doing. Tc gcncral ol artillcry should thcrclorc know
thc dccisivc stratcgic and tactical points ol thc battlccld, as wcll as thc
topography ol thc wholc spacc occupicd. Tc distribution ol thc rcscrvcs ol
artillcry will bc rcgulatcd by thcsc.
. Artillcry placcd on lcvcl ground or ground sloping gcntly to thc lront is
most lavorably situatcd cithcr lor pointblank or ricochct ring: a convcrging
rc is thc bcst.
6. !t should bc bornc in mind that thc chicl occ ol all artillcry in battlcs
is to ovcrwhclm thc cncmy's troops, and not to rcply to thcir battcrics. !t is,
ncvcrthclcss, oltcn usclul to rc at thc battcrics, in ordcr to attract thcir rc.
!
Grcatcr mobility is now givcn to lootartillcry by mounting thc mcn on thc boxcs.
ac
A third ol thc disposablc artillcry may bc assigncd this duty, but twothirds at
lcast should bc dircctcd against thc inlantry and cavalry ol thc cncmy.
,. !l thc cncmy advancc in dcploycd lincs, thc battcrics should cndcavor to
cross thcir rc in ordcr to strikc thc lincs obliqucly. !l guns can bc so placcd as
to cnladc a linc ol troops, a most powcrlul ccct is produccd.
. Vhcn thc cncmy advancc in columns, thcy may bc battcrcd in lront. !t is
advantagcous also to attack thcm obliqucly, and cspccially in ank and rcvcrsc.
Tc moral ccct ol a rcvcrsc rc upon a body ol troops is inconccivablc, and
thc bcst soldicrs arc gcncrally put to ight by it. Tc nc movcmcnt ol Ncy on
Prcititz at 8autzcn was ncutralizcd by a lcw picccs ol Klcist's artillcry, which
took his columns in ank, chcckcd thcm, and dccidcd thc marshal to dcviatc
lrom thc cxccllcnt dircction hc was pursuing. A lcw picccs ol light artillcry,
thrown at all hazards upon thc cncmy's ank, may producc most important
rcsults, lar ovcrbalancing thc risks run.
. 8attcrics should always havc supports ol inlantry or cavalry, and cspccially
on thcir anks. Cascs may occur whcrc thc rulc may bc dcviatcd lrom: Vagram
is a vcry rcmarkablc cxamplc ol this.
.c. !t is vcry important that artillcrists, whcn thrcatcncd by cavalry, prcscrvc
thcir coolncss. Tcy should rc rst solid shot, ncxt shclls, and thcn grapc, as
long as possiblc. Tc inlantry supports should, in such a casc, lorm squarcs in
thc vicinity, to shcltcr thc horscs, and, whcn ncccssary, thc cannonccrs. Vhcn
thc inlantry is drawn up bchind thc picccs, largc squarcs ol sucicnt sizc to
contain whatcvcr thcy should covcr arc bcst, but whcn thc inlantry is on thc
anks, smallcr squarcs arc bcttcr. Rockctbattcrics may also bc vcry ccicnt
in lrightcning thc horscs.
... Vhcn inlantry thrcatcns artillcry, thc lattcr should continuc its rc to thc
last momcnt, bcing carclul not to commcncc ring too soon. Tc cannonccrs
can always bc shcltcrcd lrom an inlantry attack il thc battcry is propcrly
supportcd. Tis is a casc lor thc coopcration ol thc thrcc arms, lor, il thc
cncmy's inlantry is thrown into conlusion by thc artillcry, a combincd attack
upon it by cavalry and inlantry will causc its dcstruction.
.a. Tc proportions ol artillcry havc varicd in dicrcnt wars. Napolcon
conqucrcd !taly in .cc with lorty or lty picccs,whilst in ..a hc invadcd
Russia with onc thousand picccs thoroughly cquippcd, and lailcd. Tcsc lacts
show that any xcd rulc on thc subjcct is inadmissiblc. Usually thrcc picccs
to a thousand combatants arc allowcd, but this allowancc will dcpcnd on
circumstanccs.
Tc rclativc proportions ol hcavy and light artillcry vary also bctwccn widc
limits. !t is a grcat mistakc to havc too much hcavy artillcry, whosc mobility
must bc much lcss than that ol thc lightcr calibcrs. A rcmarkablc prool ol
thc grcat importancc ol having a strong artillcryarmamcnt was givcn by
Napolcon altcr thc battlc ol ylau. Tc grcat havoc occasioncd among his
troops by thc numcrous guns ol thc Russians opcncd his cycs to thc ncccssity
a.
ol incrcasing his own. Vith wondcrlul vigor, hc sct all thc Prussian arscnals
to work, thosc along thc Rhinc, and cvcn at Mctz, to incrcasc thc numbcr ol
his picccs, and to cast ncw oncs in ordcr to cnablc him to usc thc munitions
prcviously capturcd. !n thrcc months hc doublcd thc materiel and personnel ol
his artillcry, at a distancc ol onc thousand milcs lrom his own lronticrs,a
lcat without a parallcl in thc annals ol war.
.. nc ol thc surcst mcans ol using thc artillcry to thc bcst advantagc is to
placc in command ol it a gcncral who is at oncc a good stratcgist and tactician.
Tis chicl should bc authorizcd to disposc not only ol thc rcscrvc artillcry, but
also ol hall thc picccs attachcd to thc dicrcnt corps or divisions ol thc army.
Hc should also consult with thc commanding gcncral as to thc momcnt and
placc ol conccntration ol thc mass ol his artillcry in ordcr to contributc most to
a succcsslul issuc ol thc day, and hc should ncvcr takc thc rcsponsibility ol thus
massing his artillcry without prcvious ordcrs lrom thc commanding gcncral.
ARTICLE XLVII
Of the Combined Use of the Three Arms
To concludc this Summary in a propcr manncr, ! ought to trcat ol thc combincd
usc ol thc thrcc arms, but ! am rcstraincd lrom so doing by considcring thc
grcat varicty ol points ncccssary to bc touchcd upon il ! should attcmpt to
go into an cxamination ol all thc dctailcd opcrations that would arisc in thc
application ol thc gcncral rulcs laid down lor cach ol thc arms.
Scvcral authorschicy Gcrmanhavc trcatcd this subjcct vcry cxtcnsivcly,
and thcir labors arc valuablc principally bccausc thcy consist mainly ol citations
ol numcrous cxamplcs takcn lrom thc actual minor cngagcmcnts ol thc latcr
wars. Tcsc cxamplcs must indccd takc thc placc ol rulcs, sincc cxpcricncc has
shown that xcd rulcs on thc subjcct cannot bc laid down. !t sccms a wastc ol
brcath to say that thc commandcr ol a body ol troops composcd ol thc thrcc
arms should cmploy thcm so that thcy will givc mutual support and assistancc,
but, altcr all, this is thc only lundamcntal rulc that can bc cstablishcd, lor thc
attcmpt to prcscribc lor such a commandcr a spccial coursc ol conduct in cvcry
casc that may arisc, whcn thcsc cascs may bc innitcly varicd, would involvc
him in an incxtricablc labyrinth ol instructions. As thc objcct and limits ol
this Summary do not allow mc to cntcr upon thc considcration ol such dctails,
! can only rclcr my rcadcrs to thc bcst works which do trcat ol thcm.
! havc said all ! can propcrly say whcn ! advisc that thc dicrcnt arms
bc postcd in conlormity with thc charactcr ol thc ground, according to thc
objcct in vicw and thc supposcd dcsigns ol thc cncmy, and that thcy bc uscd
simultancously in thc manncr bcst suitcd to thcm, carc bcing takcn to cnablc
thcm to aord mutual support. A carclul study ol thc cvcnts ol prcvious wars,
and cspccially cxpcricncc in thc opcrations ol war, will givc an occr corrcct
aa
idcas on thcsc points, and thc ability to usc, at thc right timc and placc, his
knowlcdgc ol thc propcrtics ol thc thrcc arms, cithcr singlc or combincd.
CNCLUS!N
! am constraincd to rccapitulatc thc principal lacts which may bc rcgardcd as
lundamcntal in war. Var in its ensemble is not a scicncc, but an art. Stratcgy,
particularly, may indccd bc rcgulatcd by xcd laws rcscmbling thosc ol thc
positivc scicnccs, but this is not truc ol war vicwcd as a wholc. Among othcr
things, combats may bc mcntioncd as oltcn bcing quitc indcpcndcnt ol
scicntic combinations, and thcy may bccomc csscntially dramatic, pcrsonal
qualitics and inspirations and a thousand othcr things lrcqucntly bcing thc
controlling clcmcnts. Tc passions which agitatc thc masscs that arc brought
into collision, thc warlikc qualitics ol thcsc masscs, thc cncrgy and talcnt ol
thcir commandcrs, thc spirit, morc or lcss martial, ol nations and cpochs,
|!|
in a word, cvcry thing that can bc callcd thc poctry and mctaphysics ol war,
will havc a pcrmancnt inucncc on its rcsults.
Shall ! bc undcrstood as saying that thcrc arc no such things as tactical rulcs,
and that no thcory ol tactics can bc usclul: Vhat military man ol intclligcncc
would bc guilty ol such an absurdity: Arc wc to imaginc that ugcnc and
Marlborough triumphcd simply by inspiration or by thc supcrior couragc and
disciplinc ol thcir battalions: r do wc nd in thc cvcnts ol Turin, 8lcnhcim,
and Ramillics mancuvcrs rcscmbling thosc sccn at Talavcra, Vatcrloo, Jcna,
or Austcrlitz, which wcrc thc causcs ol thc victory in cach casc: Vhcn thc
application ol a rulc and thc conscqucnt mancuvcr havc procurcd victory a
hundrcd timcs lor skilllul gcncrals, and always havc in thcir lavor thc grcat
probability ol lcading to succcss, shall thcir occasional lailurc bc a sucicnt
rcason lor cntircly dcnying thcir valuc and lor distrusting thc ccct ol thc
study ol thc art: Shall a thcory bc pronounccd absurd bccausc it has only thrcc
lourths ol thc wholc numbcr ol chanccs ol succcss in its lavor:
Tc morale ol an army and its chicl occrs has an inucncc upon thc latc
ol a war, and this sccms to bc duc to a ccrtain physical ccct produccd by thc
moral causc. For cxamplc, thc impctuous attack upon a hostilc linc ol twcnty
thousand bravc mcn whosc lcclings arc thoroughly cnlistcd in thcir causc
will producc a much morc powcrlul ccct than thc attack ol lorty thousand
dcmoralizcd or apathctic mcn upon thc samc point.
Stratcgy, as has alrcady bccn cxplaincd, is thc art ol bringing thc grcatcst
part ol thc lorccs ol an army upon thc important point ol thc thcatcr ol war or
ol thc zonc ol opcrations.
!
Tc wcllknown Spanish provcrb, He was brave on such a day, may bc applicd to nations as to
individuals. Tc Frcnch at Rossbach wcrc not thc samc pcoplc as at Jcna, nor thc Prussians at Prcntzlow as at
cnncwitz.
a
Tactics is thc art ol using thcsc masscs at thc points to which thcy shall havc
bccn conductcd by wcllarrangcd marchcs, that is to say, thc art ol making
thcm act at thc dccisivc momcnt and at thc dccisivc point ol thc cld ol battlc.
Vhcn troops arc thinking morc ol ight than ol ght, thcy can no longcr bc
tcrmcd activc masscs in thc scnsc in which ! usc thc tcrm.
A gcncral thoroughly instructcd in thc thcory ol war, but not posscsscd ol
military coup-d'oeil, coolncss, and skill, may makc an cxccllcnt stratcgic plan
and bc cntircly unablc to apply thc rulcs ol tactics in prcscncc ol an cncmy: his
projccts will not bc succcsslully carricd out, and his dclcat will bc probablc.
!l hc bc a man ol charactcr, hc will bc ablc to diminish thc cvil rcsults ol his
lailurc, but il hc losc his wits hc will losc his army.
Tc samc gcncral may, on thc othcr hand, bc at oncc a good tactician and
stratcgist, and havc madc all thc arrangcmcnts lor gaining a victory that his
mcans will pcrmit: in this casc, il hc bc only modcratcly sccondcd by his
troops and subordinatc occrs, hc will probably gain a dccidcd victory. !l,
howcvcr, his troops havc ncithcr disciplinc nor couragc, and his subordinatc
occrs cnvy and dcccivc him,
|!|
hc will undoubtcdly scc his nc hopcs ladc
away, and his admirablc combinations can only havc thc ccct ol diminishing
thc disastcrs ol an almost unavoidablc dclcat.
No systcm ol tactics can lcad to victory whcn thc morale ol an army is
bad, and cvcn whcn it may bc cxccllcnt thc victory may dcpcnd upon somc
occurrcncc likc thc rupturc ol thc bridgcs ovcr thc anubc at ssling. Ncithcr
will victorics bc ncccssarily gaincd or lost by rigid adhcrcncc to or rcjcction ol
this or that manncr ol lorming troops lor battlc.
Tcsc truths nccd not lcad to thc conclusion that thcrc can bc no sound rulcs
in war, thc obscrvancc ol which, thc chanccs bcing cqual, will lcad to succcss.
!t is truc that thcorics cannot tcach mcn with mathcmatical prccision what
thcy should do in cvcry possiblc casc, but it is also ccrtain that thcy will always
point out thc crrors which should bc avoidcd, and this is a highlyimportant
considcration, lor thcsc rulcs thus bccomc, in thc hands ol skilllul gcncrals
commanding bravc troops, mcans ol almost ccrtain succcss.
Tc corrcctncss ol this statcmcnt cannot bc dcnicd, and it only rcmains to
bc ablc to discriminatc bctwccn good rulcs and bad. !n this ability consists thc
wholc ol a man's gcnius lor war. Tcrc arc, howcvcr, lcading principlcs which
assist in obtaining this ability. vcry maxim rclating to war will bc good il it
indicatcs thc cmploymcnt ol thc grcatcst portion ol thc mcans ol action at thc
dccisivc momcnt and placc. !n Chaptcr !!!. ! havc spccicd all thc stratcgic
combinations which lcad to such a rcsult. As rcgards tactics, thc principal
thing to bc attcndcd to is thc choicc ol thc most suitablc ordcr ol battlc lor thc
objcct in vicw. Vhcn wc comc to considcr thc action ol masscs on thc cld, thc
mcans to bc uscd may bc an opportunc chargc ol cavalry, a strong battcry put
in position and unmaskcd at thc propcr momcnt, a column ol inlantry making
!
Tc unskilllul conduct ol a subordinatc who is incapablc ol undcrstanding thc mcrit ol a
mancuvcr which has bccn ordcrcd, and who will commit gravc laults in its cxccution, may producc thc samc
rcsult ol causing thc lailurc ol thc plans ol an cxccllcnt commandcr.
a
a hcadlong chargc, or a dcploycd division coolly and stcadily pouring upon thc
cncmy a rc, or thcy may consist ol tactical mancuvcrs intcndcd to thrcatcn
thc cncmy's anks or rcar, or any othcr mancuvcr calculatcd to diminish thc
condcncc ol thc advcrsary. ach ol thcsc things may, in a particular casc, bc
thc causc ol victory. To dcnc thc cascs in which cach should bc prclcrrcd is
simply impossiblc.
!l a gcncral dcsircs to bc a succcsslul actor in thc grcat drama ol war, his
rst duty is to study carclully thc thcatcr ol opcrations, that hc may scc
clcarly thc rclativc advantagcs and disadvantagcs it prcscnts lor himscll and
his cncmics. Tis bcing donc, hc can undcrstandingly procccd to prcparc his
basc ol opcrations, thcn to choosc thc most suitablc zonc ol opcrations lor his
main corts, and, in doing so, kccp constantly bclorc his mind thc principlcs
ol thc art ol war rclativc to lincs and lronts ol opcrations. Tc ocnsivc
army should particularly cndcavor to cut up thc opposing army by skilllully
sclccting objcctivc points ol mancuvcr, it will thcn assumc, as thc objccts ol
its subscqucnt undcrtakings, gcographical points ol morc or lcss importancc,
dcpcnding upon its rst succcsscs.
Tc dclcnsivc army, on thc contrary, should cndcavor, by all mcans, to
ncutralizc thc rst lorward movcmcnt ol its advcrsary, protracting opcrations
as long as possiblc whilc not compromising thc latc ol thc war, and dclcrring
a dccisivc battlc until thc timc whcn a portion ol thc cncmy's lorccs arc
cithcr cxhaustcd by labors, or scattcrcd lor thc purposc ol occupying invadcd
provinccs, masking lorticd placcs, covcring sicgcs, protccting thc linc ol
opcrations, dcpots, &c.
Up to this point cvcry thing rclatcs to a rst plan ol opcrations, but no
plan can providc with ccrtainty lor that which is unccrtain always,thc
charactcr and thc issuc ol thc rst conict. !l your lincs ol opcrations havc
bccn skilllully choscn and your movcmcnts wcll conccalcd, and il on thc othcr
hand your cncmy makcs lalsc movcmcnts which pcrmit you to lall on lractions
ol his army, you maybc succcsslul in your campaign, without ghting gcncral
battlcs, by thc simplc usc ol your stratcgic advantagcs. 8ut il thc two partics
sccm about cqually matchcd at thc timc ol conict, thcrc will rcsult onc ol
thosc stupcndous tragcdics likc 8orodino, Vagram, Vatcrloo, 8autzcn, and
rcsdcn, whcrc thc prcccpts ol grand tactics, as indicatcd in thc chaptcr on
that subjcct, must havc a powcrlul inucncc.
!l a lcw prcjudiccd military mcn, altcr rcading this book and carclully
studying thc dctailcd and corrcct history ol thc campaigns ol thc grcat mastcrs
ol thc art ol war, still contcnd that it has ncithcr principlcs nor rulcs, ! can only
pity thcm, and rcply, in thc lamous words ol Frcdcrick, that "a mulc which had
madc twcnty campaigns undcr Princc ugcnc would not bc a bcttcr tactician
than at thc bcginning."
Corrcct thcorics, loundcd upon right principlcs, sustaincd by actual cvcnts
ol wars, and addcd to accuratc military history, will lorm a truc school ol
instruction lor gcncrals. !l thcsc mcans do not producc grcat mcn, thcy will
a
at lcast producc gcncrals ol sucicnt skill to takc rank ncxt altcr thc natural
mastcrs ol thc art ol war.
a6
commentary on Chapter Vii
T
his chaptcr, cvcn morc than Chaptcr , is primarily ol historical intcrcst.
Unlikc Chaptcr on stratcgy, which still has somc rclcvancc in thc a.st
ccntury, Chaptcr ,s insights arc all outdatcd. n thc othcr hand, whcn
uscd as a supplcmcntary tcxt to .th and carly .th ccntury military history,
thcsc insights arc lascinating. Tc discussion ol thc virtucs and viccs ol
various corps and divisional organizations is an cxccllcnt commcntary on thc
lumbling attcmpts that Napolcons ancicnt rcgimc opponcnts madc to cmulatc
his systcm ol corps, as wcll as an implicit criticism ol Napolcons lack ol a
unilorm divisional and corps organization. Amcrican Civil Var historians
will rccognizc in Jominis organizational commcnts a critiquc ol thc dicrcncc
bctwccn Robcrt . Lccs organization ol thc Army ol Northcrn \irginia into
two (latcr thrcc) largc corps and thc organization ol thc Army ol thc Potomac
into scvcn smallcr corps.
Tc dcscription ol various lormations a gcncral might cmploy in his divisions
is ol grcat usc to anyonc struggling to undcrstand thc dicrcnccs bctwccn thc
standard lormations uscd in thc Napolconic agc and thc bcncts that a particular
lormation would havc givcn its commandcr. For cxamplc, thc dicrcnccs in
dclcnsivc rcpowcr bctwccn thc nglish linc lormation and thc habitual
Prussian usc ol columns accounts lor much ol thc dicrcncc in outcomcs at
thc battlcs ol Vatcrloo and Ligny. n thc othcr hand, mancuvcrability and
cxibility ol column lormations madc it possiblc lor 8luchcrs Prussians to
comc to Vcllingtons aid at Vatcrloo. Tis scction has lcss utility lor thosc
intcrcstcd in thc Civil Var, as thc linc was uscd almost cxclusivcly in tactics
in thc .6cs.
a,
SUPPLEMENT
TO THE
M
y Summary ol thc Art ol Var, publishcd in .6, to assist in thc military
instruction ol thc Hcrcditary Grand ukc ol Russia, containcd a
concluding articlc that was ncvcr printcd. ! dccm it cxpcdicnt to givc it now
in thc lorm ol a supplcmcnt, and add a spccial articlc upon thc mcans ol
acquiring a ccrtain and rcady stratcgic coup-d'oeil.
!t is csscntial lor thc rcadcr ol my Summary to undcrstand clcarly that in
thc military scicncc, as in cvcry othcr, thc study ol dctails is casy lor thc man
who has lcarncd how to scizc thc lundamcntal lcaturcs to which all othcrs arc
sccondary. ! am about to attcmpt a dcvclopmcnt ol thcsc clcmcnts ol thc art,
and my rcadcrs should cndcavor to apprchcnd thcm clcarly and to apply thcm
propcrly.
! cannot too oltcn rcpcat that thc thcory ol thc grcat combinations ol war
is in itscll vcry simplc, and rcquircs nothing morc than ordinary intclligcncc
and carclul considcration. Notwithstanding its simplicity, many lcarncd
military mcn havc diculty in grasping it thoroughly. Tcir minds wandcr
o to acccssory dctails, in placc ol xing thcmsclvcs on rst causcs, and thcy
go a long way in scarch ol what is just within thcir rcach il thcy only would
think so.
Two vcry dicrcnt things must cxist in a man to makc him a gcncral: he
must know how to arrange a good plan of operations, and how to carry it to a
successful termination. Tc rst ol thcsc talcnts may bc a natural gilt, but it
may also bc acquircd and dcvclopcd by study. Tc sccond dcpcnds morc on
individual charactcr, is rathcr a pcrsonal attributc, and cannot bc crcatcd by
study, although it may bc improvcd.
!t is particularly ncccssary lor a monarch or thc hcad ol a govcrnmcnt to
posscss thc rst ol thcsc talcnts, bccausc in such casc, although hc may not
havc thc ability to cxccutc, hc can arrangc plans ol opcrations and dccidc
a
corrcctly as to thc cxccllcncc or dclccts ol thosc submittcd to him by othcrs.
Hc is thus cnablcd to cstimatc propcrly thc capacity ol his gcncrals, and whcn
hc nds a gcncral producing a good plan, and having rmncss and coolncss,
such a man may bc salcly trustcd with thc command ol an army.
!l, on thc othcr hand, thc hcad ol a statc is a man ol cxccutivc ability, but
not posscssing thc laculty ol arranging wisc military combinations, hc will bc
