(3) Ilusorio-Bildner v. Lokin, Jr. (AC No. 6554, 14 December 2005) (4) Lim-Santiago v. Sagucio (AC No.

6705, 31 March 2006) ****Canon 16**** (5) Hsieh v. Quimpo (AC No. 6128, 19 December 2006) (6) Macarilay v. Serina (AC No. 6591, 4 May 2005) ****Canon 17**** (7) Francisco v. Portugal (AC No. 6155, 14 March 2006) ****Canon 19**** (8) Dalisay v. Mauricio, Jr. (AC No. 5655, 23 January 2006) (9) Bun Siong Yao v. Aurelio (AC No. 7023, 30 March 2006) ****Canon 22**** (10) Lim, Jr. v. Villarosa (AC No. 5303, 15 June 2006)

THIRD DIVISION
ERLINDA K. ILUSORIO-BILDNER, Petitioner,

Adm. Case No. 6554 Present:

- versus -

PANGANIBAN, J., Chairman, SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, CORONA, CARPIO MORALES, and GARCIA, JJ.
Promulgated:

ATTY. LUIS K. LOKIN, JR. and THE BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.

December 14, 2005

xx------------------------------------------------------------------------------xx

DECISION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:

On petition for review is the Resolution of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Board of Governors dismissing the disbarment complaint filed by Erlinda K. Ilusorio-Bildner (petitioner) against Atty. Luis Lokin, Jr. (respondent), docketed as CBD Case No. 02-984. In her complaint against respondent, petitioner alleges that on July 15, 1991, her father, the late Potenciano Ilusorio (Ilusorio), engaged the services of the law office of Liwanag Raval Pilando Suplico and Lokin to represent him in the Sandiganbayan Civil Case No. 0009,[1]Republic of the Philippines v. Jose L. Africa, et al., of which Ilusorio was one of the defendants. In that civil case, the Republic was claiming, among other properties, shareholdings in Philippine Overseas Telecommunications Corporation (POTC) and Philippine Communications Satellite Corporation (PHILCOMSAT) 99% of the shares in the latter corporation of which appeared to be owned by POTC. Respondent, together with Attorneys Demaree Raval and Salvador Hizon, actively handled the case for Ilusorio. While the case was pending, Ilusorio, with the assistance of the law firm of Raval and Lokin (successor to Liwanag Raval Pilando Suplico and Lokin), entered into a Compromise Agreement with the Republic which bore the imprimatur of the Sandiganbayan.[2] Under the Compromise Agreement which, by petitioners claim, constituted the full, comprehensive and final settlement of claims of the parties, the Republic was to get 4,727 POTC shares while Ilusorio was to get 673 POTC shares. Petitioner alleges that during the special stockholders meeting of PHILCOMSAT held on August 27, 1998 which was supposed to be a mere informal gathering to introduce the newly appointed government nominees for PHILCOMSAT to the private stockholders of POTC, the gathering, through the high-

handed and deceitful maneuvers of respondent, was suddenly and without notice transformed into a Special Stockholders Meeting at which directors and officers of PHILCOMSAT were elected. Petitioner adds that Ilusorio contested the validity of the meeting by filing before the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) a complaint, docketed as SEC Case No. 09-98-6086, against Manuel Nieto, et al. who were purportedly elected directors and officers of PHILCOMSAT,[3] in which SEC case respondent appeared as the counsel of Nieto, et al., contrary to his oath not to represent conflicting interests. Ilusorio, together with Fidelity Farms, Inc. and Great Asia Enterprises, Inc., had earlier filed with the IBP a disbarment complaint against respondent on the same grounds as those raised in the present case. However, on account of the death of Ilusorio and the failure of his children, namely, Maximo Ilusorio, Sylvia Ilusorio, and petitioner, to establish their qualification to substitute for him, his complaint was dismissed. The dismissal having explicitly stated that it was without prejudice to the filing of a new complaint by Ilusorios children or any person who knows of respondents unethical acts, petitioner contends that her present complaint is not barred by such dismissal. After hearing both parties, IBP Investigating Commissioner Milagros San Juan found merit in petitioners complaint and recommended that respondent be suspended for three months. By the now assailed Resolution of February 27, 2004, however, the IBP Board of Governors set aside the recommendation of Commissioner San Juan and dismissed the complaint. No copy of the notice of resolution was served upon petitioner. Petitioner, nonetheless, learned about the recommendation of Commissioner San Juan and the setting aside thereof by the Board of Governors, prodding her to write a March 10, 2004 letter to the Board in her own name requesting that the Board take up the matter once more and asking for the remanding of the case against Atty. Luis Lokin to the Board

of Governors. In the same letter, petitioner stated that the very brief time it took the Board to review the case and resolve it in respondents favor confirms the information she received that a former IBP official had been intervening for respondent. By letter of April 16, 2004 bearing the signatures of all its members, the Board of Governors denied what it considered as petitioners malicious and reckless allegations, stating that it was constrained to deny [petitioners] request for a remanding or a reconsideration of the case as there was no provision for a reconsideration of any such case either in Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court or in the Rules of Procedure of the Commission on Bar Discipline. Counsel for petitioner, Atty. Samuel Divina, then wrote a letter of July 19, 2004 to Atty. Jose Anselmo Cadiz, Chairman of the IBP Board of Governors and concurrently National President of the IBP, informing him that petitioner had not been notified of any final action on her complaint, and attaching thereto as further evidence a document for its consideration in the event that no such action had yet been taken. Replying, the Board Chairman, by letter dated August 11, 2004, stated that the Board could no longer act on petitioners July 19, 2004 letter, otherwise it would, in effect, be considering the letter as a motion for reconsideration which is not provided for by the rules of procedure for cases of the kind. And the Chairman referred petitioners counsel to the Boards April 16, 2004 letter to her. Atty. Divina thereupon sent a letter dated August 18, 2004 to Atty. Rogelio Vinluan, National Director for Bar Discipline of the IBP, requesting for a copy of the Notice of Resolution of the Board of Governors and of the Investigation Report of Commissioner San Juan, so that petitioner may appeal the case to the Supreme Court. Atty. Divina later sent Atty. Vinluan another letter, dated August 27, 2004, stating that upon further reading of the August 11 letter of the IBP Board Chairman, it appeared that it was the Chairmans intention that the

said letter be treated as a Notice of Resolution and, therefore, petitioner had until September 2, 2004 to file a Petition for Review (since the August 11 letter was received on August 17, 2004). Instead of asking for the Notice of Resolution as in his previous letter, Atty. Divina only requested in his August 24, 2004 letter for a copy of the Report and Recommendation of Commissioner San Juan and the record, if any, of the deliberations of the IBP indicating the basis for reversing her findings. This letter, according to petitioner, was simply ignored. Petitioner thus filed the present petition on September 2, 2004 to which respondent has already filed his Comment. Before delving into the merits of this case, the procedural issues raised by respondent against the petition will first be addressed. Respondent contends that the petition was filed beyond the 15-day reglementary period, as petitioner should be deemed to have received notice of the challenged IBP resolution, not on August 17, 2004 when her counsel received the August 11, 2004 letter of the IBP Board Chairman, but on March 10, 2004 when she wrote the Board admitting having acquired knowledge of the reversal of Commissioner San Juans recommendation. Hence, respondent claims, petitioner had only until March 25, 2004 to file a petition for review. Respondent further contends that even on the assumption that the petition was timely filed, the same should be dismissed for being inappropriate and improper, it being based not on a resolution of the IBP Board, but merely on a letter of the IBP President, contrary to Section 12 of Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court which states:
xxx (c) If the respondent is exonerated by the Board or the disciplinary sanction imposed by it is less than suspension or disbarment (such as admonition, reprimand, or fine) it shall issue a decision exonerating respondent or imposing such sanction. The case shall be deemed terminated unless upon petition of the complaint

or other interested party filed with the Supreme Court within fifteen (15) days from notice of the Boards resolution, the Supreme Court orders otherwise. (Underscoring supplied)

This Court finds that the letter of the Board Chairman to petitioners counsel may not be deemed to be the notice of resolution required by above-quoted Section 12, Rule 139-B, paragraph (c). The notice of resolution referred to in said paragraph (c) refers not to an unofficial information that may be gathered by the parties, nor to any letter from the IBP Board Chairman or even of the Board, but to the official notice of resolution that is supposed to be issued by the Board, copy of which is given to all parties and transmitted to this Court. As paragraph (d) which immediately follows paragraph (c) states:
(d) Notice of the resolution or decision of the Board shall be given to all parties through their counsel. A copy of the same shall be transmitted to the Supreme Court.

In its Comment to the present petition, respondent IBP admits that no such notice has been sent to petitioner: The Board has not to date issued the notice of resolution confirming the dismissal of CBD Case No. 02-984 for the reason that all the relevant records have yet to be completed for transmittal to the Supreme Court. The complainant will be formally furnished a copy of the resolution upon transmittal of the records to the Supreme Court.[4] The IBP eventually transmitted to this Court on July 6, 2005 the Notice of Resolution. A copy was supposedly furnished the petitioner; however, the IBP has not submitted any proof of service. Since no notice has been sent to petitioner, at least at the time this petition was filed, as the August 11, 2004 letter from the IBP Board Chairman cannot be deemed a notice of resolution, the present petition has been timely filed.

Parenthetically, the IBP Board Chairman erred when he stated that the Board may not act on motions for reconsideration as there is no provision for such motions under the rules of procedure for disbarment cases. For Pimentel, Jr. vs. Atty. Llorente[5] instructs:
x x x The question of whether a motion for reconsideration is a prohibited pleading or not under Rule 139-B, 12(c) has been settled in Halimao v. Villanueva, in which this Court held: Although Rule 139-B, 12(C) makes no mention of a motion for reconsideration, nothing in its text or in its history suggests that such motion is prohibited. It may therefore be filed within 15 days from notice to a party. Indeed, the filing of such motion should be encouraged before resort is made to this Court as a matter of exhaustion of administrative remedies, to afford the agency rendering the judgment an opportunity to correct any error it may have committed through a misapprehension of facts or misappreciation of the evidenced. (Underscoring supplied)

In another vein, respondent claims that the petition is premature as it is not based on a notice of resolution of the Board, hence, it should be dismissed for being inappropriate and improper. While, generally, a party who desires to appeal from the IBPs dismissal of a disciplinary case should await the notice of resolution, it bears noting in this instance that the Board, despite issuing a resolution on the subject complaint on February 27, 2004, failed to send a notice of resolution to petitioner. As borne out by the IBPs statement noted earlier, there was still no notice to petitioner as of February 9, 2005 almost one year after the dismissal of the subject complaint. The IBP has given no reason for the delay other than the nebulous explanation that records were still being completed. In view thereof, petitioner, who had already confirmed that her complaint was dismissed through a letter coming from the IBP Board Chairman, cannot be faulted for appealing to this Court notwithstanding the absence of an official notice of resolution.

Respondent also challenges the qualification of petitioner to file this case on the ground of her purported lack of personal knowledge of the facts alleged in the complaint. He invokes the resolution of the IBP in the prior disbarment case against him, where petitioner who therein sought to be substituted in place of her deceased father was held to be without the requisite personal knowledge to pursue the complaint. Even granting arguendo that the earlier resolution constitutes res judicata with respect to the finding that Petitioner does not possess personal knowledge of the facts and circumstances for which Respondent is sought to be administratively liable, personal knowledge is not a requisite for filing a disbarment complaint. Section 1, Rule 139-B states:
SECTION 1. How instituted. Proceedings for disbarment, suspension or discipline of attorneys may be taken by the Supreme Court motu proprio, or by the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) upon the verified complaint of any person. The complaint shall state clearly and concisely the facts complained of and shall be supported by affidavits of persons having personal knowledge of the facts therein alleged and/or by such documents as may substantiate said facts. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Clearly, personal knowledge is required, not of the complainant, but of her witnesses, if there are any. Oddly enough, the quotation of the same provision by the Investigating Commissioner who dismissed the earlier disciplinary case against respondent omitted the phrase any person, making it appear that complainants must have personal knowledge of the facts they allege.[6] Moreover, the ruling of this Court in Navarro v. Meneses III[7] bears reiteration:
The argument of respondent that complainant has no legal personality to sue him is unavailing. Section 1, Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court provides that proceedings for the disbarment,

suspension, or discipline of attorneys may be taken by the Supreme Court motu proprio or by the Integrated Bar of the Philippines upon the verified complaint of any person. The right to institute a disbarment proceeding is not confined to clients nor is it necessary that the person complaining suffered injury from the alleged wrongdoing. Disbarment proceedings are matters of public interest and the only basis for judgment is the proof or failure of proof of the charges. The evidence submitted by complainant before the Commission on Bar Discipline sufficed to sustain its resolution and recommended sanctions. (Underscoring supplied)

While this Court notes petitioners claim that she herself has personal knowledge of the facts alleged in her complaint, a ruling on such allegation is unnecessary in light of the foregoing discussion. Segueing to the merits of the petition, respondent admits that his firm represented Ilusorio in Sandiganbayan Case No. 009[8] and that he represented Manuel Nieto, Jr. and Lourdes Africa in SEC Case No. 09-986086.[9] The Court notes, however, that besides Nieto and Africa, respondent represented Salvador Hizon as well, as indicated in his Memorandum submitted to the SEC[10] and as found by the Committee on Professional Responsibility, Discipline and Disbarment of the IBP.[11] Notwithstanding his acknowledged involvement in both the Sandiganbayan and SEC cases, respondent denies that he was guilty of representing conflicting interests, he proffering that, in the first place, the case of Ilusorio in the Sandiganbayan has been the personal account of Atty. Raval, separate and apart from the accounts of the law partnership. Not only is this claim unsubstantiated, however. It is contradicted by respondents own evidence and statements. Thus, respondent attached to his Comment to the present petition documentary evidence consisting of, among other things, two letters to the PCGG, in one of which he signed on behalf of his firm, and in the other his name appeared as counsel on behalf of his firm.[12] The subject of both letters was the then pending negotiations between the PCGG and Ilusorio

who was therein identified as the client of respondents firm. In connection with these letters, respondent claims: If by chance the signature of the Respondent appears on some correspondences, it is only because Respondent, in good faith, accommodated Atty. Raval upon the latters request who, as then Deputy Secretary of the Senate of the Philippines, is not authorized to engage in the private practice.[13] Besides being a flimsy excuse by itself, this claim of respondent, being an acknowledgment that he signed correspondences with the PCGG pertaining to the Ilusorio case, only shows thatboth he and Atty. Raval collaborated on said case. Furthermore, as earlier noted, respondent has stated that Ilusorio was represented by his firm in the Sandiganbayan case.[14] In light thereof, respondent was personally barred by the rules of ethics from representing an interest contrary to that earlier espoused by his firm. So this Court held in Hilado v. David:[15]
x x x If this letter was written under the circumstances explained by Attorney Franciso and he was unaware of its contents, the fact remains that his firm did give Mrs. Hilado a formal professional advice from which, as heretofore demonstrated, emerged the relation of attorney and client. This letter binds and estops him in the same manner and to the same degree as if he personally had written it. An information obtained from a client by a member or assistant of a law firm is information imparted to the firm. This is not a mere fiction or an arbitrary rule; for such member or assistant, as in our case, not only acts in the name and interest of the firm, but his information, by the nature of his connection with

the firm is available to his associates or employers. x x x (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Respondent denies, however, representing conflicting interests on the ground that SB Case No. 009 and SEC Case No. 09-98-6086 are totally distinct from each other. He attempts to distinguish them as follows:
36. SB Case No. 009, initiated by the PCGG before the Sandiganbayan is totally distinct and separate, and has no relation at all to SEC Case No. 09-98-6086. Said cases involve different parties and causes of action. 37. In Sandiganbayan Case No. 009, the opposing parties are the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG) as plaintiff; Atty. Potenciano Ilusorio, as Defendant and Third party Plaintiff; and Independent Realty Corporation (IRC) and Mid-Pasig Land Development Corp. (MLDC). 38. The subject matter in SB Case No. 009 are shares owned by the National Government, through IRC and MLDC, in the Philippine Overseas Telecommunications Corporation (POTC). 39. SEC Case No. 09-98-6086 involves a dispute regarding the PHILCOMSAT election of its Board of Directors and corporate officers.[16]

