You are on page 1of 100

Military Review

April JH7H
THE PROFESSIONAL JOURNAL OF THE US ARMY
Published by
us ARMY COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF COLLEGE
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 66027
LIEUTENANT GENERAL J. R. THURMAN
BRIGADIER GENERAL ROBERT ARTER
Commandant
Deputy
MILITARY REVIEW STAFF:
Colonel Edward M Bradford. EdItor In ChIef
EDITORIAL STAFF: Lieutenant Colonel Joseph E Burlas.
AssIstant Ed,tor; Lieutenant Colonel Rafael Martmez-
Boucher, Spanlsh-Amencan EdItor; Lieutenant Colonel
Jamie W Walton. Features Editor
PRODUCTION STAFF Ms D'.l{leR DommQuez. ProducfJonEdJlor Mr JeromeF
Scheele Art anlj Design Mr Amos W Gallaway PublIcatIOn Officer
CIRCULATION Major A R Bundons Managmg Editor. Sergeant First Class Fell:.
A AgUIlar. Admsnrstra(lve Supervfsor
MR ADVISORY BOARD:
EX OFFICIO General Donn A Starry Commander. Trammg snd Doctrme
Command lieutenant General J A Thurman Commander Combmed Arms
Center. Malor General Homer 0 SmJth Commander, LogJsflcS Center. Major
General Wilham L Mundie Commandel Admmlstratlon Center. M8Jor General
Henry Mohr Chief uS Army Reserve. Major General LaVern E Weber, Chief
National Guard BureBl.J Major GeneTal LoUIS G Menetrey Deputy Com-
mander Combmed Alms Combat Development ActiVity
ACTIVE Colonel V M Robertson Jr Depanment of Tacltcs. Colonel T G Blagg,
Department of Command Cotonel H F Middleton. Depanment of Resource
Management Colonel R A Manion, Department of Unif,ed 8nd Combmed
Operations, Dr'lvan J BITTer, Director. Graduate Degree Program. Dr K Jack
Bauer John F Morfison ChOir oj MIlitary History, Colonel Csrl AC:ree, Na/lonpl
Guard Bureau Mr Roy Root Office of (he ChIef Army Reserve. Colonel W S
Bayer Combmed Arms Combat Development ActlVltt'. Major W J Chantelau,
Adm,mstratlon Center. Lieutenant Colonel K S Cropsey. Combmed Arms
Trammg ActIVity Major C W McinniS Loglsttcs Center, Colonel
A Heath Forces Command
Military
Review
VOLUME LVIII APRIL 1978
CONTENTS
NO 4
PAGE 2
5'
17
20
29
34
46
54
63
68
79
81
82
83
88
i
A WARSAW PACT FRONT COMMANDER'S CONCEPT
by Lieutenant Colonel George F Steger, US Army
FORCE PLANNING, POLITICAL GUIDANCE AND THE DECISION TO FIGHT
by Colin S. Gray
8AITLE STAFF OFFICER QUALIFICATION
by Malor Edwin S. Stone III, US Army
WOMEN AT WEST POINT: CHANGE WITHIN TRADITION
by Malor Alan G. Vltters, US Army and Nora Scott Kinzer
JAPAN'S DEVELOPING ARMY
by Colonel Wilfred L. Ebel, US Army Reserve
TERRAIN ANALYSIS AND ALLOCATION OF COMBAT POWER
by Major Lon E. Maggart, US Army
ACHILLES HEEL OF THE DETERRENCE TRIAD
by Malor Elbert C. Black III, US Army
AIR POWER AT KURSK A LESSON FOR TODAY?
by Captam Lonnte O. Ratley III, US Air Force
RETENTION THROUGH INTERVENTION
by Lieutenant Colonel Moss M Ikeda, US Army Reserve
THE 1954 INDOCHINA CRISIS
by Captain Richard M. Saunders, US Army
REVIEWS
STUDIES
LEITERS
NEWS
BOOKS
the best from other.lournals
contemporary reading for the professional
,.
MILITARY REVIEW IS published monthly In English, Spanish and Portuguese Usa of funds for printing
this publication approved by Headquarters, Department of the Army, 23 December 1975 Controlled
circulation postage paid at Leavenworth, KS 66048. Subscnptlon $1200 per year US and APO/FPO;
$1400 foreign Single copies $1.25 US and APO/FPO, $1 50 foreign Address all mail to Military
Review, USACGSC. Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027. Telephone 19131684-5642 or AUTOVON 552-5642.
,Unless otherWise stated. the views herem are those of the authors and are not necessarily those of
the Department of Defense or any element thereof BasIs of offiCial distribution IS one per general
officer and one per five field grade officers
US ISSN 0026-4148
MIlITARY REVIEW
Army Orders 83, More AH1 S Helicopters. The Army has exercised an
option to purchase 83 additional units of Its most modern antlarmor
helicopter. Bell Helicopter Textron's AHIS Improved Cobra.
This latest buy IS part of a planned Army acquIsition of 297 production
models of the AH 1 S. More than 75 percent of these aircraft now are on
order The first-production AHI S was delivered In March 1977.
Deliveries of the 83 aircraft Will take place In 1979 and 1980
TACFIRE Production Initiated. The US Army Electronics Command has
awarded a $ 16 8-mlllion contract to Litton Systems. Inc. to exercise the
first-production option for the AN/GSG 10 tactical fire direction system
(TACFIRE) The TACFIRE utilizes Lltton'sAN/GYKI2 tactical computer. In
order to Inject competition into the TACFIRE program. Control Data
Corporation has also been awarded a $1 9-million contract for a tactical
computer to emulate the ANIGYKI2. Units by both companies will be
competitively evaluated at a later date_-DMS Intelligence. 1977.
MILITARY REVIEW
FORT LEAVENWORTH, KS. 66027
o Please (enter) (renew) my subscnptlon to the M,litary ReView for one year ($12_00 US and
APO/FPO) ($1400 foreign)
o Check/ Money Order Inclosed 0 Check Here
o Army
o Active
for Automatic o ARNG
o Retired
o Bill me
Renewal o USAR
o USN, USAF. USMC. USCG
o Please change my address to that shown below
o Civilian
RANK/TITLE FIRST NAME INITIAL LAST NAME
STREET
CITY STATE/COUNTRY ZIP CODE
96
y
o
u
A
S
K
E
D
F
o
R
I
T
i' You are looking at a first. This is the first issue of Military Review in
its new sile and format. We hope you find it open, crisp and modern. It
was difficult to break away from a style that had served so well over the
years. Some prefer M R remain the same. But most readers, and
nonreaders too, wal1ted a more modern, eye-appealing journal.
While making significant changes throughout, we retained the
proven best. The departments have new names but they are intact, albeit
with modifications. Content analysis shows that article subject matter is
in line with your preferences. M R's credibility is high. It is your
professional journal and grows with you. It is truly a Professional
Development Journal.
We are concerned with the Total Army and show this by association
with the Command and General Staff College, interface with the Army's
major commands, the Army National Guard and Army Reserve.
Military ReVIew in accomplishing its mission renects the sigmficant
impact TRADOC. the combined arms community, CGSC, the logis-
tician and admimstrator have on doctrine, weapons systems effec-
tiveness, readiness posture and the state of training Army-wide for the
Total Army. The journal serves not only its primary field grade officer
audience. about 50.000 in number. but also the Army and public at
large. It fosters an open exchange of professional thought and enhances
mutual confIdence. trust. understanding and cooperation within the
Army. civIlian community and in the Profession of Arms around the
world.
Your comments are always welcome. In fact, they are a necessary
Ingredient to M R's success. Send us your views, desires, complaints,
preferences. ideas and improvements.
For more than one-half a century, M R has been contributing to
soldiers' knowledge and development. As organizatIOns, systems and
tImes change, so does the Review. Your ,journal renects the best facets of
a modern house magazine, While past accolades placed M R in very
exclUSIve company, we strive to move up a few more notches on the
ladder of excellence to serve you better. But also we seek to encourage,
yes entice, those officers who are not readers, to broaden their
perspectIve and thinking, thereby contributing to their potential and
professional growth. There is but one journal targeted on your mid-
career years and serVing such a large and important group of officers.
Mililarv Review plans to continue to change, to be viable and
responsIve to you, your desires and needs. We seek to enhance your
professional knowledge and thereby contribute to the readiness of our
Total Army.
OF THE ARMY
MILITARY REVIEW
US ARMY COMMAND & GENERAL STAFF COLLEGE
FORT LEAVENWORTH, KANSAS 66027
OFFICIAL BUSINESS
PENALTY FOR PRIVATE USE $300
CGSC LBL 5
15 FEB 78

.IJJ h 1l1, r I)
.\ T T i\ :., .. It 1,1 lJ;' .
. , j ....... r, I! . ,
POSTAGE AND FEES PAID
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
DOD 314
01
'ttlltl6
A Warsaw Pact

t.::!L
The following represents a hypothetical concept for a general, non-
nuclear offensive by the Warsaw Pact against the NATO forces in
Western Germany. It is designed to describe not only the Soviet tactical
intent, if such an offensive should occur, but also to demonstrate the
basic principles of Soviet military operational art in a plausible scenario.
OMRADE commanders, as you most certainly realize, the basic
"e
objective of the forthcoming offensive is the defeat and destruction
of NATO forces in the European theater and the occupation of Western
Europe. We expect high-intensity conflict, great expenditure of materiel
and mass losses of troops and equipment. This will be true even if it is
decided not to use nuclear weapons. That decision, by the way, has not
been made as yet, so we will proceed with our plans for a conventional
attack but remain prepared to use nuclear weapons at a moment's notice.
"It is imperative that our offensive be conducted with all possible speed.
Our forces in the forward area at present have a considerable advantage
over the enemy in numbers of men and armor. In effect, the enemy has no
immediate strategic reserves except for his air force. At the outset, we will
be operating in most sectors against NATO corps whose contingents are
only partially established in forward defense positions. In addition, these
corps normally maintain very small reserves.
"Our mission will be to smash through these weakened corps sectors into
the depth of the enemy before he can mobilize for war. The initial task
will be the speedy destruction of NATO forces in the Federal Republic of
Germany and the denial of that forward defensive area to reinforcements
from the United States and Great Britain. We should be on the Rhine in
three days in most places acro,'lS the front but, in no case, later than 10
days after conflict begins.
"There will be two strategic avenues the offensive. The first is across
the North German Plain, to seize obje tives at the Rhine north and south
of the Ruhr area, thereby. isolating this most important German in-
dustrial area from the rest of NATO. The second avenue is along the
general Eisenach-Frankfort axis. This is the shortest route from the
border to the Rhine. This attack is designed to seize crossings over the
PACT COMMANDER'S CONCEPT
I'
Rhine north and south of the Frankfort industrial and supply area and to
split the NATO Northern and Central Army Groups. By seizing these two
areas, we shall have effectively paralyzed 80 percent of West German
industrial, communications and fuel resources. A quick realization of this
plan may well have the additional effect of causing France to hesitate to
enter the conflict against us. From the Rhine, with the bulk of the
'standing NATO forces in Europe either destroyed or scattered behind us,
a march to the sea should encounter little resistance.
"As is readily apparent, everything depends on the speed of our offensive.
For that reason, we need, first of all, surprise. We must give the enemy no
more than two days' warning-less, if possible. That means attacking
with forces immediately available in the forward area. Forces from
Western Russian and the mobilized forces of the other Warsaw Pact
countries will follow on as quickly as possible but must not be counted
upon for the initial breakthrough. Possibly, the remaining fronts from
Russia can be used to continue the offensive on the western side of the
Rhine.
"We will disguise the beginning of the offensive by large-scale troop
\exercises in training areas close to the border. The leading elements of
each first-echelon army will be deployed in these training areas, with the
remaining forces prepared to take part in the attack directly from
garrison areas.
"To assure the lightning character of this offensive, we must see that its
preparation and conduct are merged into a single process. There must be
no stopping in waiting areas at the border. We will launch the offensive
from the march and carry it at least through the enemy's intermediate'
defensive positions. The best commanders will be able to attack the
enemy's main defensive positions from the march as well even though
those positions are most probably on river lines. The advantage in this is
that the enemy is not given time to reinforce at the locations of our main
thrusts.
L,eutenant Colonel George F. Steger received a B.A.
from Sprmg H,ll College and an M.A. In government from
Indiana UnIVerSIty. and is a graduate of the USACGSC
and the US Army Institute for Advanced Russian and
East European Studzes. Garmlsch. Germany. He i8 a
foreign area specialist In the Russzan field and has served
with the Combined Arms Combat Developments Activity,
Fort Leavenworth, Kans. His article "More Dilemmas In
Studymg Sov,et Tactics" appeared in the February 1978
Military ReVlew.
MILITARY REVIEW
"As I mentioned, the intensity of battle will be extreme. Even without
nuclear the battlefield will be a tangled and confusing place.
Centralized commCJ,nd and control will be difficult at best, and modern
electronic warfare devices might make communications almost im
possible. Every commander must, therefore, know what he must do from
the start. There must be a master plan and a plan for every conceivable
contingency so that commanders can react automatically while still
adhering to the dictates of their mission. If everything goes 'according to
plan,' the chances of becoming confused and losing offensive steam are
not so great.
"In choosing avenues of attack, keep the following principles in mind:
speed, maneuver room and concealment. And the greatest of these is
speed.
"In choosing formations to attack the main enemy defensive positions,
the formula is: dispersed approach, concentrated breakthrough on a
narrow front and dispersed exploitation. Operations are to be continuous.
Make maximum use of night operations to get close to the enemy and to
conceal our movements. And, once gained, stay in close contact with the
enemy. That will hamper his use of nuclear weapons against us and keep
him from re-establishing strong defensive positions.
"We will want to use aiJ:borne and airmobile forces extensively. If we are
successful, as we expect to be, in breaking corridors through his ground
missile belt, we will pass airborne forces through and drop them at
strategic linkup points in the enemy's rear so as to create confusion and
seize important river-crossing sites and communication hubs.
"The initial use of our air force will be to surprise the enemy's airfields
and destroy on the ground as many of his aircraft as possible. At the
same time, we will attack his command and control centers, nuclear
delivery sites and air defense systems. I do not anticipate using the air
forces a great deal in the close-air-support role, at least initially. We will
rely on our artillery to open the way for us and on our extensive ground-
based air defense system to protect our forces. Our air defense aircraft will
be used to protect the second-echelon forces further to the rear.