likcly to commit all thc laults that havc charactcrizcd thc campaigns ol many
cclcbratcd warriors who wcrc only bravc soldicrs without bcing at all improvcd
by study.
From thc principlcs which ! havc laid down, and thcir application to scvcral
lamous campaigns, my rcadcrs will pcrccivc that thc thcory ol thc grcat
combinations ol war may bc summcd up in thc lollowing truths.
Tc scicncc ol stratcgy consists, in thc rst placc, in knowing how to choosc
wcll a thcatcr ol war and to cstimatc corrcctly that ol thc cncmy. To do this,
a gcncral must accustom himscll to dccidc as to thc importancc ol dccisivc
points,which is not a dicult mattcr whcn hc is aidcd by thc hints ! havc
givcn on thc subjcct, particularly in Articlcs lrom X\!!!. to XX!!.
Tc art consists, ncxt, in a propcr cmploymcnt ol thc troops upon thc
thcatcr ol opcrations, whcthcr ocnsivc or dclcnsivc. (Scc Articlc X\!!.) Tis
cmploymcnt ol thc lorccs should bc rcgulatcd by two lundamcntal principlcs:
thc rst bcing, to obtain by free and rapid movements the advantage of bringing
the mass of the troops against fractions of the enemy; the second, to strike in the most
decisive direction,that is to say, in that dircction whcrc thc conscqucnccs ol
his dclcat may bc most disastrous to thc cncmy, whilc at thc samc timc his
succcss would yicld him no grcat advantagcs.
Tc wholc scicncc ol grcat military combination is compriscd in thcsc two
lundamcntal truths. Tcrclorc, all movcmcnts that arc disconncctcd or morc
cxtcndcd than thosc ol thc cncmy would bc gravc laults, so also would thc
occupation ol a position that was too much cut up, or scnding out a largc
dctachmcnt unncccssarily. n thc contrary, cvcry wcllconncctcd, compact
systcm ol opcrations would bc wisc, so also with ccntral stratcgic lincs, and
cvcry stratcgic position lcss cxtcndcd than thc cncmy's.
Tc application ol thcsc lundamcntal principlcs is also vcry simplc. !l you
havc onc hundrcd battalions against an cqual numbcr ol thc cncmy's, you
may, by thcir mobility and by taking thc initiativc, bring cighty ol thcm to thc
dccisivc point whilc cmploying thc rcmaining twcnty to obscrvc and dcccivc
hall ol thc opposing army. You will thus havc cighty battalions against lty
at thc point whcrc thc important contcst is to takc placc. You will rcach this
point by rapid marchcs, by intcrior lincs, or by a gcncral movcmcnt toward onc
cxtrcmity ol thc hostilc linc. ! havc indicatcd thc cascs in which onc or thc
othcr ol thcsc mcans is to bc prclcrrcd. (Scc pagcs .. and lollowing.)
a
Supplcmcnt to thc Summary ol thc Art ol Var
!n arranging a plan ol opcrations, it is important to rcmcmbcr "that a
strategic theater, as well as every position occupied by an army, has a center and two
extremities." A thcatcr has usually thrcc zoncs,a right, a lclt, and a ccntral.
!n choosing a zonc ol opcrations, sclcct onc,., that will lurnish a salc and
advantagcous basc, a, in which thc lcast risk will bc run by yourscll, whilc
thc cncmy will bc most cxposcd to injury, , bcaring in mind thc antcccdcnt
situations ol thc two partics, and, , thc dispositions and inclinations ol thc
powcrs whosc tcrritorics arc ncar thc thcatcr ol war.
nc ol thc zoncs will always bc dccidcdly bad or dangcrous, whilc thc othcr
two will bc morc or lcss suitablc according to circumstanccs.
Tc zonc and basc bcing xcd upon, thc objcct ol thc rst attcmpts must
bc sclcctcd. Tis is choosing an objcctivc ol opcrations. Tcrc arc two vcry
dicrcnt kinds: somc, that arc callcd territorial or geographical objectives, rclcr
simply to an cncmy's linc ol dclcnsc which it is dcsircd to gct posscssion ol, or
a lortrcss or intrcnchcd camp to bc capturcd, the others, on the contrary, consist
entirely in the destruction or disorganization of the enemy's forces, without giving
attention to geographical points of any kind. Tis was thc lavoritc objcctivc ol
Napolcon.
|!|
! can protably add nothing to what ! havc alrcady writtcn on this point,
(pagc 6,) and, as the choice of the objective is by far the most important thing in
a plan of operations, ! rccommcnd thc wholc ol Articlc X!X., (pagcs and
lollowing.)
Tc objcctivc bcing dctcrmincd upon, thc army will movc toward it by onc
or two lincs ol opcrations, carc bcing takcn to conlorm to thc lundamcntal
principlc laid down, and to avoid doublc lincs, unlcss thc charactcr ol thc
thcatcr ol war makcs it ncccssary to usc thcm, or thc cncmy is vcry inlcrior
cithcr in thc numbcr or thc quality ol his troops. Articlc XX!. trcats this
subjcct lully. !l two gcographical lincs arc uscd, it is csscntial to movc thc
grcat mass ol thc lorccs along thc most important ol thcm, and to occupy thc
sccondary linc by dctachmcnts having a conccntric dircction, il possiblc, with
thc main body.
Tc army, bcing on its way toward thc objcctivc, bclorc arriving in prcscncc
ol thc cncmy and giving battlc, occupics daily or tcmporary stratcgic positions:
thc lront it cmbraccs, or that upon which thc cncmy may attack, is its lront ol
opcrations. Tcrc is an important considcration with rclcrcncc to thc dircction
ol thc lront ol opcrations and to changcs it may rcccivc, which ! havc dwclt
upon in Articlc XX., (pagc .)
Tc lundamcntal principlc rcquircs, cvcn whcn thc lorccs arc cqual, that
thc lront bc lcss cxtcnsivc than thc cncmy's,cspccially il thc lront rcmains
unchangcd lor somc timc. !l your stratcgic positions arc morc closcly
conncctcd than thc cncmy's, you can conccntratc morc rapidly and morc casily
than hc can, and in this way thc lundamcntal principlc will bc applicd. !l
!
Tc objcctivc may bc in somc dcgrcc political,cspccially in cascs ol wars ol intcrvcntion in thc
aairs ol anothcr country, but it thcn rcally bccomcs gcographical
ac
NOTE
UPON
THE MEANS OF ACQUIRING A GOOD STRATEGIC
COUP-DOEIL
T
hc study ol thc principlcs ol stratcgy can producc no valuablc practical
rcsults il wc do nothing morc than kccp thcm in rcmcmbrancc, ncvcr
trying to apply thcm, with map in hand, to hypothctical wars, or to thc
brilliant opcrations ol grcat captains. 8y such cxcrciscs may bc procurcd a
rapid and ccrtain stratcgic coup-doeil,thc most valuablc charactcristic ol a
good gcncral, without which hc can ncvcr put in practicc thc ncst thcorics
in thc world.
Vhcn a military man who is a studcnt ol his art has bccomc lully imprcsscd
by thc advantagcs procurcd by moving a strong mass against succcssivc
lractions ol thc cncmys lorcc, and particularly whcn hc rccognizcs thc
importancc ol constantly dirccting thc main corts upon dccisivc points ol thc
thcatcr ol opcrations, hc will naturally dcsirc to bc ablc to pcrccivc at a glancc
what arc thcsc dccisivc points. ! havc alrcady, in Chaptcr !!!., pagc ,c, ol thc
prcccding Summary, indicatcd thc simplc mcans by which this knowlcdgc
may bc obtaincd. Tcrc is, in lact, onc truth ol rcmarkablc simplicity which
obtains in all thc combinations ol a mcthodical war. !t is this:in every position
a general may occupy, he has only to decide whether to operate by the right, by the
left, or by the front.
To bc convinccd ol thc corrcctncss ol this asscrtion, lct us rst takc this
gcncral in his privatc occ at thc opcning ol thc war. His rst carc will bc
to choosc that zonc ol opcrations which will givc him thc grcatcst numbcr ol
chanccs ol succcss and bc thc lcast dangcrous lor him in casc ol rcvcrsc. As no
thcatcr ol opcrations can havc morc than thrcc zoncs, (that ol thc right, that ol
thc ccntcr, and that ol thc lclt,) and as ! havc in Articlcs lrom X\!!. to XX!!.
pointcd out thc manncr ol pcrcciving thc advantagcs and dangcrs ol thcsc
zoncs, thc choicc ol a zonc ol opcrations will bc a mattcr ol no diculty.
a.
Notc Upon thc Mcans ol Acquiring a Good Stratcgic Coupocil
Vhcn thc gcncral has nally choscn a zonc within which to opcratc with
thc principal portion ol his lorccs, and whcn thcsc lorccs shall bc cstablishcd
in that zonc, thc army will havc a lront ol opcrations toward thc hostilc
army, which will also havc onc. Now, thcsc lronts ol opcrations will cach
havc its right, lclt, and ccntcr. !t only rcmains, thcn, lor thc gcncral to dccidc
upon which ol thcsc dircctions hc can injurc thc cncmy most,lor this will
always bc thc bcst, cspccially il hc can movc upon it without cndangcring
his own communications. ! havc dwclt upon this point also in thc prcccding
Summary.
Finally, whcn thc two armics arc in prcscncc ol cach othcr upon thc cld
ol battlc whcrc thc dccisivc collision is to cnsuc, and arc upon thc point ol
coming to blows, thcy will cach havc a right, lclt, and ccntcr, and it rcmains
lor thc gcncral to dccidc still bctwccn thcsc thrcc dircctions ol striking.
Lct us takc, as an illustration ol thc truths ! havc mcntioncd, thc thcatcr ol
opcrations, alrcady rclcrrcd to, bctwccn thc Rhinc and thc North Sca. (Scc
Fig. .)
Although this thcatcr prcscnts, in onc point ol vicw, lour gcographical
scctions,viz.: thc spacc bctwccn thc Rhinc and thc Moscllc, that bctwccn
thc Moscllc and thc Mcusc, that bctwccn thc Mcusc and thc Schcldt, and
that bctwccn thc last rivcr and thc sca,it is ncvcrthclcss truc that an army
ol which A A is thc basc and 8 8 thc lront ol opcrations will havc only thrcc
gcncral dircctions to choosc lrom, lor thc two spaccs in thc ccntcr will lorm
a singlc ccntral zonc, as it will always havc onc on thc right and anothcr on
thc lclt.
Figurc
aa
Tc army 8 8, wishing to takc thc ocnsivc against thc army CC, whosc
basc was thc Rhinc, would havc thrcc dircctions in which to opcratc. !l it
mancuvcrcd by thc cxtrcmc right, dcsccnding thc Moscllc, (toward ,) it
would cvidcntly thrcatcn thc cncmys linc ol rctrcat toward thc Rhinc, but hc,
conccntrating thc mass ol his lorccs toward Luxcmbourg, might lall upon thc
lclt ol thc army and compcl it to changc lront and ght a battlc with its rcar
toward thc Rhinc, causing its ruin il scriously dclcatcd.
!l, on thc contrary, thc army 8 wishcd to makc its grcatcst cort upon thc
lclt, (toward ,) in ordcr to takc advantagc ol thc nclylorticd towns ol Lillc
and \alcncicnncs, it would bc cxposcd to inconvcnicnccs still morc scrious
than bclorc. For thc army CC, conccntrating in lorcc toward Audcnardc,
might lall on thc right ol 8, and, outanking this wing in thc battlc, might
throw it upon thc impassablc country toward Antwcrp bctwccn thc Schcldt
and thc sca,whcrc thcrc would rcmain but two things lor it to do: cithcr to
surrcndcr at discrction, or cut its way through thc cncmy at thc sacricc ol
hall its numbcrs.
!t appcars cvidcnt, thcrclorc, that thc lclt zonc would bc thc most
disadvantagcous lor army 8, and thc right zonc would bc inconvcnicnt,
although somcwhat lavorablc in a ccrtain point ol vicw. Tc ccntral zonc
rcmains to bc cxamincd. Tis is lound to posscss all dcsirablc advantagcs,
bccausc thc army 8 might movc thc mass ol its lorcc toward Charlcroi with a
vicw ol cutting through thc immcnsc lront ol opcrations ol thc cncmy, might
ovcrwhclm his ccntcr, and drivc thc right back upon Antwcrp and thc Lowcr
Schcldt, without scriously cxposing its own communications.
Vhcn thc lorccs arc chicy conccntratcd upon thc most lavorablc zonc, thcy
should, ol coursc, havc that dircction ol movcmcnt toward thc cncmys lront
ol opcrations which is in harmony with thc chicl objcct in vicw. For cxamplc,
il you shall havc opcratcd by your right against thc cncmys lclt, with thc
intcntion ol cutting o thc grcatcr portion ol his army lrom its basc ol thc
Rhinc, you should ccrtainly continuc to opcratc in thc samc dircction, lor il
you should makc your grcatcst cort against thc right ol thc cncmys lront,
whilc your plan was to gain an advantagc ovcr his lclt, your opcrations could
not rcsult as you anticipatcd, no mattcr how wcll thcy might bc cxccutcd. !l,
on thc contrary, you had dccidcd to takc thc lclt zonc, with thc intcntion ol
crowding thc cncmy back upon thc sca, you ought constantly to mancuvcr by
your right in ordcr to accomplish your objcct, lor il you mancuvcrcd by thc lclt,
yourscll and not thc cncmy would bc thc party thrown back upon thc sca in
casc ol a rcvcrsc.
Applying thcsc idcas to thc thcatcrs ol thc campaigns ol Marcngo, Ulm,
and Jcna, wc nd thc samc thrcc zoncs, with this dicrcncc, that in thosc
campaigns thc ccntral dircction was not thc bcst. !n .cc, thc dircction ol
thc lclt lcd straight to thc lclt bank ol thc Po, on thc linc ol rctrcat ol Mclas,
in .c, thc lclt zonc was thc onc which lcd by thc way ol onauwcrth to thc
cxtrcmc right, and thc linc ol rctrcat ol Mack, in .c6, howcvcr, Napolcon
a
could rcach thc Prussian linc ol rctrcat by thc right zonc, ling o lrom
8ambcrg toward Gcra.
!n .cc, Napolcon had to choosc bctwccn a linc ol opcrations on thc right,
lcading to thc scashorc toward Nicc and Savona, that ol thc ccntcr, lcading
by MontCcnis toward Turin, and that ol thc lclt, lcading to thc linc ol
communications ol Mclas, by way ol Saint8crnard or thc Simplon. Tc rst
two dircctions had nothing in thcir lavor, and thc right might havc bccn vcry
dangcrous,as, in lact, it provcd to Masscna, who was lorccd back to Gcnoa
and thcrc bcsicgcd. Tc dccisivc dircction was cvidcntly that by thc lclt.
! havc said cnough to cxplain my idcas on this point.
Tc subjcct ol battlcs is somcwhat morc complicatcd, lor in thc arrangcmcnts
lor thcsc thcrc arc both stratcgical and tactical considcrations to bc takcn into
account and harmonizcd. A position lor battlc, bcing ncccssarily conncctcd
with thc linc ol rctrcat and thc basc ol opcrations, must havc a wclldcncd
stratcgic dircction, but this dircction must also dcpcnd somcwhat upon thc
charactcr ol thc ground and thc stations ol thc troops ol both partics to thc
cngagcmcnt: thcsc arc tactical considcrations. Although an army usually takcs
such a position lor a battlc as will kccp its linc ol rctrcat bchind it, somctimcs
it is obligcd to assumc a position parallcl to this linc. !n such a casc it is cvidcnt
that il you lall with ovcrwhclming lorcc upon thc wing ncarcst thc linc ol
rctrcat, thc cncmy may bc cut o or dcstroycd, or, at lcast, havc no othcr
chancc ol cscapc than in lorcing his way through your linc.
! will hcrc mcntion as illustrations thc cclcbratcd battlc ol Lcuthcn in .,,,
ol which ! havc givcn an account in thc history ol Frcdcricks wars, and thc
lamous days ol Krasnoi, in thc rctrcat lrom Moscow in ..a.
Figurc c
Tc anncxcd gurc (c) cxplains thc combination at Krasnoi. Tc linc A A is
Napolcons linc ol rctrcat toward C. Hc took thc position 8 8 to covcr his linc.
!t is cvidcnt that thc principal mass ol Koutousos army should havc
movcd to in ordcr to lall on thc right ol thc Frcnch, whosc army would
havc bccn ccrtainly dcstroycd il it had bccn anticipatcd at C, lor cvcrybody
knows in what a statc it was whilc thus ltccn hundrcd milcs lrom its truc
basc.
a
Tcrc was thc samc combination at Jcmmapcs, whcrc umouricz, by
outanking thc Austrian lclt, instcad ol attacking thcir right, would havc
cntircly cut thcm o lrom thc Rhinc.
At thc battlc ol Lcuthcn Frcdcrick ovcrwhclmcd thc Austrian lclt, which
was in thc dircction ol thcir linc ol rctrcat, and lor this rcason thc right wing
was obligcd to takc rclugc in 8rcslau, whcrc it capitulatcd a lcw days latcr.
!n such cascs thcrc is no causc lor hcsitation. Tc dccisivc point is that wing
ol thc cncmy which is ncarcst his linc ol rctrcat, and this linc you must scizc
whilc protccting your own.
Vhcn an cncmy has onc or two lincs ol rctrcat pcrpcndicular to and bchind
his position ol battlc, it will gcncrally bc bcst to attack thc ccntcr, or that wing
whcrc thc obstaclcs ol thc ground shall bc thc lcast lavorablc lor thc dclcnsc,
lor in such a casc thc rst considcration is to gain thc battlc, without having
in vicw thc total dcstruction ol thc cncmy. Tat dcpcnds upon thc rclativc
numcrical strcngth, thc morale ol thc two armics, and othcr circumstanccs,
with rclcrcncc to which no xcd rulcs can bc laid down.
Finally, it happcns somctimcs that an army succccds in scizing thc cncmys
linc ol rctrcat bclorc ghting a battlc, as Napolcon did at Marcngo, Ulm, and
Jcna. Tc dccisivc point having in such casc bccn sccurcd by skilllul marchcs
bclorc ghting, it only rcmains to prcvcnt thc cncmy lrom lorcing his way
through your linc. You can do nothing bcttcr than ght a parallcl battlc, as
thcrc is no rcason lor mancuvcring against onc wing morc than thc othcr.
8ut lor thc cncmy who is thus cut o thc casc is vcry dicrcnt. Hc should
ccrtainly strikc most hcavily in thc dircction ol that wing whcrc hc can hopc
most spccdily to rcgain his propcr linc ol rctrcat, and il hc throws thc mass ol
his lorccs thcrc, hc may savc at lcast a largc portion ol thcm. All that hc has
to do is to dctcrminc whcthcr this dccisivc cort shall bc toward thc right or
thc lclt.
!t is propcr lor mc to rcmark that thc passagc ol a grcat rivcr in thc prcscncc
ol a hostilc army is somctimcs an cxccptional casc to which thc gcncral rulcs
will not apply. !n thcsc opcrations, which arc ol an cxcccdingly dclicatc
charactcr, thc csscntial thing is to kccp thc bridgcs salc. !l, altcr cccting
thc passagc, a gcncral should throw thc mass ol his lorccs toward thc right or
thc lclt with a vicw ol taking posscssion ol somc dccisivc point, or ol driving
his cncmy back upon thc rivcr, whilst thc lattcr was collccting all his lorccs
in anothcr dircction to scizc thc bridgcs, thc lormcr army might bc in a vcry
critical condition in casc ol a rcvcrsc bclalling it. Tc battlc ol Vagram is
an cxccllcnt cxamplc in point,as good, indccd, as could bc dcsircd. ! havc
trcatcd this subjcct in Articlc XXX\!!., (pagcs aa and lollowing.)
A military man who clcarly pcrccivcs thc importancc ol thc truths that havc
bccn statcd will succccd in acquiring a rapid and accuratc coup-doeil. !t will
bc admittcd, morcovcr, that a gcncral who cstimatcs thcm at thcir truc valuc,
and accustoms himscll to thcir usc, cithcr in rcading military history, or in
hypothctical cascs on maps, will scldom bc in doubt, in rcal campaigns, what
a
hc ought to do, and cvcn whcn his cncmy attcmpts suddcn and uncxpcctcd
movcmcnts, hc will always bc rcady with suitablc mcasurcs lor countcracting
thcm, by constantly bcaring in mind thc lcw simplc lundamcntal principlcs
which should rcgulatc all thc opcrations ol war.
Hcavcn lorbid that ! should prctcnd to lcsscn thc dignity ol thc sublimc
art ol war by rcducing it to such simplc clcmcnts! ! apprcciatc thoroughly
thc dicrcncc bctwccn thc dirccting principlcs ol combinations arrangcd
in thc quict ol thc closct, and that spccial talcnt which is indispcnsablc to
thc individual who has, amidst thc noisc and conlusion ol battlc, to kccp a
hundrcd thousand mcn coopcrating toward thc attainmcnt ol onc singlc
objcct. ! know wcll what should bc thc charactcr and talcnts ol thc gcncral
who has to makc such masscs movc as onc man, to cngagc thcm at thc propcr
point simultancously and at thc propcr momcnt, to kccp thcm supplicd with
arms, provisions, clothing, and munitions. Still, although this spccial talcnt,
to which ! havc rclcrrcd, is indispcnsablc, it must bc grantcd that thc ability
to givc wisc dircction to masscs upon thc bcst stratcgic points ol a thcatcr ol
opcrations is thc most sublimc charactcristic ol a grcat captain. How many
bravc armics, undcr thc command ol lcadcrs who wcrc also bravc and posscsscd
cxccutivc ability, havc lost not only battlcs, but cvcn cmpircs, bccausc thcy
wcrc movcd imprudcntly in onc dircction whcn thcy should havc gonc in thc
othcr! Numcrous cxamplcs might bc mcntioncd, but ! will rclcr only to Ligny,
Vatcrloo, 8autzcn, cnncwitz, Lcuthcn.
! will say no morc, lor ! could only rcpcat what has alrcady bccn said.
To rclicvc myscll in advancc ol thc blamc which will bc ascribcd to mc lor
attaching too much importancc to thc application ol thc lcw maxims laid
down in my writings, ! will rcpcat what ! was thc rst to announcc: that
war is not an exact science, but a drama full of passion, that thc moral qualitics,
thc talcnts, thc cxccutivc lorcsight and ability, thc grcatncss ol charactcr, ol
thc lcadcrs, and thc impulscs, sympathics, and passions ol thc masscs, havc
a grcat inucncc upon it. ! may bc pcrmittcd also, altcr having writtcn thc