The foregoing explanation fails to mention, however, that Ilusorio, a defendant in the Sandiganbayan case, was one of the petitioners in the SEC case, and that among the grounds Ilusorio relied upon in his petition in the SEC was the existence of the Compromise Agreement in the Sandiganbayan, which vested in him ownership and voting rights corresponding to 673 POTC shares.[17]

Nowhere is the conflict of interest clearer than in respondents Memorandum dated September 28, 1998 filed with the SEC wherein he argued in behalf of Nieto, et al. as follows:
A continued exercise of jurisdiction and a subsequent disposition of the instant Petition by this Honorable Commission would pre-empt the resolution by the Sandiganbayan of the disputed shares. It would in fact affirm the ownership by the Petitioners of the said shares subject of the Sandiganbayan case. This Petition is a premature action to enforce the Compromise Agreement entered into by Mr. Ilusorio. Clearly, this is beyond the jurisdiction of this Honorable Commission. Any right to be derived from the Compromise Agreement is clearly inchoate at this point in time.[18] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Plainly, when respondent represented Nieto, et al. in the SEC, he was advocating an interest hostile to the implementation of the same Compromise Agreement that he had priorly negotiated for Ilusorio. The Board thus erred when, while acknowledging that Ilusorio was represented by respondents firm in his negotiations with the PCGG, it nonetheless maintained that there was no conflict of interest upon a finding that the subsequent SEC case did not in any way involve the validity of the compromise agreement forged with the PCGG.[19]

WHEREFORE, the Resolution of the IBP Board of Governors dated February 27, 2004 is SET ASIDE. Respondent Luis K. Lokin, Jr. is found guilty of violating Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of Three (3) Months, with WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar offense shall be dealt with more severely. SO ORDERED.

EN BANC RUTHIE LIM-SANTIAGO, Complainant, A.C. No. 6705 Present: PANGANIBAN, C.J., PUNO, QUISUMBING, YNARES-SANTIAGO, SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, CARPIO, AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, CORONA, CARPIO MORALES, CALLEJO, SR., AZCUNA, TINGA, CHICO-NAZARIO, and GARCIA, JJ. Promulgated: March 31, 2006

- versus -

ATTY. CARLOS B. SAGUCIO, Respondent.

x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

DECISION CARPIO, J.: The Case This is a disbarment complaint against Atty. Carlos B. Sagucio for violating Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and for defying the prohibition against private practice of law while working as government prosecutor. The Facts Ruthie Lim-Santiago (complainant) is the daughter of Alfonso Lim and Special Administratrix of his estate.[1] Alfonso Lim is a stockholder and the former President of Taggat Industries, Inc.[2] Atty. Carlos B. Sagucio (respondent) was the former Personnel Manager and Retained Counsel of Taggat Industries, Inc.[3] until his appointment as Assistant Provincial Prosecutor of Tuguegarao, Cagayan in 1992.[4] Taggat Industries, Inc. (Taggat) is a domestic corporation engaged in the operation of timber concessions from the government. The Presidential Commission on Good Government sequestered it sometime in 1986,[5] and its operations ceased in 1997.[6] Sometime in July 1997, 21 employees of Taggat (Taggat employees) filed a criminal complaint entitled Jesus Tagorda, Jr. et al. v. Ruthie Lim-Santiago, docketed as I.S. No. 97-240 (criminal

complaint).[7] Taggat employees alleged that complainant, who took over the management and control of Taggat after the death of her father, withheld payment of their salaries and wages without valid cause from 1 April 1996 to 15 July 1997.[8]

Respondent, as Assistant Provincial Prosecutor, was assigned to conduct the preliminary investigation.[9] He resolved the criminal complaint by recommending the filing of 651 Informations[10] for violation of Article 288[11] in relation to Article 116[12] of the Labor Code of the Philippines.[13] Complainant now charges respondent with the following violations: 1. Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility

Complainant contends that respondent is guilty of representing conflicting interests. Respondent, being the former Personnel Manager and Retained Counsel of Taggat, knew the operations of Taggat very well. Respondent should have inhibited himself from hearing, investigating and deciding the case filed by Taggat employees.[14] Furthermore, complainant claims that respondent instigated the filing of the cases and even harassed and threatened Taggat employees to accede and sign an affidavit to support the complaint.[15] 2. Engaging in the private practice of law while working as a government prosecutor Complainant also contends that respondent is guilty of engaging in the private practice of law while working as a government prosecutor. Complainant presented evidence to prove that respondent received P10,000 as retainers fee for the months of January and February 1995,[16] another P10,000 for the months of April and May [17] [18] 1995, and P5,000 for the month of April 1996.

Complainant seeks the disbarment of respondent for violating Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and for defying the prohibition against private practice of law while working as government prosecutor. Respondent refutes complainants allegations and counters that complainant was merely aggrieved by the resolution of the criminal complaint which was adverse and contrary to her expectation.[19] Respondent claims that when the criminal complaint was filed, respondent had resigned from Taggat for more than five years.[20]Respondent asserts that he no longer owed his undivided loyalty to Taggat.[21] Respondent argues that it was his sworn duty to conduct the necessary preliminary investigation.[22] Respondent contends that complainant failed to establish lack of impartiality when he performed his duty.[23] Respondent points out that complainant did not file a motion to inhibit respondent from hearing the criminal complaint[24] but instead complainant voluntarily executed and filed her counter-affidavit without mental reservation.[25]

Respondent states that complainants reason in not filing a motion to inhibit was her impression that respondent would exonerate her from the charges filed as gleaned from complainants statement during the hearing conducted on 12 February 1999:
xxx Q. (Atty. Dabu). What do you mean you didnt think he would do it, Madam Witness? A. Because he is supposed to be my fathers friend and he was working with my Dad and he was supposed to be trusted by my father. And he came to me and told me he gonna help me. x x x.[26]

Respondent also asserts that no conflicting interests exist because he was not representing Taggat employees or complainant. Respondent claims he was merely performing his official duty as Assistant Provincial Prosecutor.[27] Respondent argues that complainant failed to establish that respondents act was tainted with personal interest, malice and bad faith.[28] Respondent denies complainants allegations that he instigated the filing of the cases, threatened and harassed Taggat employees. Respondent claims that this accusation is bereft of proof because complainant failed to mention the names of the employees or present them for cross-examination.[29] Respondent does not dispute his receipt, after his appointment as government prosecutor, of retainer fees from complainant but claims that it

was only on a case-to-case basis and it ceased in 1996.[30] Respondent contends that the fees were paid for his consultancy services and not for representation. Respondent submits that consultation is not the same as representation and that rendering consultancy services is not prohibited.[31] Respondent, in his Reply-Memorandum, states:
x x x [I]f ever Taggat paid him certain amounts, these were paid voluntarily by Taggat without the respondents asking, intended as token consultancy fees on a case-to-case basis and not as or for retainer fees. These payments do not at all show or translate as a specie of conflict of interest. Moreover, these consultations had no relation to, or connection with, the above-mentioned labor complaints filed by former Taggat employees.[32]

Respondent insists that complainants evidence failed to prove that when the criminal complaint was filed with the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Cagayan, respondent was still the retained counsel or legal consultant.[33] While this disbarment case was pending, the Resolution and Order issued by respondent to file 651 Informations against complainant was reversed and set aside by Regional State Prosecutor of Cagayan Rodolfo B. Cadelina last 4 January 1999.[34] Hence, the criminal complaint was dismissed.[35]

The IBPs Report and Recommendation The Integrated Bar of the Philippines Investigating Commissioner Ma. Carmina M. Alejandro-Abbas (IBP Commissioner Abbas) heard the case[36] and allowed the parties to submit their respective memoranda.[37] Due to IBP Commissioner Abbas resignation, the case was reassigned to Commissioner Dennis A.B. Funa (IBP Commissioner Funa).[38] After the parties filed their memoranda and motion to resolve the case, the IBP Board of Governors issued Resolution No. XVI-2004-479 (IBP Resolution) dated 4 November 2004 adopting with modification[39] IBP Commissioner Funas Report and Recommendation (Report) finding respondent guilty of conflict of interests, failure to safeguard a former clients interest, and violating the prohibition against the private practice of law while being a government prosecutor. The IBP Board of Governors recommended the imposition of a penalty of three years suspension from the practice of law. The Report reads:
Now the issue here is whether being a former lawyer of Taggat conflicts with his role as Assistant Provincial Prosecutor in deciding I.S. No. 97-240. A determination of this issue will require the test of whether the matter in I.S. No. 97-240 will conflict with his former position of Personnel Manager and Legal Counsel of Taggat.

I.S. No. 97-240 was filed for Violation of Labor Code (see Resolution of the Provincial Prosecutors Office, Annex B of Complaint). Herein Complainant, Ruthie Lim-Santiago, was being accused as having the management and control of Taggat (p. 2, Resolution of the Prov. Pros. Office, supra). Clearly, as a former Personnel Manager and Legal Counsel of Taggat, herein Respondent undoubtedly handled the personnel and labor concerns of Taggat. Respondent, undoubtedly dealt with and related with the employees of Taggat. Therefore, Respondent undoubtedly dealt with and related with complainants in I.S. No. 97-240. The issues, therefore, in I.S. No. 97-240, are very much familiar with Respondent. While the issues of unpaid salaries pertain to the periods 1996-1997, the mechanics and personalities in that case are very much familiar with Respondent. A lawyer owes something to a former client. Herein Respondent owes to Taggat, a former client, the duty to maintain inviolate the clients confidence or to refrain from doing anything which will injuriously affect him in any matter in which he previously represented him (Natam v. Capule, 91 Phil. 640; p. 231, Agpalo, Legal Ethics, 4th ed.) Respondent argues that as Assistant Provincial Prosecutor, he does not represent any client or any interest except justice. It should not be forgotten, however, that a lawyer has an immutable duty to a former client with respect to matters that he previously handled for that former client. In this case, matters relating to personnel, labor policies, and labor relations that he previously handled as Personnel Manager and Legal Counsel of Taggat. I.S. No. 97-240 was for Violation of the Labor Code. Here lies the conflict. Perhaps it would have been different had I.S. No. 97-240 not been labor-related, or if Respondent had not been a Personnel Manager concurrently as Legal Counsel. But as it is, I.S. No. 97-240 is labor-related and Respondent was a former Personnel Manager of Taggat. xxxx While Respondent ceased his relations with Taggat in 1992 and the unpaid salaries being sought in I.S. No. 97-240 were of the years 1996 and 1997, the employees and management involved are the very personalities he dealt with as Personnel Manager and Legal Counsel of Taggat. Respondent dealt with these persons in his fiduciary relations with Taggat. Moreover, he was an employee of the corporation and part of its management.

xxxx As to the propriety of receiving Retainer Fees or consultancy fees from herein Complainant while being an Assistant Provincial Prosecutor, and for rendering legal consultancy work while being an Assistant Provincial Prosecutor, this matter had long been settled. Government prosecutors are prohibited to engage in the private practice of law (see Legal and Judicial Ethics, Ernesto Pineda, 1994 ed., p. 20; People v. Villanueva, 14 SCRA 109; Aquino v. Blanco 70 Phil. 647). The act of being a legal consultant is a practice of law. To engage in the practice of law is to do any of those acts that are characteristic of the legal profession (In re: David, 93 Phil. 461). It covers any activity, in or out of court, which required the application of law, legal principles, practice or procedures and calls for legal knowledge, training and experience (PLA v. Agrava, 105 Phil. 173; People v. Villanueva, 14 SCRA 111; Cayetano v. Monsod, 201 SCRA 210). Respondent clearly violated this prohibition. As for the secondary accusations of harassing certain employees of Taggat and instigating the filing of criminal complaints, we find the evidence insufficient. Accordingly, Respondent should be found guilty of conflict of interest, failure to safeguard a former clients interest, and violating the prohibition against the private practice of law while being a government prosecutor.[40]

The IBP Board of Governors forwarded the Report to the Court as provided under Section 12(b), Rule 139-B[41] of the Rules of Court.

The Ruling of the Court

The Court exonerates respondent from the charge of violation of Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility (Code). However, the Court finds respondent liable for violation of Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility against unlawful [42] conduct. Respondent committed unlawful conduct when he violated

Section 7(b)(2) of the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees or Republic Act No. 6713 (RA 6713). Canon 6 provides that the Code shall apply to lawyers in government service in the discharge of their official duties.[43] A government lawyer is thus bound by the prohibition not [to] represent conflicting interests.[44] However, this rule is subject to certain limitations. The prohibition to represent conflicting interests does not apply when no conflict of interest exists, when a written consent of all concerned is given after a full disclosure of the facts or when no true attorney-client relationship exists.[45] Moreover, considering the serious consequence of the disbarment or suspension of a member of the Bar, clear preponderant evidence is necessary to justify the imposition of the administrative penalty.[46] Respondent is also mandated under Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 not to engage in unlawful x x x conduct. Unlawful conduct includes violation of the statutory prohibition on a government employee to engage in the private practice of [his] profession unless authorized by the Constitution or law, provided, that such practice will not conflict or tend to conflict with [his] official functions.[47] Complainants evidence failed to substantiate the claim that respondent represented conflicting interests In Quiambao v. Bamba,[48] the Court enumerated various tests to determine conflict of interests. One test of inconsistency of interests is whether the lawyer will be asked to use against his former client any confidential information acquired through their connection or previous employment.[49] In essence, what a lawyer owes his former client is to maintain inviolate the clients confidence or to refrain from doing anything which will injuriously affect him in any matter in which he previously represented him.[50]

In the present case, we find no conflict of interests when respondent handled the preliminary investigation of the criminal complaint filed by Taggat employees in 1997. The issue in the criminal complaint pertains to non-payment of wages that occurred from 1 April 1996 to 15 July 1997. Clearly, respondent was no longer connected with Taggat during that period since he resigned sometime in 1992. In order to charge respondent for representing conflicting interests, evidence must be presented to prove that respondent used against Taggat, his former client, any confidential information acquired through his previous employment. The only established participation respondent had with respect to the criminal complaint is that he was the one who conducted the preliminary investigation. On that basis alone, it does not necessarily follow that respondent used any confidential information from his previous employment with complainant or Taggat in resolving the criminal complaint. The fact alone that respondent was the former Personnel Manager and Retained Counsel of Taggat and the case he resolved as government prosecutor was labor-related is not a sufficient basis to charge respondent for representing conflicting interests. A lawyers immutable duty to a former client does not cover transactions that occurred beyond the lawyers employment with the client. The intent of the law is to impose upon the lawyer the duty to protect the clients interests only on matters that he previously handled for the former client and not for matters that arose after the lawyer-client relationship has terminated. Further, complainant failed to present a single iota of evidence to prove her allegations. Thus, respondent is not guilty of violating Rule 15.03 of the Code.