"Remember, at the beginning of the offensive, we will have the advantage
of surprise. We also have an advantage initially in almost every other
area-armor, manpower, firepower. We must exploit these advantages by
making maximum use of two governing factors: speed and shockpower.
Spare nothing. Count no lmlses until we have achieved the breakthrough.
Then, once that is achieved and we are exploiting with our tank armies in
the depth of the enemy's rear area, the battle, for all intents and purposes,
will be over."
4
Force Planning, ,Political Guidance
and the Decision to Fight
Colin S. Gray.
Political guidance drives force planning,
and the decision to fight should be based on
protection of vital interests. Determining
which are vital interests and which are
simple ones is difficult. Budget limitations
and manpower ceilings constrain the force
planner. Our current force planning iden-
tifies NATO-Europe as the most vital of our
vital interests. What happens if our general
purpose forces are required elsewhere? Can
we maintain our NATO commitment and
fight elsewhere?
O
N WHAT basis does a country with
, global interests, that is its own last
line of defense (there is no foreign
backstop ready and able to compensate
for American error in defense policy),
decide upon the proper size and
character of its armed forces? It is the
contention of this article that there is,
and can be, no "rational" framework for
American force planning (unless
rationality is held to be compatible with
large-scale guesswork and arbitrary
decisions) 1 But force planning has to be
conducted, and the results of that
planning have to be presented publicly
with at least some show of an attempt at
rational analysis.
In theory, there is no problem. The
aspiring national cjefense plan her Insists
upon the prior pr&ltision of unambiguous
foreign poiicy guidance. Following the
assessment of such guidance in force
planning terms, an appropriate price is
place.d upon the level of military effort
required to support foreign policy. In
principle, the rationality of this process
should easily be demonstrable. Skeptical
Congressmen should be appeased' by the
ability of service spokesmen to trace their
budget requests back to very explicit
political guidance. The wisdom of the
MIlITARY REVIEW
political guidance may be challengeable,
but the fit between the armed forces and
foreign policy should noV
Since external political circumstances
may change rapidly and the armed forces
cannot be redesigned overnight, none
would cavil at the fact that the military
posture of today must always reflect a
good many of the policy impulses of
yesterday. However, sensible men do not
seek perfection. Instead, they aim to
provide a posture that should be "good
enough" "Defense analysis" or
"defense economics" as a (largely
civilian) subprofession has tended to
suffer from a fundamental weakness that
derives directly from its master discipline
of economics-namely, economists are
strong on "trade-off. analysis," but they
are, as a generality, disinclined and
indeed ill-equipped to speculate about
values and purposes.' When defense
economists are compelled to address
wider issues, of overall sufficiency say,
they tend to look for simplified measures
of adequacy. The classIc case of apolitical
strategic analysis was the criterion of
mutual assured destruction.
In fairness to defense economists, it is
perhaps appropriate to quote the old
adage that "in the kingdom of the blind,
the one-eyed man is klngl" The man who
claims to know how many intercon-
tinental ballistic missiles are enough, and
can deploy graphs in his support, clearly
has a strong bargaining advantage over
the man who can deploy only his
judgment or other qualitative arguments.
The former may have a theory of suf-
ficiency that is internally rational while
the latter may, or may not, have a
judgment that approaches external
rationality (for example, the and
character of the desired forces speak to
the political purposes of the country and
the nature of the adversary).
6
It is easy to be misunderstood: This is
not an argument against planning;
rather, is it an argument in favor of
planning with an eye to making provision
for unforeseen, and really unforeseeable,
contingencies. From time to time,
Military Review publishes articles on the
value of military historic?1 study-this
article, generically, is strongly in support
of those pieces.
3
Unless one believes that
some fundamental corner has been
turned in our ability to predict the future.
it is only prudent to assume that future
causa belli remains as unpredictable
today and for the future as they have
been in the past.
Vital Interests
A vital interest usually is defined as
an interest worth 'fighting for. Can one
identify, in advance, those American
interests that warrant description as
"vital"? Is it sensible to approach the vital


( ,," ".-
..
'1'
Colin S. Gray IS on the staff of the Hudson
Institute. Croton-on-Hudson. New York.. He has
been an assistant director of The International
InstItute for Strategic Studies. London, Eng . and
a Ford Fellow in the Department of War Studies.
Klng's College. Umversity of London. He
receIved his Ph.D. in mternallonal politics from
Oxford Umverslly and IS the author of The
Soviet-American Arms Race. HIS article "The
Blitzk.rieg A Premature Burial?" appeared in the
October 1976 Military ReView
interests of the United States (presuming
that they can be defined) with a view to
their being judged to impose additive
requirements upon an American militllry
posture that has at its core the need to
preserve the physical survival and es-
sential domestic values of Americans7
The United States operates upon the
very reasonable assumption that very
few of the security checks that it has
issued will need to be honored at the
same time. Expression of this assumption
may be located in the "2 1/2" and "1
1/2" war guidelines that were endorsed
respectively in the 1960s and early
1970s. In fact, both guidelines were
without value. In the 1960s, the United
States could not have waged war in
Europe and in Asia and have sustained a
"1/2" war elsewhere. Moreover, today,
the United States could not wage war in
Europe and conduct a 112 war in the
Caribbean or in Africa.
Although the leitmotif of this article is
the argument that wars tend to occur in
places and at times that evade confident
prediction, a necessary corollary is to the
effect that one should not develop forces
for contingencies that plainly would be
unacceptable in fact. To be specific, even
given the elan of early 1960s America,
was it sensible that the United States
should adopt as a formal planning
guideline the idea that it should be
prepared to wage, simultaneously, major
wars in Europe and Asia plus a 1/2 war
contingency elsewhere7 In defense of 2
1/2 or 1 1/2 war assumptions, it can
and probably should be said that these
were intended simply to facilitate force
sizing analysis. They were not seen by
their authors as predictions of political
tolerance. Similarly, mutual assured
destruction is a criterion that has
everything to do with the sizing of the
strategic forces but nothing wort/ly of
7
DECISION TO FIGHT
note to do with strategy.
Aside from the historical point that
the United States has neglected to
develop the forces necessary to wage 2
1/2 or even 1 1/2 wars against serious
adversaries, it is intriguing to ask
whether foreign policymakers can
identify with any measure of confidence
both where war is likely to occur and
where the United States is very likely to
judge its vital interests to be so intimately
involved that a decision for war would be
a live policy option.- Among the many
problems with vital interests are that
they can be difficult to distinguish from
simple interests and they can have very
different contents.
By way of an elementary exercise, let
us pose the question-"for what would
the United States fight?" The reply, "for
its vital interests," is, of course, an
unhelpful tautology. What is a vital in-
terest7 In the aftermath of Vietnam,
many commentators on American foreign
policy have devised, explicitly or im-
plicitly, criteria for the assessment of the
relevance of American military power.
Commonly, it is judged that the United
States should assert military power only
if the following requirements are met:
The cause to be supported either is
in possession of, or claims title to, assets
demonstrably critical to the welfare of
Americans.
The local ally unambiguously is
exerting itself very substantially in an
effort at self-defense.
The local ally, if not Jeffersonian in
character, at least falls within the
catElgory of political acceptability.
The local cause, in addition to
being plausibly just, also is plausibly
, defensible militarily-the prospects for
success in the enterprise look promising.
These are useful criteria, but so many
and weighty are the needed
MILITARY REVIEW
qualifications that they are as apt to
mislead as they are to instruct. What is
one to make of a case" where the
material-strategic vital interest is directly
in conflict with political-ethical criteria?
The most obvious cases, in both direc-
tions, are South Africa and Israel.
In terms of strategic raw material
resources and the significance of
strategic location, South Africa is a vital
interest of the United States. On the
criterion of inherent importance (that is,
of real things that may change hands-or
may alter In thelfl control-to the
Western disadvantage), the United States
should be. prepared to fight in support of
the Republic of South Africa. But the
local potential ally, South Africa, is a
political pariah in defense of which no
American administration could mobilize
significant domestic political support.
Even if the American public were
offered a straight choice between the
Republic of South Africa as it is, and a
Soviet-dominated/influenced, Cuban-
policed, black dictatorship, it IS extremely
unlikely that support could be mobilized
In the United States for the military or
political defense of South Africa. Would
the vital Interest of the United States lie
in denying access to South Africa's
mineral resources and geopolitical assets
to Soviet power?-or would It lie in not
tainting the United States with public
association with the governnlent of
South Africa?
By way of sharp contrast with South
Africa, Israel-Its material resources and
strategic location-is of no, or v ~ little,
value to the United States. But many
people believe, perhaps with good
reason, that Israel is one of the few
countries on whose behalf the Uni.ted
States would take extreme risks (not
eXCluding military intervention In direct
face-to-face opposition to Soviet military
~
power).5 In terms of classical national
interest analysis, the prospect of the
United States fighting for Israel would be
an absurdity. If the United States were
able to view Israel as "just another
foreign country," in support of whose
integrity occasional speeches might be
delivered in the United Nations, but
nothing more, then American policy vis-
a-vis the Middle East as a whole could be
far more flexible, and the major lever for
local Soviet 'exploitation would be
removed.
The survival of Israel constitutes a
vital Interest of the United States
because of the ties of sentiment and the
past record of solemn offiCial American
declarations to the effect that the United
States would not permit Israel to be
destroyed. Substantial official American
support of Israel only postdates the 1967
war (as the United States replaced
France as Israel's principal arms
supplier), yet it IS interesting to observe
that the total military defeat of South
Vietnam in the spring of 1975 was
infinitely less damaging to the American
reputation than would be a similar defeat
of Israel.
On the surface, this judgment should
be Incorrect. After all, the United States,
for a period, committed in excess of half
a million men directly to the defense of
South Vietnam and had argued that the
loss of South Vietnam would have grave
"falling domino" effects throughout the
region. The United States has not com-
mitted any Americans to the direct
defense of Israel and has not identified
any adverse regional consequences that
should follow from the defeat of Israel.
Indeed. remarkably little probably
would change-except that there would
be a new radical Arab state in Palestine.
The Arab states already have
demonstrated amply the fact that they
"
do not really need Israel as a fuel for
intraregional conflict. If the frontline Arab
states were not In conflict with Israel,
they would be more than fully occupied
in conflict with each other. The existence
of Israel is necessary, even for the
achievement of a very limited measure of
pro-Arab unity. In the absence of Israel,
there would be no basis whatever for
common Arab action and policy.
The case of Israel in current American
foreign policy illustrates the fact that one
can have a vital interest that does not
repose in considerations of material or
strategic advantage/denial. For reasons
of vulnerability to an oil embargo, im-
patience with believed Israeli intran-
sigence over occupied territOries or
desire to seek to explOit Western political
vulnerabilities in the Middle East, much
of the world may be indifferent to the fate
of Israel. But the depth of the American
sentimental-political commitment to
Israel is fully appreciated by ali interested
observers.
Following the fall of Saigon and the
Cuban conquest in Angola, the United
States could say, in effect, "next time we
will stand firm:' and many people were
prepared to be credulous. The fall of Tel
Aviv could not be dismissed so lightly. In
terms of its reputation, regardless of the
inherent material-strategic value of the
local stakes, the United States should be
prepared to bear any and all risks in
defense of core Israeli values. This is
\-A..'hat is meant by a vital interest.
Interests and War
The official foreign policy community
in the United States should be able to
provide the American Armed Forces with
a short list of vital interests for force
9
DECISION TO FIGHT
planning purposes. Expressed negatively,
it is a vital interest of the United 'StEltes
that control over Western Europe be
denied to the Soviet Union; that Japan
not fali under Soviet hegemony; that
Middle East oil not be controlled, at
source, by the Soviet Union; that (pre-
1967) Israel not be destroyed; that
Canada and Mexico should not have
basically "unfriendly" governments; and
that the Panama Canal not become'
subject to unfriendly control. This bare
recital serves more to suggest problems
than it provides useful guidance for force
planning. Are the armed forces to be
ready to defend all foreign vital interests
simultaneously?-or only some of
them?-in which case, which ones?
Even the most vital of foreign vital
interests have border zones.
If Western Europe is vital to the United
States, then Washington policymakers
cannot be indifferent to developments
Involving non-NATO-Europe-for ex-
ample, YugoslaVia. The United States'
vital interests in the Far East niay center
around the integrity of Japan, but that
integrity is not related to American policy
vis-a-vis South Korea and Taiwan.
In addition, the United States has
Interests that probably are worthy of
being categorized as vital, yet which
considerations of prudence serve to
downgrade in terms of potent !ill policy
. action. Preeminently, it is vitally im-
portant that the Sino-Soviet conflict not
be resolved In an enduring fashion. Does
this mean that the American Armed
Forces should be tasked with providing
capabilities relevant to aid Chinese
defensive endeavors against the Soviet
Union? There are some problems with
which one simply elects to live because
the alternatives promise 'credibly to
invoke even more serious problems.
In practice, the vital or nonvital
MILITARY REVIEW
character of an interest tends to be
determined more by the timing and
related immediate circumlltances of a
challenge than it is either by the
character of the prior commitments
issued by the US Government or by the
readiness of the US Armed Forces to take
appropriate action. Democracies tend to
an instability of policy action that vitiates
confident prediction. They tend not to
respond to challenges to their interests,
as those challenges involve,
progressively, interests that are less and
then more vital. Instead, they place their
faith in reason, goodwill and the
presumed existence of forces for
moderation until it becomes clear beyond
plausible argument that reason, goodwill
and moderation are playing no significant
roles in the policy' councils of the
adversary-then a line is drawn.
By this late stage, the adversary is
drunk with his easy victories and is
disinclined to believe that. "effete
democracies" really mean what they say.
Herein lies the greatest danger of a shde
into world war III. "Sophisticated" of-
ficials and commentators in the United
States are programed by culture and
ideology to discern the best in
prospective adversaries. Short of overt
military adventure, most foreign policy
enterprises lend themselves to varying
interpretations.
6
If one wants to believe
that Soviet policymakers have a view of
regional and international order that is
toierabiy compatibie with our own, then a
great many ambivalent developments will
be explained away in terms that do not
warrant overt and very public American
opposition. A pattern of Western ac-
quiescence is fixed in the minds of the
policymakers of a state who interpret
such inaction not as sophisticated self-
restraint, but, rather, as pusillanimity or
evidence of low Western morale.
10
As a prediction for the next decade,
should a Soviet-American war occur, it
will not arise as a consequence of Soviet
forces erupting into West Germany.
Rather, will it occur because the United
States will come to a policy deter-
mination that Soviet policy shall be per-
mitted to advance "thus far, and no
further," and "no further" will not be an
interest long identified by American
policymakers as vital-and the Soviet
leaders will be strongly disinclined to
believe what they are told.