dctailcd history ol thirty campaigns and assistcd in pcrson in twclvc ol thc
most cclcbratcd ol thcm, to dcclarc that ! havc not lound a singlc casc whcrc
thcsc principlcs, corrcctly applicd, did not lcad to succcss.
As to thc spccial cxccutivc ability and thc wcllbalanccd pcnctrating mind
which distinguish thc practical man lrom thc onc who knows only what othcrs
tcach him, ! conlcss that no book can introducc thosc things into a hcad whcrc
thc gcrm docs not prcviously cxist by naturc. ! havc sccn many gcncrals
marshals, cvcnattain a ccrtain dcgrcc ol rcputation by talking largcly ol
principlcs which thcy conccivcd incorrcctly in thcory and could not apply at
all. ! havc sccn thcsc mcn intrustcd with thc suprcmc command ol armics,
and makc thc most cxtravagant plans, bccausc thcy wcrc totally dccicnt in
good judgmcnt and wcrc llcd with inordinatc scllconccit. My works arc
not intcndcd lor such misguidcd pcrsons as thcsc, but my dcsirc has bccn to
lacilitatc thc study ol thc art ol war lor carclul, inquiring minds, by pointing
a6
out dirccting principlcs. Taking this vicw, ! claim crcdit lor having rcndcrcd
valuablc scrvicc to thosc occrs who arc rcally dcsirous ol gaining distinction
in thc prolcssion ol arms.
Finally, ! will concludc this short summary with onc last truth:
Tc rst ol all thc rcquisitcs lor a mans succcss as a lcadcr is, that hc bc
pcrlcctly bravc. Vhcn a gcncral is animatcd by a truly martial spirit and can
communicatc it to his soldicrs, hc may commit laults, but hc will gain victorics
and sccurc dcscrvcd laurcls.
a,
SECOND APPENDIX
TO THE
ON THE FORMATION OF TROOPS FOR BATTLE
H
appcning to bc in Paris, ncar thc cnd ol .., a distinguishcd pcrson did
mc thc honor to ask my opinion as to whcthcr rcccnt improvcmcnts in
rcarms would causc any grcat modications in thc manncr ol making war.
! rcplicd that thcy would probably havc an inucncc upon thc dctails ol
tactics, but that, in grcat stratcgic opcrations and thc grand combinations ol
battlcs, victory would, now as cvcr, rcsult lrom thc application ol thc principlcs
which had lcd to thc succcss ol grcat gcncrals in all agcs,ol Alcxandcr and
Cacsar as wcll as ol Frcdcrick and Napolcon. My illustrious intcrlocutor
sccmcd to bc complctcly ol my opinion.
Tc hcroic cvcnts which havc rcccntly occurrcd ncar Scbastopol havc not
produccd thc slightcst changc in my opinion. Tis gigantic contcst bctwccn
two vast intrcnchcd camps, occupicd by cntirc armics and mounting two
thousand guns ol thc largcst calibcr, is an cvcnt without prcccdcnt, which will
havc no cqual in thc luturc, lor thc circumstanccs which produccd it cannot
occur again.
Morcovcr, this contcst ol cannon with ramparts, bcaring no rcscmblancc to
rcgular pitchcd battlcs lought in thc ccntcr ol a contincnt, cannot inucncc in
any rcspcct thc grcat combinations ol war, nor cvcn thc tactics ol battlcs.
Tc bloody battlcs ol thc Alma and !nkcrmann, by giving cvidcncc ol thc
murdcrous ccct ol thc ncw rcarms, naturally lcd mc to invcstigatc thc
changcs which it might bc ncccssary to makc on this account in thc tactics
lor inlantry.
! shall cndcavor to lulll this task in a lcw words, in ordcr to complctc what
was publishcd on this point twcnty ycars ago in thc Summary ol thc Art ol
Var.
a
Tc important qucstion ol thc inucncc ol muskctryrc in battlcs is not
ncw: it datcs lrom thc rcign ol Frcdcrick thc Grcat, and particularly lrom
thc battlc ol Mollwitz, which hc gaincd (it was said) bccausc his inlantry
soldicrs, by thc usc ol cylindrical rammcrs in loading thcir muskcts, wcrc ablc
to rc thrcc shots pcr minutc morc than thcir cncmics.
|!|
Tc discussion which
arosc at this cpoch bctwccn thc partisans ol thc shallow and dccp ordcrs ol
lormation lor troops is known to all military studcnts.
Tc systcm ol dcploycd lincs in thrcc ranks was adoptcd lor thc inlantry, thc
cavalry, lormcd in two ranks, and in thc ordcr ol battlc, was dcploycd upon
thc wings, or a part was hcld in rcscrvc.
Tc cclcbratcd rcgulation lor mancuvcrs ol .,. xcd thc dcploycd as thc
only ordcr lor battlc: it sccmcd to admit thc usc ol battalioncolumns doublcd
on thc ccntcr only in partial combats,such as an attack upon an isolatcd post,
a villagc, a lorcst, or small intrcnchmcnts.
|!!|
Tc insucicnt instruction in mancuvcrs ol thc troops ol thc Rcpublic
lorccd thc gcncrals, who wcrc poor tacticians, to cmploy in battlc thc systcm
ol columns supportcd by numcrous skirmishcrs. 8csidcs this, thc naturc ol
thc countrics which lormcd thc thcatcrs ol opcrationsthc \osgcs, Alps,
Pyrcnccs, and thc dicult country ol La \cndccrcndcrcd this thc only
appropriatc systcm. How would it havc bccn possiblc to attack thc camps ol
Saorgio, Figucras, and MontCcnis with dcploycd rcgimcnts:
!n Napolcons timc, thc Frcnch gcncrally uscd thc systcm ol columns, as
thcy wcrc ncarly always thc assailants.
!n .c,, ! publishcd, at Glogau in Silcsia, a small pamphlct with thc titlc ol
Summary ol thc Gcncral Principlcs ol thc Art ol Var, in which ! proposcd
to admit lor thc attack thc systcm ol lincs lormcd ol columns ol battalions
by divisions ol two companics, in othcr words, to march to thc attack in
lincs ol battalions closcd in mass or at halldistancc, prcccdcd by numcrous
skirmishcrs, and thc columns bcing scparatcd by intcrvals that may vary
bctwccn that ncccssary lor thc dcploymcnt ol a battalion and thc minimum ol
thc lront ol onc column.
Vhat ! had rcccntly sccn in thc campaigns ol Ulm, Austcrlitz, Jcna, and
ylau had convinccd mc ol thc diculty, il not thc impossibility, ol marching
an army in dcploycd lincs in cithcr two or thrcc ranks, to attack an cncmy in
position. !t was this conviction which lcd mc to publish thc pamphlct abovc
!
!t is probablc that 8aron Jomini hcrc rclcrs to iron, instcad ol cylindrical, ramrods. 8clorc .,c,
all uropcan troops uscd woodcn ramrods, and thc crcdit ol thc invcntion ol iron oncs is attributcd by somc
to thc Princc ol Anhalt, and by othcrs to Princc Lcopold ol cssau. Tc Prussians wcrc thc rst to adopt
thc iron ramrod, and at thc datc ol thc battlc ol Mollwitz (.,.) it had not bccn introduccd into thc Austrian
scrvicc.
Frcdcrick did not adopt thc cylindrical ramrod till .,,,, thirtysix ycars altcr thc battlc ol Mollwitz. Tc
advantagc ol thc cylindrical ramrod consistcd in this,that thc soldicr in loading savcd thc timc ncccssary to
turn thc ramrod, but obviously this small cconomy ol timc could ncvcr havc cnablcd him to load thrcc timcs
whilc thc cncmy loadcd oncc,all othcr things bcing cqual.Translators.
!!
Columns by battalions closcd in mass sccmcd only to bc intcndcd to usc in long columns on thc
march, to kccp thcm closcd, in ordcr to lacilitatc thcir dcploymcnt.
a
Sccond Appcndix to thc Summary ol thc Art ol Var
on thc Formation ol Troops lor 8attlc
rclcrrcd to. Tis work attractcd somc attcntion, not only on account ol thc
trcatisc on stratcgy, but also on account ol what was said on tactics.
Tc succcsscs gaincd by Vcllington in Spain and at Vatcrloo with troops
dcploycd in lincs ol two ranks wcrc gcncrally attributcd to thc murdcrous
ccct ol thc inlantryrc, and crcatcd doubt in somc minds as to thc propricty
ol thc usc ol small columns, but it was not till altcr .. that thc controvcrsics
on thc bcst lormation lor battlc worc rcncwcd by thc appcarancc ol a pamphlct
by thc Marquis ol Chambray.
!n thcsc discussions, ! rcmarkcd thc latal tcndcncy ol thc clcarcst minds to
rcducc cvcry systcm ol war to absolutc lorms, and to cast in thc samc mold
all thc tactical combinations a gcncral may arrangc, without taking into
considcration localitics, moral circumstanccs, national charactcristics, or thc
abilitics ol thc commandcrs. ! had proposcd to usc lincs ol small columns,
cspccially in thc attack: ! ncvcr intcndcd to makc it an cxclusivc systcm,
particularly lor thc dclcnsc.
! had two opportunitics ol bcing convinccd that this lormation was approvcd
ol by thc grcatcst gcncrals ol our timcs. Tc rst was at thc Congrcss ol \icnna,
in thc lattcr part ol ..: thc Archdukc Charlcs obscrvcd that hc was undcr
grcat obligations lor thc summary ! had publishcd in .c,, which Gcncral
Valmodcn had brought to him in .c lrom Silcsia. At thc bcginning ol
thc war ol .c, thc princc had not thought it possiblc to apply thc lormation
which ! had proposcd, but at thc battlc ol ssling thc contractcd spacc ol thc
cld induccd him to lorm a part ol his army in columns by battalions, (thc
landwchr particularly,) and thcy rcsistcd admirably thc lurious chargcs ol thc
cuirassicrs ol Gcncral dspagnc, which, in thc opinion ol thc archdukc, thcy
could not havc donc il thcy had bccn dcploycd.
At thc battlc ol Vagram, thc grcatcr part ol thc Austrian linc was lormcd in
thc samc way as at ssling, and altcr two days ol tcrriblc ghting thc archdukc
abandoncd thc cld ol battlc, not bccausc his army was badly bcatcn, but
bccausc his lclt was outankcd and thrown back so as to cndangcr his linc ol
rctrcat on Hungary. Tc princc was satiscd that thc rm bcaring ol his troops
was in part duc to this mixturc ol small columns with dcploycd battalions.
Tc sccond witncss is Vcllington, although his cvidcncc is, apparcntly, not
so conclusivc. Having bccn prcscntcd to him at thc Congrcss ol \crona in
.a, ! had occasion to spcak to him on thc subjcct ol thc controvcrsics to
which his systcm ol lormation lor battlc (a systcm to which a grcat part ol
his succcss had bccn attributcd) had givcn risc. Hc rcmarkcd that hc was
convinccd thc manncr ol thc attack ol thc Frcnch upon him, in columns morc
or lcss dccp, was vcry dangcrous against a solid, wcllarmcd inlantry having
condcncc in its rc and wcll supportcd by artillcry and cavalry. ! obscrvcd to
thc dukc that thcsc dccp columns wcrc vcry dicrcnt lrom thc small columns
which ! proposcd,a lormation which insurcs in thc attack stcadincss, lorcc,
and mobility, whilc dccp masscs aord no grcatcr mobility and lorcc than a
dcploycd linc, and arc vcry much morc cxposcd to thc ravagcs ol artillcry.
a6c
! askcd thc illustrious gcncral il at Vatcrloo hc had not lormcd thc
Hanovcrian, 8runswick, and 8clgian troops in columns by battalions. Hc
answcrcd, Ycs, bccausc ! could not dcpcnd upon thcm so wcll as upon thc
nglish. ! rcplicd that this admission provcd that hc thought a linc lormcd
ol columns by battalions was morc rm than long dcploycd lincs. Hc rcplicd,
Tcy arc ccrtainly good, also, but thcir usc always dcpcnds upon thc localitics
and thc spirit ol thc troops. A gcncral cannot act in thc samc manncr undcr
all circumstanccs.
To this illustrious cvidcncc ! might add that Napolcon himscll, in thc
campaign ol .., prcscribcd lor thc attack thc lormation ol thc inlantry in
columns by divisions ol two companics in two ranks, as thc most suitablc,
which was idcntically what ! had proposcd in .c,.
Tc ukc ol Vcllington also admittcd that thc Frcnch columns at Vatcrloo,
particularly thosc ol thcir right wing, wcrc not small columns ol battalions,
but cnormous masscs, much morc unwicldy and much dccpcr.
!l wc can bclicvc thc Prussian accounts and plans ol thc battlc, it would sccm
that Ncys lour divisions wcrc lormcd in but lour columns, at lcast in thcir
march to thc attack ol La Hayc Saintc and thc linc cxtcnding lrom this larm
to thc Papclottc. ! was not prcscnt, but scvcral occrs havc assurcd mc that at
onc timc thc troops wcrc lormcd in columns by divisions ol two brigadcs cach,
thc battalions bcing dcploycd bchind cach othcr at six paccs intcrval.
Tis circumstancc dcmonstratcs how much is wanting in thc military tcrms
ol thc Frcnch. Vc givc thc samc namc ol division to masscs ol lour rcgimcnts
and to lractions ol a battalion ol two companics cach, which is absurd. Lct
us supposc, lor cxamplc, that Napolcon had dircctcd on thc .th ol Junc, ..,
thc lormation ol thc linc in columns by divisions and by battalions, intcnding
that thc rcgulation ol .. should bc lollowcd. His licutcnants might naturally
havc undcrstood it vcry dicrcntly, and, according to thcir intcrprctation ol
thc ordcr, would havc cxccutcd onc ol thc lollowing lormations:
.. ithcr thc lour divisions ol thc right wing would havc bccn lormcd in lour
largc masscs, cach onc ol cight or twclvc battalions, (according to thc strcngth
ol thc rcgimcnts,) as is indicatcd in this gurc lor cight battalions.
|!|
!
Vc supposc cach rcgimcnt to consist ol two battalions: il thcrc should bc thrcc in cach rcgimcnt,
thc dccp column would thcn consist ol twclvc lincs ol cithcr twcntylour or thirtysix ranks, whilc in thc ncxt
gurc thcrc would bc twclvc battalions on thc linc instcad ol cight, thc dcpth not bcing incrcascd.
a6.
a. r cach division would havc bccn lormcd in cight or twclvc columns ol
battalions by divisions ol two platoons or companics, according to thc systcm
! havc proposcd, as in this gurc, viz.:
! do not mcan to asscrt positivcly that this conlusion ol words lcd to thc
dccp masscs at Vatcrloo, but it might havc donc so, and it is important that
in cvcry languagc thcrc should bc two dicrcnt tcrms to cxprcss two such
dicrcnt things as a division ol twclvc battalions and a division ol a quartcr ol
a battalion.
Struck with what prcccdcs, ! thought it propcr to modily my Summary
alrcady rclcrrcd to, which was too concisc, and in my rcvision ol it ! dcvotcd a
chaptcr to thc discussion ol thc advantagcs and disadvantagcs ol thc dicrcnt
lormations lor battlc. ! also addcd somc considcrations rclativc to a mixcd
systcm uscd at ylau by Gcncral 8cnningscn, which consistcd in lorming a
rcgimcnt ol thrcc battalions by dcploying thc ccntral onc, thc othcr two bcing
in column on thc wings.
Altcr thcsc discussions, ! drcw thc conclusions:
.. Tat Vcllingtons systcm was ccrtainly good lor thc dclcnsivc.
a. Tat thc systcm ol 8cnningscn might, according to circumstanccs, bc
as good lor thc ocnsivc as lor thc dclcnsivc, sincc it was succcsslully
uscd by Napolcon at thc passagc ol thc Tagliamcnto.
. Tat thc most skilllul tactician would cxpcricncc grcat diculty in
marching lorty or lty dcploycd battalions in two or thrcc ranks ovcr an
intcrval ol twclvc or ltccn hundrcd yards, prcscrving sucicnt ordcr to
attack an cncmy in position with any chancc ol succcss, thc lront all thc
whilc bcing playcd upon by artillcry and muskctry.
! havc ncvcr sccn any thing ol thc kind in my cxpcricncc. ! rcgard it as
impossiblc, and am convinccd that such a linc could not advancc to thc attack
in sucicntly good ordcr to havc thc lorcc ncccssary lor succcss.
Napolcon was in thc habit ol addrcssing his marshals in thcsc tcrms:Takc
your troops up in good ordcr, and makc a vigorous assault upon thc cncmy.
! ask, what mcans is thcrc ol carrying up to thc assault ol an cncmy lorty or
lty dcploycd battalions as a wholc in good ordcr: Tcy will rcach thc cncmy
a6a
in dctachmcnts disconncctcd lrom cach othcr, and thc commandcr cannot
cxcrcisc any control ovcr thc mass as a wholc.
! saw nothing ol this kind cithcr at Ulm, Jcna, ylau, 8autzcn, rcsdcn,
Culm, or Lcipsic, ncithcr did it occur at Austcrlitz, Fricdland, Katzbach, or
cnncwitz.
! am not awarc that Vcllington, in any ol his battlcs, cvcr marchcd in
dcploycd lincs to thc attack ol an cncmy in position. Hc gcncrally awaitcd thc
attack. At \ittoria and Toulousc hc gaincd thc victory by mancuvcrs against
thc anks, and at Toulousc Soults right wing was bcatcn whilc dcsccnding thc
hcights to attack. vcn at Vatcrloo, what latc would havc bclallcn thc nglish
army il, lcaving thc platcau ol Mont SaintJcan, it had marchcd in dcploycd
ordcr to attack Napolcon in position on thc hcights ol La 8cllc Alliancc:
! will bc pardoncd lor thcsc rccapitulations, as thcy sccm to bc ncccssary to
thc solution ol a qucstion which has ariscn sincc my Summary ol thc Art ol
Var was writtcn.
Somc Gcrman gcncrals, rccognizing lully thc advantagcs dcrivcd in ..
lrom thc systcm ol columns ol battalions, havc cndcavorcd to add to its valuc
by dividing up thc columns and incrcasing thcir numbcr, so as to makc thcm
morc shallow and to lacilitatc thcir dcploymcnt. Vith this vicw, thcy proposc,
instcad ol lorming lour divisions or companics onc bchind thc othcr, to placc
thcm bcsidc cach othcr, not dcploycd, but in small columns. Tat is, il thc
battalion consists ol lour companics ol two hundrcd and lorty mcn cach, cach
company is to bc dividcd into lour scctions ol sixty cach: onc ol thcsc scctions
will bc dispcrscd as skirmishcrs, and thc othcr thrcc, in two ranks, will lorm a
small column, so that thc battalion, instcad ol lorming onc column, will lorm
lour, and thc rcgimcnt ol thrcc battalions will lorm twclvc small columns
instcad ol thrcc
!t is ccrtain that it would bc casicr to march such a linc against thc cncmy
than il dcploycd, but thcsc diminutivc columns ol sixty skirmishcrs and onc
hundrcd and cighty mcn in thc ranks would ncvcr prcscnt thc samc ordcr
and solidity as a singlc column ol a battalion. Still as thc systcm has somc
advantagcs, it dcscrvcs a trial, and, indccd, it has alrcady bccn practiccd in
Prussia and Austria.
Tc samc lormation applics cqually to battalions ol six or cight companics.
!n this casc thc battalion would not bc lormcd by companics, but by divisions
ol two companics,that is, in thrcc or lour columns, according to thc numbcr
ol companics.
a6
Two scrious inconvcnicnccs appcar to mc to attach to cach ol thcsc lormations.
!l vigorously chargcd by cavalry, thcsc small subdivisions would bc in grcat
dangcr, and cvcn in attacking thc cncmys linc, il drivcn back and pursucd,
disordcr would bc morc likcly to occur than in thc columns ol battalions. Still,
cithcr ol thcm may bc cmploycd, according to circumstanccs, localitics, and
thc morale ol thc troops. xpcricncc alonc can assign to cach its propcr valuc.
! am not awarc whcthcr thc Austrians applicd thcsc columns ol companics at
Custozza and Novara, or whcthcr thcsc mancuvcrs havc only bccn practiccd
in thcir camps ol instruction.
8c that as it may, thcrc is anothcr not lcss important qucstion to bc
considcrcd:
Vill thc adoption ol thc ricd smallarms and improvcd balls bring about
any important changcs in thc lormation lor battlc and thc now rccognizcd
principlcs ol tactics:
!l thcsc arms aidcd thc allics at thc Alma and !nkcrmann, it was bccausc thc
Russians wcrc not providcd with thcm, and it must not bc lorgottcn that in a
ycar or two all armics will alikc bc lurnishcd with thcm, so that in luturc thc
advantagc will not bc conncd to onc sidc.
Vhat changc will it makc in tactics:
Vill wholc armics bc dcploycd as skirmishcrs, or will it not still bc ncccssary
to prcscrvc cithcr thc lormation ol lincs dcploycd in two or thrcc ranks, or
lincs ol battalions in columns:
Vill battlcs bccomc mcrc ducls with thc ric, whcrc thc partics will rc
upon cach othcr, without mancuvcring, until onc or thc othcr shall rctrcat or
bc dcstroycd:
Vhat military man will rcply in thc armativc:
!t lollows, thcrclorc, that, to dccidc battlcs, mancuvcrs arc ncccssary, and
victory will lall to thc gcncral who mancuvcrs most skilllully, and hc cannot
mancuvcr cxccpt with dcploycd lincs or lincs ol columns ol battalions, cithcr
wholc or subdividcd into columns ol onc or two companics. To attcmpt to
prcscribc by rcgulation undcr what circumstanccs cithcr ol thcsc systcms is to
bc applicd would bc absurd.
!l a gcncral and an army can bc lound such that hc can march upon thc
cncmy in a dcploycd linc ol lorty or lty battalions, thcn lct thc shallow ordcr
bc adoptcd, and thc lormation in columns bc conncd to thc attack ol isolatcd
posts, but ! lrccly conlcss that ! would ncvcr acccpt thc command ol an army
undcr this condition. Tc only point lor a rcgulation lor thc lormation lor
battlc is to lorbid thc usc ol vcry dccp columns, bccausc thcy arc hcavy, and
dicult to movc and to kccp in ordcr. 8csidcs, thcy arc so much cxposcd to
artillcry that thcir dcstruction sccms incvitablc, and thcir grcat dcpth docs not
incrcasc in any rcspcct thcir chanccs ol succcss.
!l thc organization ol an army wcrc lclt to mc, ! would adopt lor inlantry
thc lormation in two ranks, and a rcgimcntal organization according with thc
a6
lormation lor battlc. ! would thcn makc cach rcgimcnt ol inlantry to consist
ol thrcc battalions and a dcpot. ach battalion should consist ol six companics,