Respondent engaged in the private practice of law while working as a government prosecutor The Court has defined the practice of law broadly as
x x x any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of law, legal procedure, knowledge, training and experience. To engage in the practice of law is to perform those acts which are characteristics of the profession. Generally, to practice law is to give notice or render any kind of service, which device or service requires the use in any degree of legal knowledge or skill.[51]

Private practice of law contemplates a succession of acts of the same nature habitually or customarily holding ones self to the public as a lawyer.[52] Respondent argues that he only rendered consultancy services to Taggat intermittently and he was not a retained counsel of Taggat from 1995 to 1996 as alleged. This argument is without merit because the law does not distinguish between consultancy services and retainer agreement. For as long as respondent performed acts that are usually rendered by lawyers with the use of their legal knowledge, the same falls within the ambit of the term practice of law. Nonetheless, respondent admitted that he rendered his legal services to complainant while working as a government prosecutor. Even the receipts he signed stated that the payments by Taggat were for Retainers fee.[53] Thus, as correctly pointed out by complainant, respondent clearly violated the prohibition in RA 6713. However, violations of RA 6713 are not subject to disciplinary action under the Code of Professional Responsibility unless the violations also constitute infractions of specific provisions of the Code of Professional

Responsibility. Certainly, the IBP has no jurisdiction to investigate violations of RA 6713 the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees unless the acts involved also transgress provisions of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Here, respondents violation of RA 6713 also constitutes a violation of Rule 1.01 of Canon 1, which mandates that [a] lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. Respondents admission that he received from Taggat fees for legal services while serving as a government prosecutor is an unlawful conduct, which constitutes a violation of Rule 1.01. Respondent admitted that complainant also charged him with unlawful conduct when respondent stated in his Demurrer to Evidence:
In this instant case, the complainant prays that the respondent be permanently and indefinitely suspended or disbarred from the practice of the law profession and his name removed from the Roll of Attorneys on the following grounds: xxxx d) that respondent manifested gross misconduct and gross violation of his oath of office and in his dealings with the public.[54]

On the Appropriate Penalty on Respondent The appropriate penalty on an errant lawyer depends on the exercise of sound judicial discretion based on the surrounding facts.[55] Under Civil Service Law and rules, the penalty for government employees engaging in unauthorized private practice of profession is suspension for six months and one day to one year.[56] We find this penalty appropriate for respondents violation in this case of Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

WHEREFORE, we find respondent Atty. Carlos B. Sagucio GUILTY of violation of Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Accordingly, we SUSPEND respondent Atty. Carlos B. Sagucio from the practice of law for SIX MONTHS effective upon finality of this Decision. Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant to be appended to respondents personal record as an attorney, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, the Department of Justice, and all courts in the country for their information and guidance. SO ORDERED.

CANON 16
THIRD DIVISION ROSEMARIE L. HSIEH, Complainant, A.C. No. 6128 Present: QUISUMBING, J., Chairperson, CARPIO, CARPIO MORALES, TINGA, and VELASCO, JR., JJ.

- versus -

ATTY. SALVADOR QUIMPO AND ATTY. NANCY QUIMPO, Respondents .

Promulgated:

December 19, 2006 x----------------------------------------------x DECISION CARPIO MORALES, J.:

The present complaint of Rosemarie Loria Hsieh[1] (complainant) against respondents-spouses Attorneys Salvador and Nancy Quimpo, for gross misconduct, was referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation. The following antecedents spawned the filing of the complaint. Complainant, together with one Pilar Cabuslay, was arrested for drug trafficking and possession of marijuana during a buy-bust operation conducted by police operatives within the vicinity of Isetann Department Store, Manila. Her car, a Mitsubishi Eclipse which she boarded in going to the site of the operation, was impounded by the police authorities. And she was detained at the Manila City Jail. Complainant secured the services of respondents who represented her and Pilar during the inquest and preliminary investigation of the case. As complainant did not have sufficient funds to defray the expenses attendant to her defense, she, while on detention at the Manila City Jail or on May 21, 1999, authorized respondents, who in the meantime were able to secure the release of the car, to sell it by signing a Deed of Sale the complete particulars of which were left in blank. By complainants claim, respondents informed her that the proceeds of the sale would defray expenses in dismissing her case and expediting and facilitating her release from the Manila City Jail;[2] respondents, however, ceased to appear on her behalf, forcing her to secure the services of another lawyer; and when she demanded the return of her car, respondents refused, claiming that it would serve as payment for their legal services. Complainant thus filed a complaint for replevin[3] against respondents. She soon discovered, however, that the car was already registered in the name of respondents by virtue of the Deed of Sale.[4]

While complainant was able to regain possession of the car, the Traffic Management Group seized it from her and charged her withcarnapping and theft,[5] and respondents were eventually able to get hold of it. Respondents, on the other hand, claim that they agreed to handle complainants case for P20,000 as acceptance fee, and P1,000,000 success fee, but as complainant did not have money, she convinced them to accept the Deed of Sale covering her car as a form of assurance that she would settle any outstanding account. Respondents claim further that on September 1999, as there was a big possibility that complainant would be released on bail, she secured the services of another lawyer without her informing them, and to avoid a humiliating situation, they withdrew as her counsel but demanded full settlement of her outstanding account; and since complainant failed to settle her account, she and respondents mutually agreed on September 21, 1999 to give effect to the Deed of Sale which they caused to be notarized. The IBP Investigator defined the issue in the present complaint to be whether respondents, as counsels for complainant, violated the Canons of Professional Responsibility when they acquired from the complainant the [car]. The IBP investigator found that there was a breach of trust on respondents part, in light of, among other things, the lack of justification of the charge of P600,000 for attorneys fees, and the fact that the order allowing complainant to post bail was issued two months after the deed of sale was concluded and, therefore, the amount could not have represented the success fee even if there was such an agreement for the payment thereof.
. . . [T]here is here a case of a breach of trust on the part of the respondents. It is submitted that respondents took advantage of the fact

that the Deed of Sale of Motor Vehicle was already signed in blank by the complainant and which was in their possession coupled with the fact that complainant was still in jail. Their act of filling in the details of the blank instrument by causing the name of Atty. Nancy Quimpo as well as the purchase price of the sale at P600,000.00 to be indicated therein and Atty. Nancy Quimpos signing the same in 21 September 1999 [see p. 3, Respondents Reply to Complainants Position Paper] was unethical if not improper, and smacks of lack of delicadeza especially since the amount of P600,000.00 allegedly representing legal fees or expenses incurred have not been clearly substantiated or justified by the respondents. It is further pointed out that thecomplainant was allowed to post bail only on 09 November 1999 [see Order dated 09 November of Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 54; Annex F, Complainants Reply to Respondents Position Paper]. This is roughly two (2) months after the questioned instrument was allegedly notarized. At this time [21 September 1999], respondents were thus not entitled to collect a success fee from the complainant even if there was an agreement between the parties for the payment of such a fee. Ergo, said P600,000.00 could not also be considered a success fee payable to the respondents. Canon 16 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that a lawyer shall hold in trust all moneys and properties of his client that may come into his possession. Moreover, the respondents were duty-bound to observe faithfulness towards their client and should have conducted themselves with utmost professionalism in discharging their fiduciary duty.[6] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

By Report[7] dated July 22, 2005, the IBP thus recommended:

. . . that both respondents, Atty. Salvador Quimpo and Atty. Nancy Quimpo, be STRONGLY REPRIMANDED, and that a repetition by respondents of this offense shall be dealt with more severely. However, it is further recommended that the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 90 and the Regional Trial Court of Kalookan, Branch 129, be required to submit their decisions in the replevin case [Civil Case No. Q00-41395] and the carnapping/theft cases [Criminal Case Nos. C-67161 and C-67162], respectively, as soon as they are promulgated, to enable the Honorable Supreme Court to determine whether there is a need to revise or adjust the herein recommended penalty, assuming the same is approved.[8] (Underscoring supplied)

It appears from the computer-generated Deed of Sale that complainants first name, the particulars of the car, and the month and year

(May 1999) of the signing of the document were the only data originally provided therein. It can thus be reasonably concluded that the other important particulars, such as the vendees name respondent Atty. Nancy Quimpo, and the purchase price P600,000, were subsequently filled up. If the Deed of Sale was originally intended to serve as security for the payment of complainants outstanding account with respondents, as claimed by the latter, why was not the name of the obligee for whom the security was allegedly executed respondents not also printed out? And why did not respondents bother to advise complainant of the eventual sale of the car and account the proceeds thereof? It is on this account that this Court finds the above-quoted ratiocination of the IBP Investigator in holding respondents to have committed breach of contract well-taken. Although a lawyers lien over a clients property in satisfaction of his lawful fees and disbursements is recognized by this Court, the same cannot be exercised haphazardly. This Courts pronouncement that a fiduciary relationship requires a high degree of fidelity and good faith and is designed to remove all such temptation and to prevent everything of that kind from being done for the protection of the client[9] bears reiterating. It is thus this Courts duty to look into dealings between attorneys and their clients and guard the latter from any undue consequences resulting from a situation in which they may stand unequal.[10] As the breach of the trust reposed upon respondents constitutes a violation of the Canon 16 of the Canons of Professional Responsibility which reads: Canon 16 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides:

CANON 16 A LAWYER SHALL HOLD IN TRUST ALL MONEYS AND PROPERTIES OF HIS CLIENT THAT MAY COME INTO HIS POSSESSION,

this Court finds that the recommended penalty therefor is not commensurate. Instead, respondents suspension for three months from the practice of law would be reasonable. On the IBP-CBD recommendation that the courts before the replevin and carnapping/theft cases involving the same parties were lodged submit their decisions to enable this Court to determine whether there is a need to revise or adjust the penalty, the same does not lie. Administrative cases against lawyers belong to a class of their own. They are distinct from and may proceed independently of civil and/or criminal cases. Hence, the disposition in the administrative case is not governed by that in the civil and/or criminal cases and vice versa.[11] WHEREFORE, respondents Atty. Salvador Quimpo and Atty. Nancy Quimpo are SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of Three (3) Months from notice, with warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with more severely. Let copies of this Decision be furnished all courts in the country, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and the Office of the Bar Confidant. SO ORDERED CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES Associate Justice THIRD DIVISION

[A.C. No. 6591. May 4, 2005]

MARISSA L. MACARILAY, complainant, SERIA, respondent. DECISION

PANGANIBAN, J.:

vs. FELIX

B.

Failure to render the legal services agreed upon, despite the undisputed receipt of an acceptance fee, is a clear violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Negligence in attending to the needs of a client and a deceitful cover-up of such carelessness likewise constitute major breaches of the lawyers oath.

The Case Before us is a verified Complaint[1] for malpractice and/or gross misconduct against Atty. Felix B. Seria, filed by Marissa L. Macarilay with the Integrated Bar of the Philippines Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD) on September 22, 2003. The IBP-CBD, through Director Rogelio A. Vinluan, required respondent to answer the charges.[2] It thereafter held a mandatory conference/hearing on January 13, 2004, during which the parties were able to enter into a stipulation of facts as well as to present and mark their documentary evidence.[3]After they submitted their respective Position Papers,[4] the case was deemed submitted for resolution. The investigator of the case, Commissioner Leland R. Villadolid Jr., summarized the antecedents thus:

Complainants version of the facts pertinent to this case is as follows: Sometime in year 2000, Complainant and one Jenelyn Balaoro (Balaoro) bought a lot from one Albaria Mohammad (Mohammad). Complainant and Balaoro, however, could not register the sale with the Register of Deeds and cause the transfer of the title in their names because Mohammad failed to surrender the owners duplicate certificate of title for said lot. Subsequently, Complainant learned from one Reina Ong (Ong) that Mohammad had mortgaged the said lot to a third party. Ong advised Complainant to get a copy of the mortgage contract and to do this the latter needs to have a contact in the Register of Deeds. Sometime in January or February 2002, Ong introduced Complainant to one Vic Paule (Paule), an employee of the Register of Deeds of Quezon City, who advised Complainant to get a lawyer to handle the case. Complainant allegedly gave Paule P8,000.00 for the help the latter will give her in securing a copy of the mortgage contract concerned. On March 18, 2002, Complainant, Balaoro and Ong met with Paule at the Star Mall in Mandaluyong and proceeded to the office of

Respondent, the lawyer recommended by Paule. During said meeting, Complainant consulted Respondent about the problem concerning the transfer of the subject lot title in her and Balaoros names and the latter advised that the first thing [they have to do], is to file an adverse claim with the Register of Deeds. Respondent, however, required an acceptance fee ofP20,000.00 before he could act on the matter. Thus, on the same day, Complainant issued a check to Respondent for P20,000.00 as payment of the acceptance fee. Subsequently, Respondent asked Complainant for P3,000.00 as notarization fee and P5,000.00 as filing fee for the adverse claim. On April 5, 2002, Complainant and Balaoro went to Respondents office and paid said amounts. On the same day, Respondent himself typed the affidavit of adverse claim in the presence of Complainant and Balaoro and the latter subsequently signed the same. On May 16, 2002, upon Respondents advice, Complainant gave Respondent another P20,000.00 in check as filing fee for the suits to be filed against Mohammad. Towards the middle part of the year, Complainant inquired from Respondent about the status of the case(s) against Mohammad but the latter could not give any further developments other than that the affidavit of adverse claim had already been filed with the Register of Deeds. It appears that Respondent was having problems about the fact that Mohammads whereabouts are unknown and Respondent was not sure what to do about it. Subsequently, Complainant received assurance from Respondent that the case against Mohammad was already filed in court although Respondent could not identify the particular court except that it was pending in the sala of one Judge Regala. Upon verification with the courts and the fiscals office [at] Quezon City, Complainant learned that no case, whether criminal or civil, was ever filed by Respondent against Mohammad. Complainant then called Respondent regarding her findings and even suggested service of summons by publication upon Mohammad, having receiv[ed] advice from one Atty. Noel Sorreda (Atty. Sorreda) that such manner of service is appropriate in view of the lack of information regarding Mohammads whereabouts. Respondent, however, immediately got angry so Complainant did not insist on her inquiries and suggestions. On March 24, 2003, upon Complainants request, Atty. Sorreda called Respondent to inquire about the specific branch where the case against Mohammad was supposedly pending. Respondent got angry and hung up the phone. Upon learning this, Complainant authorized Atty. Sorreda to terminate the services of Respondent on her behalf. Atty. Sorreda called Respondent a second time but was able to talk only with presumably