Force Planning
Very properly, the armed forces are
instructed to be prepared to defend
Western Europe and to maintain far more
than minimal capabilities in the
Mediterranean and the Pacific. But how
precise can (or should) a foreign
policymaker be in the instructions that he
issues to the force planners in the
military establishment? From time to
time, the absence of appropriate prior
planning produces dramatically un-
necessary and unpleasant results. The
classic case is "the Pueblo Incident" of
early 1968. In ways analogous to the
later tree-cutting tragedy in the
demilitarized zone in Korea, the Pueblo
Incident is a slice of history that belongs
more in fictional scenario horror story
writing than it does in the record of real
events-thereby proving, yet again, that
history has a way of outdoing the imag-
ination of scenario writers. The Pueblo
case illustrates dramatically both the
operation of Murphy's Law and the
strong probability that, Murphy
notwithstanding, imaginative planning
should help.
Twenty-twenty hindsight IS a familiar
phenomenon, but it should hardly have
required military genius to perceive the
potential for trouble inherent in the
conduct of electronic espionage in watars
dominated by North Korean forces. While
no one could have foreseen the Pueblo
Incident in detail, what should have been
foreseen was a requirement for near
real-time general purpose (and non-
nuclear) force cover for special missions
in East Asian waters.
In practice, force planning is
dominated by the budget not by detailed
foreign policy guidance, and decisions to
fight are dominated more by cir-
cumstances than by careful reference to
established policy wisdom on what is and
what is not a vital interest. Both military
force planning and the foreign policy
guidance on which it should be founded
rest upon educated guesswork.
The foreign policymakers can tell the
military establishment that, as in the late
1930s and early 1940s, the United
States adheres to a strategy of "Europe
(and Mediterranean) first." But that is
very different from attempting to offer
guidance over the circumstances in
which American armed force is most
lik'ely to be applied In the years im-
mediately ahead. Despite the activities of
foreign policy planners, wars tend to
occur in places, over issues and at times
not selected by the United States. The
right war, in the right place, at the right
time, seems never to occur.
In geopolitical terms, it is an
elementary matter to specify that it is a
vital interest of the United States that
Eurasia and Its adjacent waters should
not be dominated by a single
(necessarily) hostile power. However,
American policymakers are not trained or
inclined to think geopolitically.7 Instead,
the policymakers tend to prefer the prag-
matic tradition of judging each case on
DECISION TO FIGHT .
its individual merits.
With this approach, scarcely anything
short of direct assault on Western Europe
is worth fighting for. Most individual
cases are ambivalent to a degree. (The
local ally does not match up to Jeffer-
sonian standards; the Soviet Union is not
directly involved-only its proxies; and
the inherent value of the assets at'stake,
appraised in isolation, is not judged to be
very great, and so forth).
By way of contrast, in a period of far
greater American self-confidence, very
expansive understanding tends to be
endorsed. Since the world is a unity in
many senses and, for the first time, one
can talk of a global political system, it is
tempting to allow the vital category of
interests to be identified more with
reference to the believed writ of effective
American action than to any measure of
inherent or 'even symbolic importance.
US Marines intervened (unopposed) in
Lebanon in 195B; what would it take by
way of local political developments to
bTing the Marines back in 197B7 Lebanon
is no less important in the late 1970s
than It was in the late 1950s, while
demonstration of muscular will probably
would be even more useful at the later
date. Clearly, what has changed is the
perception of the structure of risks in-
volved and the nature of the United
States as a foreign policy player. Short of
;/,the undeSired event, it is always very
difficult to predict which interests would
be judged io be worth fighting for and
which are the interests for which it
would be worth the risking of damage to
the American homeland. Even NATO-
Europe may look less vital than
previously had been anticipated should a
president be faced with the choice
between expanding a European conflict
so as to strike at the Soviet Union and
acquiescing in a major theater defeat.
11
MIlITARY REVIEW
The American Way
The United States probably is the only
country in the world wherein the claim
that its foreign policy was selfish would
not meet with broad approval. For better
or for worse, the American political
system declines to jOin the rest of
mankind in accepting the view that its
polity is simply a unity of power con-
tending In semistructured anarchy with
~ r units of power. As countless com-
mentators have observed, this belief in
the political-ethical uniqueness of the
United States has profound implications
for "the American way" in defense
preparation, arms control negotiations
and the conduct of war." When America
goes to war, it does so'with an appalling
technological ferocity and Without paying
proper attention to Liddell Hart's maxim
that the object of war is the attainment of
a better peace."
The traditional American style in war-
waging, reflecting the enormous
American capacity for industrial
mobilization, did at least have one signal
virtue-it guaranteed the defeat of
today's enemy. Since the very early
1950s in practice, and the late 1950s In
theory, the armed forces of the United
States have been subject to the policy
guidance of a limited war theory that has
registered the signal accomplishment of
retaining the least useful traditional
Ameiican piactices and adding new
political constraints that vitiate the entire
enterprlse.
lO
For the leading example, in
Vietnam the United States waged a
massive firepower-logistic war, but no
pia usible concept of victory was pursued.
Without directing accusations at Pllr-
ticular individuals, a brief review of the
Vietnam experience will serve to il-
lustrate the major themes in this article.
12
From the Pentagon Papers and other
sources, it is common knowledge that the
United States, in 1964-65, saw Vietnam
as a critical test of America's "reputation
for power."" (This was a shaky principal
impetus for action, for the American
conduct of war tends to be effective only
when the enemy can be described con-
vinCingly as representing evil.)
Second in importance to the maxim
that only vital interests should be fought
for-although their identity will vary
somewhat over time-is the principle
that any war worth fighting is also worth
winning. If, as was true in Vietnam, the
American political stake was strictly
limited in character, then a president
should ask himself whether or not
military measures commensurate with
the limited political stake are likely to
produce a satisfactory outcome? In
Vietnam, the United States was trapped
in the dilemma that it was committing
over half a million men to the enterprise,
but that enterprise was not deemed to be
worth the risks inherent in the kind of
strategy that might have produced a
victory of enduring worth. Here, encap-
sulated, is the debilitating paradox that
lurked, vastly underrecognized, in
American limited war theory.
American, and some allied, civilian
theOrists had devised, from 1956-63, an
intellectual structure intended to relate
military power to political purpose in
ways that would be compatible with the
peculiar dangers of the nuclear age. But
they had neglected virtually en masse to
study Clausewitz' dictum that "it [war)
has certainly a grammar of its own, but
its logic is not peculiar to itself."'2
In short, American limited war theory,
with its stress upon flexibility, control,
crisis-management and the fine tuning of
escalation processes, translated in action
into the placing of the armed forces in a
"
no-win context. If the American foreign
and defense policy community ever' has
the courage to conduct a no-holds barred
examination of what went wrong' in
Vietnam, the quality and detail of the
(largely civilian) strategic thought of the
decade that preceded the conflict should
be subject to the most intensive critical
review."
The United States can employ its
military power for many purposes. To
express concern, through only limited
commitment, military supplies and
technical advisers can be dispatched. A
political point can be made through very
very limited military action. However, one
does not "express concern" or "make a
point" with more than 500,000 men.
Such a deployment means that your
country is (or should be) about the most
serious of bUSiness.
In Vietnam, the United States Violated
every major rule of statecraft and
strategy-for reasons that may be traced,
in part, very directly Indeed to the limited
war theory of the previous decade. The
civilian theorists of limited war provided
credulous politicians and officials with a
doctrine which American society could
no! tolerate in practice and which could
not fail to be ineffective in action.
Limited war, one of the three central
pillars of the new nuclear-age strategic
thinking (along with deterrence and arms
control theory)," attracted enormous
theoretical attention with respect to the
adjective ("limited"), but notably little
With regard to the noun ("war"). One can
perhaps understand why it was that
American politiCians and civilian officials
were persuaded by the new theory of
pains-and-risks minimiZing war, but why
did the most senior members of the
American military establishment not
protest, to the point of resignation, a
policy that was bound to fail? Although
13
DECISION 10 FIGHT
very senior professional soldiers are
obliged to obey political orders, they also
have obligations to the men and women
who are the human instruments of those
orders.
Vietnam demonstrates that, when the
United States chooses to fight for an
interest, as opposed to a vital interest,
against an adversary who must be
defeated or hurt very grievously before
he will submit. American policy cannot
possibly succeed. Any war that is worth
fighting IS worth the costs of winning-
even if the idea of victory is a constrained
one. Unfortunately, it is more likely than
not, on current evidence, that critically
important aspects of the Vietnam ex-
perience might be reproduced as a far
broader canvass and with far more
damaging consequences with respect to
a conflict in Europe.
The excellent new master operations
manual of the US Army (Field Manual
(FM) 100-5, Operations) maintainS un-
ambiguously that "the objective of the
.Army is to win the land battle."" What
FM 100-5 does not. and, of course, could
not, say is that NATO .(including
American) politicians are gOing to be so
concerned to limit the immediate risks of
nuclear escalation that they will deny
resort to tactics that should defeat the
invader close to his starting lines. When,
as in Vietnam, and one day perhaps in
Europe, the US Army is tested in combat
by an adversary who has a clear concept
of vIctory, ,,-who appreciates that control of
the political structure of the peace is the
prerogative of the military victor, disaster
is courted if the political guidance says,
in effect-"do not lose" and "don't lose
in such a way that high-risk actions are
runl"
What was wrong with American
strategy In Vietnam, as it appears to be
wrong in NATO today, is that Clausewitz'
MILITARY REVIEW
"grammar" of war is neglected in
American political appreciation. To offer
a pessimistic prediction: American policy
vis-ii-vis NATO-Europe might succeed in
that nuclear escalation would be con-
trolled (probably by the elementary
means of not initiating it-and offering
the Soviet Union only the smallest of
incentives to resort to nuclear war), and
the risks of the direct involvement of the
American homeland would be
minimized-but at the cost of conceding
defeat in the theater.
Similarly, Western defense com-
munities have sensibly been concerned
with the idea, and indeed the mechanics,
of "crisis management." However, as
with limited war, crisis management
locks in a tense marriC!ge two opposing
ideas-crisis and management. The price
that history exacts for very prudent
management is defeat in crisis (which is,
in essence, a contest of wills). As
Thomas Schelling has argued in detail,
the side more willing (or apparently more
willing) to take risks, even to behave
recklessly, has a bargaining advantage
over the adversary.'6
The conduct of war is the business of
politicians not of generals, but the
conduct of campaigns IS the business of
generals not of politicians. Politicians
have the right and indeed the duty to
decide both that the United States should
fight and that the fighting should be
restricted by certain arbitrary though
conveniently prominent rules of conduct
(for example, that there should be no
bombing beyond the Valu or that Laos,
Cambodia and North Vietnam are to be
treated as enemy sanctuaries-save with
respect to aerial bombardment).
However, the Joint Chiefs of Staff
have the right and the duty to advise both
the president and the Congress that such
political guidance must result, at best. if
14
this is their professional judgment, in an
inconclusive military campaign. The
offering of such professional military
judgment does not challenge in any way
the presidential political prerogative-all
that it does is to draw legitimate
professional conclusions from a pro-
jection of the effect of presidential
gUidance upon the conduct of the cam-
paign. A general is not trained to assess
the likely impact of an American invasion
of North Vietnam upon Chinese and
Soviet policy, but he is cfC0mpetent to
advise a president as to the very likely
effect of such an invasion upon the
quantity and quality of the North Viet-
namese effort in the South.
Prediction
The US Government requires a wide
range of military options, not a set of
capabilities designed to accommodate
the needs of a very few plausible
scenarios. A defense community cannot
be trusted to identify futu re occasions for
war. The record of this century
demonstrates that the defense com-
munities of the major powers have, with
only minor exceptions, failed to discern
the occasion and the shape of "war to
come." The American military force
planner of the late-1970s is charged with
a nextto-impossible task. Widespread
and deep-felt (though Infrequently
deeply reasoned) incredulity meets
almost any attempt to outline plausible
scenarios wherein the United States
might, not unreasonably, wish to apply
armed coercion.
The Soviet Union maintains very large
armed forces in peacetime because that
is the Russian/Soviet way, and because
Soviet officials understand-courtesy of
\. IT
Russian/Soviet history-that peacetime
is the interval between crises and wars.
Soviet officials know that there will be
crises and wars in the future and that
there is no close substitute for military
power (preferably in being).
In the West, the devotion of a steady
high level of resources to defense func-
tions does not rest, as in the East, upon a
mature understanding of the competitive
structure of international life. Instead,
desired capabilities have to be justified in
terms of plausible specific threats.
For reasons of political culture, the
American defense community is unable
to suggest, simply, that the world is a
dangerous place and, therefore, the
United States needs general purpose
military capabilities appropriate to deter
and if need be cope with large threats.
Instead, the United States has a military
posture which, is custom-
designed to fit one set of scenarios-
major war on NATO's Central Front. Of
course, the United States has army, air
and maritime forces stationed in and
assigned to regions other than to Europe,
but the European focus has become
overwhelming as the armed forces have
shrunk in size. (This focus IS particularly
noticeable With respect to the army.)
The current role of NATO-Europe In
the force planning of the US Army IS
intrrgurng. First, a "Europe first, and
second" posture is eminently justifiable
both in terms of the growth rn the
objective threat rn, and to, that region
and with reference to the character of
American interests in the area. Second, a
heavy NATO-Europe orientation provides
only the most minimal domestic political
problems (the "ground war rn Asia" fear
of niany legislators is avoided). Third,
Europe is the most sophisticated of all
political combat environments. Hence,
the more serious one is about defense
15
DECISION TO FIGHT
business in Europe, the easier it is to
justify claims for the most advanced
military technology. Whereas strategic
and naval operations are inherently high
technology enterprises, the technology
levels of the ground and tactical air
forces depend significantly upon their
geopolitical orientation.
The Army's European focus reflects,
very appropriately, official judgment con-
cerning which overseas interests are
more, as opposed to less, important. But
this focus does not reflect any very
convincing official assessment as to the
likely geopolitical setting for future con-
flict. Overall, the US Armed Forces and
particularly the Army (with less than
800,000 men-the lowest figure since
the onset of the Korean War in June
'950) have responded to post-Vietnam
conditions in an eminently defensible
manner.
The prinCipal important criticism that
should be directed at American military
plannrng today is not that it is mis-
allocating resources between the ser-
Vices, by functional category (strategic
forces, general purpose forces, and so
forth), or by regional assignment but,
rather, that it has too few resources to
allocate. The critical distinction here lies
between the internal and the external
rationality of defense allocation and force
planning.