so that whcn in column by division thc dcpth would bc thrcc divisions or six
ranks.
Tis lormation sccms most rcasonablc, whcthcr it is dcsircd to lorm thc
battalion in columns ol attack by divisions on thc ccntcr ol cach battalion, or
on any othcr division.
Tc columns ol attack, sincc thc dcpth is only six ranks, would not bc so
much cxposcd to thc rc ol artillcry, but would still havc thc mobility ncccssary
to takc thc troops up in good ordcr and launch thcm upon thc cncmy with
grcat lorcc. Tc dcploymcnt ol thcsc small columns could bc cxccutcd with
grcat casc and promptitudc, and lor thc lorming ol a squarc a column ol thrcc
divisions in dcpth would bc prclcrablc in scvcral rcspccts to onc ol lour or six
divisions.
!n thc Russian scrvicc cach battalion consists ol lour companics ol two
hundrcd and lty mcn cach, cach company bcing as strong as a division in
thc Frcnch organization. Tc mancuvcr ol doublc column on thc ccntcr is not
practicablc, sincc thc ccntcr is hcrc mcrcly an intcrval scparating thc sccond
and third companics. Hcncc thc column must bc simplc, not on thc ccntcr,
but on onc ol thc lour companics. Somcthing analogous to thc doublc column
on thc ccntcr would bc attaincd by lorming thc rst and lourth companics
bchind thc sccond and third rcspcctivcly, but thcn thc lormation would bc in
two lincs rathcr than in column, and this is thc rcason why ! would prclcr thc
organization ol thc battalion in six companics or thrcc divisions.
8y dividing cach ol thc lour companics into two platoons, making cight in
all, thc lormation ol double column on the center might bc madc on thc lourth
and lth platoons as thc lcading division, but thcn cach division would bc
composcd ol two platoons bclonging to dicrcnt companics, so that cach
captain would havc hall ol thc mcn ol his company undcr thc command ol
anothcr occr, and hall ol his own division would bc madc up ol anothcr
company.
Such an arrangcmcnt in thc attack would bc vcry inconvcnicnt, lor, as
thc captain is thc rcal commandcr, lathcr, and judgc ol thc mcn ol his own
company, hc can always obtain morc lrom thcm in thc way ol duty than any
strangcr. !n addition, il thc doublc column should mcct with a dccidcd rcpulsc,
and it should bc ncccssary to rclorm it in linc, it would bc dicult to prcvcnt
disordcr, thc platoons bcing obligcd to run lrom onc sidc to thc othcr to nd
thcir companics. !n thc Frcnch systcm, whcrc cach battalion consists ol cight
companics, lorming as many platoons at drill, this objcction docs not cxist,
sincc cach company is conductcd by its own captain. !t is truc that thcrc
will bc two captains ol companics in cach division, but this will bc rathcr
an advantagc than thc rcvcrsc, sincc thcrc will bc a rivalry and cmulation
bctwccn thc two captains and thcir mcn, which will lcad to grcatcr display
a6
ol bravcry: bcsidcs, il ncccssary, thc scnior captain is thcrc, to command thc
division as a wholc.
!t is timc to lcavc thcsc sccondary dctails and rcturn to thc important
qucstion at issuc.
Sincc ! havc alludcd to thc systcm adoptcd by Vcllington, it is propcr to
cxplain it so that it can bc cstimatcd at its truc valuc in thc light ol historical
cvcnts.
!n Spain and Portugal, particularly, Vcllington had undcr his command
a mass ol troops ol thc country, in which hc placcd but littlc condcncc in
rcgular lormation in a pitchcd battlc, on account ol thcir want ol instruction
and disciplinc, but which wcrc animatcd by a livcly hatrcd ol thc Frcnch and
lormcd bodics ol skirmishcrs usclul in harassing thc cncmy. Having lcarncd
by cxpcricncc thc cccts ol thc lury and impctuosity ol thc Frcnch columns
whcn lcd by such mcn as Masscna and Ncy, Vcllington dccidcd upon wisc
mcans ol wcakcning this impctuosity and altcrward sccuring a triumph ovcr
it. Hc chosc positions dicult to approach, and covcrcd all thcir avcnucs
by swarms ol Spanish and Portugucsc ricmcn, who wcrc skillcd in taking
advantagc ol thc incqualitics ol thc ground, hc placcd a part ol his artillcry
on thc tactical crcst ol his position, and a part morc to thc rcar, and riddlcd
thc advancing columns with a murdcrous artillcry and muskctry rc, whilc
his cxccllcnt nglish inlantry, shcltcrcd lrom thc rc, wcrc postcd a hundrcd
paccs in rcar ol thc crcst, to await thc arrival ol thcsc columns, and whcn thc
lattcr appcarcd on thc summit, wcaricd, out ol brcath, dccimatcd in numbcrs,
thcy wcrc rcccivcd with a gcncral dischargc ol artillcry and muskctry and
immcdiatcly chargcd by thc inlantry with thc bayonct.
Tis systcm, which was pcrlcctly rational and particularly applicablc to
Spain and Portugal, sincc hc had thcrc grcat numbcrs ol this kind ol troops
and thcrc was a grcat dcal ol rough ground upon which thcy could bc usclul
as marksmcn, nccdcd somc modications to makc it applicablc to 8clgium.
At Vatcrloo thc dukc took his position on a platcau with a gcntlc slopc likc a
glacis, whcrc his artillcry had a magniccnt cld ol rc, and whcrc it produccd
a tcrriblc ccct: both anks ol this platcau wcrc wcll protcctcd. Vcllington,
lrom thc crcst ol thc platcau, could discovcr thc slightcst movcmcnt in thc
Frcnch army, whilc his own wcrc hiddcn, but, ncvcrthclcss, his systcm would
not havc prcvcntcd his losing thc battlc il a numbcr ol othcr circumstanccs
had not comc to his aid.
vcry onc knows morc or lcss corrcctly thc cvcnts ol this tcrriblc battlc,
which ! havc clscwhcrc impartially dcscribcd. ! dcmonstratcd that its rcsult
was duc ncithcr to thc muskctryrc nor to thc usc ol dcploycd lincs by thc
nglish, but to thc lollowing accidcntal causcs, viz.:
a66
.. To thc mud, which rcndcrcd thc progrcss ol thc Frcnch in thc attack
painlul and slow, and causcd thcir rst attacks to bc lcss ccctivc, and
prcvcntcd thcir bcing propcrly sustaincd by thc artillcry.
a. To thc original lormation ol vcry dccp columns on thc part ol thc
Frcnch, principally on thc right wing.
. To thc want ol unity in thc cmploymcnt ol thc thrcc arms: thc inlantry
and cavalry madc a numbcr ol chargcs altcrnating with cach othcr, but
thcy wcrc in no casc simultancous.
. Finally and chicy, to thc uncxpcctcd arrival ol thc wholc Prussian
army at thc dccisivc momcnt on thc right ank, il not thc rcar, ol thc
Frcnch.
vcry cxpcricnccd military man will agrcc that, in spitc ol thc mud and thc
rmncss ol thc nglish inlantry, il thc mass ol thc Frcnch inlantry had bccn
thrown on thc nglish in columns ol battalions immcdiatcly altcr thc grcat
chargc ol cavalry, thc combincd army would havc bccn brokcn and lorccd
back on Antwcrp. !ndcpcndcntly ol this, il thc Prussians had not arrivcd, thc
nglish would havc bccn compcllcd to rctrcat, and ! maintain that this battlc
cannot justly bc citcd as prool ol thc supcriority ol muskctryrc ovcr wcll
dircctcd attacks in columns.
From all thcsc discussions wc may draw thc lollowing conclusions, viz.:
.. Tat thc improvcmcnts in rcarms will not introducc any important
changc in thc manncr ol taking troops into battlc, but that it would
bc usclul to introducc into thc tactics ol inlantry thc lormation ol
columns by companics, and to havc a numcrous body ol good ricmcn
or skirmishcrs, and to cxcrcisc thc troops considcrably in ring. Tosc
armics which havc wholc rcgimcnts ol light inlantry may distributc thcm
through thc dicrcnt brigadcs, but it would bc prclcrablc to dctail sharp
shootcrs altcrnatcly in cach company as thcy arc nccdcd, which would
bc practicablc whcn thc troops arc accustomcd to ring: by this plan thc
lightinlantry rcgimcnts could bc cmploycd in thc linc with thc othcrs,
and should thc numbcr ol sharpshootcrs takcn lrom thc companics bc
at any timc insucicnt, thcy could bc rcinlorccd by a battalion ol light
inlantry to cach division.
a. Tat il Vcllingtons systcm ol dcploycd lincs and muskctryrc bc
cxccllcnt lor thc dclcnsc, it would bc dicult cvcr to cmploy it in an
attack upon an cncmy in position.
. Tat, in spitc ol thc improvcmcnts ol rcarms, two armics in a battlc
will not pass thc day in ring at cach othcr lrom a distancc: it will always
bc ncccssary lor onc ol thcm to advancc to thc attack ol thc othcr.
. Tat, as this advancc is ncccssary, succcss will dcpcnd, as lormcrly,
upon thc most skilllul mancuvcring according to thc principlcs ol grand
tactics, which consist in this, viz.: in knowing how to dircct thc grcat
a6,
SKETCH OF THE PRINCIPAL MARITIME EXPEDITIONS
I
havc thought it propcr to givc hcrc an account ol thc principal maritimc
cxpcditions, to bc takcn in conncction with maxims on dcsccnts.
Tc naval lorccs ol gypt, Phocnicia, and Rhodcs arc thc carlicst mcntioncd
in history, and ol thcm thc account is conluscd. Tc Pcrsians conqucrcd thcsc
nations, as wcll as Asia Minor, and bccamc thc most lormidablc powcr on
both land and sca.
About thc samc timc thc Carthaginians, who wcrc mastcrs ol thc coast
ol Mauritania, bcing invitcd by thc inhabitants ol Cadiz, passcd thc straits,
colonizcd 8octica and took posscssion ol thc 8alcaric !slcs and Sardinia, and
nally madc a dcsccnt on Sicily.
Tc Grccks contcndcd against thc Pcrsians with a succcss that could not
havc bccn cxpcctcd,although no country was cvcr morc lavorably situatcd
lor a naval powcr than Grcccc, with hcr lty islands and hcr grcat cxtcnt ol
coast.
Tc mcrchant marinc ol Athcns produccd hcr prospcrity, and gavc hcr thc
naval powcr to which Grcccc was indcbtcd lor hcr indcpcndcncc. Hcr ccts,
unitcd with thosc ol thc islands, wcrc, undcr Tcmistoclcs, thc tcrror ol thc
Pcrsians and thc rulcrs ol thc ast. Tcy ncvcr madc grand dcsccnts, bccausc
thcir landlorccs wcrc not in proportion to thcir naval strcngth. Had Grcccc
bccn a unitcd govcrnmcnt instcad ol a conlcdcration ol rcpublics, and had
thc navics ol Athcns, Syracusc, Corinth, and Sparta bccn combincd instcad
ol ghting among cach othcr, it is probablc that thc Grccks would havc
conqucrcd thc world bclorc thc Romans.
!l wc can bclicvc thc cxaggcratcd traditions ol thc old Grcck historians,
thc lamous army ol Xcrxcs had not lcss than lour thousand vcsscls, and this
numbcr is astonishing, cvcn whcn wc rcad thc account ol thcm by Hcrodotus. !t
is morc dicult to bclicvc that at thc samc timc, and by a conccrtcd movcmcnt,
a6
vc thousand othcr vcsscls landcd thrcc hundrcd thousand Carthaginians
in Sicily, whcrc thcy wcrc totally dclcatcd by Gclon on thc samc day that
Tcmistoclcs dcstroycd thc cct ol Xcrxcs at Salamis. Trcc othcr cxpcditions,
undcr Hannibal, !milcon, and Hamilcar, carricd into Sicily lrom onc hundrcd
to onc hundrcd and lty thousand mcn: Agrigcntum and Palcrmo wcrc
takcn, Lilybacum was loundcd, and Syracusc bcsicgcd twicc. Tc third timc
Androclcs, with ltccn thousand mcn, landcd in Alrica, and madc Carthagc
trcmblc. Tis contcst lastcd onc ycar and a hall.
Alcxandcr thc Grcat crosscd thc Hcllcspont with only lty thousand mcn:
his naval lorcc was only onc hundrcd and sixty sail, whilc thc Pcrsians had
lour hundrcd, and to savc his cct Alcxandcr scnt it back to Grcccc.
Altcr Alcxandcrs dcath, his gcncrals, who quarrclcd about thc division ol
thc cmpirc, madc no important naval cxpcdition.
Pyrrhus, invitcd by thc inhabitants ol Tarcntum and aidcd by thcir cct,
landcd in !taly with twcntysix thousand inlantry, thrcc thousand horscs, and
thc rst clcphants which had bccn sccn in !taly. Tis was two hundrcd and
cighty ycars bclorc thc Christian cra.
Conqucror ol thc Romans at Hcraclca and Ascoli, it is dicult to undcrstand
why hc should havc gonc to Sicily at thc solicitation ol thc Syracusans to
cxpcl thc Carthaginians. Rccallcd, altcr somc succcss, by thc Tarcntincs, hc
rccrosscd thc straits, harasscd by thc Carthaginian cct: thcn, rcinlorccd by
thc Samnitcs or Calabrians, hc, a littlc too latc, concludcd to march on Romc.
Hc in turn was bcatcn and rcpulscd on 8cncvcntum, whcn hc rcturncd to
pirus with ninc thousand mcn, which was all that rcmaincd ol his lorcc.
Carthagc, which had bccn prospcring lor a long timc, protcd by thc ruin
ol Tyrc and thc Pcrsian cmpirc.
Tc Punic wars bctwccn Carthagc and Romc, now thc prcpondcrating
powcr in !taly, wcrc thc most cclcbratcd in thc maritimc annals ol antiquity.
Tc Romans wcrc particularly rcmarkablc lor thc rapidity with which thcy
improvcd and incrcascd thcir marinc. !n thc ycar a6 8.C. thcir boats or
vcsscls wcrc scarccly t to cross to Sicily, and cight ycars altcr lound Rcgulus
conqucror at cnomos, with thrcc hundrcd and lorty largc vcsscls, cach with
thrcc hundrcd rowcrs and onc hundrcd and twcnty combatants, making in
all onc hundrcd and lorty thousand mcn. Tc Carthaginians, it is said, wcrc
strongcr by twclvc to ltccn thousand mcn and lty vcsscls.
Tc victory ol cnomospcrhaps morc cxtraordinary than that ol Actium
was thc rst important stcp ol thc Romans toward univcrsal cmpirc. Tc
subscqucnt dcsccnt in Alrica consistcd ol lorty thousand mcn, but thc grcatcr
part ol this lorcc bcing rccallcd to Sicily, thc rcmaindcr was ovcrthrown, and
Rcgulus, bcing madc prisoncr, bccamc as cclcbratcd by his dcath as by his
lamous victory.
Tc grcat cct which was to avcngc him was succcsslul at Clypca, but was
dcstroycd on its rcturn by a storm, and its succcssor mct thc samc latc at Capc
a6
Skctch ol thc Principal Maritimc xpcditions
Palinuro. !n thc ycar a 8.C. thc Romans wcrc dclcatcd at rcpanum, and
lost twcntycight thousand mcn and morc than onc hundrcd vcsscls. Anothcr
cct, on its way to bcsicgc Lilybacum, in thc samc ycar, was lost o Capc
Pactyrus.
iscouragcd by this succcssion ol disastcrs, thc Scnatc at rst rcsolvcd to
rcnouncc thc sca, but, obscrving that thc powcr ol Sicily and Spain rcsultcd
lrom thcir maritimc supcriority, it concludcd to arm its ccts again, and in
thc ycar aa Lutatius Catullus sct out with thrcc hundrcd gallcys and scvcn
hundrcd transports lor rcpanum, and gaincd thc battlc in thc Agatcs
!slands, in which thc Carthaginians lost onc hundrcd and twcnty vcsscls. Tis
victory brought to a closc thc rst Punic war.
Tc sccond, distinguishcd by Hannibals cxpcdition to !taly, was lcss maritimc
in its charactcr. Scipio, howcvcr, borc thc Roman caglcs to Cartagcna, and by
its capturc dcstroycd lorcvcr thc cmpirc ol thc Carthaginians in Spain. Finally,
hc carricd thc war into Alrica with a lorcc inlcrior to that ol Rcgulus, but still
hc succccdcd in gaining thc battlc ol Zama, imposing a shamclul pcacc on
Carthagc and burning vc hundrcd ol hcr ships. Subscqucntly Scipios brothcr
crosscd thc Hcllcspont with twcntyvc thousand mcn, and at Magncsia
gaincd thc cclcbratcd victory which surrcndcrcd to thc mcrcy ol thc Romans
thc kingdom ol Antiochus and all Asia. Tis cxpcdition was aidcd by a victory
gaincd at Myonncsus in !onia, by thc combincd ccts ol Romc and Rhodcs,
ovcr thc navy ol Antiochus.
From this timc Romc had no rival, and shc continucd to add to hcr powcr by
using cvcry mcans to insurc to hcr thc cmpirc ol thc sca. Paulus milius in thc
ycar .6 8.C. landcd at Samothracc at thc hcad ol twcntyvc thousand mcn,
conqucrcd Pcrscus, and brought Maccdonia to submission.
Twcnty ycars latcr, thc third Punic war dccidcd thc latc ol Carthagc. Tc
important port ol Utica having bccn givcn up to thc Romans, an immcnsc
cct was cmploycd in transporting to this point cighty thousand lootsoldicrs
and lour thousand horscs, Carthagc was bcsicgcd, and thc son ol Paulus
milius and adoptcd son ol thc grcat Scipio had thc glory ol complcting thc
victory which milius and Scipio had bcgun, by dcstroying thc bittcr rival ol
his country.
Altcr this triumph, thc powcr ol Romc in Alrica, as wcll as in uropc, was
suprcmc, but hcr cmpirc in Asia was lor a momcnt shakcn by Mithridatcs.
Tis powcrlul king, altcr scizing in succcssion thc small adjaccnt statcs, was in
command ol not lcss than two hundrcd and lty thousand mcn, and ol a cct
ol lour hundrcd vcsscls, ol which thrcc hundrcd wcrc dcckcd. Hc dclcatcd thc
thrcc Roman gcncrals who commandcd in Cappadocia, invadcd Asia Minor
and massacrcd thcrc at lcast cighty thousand Roman subjccts, and cvcn scnt a
largc army into Grcccc.
Sylla landcd in Grcccc with a rcinlorccmcnt ol twcntyvc thousand
Romans, and rctook Athcns, but Mithridatcs scnt in succcssion two largc
armics by thc 8osporus and thc ardancllcs: thc rst, onc hundrcd thousand
a,c
strong, was dcstroycd at Chacronca, and thc sccond, ol cighty thousand
mcn, mct a similar latc at rchomcnus. At thc samc timc, Lucullus, having
collcctcd all thc maritimc rcsourccs ol thc citics ol Asia Minor, thc islands,
and particularly ol Rhodcs, was prcparcd to transport Syllas army lrom Scstos
to Asia, and Mithridatcs, lrom lcar, madc pcacc.
!n thc sccond and third wars, rcspcctivcly conductcd by Murcna and
Lucullus, thcrc wcrc no dcsccnts ccctcd. Mithridatcs, drivcn stcp by stcp into
Colchis, and no longcr ablc to kccp thc sca, conccivcd thc projcct ol turning
thc 8lack Sca by thc Caucasus, in ordcr to pass through Tracc to assumc thc
ocnsivc,a policy which it is dicult to undcrstand, in vicw ol thc lact that
hc was unablc to dclcnd his kingdom against lty thousand Romans.
Cacsar, in his sccond dcsccnt on ngland, had six hundrcd vcsscls,
transporting lorty thousand mcn. uring thc civil wars hc transportcd thirty
vc thousand mcn to Grcccc. Antony camc lrom 8rundusium to join him with
twcnty thousand mcn, and passcd through thc cct ol Pompcy,in which act
hc was as much lavorcd by thc lucky star ol Cacsar as by thc arrangcmcnts ol
his licutcnants.
Altcrward Cacsar carricd an army ol sixty thousand mcn to Alrica, thcy did
not, howcvcr, go in a body, but in succcssivc dctachmcnts.
Tc grcatcst armamcnt ol thc lattcr days ol thc Roman rcpublic was that
ol Augustus, who transportcd cighty thousand mcn and twclvc thousand
horscs into Grcccc to opposc Antony, lor, bcsidcs thc numcrous transports
rcquircd lor such an army, thcrc wcrc two hundrcd and sixty vcsscls ol war
to protcct thcm. Antony was supcrior in lorcc on land, but trustcd thc cmpirc
ol thc world to a naval battlc: hc had onc hundrcd and scvcnty warvcsscls,
in addition to sixty ol Clcopatras gallcys, thc wholc manncd by twcntytwo
thousand choicc troops, bcsidcs thc ncccssary rowcrs.
Latcr, Gcrmanicus conductcd an cxpcdition ol onc thousand vcsscls,
carrying sixty thousand mcn, lrom thc mouths ol thc Rhinc to thc mouths
ol thc ms. Hall ol this cct was dcstroycd on its rcturn by a storm, and it is
dicult to undcrstand why Gcrmanicus, controlling both banks ol thc Rhinc,
should havc cxposcd his army to thc chanccs ol thc sca, whcn hc could havc
rcachcd thc samc point by land in a lcw days.
Vhcn thc Roman authority cxtcndcd lrom thc Rhinc to thc uphratcs,
maritimc cxpcditions wcrc rarc, and thc grcat contcst with thc raccs ol
thc North ol uropc, which bcgan altcr thc division ol thc cmpirc, gavc
cmploymcnt to thc Roman armics on thc sidcs ol Gcrmany and Tracc. Tc
castcrn lraction ol thc cmpirc still maintaincd a powcrlul navy, which thc
posscssion ol thc islands ol thc Archipclago madc a ncccssity, whilc at thc
samc timc it aordcd thc mcans.
Tc rst vc ccnturics ol thc Christian cra aord but lcw cvcnts ol intcrcst
in maritimc warlarc. Tc \andals, having acquircd Spain, landcd in Alrica,
cighty thousand strong, undcr Gcnscric. Tcy wcrc dclcatcd by 8clisarius, but,
a,.
holding thc 8alcaric !slcs and Sicily, thcy controllcd thc Mcditcrrancan lor a
timc.
At thc vcry cpoch whcn thc nations ol thc ast invadcd uropc, thc
Scandinavians bcgan to land on thc coast ol ngland. Tcir opcrations arc
littlc bcttcr known than thosc ol thc barbarians: thcy arc hiddcn in thc
mystcrics ol din.
Tc Scandinavian bards attributc two thousand vc hundrcd vcsscls to
Swcdcn. Lcss poctical accounts assign ninc hundrcd and scvcnty to thc ancs
and thrcc hundrcd to Norway: thcsc lrcqucntly actcd in conccrt.
Tc Swcdcs naturally turncd thcir attcntion to thc hcad ol thc 8altic, and
drovc thc \arangians into Russia. Tc ancs, morc lavorably situatcd with
rcspcct to thc North Sca, dircctcd thcir coursc toward thc coasts ol Francc
and ngland.
!l thc account citcd by cpping is corrcct, thc grcatcr part ol thcsc vcsscls
wcrc nothing morc than shcrmcns boats manncd by a scorc ol rowcrs. Tcrc
wcrc also snekars, with twcnty banks or lorty rowcrs. Tc largcst had thirty
lour banks ol rowcrs. Tc incursions ol thc ancs, who had long bclorc
asccndcd thc Scinc and Loirc, lcad us to inlcr that thc grcatcr part ol thcsc