Respondents lady-receptionist or secretary whom Atty. Sorreda requested to just relay to Respondent his message regarding the termination of Respondents services. On March 26, 2003, Atty. Sorreda, upon Complainants request, sent a letter to Respondent confirming the verbal termination of services, and also asking for the turnover of the pertinent documents that were with Respondent. Subsequently, Complainant herself wrote Respondent a letter affirming the contents of the earlier letter of Atty. Sorreda. In a letter dated April 4, 2003, Respondent denied the fact of his termination by Atty. Sorreda and invited Complainant to his office to talk things over. Complainant responded through Atty. Sorreda in a letter dated May 16, 2003 by reiterating the termination of Respondents services and the request for the turnover of documents. In a letter dated May 23, 2003, Respondent enclosed the documents requested. Since it appears from the documents turned over that Respondent never filed a suit against Mohammad, Complainant wrote Respondent demanding the return of the money she paid for the anticipated legal services Respondent was supposed to render but which were not actually rendered. Respondents failure to respond to said letter prompted Complainant [to] send a follow-up letter dated July 16, 2003. Instead of returning the money, Respondent wrote Complainant a letter dated July 14, 2003 denying receipt of any amount from Complainant other than the P20,000.00 acceptance fee and demanding payment of alleged unpaid attorneys fee of P40,000 and fees for notarial services of P3,000.00 which Respondent allegedly advanced for Complainant. Thus, Complainant filed the present administrative case for disciplinary action, likewise praying for the return of the money she paid for the anticipated legal services Respondent was supposed to render but which were not actually rendered. On the other hand, Respondents version of the facts pertinent to this case is as follows: On March 16, 2002, Complainant, Balaoro and Ong went to Respondents office during which Complainant related to Respondent her various problems and cases. Respondent advised Complainant that the solutions to her problem regarding Mohammad consist of two (2) phases. The first phase consists of: (1) having the notary public of the deed covering the sale of the subject property sign the acknowledgment page (since although the said deed contained the notarial seal of said notary, the latter did not sign the same); (2) preparing a complaint in court to compel Mohammad to surrender the owners certificate of title; and (3) executing an affidavit of adverse claim to cause its inscription on the copy of the said title in the Registry of Deeds to protect their interest. The second [phase] consists of: (1) filing the complaint in court to

compel Mohammad to surrender the owners duplicate certificate of title, to cause the cancellation of said title and the issuance of another title in the names of Complainant and Balaoro, and to cause the removal from said title of the mortgage lien thereon in favor of Hernando and Nenita Rosario; and (2) filing of a criminal complaint for estafa against Mohammad. On the same day, Complainant engaged Respondent to provide the legal services to pursue the foregoing remedies. The parties verbal agreement with respect to Respondents fees is as follows: (1) payment of acceptance fee of P20,000.00; (2) payment of attorneys fees of P15,000 after Respondent has accomplished the first [phase] of the remedies; (3) payment of attorneys fees of P15,000 after Respondent has accomplished the second [phase] of the remedies; and (4) for hearings/follow-ups, payment of per appearance fee of P3,000.00. Complainant paid the acceptance fee by issuing Respondent a check dated March 18, 2002 covering P20,000.00. Thereafter, Respondent caused the notary public whose seal appeared on the deed covering the sale of the subject property to sign the acknowledgment page thereof, advancing the notarial fee of P3,000.00 which Complainant failed to pay for which reason said notary did not sign said deed. On April 5, 2002, Complainant and Balaoro went to his office and signed the affidavit of adverse claim, which Respondent prepared. On the same date, Respondent requested Complainant and Balaoro to sign the civil complaint and criminal complaint against Mohammad which Respondent prepared but Complainant and Balaoro refused to sign because according to the latter two the residence of Mohammad in said complaints is already wrong since Mohammads whereabouts are already unknown. Complainant and Balaoro promised to locate Mohammads whereabouts and asked Respondent to wait for such data. Thereafter, Respondent even advised Complainant and Balaoro to locate Mohammad because resorting to the remedy of complaint and summons by publication is very expensive and should be resorted to only as a last recourse. Respondent adds that even as late as January 8, 2003, the civil and criminal complaints could not be filed because Complainant herself wanted Respondent to amend the pleadings by including an additional defendant or respondent and increasing the claim, for damages. Respondent further claims that he also extensively gave legal advise to Complainant with respect to the following matters: (1) Complainants litigation against spouses Casido to recover her 10% retention in architects fee; (2) collection of P800,000.00 indebtedness of one Mrs. Dizon; and (3) recovery of Complainants investments in her 2001 and 2002 car transactions.

Claiming that Complainant did not pay him any amount other than the P20,000.00 acceptance fee, Respondent argues that Complainant still owes him the following amounts: (1) the P3,000.00 he paid to the notary public to sign the acknowledgment page of the deed covering the sale of the subject property; (2) the P200 he spent in the notarization, registration and inscription of the affidavit of adverse claim; (3) the P15,000.00 attorneys fees agreed upon for accomplishing the first [phase] of Complainants remedies relative to her problem with Mohammad; and (4) an additional P40,000.00 for the legal services he rendered with respect to Complainants other problems. Respondent further claims that Complainant should pay him the costs relative to the filing of this administrative case.
[5]

Report of the Investigating Commissioner In the investigating commissioners opinion, respondent had been remiss in attending to the cause of his client, in violation of Rules 18.03 and 18.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Regarded as a mere afterthought was his defense that his failure to file the civil and the criminal complaints was the fault of complainant. It was noted that if she was indeed responsible for the non-filing of the complaints, he should have pointed out this fault at the earliest opportunity, which was in his April 4, 2003 letter. The commissioner further opined that this defense had been invoked only in respondents letter dated July 14, 2003, after complainant demanded the return of the amounts she had paid. While likewise rejecting respondents claim for unpaid legal fees amountin g to P15,000, the commissioner upheld Balaoros sworn testimony. It corroborated that of complainant, who had said that the only agreement between her and respondent was the acceptance fee of P20,000. His claim ofP40,000 as consultation fee for the advice he had allegedly given her concerning other legal problems was also rejected for lack of evidence. Commissioner Villadolid then wrote the following recommendation:

x x x [T]his Commissioner finds that Respondent violated Canons 17 and 18 of the CPR and recommends a penalty of reprimand or suspension subject to the discretion of the Commission. Further, considering that it is established from the records that Respondent received a total of P48,000.00 from Complainant and that the only legal service rendered by Respondent consists of the notarization of the deed of sale covering the subject property and the filing of the adverse claim, this Commissioner believes that P8,000.00 is sufficient compensation for the

services actually rendered and thus recommends that Respondent be ordered to pay Complainant P40,000.00 by way of restitution to Complainant.
[6]

Acting on the above recommendation, the IBP board of governors approved on July 30, 2004, the following Resolution:

RESOLUTION NO. XVI-2004-386 CBD Case No. 03-1141 Marissa L. Macarilay vs. Atty. Felix B. Seria RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, with modification, the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of the above-entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution as Annex A; and, finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules, and for respondents violation of Canons 17 and 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility by his failure to exercise due diligence in protecting and attending to the interest of complainant after receiving payment for the legal services he was supposed to render, Atty. Felix B. Seria is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for six (6) months and Ordered to Pay complainant P40,000.00 by way of Restitution.
[7]

The Courts Ruling We agree with the foregoing Resolution of the IBP board of governors.

Administrative Liability A lawyer-client relationship is highly fiduciary in nature;[8] it is delicate, exacting and confidential.[9] It requires a high standard of conduct and demands utmost fidelity, candor, fairness, and good faith.[10] The legal profession demands vigilance and attention expected of a good father of a family.[11] Lawyers should adopt the norm expected of people of good intentions. In brief, they must always be protective of the interests of their clients as good parents would be protective of their own families.[12] Indeed, under their sacred oath, lawyers pledge not to delay any person for money or malice. They are bound to conduct themselves according to the best of their knowledge and discretion, with all good fidelity to their clients.[13] These duties are further stressed in the Code of Professional Responsibility, specifically in the following pertinent provisions:

CANON 15 A lawyer shall observe candor, fairness and loyalty in all his dealings and transactions with his clients. CANON 16 A lawyer shall hold in trust all moneys and properties of his client that may come into his possession. xxx xxx xxx

Rule 16.03 A lawyer shall deliver the funds and property of his client when due or upon demand. x x x. CANON 17 A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and he shall be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him. CANON 18 A lawyer shall serve his client with competence and diligence. xxx xxx xxx

Rule 18.03 A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him and his negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable. Rule 18.04 A lawyer shall keep the client informed of the status of his case and shall respond within a reasonable time to the clients request for information.
Admittedly, respondent received the amount of P20,000 as acceptance fee for the cases he had agreed to file on behalf of complainant. Plainly, he was less than candid in his dealings with his client; he displayed lack of honesty and fidelity to her cause. Sufficiently established were the following acts: (1) despite his receipt on May 16, 2002, of P20,000 for filing fees, he did not file the cases he had agreed to handle; (2) he deceived complainant when he lied by saying that a civil complaint had been filed in the sala of one Judge Regala of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City; (3) respondent refused to return the money he had received for the filing fees. These misrepresentations, lies and lapses constituted a breach of his sworn duty as a lawyer and of the ethical standards he was required to honor and observe. Lawyers owe full devotion to the protection of the interests of their clients, as well as warmth and zeal in the defense of the latters rights. [14] Once they agree to handle a case, lawyers are bound to give to it their utmost attention, skill and competence, regardless of its significance.[15] Public interest requires that they exert their best efforts and use all their learning and ability in the speedy prosecution or defense of the clients cause.[16] Those who perform that duty with diligence and candor not only safeguard the interests of the client, but also serve the ends of justice. [17] They do honor to the bar and help maintain the communitys respect for the legal profession.[18]

Moreover, the lawyer-client relationship, being one of confidence, requires lawyers to give the client timely, adequate and truthful updates on the developments of the case.[19] In this manner, the trust and faith of clients in their counsel would remain unimpaired. Indeed, respondent neglected a legal matter entrusted to him by failing to file the complaints as he was supposed to. Unbelievable is his claim that the complaints were ready as early as April 5, 2002, but that these were not filed anyway because complainant had refused to sign them, absent the correct address of the defendant (Albaria Mohammad). First, evidence abound that it was complainant who was insistent that the cases be filed. She repeatedly inquired about the case, but respondent would not give her any clear answer. Later on, he lied to her by saying that the complaint was pending in the sala of one Judge Regala. His deception on top of his failure to file the cases were raised in the letter dated March 26, 2003,[20] written by Atty. Noel Sorreda, her new counsel. In his April 4, 2003 reply,[21] respondent did not mention anything about the complaints that had allegedly been prepared as early as April 5, 2002. Commissioner Villadolid aptly observed in his Report:

x x x The fact that respondents 4 April 2003 letter-response to said letter, as well as respondents subsequent letter dated 23 May 2003, did not contain either gives further credence to complainants version of the facts. Notably, it was only in respondents letter dated 14 July 2003 that respondent raised such defenses for the first time. Considering that said 14 July 2003 letter was in response to complainants 28 June 2003 letter demanding the return of certain amounts for legal services which complainant believed respondent did not render, this Commissioner is inclined to believe that such defenses are mere afterthought to defeat complainants claim for the return of said amounts.
Were it not for the vigilance of complainant in inquiring about the status of her cases, she would not have known that the complaints had not been filed at all. Respondent deliberately withheld informing her of his inaction, notwithstanding her repeated follow-ups. Thus, he is deemed to have wronged her and effectively betrayed the trust she had placed in him. Second, his alleged lack of knowledge of the correct address of the defendant is not a hindrance to the filing of a complaint. Indeed, such address is material to the service of summons[22] which, however, presupposes that a complaint has been properly filed in court. Furthermore, Section 14 of Rule 14 of the Rules of Court[23] provides for remedies when the defendants address is unknown. Thus, respondent should have nevertheless filed the complaint, especially because complainant had already given him payment for the filing fees. His attempt to cover up his negligence by wrongfully shifting the blame to her cannot be countenanced by this Court.

Finally, respondent should have returned the money to complainant following his failure to file the cases.[24] Where the client gives money to the lawyer for a specific purpose -- such as to file an action or to appeal an adverse judgment -- the latter should, upon failure to do so, immediately return it to the former.[25] The unjustified withholding of funds belonging to the client warrants the imposition of disciplinary action against the lawyer.[26] It was sufficiently proven that, all in all, complainant had paid respondent P48,000:

Similarly, a review of the records reveals that contrary to Respondents claim, in addition to the P20,000.00 covered by the check dated 18 March 2002 which complainant paid during the parties initial meeting, complainant made subsequent payments to respondent. Balaoro confirms that when she and complainant went back to respondents office on 5 April 2002, complainant paid respondent P3,000.00 and P5,000.00 in cash. Another P20,000.00 was likewise paid to respondent as evidenced by the RCBC check dated 16 May 2002 issued by complainant to respondent.
[27]

Likewise established was the obvious fact that the only legal service rendered by respondent consisted of the notarization of the Deed of Sale covering the property purchased by complainant and the filing of the adverse claim. We agree with Commissioner Villadolid that P8,000 was sufficient compensation for the services actually rendered. Hence, respondent must return to complainant the balance of P40,000 plus legal interest. The failure of respondent to discharge his duty properly constitutes an infringement of ethical standards and of his oath. Such failure makes him answerable not just to his client, but also to this Court, to the legal profession, and to the general public.[28] The recommended penalty of suspension from the practice of law for six months is in accordance with jurisprudence.[29] WHEREFORE, Atty. Felix B. Seria is found GUILTY of violating Canons 15, 16, 17 and 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of six (6) months, effective upon his receipt of this Decision. He is further ORDERED to return to Marissa L. Macarilay, within thirty (30) days from notice, the amount of P40,000, with interest at 6 percent per annum from May 16, 2002, until full payment. Let copies of this Decision be furnished all courts as well as the Office of the Bar Confidant, which is instructed to include a copy in respondents personal file. SO ORDERED. Sandoval-Gutierrez, Corona, Carpio-Morales, and Garcia, JJ., concur.

CANON 17

THIRD DIVISION

MA. GINA L. FRANCISCO, JOSEPHINE S. TAN and CARLOS M. JOAQUIN, Complainants,

A.C. No. 6155

Present:

- versus -

QUISUMBING, J., Chairman, CARPIO, CARPIO MORALES, and TINGA, JJ.

ATTY. JAIME JUANITO P. PORTUGAL, Respondent. Promulgated:

March 14, 2006

x---------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

TINGA, J.:

Complainants filed before this Court an affidavit-complaint[1] on 15 August 2003 against Atty. Jaime Juanito P. Portugal (respondent) for violation of the Lawyers Oath, gross misconduct, and gross negligence. Complainants are related to petitioners in G.R. No. 152621-23 entitled SPO1 Ernest C. Francisco, SPO1 Donato F. Tan and PO3 Rolando M. Joaquin v. People of the Philippines, in whose behalf respondent filed the Petition for Review on Certiorari (Ad Cautelam) in the case.

The complaint against respondent originated from his alleged mishandling of the above-mentioned petition which eventually led to its denial with finality by this Court to the prejudice of petitioners therein.

The facts are as follows:

On 21 March 1994, SPO1 Ernesto C. Francisco, SPO1 Donato F. Tan and PO3 Rolando M. Joaquin (eventually petitioners in G.R. No. 152621-23, collectively referred to herein as the accused) were involved in a shooting incident which resulted in the death of two individuals and the serious injury of another. As a result, Informations were filed against them before the Sandiganbayan for murder and frustrated murder. The accused pleaded not guilty and trial ensued. After due trial, the Sandiganbayan[2] found the accused guilty of two counts of homicide and one count of attempted homicide.

At that juncture, complainants engaged the services of herein respondent for the accused. Respondent then filed a Motion for Reconsideration with the Sandiganbayan but it was denied in a Resolution dated 21 August 2001. Unfazed by the denial, respondent filed an Urgent Motion for Leave to File Second Motion for Reconsideration, with the attached Second Motion for Reconsideration.[3] Pending resolution by the Sandiganbayan, respondent also filed with this Court a Petition for Review on Certiorari (Ad Cautelam) on 3 May 2002.

Thereafter, complainants never heard from respondent again despite the frequent telephone calls they made to his office. When respondent did not return their phone inquiries, complainants went to respondents last known address only to find out that he had moved out without any forwarding address.

More than a year after the petition was filed, complainants were constrained to personally verify the status of the ad cautelam petition as they had neither news from respondent about the case nor knowledge of

his whereabouts. They were shocked to discover that the Court had already issued a Resolution[4] dated 3 July 2002, denying the petition for late filing and non-payment of docket fees.