Given a military posture of the current
dimensions, geared to a defense budget
that-short of major political shocks-
Will vary only at the margrn over the next
few years, the heavy NATO-European
focus IS really preordained. The internal
rationality of the allocation of current
military resources is not at issue here.
What is at issue is the matter of external
rationality-are the military resources
large enough to support Amerrcan
foreign policy?
MILITARY REVIEW
At the present time, the US
Government appears to have convinced
Itself that large-scale conflict in which
American military power might be in-
volved is likely only in Europe (and in
Central Europe at that). Extreme skep-
'ticism tends to meet suggestions that
American military force planners take the
prospects of conflict in the Persian Gulf
or the Far East (to cite only two areas)
very seriously.
The government may well be right to
be skeptical. But one should be excused
some slight tremors of concern, if not
alarm, when senior civilian officials re-
spond to any suggestion of American
military involvement outside of Europe
with the all-too-familiar demand, "give
me a plausible scenariol"
History offers no certain detailed
guide for the future, but it does yield
some general cautionary wisdom that
should not be ignored. Specifically,
1 For a dIfferent .. /lew see Alain C Enthoven and K Wayne
Smith, HDw Much 15 Enough Shaptng the Defense Program 1961
1969, Harper & Row Publishers, Inc N '(. 1971 It should be
appreCiated that poht!cal Wisdom In the White House and the
Congress on the subject of the proper use of armed force IS Infinitely
more ""'portant than IS more or less rational management of the
DepaJ1lYlent of Defense
2 See Bernard Brodie War and POlitiCS. The Macmillan Co
N Y 1973 pp 474 75
3 A particularly mterestlng contnbutlon waS MIchael Howard
'The Demand for Military History. MIlitary ReVIew, May 1971. pp
344]
4 A \ler.,. useful study of thiS subject IS Robert L Rothstein
Plannmg Prediction and Pollcymaillng m Foreign Aff8lrs Theory and
PractIce little Brown & Co Boston Mass 1972
5 The United States Signaled as mUCh With Its move to Defense
Condition Number 3 CDefeon 3) on 23 October 1973, dunng the last
Arab Israeli War. as reports of pOSSible Sovlel troop movements to
Egypt began to appesr more serious
6 E\len some SO\llet military ad\lentures would not lack for
apologists m Western foreign poliCY communhles Just as the
Cubans In Angola h8\1e been held b .... Ambassador Andrew V\)ung to
be a force for stabillt .... (as. of course are the Soviet forces In
Czechoslovakia), so It IS increaSingly fashionable to adopt 8 very
relaxed aUItude toward the Soviet Union S African m\lol\lement- on
the grounds that the Soviet Unron IS slmplv laVing In store future
trouble for llself After aU has that not been the Western experience?
NOTES
16
defense communities most often are
wrong In their collective judgments over
the likely place and character of "the
next conflict" (so the fact that officials
are not much impresse/il, with scenarios
of extra-European in the late-
1970s may mean very littlel. Also, air and
sea power are necessary but insufficient
Instruments of American policy-if the
United States wishes seriously to defend
local interests (suddenly, in the event of
challenge, discovered to be "vital"), there
IS no adequate substitute for American -
ground forces.
As of today, if American ground, air
and naval forces assigned to NATO
duties are not to be run down well below
a tolerable level, the United States lacks
a margin of safety In the scale of its
general purpose forces if anything more
substantial than a token commitment is
to be offered in support of (vital) interests
outside of Europe.
7 See Cohn S Gray The Geopolitics of the Nuclear Era
Heartland Rlm/ands. and the Technologlcsl Revolution, Crane,
Russak & Co Inc, Ny. 1977
8 See Russell F Weigle .... The American Way of War A HISTory
of United States Military Strategy and Policy. The Macmillan Co
N Y 1973
9 B H Liddell Hart. Strategy The Indirect Approach, Faber &
Faber London. Eng 1967. p 366
10 A conCise presentation of clvlhan theonzlng on limited war is
Morton H Halpenn LImited War In the Nuclear Age, John Wiley &
Sons Inc N Y 1963
11 for an enhghtentng diSCUSSion of thiS concept. see Hans J
Morgenthau. PolitiCS Among Nations The Struggle for Power and
Peace. Alfred A Knopf. Inc. NY. 1974. Chapter 6
12 Carl von Clausewltz, On War, Routledge & Kegan Paul. Ltd,
Boston, Mass 1966 Volume III p 122
13 A very useful beglnnlOg IS W Scott Thompson and Donaldson
o Fflzzel The Lessons of Vlern{lm, Crane. Russak & Co. Inc. N Y
1976
14 I rev'ew the Qual11'l and policy relevance lOT otherWise) of
post 1945 CIVllran strategic In Coltn S s forthcoming
book Strategic Studies and Public Pohc'l
15 Field Manual 100 5, OperatIons. Department of the Armv.
Washington. DC. 1 July 1976. P '1
16 Thomas C Schelling. The Strategy of Confhet. Oxford Unl.
verslty Press. N V 1963. Chapter 2. and Thomas C Schelhng. Arms
and Influe(Jce. Yale UnlverSltv Press New Haven Conn, 1966,
Chapters 2,3
Battle Staff Officer Qualification
Major Edwin S. Stone III. US Army
The explosion of new doctrinal concepts brought about by the new
"how we fight" manuals impacts on every officer in the field.
However. FMs alone cannot do the job. Most officers have not received
CGSC training in these new concepts. Staff officers. particularly at
division and higher level. need to understand and apply these con-
cepts. Some type of formal schooling in the field is required. In 1917. a
US Army Staff College was established in France to train AEF staff
officers. Why not estahlish a similar course today to teach the new
doctrinal concepts?
T
HERE have been many changes in the offing that have potential
for serious impact at division level and above. Some of the new
doctrinal concepts are found in the following recently released or
impending publications:
Field Manual (PM) 100-5, Operations.
FM 71100, Armored and Mechanized Division Opprations.
FM 71-101. Infantry and Azrborne Division Opaations.
FM 71-102, Air Assault Division OpaatlOns.
FM 10015, Larger Unit OppratlOns.
FM 101-5, Command and Control of Combat Operations.
This list is not all-inclusive. Given these many new doctrinal
concepts, the need for exporting new doctrine to the field exists in a
form other than through the distribution of manuals.
The seriousness of the impact should be assessed in terms of
whether the "battle captains" will have battle staff officers in the
immediate future who understand the concepts that must be applied
now "to fight outnumbered, and win." This contention does not suggest
that battle staff officers at division level and higher are not enter-
prising enough to pursue a program of selfeducation. It does suggest
that changes in doctrinal concepts are reaching the field in a com-
pressed, piecemeal fashion that makes focusing on a common theme
difficult and thereby impedes progressive application of available
combat resources.
Division and above are levels chosen for several reasons. A large
number of field grade officers serving in positions of responsibility
attend the US Army Command and General Staff College
(USACGSC)-the last level at which tactics are taught-before the
necessity for the new concepts was perceived; thus, they have received
17
MILITARY REVIEW
no formal instruction in these matters. Next, those officers who have
attended formal schooling recently and have studied the new concepts
are not in positions that would facilitate the imparting of
the new concepts to fellow officers in field units.
So, at best, present schooling in new concepts impacts sporadically
upon the field. Additionally, there are a number of officers who never
will have the opportunity to receive formal instructions in doctrine for
division level and above. Yet all of these officers must carry the
burdens of translating these new thoughts into action. Therefore, what
we nepd is some form of school in the field for those officers at division
level and higher who keep abreast of proliferating doctrinal
concepts.
There is a precedent for this sort of suggestion: 28 November
marked the 60th anniversary of the beginning of the first course of the
Army Staff College in Langres, France.
1
This college was instrumental
in training staff officers in concepts in tactics, logistics, division and
corps-level organization, and functions for the burgeoning
American Expeditionary Forces (AEF). The problems in the World War
I period were similar to those of today. For example, some of( the
notable disparities in training were:
The staff system and organization-down to division
level-were new.'
Most of the members of the AEF who had had general staff
training were siphoned off to fulfill needs at higher headquarters.
Consequently, staff officers trained in new concepts were not available
for the lower levels. I
There were conceptual changes in tactical doctrine that had to be
addressed in the vein of "which way do you fight?'"
The problems of the AEF in this frame of reference roughly equate
to tnday's The reasons for the problems are different-the
needs are the same. New concepts must be infused quickly in order that
units in the field may meet the challenge adequately. Even General
.John J. Pel'shing was wiliing io admit that it was impossible to
fr"fajor Edu:tn S. Stone III lS semo' aSslstant
pruft?ssor of military SCience at JlfcNeese Stale
Unli:rrslly, Lake Charles. La He recewed a B.A
from The CItadel. an M.S.E from the UnIVersIty
of Southern CallfornlO and an M.M.A.S. from the
USACGSC. class of 19'17. He has served In
VICtnam and with the 69th Air Defense Arllllery
Group, Wiirzburg, Germany.
18
.Q.-_., V
Ilia
BATTLE STAFF OFFICERS
f'
produce thoroughly trained staff officers in a short time; still, he
considered it necessary to ground them in common doctrine "with a
loyal sense of cooperation well accentuated .... '" In short, here is an
example of a school like the USACGSC producing staff officers within
a theater of operations .
. Pershing was willing to accept some degradation in overall perform-
ance across the spectrum in order to start the program. He needed
immediate performance." There were not enough American officers
available for assignment as instructors for the first course, so lectures
were given by British and French officers.
7
Thus, a start was made,
and, as the courses progressed, American graduates experienced in the
field were returned to teach other Americans. Further, a higher quality
of instructional output evolved because experienced American staff
officers were teaching American doctrine in terms of how it was
actually being done by the US forces in the field."
The method of instruction centered around map exercises. Lectures
and conferences preceded the exercises. The purpose was to explain the
staff roles that members were to act out and then have them actually
execute some particular phase of staff work in the map exercise.
Critiques were conducted with students exchanging and marking each
other's papers. Gradually, these exercises progressed to a point that
they were conducted in the fashion of today's "command post ex-
ercise."9 So, the ingenuity of those exporting doctrine to the field was
not limited.
If the argumentation that there is now a need of bringing the
members of staffs of highlevel units in the field "up to speed" on
current doctrine is valid, then a model for accomplishing this end
exists. Initially, doctrine could be exported to a field by a small,
selected USACGSC contingent to "train the trainers" who could, in
turn, impart the. new precepts to their units through their daily actions.
At that point in time, when the field is abreast of contemporary
doctrine, then the need for this alternative form of training will no
longer exist and the Army can rely upon its more traditional methods
of exporting doctrine.
!'OOTES
1 Arm) Ger/eral Staff roiifge Fourth Course Octobf'r December 191k. ThE' Pnntmg Plant. 29th Enlnneers, US
Ann)', 1918, P .11
2 Bngadter Gem'raJ.J n HIttlc'. Thf' Military Staff, ThE' Stuc-kpok Co , Harrisburg, Po., 1961, P 211
.1 Ibid. p 21J
-:I General John J Pershmg, M)' Experiences In the \\.'or-ld War. Fredencil A Stokf's Co, NY. P 15154
:) IbId pp 15556
6 Ibid
7 Arm)' General Staff Fourth Course OrtonerDf'(',mbr'" 1911:1 up lit pp 3112
8 Ibid. p .14
9 Ibid
19
Wo.men at West Point:
Change
Within
Tradition
Major Alan G. Vitters, US Army
and
Nora Scott Kinzer
O
N 6 JULY 1977, 104 young women
marched into the US Military
Academy (USMA) to take their place in
"the long grey line" They were in the
second coeducational class to enter,
and they were entering an academy
which has been characterized this past
year by change within tradition. The
purpose of West Point remained fixed-
to respond to the needs of the Army for
educated, trained and motivated. of
ficers. The admission of women,
however, has served as a catalyst to
the most extensive, systematic, in
20
The men and women of the class of
1980 had more similarities than
differences. However, not all problems
encountered at the institution were
resolved although everyone involved
made an honest effort to make the
system work. The integration process
may take another three or four years,
and only time will tell what the real
impact of this change will be.
depth analysis into the education and
training of cadets ever to be conducted
at the Military Academy.
The purpose of this article is to
review some of the significant events
of the first year of women at West
Point. Data on characteristics of
entering cadets, resignation rates,
academic and physical performance,
attitudes and adjustment problems of
men and women are presented.
On 7 October 1975, President Ford
signed into law Public Law 94106, an
amendment to which authorized
1<
women's admissions to the service
academies. The amendment was con-
troversial from its inception, with each
of the services opposing it. The Army's
position was that the primary purpose
of the academy was to develop combat
arms leaders and that, since women'
were exd uded from com ba t
assignments, admitting women to the
academy was incongruent with its
mission.
Arguments of those in favor of the
amendment centered on the issue of
equal opportunity and of women being
provided educational opportunities
available to men. Excluding women
from federal institutions, like the
service academies, was thought to be
discrimination on the basis of sex. In
addition, a precedent existed at the
academy for graduates to be com-
missioned in noncombat arms. Finally,
the expanding role and utilization of
women in each of the services argued
in favor of women's admission. In May
1975, the House of Representatives
voted 303 to 96 to admit women; in
June 1975, the Senate voted
WOMEN AT WEST POINT
overwhelmingly in favor by voice vote.
Following congressional mandate,
the academy developed operational
plans for the admission of women. The
philosophy of West Point in in-
tegr.ating women followed the letter of
the law carefully, almost rigidly.
Academy officials were committed to
challenging women to their utmost and
including women in all phases of cadet
life and training. Consultants had
stressed the dangers of being too easy
on women cadets and other forms of
paternalism. Since the law stated that
"only minimum essential adjustments'
be made in existing standards to in-
tegrate women, and that these ad
justments be based on physiological
differences between the sexes," the
USMA planned few changes to its
traditional program.
Among the more significant aspects
of the preadmission phase w r ~ the
following; Several research projects
were designed and conducted to ex-
amine' systematically physiological
and attitudinal differences betwepn the
sexes; prominent consultants and
MILITARY REVIEW
guest lecturers were invited to address
cadet and faculty audiences on topics
related to women; the USMA increased
the number of women officers assigned
to the academy; and the USMA
decided to integrate women into the
cadet barracks.
On 7 July 1976, 119 women entered
the USMA with the class of 1980.