vcsscls wcrc vcry small.
Howcvcr, Hcngist, invitcd by thc 8riton \ortigcrn, transportcd vc
thousand Saxons to ngland in cightccn vcsscls,which would go to show
that thcrc wcrc thcn also largc vcsscls, or that thc marinc ol thc lbc was
supcrior to that ol thc Scandinavians.
8ctwccn thc ycars a, and , thrcc ncw cxpcditions, undcr !da and Cridda,
gaincd ngland lor thc Saxons, who dividcd it into scvcn kingdoms, and it
was not until thrcc ccnturics had clapscd () that thcy wcrc again unitcd
undcr thc authority ol gbcrt.
Tc Alrican raccs, in thcir turn, visitcd thc South ol uropc. !n ,.a, thc
Moors crosscd thc Straits ol Gibraltar, undcr thc lcad ol Tarik. Tcy camc, vc
thousand strong, at thc invitation ol Count Julian, and, lar lrom mccting grcat
rcsistancc, thcy wcrc wclcomcd by thc numcrous cncmics ol thc \isigoths. Tis
was thc happy cra ol thc Caliphs, and thc Arabs might wcll pass lor libcrators
in comparison with thc tyrants ol thc North. Tariks army, soon swcllcd to
twcnty thousand mcn, dclcatcd Rodrigo at Jcrcz and rcduccd thc kingdom to
submission. !n timc, scvcral millions ol thc inhabitants ol Mauritania crosscd
thc sca and scttlcd in Spain, and il thcir numcrous migrations cannot bc
rcgardcd as dcsccnts, still, thcy lorm onc ol thc most curious and intcrcsting
sccncs in history, occurring bctwccn thc incursions ol thc \andals in Alrica
and thc Crusadcs in thc ast.
A rcvolution not lcss important, and onc which has lclt morc durablc traccs,
markcd in thc North thc cstablishmcnt ol thc vast cmpirc now known as
Russia. Tc \arangian princcs, invitcd by thc Novgorodians, ol whom Rurik
was thc chicl, soon signalizcd thcmsclvcs by grcat cxpcditions.
a,a
!n ca, lcg is said to havc cmbarkcd cighty thousand mcn in two thousand
boats on thc nicpcr: thcy passcd thc lalls ol thc rivcr and dcbouchcd in
thc 8lack Sca, whilc thcir cavalry lollowcd thc banks. Tcy procccdcd to
Constantinoplc, and lorccd Lco thc Philosophcr to pay tributc.
Forty ycars subscqucntly, !gor took thc samc routc with a cct said to havc
consistcd ol tcn thousand boats. Ncar Constantinoplc his cct, tcrricd by thc
cccts ol thc Grcck rc, was drivcn on thc coast ol Asia, whcrc thc lorcc was
discmbarkcd. !t was dclcatcd, and thc cxpcdition rcturncd homc.
Not discouragcd, !gor rccstablishcd his cct and army and dcsccndcd to
thc mouths ol thc anubc, whcrc thc mpcror Romanus !. scnt to rcncw thc
tributc and ask lor pcacc, (.)
!n 6,, Svatoslav, lavorcd by thc quarrcl ol Niccphorus with thc King
ol 8ulgaria, cmbarkcd sixty thousand mcn, dcbouchcd into thc 8lack Sca,
asccndcd thc anubc, and scizcd 8ulgaria. Rccallcd by thc Pctchcncgs, who
wcrc mcnacing Kicw, hc cntcrcd into alliancc with thcm and rcturncd into
8ulgaria, brokc his alliancc with thc Grccks, and, bcing rcinlorccd by thc
Hungarians, crosscd thc 8alkan and marchcd to attack Adrianoplc. Tc thronc
ol Constantinc was hcld by Zimisccs, who was worthy ol his position. !nstcad
ol purchasing salcty by paying tributc, as his prcdcccssors had donc, hc raiscd
onc hundrcd thousand mcn, armcd a rcspcctablc cct, rcpulscd Svatoslav at
Adrianoplc, obligcd him to rctrcat to Silistria, and took by assault thc capital
ol thc 8ulgarians. Tc Russian princc marchcd to mcct him, and gavc battlc
not lar lrom Silistria, but was obligcd to rccntcr thc placc, whcrc hc sustaincd
onc ol thc most mcmorablc sicgcs rccordcd in history.
!n a sccond and still morc bloody battlc, thc Russians pcrlormcd prodigics
ol valor, but wcrc again compcllcd to yicld to numbcrs. Zimisccs, honoring
couragc, nally concludcd an advantagcous trcaty.
About this pcriod thc ancs wcrc attractcd to ngland by thc hopc ol pillagc,
and wc arc told that Lothairc callcd thcir king, gicr, to Francc to bc avcngcd
ol his brothcrs. Tc rst succcss ol thcsc piratcs incrcascd thcir londncss lor
this sort ol advcnturc, and lor vc or six ycars thcir bands swarmcd on thc
coasts ol Francc and 8ritain and dcvastatcd thc country. gicr, Hastings,
Rcgncr, and Sigclroi conductcd thcm somctimcs to thc mouths ol thc Scinc,
somctimcs to thc mouths ol thc Loirc, and nally to thosc ol thc Garonnc. !t
is cvcn asscrtcd that Hastings cntcrcd thc Mcditcrrancan and asccndcd thc
Rhonc to Avignon, but this is, to say thc lcast, doubtlul. Tc strcngth ol thcir
ccts is not known: thc largcst sccms to havc bccn ol thrcc hundrcd sail.
!n thc bcginning ol thc tcnth ccntury, Rollo at rst landcd in ngland, but,
nding littlc chancc ol succcss against Allrcd, hc cntcrcd into alliancc with
him, landcd in Ncustria in .., and advanccd lrom Roucn on Paris: othcr
bodics marchcd lrom Nantcs on Chartrcs. Rcpulscd hcrc, Rollo ovcrran and
ravagcd thc ncighboring provinccs. Charlcs thc Simplc saw no bcttcr mcans ol
dclivcring his kingdom ol this cvcrincrcasing scourgc than to ocr Rollo thc
a,
nc provincc ol Ncustria on condition that hc would marry his daughtcr and
turn Christian,an ocr which was cagcrly acccptcd.
Tirty ycars latcr, Rollos stcpson, annoycd by thc succcssors ol Charlcs,
callcd to his aid thc King ol cnmark. Tc lattcr landcd in considcrablc lorcc,
dclcatcd thc Frcnch, took thc king prisoncr, and assurcd Rollos son in thc
posscssion ol Normandy.
uring thc samc intcrval ( to c) thc ancs cxhibitcd cvcn grcatcr
hostility toward ngland than to Francc, although thcy wcrc much morc
assimilatcd to thc Saxons than to thc Frcnch in languagc and customs. !var,
altcr pillaging thc kingdom, cstablishcd his lamily in Northumbcrland.
Allrcd thc Grcat, at rst bcatcn by !vars succcssors, succccdcd in rcgaining
his thronc and in compclling thc submission ol thc ancs.
Tc aspcct ol aairs changcs ancw: Swcyn, still morc lortunatc than !var,
altcr conqucring and dcvastating ngland, grantcd pcacc on condition that a
sum ol moncy should bc paid, and rcturncd to cnmark, lcaving a part ol his
army bchind him.
thclrcd, who had wcakly disputcd with Swcyn what rcmaincd ol thc Saxon
powcr, thought hc could not do bcttcr to lrcc himscll lrom his importunatc
gucsts than to ordcr a simultancous massacrc ol all thc ancs in thc kingdom,
(.cca.) 8ut Swcyn rcappcarcd in thc lollowing ycar at thc hcad ol an
imposing lorcc, and bctwccn .cc and .cc, thrcc succcssivc ccts ccctcd
discmbarkations on thc coast, and unlortunatc ngland was ravagcd ancw.
!n .c.a, Swcyn landcd at thc mouth ol thc Humbcr and again swcpt ovcr
thc land likc a torrcnt, and thc nglish, tircd ol obcdicncc to kings who could
not dclcnd thcm, rccognizcd him as king ol thc North. His son, Canutc thc
Grcat, had to contcnd with a rival morc worthy ol him, (dmund !ronsidc.)
Rcturning lrom cnmark at thc hcad ol a considcrablc lorcc, and aidcd by thc
pcrdious dric, Canutc ravagcd thc southcrn part ol ngland and thrcatcncd
London. A ncw division ol thc kingdom rcsultcd, but, dmund having bccn
assassinatcd by dric, Canutc was nally rccognizcd as king ol all ngland.
Altcrward hc sailcd to conqucr Norway, lrom which country hc rcturncd to
attack Scotland. Vhcn hc dicd, hc dividcd thc kingdom bctwccn his thrcc
childrcn, according to thc usagc ol thc timcs.
Fivc ycars altcr Canutcs dcath, thc nglish assigncd thc crown to thcir
AngloSaxon princcs, but dward, to whom it lcll, was bcttcr ttcd to bc a
monk than to savc a kingdom a prcy to such commotions. Hc dicd in .c66,
lcaving to Harold a crown which thc chicl ol thc Normans scttlcd in Francc
contcstcd with him, and to whom, it is said, dward had madc a ccssion ol
thc kingdom. Unlortunatcly lor Harold, this chicl was a grcat and ambitious
man.
Tc ycar .c66 was markcd by two cxtraordinary cxpcditions. Vhilc Villiam
thc Conqucror was prcparing in Normandy a lormidablc armamcnt against
Harold, thc brothcr ol thc lattcr, having bccn drivcn lrom Northumbcrland
a,
lor his crimcs, sought support in Norway, and, with thc King ol Norway, sct
out with thirty thousand mcn on vc hundrcd vcsscls, and landcd at thc mouth
ol thc Humbcr. Harold almost cntircly dcstroycd this lorcc in a bloody battlc
lought ncar York, but a morc lormidablc storm was about to burst upon his
hcad. Villiam took advantagc ol thc timc whcn thc AngloSaxon king was
ghting thc Norwcgians, to sail lrom St. \alcry with a vcry largc armamcnt.
Humc asscrts that hc had thrcc thousand transports, whilc othcr authoritics
rcducc thc numbcr to twclvc hundrcd, carrying lrom sixty to scvcnty thousand
mcn. Harold hastcncd lrom York, and lought a dccisivc battlc ncar Hastings,
in which hc mct an honorablc dcath, and his lortunatc rival soon rcduccd thc
country to submission.
At thc samc timc, anothcr Villiam, surnamcd 8rasdclcr, Robcrt Guiscard,
and his brothcr Rogcr, conqucrcd Calabria and Sicily with a handlul ol
troops,(.c to .c,c.)
Scarccly thirty ycars altcr thcsc mcmorablc cvcnts, an cnthusiastic pricst
animatcd uropc with a lanatical lrcnzy and prccipitatcd largc lorccs upon
Asia to conqucr thc Holy Land.
At rst lollowcd by onc hundrcd thousand mcn, altcrward by two hundrcd
thousand badlyarmcd vagabonds who pcrishcd in grcat part undcr thc attacks
ol thc Hungarians, 8ulgarians, and Grccks, Pctcr thc Hcrmit succccdcd
in crossing thc 8osporus, and arrivcd bclorc Nicc with lrom lty to sixty
thousand mcn, who wcrc cithcr killcd or capturcd by thc Saraccns.
An cxpcdition morc military in its charactcr succccdcd this campaign
ol rcligious pilgrims. nc hundrcd thousand mcn, composcd ol Frcnch,
8urgundians, Gcrmans, and inhabitants ol Lorrainc, undcr Godlrcy ol
8ouillon, marchcd through Austria on Constantinoplc, an cqual numbcr,
undcr thc Count ol Toulousc, marchcd by Lyons, !taly, almatia, and
Maccdonia, and 8ohcmond, Princc ol Tarcntum, cmbarkcd with a lorcc ol
Normans, Sicilians, and !talians, and took thc routc by Grcccc on Gallipolis.
Tis cxtcnsivc migration rcminds us ol thc labulous cxpcditions ol Xcrxcs.
Tc Gcnocsc, \cnctian, and Grcck ccts wcrc chartcrcd to transport thcsc
swarms ol Crusadcrs by thc 8osporus or ardancllcs to Asia. Morc than lour
hundrcd thousand mcn wcrc conccntratcd on thc plains ol Nicc, whcrc thcy
avcngcd thc dclcat ol thcir prcdcccssors. Godlrcy altcrward lcd thcm across
Asia and Syria as lar as Jcrusalcm, whcrc hc loundcd a kingdom.
All thc maritimc rcsourccs ol Grcccc and thc ourishing rcpublics ol !taly
wcrc rcquircd to transport thcsc masscs across thc 8osporus and in provisioning
thcm during thc sicgc ol Nicc, and thc grcat impulsc thus givcn to thc coast
statcs ol !taly was pcrhaps thc most advantagcous rcsult ol thc Crusadcs.
Tis tcmporary succcss ol thc Crusadcrs bccamc thc sourcc ol grcat disastcrs.
Tc Mussulmans, hcrctolorc dividcd among thcmsclvcs, unitcd to rcsist
thc indcl, and divisions bcgan to appcar in thc Christian camps. A ncw
cxpcdition was ncccssary to aid thc kingdom which thc bravc Nourcddin was
a,
thrcatcning. Louis \!!. and thc mpcror Conrad, cach at thc hcad ol onc
hundrcd thousand Crusadcrs, marchcd, as thcir prcdcccssors had donc, by thc
routc ol Constantinoplc, (..a.) 8ut thc Grccks, lrightcncd by thc rccurring
visits ol thcsc mcnacing gucsts, plottcd thcir dcstruction.
Conrad, who was dcsirous ol bcing rst, lcll into thc traps laid lor him by
thc Turks, and was dclcatcd in dctachmcnts in scvcral battlcs by thc Sultan
ol !conium. Louis, morc lortunatc, dclcatcd thc Turks on thc banks ol thc
Mcndcr, but, bcing dcprivcd ol thc support ol Conrad, and his army bcing
annoycd and partially bcatcn by thc cncmy in thc passagc ol dclcs, and bcing
in want ol supplics, hc was conncd to Attalia, on thc coast ol Pamphylia,
whcrc hc cndcavorcd to cmbark his army. Tc mcans lurnishcd by thc Grccks
wcrc insucicnt, and not morc than ltccn or twcnty thousand mcn arrivcd
at Antioch with thc king: thc rcmaindcr cithcr pcrishcd or lcll into thc hands
ol thc Saraccns.
Tis lccblc rcinlorccmcnt soon mcltcd away undcr thc attacks ol thc climatc
and thc daily contcsts with thc cncmy, although thcy wcrc continually aidcd
by small bodics brought ovcr lrom uropc by thc !talian ships, and thcy wcrc
again about to yicld undcr thc attacks ol Saladin, whcn thc court ol Romc
succccdcd in cccting an alliancc bctwccn thc mpcror Frcdcrick 8arbarossa
and thc Kings ol Francc and ngland to savc thc Holy Land.
Tc cmpcror was thc rst to sct out. At thc hcad ol onc hundrcd thousand
Gcrmans, hc opcncd a passagc through Tracc in spitc ol thc lormal rcsistancc
ol thc Grccks, now govcrncd by !saac Angclus. Hc marchcd to Gallipolis,
crosscd thc ardancllcs, and scizcd !conium. Hc dicd in conscqucncc ol
an imprudcnt bath in a rivcr, which, it has bccn prctcndcd, was thc Cydnus.
His son, thc ukc ol Swabia, annoycd by thc Mussulmans and attackcd by
discascs, brought to Ptolcmais scarccly six thousand mcn.
At thc samc timc, Richard CocurdcLion
|!|
and Philip Augustus morc
judiciously took thc routc ovcr thc sca, and sailcd lrom Marscillcs and Gcnoa
with two immcnsc ccts,(..c.) Tc rst scizcd Cyprus, and both landcd in
Syria,whcrc thcy would probably havc triumphcd but lor thc rivalry which
sprang up bctwccn thcm, in conscqucncc ol which Philip rcturncd to Francc.
Twclvc ycars latcr, a ncw Crusadc was dctcrmincd upon, (.ac.) Part ol
thc Crusadcrs cmbarkcd lrom Provcncc or !taly, othcrs, lcd by thc Count
ol Flandcrs and thc Marquis ol Montlcrrat, procccdcd to \cnicc, with thc
intcntion ol cmbarking thcrc. Tc party last mcntioncd wcrc pcrsuadcd by thc
skilllul andolo to aid him in an attack upon Constantinoplc, upon thc prctcxt
ol upholding thc rights ol Alcxis Angclus, thc son ol !saac Angclus, who had
lought thc mpcror Frcdcrick and was thc succcssor ol thosc Comncnuscs
who had connivcd at thc dcstruction ol thc armics ol Conrad and Louis \!!.
!
Richard sailcd lrom ngland with twcnty thousand loot and vc thousand horscmcn, and
landcd in Normandy, whcncc hc procccdcd by land to Marscillcs. Vc do not know what cct hc cmploycd to
transport his troops to Asia. Philip cmbarkcd at Gcnoa on !talian ships, and with a lorcc at lcast as largc as
that ol Richard.
a,6
Twcnty thousand mcn had thc boldncss to attack thc ancicnt capital ol thc
world, which had at lcast two hundrcd thousand dclcndcrs. Tcy assailcd it by
sca and land, and capturcd it. Tc usurpcr cd, and Alcxis was rcplaccd upon
thc thronc, but was unablc to rctain his scat: thc Grccks madc an insurrcction
in lavor ol Murzupha, but thc Latins took posscssion ol Constantinoplc altcr
a morc bloody assault than thc rst, and placcd upon thc thronc thcir chicl,
Count 8aldwin ol Flandcrs. Tis cmpirc lastcd a hallccntury. Tc rcmnant ol
thc Grccks took rclugc at Nicc and Trcbizond.
A sixth cxpcdition was dircctcd against gypt by John ol 8ricnnc, who,
notwithstanding thc succcsslul issuc ol thc horriblc sicgc ol amictta, was
obligcd to givc way bclorc thc constantlyincrcasing corts ol thc Mussulman
population. Tc rcmains ol his splcndid army, altcr a narrow cscapc lrom
drowning in thc Nilc, dccmcd thcmsclvcs vcry lortunatc in bcing ablc to
purchasc pcrmission to rccmbark lor uropc.
Tc court ol Romc, whosc intcrcst it was to kccp up thc zcal ol Christcndom
in thcsc cxpcditions, ol which it gathcrcd all thc lruits, cncouragcd thc Gcrman
princcs to uphold thc tottcring rcalm at Jcrusalcm. Tc mpcror Frcdcrick
and thc Landgravc ol Hcssc cmbarkcd at 8rundusium in .aa,, at thc hcad
ol lorty thousand choscn soldicrs. Tc landgravc, and altcrward Frcdcrick
himscll, lcll sick, and thc cct put in at Tarcntum, lrom which port thc
cmpcror, irritatcd by thc prcsumption ol Grcgory !X., who cxcommunicatcd
him bccausc hc was too slow in thc gratication ol his wishcs, at a latcr datc
procccdcd with tcn thousand mcn, thus giving way to thc lcar inspircd by thc
pontical thundcrs.
Louis !X., animatcd by thc samc lccling ol lcar, or impcllcd, il wc may crcdit
Ancclot, by motivcs ol a highcr charactcr, sct out lrom AigucsMortcs, in .a,
with onc hundrcd and twcnty largc vcsscls, and ltccn hundrcd smallcr boats,
hircd lrom thc Gcnocsc, thc \cnctians and thc Catalans, lor Francc was at
that timc without a navy, although washcd by two scas. Tis king procccdcd
to Cyprus, and, having thcrc collcctcd a still largcr lorcc, sct out, according
to Joinvillcs statcmcnt, with morc than cightccn hundrcd vcsscls, to makc a
dcsccnt into gypt. His army must havc numbcrcd about cighty thousand
mcn, lor, although hall ol thc cct was scattcrcd and cast away upon thc coast
ol Syria, hc marchcd upon Cairo a lcw months latcr with sixty thousand
ghtingmcn, twcnty thousand bcing mountcd. !t should bc statcd that thc
Count ol Poicticrs had arrivcd also with troops lrom Francc.
Tc sad lortunc cxpcricnccd by this splcndid army did not prcvcnt thc
samc king lrom cngaging in a ncw Crusadc, twcnty ycars latcr,(.a,c.) Hc
discmbarkcd upon that occasion at thc ruins ol Carthagc, and bcsicgcd Tunis.
Tc plaguc swcpt o hall his army in a lcw months, and himscll was onc ol its
victims. Tc King ol Sicily, having arrivcd with powcrlul rcinlorccmcnts at thc
timc ol Louiss dcath, and dcsiring to carry back thc rcmains ol thc army to his
island ol Sicily, cncountcrcd a tcmpcst which causcd a loss ol lour thousand
mcn and twcnty largc ships. Tis princc was not dctcrrcd by this mislortunc
a,,
lrom dcsiring thc conqucst ol thc Grcck cmpirc and ol Constantinoplc, which
sccmcd a prizc ol grcatcr valuc and morc rcadily obtaincd. Philip, thc son
and succcssor ol Saint Louis, bcing anxious to rcturn to Francc, would havc
nothing to do with that projcct. Tis was thc last cort. Tc Christians who
wcrc abandoncd in Syria wcrc dcstroycd in thc notcd attacks ol Tripoli and
Ptolcmais: somc ol thc rcmnants ol thc rcligious ordcrs took rclugc at Cyprus
and cstablishcd thcmsclvcs at Rhodcs.
Tc Mussulmans, in thcir turn, crosscd thc ardancllcs at Gallipolis in .,
and took posscssion, onc altcr thc othcr, ol thc uropcan provinccs ol thc
astcrn mpirc, to which thc Latins had thcmsclvcs givcn thc latal blow.
Mohammcd !!., whilc bcsicging Constantinoplc in ., is said to havc
had his cct transportcd by land with a vicw to placing it in thc canal and
closing thc port: it is statcd to havc bccn largc cnough to bc manncd by twcnty
thousand sclcct lootsoldicrs. Altcr thc capturc ol this capital, Mohammcd
lound his mcans incrcascd by all thosc ol thc Grcck navy, and in a short timc
his cmpirc attaincd thc rst rank ol maritimc powcrs. Hc ordcrcd an attack
to bc madc upon Rhodcs and upon tranto on thc !talian main, whilst hc
procccdcd to Hungary in scarch ol a morc worthy opponcnt (Hunniadcs.)
Rcpulscd and woundcd at 8clgradc, thc sultan lcll upon Trcbizond with a
numcrous cct, brought that city to suc lor tcrms, and thcn procccdcd with
a cct ol lour hundrcd sail to makc a landing upon thc island ol Ncgropont,
which hc carricd by assault. A sccond attcmpt upon Rhodcs, cxccutcd, it is
statcd, at thc hcad ol a hundrcd thousand mcn, by onc ol his ablcst licutcnants,
was a lailurc, with loss to thc assailants. Mohammcd was prcparing to go to
that point himscll with an immcnsc army asscmblcd on thc shorcs ol !onia,
which \crtot cstimatcs at thrcc hundrcd thousand mcn, but dcath closcd his
carccr, and thc projcct was not carricd into ccct.
About thc samc pcriod ngland bcgan to bc lormidablc to hcr ncighbors on
land as wcll as on thc sca, thc utch also, rcclaiming thcir country lrom thc
inroads ol thc sca, wcrc laying thc loundations ol a powcr morc cxtraordinary
cvcn than that ol \cnicc.
dward !!!. landcd in Francc and bcsicgcd Calais with cight hundrcd ships
and lorty thousand mcn.
Hcnry \. madc two dcsccnts in .. and ..,: hc had, it is statcd, ltccn
hundrcd vcsscls and only thirty thousand mcn, ol whom six thousand wcrc
cavalry.
All thc cvcnts wc havc dcscribcd as taking placc, up to this pcriod, and
including thc capturc ol Constantinoplc, wcrc bclorc thc invcntion ol
gunpowdcr, lor il Hcnry \. had cannon at Agincourt, as is claimcd by somc
writcrs, thcy wcrc ccrtainly not uscd in naval warlarc. From that timc all thc
combinations ol naval armamcnts wcrc cntircly changcd, and this rcvolution
took placcil ! may usc that cxprcssionat thc timc whcn thc invcntion
ol thc marincrs compass and thc discovcry ol Amcrica and ol thc Capc ol
a,
Good Hopc wcrc about to turn thc maritimc commcrcc ol thc world into ncw
channcls and to cstablish an cntircly ncw systcm ol colonial dcpcndcncics.