Complainants also learned that the said Resolution had attained finality and warrants of arrest[5] had already been issued against the accused because respondent, whose whereabouts remained unknown, did nothing to prevent the reglementary period for seeking reconsideration from lapsing.

In his Comment,[6] respondent states that it is of vital significance that the Court notes that he was not the original counsel of the accused. He only met the accused during the promulgation of the Sandiganbayan decision convicting the accused of two counts of homicide and one count of attempted homicide. He was merely requested by the original counsel to be on hand, assist the accused, and be present at the promulgation of the Sandiganbayan decision.

Respondent claims that there was no formal engagement undertaken by the parties. But only because of his sincere effort and in true spirit of the Lawyers Oath did he file the Motion for Reconsideration. Though admitting its highly irregular character, respondent also made informal but urgent and personal representation with the members of the Division of the Sandiganbayan who promulgated the decision of conviction. He asserts that because of all the efforts he put into the case of the accused, his other professional obligations were neglected and that all these were done without proper and adequate remuneration.

As to the ad cautelam petition, respondent maintains that it was filed on time. He stresses that the last day of filing of the petition was on 3 April 2002 and on that very day, he filed with this Court a Motion for Extension of Time to File Petition for Review,[7] seeking an additional thirty (30) days to file the petition. Subsequently, on 3 May 2002, he filed the petition by registered mail and paid the corresponding docket fees. Hence, so he concludes, it was filed within the reglementary period.

Soon thereafter, respondent recounted all the herculean efforts he made in assisting the accused for almost a year after the promulgation of the Sandiganbayan decision. He considered the fact that it was a case he had just inherited from the original counsel; the effect of his handling the case on his other equally important professional obligations; the lack of adequate financial consideration for handling the case; and his plans to travel to the United States to explore further professional opportunities. He then decided to formally withdraw as counsel for the accused. He wrote a letter to PO3 Rolando Joaquin (PO3 Joaquin), who served as the contact person between respondent and complainants, explaining his decision to withdraw as their counsel, and attaching the Notice to Withdraw which respondent instructed the accused to sign and file with the Court. He sent the letter through registered mail but unfortunately, he could not locate the registry receipt issued for the letter.

Respondent states that he has asked the accused that he be discharged from the case and endorsed the Notice of Withdrawal to PO3 Joaquin for the latter to file with the Court. Unfortunately, PO3 Joaquin did not do so, as he was keenly aware that it would be difficult to find a new counsel who would be as equally accommodating as

respondent. Respondent suggests this might have been the reason for the several calls complainants made to his office.

On 9 February 2004, the Court resolved to refer the matter to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation.

The case was assigned to Investigating Commissioner Leland R. Villadolid, Jr. (Commissioner Villadolid) who sent notices of hearing to the parties but of the three complainants, only complainant Carlos Joaquin appeared. Thus, in the mandatory conference held, the other two complainants were declared as having waived their rights to further participate in the IBP proceedings.[8]

The parties were directed to file their respective position papers and on 27 May 2005, Commissioner Villadolid submitted his Report and Recommendation finding respondent guilty of violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility[9] and recommended the imposition of penalty ranging from reprimand to suspension of six (6) months.[10] On 12 November 2005, the Board of Directors of the IBP resolved to adopt and approve Commissioner Villadolids recommendation to find respondent guilty and specifically to recommend his suspension for six (6) months as penalty.

The only issue to be resolved in the case at bar is, considering all the facts presented, whether respondent committed gross negligence or

misconduct in handling G.R. No. 152621-23, which eventually led to the ad cautelam petitions dismissal with finality.

After careful consideration of the records of the case, the Court finds the suspension recommended by the IBP proper.

In a criminal case like that handled by respondent in behalf of the accused, respondent has a higher duty to be circumspect in defending the accused for it is not only the property of the accused which stands to be lost but more importantly, their right to their life and liberty. As held in Regala v. Sandiganbayan:[11]

Thus, in the creation of lawyer-client relationship, there are rules, ethical conduct and duties that breathe life into it, among those, the fiduciary duty to his client which is of very delicate, exacting and confidential character, requiring a very high degree of fidelity and good faith, that is required by reason of necessity and public interest x x x .

It is also the strict sense of fidelity of a lawyer to his client that distinguishes him from any other profession in society. x x x[12]

At the onset, the Court takes notice that the ad cautelam petition was actually filed out of time. Though respondent filed with the Sandiganbayan an Urgent Motion for Leave to File Second Motion for Reconsideration with the attached Second Motion for Reconsideration, he should have known that a second motion for reconsideration is a prohibited pleading[13] and it rests on the sound discretion of the Sandiganbayan to admit it or not. Thus,

in effect, the motion did not toll the reglementary period to appeal. Having failed to do so, the accused had already lost their right to appeal long before respondent filed his motion for extension. Therefore, respondent cannot now say he filed the ad cautelam petition on time. Also important to note is the allegation of complainants that the Sandiganbayan denied the second motion for reconsideration in its Resolution dated 7 February 2002. This respondent does not dispute.

As to respondents conduct in dealing with the accused and complainants, he definitely fell short of the high standard of assiduousness that a counsel must perform to safeguard the rights of his clients. As aptly observed by Commissioner Villadolid, respondent had not been quite candid in his dealings with the accused or complainants. The Court notes that though respondent represented to the accused that he had changed his office address, still, from the examination of the pleadings[14] he filed, it can be gleaned that all of the pleadings have the same mailing address as that known to complainants. Presumably, at some point, respondents office would have received the Courts Resolution dismissing the petition. Of course, the prudent step to take in that situation was to at least inform the client of the adverse resolution since they had constantly called respondents office to check the status of the case. Even when he knew that complainants had been calling his office, he opted not to return their calls.

Respondent professed an inkling that the several phone calls of complainants may have been about the letter he sent PO3 Joaquin regarding his desire to be discharged as counsel of the case. However, though aware of such likelihood, respondent still did not return their

calls. Had he done so, he and complainants could have threshed out all unresolved matters between them.

Had respondent truly intended to withdraw his appearance for the accused, he as a lawyer who is presumably steeped in court procedures and practices, should have filed the notice of withdrawal himself instead of the accused. At the very least, he should have informed this Court through the appropriate manifestation that he had already given instructions to his clients on the proper way to go about the filing of the Notice of Withdrawal, as suggested by Commissioner Villadolid. In not so doing, he was negligent in handling the case of the accused. Certainly, respondent ought to know that he was the one who should have filed the Notice to Withdraw and not the accused. His tale that he sent a registered letter to the accused and gave them instructions on how to go about respondents withdrawal from the case defies credulity. It should have been respondent who undertook the appropriate measures for the proper withdrawal of his representation. He should not have relied on his client to do it for him if such was truly the case. Without the presentation of the alleged registry receipt (or the return card, which confirms the receipt of the mail by the recipient) of the letter he allegedly sent to PO3 Joaquin, the Court cannot lend credence to respondents naked claim, especially so that complainants have been resolute in their stand that they did not hear from respondent after the latter had filed the ad cautelam petition. He could relieve himself of his responsibility as counsel only first by securing the written conformity of the accused and filing it with the court pursuant to Rule 138, Section 26 of the Rules of Court.[15]

The rule in this jurisdiction is that a client has the absolute right to terminate the attorney-client relation at anytime with or without cause. The right of an attorney to withdraw or terminate the relation other than for

sufficient cause is, however, considerably restricted. Among the fundamental rules of ethics is the principle that an attorney who undertakes to conduct an action impliedly stipulates to carry it to its conclusion. He is not at liberty to abandon it without reasonable cause. A lawyers right to withdraw from a case before its final adjudication arises only from the clients written consent or from a good cause.[16]

We agree with Commissioner Villadolid that the dismissal of the ad cautelam petition was primarily due to the gross negligence of respondent. The Court has stressed in Aromin v. Boncavil[17] that:

Once he agrees to take up the cause of the client, the lawyer owes fidelity to such cause and must always be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him. He must serve the client with competence and diligence, and champion the latters cause with wholehearted fidelity, care, and devotion.Elsewise stated, he owes entire devotion to the interest of the client, warm zeal in the maintenance and defense of his clients rights, and the exertion of the his utmost learning and ability to the end that nothing be taken or withheld from his client, save by the rules of law, legally applied. This simply means that his client is entitled to the benefit of any and every remedy and defense that is authorized by the law of the land and he may expect his lawyer to assert every such remedy or defense. If much is demanded from an attorney, it is because the entrusted privilege to practice law carries with it the correlative duties not only to the client but also to the court, to the bar, and to the public. A lawyer who performs his duty with diligence and candor not only protects the interest of his client; he also serves the ends of justice, does honor to the bar, and helps maintain the respect of the community to the legal profession.[18]

Respondent has time and again stated that he did all the endeavors he enumerated without adequate or proper remuneration. However, complainants have sufficiently disputed such claim when they attached in their position paper filed before the IBP a machine validated deposit slip in

the amount of P15,500.00 for the Metro Bank savings account of one Jaime Portugal with account number 7186509273.[19] Respondent has neither admitted nor denied having claimed the deposited amount. The Court also rejects respondents claim that there was no formal engagement between the parties and that he made all his efforts for the case without adequate and proper consideration. In the words of then Justice Panganiban (presently Chief Justice) in Burbe v. Atty.Magulta:[20]

After agreeing to take up the cause of a client, a lawyer owes fidelity to both cause and client, even if the client never paid any fee for the attorney-client relationship. Lawyering is not a business; it is a profession in which duty of public service, not money, is the primary consideration.[21]

Also to the point is another case where this Court ruled, thus:
A written contract is not an essential element in the employment of an attorney; the contract may be express or implied. To establish the relation, it is sufficient that the advice and assistance of an attorney is sought and received in any matter pertinent to his profession. x x x [22]

Hence, even if respondent felt under-compensated in the case he undertook to defend, his obligation embodied in the Lawyers Oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility still remains unwavering. The zeal and the degree of fervor in handling the case should neither diminish nor cease just because of his perceived insufficiency of remuneration. Lastly, the Court does not appreciate the offensive appellation respondent called the shooting incident that the accused was engaged in. He described the incident, thus: the accused police officers who had been convicted of [h]omicide for the salvage of Froilan G. Cabilingand Jose M. Chua and [a]ttempted [h]omicide of Mario C. Macato.[23] Rule 14.01[24] of the Code of Professional Responsibility clearly directs lawyers not to discriminate clients as to their belief of the guilt of the latter. It is ironic that it is the defense counsel that actually branded his own clients as

being the culprits that salvaged the victims. Though he might think of his clients as that, still it is unprofessional to be labeling an event as such when even the Sandiganbayan had not done so.

The IBP Board of Governors recommended the suspension of respondent for six (6) months, the most severe penalty recommended by Commissioner Villadolid, but did not explain why such penalty was justified. In a fairly recent case where the lawyer failed to file an appeal brief which resulted to the dismissal of the appeal of his client in the Court of Appeals, the Court imposed upon the erring lawyer the penalty of three (3) months suspension.[25] The Court finds it fit to impose the same in the case at bar.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, respondent is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for three (3) months. Let a copy of theResolution be furnished the Bar Confidant for appropriate annotation in the record of respondent.

SO ORDERED.

CANON 19
SPECIAL THIRD DIVISION

VALERIANA U. DALISAY, Complainant,

A.C. No. 5655 Present:

-versus-

PANGANIBAN, J., Chairman, SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, CORONA, CARPIO MORALES, and GARCIA, JJ.

ATTY. MELANIO MAURICIO, JR., Respondent.

Promulgated:

January 23, 2006 x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x RESOLUTION SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:

At bar is a motion for reconsideration of our Decision dated April 22, 2005 finding Atty. Melanio Batas Mauricio, Jr., respondent, guilty of malpractice and gross misconduct and imposing upon him the penalty of suspension from the practice of law for a period of six (6) months. A brief revisit of facts is imperative, thus:

On October 13, 2001, Valeriana U. Dalisay, complainant, engaged respondents services as counsel in Civil Case No. 00-044, entitled Lucio De Guzman, etc., complainants, v. Dalisay U. Valeriana, respondent, pending before the Municipal Trial Court, Branch 1, Binangonan, Rizal. Notwithstanding his receipt of documents and attorneys fees in the total amount of P56,000.00 from complainant, respondent never rendered legal services for her. As a

result, she terminated the attorney-client relationship and demanded the return of her money and documents, but respondent refused. On January 13, 2004, Investigating Commissioner Lydia A. Navarro of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Commission on Bar Discipline, found that for the amount of P56,000.00 paid by the complainant x x x, no action had been taken nor any pleadings prepared by the respondent except his alleged conferences and opinions rendered when complainant frequented his law office. She recommended that respondent be required to refund the amount of P56,000.00 to the complainant, and surprisingly, that the complaint be dismissed. On February 27, 2004, the IBP Board of Governors passed Resolution No. XVI-2004-121, adopting and approving in totoCommissioner Navarros Report and Recommendation. On April 22, 2005, we rendered the assailed Decision. Incidentally, upon learning of our Decision, respondent went to the MTC, Branch I, Binangonan, Rizal to verify the status of Civil Case No. 00044. There, he learned of the trial courts Decision dated December 6, 2001 holding that the tax declarations and title submitted by complainant are not official records of the Municipal Assessor and the Registry of Deed. Thereupon, respondent filed a Sworn Affidavit Complaint[1] against complainant charging her with violations of Article 171[2] and 172,[3] and/or Article 182[4] of the Revised Penal Code. He alleged that complainant offered tampered evidence. In this motion for reconsideration, respondent raises the following arguments:

First, complainant did not engage his services as counsel in Civil Case No. 00-044. She hired him for the purpose of filing two new petitions, a petition for declaration of nullity of title and a petition for review of a decree. Second, Civil Case No. 00-044 was considered submitted for decision as early as August 6, 2001, or more than two months prior to October 13, 2001, the date he was engaged as counsel, hence, he could not have done anything anymore about it.