Research found more similarities than
differences existed between these
young men and women. All came to
the academy for similar reasons, were
similar in their commitment to a
mil i tary career and possessed
academic, athletic and leadership
skills. Obviously, both self-selection by
candidates and careful admissions
screening helped to contribute to the
equality among the sexes.
In spite of considerable similarity,
however, men and women cadets were
different in a number of attitudes and
other personal characteristics at en-
trance. One does not erase 18 years of
biological and cultural conditioning
easily. Significant differences existed
Major Alan G Vaters lS wlth the
Department of BehaVIOral SCIences and
LeadershIp at the USMA' He reeelUed a B.S.
from the USMA and an MS. from the Uni-
versIty of Utah. Major Vttters and Dr. Kinzer
are currently co-dlrt:'ctors of PrOject Athena,. a
research project to study the psychological,
socLOloglcal and organtzalzonal Impact of
admIttmg women to West Pomt
22
on a series of physiological measures.
In attitudes toward sex roles, marriage
and childbearing, the women cadets
were more nontraditional than the men
cadets (Tables 1 and 2).
During July and August, men and
women went through all phases of
cadet basic training together. By and
large, they performed similarly in most
phases of training, with the exception
of physical training and physical
aspects of military training.' Although.
instructors made some adjustments for
women to compete with men in
physical training (that is, women
carried the lighter MI6 rifle in lieu of
the M14 on reveille runs), these
changes were minimal, and the essen-
tially one-track program pushed
women (and some men) beyond their
limits. As a result, women tended to
endure more failure experiences, as
well as more fatigue and fatigue-
related injuries.
In addition, a higher percentage of
women tended to voluntarily resign the
first summer, 16 percent as compared
Nora Scott Kmzer lS a senLDr research
SClentlst at the Army Research Institute.
Arllngton. Va. She recelUed an M.A. from
MIddlebury College and a Ph.D. from Purdue
Unwerslty She has served In the Department
of Modern Languages. Purdue UnIVersity.
Lafayette. Ind .. and as assIstant professor of
SOCIOlogy. Purdue North Central. Westvtlle.
Ind.
WOMEN AT WEST POINT
Anthropometric Differences Between Men and Women
Percent Women Wh9
Variable Men Women Exceed Male Standard
e
Height. mches
3
702 654
d
52
Weight. pounds
a
1099 1309 66
PhYSical aptitude exam,
standard score unlts
a
5553 2902
d
00
Percent lelt handed
b
118 30
d
National sample
;"
Welght
C
1520 1255
d
248
Helgh{ 690 640
d
86
dSouTce Houston 1916
bSource Clas) Characteristic SurlJey
"
(Source A sample at 105 white males age 18. and 100 temale., measured by thp US Health Examlnat'or
Survey. 1966 70
E:'The male 'standard for edCh scale I') defined as that scale which 66 percent of the male'::. ex[pl
Table I
with 10 percent of the men. Cadet
counselors noted that both sexes cited
similar reasons for leaving, with
dislike of military discipline and
regimentation being the reason most
frequently given. There were no com-
plaints of sex bias or prejudice from
the women resignees. West Point did
experience a somewhat higher attrition
rate than the other service academies,
which could be attributed to a policy of
accepting intended resignations rather
23
than discouraging them, a tough
physical training schedule and a
history of relatively high early at-
trition.
Self-reported measures of
motivation and commitment obtained
at the start and at the end of the
summer training period revealed that
both genders tended to become more
committed to a military career,
graduation from the academy and
West Point as an institution.
MILITARY REVIEW
ComparISon of AWS' Scores for Males and Females at
Several Institutions
Standard
Sample Date Number Mean Deviation
University of Te,as 1975
Males 248 4716 1278
females 282 5316 1256
US MIlitary Academy 1976
4" Males 980 4234 993
4" Females 102 5751 888
US Air force Academy 1976
4" Males 367 43 10 1238
4" Females 42 5409 1235
USMA faculty 1976
Males 236 4883 1164
*The AWS (AttItude" Women Scale\ IS a 25 Itm Instrument deSIgned to mea"lure tTadltlonahsm {low
scores) or eaualltarlanlsm {high scores) In attitude toward the nghts and roles of women In (Spence
Helmre,ch ,nd Stapp 1973. Spence ,nd Helmre,Ch 1972)
Table 2
During the academic year, men and
women again performed similarly in
most areas of cadet life. In academic
subjects, the top woman stood 44th in
her class, and 23 percent of the women
(as compared to 30 percent of the men)
made the dean's list. The women
cadets performed as well or better than
the men in English and foreign
languages, but they performed below
the men in engineering fundamentals,
environmental science and military
science. In physical education, women
took courses in selfdefense in lieu of
traditional courses in boxing and
wrestling. In addition, women were
evaluated on separate grading scales
on such events as the 2-mile run,
obstacle course and physical aptitude
24
exams. Separate grading scales were
required since relatively few women
would have passed when evaluated on
men's scales.
An analysis of the conduct (or
demerit) system revealed that cadets in
integrated companies tended to receive
slightly more demerits than cadets in
segregated units, but that men and
women received similar numbers of
demerits. (Demerits are given at the
USMA for violations of cadet
regulations.)
Semiannually, upperclassmen and
tactical officers rate cadets on their
leadership ability. The ratings are
conducted as part of the "leadership
evaluation system" at the USMA. In
these ratings, women tended to have
f'
been rated lower than men in their
class. Whether these lower ratings, a
phenomenon which has been ex-
perienced in other training etl-
vironments, imply that cadets perceive
that women genuinely lack potential
for military leadership or whether
other factors may be influencing the
ratings is unclear at this point. Future
analysis into this aspect of the system
is planned.
During the year, women resigned
about the same rate as the men. As of 6
July 1977, 33 of the original 119 women
had voluntarily resigned, for an at-
trition rate of 28 percent. Of the
original 1,366 men, 309 had resigned,
for an attrition rate of 23 percent
(Table 3).
- Women who entered the USMA
participated in more extracurricular
clubs in high school than their male
counterparts.
2
This interest appears to
have continued as women joined 46 of
WOMEN AT WEST POINT
the 80 clubs at the USMA. In addition,
several women's athletic teams were
formed as clubs this first year. The
women's basketball team had an ex-
cellent 14-5 first-year record. Members
of the squad became affectionately
known by other cadets as "sugar
smacks" ("smacks" is a term used by
cadets to denote "plebes" or freshmen).
Women were integrated into the
barracks with relatively few problems,
but a number of other attitudinal
problems surfaced this past year.
Many cadets continue to disagree with
the policy admitting women to the
academies and tend to hold
"traditional" views toward the ex-
panding role of women in the Army.3
Research conducted in April 1977
indicated that upperclassmen assigned'
to companies without women tended to
hold the most traditional attitudes
(Table 4). Several reasons have been
offered to explain these findings: an
Attrition Rates of Male and Female USMA Cadets
July 1976-May 1977
Males (1.366) Females (119) Total (1.485)
Percent (Number) Percent (Number) Percent (Number)
Cadet baSIC training 99 (135) 159 (19) 104 (154)
(7 July6 September 1976)
First semester 64
'(88) 59 (7) 64 (95)
(7 September J 97622 January 1977)
Second semester 41 (56) 34 (4) 40 (60)
(24 January 1977-28 May 1977)
Total attrrtlOn rate 20.4
(279) 252 (30) 208 (309)
(7 July 1976-28 May 1977)
Source Project Athena, USMA
Table 3
25
MIlITARY REVIEW
Attitudes of Cadets and Army Personnel
Group N X
Men. class of 1980-
In compames with women 250 -246 221
In companies without women
633 -228 203
Men. class ot 1918 and 1979-
In companies with women 481 -240 204
In companies without women 932 -264
a
211
CommisSioned Otlicers, Armywlde sample.
NovemberDecember 1975
b
/,113 -007 287
Warrant officers, Armywlde sample,
November-December 1975b
396 -015 298
Enlisted personnel. Armywlde sample,
November-December 1975
b
3,331 +001 286
Women In the Army. Armywlde sample.
November December 1975 366 +/08 /50
30ItterencE'<:: between (ompan!E') with and i'rlthout l'I'omen I:::' SignifICant t ;: -207. p" OJ
bSource J Savell &. J Woptpj. Army Research Institute paper, 1977 Negative scores lridlcate mon?tradltlonal
';:.ex role concept
awareness that the academy's top
leadership originally opposed the ad-
mission of women; a perception that
USMA officials may have
"overreacted" to the change as
evidenced by the amount of time
devoted to lectures. surveys and
briefings on the subject; and' a
perception. among both men and
women, that women may have received
"inequitable treatment" as plebes by
Table 4
26
other cadets and officers_ j
Men cite instances of women being
dated by upperclassmen (a regulations
offense at the USMA) and of media
coverage focusing exclusively on
women, Women cite instances of excep-
tionally harsh conditions as ex-
emplified by having been the target of
rumors and jokes throughout the year,
Perhaps the most difficult aspect of all.
for women, has been the psychological
WOMEN AT WEST POINT
I'
' ~ ' . ' . ':,,: .
.... :
j!
27
MILITARY REVIEW
effect of being physically integrated
into the corps but not having been
fully accepted by their peers.
In some ways, the stress ex-
perienccd this first year by women was
of a different nature than that ex-
perienced by their male peers. Men
ridiculed the women's higher pitched
voices as not a "command voice" and
said that shorter marching strides
were not "military." Some women were
made to feel that, even if they made it
through the first year, in subsequent
years male plebes would not take
orders from them. Finally, some
women felt that, to be accepted, they
had to be "one of the boys," but, by so
doing, felt that they might be
sacrificing their femininity and
changing their basic self-image. Many
women experienced these conflicts at
various times throughout the year and
had to develop methods for coping with
them.'
It has been a year of interpersonal
and organizational change at the
academy. In spite of its opposition to
admitLing women as cadets, West
Point planned for them carefully and
listened to carefully considered advice
on how to do it. Because of its com-
mitment to athletic prowess, West
Point pioneered in scientific analyses
of physiological abilities of women. It
discovered how to challenge women
physically and push them to new levels
of endurance. It was able to select and
retain an academically and at-
titudinally talented group of women
and give them the satisfaction of new
intramural and athletic teams, as well
as academic training which was suited
to their individual abilities. West Point
had joined the mainstream of
American coeducation while retaining
many of its distinctive qualities as a
"school for soldiers."
Women at West Point is an event
without precedent in the history of the
Western World as a military academy
adapts to meet the needs of its entering
women. Women are being integrated
into West Point due to the ability and
commitment of those women who have
entered, and the commitment of the
institution to that goal. Facilitating
the integration process may be the
three to four-year transgeneration
which occurs at the academy as cadets
graduate and officers rotate to new
assignments. However, only time will
tell the real impact of this change on
the individuals involved, as well as on
the institution within which it is
taking place.
NOTES
1 Alan G Vltters and Nora Scott Kinzer, "Prehmmar't' Report
on Wompn Cadell. at thp V S MIlitary Academy:' Unpubhahed
paper presented at thf' 1976 Regional M{'f'tmg of thl" Inter
University Semmar on Anned Forces and Society, Au Command
and Staff College. MaJol,welJ AIr Force Rase. Ala, October 1976, pp
14 15
2 Robert Pnest, Howard Pnnce, Teresa Rhone and .A..lan
V1Uers. "Dlfferen(,(!9 Betv.een ChnractenstIcs of Men and Women
~
w dets Closs of 1980," liS Mlhtary Academy \USMAl
Re rt Number 77010, Wcst Pomt, NY, March 1977 p 17
<1 Roben Pnest, "Cadet Attitudes Toward Wom{'n-19tfl,"
USMA Report Number 76{)15, West POint, NY. May 1976, p 27,
28
"A Companson of Facult)l and Cadet Attitudes Toward Womt-n,"
USMA Rpport Numbpr 76017, West POInt, NY, May 1976. p 5.
and "Cadpts Attitudes Toward the AdmiSSIOn of Women to West
POInt," USMA Rt>port Number 76.{)18, Wpst POInt, NY. June
1976. p 7
4. Robert Pnest, "Cadet Pen'cptlOns of IneqUItable Treatment
Dunng Cildet Brune TraInmg 1976," USMA Report Number 77
012. West POInt, NY, March 1977 pp 35
5 Alan Vltters and Howard Pnnce, "NontraditIOnal Roles In n
TraditIOnal SPttmg Women at West POint," Office of Mlhtary
Leudr-rshlp. USMA. West Pomt, NY, UnpublIshed paper Apni
1977, pp 1:117
from
National Defense
Colonel Wilfred L. Ebel, US Army Reserve
The Japanese Constitution forbids
a national army. However, at the
urging of the United States during the
Korean War, the Japanese organized
Self-Defense Forces with the Ground
Force as the major component. Today,
Japan ranks in the top 10 nations in
defense spending. The GSDF is well-
trained, well-equipped and capable of
performing its defensive mission quite
well. While Japan relies on the US
nuclear umbrella as a deterrent, its
ground forces provide for its safety
and well-being, and add stability to
Northeast Asia.
J
APAN has maintained an extremely
low military profile for the past
quarter of a century. Although Japan
began forming a de facto army in 1950,
and although that army today com-
mands more firepower than did the
Imperial Army of World War II, very
little attention has been focused on
Japan's military buildup.
For years, the post-World War II
. Japanese Army was euphemistically
referred to as a National Police
Reserve or as a Security Force. Even
today, the Japanese prefer not to
acknowledge possession of an army;
their land force is officially referred to
as the Ground Self-Defense Force
(GSDF).
This contrived avoidance of
Reprinted from NatIOnal Defense, September October 1977. COPYright @ 1977 by the American Defense Preparedness
Association, Washington, D C.
29
MILITARY REVIEW
military terminology is a bow to the
peace constitution that Japan adopted
in 1947, a constitution containing a
"no-war" clause. This pacifist clause,
Article 9, forbids "the authorization of
any army, navy, air force or other war
poten tial. ... "
The Japanese interpret their peace
constitution as posing no bar to self-
defense measures. This liberal inter-
pretation has permitted Japan to form
an army (the Ground Self-Defense
Force), a navy (the Maritime Self-
Defense Force) and an air force (the
Air Self-Defense Force).
Today, Japan ranks 10th globally
in total defense expenditures. Japan's
sizable defense budget is even more
remarkable when one considers that
. none of Japan's defense yen go for
those big ticket items (nuclear
weaponry, aircraft carriers, long-range
bombers) which consume a goodly
portion of the defense budgets .of other
nations in the top-10 category.
Japan is pledged by its constitution
to settle international disputes without
the threat or use of force. Why, then,
does Japan possess a GSDF which can
field 13 divisions plus several separate
brigades? How did it all start?