! shall not mcntion in dctail thc cxpcditions ol thc Spaniards to Amcrica, or
thosc ol thc Portugucsc, utch, and nglish to !ndia by doubling thc Capc
ol Good Hopc. Notwithstanding thcir grcat inucncc upon thc commcrcc ol
thc world,notwithstanding thc gcnius ol Gama, Albuqucrquc, and Cortcz,
thcsc cxpcditions, undcrtakcn by small bodics ol two or thrcc thousand mcn
against tribcs who kncw nothing ol rcarms, arc ol no intcrcst in a military
point ol vicw.
Tc Spanish navy, whosc lamc had bccn grcatly incrcascd by this discovcry
ol a ncw world, was at thc hcight ol its splcndor in thc rcign ol Charlcs \.
Howcvcr, thc glory ol thc cxpcdition to Tunis, which was conqucrcd by this
princc at thc hcad ol thirty thousand nc soldicrs transportcd in vc hundrcd
Gcnocsc or Spanish vcsscls, was balanccd by thc disastcr which bclcll a
similar cxpcdition against Algicrs, (..,) undcrtakcn whcn thc scason was
too lar advanccd and in opposition to thc wisc counscls ol Admiral oria.
Tc cxpcdition was scarccly undcr way whcn thc cmpcror saw onc hundrcd
and sixty ol his ships and cight thousand mcn swallowcd up by thc wavcs: thc
rcmaindcr was savcd by thc skill ol oria, and asscmblcd at Capc Mctaluz,
whcrc Charlcs \. himscll arrivcd, altcr cncountcring grcat dicultics and
pcril.
Vhilc thcsc cvcnts wcrc transpiring, thc succcssors ol Mohammcd wcrc
not ncglccting thc advantagcs givcn thcm by thc posscssion ol so many nc
maritimc provinccs, which taught thcm at oncc thc importancc ol thc control
ol thc sca and lurnishcd mcans lor obtaining it. At this pcriod thc Turks
wcrc quitc as wcll inlormcd with rclcrcncc to artillcry and thc military art
in gcncral as thc uropcans. Tcy rcachcd thc apcx ol thcir grcatncss undcr
Solyman !., who bcsicgcd and capturcd Rhodcs (.a) with an army statcd to
havc rcachcd thc numbcr ol onc hundrcd and lorty thousand mcn,which was
still lormidablc cvcn upon thc supposition ol its strcngth bcing cxaggcratcd
by onchall.
!n .6, Mustapha and thc cclcbratcd ragut madc a dcsccnt upon Malta,
whcrc thc Knights ol Rhodcs had madc a ncw cstablishmcnt, thcy carricd ovcr
thirtytwo thousand Janissarics, with onc hundrcd and lorty ships. John ol
\alctta, as is wcll known, gaincd an cnduring lamc by rcpulsing thcm.
A morc lormidablc cxpcdition, consisting ol two hundrcd vcsscls and lty
vc thousand mcn, was scnt in .a, to thc islc ol Cyprus, whcrc Nicosia was
takcn and Famagosta bcsicgcd. Tc horriblc crucltics practiccd by Mustapha
incrcascd thc alarm occasioncd by his progrcss. Spain, \cnicc, Naplcs, and
Malta unitcd thcir naval lorccs to succor Cyprus, but Famagosta had alrcady
surrcndcrcd, notwithstanding thc hcroic dclcnsc ol 8ragadino, who was
pcrdiously aycd alivc by Mustaphas ordcr, to avcngc thc dcath ol lorty
thousand Turks that had pcrishcd in thc spacc ol two ycars spcnt on thc
island.
a,
Tc allicd cct, undcr thc ordcrs ol two hcrocs, on John ol Austria, brothcr
ol Philip !!., and Andrca oria, attackcd thc Turkish cct at thc cntrancc
ol thc Gull ol Lcpanto, ncar thc promontory ol Actium, whcrc Antony and
Augustus oncc lought lor thc cmpirc ol thc world. Tc Turkish cct was
almost cntircly dcstroycd: morc than two hundrcd vcsscls and thirty thousand
Turks wcrc capturcd or pcrishcd, (.,..) Tis victory did not put an cnd to thc
suprcmacy ol thc Turks, but was a grcat chcck in thcir carccr ol grcatncss.
Howcvcr, thcy madc such vigorous corts that as largc a cct as thc lormcr
onc was scnt to sca during thc ncxt ycar. Pcacc tcrminatcd this contcst, in
which such cnormous losscs wcrc sustaincd.
Tc bad lortunc ol Charlcs \. in his cxpcdition against Algicrs did not
dctcr Scbastian ol Portugal lrom wishing to attcmpt thc conqucst ol Morocco,
whcrc hc was invitcd by a Moorish princc who had bccn dcprivcd ol his cstatcs.
Having discmbarkcd upon thc shorcs ol Morocco at thc hcad ol twcnty
thousand mcn, this young princc was killcd and his army cut to picccs at thc
battlc ol Alcazar by Mulcy Abdulmalck, in .,.
Philip !!., whosc pridc had incrcascd sincc thc naval battlc ol Lcpanto on
account ol thc succcss hc had gaincd in Francc by his diplomacy and by thc
lolly ol thc adhcrcnts ol thc Lcaguc, dccmcd his arms irrcsistiblc. Hc thought
to bring ngland to his lcct. Tc invinciblc Armada intcndcd to producc
this ccct, which has bccn so lamous, was composcd ol an cxpcditionary
lorcc procccding lrom Cadiz, including, according to Humcs narrativc, onc
hundrcd and thirtyscvcn vcsscls, armcd with two thousand six hundrcd and
thirty bronzc cannon, and carrying twcnty thousand soldicrs, in addition to
clcvcn thousand sailors. To thcsc lorccs was to bc addcd an army ol twcntyvc
thousand mcn which thc ukc ol Parma was to bring up lrom thc Ncthcrlands
by way ol stcnd. A tcmpcst and thc corts ol thc nglish causcd thc lailurc
ol this cxpcdition, which, although ol considcrablc magnitudc lor thc pcriod
whcn it appcarcd, was by no mcans cntitlcd to thc highsounding namc it
rcccivcd: it lost thirtccn thousand mcn and hall thc vcsscls bclorc it cvcn camc
ncar thc nglish coast.
Altcr this cxpcdition comcs in chronological ordcr that ol Gustavus
Adolphus to Gcrmany,(.6c.) Tc army containcd only lrom ltccn to
cightccn thousand mcn: thc cct was quitc largc, and was manncd by ninc
thousand sailors, M. Ancillon must, howcvcr, bc mistakcn in stating that
it carricd cight thousand cannon. Tc dcbarkation in Pomcrania rcccivcd
littlc opposition lrom thc !mpcrial troops, and thc King ol Swcdcn had a
strong party among thc Gcrman pcoplc. His succcssor was thc lcadcr ol a
vcry cxtraordinary cxpcdition, which is rcscmblcd by only onc othcr cxamplc
mcntioncd in history: ! rclcr to thc march ol Charlcs X. ol Swcdcn across thc
8clt upon thc icc, with a vicw ol moving lrom Slcswick upon Copcnhagcn by
way ol thc island ol Funcn,(.6.) Hc had twcntyvc thousand mcn, ol whom
ninc thousand wcrc cavalry, and artillcry in proportion. Tis undcrtaking was
ac
so much thc morc rash bccausc thc icc was unsalc, scvcral picccs ol artillcry
and cvcn thc kings own carriagc having brokcn through and bccn lost.
Altcr scvcntyvc ycars ol pcacc, thc war bctwccn \cnicc and thc Turks
rccommcnccd in .6. Tc lattcr transportcd an army ol ltyvc thousand
mcn, in thrcc hundrcd and lty vcsscls, to Candia, and gaincd posscssion ol
thc important post ol Canca bclorc thc rcpublic thought ol scnding succor.
Although thc pcoplc ol \cnicc bcgan to losc thc spirit which madc hcr grcat,
shc still numbcrcd among hcr citizcns somc noblc souls: Morosini, Grimani,
and Moccnigo strugglcd scvcral ycars against thc Turks, who dcrivcd grcat
advantagcs lrom thcir numcrical supcriority and thc posscssion ol Canca. Tc
\cnctian cct had, ncvcrthclcss, gaincd a markcd asccndcncy undcr thc ordcrs
ol Grimani, whcn a third ol it was dcstroycd by a lrightlul tcmpcst, in which
thc admiral himscll pcrishcd.
!n .6, thc sicgc ol Candia bcgan. Jussul attackcd thc city luriously at thc
hcad ol thirty thousand mcn: altcr bcing rcpulscd in two assaults, hc was
cncouragcd to attcmpt a third by a largc brcach bcing madc. Tc Turks cntcrcd
thc placc: Moccnigo rushcd to mcct thcm, cxpccting to dic in thcir midst. A
brilliant victory was thc rcward ol his hcroic conduct: thc cncmy wcrc rcpulscd
and thc ditchcs llcd with thcir dcad bodics.
\cnicc might havc drivcn o thc Turks by scnding twcnty thousand mcn
to Candia, but uropc rcndcrcd hcr but lccblc support, and shc had alrcady
callcd into activc scrvicc all thc mcn t lor war shc could producc.
Tc sicgc, rcsumcd somc timc altcr, lastcd longcr than that ol Troy, and
cach campaign was markcd by lrcsh attcmpts on thc part ol thc Turks to carry
succor to thcir army and by naval victorics gaincd by thc \cnctians. Tc lattcr
pcoplc had kcpt up with thc advancc ol naval tactics in uropc, and thus wcrc
plainly supcrior to thc Mussulmans, who adhcrcd to thc old customs, and
wcrc madc to pay dcarly lor cvcry attcmpt to issuc lrom thc ardancllcs. Trcc
pcrsons ol thc namc ol Morosini, and scvcral Moccnigos, madc thcmsclvcs
lamous in this protractcd strugglc.
Finally, thc cclcbratcd Coprougli, placcd by his mcrits at thc hcad ol thc
ttoman ministry, rcsolvcd to takc thc pcrsonal dircction ol this war which
had lastcd so long: hc accordingly procccdcd to thc island, whcrc transports
had landcd lty thousand mcn, at whosc hcad hc conductcd thc attack in a
vigorous manncr.(.66,.)
!n this mcmorablc sicgc thc Turks cxhibitcd morc skill than prcviously: thcir
artillcry, ol vcry hcavy calibcr, was wcll scrvcd, and, lor thc rst timc, thcy
madc usc ol trcnchcs, which wcrc thc invcntion ol an !talian cnginccr.
Tc \cnctians, on thcir sidc, grcatly improvcd thc mcthods ol dclcnsc
by mincs. Ncvcr had thcrc bccn sccn such lurious zcal cxhibitcd in mutual
dcstruction by combats, mincs, and assaults. Tcir hcroic rcsistancc cnablcd thc
garrison to hold out during wintcr: in thc spring, \cnicc scnt rcinlorccmcnts
and thc ukc ol Fcuilladc brought a lcw hundrcds ol Frcnch voluntccrs.
a.
Tc Turks had also rcccivcd strong rcinlorccmcnts, and rcdoublcd thcir
corts. Tc sicgc was drawing to a closc, whcn six thousand Frcnchmcn
camc to thc assistancc ol thc garrison undcr thc lcadcrship ol thc ukc ol
8caulort and Navaillcs,(.66.) A badlyconductcd sortic discouragcd thcsc
prcsumptuous young mcn, and Navaillcs, disgustcd with thc sucrings
cndurcd in thc sicgc, assumcd thc rcsponsibility, at thc cnd ol two months, ol
carrying thc rcmnant ol his troops back to Francc. Morosini, having thcn but
thrcc thousand cxhaustcd mcn to dclcnd a placc which was opcn on all sidcs,
nally conscntcd to cvacuatc it, and a trucc was agrccd upon, which lcd to a
lormal trcaty ol pcacc. Candia had cost thc Turks twcntyvc ycars ol corts
and morc than onc hundrcd thousand mcn killcd in cightccn assaults and
scvcral hundrcd sortics. !t is cstimatcd that thirtyvc thousand Christians ol
dicrcnt nations pcrishcd in thc glorious dclcnsc ol thc placc.
Tc strugglc bctwccn Louis X!\., Holland, and ngland givcs cxamplcs
ol grcat maritimc opcrations, but no rcmarkablc dcsccnts. Tat ol Jamcs !!.
in !rcland (.6c) was composcd ol only six thousand Frcnchmcn, although
c Tourvillcs cct containcd scvcntythrcc ships ol thc linc, carrying vc
thousand cight hundrcd cannon and twcntyninc thousand sailors. A gravc
lault was committcd in not throwing at lcast twcnty thousand mcn into
!rcland with such mcans as wcrc disposablc. Two ycars latcr, c Tourvillc
had bccn conqucrcd in thc lamous day ol La Hoguc, and thc rcmains ol thc
troops which had landcd wcrc cnablcd to rcturn through thc instrumcntality
ol a trcaty which rcquircd thcir cvacuation ol thc island.
At thc bcginning ol thc cightccnth ccntury, thc Swcdcs and Russians
undcrtook two cxpcditions vcry dicrcnt in charactcr.
Charlcs X!!., wishing to aid thc ukc ol Holstcin, madc a dcsccnt upon
cnmark at thc hcad ol twcnty thousand mcn, transportcd by two hundrcd
vcsscls and protcctcd by a strong squadron. Hc was rcally assistcd by thc
nglish and utch navics, but thc cxpcdition was not lor that rcason thc lcss
rcmarkablc in thc dctails ol thc discmbarkation. Tc samc princc ccctcd a
dcsccnt into Livonia to aid Narva, but hc landcd his troops at a Swcdish port.
Pctcr thc Grcat, having somc causc ol complaint against thc Pcrsians, and
wishing to takc advantagc ol thcir disscnsions, cmbarkcd (in .,aa) upon thc
\olga: hc cntcrcd thc Caspian Sca with two hundrcd and scvcnty vcsscls,
carrying twcnty thousand lootsoldicrs, and dcsccndcd to Agrakhan, at thc
mouths ol thc Koisou, whcrc hc cxpcctcd to mcct his cavalry. Tis lorcc,
numbcring ninc thousand dragoons and vc thousand Cossacks, joincd him
altcr a landmarch by way ol thc Caucasus. Tc czar thcn scizcd crbcnt,
bcsicgcd 8akou, and nally madc a trcaty with onc ol thc partics whosc
disscnsions at that timc llcd with discord thc cmpirc ol thc Soolccs: hc
procurcd thc ccssion ol Astrabad, thc kcy ol thc Caspian Sca and, in somc
mcasurc, ol thc wholc Pcrsian cmpirc.
aa
Tc timc ol Louis X\. lurnishcd cxamplcs ol nonc but sccondary cxpcditions,
unlcss wc cxccpt that ol Richclicu against Minorca, which was vcry glorious
as an cscaladc, but lcss cxtraordinary as a dcsccnt.
|!n .,6a, an nglish cct sailcd lrom Portsmouth: this was joincd by a
portion ol thc squadron lrom Martinico. Tc wholc amountcd to ninctccn
ships ol thc linc, cightccn smallcr vcsscls ol war, and onc hundrcd and lty
transports, carrying tcn thousand mcn. Tc cxpcdition bcsicgcd and capturcd
Havana.TRS.|
Tc Spaniards, howcvcr, in .,,, madc a dcsccnt with ltccn or sixtccn
thousand mcn upon Algicrs, with a vicw ol punishing thosc rovcrs ol thc
sca lor thcir bold piracics, but thc cxpcdition, lor want ol harmonious action
bctwccn thc squadron and thc landlorccs, was unsucccsslul, on account ol
thc murdcrous rc which thc troops rcccivcd lrom thc Turkish and Arab
muskctccrs dispcrscd among thc undcrgrowth surrounding thc city. Tc
troops rcturncd to thcir vcsscls altcr having two thousand mcn placcd hors de
combat.
Tc Amcrican war (.,,) was thc cpoch ol thc grcatcst maritimc corts
upon thc part ol thc Frcnch. uropc was astonishcd to scc this powcr scnd
Count dstaing to Amcrica with twcntyvc ships ol thc linc, whilc at thc
samc timc M. rvillicrs, with a FrancoSpanish cct ol sixtyvc ships ol thc
linc, was to covcr a dcsccnt to bc ccctcd with thrcc hundrcd transports and
lorty thousand mcn, asscmblcd at Havrc and St. Malo.
Tis ncw armada movcd back and lorth lor scvcral months, but accomplishcd
nothing: thc winds nally drovc it back to port.
staing was morc lortunatc, as hc succccdcd in gctting thc supcriority
in thc Antillcs and in landing in thc Unitcd Statcs six thousand Frcnchmcn
undcr Rochambcau, who wcrc lollowcd, at a latcr datc, by anothcr division,
and assistcd in invcsting thc nglish army undcr Cornwallis at Yorktown,
(.,.:) thc indcpcndcncc ol Amcrica was thus sccurcd. Francc would pcrhaps
havc gaincd a triumph ovcr hcr implacablc rival morc lasting in its cccts, had
shc, in addition to thc display madc in thc nglish Channcl, scnt tcn ships
and scvcn or cight thousand mcn morc to !ndia with Admiral Surcn.
uring thc Frcnch Rcvolution, thcrc wcrc lcw cxamplcs ol dcsccnts: thc
rc at Toulon, cmigration, and thc battlc ol Ushant had grcatly injurcd thc
Frcnch navy.
Hochcs cxpcdition against !rcland with twcntyvc thousand mcn was
scattcrcd by thc winds, and no lurthcr attcmpts in that quartcr wcrc madc.
(.,6.)
At a latcr datc, 8onapartcs cxpcdition to gypt, consisting ol twcntythrcc
thousand mcn, thirtccn ships, scvcntccn lrigatcs, and lour hundrcd transports,
obtaincd grcat succcsscs at rst, which wcrc lollowcd by sad rcvcrscs. Tc
Turks, in hopcs ol cxpclling him, landcd ltccn thousand mcn at Aboukir, but
wcrc all capturcd or drivcn into thc sca, notwithstanding thc advantagcs this
a
pcninsula gavc thcm ol intrcnching thcmsclvcs and waiting lor rcinlorccmcnts.
Tis is an cxccllcnt cxamplc lor imitation by thc party on thc dclcnsivc undcr
similar circumstanccs.
Tc cxpcdition ol considcrablc magnitudc which was scnt out in .ca to St.
omingo was rcmarkablc as a dcsccnt, but lailcd on account ol thc ravagcs ol
ycllow lcvcr.
Sincc thcir succcss against Louis X!\., thc nglish havc givcn thcir attcntion
morc to thc dcstruction ol rival ccts and thc subjugation ol colonics than to
grcat dcsccnts. Tc attcmpts madc in thc cightccnth ccntury against 8rcst and
Chcrbourg with bodics ol tcn or twclvc thousand mcn amountcd to nothing
in thc hcart ol a powcrlul statc likc Francc. Tc rcmarkablc conqucsts which
procurcd thcm thcir !ndian cmpirc occurrcd in succcssion. Having obtaincd
posscssion ol Calcutta, and thcn ol 8cngal, thcy strcngthcncd thcmsclvcs
gradually by thc arrival ol troops in small bodics and by using thc Scpoys,
whom thcy disciplincd to thc numbcr ol onc hundrcd and lty thousand.
Tc AngloRussian cxpcdition to Holland in ., was composcd ol lorty
thousand mcn, but thcy wcrc not all landcd at oncc: thc study ol thc dctails ol
thc opcrations is, howcvcr, quitc intcrcsting.
!n .c., Abcrcrombic, altcr thrcatcning Fcrrol and Cadiz, ccctcd a dcsccnt
into gypt with twcnty thousand nglishmcn. Tc rcsults ol this cxpcdition
arc wcll known.
Gcncral Stuarts cxpcdition to Calabria, (.c6,) altcr somc succcsscs at
Maida, was lor thc purposc ol rcgaining posscssion ol Sicily. Tat against
8ucnos Ayrcs was morc unlortunatc in its rcsults, and was tcrminatcd by a
capitulation.
!n .c,, Lord Cathcart attackcd Copcnhagcn with twcntyvc thousand
mcn, bcsicgcd and bombardcd thc city, and gaincd posscssion ol thc anish
cct, which was his objcct.
!n .c, Vcllington appcarcd in Portugal with ltccn thousand mcn.
Altcr gaining thc victory ol \imcira, and assistcd by thc gcncral rising ol thc
Portugucsc, hc lorccd Junot to cvacuatc thc kingdom. Tc samc army, incrcascd
in numbcrs to twcntyvc thousand and placcd undcr Moorcs command, whilc
making an cort to pcnctratc into Spain with a vicw ol rclicving Madrid, was
lorccd to rctrcat to Corunna and thcrc rccmbark, altcr sucring scvcrc losscs.
Vcllington, having ccctcd anothcr landing in Portugal with rcinlorccmcnts,
collcctcd an army ol thirty thousand nglishmcn and as many Portugucsc,
with which hc avcngcd Moorcs mislortuncs by surprising Soult at porto,
(May, .c,) and thcn bcating Joscph at Talavcra, undcr thc vcry gatcs ol his
capital.
Tc cxpcdition to Antwcrp in thc samc ycar was onc ol thc largcst ngland
has undcrtakcn sincc thc timc ol Hcnry \. !t was composcd ol not lcss than
scvcnty thousand mcn in all,lorty thousand landlorccs and thirty thousand
sailors. !t did not succccd, on account ol thc incapacity ol thc lcadcr.
a
A dcsccnt cntircly similar in charactcr to that ol Charlcs X. ol Swcdcn was
ccctcd by thirty Russian battalions passing thc Gull ol 8othnia on thc icc
in vc columns, with thcir artillcry. Tcir objcct was to takc posscssion ol
thc islands ol Aland and sprcad a lccling ol apprchcnsion to thc vcry gatcs ol
Stockholm. Anothcr division passcd thc gull to Umca, (March, .c.)
Gcncral Murray succccdcd in cccting a wcllplanncd dcsccnt in thc
ncighborhood ol Tarragona in .., with thc intcntion ol cutting Suchct o
lrom \alcncia: howcvcr, altcr somc succcsslul opcrations, hc thought bcst to
rccmbark.
Tc cxpcdition sct on loot by ngland against Napolcon altcr his rcturn
lrom lba in .. was rcmarkablc on account ol thc grcat mass ol materiel
landcd at stcnd and Antwcrp. Tc AngloHanovcrian army containcd sixty
thousand mcn, but somc camc by land and othcrs wcrc discmbarkcd at a
lricndly port.
Tc nglish cngagcd in an undcrtaking in thc samc ycar which may bc
rcgardcd as vcry cxtraordinary: ! rclcr to thc attack on thc capital ol thc Unitcd
Statcs. Tc world was astonishcd to scc a handlul ol scvcn or cight thousand
nglishmcn making thcir appcarancc in thc midst ol a statc cmbracing tcn
millions ol pcoplc, taking posscssion ol its capital, and dcstroying all thc
public buildings,rcsults unparallclcd in history. Vc would bc tcmptcd to
dcspisc thc rcpublican and unmilitary spirit ol thc inhabitants ol thosc statcs
il thc samc militia had not riscn, likc thosc ol Grcccc, Romc, and Switzcrland,
to dclcnd thcir homcs against still morc powcrlul attacks, and il, in thc samc
ycar, an nglish cxpcdition morc cxtcnsivc than thc othcr had not bccn
cntircly dclcatcd by thc militia ol Louisiana and othcr statcs undcr thc ordcrs
ol Gcncral Jackson.
!l thc somcwhat labulous numbcrs cngagcd in thc irruption ol Xcrxcs
and thc Crusadcs bc cxccptcd, no undcrtaking ol this kind which has bccn
actually carricd out, cspccially sincc ccts havc bccn armcd with powcrlul
artillcry, can at all bc comparcd with thc gigantic projcct and proportionatc
prcparations madc by Napolcon lor throwing onc hundrcd and lty thousand
vctcrans upon thc shorcs ol ngland by thc usc ol thrcc thousand launchcs or
largc gunboats, protcctcd by sixty ships ol thc linc.
|!|
From thc prcccding narrativc thc rcadcr will pcrccivc what a dicrcncc thcrc
is in point ol diculty and probability ol succcss bctwccn dcsccnts attcmptcd
across a narrow arm ol thc sca, a lcw milcs only in width, and thosc in which
thc troops and materiel arc to bc transportcd long distanccs ovcr thc opcn
sca. Tis lact givcs thc rcason why so many opcrations ol this kind havc bccn
cxccutcd by way ol thc 8osporus.