Third, complainant refused to provide him with documents related to the case, preventing him from doing his job. And fourth, complainant offered tampered evidence in Civil Case No. 00-004, prompting him to file falsification cases against her. opposition to the motion, complainant contends that: (1) respondent violated the principle of confidentiality between a lawyer and his client when he filed falsification charges against her; (2) respondent should have returned her money; (3) respondent should have verified the authenticity of her documents earlier if he really believed that they are falsified; and (4) his refusal to return her money despite this Courts directive constitutes contempt. We deny respondents motion for reconsideration. It is axiomatic that no lawyer is obliged to act either as adviser or advocate for every person who may wish to become his client. He has the right to decline employment. But once he accepts money from a client, an attorney-client relationship is established, giving rise to the duty of fidelity to the clients cause.[5] From then on, he is expected to be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him. He must serve the client with competence and diligence, and champion the latters cause with wholehearted devotion.[6] Respondent assumed such obligations when he received the amount of P56,000.00 from complainant and agreed to handle Civil Case No. 00044. Unfortunately, he had been remiss in the performance of his duties. As we have ruled earlier, there is nothing in the records to show that In her

he (respondent) entered his appearance as counsel of record for complainant in Civil Case No. 00-044. Neither is there any evidence nor pleading submitted to show that he initiated new petitions. With ingenuity, respondent now claims that complainant did not engage his services for Civil Case No. 00044 but, instead, she engaged him for the filing of two new petitions. This is obviously a last-ditch attempt to evade culpability. Respondent knows very well that if he can successfully disassociate himself as complainants counsel in Civil Case No.00-044, he cannot be held guilty of any dereliction of duties. But respondents current assertion came too late in the day. He is already bound by his previous statements. In his Verified Comment on the Affidavit-Complaint,[7] he categorically stated that complainant engaged his services in Civil Case No. 00-044, originally handled by Atty. Oliver Lozano, thus:
4.a. Complainant was referred to the Respondent by Atty. Oliver Lozano. 4.b. The referral intrigued Respondent no end, simply because Atty. Oliver Lozano is a bright lawyer and is very much capable of handling Civil Case No. 00-044. 4.c. Respondent-out of respect from Atty. Oliver Lozano did not inquire the reason for the referral. But he was made to understand that he was being referred because Atty. Oliver Lozano believed that Respondent would be in a better position to prosecute and/or defend the Complainant in Civil Case No. 00-044. x x x x x x

5.c. Complainant went to the law office of Respondent on October 13, 2001 and demanded that he provides her with free legal service. x x x x x x

5.e. Respondent, however, told Complainant that the case (Civil Case No. 00-044) would not entitle her to a free legal service and advised her to just re-engage the services of Atty. Oliver Lozano. 5.f. Undaunted, Complainant asked Respondent to assess her case and how she and her lawyer should go prosecuting and/or defending her position therein. 5.g. Honestly believing that Complainant was no longer represented by counsel in Civil Case No. 00-044 at that time, Respondent gave his professional opinion on the factual and legal matters surrounding the said case. 5.h. Apparently impressed with the opinion of the Respondent, Complainant became even more adamant in asking the former to represent her in Civil Case No. 00-044. 5.i. Respondent then told Complainant that she would be charged as a regular client is she insists in retaining his services. 5.j. It was at this juncture that Complainant asked Respondent about his fees. 5.k. After re-assessing Civil Case No. 00-044, Respondent told Complainant that he will have to charge her with an acceptance fee of One Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00), aside form being charged for papers/pleadings that may have to be prepared and filed in court in connection with the aforesaid case. x x x x x x 5.n. A few days after, Respondent got a call from Atty. Oliver Lozano. The said Atty. Oliver Lozano interceded for and in behalf of Complainant and asked that the acceptance fee that Respondent was charging the Complainant be reduced. x x x x x x

5.r. Complainant then returned to the office of the Respondent on October 20, 2001. The latter then informed the former of his conversation with Atty. Oliver Lozano and his (respondents) decision to reduce the acceptance fee. 5.s. Complainant was very grateful at the time, even shedding a tear or two simply because Respondent had agreed to handle her case at a greatly reduced acceptance fee.

Statements of similar tenor can also be found in respondents Memorandum[8] filed with the IBP. Undoubtedly, respondents present version is a flagrant departure from his previous pleadings. This cannot be countenanced. A party should decide early what version he is going to advance. A change of theory in the latter stage of the proceedings is objectionable, not due to the strict application of procedural rules, but because it is contrary to the rules of fair play, justice and due process.[9] The present administrative case was resolved by the IBP on the basis of respondents previous admission that complainant engaged his legal services in Civil Case No. 00-044. He cannot now unbind himself from such admission and its consequences. In fact, if anything at all has been achieved by respondents inconsistent assertions, it is his dishonesty to this Court. At any rate, assuming arguendo that complainant indeed engaged respondents services in filing the two (2) new petitions, instead of Civil Case No. 00-044, still, his liability is unmistakable. There is nothing in the records to show that he filed any petition. The ethics of the profession demands that, in such a case, he should immediately return the filing fees to complainant. In Parias v. Paguinto,[10] we held thata lawyer shall account for all money or property collected from the client. Money entrusted to a lawyer for a specific purpose, such as for filing fee, but not used for failure to file the case must immediately be returned to the client on demand. Per records, complainant made repeated demands, but respondent is yet to return the money. Neither do we find merit in respondents second argument. The fact that Civil Case No. 00-044 was already submitted for decision does not justify his inaction. After agreeing to handle Civil Case No. 00-044, his duty is, first and foremost, to enter his appearance. Sadly, he failed to do this

simple task. He should have returned complainants money. Surely, he cannot expect to be paid for doing nothing. In his third argument, respondent attempts to evade responsibility by shifting the blame to complainant. He claims that she refused to provide him with documents vital to the case. He further claims that he would be violating the Code of Professional Responsibility by handling a case without adequate preparation. This is preposterous. When a lawyer accepts a case, his acceptance is an implied representation that he possesses the requisite academic learning, skill and ability to handle the case.[11] As a lawyer, respondent knew where to obtain copies of the certificates of title. As a matter of fact, he admitted that his Law Office, on its own, managed to verify the authenticity of complainants title. It bears reiterating that respondent did not take any action on the case despite having been paid for his services. This is tantamount to abandonment of his duties as a lawyer and taking undue advantage of his client. Finally, in an ironic twist of fate, respondent became the accuser of complainant. In his fourth argument, respondent accuses her of offering falsified documentary evidence in Civil Case No. 00-004, prompting him to file falsification cases against her. He thus justifies his inability to render legal services to complainant. Assuming that complainant indeed offered falsified documentary evidence in Civil Case No. 00-044, will it be sufficient to exonerate respondent? We believe not. First, Canon 19 outlines the procedure in dealing with clients who perpetrated fraud in the course of a legal proceeding. Consistent with its mandate that a lawyer shall represent his client with zeal and only within the bounds of the law, Rule 19.02 of the same Canon specifically provides:

Rule 19.02 A lawyer who has received information that his clients has, in the course of the representation, perpetrated a fraud upon a person or tribunal, shall promptly call upon the client to rectify the same, and failing which he shall terminate the relationship with such client in accordance with the Rules of Court.

As a lawyer, respondent is expected to know this Rule. Instead of inaction, he should have confronted complainant and ask her to rectify her fraudulent representation. If complainant refuses, then he should terminate his relationship with her. Understandably, respondent failed to follow the above-cited Rule. This is because there is no truth to his claim that he did not render legal service to complainant because she falsified the documentary evidence in Civil Case No.00-044. This brings us to the second reason why we cannot sustain his fourth argument. The pleadings show that he learned of the alleged falsification long after complainant had terminated their attorney-client relationship. It was a result of his active search for a justification of his negligence in Civil Case No. 00-044. As a matter of fact, he admitted that he verified the authenticity of complainants title only after the news of his suspension spread in the legal community. To our mind, there is absurdity in invoking subsequent knowledge of a fact as justification for an act or omission that isfait accompli. Obviously, in filing falsification charges against complainant, respondent was motivated by vindictiveness. In fine, let it be stressed that the authority of an attorney begins with his or her retainer.[12] It gives rise to a relationship between an attorney and a client that is highly fiduciary in nature and of a very delicate, exacting, and confidential character, requiring a high degree of fidelity and good faith.[13] If much is demanded from an attorney, it is because the entrusted privilege to practice law carries with it the correlative duties not only to the

client but also to the court, to the bar, and to the public. A lawyer who performs his duty with diligence and candor not only protects the interest of his client; he also serves the ends of justice, does honor to the bar, and helps maintain the respect of the community to the legal profession.[14] Indeed, law is an exacting goddess demanding of her votaries not only intellectual but also moral discipline. WHEREFORE, we DENY respondents motion for reconsideration. Our Decision dated April 22, 2005 is immediately executory. Respondent is directed to report immediately to the Office of the Bar Confidant his compliance with our Decision. Let a copy of this Resolution be attached to his personal record and copies furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Office of the Court Administrator for dissemination to all courts. SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila FIRST DIVISION A.C. No. 7023 March 30, 2006

BUN SIONG YAO, Complainant, vs. ATTY. LEONARDO A. AURELIO, Respondent. DECISION YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.: On November 11, 2004, a complaint-affidavit1 was filed against Atty. Leonardo A. Aurelio by Bun Siong Yao before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) seeking for his disbarment for alleged violations of the Code of Professional Responsibility. The complainant alleged that since 1987 he retained the services of respondent as his personal lawyer; that respondent is a stockholder and the retained counsel of Solar

Farms & Livelihood Corporation and Solar Textile Finishing Corporation of which complainant is a majority stockholder; that complainant purchased several parcels of land using his personal funds but were registered in the name of the corporations upon the advice of respondent; that respondent, who was also the brother in-law of complainants wife, had in 1999 a disagreement with the latter and thereafter respondent demanded the return of his investment in the corporations but when complainant refused to pay, he filed eight charges for estafa and falsification of commercial documents against the complainant and his wife and the other officers of the corporation; that respondent also filed a complaint against complainant for alleged non-compliance with the reportorial requirements of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) with the Office of the City Prosecutor of Mandaluyong City and another complaint with the Office of the City Prosecutor of Malabon City for alleged violation of Section 75 of the Corporation Code; that respondent also filed a similar complaint before the Office of the City Prosecutor of San Jose Del Monte, Bulacan. Complainant alleged that the series of suits filed against him and his wife is a form of harassment and constitutes an abuse of the confidential information which respondent obtained by virtue of his employment as counsel. Complainant argued that respondent is guilty of representing conflicting interests when he filed several suits not only against the complainant and the other officers of the corporation, but also against the two corporations of which he is both a stockholder and retained counsel. Respondent claimed that he handled several labor cases in behalf of Solar Textile Finishing Corporation; that the funds used to purchase several parcels of land were not the personal funds of complainant but pertain to Solar Farms & Livelihood Corporation; that since 1999 he was no longer the counsel for complainant or Solar Textile Finishing Corporation; that he never used any confidential information in pursuing the criminal cases he filed but only used those information which he obtained by virtue of his being a stockholder. He further alleged that his requests for copies of the financial statements were ignored by the complainant and his wife hence he was constrained to file criminal complaints for estafa thru concealment of documents; that when he was furnished copies of the financial statements, he discovered that several parcels of land were not included in the balance sheet of the corporations; that the financial statements indicated that the corporations suffered losses when in fact it paid cash dividends to its stockholders, hence, he filed additional complaints for falsification of commercial documents and violation of reportorial requirements of the SEC. On July 19, 2005, the Investigating Commissioner2 submitted a Report and Recommendation3 finding that from 1987 up to 1999, respondent had been the personal lawyer of the complainant and incorporator and counsel of Solar Farms & Livelihood Corporation. However, in 1999 complainant discontinued availing of the services of respondent in view of the admission of his (complainants) son to the bar; he also discontinued paying dividends to respondent and even concealed from him the

corporations financial statements which compelled the respondent to file the multiple criminal and civil cases in the exercise of his rights as a stockholder. The investigating commissioner further noted that respondent is guilty of forum shopping when he filed identical charges against the complainant before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Malabon City and in the Office of the City Prosecutor of San Jose del Monte, Bulacan. It was also observed that respondent was remiss in his duty as counsel and incorporator of both corporations for failing to advise the officers of the corporation, which he was incidentally a member of the Board of Directors, to comply with the reportorial requirements of the SEC and the Bureau of Internal Revenue. Instead, he filed cases against his clients, thereby representing conflicting interests. The investigating commissioner recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for a period of six months4 which was adopted and approved by the IBP Board of Governors. We agree with the findings and recommendation of the IBP. We find that the professional relationship between the complainant and the respondent is more extensive than his protestations that he only handled isolated labor cases for the complainants corporations. Aside from being the brother-in-law of complainants wife, it appears that even before the inception of the companies, respondent was already providing legal services to the complainant, thus: COMM. NAVARRO: Was there a formal designation or you where only called upon to do so? ATTY. AURELIO: Well, I understand in order to show to the employees that they have labor lawyer and at that time I went to the office at least half day every week but that was cut short. And so when there are cases that crop-up involving labor then they called me up. xxxx ATTY. OLEDAN: Will counsel deny that he was the personal lawyer of the complainant long before he joined the company? ATTY. AURELIO: Yes, with respect to the boundary dispute between his land and his neighbor but the subject matter of all the cases I filed they all revolved around the Financial Statement of

the 2 corporations. I never devolves any information with respect to labor cases and the MERALCO case with respect to boundary dispute, nothing I used. ATTY. OLEDAN: Was he not also the lawyer at that time of complainant when he incorporated the second corporation in 1992? ATTY. AURELIO: Well, I was the one submitted the corporate papers and I think after that I have nothing to do with the SEC requirements regarding this corporation. Just to submit the incorporation papers to the SEC and anyway they have already done that before. They have already created or established the first corporation way back before the second corporation started and there was no instance where I dealt with the Financial Statement of the corporation with respect to its filing with the SEC. ATTY. OLEDAN: My only question is whether he incorporated and therefore was aware of the corporate matters involving Solar Farms? ATTY. AURELIO: As a stockholder Im aware. ATTY. OLEDAN: As a lawyer? ATTY. AURELIO: Well, as a stockholder Im aware. xxxx ATTY. OLEDAN: You are not the one who filed. ATTY. AURELIO: I was the one who filed the corporate paper but thats all the participation I had with respect to the requirement of the SEC with respect to the corporation. COMM. NAVARRO:

So, you acted as legal counsel of the corporation even before the initial stage of the incorporation? ATTY. AURELIO: There are two (2) corporations involving in this case, Your Honor, and the first was I think Solar Textile and this was. COMM. NAVARRO: You were already the legal counsel? ATTY. AURELIO: No, this was created before I became a stockholder. COMM. NAVARRO: Who was then the legal counsel before of Solar? MR. YAO: Siya pa rin pero hindi pa siya stockholder. ATTY. OLEDAN: Because, Your Honor, he happens to be the brother-in-law of the wife of the complainant and he is the husband of the wife of her sister so thats why he was (inaudible) other legal matters even before the corporation that was formed and he became also a stockholder and in fact he charge the corporation certain amounts for professional service rendered it is part of the Resolution of the Office of the City Prosecutor of Malabon as annex to the complaint so he cannot say that he only presented, that he only filed the papers at SEC and aside from that when the corporation, the Solar Farms was already formed and the property which he is now questioning was purchased by complainant. He was the one who negotiated with the buyer, he was always with the complainant and precisely acted as complainants personal lawyer. The truth of the matter he is questioning the boundary and in fact complainant had survey conducted in said parcel of land which he bought with the assistance and legal advice of respondent and in fact complainant gave him only a copy of that survey. Him alone. And he used this particular copy to insists that this property allegedly belong to the corporation when in truth and in fact he was fully aware that it was the complainants personal funds that were used to pay for the whole area and this was supported by the stockholders who admitted that they were aware that the parcel of land which he claims does not appear in the Financial Statement of the corporation was purchased by the complainant subject to reimbursement by the Board and should the corporation finally have sufficient fund to cover the payment advance by complainant

then the property will be transferred to the corporation. All of these facts he was privy to it, Your Honor, so he cannot say that and he is also a stockholder but the fact is, prior to the incorporation and during the negotiation he was the personal counsel of the complainant.5 It appears that the parties relationship was not just professional, but they are also related by affinity. The disagreement between complainants wife and the respondent affected their professional relationship. Complainants refusal to disclose certain financial records prompted respondent to retaliate by filing several suits. It is essential to note that the relationship between an attorney and his client is a fiduciary one.6 Canon 17 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that a lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and shall be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed on him. The long-established rule is that an attorney is not permitted to disclose communications made to him in his professional character by a client, unless the latter consents. This obligation to preserve the confidences and secrets of a client arises at the inception of their relationship. The protection given to the client is perpetual and does not cease with the termination of the litigation, nor is it affected by the party's ceasing to employ the attorney and retaining another, or by any other change of relation between them. It even survives the death of the client.7 Notwithstanding the veracity of his allegations, respondents act of filing multiple suits on similar causes of action in different venues constitutes forum-shopping, as correctly found by the investigating commissioner. This highlights his motives rather than his cause of action. Respondent took advantage of his being a lawyer in order to get back at the complainant. In doing so, he has inevitably utilized information he has obtained from his dealings with complainant and complainants companies for his own end. Lawyers must conduct themselves, especially in their dealings with their clients and the public at large, with honesty and integrity in a manner beyond reproach.8 Lawyers cannot be allowed to exploit their profession for the purpose of exacting vengeance or as a tool for instigating hostility against any personmost especially against a client or former client. As we stated in Marcelo v. Javier, Sr.:9 A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession. The trust and confidence necessarily reposed by clients require in the attorney a high standard and appreciation of his duty to his clients, his profession, the courts and the public. The bar should maintain a high standard of legal proficiency as well as of honesty and fair dealing. Generally speaking, a lawyer can do honor to the legal profession by faithfully performing his duties to society, to the bar, to the courts and to his clients. To this end, nothing should be done by any member of the legal fraternity which might tend to lessen in any degree the confidence of the public in the fidelity, honesty and integrity of the profession.10 (Emphasis supplied)

In sum, we find that respondent's actuations amount to a breach of his duty to uphold good faith and fairness, sufficient to warrant the imposition of disciplinary sanction against him. WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Leonardo A. Aurelio is ordered SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of SIX (6) MONTHS effective upon receipt of this Decision. Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant and the Integrated Bar of the Philippines. The Court Administrator is directed to circulate this order of suspension to all courts in the country. SO ORDERED.