The rearmament of Japan began at
the insistence of the United States.
Japan might have become an un-
armed, neutral "Switzerland of the
Pacific" except for the Korean War.
But, when US occupation troops in
Colonel WIlfred LEbel. US Army Reserve.
serves as ASSIstant ChIef of Staff, Personnel,
310th Support Command (Theater Army
Area), Washmgton. D C. HIS article "Jap.an
US RelatIOns" appeared m the May 1977
Mihtary Review.
30
Japan were rushed to the Korean
Peninsula in 1950, the United States
encouraged Japan to form a 75,000-
man National Police Reserve. (The
United States actually would have
preferred a larger scale rearmament by
Japan.) This National Police Reserve
eventually became the Self-Defense
Forces, now about 250,000 strong and
equipped with sophisticated military
gear.
When Japan agreed to become a
military ally of the United States in'
return for an end to the US occupation
of Japan, it foreclosed the option of
becoming an Asiatic Switzerland. If
the world goes to war, Japan can
hardly remain aloof. The safety and
well-being of Japan are dependent
upon maintenance of its own conven-
tional armed force and upon reliance
on the US nuclear umbrella.
Japan's defense forces have been
developed gradually through a series of
four defense buildup plans. Each of
these Five-Year Plans brought
qualitative improvements to Japan's
defense posture. Defense expenditures
increased annually. The 1976 defense
budget was 10 times greater than the
1955 defense budget and nearly three
times as large as the 1970 defense
budget.
The GSDF ineludes twelve infantry
divisions and one mechanized division.
Seven of the infantry divisions have
four regiments and an authorized
strength of 9,000. The other five in-
fantry divisions have only three
regiments and an authorized strength
of 7,000.
The 7th Mechanized Division was
planned for conversion to an armor
division in the fiscal year beginning
April 1977. The 1st Tank Brigade,
organized in 1974, may be absorbed
i'
into the new ann or division. The
GSDF has eight antiaircraft artillery,
groups equipped with HA WK surface-
to-air guided missiles.
JAPAN'S DEVELOPING ARMY
The GSDF has approximately 890
tanks. Its new main battle tank, the
Type 74, is built in Japan and is rated
a good performer. Other recent ac-
quisitions by the GSDF include HA WK
missiles, 155mm self-propelled
howitzers, 130mm self-propelled,
multiple-barreled rocket launchers,
helicopters and armored personnel
carriers.
Some fairly serious manpower
problems plague the GSDF. Rising
personnel costs consume an ever-
increasing share of the defense budget.
Recruiting has not been an easy task.
Enlisted personnel must follow rugged
working and training schedules. With
few exceptions, enlisted personnel are
required to live in barracks. Anny
enlistments, except in some technical
skills, can be for as little as two years.
Although the GSDF opened its ranks
to women in 1968, less than one
percent of the force is female.
In theory, a soldier can shed his
urrifonn and return to civilian life any
time he desires since there are no
military laws or military courts. Self-
Defense Forces (SDF) personnel are
subject to civil-service regulations, but
there are no military crimes such as
absent without leave or desertion. Like
policemen and firemen, SDF personnel
are prohibited from organizing into
unions.
Most officer personnel are required
to serve a year of active duty as
noncommissioned officers (NCOs)
before being commissioned. The
National Defense Academy (es-
tablished in 1954) graduates 530 cadets
ann!lally. Of these, 300 are destined for
31
'0

<l
.()
" \
HAWK (GSDF)
the GSDF. After graduation, they will
spend one year as master sergeants
before reaching the rank of lieutenant.
There is no Reserve Officers'
Training Corps program, but
graduates of civilian colleges and uni-
versities can compete for admission to
a one-year officer candidate school
program. Individuals accepted into
officer candidate school attend the
school as master sergeants.
A continuing shortage of military
medical officers prompted es-
tablishment of the National Defense
MILITARY REVIEW
Medical College in 1973. The first class
graduated in 1977 and began two year
internships at military hpspitals. In
1975, 74 students were selected from
over 5,000 applicants. The college
plans to accept 80 new students each
year. Graduates are expected to serve a
minimum of nine years with the SDF;
those leaving the service earlier nor-
mally will have to reimburse the
government for the training received.
A new recruiting program for high
school graduates was recently in-
stituted. Under this new program, 500
graduates, ages 18 to 20, are accepted
into the GSDF each year as special
recruits. These enlistees are provided
two years of training and guaranteed
promotion to sergeant third class upon
graduation. When the program opened
in 1975, over 12,000 high school
graduates competed for the 500 spaces
in the first class.
The GSDF has a youth, cadet
program designed for junior high
school graduates. Minimum age for
joining the youth cadets is 15. More
than 7,000 applied for the 520 spaces
available in 1975. Youth cadets receive
four years of schooling and are
guaranteed an NCO rating upon com-
pletion ,of the curriculum.
The SDF operates a physical
training school which serves the dual
Ipurpose of promoting physical fitness
and improving the image of the SDF.
The school not only trains military
personnel to serve as coaches and
instructors in SDF units, but also
offers training to high school and
college athletes who hope to compete in
the Olympics and/ or in national spotts
festivals. Several thousand SDF tro.ops
supported the 1972 Winter Olympic
Games, and several hundred troops are
committed each year to support
32
national sports festivals.
Many defense analysts perceive the
GSDF to be heavily over-officered.
With 23,739 officers, 74,752 NCOs and
only 56,217 lower ranking personnel,
there are ample leaders in the current
force to support a significant ex-
pansion in size.
All officers and NCOs are highly
trained and certainly are capable of
serving at higher grade levels if a
rapid expansion of the force becomes
necessary.
Japan deliberately stockpiles
military personnel in those skills that
require long periods of training. By
training more pilots than are needed in
the peacetime force, the SDF ensures
the immediate availability of these
skills in a future crisis. However, there
is no peacetime registration of youth to
facilitate conscription in event of an
emergency.
Because Japan's defense plan calls
for a full alert posture in peacetime,
relatively little emphasis is given to
reserve forces. The GSDF reserve is
authorized a strength of 39,600 but has
been unable to enroll that number.
There is no system for direct
enlistment of non-prior-service per-
sonnel into the reserve; consequently,
the reserve forces are comprised solely
of veterans. This year's budget con-
tains a sizable pay increase for re-
servists in hopes of attracting greater
numbers of veterans to participate in
reserve training.
The Defense Agency recently
published a document called the
Outline of the National Defense Plan.
Instead of issuing a fifth Five-Year
Buildup Plan, the agency will review
and adjust defense capabilities on an
annual basis in the future. Emphasis is
on qualitative improvement of f ~ r e s
(,
rather than expansion in size. Special
attention is now being given to im-
proving the system of logistic support.
Around-the-clock surveillance of
coastal waters and the air space sur-
rounding Japan is a priority mission
for the Maritime and Air Self-Defense
Forces.
By maintaining a moderate-size,
well-trained and equipped force, and by
maintaining a security relationship
with the United States (including
reliance on the nuclear deterrent
capability of the United States), Japan
hopes to deter any aggressor nation
from initiating armed conflict.
John Paton Davies, in his recent
article "America and East Asia,"
stated:
(Japan) is by far the most im
portant US ally in East Asia, and
although the unwisdom of drawing
defense perimeters has been
demonstrated, it is evident that Japan
is definitely within that line.
Mr. Davies his remark
with the discerning observation that
"Japan is too much taken for granted
by Washington." Edwin O. Reischauer
(fonner US ambassador to Japan)
went a step further in his book Beyond
Vietnam: "As I see it, the chief problem
in American-Japanese relations is that
we both tend to take each other too
much for granted."
There is no doubt but that the
United States focuses on Europe first,
the Middle East second and, finally, on
Japan.
The United States will never renege
on its commitment to protect Japan,
but that is not the issue. The issue is
whether or not Japan wishes to hang
onto US coattails in perpetuity. A
Japan reluctant to remain so heavily
dependent upon the United States for
33
JAPAN'S DEVELOPING ARMY
security can be expected to continue
gradually to build up its own military ..
This does not necessarily presage a
break with the United States-Japan-
US trade ties are far too important to
permit such an untoward happening.
Additionally, Japan will surely want to
remain under the US nuclear umbrella
no matter how strong its conventional
force.
Japan understandably wishes to be
the master of its own destiny. If too
close an alliance with the United
States becomes counterproductive to
Japanese aims and goals, the United
States should not become overly dis-
turbed at a Japanese move toward
greater independence in foreign policy.
The United States should gracefully
accept Japan's desire to pursue a
foreign policy that might not always
mesh perfectly with US foreign policy.
Eleven years ago, Richard Nixon. then
a private citizen, wrote:
Not to trust Japan today with- its
own armed forces and with respon-
sibility for its own defense would be to
place its people and its government
under a disability which. whatever its
roots in painful recent history, ill ac-
cords with the role Japan must play in
helping secure the safety of non-
Communist Asia.
None of Japan's neighbors need be
'alarmed by the size and composition of
the SDF. The SDF constitutes no
threat except to the misguided nation
that might issue a military challenge
to Japan or otherwise take aggressive
actions that would result in armed
conflict in East Asia. Rather, the SDF
heralds a promise of stability in inter-
national relations in the one area of
the world where the important
strategic interests of all the super-
powers converge.
An A!-l!llytical Approach
to Analysis \\
The active defense presupposes that
the main enemy thrust can be iden-
tified early enough to allow
positioning of sufficient friendly units
to defeat the attack. By careful study
of the terrain and rank ordering of the
avenues of approach, the planner can
anticipate where the enemy is most-
likely to attack in force. After con-
ducting a risk analysis, the planner
can allocate forces in Buffic\ent
numbers to meet the attack. Through
the analytical approach, the planner
develops a clearer picture of the
battlefield and can make more in-
telligent decisions on combat power
allocations.
T
HE ACTIVE defense concept is
based on the premise that a
numerically superior force can be
defeated on the modem battlefi.eld,
provided that the main effort can be
identified early enough to permit
repositioning of sufficient friendly
34
..
....
and
of
mbat Power'
Major Lon E. Maggart,
US Army
units forward of the attack to halt
its advance.
The tools presently available to the
commander for identifying the enemy's
main effort include various electronic,
visual and photographic resources in
addition to the efforts of a strong
covering force organized and employed
to make the enemy converge early in
the battle. Ostensibly, by forcing the
enemy to converge early, the location,
disposition and direction of attack of
enemy units can be determined.
The concept's chief weakness lies in
the time-distance required to reposition
friendly units at the place where the
enemy attack will enter the main battle
area (MBA). Discounting the difficulty
in maneuvering due to battlefield
obscuration, enemy artillery, air inter-
diction and electronic warfare
measures, friendly response will be a
function of the amount of time each
unit has to move from its present
location to the threatened area.
If the main effort cannot be iden-
f'
tified early enough to permit
movement of sufficient combat power
to influence the battle decisively well
'forward in the MBA, the enemy may
be able to achieve a penetration so
deep that a viable defense cannot be
reconstituted with available forces.
While this concept does not suggest
that the defender has to be strong
everywhere, it does indicate concern
that the enemy's main effort cannot be
predicted accurately but must be deter-
mined during the course of the battle.
The expectation of massed armor,
rapid movemen t, extremely lethal
weapons systems and heavy reliance
on maneuver to achieve favorable
combat power ratios and depth suggest
that there will be little margin for error
on the modem battlefield. Com-
manders simply will not have the time
or the resources to recover from an
error committed early in the battle.
Therefore, commanders in the field
must have a system which gives them
a high of allocating ade-
Major Lon E. Maggart ,s with the Tactical
Doctrine Off,ce, Headquarters, US Army
Training and Doctrine Command, Fort
Monroe, Va. He receIVed a B.A. from Kansas
State UnIVersity, an M.S. from the Uni-
versity of Utah and .s a graduate of the
USACGSC. He has served In the Federal
Republic of Germany. zn Vietnam and was an
author/instructor m the Department of
Tactics, USACGSC.
35
TERRAIN ANALYSIS
quate combat power correctly.
In previous methods of analysis,
avenues of approach were drawn from
enemy-held territory to a terminating
point on key terrain within the
defensive sector. Avenues identified in
this fashion then would be analyzed
using. the considerations of observation
and fire, cover and concealment,
obstacles, use of key terrain, adequate
maneuver space and ease of movement
(trafficability, road and trail network,
effect of weather, length and
directness).
Ostensibly, this analysis was made
to allow the defensive planner to rank
order the avenues so that he could
identify those which the enemy most
likely would use for his main effort. By
rank ordering the avenues, the planner
had some basis for allocating combat
power to each. Unfortunately, this
method has several significant
limitations. First, it only identifies
enemy attack zones of action-not the
precise routes over which the enemy
must come because of terrain restric-
tions, tactics or doctrine. The planner
may be misled as to the number and
size of the enemy forces that can
actually use the terrain available for
maneuver, forcing him to misallocate
combat power assigned to each avenue.
The obvious solution is to position
. sufficient combat power astride the
avenue of approach the enemy most
likely win have to use for his main
effort because of terrain restrictions or
rigid adherence to doctrine.
Pre-positioning forces in this
manner requires that calculated risks
I;>e taken along less favorable enemy
avenues of approach. However, such
risks are inevitable in the active
defense and should be planned rather
than allowed to occur subsequent to
MILITARY REVIEW
the concentration of enemy forces for
the main attack. By initially allocating
sufficient combat power, to the unit
astride the most dangerous avenue of
approach, the commander reduces the
requirements to shift large numbers of
units during critical times of the battle.
In reality, this method is the
product of a simple risk analysis which
suggests that the commander should
organizp his defense boldly based on
what the enemy can do rather than on
what he might do.
The commander is confronted with
two problems when organizing the
defense:
He must decide how much combat
power to allocate to each enemy
avenue of approach.
He must determine where to
position his forces so they may be used
most efficiently.
The procedure used to solve the
allocation and positioning probJem has
varied from the use of a prescribed
number of meters of unit front in the
position defense to some vague notion
of combat power ratios in the active
defense. Unfortunately, experience and
knowledge of the terrain are the
primary tools available to the com-
mander for this decision process at the
present time.
A new, relatively simple procedure
has been developed to give the
defensive planner a more systematic
approach to solve the problems of
combat power allocation and
positioning. Since terrain is the great
equalizer in the active defense, the
procedure appropriately is designed
around a thorough analysis of the
terrain. The procedure is outline<;l in
the following steps:
Identify terrain along the forward
edge of the battle area (FEBA) which
36
disrupts lateral movement of attacking
forces.