Tc lollowing paragraphs havc bccn compilcd lrom authcntic data:
!
Scc thc account ol thc cxpcdition to thc Crimca.TRANSLATRS.
a
!n .c, thc Frcnch govcrnmcnt scnt an cxpcdition to Algicrs, composcd
ol an army ol thirtyscvcn thousand vc hundrcd mcn and onc hundrcd and
cighty picccs ol artillcry. Morc than vc hundrcd vcsscls ol war and transports
wcrc cmploycd. Tc cct sailcd lrom Toulon.
!n ., Francc scnt a cct ol twcntytwo vcsscls to \cra Cruz. Tc castlc
ol San Juan dUlloa lcll into thcir hands altcr a short bombardmcnt. A small
lorcc ol about onc thousand mcn, in thrcc columns, took thc city ol \cra Cruz
by assault: thc rcsistancc was slight.
!n .,, thc Unitcd Statcs causcd a dcsccnt to bc madc upon thc coast ol
Mcxico, at \cra Cruz, with an army ol thirtccn thousand mcn, undcr thc
command ol Gcncral Scott. nc hundrcd and lty vcsscls wcrc cmploycd,
including mcnolwar and transports. Tc city ol \cra Cruz and thc castlc ol
San Juan dUlloa spccdily lcll into thc posscssion ol thc lorccs ol thc Unitcd
Statcs. Tis important post bccamc thc sccondary basc ol opcrations lor thc
brilliant campaign which tcrminatcd with thc capturc ol thc city ol Mcxico.
!n . commcnccd thc mcmorablc and gigantic contcst bctwccn Russia on
thc onc sidc and ngland, Francc, Sardinia, and Turkcy on thc othcr. Scvcral
dcsccnts wcrc madc by thc allicd lorccs at dicrcnt points ol thc Russian coast:
ol thcsc thc rst was in thc 8altic Sca. An nglish cct sailcd lrom Spithcad,
undcr thc command ol Sir Charlcs Napicr, on thc .ath ol March, and a Frcnch
cct lrom 8rcst, undcr thc command ol \iccAdmiral Parscval cschcncs,
on thc .th ol April. Tcy ccctcd a junction in thc 8ay ol 8arosund on thc
..th ol Junc. Tc allicd cct numbcrcd thirty ships and lty lrigatcs, corvcttcs,
and othcr vcsscls. Tc naval commandcrs wishcd to attack thc dclcnscs ol
8omarsund, on onc ol thc Aland !slcs, but, altcr a rcconnoissancc, thcy camc
to thc conclusion that it was ncccssary to havc landlorccs. A Frcnch corps
ol tcn thousand mcn was at oncc dispatchcd to 8omarsund undcr Gcncral
8araguaydHillicrs, and thc placc was spccdily rcduccd.
Latcr in thc samc ycar, thc grcat cxpcdition to thc Crimca was cxccutcd,
and with rclcrcncc to it thc lollowing lacts arc mcntioncd, in ordcr to givc an
idca ol its magnitudc:
Scptcmbcr ., ., an army ol ltycight thousand vc hundrcd mcn
and two hundrcd picccs ol artillcry was landcd ncar upatoria, composcd
ol thirty thousand Frcnch, twcntyonc thousand vc hundrcd nglish, and
scvcn thousand Turks. Tcy wcrc transportcd lrom \arna to thc placc ol
landing by thrcc hundrcd and cightyninc ships, stcamcrs, and transports.
Tis lorcc lought and gaincd thc battlc ol thc Alma, (Scptcmbcr ac,) and
thcncc procccdcd to Scbastopol. Tc nglish took posscssion ol thc harbor
ol 8alaklava and thc Frcnch ol Kamicsch: thcsc wcrc thc points to which
subscqucnt rcinlorccmcnts and supplics lor thc army in thc Crimca wcrc scnt.
Novcmbcr , at thc battlc ol !nkcrmann, thc allicd army numbcrcd scvcnty
onc thousand mcn.
a6
At thc cnd ol January, ., thc Frcnch lorcc was scvcntyvc thousand mcn
and tcn thousand horscs. Up to thc samc timc, thc nglish had scnt ltylour
thousand mcn to thc Crimca, but only ltccn thousand wcrc alivc, prcscnt,
and t lor duty.
Fcbruary , thc Frcnch numbcrcd cightyvc thousand, thc nglish, twcnty
vc thousand t lor duty, thc Turks, twcntyvc thousand.
May , ., Gcncral La Marmora arrivcd at 8alaklava with ltccn thousand
Sardinians.
!n thc lattcr part ol May, an cxpcdition ol sixtccn thousand mcn was scnt
to Kcrtch.
!n August, thc Frcnch lorcc at Scbastopol had riscn to onc hundrcd and
twcnty thousand mcn.
Scptcmbcr , thc nal assault took placc, which rcsultcd in thc cvacuation
ol thc placc by thc Russians. Tc allics had thcn in battcry morc than cight
hundrcd picccs ol artillcry.
Tc cct which coopcratcd with thc landlorccs in thc artillcry attack
ol ctobcr .,, ., consistcd ol twcntyvc ships. Tcrc wcrc prcscnt and
prcparcd to attack in Scptcmbcr, ., thirtylour ships.
ctobcr, ., an cxpcditionary lorcc ol ninc thousand mcn was scnt to
Kinburn, which placc was capturcd.
Marshal \aillant, in his rcport, as Ministcr ol Var, to thc Frcnch cmpcror,
says thcrc wcrc scnt lrom Francc and Algcria thrcc hundrcd and tcn thousand
mcn and lorty thousand horscs, ol which two hundrcd and twcntyscvcn
thousand mcn rcturncd to Francc and Algcria.
Tc marshals rcport givcs thc lollowing striking lacts, (hc rclcrs only to
Frcnch opcrations:)
Tc artillcry materiel at thc disposal ol thc Army ol thc ast compriscd onc
thousand scvcn hundrcd guns, two thousand guncarriagcs, two thousand
scvcn hundrcd wagons, two millions ol projcctilcs, and ninc million pounds
ol powdcr. Tcrc wcrc scnt to thc army thrcc thousand tons ol powdcr, scvcnty
millions ol inlantrycartridgcs, two hundrcd and scvcnty thousand rounds ol
xcd ammunition, and cight thousand warrockcts.
n thc day ol thc nal assault thcrc wcrc onc hundrcd and cightccn battcrics,
which during thc sicgc had consumcd scvcn million pounds ol powdcr. Tcy
rcquircd onc million sandbags and lty thousand gabions.
l cnginccr matcrials, lourtccn thousand tons wcrc scnt. Tc cnginccrs
cxccutcd lty milcs ol trcnchcs, using cighty thousand gabions, sixty thousand
lascincs, and onc million sandbags.
l subsistcncc, lucl, and loragc, vc hundrcd thousand tons wcrc scnt.
l clothing, campcquipagc, and harncss, twclvc thousand tons.
Hospital storcs, six thousand vc hundrcd tons.
Provisionwagons, ambulanccs, carts, lorgcs, &c, cight thousand tons.
a,
!n all, about six hundrcd thousand tons.
!t is not thought ncccssary to add similar lacts lor thc nglish, Sardinian,
and Turkish armics.
!n ., thc Spaniards madc a dcsccnt upon Morocco with a lorcc ol lorty
thousand inlantry, clcvcn squadrons ol cavalry, and cighty picccs ol artillcry,
using twcntyonc vcsscls ol war with thrcc hundrcd and twcntyscvcn guns,
bcsidcs twcntylour gunboats and numcrous transports.
!n .6c, a lorcc ol nglish and Frcnch was landcd on thc coast ol China,
whcncc thcy marchcd to Pckin and dictatcd tcrms ol pcacc. Tis cxpcdition is
rcmarkablc lor thc smallncss ol thc numbcrs which vcnturcd, at such a grcat
distancc lrom thcir sourccs ol supply and succor, to land upon a hostilc shorc
and pcnctratc into thc midst ol thc most populous cmpirc in thc world.
Tc Frcnch cxpcdition to Syria in .6c was small in numbcrs, and prcscntcd
no rcmarkablc lcaturcs.
Toward thc closc ol thc ycar .6., thc govcrnmcnt ol thc Unitcd Statcs scnt
an cxpcdition ol thirtccn thousand mcn to Port Royal, on thc coast ol South
Carolina, onc ol thc scccding Statcs. Tc cct ol warvcsscls and transports
sailcd lrom Hampton Roads, undcr command ol Captain upont, and was
dispcrscd by a violcnt galc: thc losscs ol mcn and materiel wcrc small, howcvcr,
and thc cct nally rcachcd thc rcndczvous. Tc dclcnscs ol thc harbor having
bccn silcnccd by thc naval lorccs, thc discmbarkation ol thc landtroops took
placc, Gcncral Shcrman bcing in command.
ngland, Francc, and Spain arc now (January .6, .6a) cngagcd in an
cxpcdition dircctcd against Mcxico. Tc rst opcrations wcrc thc capturc, by
thc Spanish lorccs, ol \cra Cruz and its dclcnscs: thc Mcxicans ocrcd no
rcsistancc at that point. Tc luturc will dcvclop thc plans ol thc allics, but thc
ultimatc rcsult ol a strugglc (il, indccd, onc bc attcmptcd by thc Mcxicans)
cannot bc doubtcd, whcn thrcc ol thc most powcrlul statcs ol uropc arc
arraycd against thc lccblc and tottcring rcpublic ol Mcxico.|
a
Concluding commentary
J
ominis lall lrom lavor was rapid, causcd by thc Prussian victory ovcr thc
Frcnch in thc FrancoPrussian Var ol .,c, a lcw ycars altcr his dcath. As
soon as thc Prussian systcm had provcn itscll in battlc, thc military world
bcgan looking to Gcrmany as thc cpitomc ol martial cxccllcncc. Gcrmany
was in, and Francc was out, Clauscwitz was in, and Jomini was out. Jominis
rcputation lcll victim to a changc in lashion.
(click hcrc)
8uv :nv P~vvvwovx
8UY!NG PT!NS
(click hcrc)
You may also buy this book at othcr nc storcs by scarcing lor
!S8N c,66,