CANON 22

SECOND DIVISION HUMBERTO C. LIM, JR., in behalf of PENTA RESORTS CORPORATION/Attorney-inFact of LUMOT A. JALANDONI, Complainant, A.C. No. 5303

Present: PUNO, J., Chairperson, SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, CORONA, AZCUNA and GARCIA, JJ. Promulgated: June 15, 2006

- versus -

ATTY. NICANOR V. VILLAROSA, Respondent.

x---------------------------------------- x

RESOLUTION CORONA, J.

Humberto C. Lim Jr.[1] filed a verified complaint for disbarment against respondent Atty. Nicanor V. Villarosa on July 7, 2000.[2] On February 19, 2002, respondent moved for the consolidation of the said complaint with the following substantially interrelated cases earlier filed with the First Division of this Court: 1. Administrative Case No. 5463: Sandra F. Vaflor v. Atty. Adoniram P. Pamplona and Atty. Nicanor V. Villarosa; 2. Administrative Case No. 5502: Daniel A. Jalandoni v. Atty. Nicanor V. Villarosa. In a resolution dated February 24, 2003, this Court considered Administrative Case No. 5463 closed and terminated.[3] On February 4, 2004, considering the pleadings filed in Administrative Case No. 5502, the Court resolved:
(a) to NOTE the notice of the resolution dated September 27, 2003 of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines dismissing the case against respondent for lack of merit; and to DENY, for lack of merit, the petition filed by complainant praying that the resolution of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines dismissing the instant case be reviewed and that proper sanctions be imposed upon respondent.[4]

(b)

No motion for reconsideration of the aforesaid denial in Administrative Case No. 5502 appears in the records. The Court is now called upon to determine the merits of this remaining case (A.C. No. 5303) against respondent. The complaint read:
AS FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION

xxx

xxx - II -

xxx

That respondent is a practicing lawyer and a member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, Bacolod City, Negros Occidental Chapter. That sometime on September 19, 1997, Lumot A. Jalandoni, Chairman/President of PRC was sued before RTC, Branch 52 in Civil Case No. 97-9865, RE: Cabiles et al. vs. Lumot Jalandoni, et al. The latter engaged the legal services of herein respondent who formally entered his appearance on October 2, 1997 as counsel for the defendants Lumot A. Jalandoni/Totti Anlap Gargoles. Respondent as a consequence of said Attorney-Client relationship represented Lumot A. Jalandoni et al in the entire proceedings of said case. Utmost trust and confidence was reposed on said counsel, hence delicate and confidential matters involving all the personal circumstances of his client were entrusted to the respondent. The latter was provided with all the necessary information relative to the property in question and likewise on legal matters affecting the corporation (PRC) particularly [involving] problems [which affect] Hotel Alhambra. Said counsel was privy to all transactions and affairs of the corporation/hotel.

- III -

That it was respondent who exclusively handled the entire proceedings of afore-cited Civil Case No. 97-9865 [and] presented Lumot A. Jalandoni as his witness prior to formally resting his case. However, on April 27, 1999 respondent, without due notice prior to a scheduled hearing, surprisingly filed a Motion to withdraw as counsel, one day before its scheduled hearing on April 28, 1999. A careful perusal of said Motion to Withdraw as Counsel will conclusively show that no copy thereof was

furnished to Lumot A. Jalandoni, neither does it bear her conformity . No doubt, such notorious act of respondent resulted to (sic) irreparable damage and injury to Lumot A. Jalandoni, et al since the decision of the court RTC, Branch 52 proved adverse to Lumot A. Jalandoni, et al. The far reaching effects of the untimely and unauthorized withdrawal by respondent caused irreparable damage and injury to Lumot A. Jalandoni, et al; a highly meritorious case in favor of his client suddenly [suffered] unexpected defeat. - IV -

That the grounds alleged by respondent for his withdrawal as counsel of Lumot A. Jalandoni, et al. was that he is [a] retained counsel of Dennis G. Jalbuena and the Fernando F. Gonzaga, Inc. It was Dennis G. Jalbuena who recommended him to be the counsel of Lumot A. Jalandoni, et al. It is worthy to note that from the outset, respondent already knew that Dennis G. Jalbuena is the son-in-law of Lumot A. Jalandoni being married to her eldest daughter, Carmen J. Jalbuena. The other directors/officers of PRC were comprised of the eldest sibling of the remaining children of Lumot A. Jalandoni made in accordance with her wishes, with the exception of Carmen J. Jalbuena, the only daughter registered as one of the incorporators of PRC, obviously, being the author of the registration itself [sic]. Respondent further stated that he cannot refuse to represent Dennis G. Jalbuena in the case filed against the latter before the City Prosecutors Office by PRC/Lumot A. Jalandoni due to an alleged retainership agreement with said Dennis G. Jalbuena. [He] likewise represented Carmen J. Jalbuena and one Vicente Delfin when PRC filed the criminal complaint against them. On April 06, 1999, twenty-one (21) days prior to respondents filing of his Motion to Withdraw as Counsel of Lumot A. Jalandoni, et al., respondent entered his appearance with Bacolod City Prosecutor OIC-Vicente C. Acupan, through a letter expressly stating that effective said date he was appearing as counsel for both Dennis G. Jalbuena and Carmen J. Jalbuena and Vicente Delfin in the Estafa case filed by the corporation (PRC) against them. Simply stated, as early as April 6, 1999 respondent already appeared for and in behalf of the Sps. Carmen and Dennis Jalbuena/Vicente Delfin while concurrently representing Lumot A. Jalandoni, et al. in Civil Case No. 97-9865. However, despite being fully aware that the interest of his client Lumot A. Jalandoni [holding an equivalent of Eighty-two (82%) percent of PRCs shares of stocks] and the interest of PRC are one and the same, notwithstanding the fact that Lumot A. Jalandoni was still his client in Civil Case No. 97-9862, respondent opted to represent opposing clients at the same time. The corporations complaint for estafa (P3,183,5525.00) was filed against the Sps. Dennis and Carmen J. Jalbuena together with UCPB bank manager Vicente Delfin. Succeeding

events will show that respondent instead of desisting from further violation of his [lawyers] oath regarding fidelity to his client, with extreme arrogance, blatantly ignored our laws on Legal Ethics, by palpably and despicably defending the Sps. Dennis and Carmen J. Jalbuena in all the cases filed against them by PRC through its duly authorized representatives, before the Public Prosecutors Office, Bacolod City (PP vs. Sps. Dennis and Carmen J. Jalbuena for False Testimony/Perjury, viol. of Art. 183 RPC under BC I.S. No. 2000-2304; viol. of Art. 363, 364, 181 and 183 RPC under BC I.S. 2000-2343, PP vs. Carmen J. Jalbuena for viol. of Art. 315 under BC I.S. 2000-2125 and various other related criminal cases against the Sps. Dennis and Carmen Jalbuena). AS SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION

xxx

xxx -I-

xxx

xxx

xxx

xxx

There is no dispute that respondent was able to acquire vast resources of confidential and delicate information on the facts and circumstances of [Civil Case No. 97-9865] when Lumot A. Jalandoni was his client which knowledge and information was acquired by virtue of lawyer-client relationship between respondent and his clients. Using the said classified information which should have been closely guarded respondent did then and there, willfully, unlawfully, feloniously conspired and confabulated with the Sps. Dennis and Carmen J. Jalbuena in concocting the despicable and fabricated charges against his former clients denominated as PP vs. Lumot A. Jalandoni, Pamela J. Yulo, Cristina J. Lim and Leica J. Lim for viol. of Art. 172 of Revised Penal Code due to a board resolution executed by the corporation which the Sps. Jalbuena, with the assistance of herein respondent, claimed to have been made without an actual board meeting due to an alleged lack of quorum, [among other things]. Were it not for said fiduciary relation between client and lawyer, respondent will not be in a position to furnish his conspirator spouses with confidential information on Lumot A. Jalandoni/PRC, operator of Alhambra Hotel.

- II -

Adding insult to injury, respondent opted to deliberately withhold the entire case file including the marked exhibits of the Cabiles case for

more than three (3) months after his untimely unilateral withdrawal therefrom, despite repeated demands from [his] client. On July 26, 1999, capitalizing on his knowledge of the indispensability of said documents particularly the marked exhibits, which deadline to file the formal offer of exhibits was continually impressed upon the new counsel by the court, respondent suddenly interposed an amount of five thousand (P5,000.00) pesos as consideration prior to or simultaneous to the turnover of said documents. [On] July 29, 1999, left with no other alte rnative owing to the urgency of the situation, PRC issued Check No. 2077686 for P5,000.00 in payment thereof. This was duly received by respondents office on the same date. Such dilatory tactics employed by respondent immensely weakened the case of Lumot A. Jalandoni eventually resulting to (sic) an adverse decision against [her]. Further demonstrating before this Honorable Court the notoriety of respondent in representing conflicting interest which extended even beyond the family controversy was his improper appearance in court in Civil Case No. 99-10660, RE: Amy Albert Que vs. Penta Resorts Corp., this time favoring the party opponent of defendant who is even outside the family circle. During the pre-trial hearing conducted on May 5, 1999, while still [holding] exclusive possession of the entire case file of his client in Civil Case No. 97-9865, respondent brazenly positioned himself beside Atty. Adoniram P. Pamplona, counsel of plaintiff [in] a suit against his client Lumot A. Jalandoni/PRC, coaching said counsel on matters [he was privy to] as counsel of said client. Facts mentioned by said counsel of the plaintiff starting from the last par. of page 25 until and including the entire first par. of page 26 were the exact words dictated by respondent. The entire incident was personally witnessed by herein complainant [who was] only an arms length away from them during the hearing. However, the particular portion showing the said irregular acts of respondent was deliberately excluded by the court stenographer from the transcript, despite her detailed recollection and affirmation thereof to herein complainant. This prompted the new counsel of Lumot A. Jalandoni/PRC to complain to the court why Atty. Nicanor Villarosa was coaching Atty. Pamplona in such proceedings. Said corrections were only effected after repeated demands to reflect the actual events which [transpired] on said pre-trial.[5] (emphasis ours)

In an addendum to the July 4, 2000 complaint, Lim also pointed to certain acts of respondent which allegedly violated the Rules of Court perpetration of falsehood and abuse of his influence as former public prosecutor. These supposedly affected

the status of the cases that Lim filed against the clients of respondent.[6] In a motion to dismiss dated October 30, 2000, respondent claimed that the complainant violated Circular No. 48-2000 because, in his verification, Lim stated:
3. That [he] prepared this instant complaint for disbarment against Atty. Nicanor V. Villarosa, read its contents, the same are all true and correct to [his] own personal knowledge and belief.[7] (emphasis ours)

Section 4, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court explicitly provides that:

SEC. 4. Verification. Except when otherwise specifically required by law or rule, pleadings need not be under oath, verified or accompanied by affidavit. (5a) A pleading is verified by an affidavit that the affiant has read the pleading and that the allegations therein are true and correct of his personal knowledge or based on authentic records. A pleading required to be verified which contains verification based on information and belief or upon knowledge, information and belief, or lacks a proper verification, shall be treated as an unsigned pleading. (As amended, A.M. 00-2-10, May 1, 2000.) (emphasis ours)

While the Rules provide that an unsigned pleading produces no legal effect,[8] the court may, in its discretion, allow such deficiency to be remedied if it appears that the same was due to mere inadvertence and not intended for delay.[9] We find that Lim was not shown to have deliberately filed the pleading in violation of the Rules.

In his comment dated December 1, 2000, respondent, reiterating his ground for the dismissal of the complaint, added:
[that] complainant Humberto C. Lim, Jr. has not only violated the Rule on Civil Procedure but he was/is NOT duly authorize[d] by the Penta Resorts Corp. (PRC) nor [by] Lumot A. Jalandoni to file this complaint against [him]. Neither [was Lim] a proper party to file this complaint. This fact is an additional ground to have his case dismissed because Humberto C. Lim Jr. exceeded whatever authority was granted to him as embodied in a resolution and the Special Power of Attorney allegedly granted to him by the complainants.[10]

To bolster his assertion that the complaint against him was unfounded, respondent presented the following version in his defense:
FACTS OF THE CASE

xxx

xxx

xxx

That Mrs. Jalandoni has two sons-in-law, namely Dennis G. Jalbuena married to her daughter, Carmen J. Jalbuena, and Humberto C. Lim Jr., the herein complainant married to her daughter, Cristina J. Lim. That Mrs. Lumot Jalandoni organized a corporation namely the Penta Resorts Corporation (PRC) where she owned almost ninety seven percent (97%). In other words, in reality, Penta Resorts Corporation is a single proprietorship belonging to Mrs. Jalandoni. That the only property of the corporation is as above-stated, the Alhambra Hotel, constructed solely through the effort of the spouses Jalbuena on that parcel of land now claimed by the Cabiles family. That sometime on the year 1997 the case above-cited (Civil Case No. 97-9865) was filed before the court against the sisters. That [he], being RETAINED counsel of the spouses Dennis and Carmen J. Jalbuena was RECOMMENDED by the spouses to the sisters to answer the complaint filed against them.

II.