Identify avenues of approach
which exist between the disruptive
terrain.
Identify likely enemy objectives.
Identify blocking terrain on both
sides of the FEBA.
Extend avenues identified earlier
along the shortest routes which cross
the least amount of blocking terrain.
Refine avenues of approach if
necessary.
Identify key terrain.
'Arrange Soviet offensive doctrine
to conform to the avenue of approach
identified.
Convert the size enemy force on
each avenue of approach to US
equivalents.
Determine the combat ratio that
is acceptable in the covering force area
(CFA), MBA and rear area (RA).
Allocate to each avenue of ap-
proach the n u m e ~ of battalions that
will satisfy the combat ratio found to
be acceptable.
Conduct risk analysis if the re-
quirement for combat power exceeds
availability.
Allocate command and control
headquarters based on number of bat-
talions allocated to the CF A and the
MBA.
Identify Terrain Along the FEBA
Which Disrupts Lateral Movement. An
allocation procedure sufficiently
detailed for the active defense begins
with the identification of every
available enemy avenue of approach
leading into and through the assigned
defensive sector. Since the MBA is the
focal point of the defense, the analyst
first will examine the terrain along the
FEBA to determine those areas which
will disrupt lateral movement of at-
f'
tacking forces (Figure 1). The most
likely candidates are builtup areas,
steep slopes and river confluences.
Identify Avenues of Approach
Between the Disruptive Terrain. Once
disruptive terrain has been identified,
the space available for maneuver
around these areas should be marked
with an arrow to indicate the width of
the avenue and labeled according to
the size enemy force that can be ex-
pected to attack along it (Figure 1). The
size enemy force is determined by
comparing the available space with
known Soviet attack zones of action
(battalion 2 to 3 kilometers, regiment 5
to 8 kilometers, division 10 to 16
kilometers).
By identifying all of the space along
the FEBA through which an enemy
force of a given size (!an attack, the
analyst gains a general impression of
the size force that can attack his
defensive sector. Unfortunately, this is
not enough information-the planner
needs more than a general impression
of the size of the attacking force. The
planner wants to know exactly how
large the attack will be, in what for
manon it will come and where the
enemy can and cannot maneuver.
Identify Likely Objectives. The
identification of likely enemy objec.
tives is based on current enemy tac-
tical doctrine tempered by judgment,
experience and previous enemy action.
A motorized rifle division can be ex-
pected to attack to a depth of 70 to 100
kilometers during a 24 to 28-hour
period. Division objectives of the day
can be expected to a depth of 20 to 30
kilometers behind the FEBA. Enemy
attacks will orient on division and
corps reserves, command and control
systems and artillery positions. Com
munication centers that control rail
37
TERRAIN ANALYSIS
and road networks necessary for
sustaining his attack also may be
likely objectives.
Since the enemy usually orients on
opposing forces rather than terrain,
the objectives identified may cover a
relatively large area. Enemy avenues.
of approach do not have to terminate
on key terrain in the friendly defensive
sector. In fact, the location of likely
enemy objectives may be well behind
the rear boundary of the defending
unit if the attacker adheres to known
tactical doctrine requiring deep
penetrations into the enemy's rear.
Regardless of where these objectives
are identified, the analyst should mark
them clearly on his map or overlay
(Figure 1).
Identify Blocking Terrain. The term
blocking terrain describes areas which
are impractical or impossible for rapid
cross-country movement by tracked
vehicles because of slope, heavy
forests, unstable soil, builtup areas and
hydrography.
Engineer studies which identify this
terrain are available and simplify the
procedure. However, if these are not
available, the analyst must rely on the
information provided on a standard
topographic map. Unfortunately,
topographic maps were not designed
for this type of analysis so only slope,
. builtup areas and hydrography can be
identified accurately by the planner
with this map. All other impediments
to movement must be estimated.
There are some general rules which
may help the analyst identify blocking
terrain. Tracked vehicles cannot climb
bare slopes greater than 60 percent.
Slopes which have closely spaced trees
4 inches in diameter or greater will
reduce the ability of tracked vehicles to
approximately a 32-percent slope.
MILITARY REVIEW
Mark disruptive terrain Draw avenues of approach Identify likely objectives
Figure 1
Trees 8 to 12 inches in diameter will
stop a medium tank. Tree spacing less
than 20 feet in a m ~ n g e d forest will
impede tracked vehicles. Em-
bankments more than 10 feet high are
serious obstacles to movement. Water
depths greater than 4 feet will stop
tanks without snorkling equipment.
Hard vertical banks higher than 4 feet
will stop tanks.
Regardless of the source of infor-
mation, the planner must mark on his
map or overlay the blocking terrain
that exists within his area of respon-
sibility. The remaining space
represents those areas where the
enemy can maneuver with relative
ease and gives the planner an im-
mediate impression of the mobility
corridors the enemy can use for his
attack.
Extend Avenues of Approach. The
process of identifying and classifying
enemy avenues of approach is com-
pleted by extending the avenues iden-
tified in the second step along. the
shortest routes which cross the least
amount of blocking terrain between
the likely enemy objectives and the
38
present (or suspected) location of
enemy units. Once this has been done,
the analyst must rank order each
avenue using the conventional con-
siderations for analyzing avenues of
approach. The rank-ordering process
gives the planner a quick reference in
determining which avenues the enemy
most likely will use for his main effort.
This knowledge makes risk analysis,
identification of enemy second-echelon
forces and allocation of combat power
considerably easier later in the
planning process.
Engineer-prepared overlays which
identify blocking terrain account for
the effects of weather, trafficability,
slope, obstacles and forested areas
which halt or restrict vehicular
movement. Therefore, when avenues of
approach are drawn using such
overlays, much of the rank-order
analysis has been completed. The
analyst should focus on the variables
of length, directness, maneuver space,
road networks, observation and fire,
and cover and concealment to rank
order each avenue.
Once the analyst has rank ordered
i'
the avenues, he must classify each
according to the size and type enemy
force it will support. Since the avenues
that now have been identified
represent the largest space on a given
piece of terrain that can be used for
rapid.. relatively unrestricted
maneuver, the analyst need only
compare the width of these avenues
with known Soviet attack frontages to
determine the largest sized force with
which he must contend along each
avenue.
There is considerable debate con-
cerning Soviet attack frontages.
However, we know that breakthrough
attacks provide for the largest size
force in the smallest space. Therefore,
we will use 1 to 1.5 kilometers for a
battalion, 2 to 4 kilometers for a
regiment and 4 to 7 kilometers for a
division to standardize the procedure.
The type unit that can use the
avenue is important to the commander
when he is required to task organize
forces for each avenue. For the purpose
of this analysis, however, it will be
presumed that the first-echelon forces
attacking along each avenue will be
motorized rifle units to which tanks
have been attached. Tank units will be
presumed to be held back as exploi-
tation forces.
Refine Avenues of Approach. The
planner may find it impossible to
extend some of the avenues of ap-
proach identified earlier toward the
objective because of blocking terrain
adjacent to the FEBA, because the
extension does not connect logically
with predominant routes leading back
to enemy locations or because the
avenue joins an adjacent avenue which
appears to be a more reasonable route
to the objective. When this occurs, the
planner should attempt to connect this
39
TERRAIN ANALYSIS
avenue with one of the predominant
avenues that does extend throughout
the entire sector and consider it as a
possible avenue for a limited objective
or fixing attack by enemy forces.
Identify Key Terrain. The final step
in the terrain analysis procedure is to
identify key terrain. Previously, the
defensive planner had to select key
terrain based on a vague notion of
where enemy avenues of approach
existed and on his judgment of which
terrain gave either him or the attacker
a marked advantage. By more clearly
identifying and marking the enemy
avenues of approach which exist
through the CFA, MBA and RA, the
defensive planner has a tangible basis
for selecting key terrain.
In general, that terrain which the
enemy must seize or control in order to
continue movement along an avenue is
key. Obviously, that terrain within the
area defined as a likely objective is
also key. The defensive planner may
decide to identify for planning pur-
poses key terrain in the CF A, par-
ticularly if he is responsible for the
covering force operation.
Arrange Soviet Offensive Doctrine
to Conform to the Avenues of Ap-
proach Identified. Before the planner
can begin the allocation process, he
must arrange known Soviet offensive
doctrine to conform to the avenues of
approach that have been identified.
For example, given six avenues of
approach at Figure 2, the planner
might arrange Soviet offensive doc-
trine to show that he is confronted
with two divisions and a regiment
from a third division which is at-
tacking astride the divisional
boundary. These forces represent only
the first echelon, however, so the
planner must visualize where the
MILITARY REVIEW
second-echelon elements will be,
depending on the command level for
which he is planning.
Using rank order, the' planner can
determine on which avenues the enemy
second-echelon forces are most likely to
pe found. At Figure 2, the rank order
for each avenue is shown along with
the planner's assessment of where the
second-echelon forces are found.
The second-echelon forces for the
enemy division attacking on Avenues
D and E are depicted on Avenue D as it
was rank ordered number I-the most
likely avenue to be used for the main
effort into the defensive sector. Second-
echelon forces for the division at-
tacking along Avenue F and the
avenue adjacent to the friendly
division boundary were depicted on
Avenue F, first, to worst case the
number of enemy battalions with
which the friendly division must
contend, and, second, because Avenue
F was rank ordered the thira most
likely avenue to be used for the main
effort into the defensive sector. Finally,
the second-echelon forces for the
division attacking on Avenues A, B
and C were depicted on Avenue C as it
was rank ordered the fourth most
likely avenue.
The graphic display presumes the
reinforcement of first-echelon
motorized rifle regiments with tanks
from the tank regiment. A_l1 aggregate
of 11 battalion equivalents in the
enemy division and army second
echelon is shown graphically using
only the three motorized rifle
regiments. The combat value of the
tank- regiment remaining after it has
reinforced the lead motorized rifle
regiments has been combined with' the
trailing motorized rifle regiment. If a
typical Soviet army is organized with
40
five divisions, we need only find the
remaining two divisions to conclude
the analysis. If this analysis were
conducted at corps level, the planner
would have to depict the location of
front second-echelon forces.
Since Avenues D and E were rank
ordered 1 and 2, it is reasonable to
expect that one of the army second-
echelon divisions will use these two
avenues. Avenue F was rank ordered
as the third most likely avenue, so, to
worst case the number of enemy bat- .
talions which could attack between the
boundaries of the defending unit, the
bulk of the remaining army second-
echelon division was shown on this
avenue.
Convert Enemy Forces to US Bat-
talion Equivalents. There is a sub-
stantial difference between the size,
capabilities and firepower of US and
Soviet battalions. Defining
equivalency becomes subjective very
quickly, but studies indicate that, in
terms of total combat power, 1.5 Soviet
battalions are required to equal one US
battalion.
The significance of converting
enemy battalions to US equivalents is
subtle but, nonetheless, important. For
example, if a planner were trying to
defend at a 1 to 3 ratio against a
motorized rifle division of 15 bat-
talions, 5 US battalions would be re-
quired if equivalency were not con-
sidered. However, if equivalency is
considered, then only 4 US battalions
would be req uired to defend
successfully at the same ratio. The
point is that an outnumbered defender
cannot afford to waste his limited
assets where they are not actually
needed.
To convert enemy forces to US
battalion equivalents, the planner
x
x
x
X
X
X
I
TERRAIN ANALYSIS
(,
A
B C
D E F
t t t
t t t
6
5 4 2 3 Rank Order
~
~
\
Regt ,Regt
/ \ Regt
v
i.
Avenue
______ Regt /
V
Regt Regt
Division
\
(
V
Division
Arrange Soviet Doctrine to Conform to Avenues
dJ dJ
dJLtJdJ
dJdJ dJ
ABC D E F
t t t t t t
6 5 4 1 2 3
cbdJdJc!Jc!JdJ
I Division
T
Army
loll} 2d
r echelon
L. __
}
Division
2d
echelon
L __ I echelon
\ V / ~
Division A Division
16 enemy
)
Division
rlJlo 1 st
~ v /
. battalion
equivalents
Convert to US battalion equivalents
Determine combat ratio
Figure 2
41
X Division
X
MILITARY REVIEW
divides the number of enemy bat
talions capable of-attacking on a given
avenue of approach by 1.5 since the
planner is attempting to account at
least numerically for the aggregate
battalion equivalents for each enemy
division.
Determine the Combat Ratio
Acceptable in the CFA, MBA and RA
History of past battles suggests that a
defender can successfully defeat an
attacking force at least three times
larger than itself given proper use of
terrain, sufficient logistical support,
adequate leadership, and so forth.
Therefore, the defensive planner would
attempt to defend each avenue of ap
proach with no less than a 1 to 3 ratio.
An acceptable combat ratio in the
CFA is more difficult to determine
since the covering force action required
in the active defense has never been
conducted. However, it seems
reasonable that a combat ratid of less
than 1 to 3 would be sufficient since
covering forces are not defending. For
the purpose of this procedure, a ratio of
1 to 6 is acceptable, but the planner
must be aware that a 1 to 5 or 1 to 4
ratio might be more appropriate under
other circumstances.
The forces allocated to the rear area
(or reserve) are present on the
battlefield as a contingency measure
against unforeseen enemy action. The
defensive planner at brigade and below
probably will not be concerned with
allocating forces for a reserve.
However, division and corps planners
will be required to set aside some
forces. Forces allocated to the rear in
this procedure represent the division
reserve.
In theory, the reserve force should
be equal to the difference between the
total number of US battalions
42
allocated to the CF A and MBA and the
total number of enemy battalions that
can be expected to attack over a given
avenue of approach based on a 1 to 3
ratio using US battalion equivalents.
For example, given a regimental
avenue of approach rank ordered
number 1, a division defensive planner
might expect a total of 16 enemy bat
talion equivalents to attack on the
avenue. Therefore, a total of five US
battalions would be required on this.
avenue to defend at a 1 to 3 ratio. If
three US battalions have been
allocated to this avenue in the CFA
and MBA, then the reserve re-
quirement would be two battalions at a
1 to 3 ratio.
Obviously, there may be an insuf-
ficient number of US battalions
available to meet the total division
reserve requirement. However, the
planner has a basis for making
decisions on where he must take risks.
Allocate Battalions to the CFA,
MBA and RA Logically, the allocation
procedure should begin with the MBA
as it is the focal point for the defense.
However, since forces employed in the
CFA will ,be able to assist in the MBA
defense, a.t least to some degree, the
planner must know what assets are
available from the CFA before he can
determine the MBA requirement.