Arte de La Guerra - Jomini

Uploaded by

Document Information

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

Arte de La Guerra - Jomini

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

The

crcating an instruction manual lor warjust lollow thc chccklist to cnsurc

Chaptcr !!. Military Policy

Jomini Tc Art ol Var

Chaptcr !!. Military Policy

Jomini Tc Art ol Var

Chaptcr !!. Military Policy

Chaptcr !!. Military Policy

Jomini Tc Art ol Var

Chaptcr !!. Military Policy

Chaptcr !!!. Stratcgy: cnition ol Stratcgy

Jomini Tc Art ol Var

Chaptcr !!!. Stratcgy: cnition ol Stratcgy

Jomini Tc Art ol Var

Chaptcr !!!. Stratcgy: cnition ol Stratcgy

Chaptcr !!!. Stratcgy: cnition ol Stratcgy

Jomini Tc Art ol Var

Chaptcr !!!. Stratcgy: cnition ol Stratcgy

Jomini Tc Art ol Var

Chaptcr !!!. Stratcgy: cnition ol Stratcgy

Chaptcr !!!. Stratcgy: cnition ol Stratcgy

Jomini Tc Art ol Var

Chaptcr !!!. Stratcgy: cnition ol Stratcgy

Jomini Tc Art ol Var

Chaptcr !!!. Stratcgy: cnition ol Stratcgy

You might also like