That as counsel to the sisters, [he] filed a Motion for Extension Of Time To File Answer and ultimately, [he] filed an Answer With Counter Claim And Prayer For Issuance Of Writ Of Preliminary Injunction. That reading the Answer it is clear that the defense of the sisters totally rest on public documents (the various titles issued to the land in question because of the series [of changes] in ownership) and the sisters and their parents actual occupation and possession thereof. xxx xxx xxx Mr. Lim[s] accusation against [him] in the light of the above-facts is the best evidence of Humberto C. Lim, Jr.s penchant for exaggeration and distortion of the truth. Since the defense of the sisters to retain ownership of the land in question is based on PUBLICdocuments, what delicate and confidential matters involving personal circumstances of the sisters allegedly entrusted to [him], is Mr. Humberto C. Lim, Jr. talking about in paragraphs I and II of his Complaint? What [privity] to all transactions and affairs of the corporation/hotel is he referring to? Whatever transactions the corporation may have been involved in or [may be getting involved into], is totally immaterial and irrelevant to the defense of the sisters. There was nothing personal [about the] circumstances of the sisters nor transactions of the corporation [which were] discussed. The documents being offered as evidence, [he] reiterate[s] for emphasis, are public; the presumption is that the whole world knows about them. That [he] [also] vehemently den[ies] another distorted allegation of Mr. Lim that [he] represented Mrs. Jalandoni [in] the entireproceedings of [the] case. [Lim] himself attested that [he] [filed] [his] Motion to Withdraw As Counsel, dated April 26, 1999 , before the trial court, sometime on April 27, 1999. How then could [he] have represented Mrs. Jalandoni for [the] entire proceedings of the case? Further, Mr. Lim intentionally hid from this Honorable Court the important fact that [his] Motion to Withdraw was APPROVED by the trial court because of the possibility of a conflict of interest. xxx xxx xxx. [11]

Respondent discredited Lims claim that he deliberately withheld the records of the cited civil case. He insisted that it took

him just a few days, not three months, to turn over the records of the case to Lim.[12] While he admitted an oversight in addressing the notice of the motion to withdraw as counsel to Mrs. Totti Anlap Gargoles instead of Mrs. Jalandoni at Hotel Alhambra, he maintained that it was the height of hypocrisy to allege that Mrs. Jalandoni was not aware of his motion to withdraw[13] since Mrs. Gargoles is Mrs. Jalandonis sister and Hotel Alhambra is owned by PRC which, in turn, actually belongs to Mrs. Jalandoni. Respondent also argued that no prejudice was suffered by Mrs. Jalandoni because she was already represented by Atty. Lorenzo S. Alminaza from the first hearing date.[14] In fact, respondent contended, it was he who was not notified of the substitution of counsels.[15] As to the bill of P 5,000, respondent stated:
That Mr. Lim begrudge[s] [him] for billing Mrs. Jalandoni Five Thousand (Php5,000.00) Pesos. Mr. Humberto C. Lim Jr. conveniently forgets that the net worth of the property together with its improvements, under litigation in that Cabiles, et al. vs. Gargoles et al. case, is a minimum of THIRTY MILLION (Php30,000,000.00) PESOS then, and more so now. [He] cannot find any law which prohibits a counsel from billing a client for services in proportion to the services he rendered.[16]

In view of these developments, respondent was adamant that:

the only real question to be answered in this complaint is why Mr. Lim so consistently [determined] to immerse the Jalandoni family [in] a series of criminal and civil suits and to block all attempts to reconcile the family by prolonging litigations, complaints and filing of new ones in spite of the RESOLUTION of the corporation and the UNDERTAKING of the members.[17]

On June 18, 2001, the Court resolved to refer the complaint to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation. Commissioner Lydia A. Navarro made the following report and recommendation:
xxx xxx xxx

After going over the [pieces of evidence] submitted by the parties[,] the undersigned noted that from the onset, PRC had a case wherein respondent was its counsel. Later on, complainant had a case against spouses Jalbuena where the parties were related to each other and the latter spouses were represented by the respondent as their retained counsel; after respondent had allegedly withdrawn as counsel for the complainant in Civil Case No. 97-9865.

Being the husband of one of the complainants which respondent himself averred in his answer, it is incumbent upon Humberto Lim Jr. to represent his wife as one of the representatives of PRC and Alhambra Hotel in the administrative complaint to protect not only her interest but that of the [familys]. From the facts obtaining, it is evident that complainant had a lawyer-client relationship with the respondent before the latter [was] retained as counsel by the Spouses Jalbuena when the latter were sued by complainants representative. We cannot disregard the fact that on this situation for some reason or another there existed some confidentiality and trust between complainants and respondent to ensure the successful defense of their cases. Respondent for having appeared as counsel for the Spouses Jalbuena when charged by respondents former client Jalandoni of PRC and Alhambra Hotel, represented conflicting interests in violation of the Canon of Professional Responsibility. As such therefore, the Undersigned has no alternative but to respectfully recommend the suspension of the respondent from the practice of law for a period of six (6) months from receipt hereof. RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED.

Pasig City, June 20, 2002.[18]

The IBP Board of Governors (Board), however, reversed the recommendation of the investigating commissioner and resolved to dismiss the case on August 3, 2002.[19] Lumot A. Jalandoni filed a motion for reconsideration (MR) on October 18, 2002 but the Board denied the MR since it no longer had jurisdiction to consider and resolve a matter already endorsed to this Court.[20] Before delving into the core issues of this case, we need to address some preliminary matters. Respondent argues that the alleged resolution of PRC and the special power of attorney given by Lumot A. Jalandoni to Humberto did not contemplate the filing of an administrative complaint.[21] Citing the Rules of Court, respondent said that:
[s]uch complaints are personal in nature and therefore, the filing of the same, cannot be delegated by the alleged aggrieved party to any third person unless expressly authorized by law.

We must note, however, the following:

SECTION 1. How instituted. Proceedings for disbarment, suspension or discipline of attorneys may be taken by the Supreme Court motu propio, or by the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) upon the verified complaint of any person. The complaint shall state clearly and concisely the facts complained of and shall be supported by affidavits or persons having personal knowledge of the facts therein alleged and/or by such documents a may substantiate said facts.

The IBP Board of Governors may, motu propio or upon referral by the Supreme Court or by a Chapter Board of Officers, or at the instance of any person, initiate and prosecute proper charges against any erring attorneys.[22] (emphasis ours)

Complaints against members of the Bar are pursued to preserve the integrity of the legal profession, not for private vendetta. Thus, whoever has such personal knowledge of facts constituting a cause of action against erring lawyers may file a verified complaint with the Court or the IBP.[23] Corollary to the public interest in these proceedings is the following rule:
SEC. 11. Defects. No defect in a complaint, notice, answer, or in the proceeding or the Investigators Report shall be considered as substantial unless the Board of Governors, upon considering the whole record, finds that such defect has resulted or may result in a miscarriage of justice, in which event the Board shall take such remedial action as the circumstances may warrant, including invalidation of the entire proceedings.[24] (emphasis ours)

Respondent failed to substantiate his allegation that Lims complaint was defective in form and substance, and that entertaining it would result in a miscarriage of justice. For the same reason, we will no longer put in issue the filing at the onset of a motion to dismiss by respondent instead of an answer or comment.[25]

The core issues before us now are:

1. 2.

whether there existed a conflict of interest in the cases represented and handled by respondent, and whether respondent properly withdrew his services as counsel of record in Civil Case No. 97-9865.

CONFLICT OF INTEREST

Petitioners

alleged

that

as

an

offshoot of

representing

conflicting interests, breach of attorney-client confidentiality and deliberate withholding of records were committed by respondent. To effectively unravel the alleged conflict of interest, we must look into the cases involved. In Civil Case No. 97-9865, respondent represented Lumot A. Jalandoni and Totti Anlap Gargoles. This was a case for the recovery of possession of property involving Hotel Alhambra, a hotel owned by PRC. In BC I.S. No. 99-2192, Lim v. Vicente Delfin, Spouses Dennis and Carmen Jalbuena, respondent was counsel for Delfin and the spouses Jalbuena. In this case, plaintiff Cristina Lim sued the spouses Jalbuena and Delfin on the basis of two checks issued by PRC for the construction of Hotel Alhambra.[26] The corporate records allegedly reflected that the contractor, AAQ Sales and Construction (AAQSC), was already paid in full yet Amy Albert Que of AAQSC still filed a collection case against PRC for an unpaid balance.[27] In her complaint-affidavit, Cristina averred:

11. That it was respondent Carmen J. Jalbuena, who took advantage of [her] signatures in blank in DBP Check Nos. 0865590 and 0865591, and who filled up the spaces of the payee, date and amount without the knowledge and consent of any officer of the corporation and [herself], after which she caused the delivery of the same checks to her husband Dennis Jalbuena, who encashed without [their] knowledge and consent, and received the proceeds of the same checks (as evidenced by his signature in receipt of payment on the dorsal side of the said checks) with the indispensable participation and cooperation of respondent Vicente B. Delfin, the Asst. Vice President and Branch Head of UCPB.[28]

Notably, in his comment, respondent stated:

There was a possibility of conflict of interest because by this time, or one month before [he] filed [his] Motion to Withdraw, Mrs. Jalandoni /Penta Resorts Corporation, Mr. Lim, through his wife, Cristina J. Lim, by another counsel, Atty. Lorenzo S. Alminaza, filed a criminal complaint against the spouses Dennis and Carmen J. Jalbuena on March 26, 1999 under BC-I.S. Case No. 99-2192.[29]

Similarly, in BC I.S. Nos. 00-1370, 2000-2304, 2000-2343, 002125, 00-2230, 00-880, respondent positioned himself against PRCs interests. And, in Civil Case No. 99-10660, a collection case against PRC, Atty. Alminaza of PRC was alarmed by the appearance of respondent at the table in court for AAQSCs counsel.[30] Canon 15 of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR) highlights the need for candor, fairness and loyalty in all the dealings of lawyers with their clients. Rule 15.03 of the CPR aptly provides:

Rule 15.03 A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by written consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts.

It is only upon strict compliance with the condition of full disclosure of facts that a lawyer may appear against his client; otherwise, manner:
There is representation of conflicting interests if the acceptance of the new retainer will require the attorney to do anything which will injuriously affect his first client in any matter in which he represents him and also whether he will be called upon in his new relation, to use against his first client any knowledge acquired through their connection.[32] (emphasis ours)

his

representation

of

conflicting

interests

is

reprehensible.[31] Conflict of interest may be determined in this

The rule on conflict of interests covers not only cases in which confidential communications have been confided but also those in which no confidence has been bestowed or will be used.[33]
Another test of the inconsistency of interests is whether the acceptance of a new relation will prevent an attorney from the full discharge of his duty of undivided fidelity and loyalty to his client or invite suspicion of unfaithfulness or double-dealing in the performance thereof, and also whether he will be called upon in his new relation to use against his first client any knowledge acquire in the previous employment. The first part of the rule refers to cases in which the opposing parties are present clients either in the same action or in a totally unrelated case; the second part pertains to those in which the adverse party against whom the attorney appears is his former client in a matter which is related, directly or indirectly, to the present controversy.[34] (emphasis ours)

The rule prohibits a lawyer from representing new clients whose interests oppose those of a former client in any manner,

whether or not they are parties in the same action or in totally unrelated cases. The cases here directly or indirectly involved the parties connection to PRC, even if neither PRC nor Lumot A. Jalandoni was specifically named as party-litigant in some of the cases mentioned.
An attorney owes to his client undivided allegiance. After being retained and receiving the confidences of the client, he cannot, without the free and intelligent consent of his client, act both for his client and for one whose interest is adverse to, or conflicting with that of his client in the same general matter. The prohibition stands even if the adverse interest is very slight; neither is it material that the intention and motive of the attorney may have been honest.[35] (emphasis ours)

The representation by a lawyer of conflicting interests, in the absence of the written consent of all parties concerned after a full disclosure of the facts, constitutes professional misconduct which subjects the lawyer to disciplinary action.[36] Even respondents alleged effort to settle the existing

controversy among the family members[37] was improper because the written consent of all concerned was still required.[38] A lawyer who acts as such in settling a dispute cannot represent any of the parties to it.[39]
WITHDRAWAL AS COUNSEL IN CIVIL CASE NO. 97-9865

The next bone of contention was the propriety of respondents withdrawal as counsel for Lumot A. Jalandoni in Civil Case No. 979865 to fulfill an alleged retainership agreement with the spouses

Jalbuena in a suit by PRC, through Cristina Lim, against the Jalbuenas and Delfin (BC I.S. No. 99-2192). In his December 1, 2000 comment, respondent stated that it was he who was not notified of the hiring of Atty. Alminaza as the new counsel in that case and that he withdrew from the case with the knowledge of Lumot A. Jalandoni and with leave of court. The rule on termination of attorney-client relations may be summarized as follows:
The relation of attorney and client may be terminated by the client, by the lawyer or by the court, or by reason of circumstances beyond the control of the client or the lawyer. The termination of the attorney-client relationship entails certain duties on the part of the client and his lawyer.[40]

Accordingly, it has been held that the right of an attorney to withdraw or terminate the relation other than for sufficient cause is considerably restricted. Canon 22 of the CPR reads:
Canon 22 A lawyer shall withdraw his services only for good cause and upon notice appropriate in the circumstances.

An attorney may only retire from a case either by written consent of his client or by permission of the court after due notice and hearing, in which event the attorney should see to it that the name of the new lawyer is recorded in the case.[41] A lawyer who desires to retire from an action without the written consent of his client must file a petition for withdrawal in court.[42] He must serve a copy of his petition upon his client and the adverse party at least

three days before the date set for hearing, otherwise the court may treat the application as a mere scrap of paper.[43]Respondent made no such move. He admitted that he withdrew as counsel on April 26, 1999, which withdrawal was supposedly approved by the court on April 28, 1999. The conformity of Mrs. Jalandoni was only presumed by Atty. Villarosa because of the appearance of Atty. Alminaza in court, supposedly in his place.
[A client] may discharge his attorney at any time with or without cause and thereafter employ another lawyer who may then enter his appearance. Thus, it has been held that a client is free to change his counsel in a pending case and thereafter retain another lawyer to represent him. That manner of changing a lawyer does not need the consent of the lawyer to be dismissed. Nor does it require approval of the court.[44]

The appearance of Atty. Alminaza in fact was not even to substitute for respondent but to act as additional counsel.[45] Mrs. Jalandonis conformity to having an additional lawyer did not necessarily mean conformity to respondents desire to withdraw as counsel. Respondents speculations on the professional relationship of Atty. Alminaza and Mrs. Jalandoni find no support in the records of this case. Respondent should not have presumed that his motion to withdraw as counsel[46] would be granted by the court. Yet, he stopped appearing as Mrs. Jalandonis counsel beginning April 28, 1999, the first hearing date. No order from the court was shown to have actually granted his motion for withdrawal. Only an order dated June 4, 1999 had a semblance of granting his motion:

When this case was called for hearing Atty. Lorenzo Alminaza appeared for the defendants considering that Atty. Nicanor Villarosa has already withdrawn his appearance in this case which the Court considered it to be approved as it bears the conformity of the defendants.[47] (emphasis ours)

That professional

Mrs.

Jalandoni on

continued her

with

Atty.

Alminazas respondents

engagement

behalf

despite

withdrawal did not absolve the latter of the consequences of his unprofessional conduct, specially in view of the conflicting interests already discussed. Respondent himself stated that his withdrawal from Civil Case No. 97-9865 was due to the possibility of a conflict of interest.[48] Be that as it may, the records do not support the claim that respondent improperly collected P5,000 from petitioner. Undoubtedly, respondent provided professional services to Lumot A. Jalandoni. Furthermore, there is no evidence that the documents belonging to Mrs. Jalandoni were deliberately withheld. The right of an attorney to retain possession of a clients documents, money or other property which may have lawfully come into his possession in his professional capacity, until his lawful fees and disbursements have been fully paid, is well-established.[49] Finally, we express our utter dismay with Lims apparent use of his wifes community tax certificate number in his complaint for disbarment against respondent.[50] This is not, however, the forum to discuss this lapse.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, respondent Atty. Nicanor V. Villarosa is hereby found GUILTY of violating Canon 15 and Canon 22 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for one (1) year, effective upon receipt of this decision, with a STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with more severely. Let a copy of this resolution be entered into the records of respondent and furnished to the Office of the Clerk of Court, the Office of the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and all courts in the Philippines, for their information and guidance. SO ORDERED.