To allocate to the CF A, the planner
needs only to identify the size enemy
force in battalion equivalents that can
attack on each avenue and divide that
number by the combat ratio found to
be acceptable for the CFA. For ex-
ample, when allocating against a
regimental approach (3 US battalion
equivalents) in the CFA where a
combat ratio of 1 to 6 is acceptable, the
planner would allocate one-half of a
battalion (3 -i- 6 = .5) or rounding up,
f
two companies.
The MBA is divided into two dis-
tinct categories to account for enemy
first and second-echelon forces: the
FEBA for first-echelon forces and the
second-echelon counterforce for the
second echelon.
We will focus on the planning
process at the division level for the
remaining examples. To allocate bat-
talions to the FEBA, the planner must
identify enemy units in the division
first echelon in battalion equivalents
for each avenue of approach and
determine the number of US battalion
equivalents required to achieve the
combat ratio acceptable for the F!'.oA
(for example, if allocating against an
enemy regiment equivalent to three US
battalions at an acceptable combat
ratio of 1 to 3, one US battalion would
be required 3 7 3 = 1).
The planner allocates to the second-
echelon counterforce by identifying
enemy units in the division second
echelon in battalion equivalents for
each avenue of approach; adding the
total value in battalion equivalents of
all enemy units in the division first
and second echelon; determining the
number of US battalions required to
achieve the combat ratio acceptable for
the second-echelon counterforce (1 to
3); and subtracting the number of US
battalions allocated to the FEBA and
the CFA from the total number re-
quired.
The division planner allocates to
the rear area by identifying the bat-
talion equivalents of enemy units in
the army second echelon on each
avenue of approach; adding the total
value in battalion equivalents of all
enemy units depicted on each avenue
of approach; determining the number
of US battalions required to achieve
43
TERRAIN ANALYSIS
the combat ratio acceptable for the rear
area (usually 1 to 3); and subtracting
the number of US battalions
previously allocated to the CFA and
MBA from the total number required.
Once the planner has completed
this initial allocation, he will find that
his requirements exceed the number of
battalions available. This is especially
true for the rear area. Therefore, a risk
analysis is required to reduce combat
power allocated on selected avenues of
approach until the requirement is
equal to the availability.
Conduct Risk Analysis. The
primary tool available to the planner
for conducting risk analysis is the rank
order for each avenue of approach. The
rank order represents the analyst's
best judgment on the probability that
the enemy will select one avenue of
approach to make his main effort in
relation to the remaining avenues.
The concept of risk analysis in the
active defense suggests that an out-
numbered defender cannot be strong
everywhere so he must predict ac-
curately where he must weight his
defense and where he can afford to
take risk. The rank ordering of each
avenue will provide a basis for making
the decision.
In the active defense, the main
battle area is the focal point for the
defensive planner. Within the MBA, he
must ensure throughout the allocation
process that he provides adequate
combat power (no less than the accept-
able combat ratio) to the avenues of
approach over which the enemy most
likely will conduct his main effort. If
risks are to be taken, they should be
made in the covering force or reserve
area before the combat ratio of the
MBA forces is reduced_
Conceptually, risk analysis is
MILITARY REVIEW
simple. The analyst has only to
identify in order those areas where he
can accept risk, then reduce the combat
power allocated there initially until his
requirements meet the available
resources. In practice, however, the
division or corps planner will find that,
once the initial allocation is made, he
must make a decision immediately on
how large a reserve he can accept. For
example, in a situation, 17 113 bat
talions may be required to defend
successfully against the arrayed
threat. Unfortunately, the planner has
only 12 battalions to allocate. Where
does he eliminate 5 113 battalions so
that his requirement equals his
available resources?
The planner knows that he cannot
have 5 113 battalions in reserve
because he does not have the resources
available. In fact, he knows that he
will h,;ive to take some risk in the CFA
and MBA just to reduce his re-
quirement to 12 battalions. He could
accept risk in the RA by not allocating
any forces for the division reserve.
This is probably an unacceptable
choice. Therefore, the planner must
decide how much less than 5 113 bat-
talions he is willing to accept in the
division reserve. This decision must be
considered in conjunction with an
assessment of how much risk he is
willing to accept along each avenue of
approach in the CF A and MBA.
The planner may visualize that he
would need at least one reserve bat-
talion on each avenue along which an
army second-echelon unit has been
depicted. This decision would require
one battalion in division reserve on
three avenues. If the planner feels that
a three-battalion reserve required' ex-
cessive risk in the CFA and MBA, he
may well reduce the requirement to two
44
battalions positioned on those avenues
identified as the most likely to be used
for the enemy main attack.
In this case, the planner decided
that a two-battalion reserve
represented a prudent risk. He
recognized that the CF A and MBA
would have to be reduced by two bat-
talions to achieve the desired-sized
reserve.
In order to leave the covering force
and FEBA allocations at the accept-
able combat ratio, the second-echelon -
counterforces on two avenues were
reduced by one battalion each. This
decision allowed the forces on the most
likely avenues to remain at the accept-
able combat ratio while risk was
taken on the avenues rank ordered 3
and 4.
Allocate Command and Control
Headquarters. Once the planner is
satisfied with his initial combat power
allocation, he must allocate command
and control headquarters. This is ac-
complished by comparing the span of
control for the concerned subordinate
unit with the number of battalions
allocated to the identified avenues of
approach. Avenues A and B will
support one division. The planner has
allocated a total of four battalions to
these two avenues. A brigade com-
mander's span of control is ap-
proximately five battalions. Therefore,
one brigade headquarters could
logically control Avenues A and B.
Applying the same logic, Avenues C
and D could be controlled by one
brigade headquarters and Avenue E by
the remaining brigade (Figure 3).
Position Forces. Once the planner
has allocated command and control
headquarters, he is ready to position
the forces on the ground.
First, forces are allocated terrain at
TERRAIN ANALYSIS
!,
A B c D E
t t t t t
U LJ u u LJ
Regt Regt Regt Regt Regt Regt

Allocate
Command and Control
Headquarters
x IVISlon IVlslon x IVISlon
x 1 Bn 1 Bn I, Bn 1 Bn 1 1 Bn x
: So : So I ::: : So I : ::
:---X . X X-

corps and division based on the ex-
tended avenues of approach. However,
because brigade and lower units must
actually fit the forces to the ground,
they must position forces to defend all
of the terrain within their assigned
sectors. Second, the extended avenues
suggest to brigade and lower com-
manders where forces ultimately will
have to be positioned to halt enemy
advances through the MBA, which
areas should be weighted where risks
can be taken and where subsequent
positions in depth should be es-
tablished. Finally, the extended
avenues of approach graphically
portray where an attacking force of a
given size can maneuver most easily
within the defensive sector. By
selecting terrain which controls these
avenues, commanders at all levels
Figure 3
45
have a sound basis for selecting
positions in the covering force area, the
main battle area and the rear area
which give a high probability of en-
countering the largest number of
enemy forces.
The procedure outlined is not a
substitute for good judgment, intuition
or experience. It does not account for
the effects of fire support. However, it
is a logical procedure for analyzing
terrain and allocating combat power
which gives the planner a basis for
intelligent judgments on how best to
defend. It allows the planner to assume
risk based on fact rather than notion.
Obviously, as additional information
becomes available, changes in the
allocation will result. The final product
remains dynamic and subject to
changes based on additional facts. "k
Achilles (Heel 'I
of 'the Deterren
Major Elbert C. Black III, US Army
The deterrence triad consists of
strategic nuclear, tactical nuclear and
conventional warfare capabilities. The
US must be capable of meeting Soviet
military challenges across a broad
spectrum. Using Soviet press
statements as a measure, it appears
that the Soviets do not perceive that
they can win a high-intensity, short-
term war. However,. they have the
conventional capability to disrupt US
interests outside Europe, particularly
in Third World nations. Does the US
have the conventional capability to
stand firm in Central Europe and still
face Soviet military forces elsewhere
in the world?
A
s IF INSPIRED by the words of
the prophet Joel 3:910, the Soviet
Union has made great sacrifices to
forge the most awesome offensive cap-
ability of any military force in the
world. The magnitude of the sacrifice
was revealed by the recent revisions in
the Central Intelligence Agency
estimate of Soviet defense expendi-
tures. Those new assessments indicate
that the USSR spent 11 to 13 percent of
its gross national product on military
forces during the first five years of the
1970s.
1
This level of economic
"burden" is about twice that allocated
to maintain the US Armed Forces.
The products of the Soviet defense
budget are impressive. The USSR has
a sizable lead over the United States in
both numbers and "throw-weight" of
strategic missiles. The Soviet Navy is
emerging as a credible instrument for
projecting power around the globe.
Ground forces are significantly larger
and are armed with modern
equipment.
The Soviet Union has 3,650,000 men
under arms, plus 750,000 uniformed
civilians in the military. Backing up
The VIews expressed In thiS article nre the author's and are not nf'rf'8sanly those of the
Department of Defense, the Department of State or their agencies
46
!,
these forces are 6,800,000 reservists
with recent training and another
350,000 men in paramilitary forces. By
comparison, the United States h'as
about 2,087,000 men and women' in
active forces and less than 875,000
reservists." The relative combat power
of the respectivc ground forces is
suggested by a comparison of major
weapons and cquipment (Figure 1).
The quantitative shift in many of
the measures of the nuclear and con-
ventional balance of military power to
the Soviets necessitates re-evaluation
of the US capability to deter the USSR
in the near term. To maintain realistic
deterrence, the United States must he
prepared to meet Soviet challengcs
across a broad spectrum of conflict
intensity. Consequently. the United
States must possess a triad of warfare
capabilities (Figure 2).
Unfortunately. most of the public
debate over the US military posture
and budget in the past two years has
focused upon the issue of
"equivalency" in strategic nuclear
weapons. This article postulates that
t ~ real Achilles heel of our present
forces is not in nuclear 'Veaponry but
in conventional capability. To un-
derstand the basis for this belief, we
Tanks
DETERRENCE TRIAD
must consider the utility of strategic
nuclear weapons from the Soviet view-
point.
Some Western strategists assert
that a strategic nuclear exchange
would assure the destruction of both
the United States and the USSR. If
this is true. we can be confident that a
rational decision will never be made to
initiate such an exchange. However,
there is evidence that Soviet political
and military leaders reject the concept
of mutual assured destruction. Instead.
Soviet leaders believe that "victory is
possible in any war for which the
country properly prepares. This "war-
winning" philosophy is apparent in
the statements of Leonid 1. Brezhnev,
Major General K. Bochkarev and
Colonel General A. Altunin:
Let it be known to all that in a clash
with any aggressor the Soviet Union
will win a victory worthy of our great
people, of the homeland of the October
Revolution."
Marxist-Lemnists are not panicked
in the face of the tem/yinR danRer
created by imperialism nor depiet It as
the prelude to the end of the world,
. _ . the bourReols pacifists' arRuments
about the end of the world in such a
war and the Impossibility of vIctory
Armored Personnel Carriers and Fighting Vehicles
Artillery
US
10,000
22,000
5,000
3,000
9,000
USSR
45,000
45,000-55,000
19,000
7,000
3,800
Heavy Mortars
Helicopters
'Source "Assessing the Balance of US. U S S R & PRe General Purpose Forces." Commanders
Digest, 17 february 1977, p 6,
Figure 1
47
MILITARY REVIEW
STRATEGIC
NUCLEAR
/ ~ - - - I
TACTICAL
NUCLEAR
Figure 2
benefit only the aggressor and the
nuclear maniacs, who would very
much like one or the other of those
a{4ainst whom they are contemplating
. a nuclear attack to freeze with terror
and lay down their arms. No, this is
not how things stand . ... 4
... the preparatwn of the country's
rear for defense against means of mass
destructwn has become, without a
doubt, one of the decisive strategic
factors ensuring the ability of the state
to function in wartime, and In the final
analysis the attainment of victory in
u
1
ar."
By themselves, these Soviet
statements might be dismissed as
propagandistic bluster. However, the
existence of published doctrine on
preparation for surviving and winning
"the final war," the creation of
military forces in excess of defensive
needs and the billion-dollar-a-year civil
defense program indicate that the
Soviets are serious about establishing
a war-winning capability.
The real issue in strategic
capabilities is not how many more
missiles or megatons the Soviets have,
but whether the Soviets perceive
themselves as being prepared to
survive and win a high-intensity con-
48
CONVENTIONAL
flict. This issue requires evaluation of
the components of a war-winning
capability.
In accordance with Marxist doc-
trine, well-led, well-equipped and
thoroughly trained armed forces can
win battles but, without other in-
stitutions, cannot win a major war.6 To
assure ultimate victory, there must be
an infrastructure capable of:
Sustaining the armed forces with
food, equipment, supplies and ad
ditional manpower.
Providing the SUrVIVIng pop-
ulation with basic necessities.
Preserving sufficient capacity to
govern and rebuild the nation after
termination of hostilities.
The detailed discussion of how to
prepare military forces and the
national infrastructure is in Soviet
Military Strategy. Edited by Marshal
of the Soviet Union V. D. Sokolovsky,
this book is the authoritative work on
Soviet strategic thought. Chapter VII,
"Preparing a Country for the
Repulsion of Aggression," lists 10 com-
ponents for a war-winning capability:
Mobilization and combat prepa-
ration.
Materiel and technieal support of
the armed forces.
f'
Preparation of the home territory
as a theater of military operations.
Preparation of industry.
Preparation of agriculture.
Preparation of transportation.
Preparation of communications.
Moral-political preparation of the
population.
Protection of the population
against weapons of mass destruction.
Military preparation of the pop-
ulation.
7
It is not the purpose of this article to
list the details of these components. It
is sufficient to say that they concern
preparation of the armed forces, the
national economy and the population
for surviving and winning a major war
whether it be nuclear, chemical or
conventional in nature.
Knowing the components necessary
for the Soviets to perceive achievement
of a war-winning capability allows us
to estimate the utility of their armed
forces. If Soviet leaders do not perceive
that a war-winning capability has
been achieved, their options for
military action are restricted to a range
below the threshold of strategic
nuclear exchange. Once all re-
quirements for the war-winning
capability are fulfilled, Soviet leaders
are free to consider the full range of
military options in the pursuit of
politicHl, pconomic or ideological objec
tives.
The challenge remaining, then, is to
evaluate the Soviet perception of their
achievement of the war-winning
capability. In the absence of an ob-
jective formula for determining percep-
tions, we must use logic to develop a
subjective appraisal of perceptions. A
suggested logic system is:
There is considerable evidence to
indicate that the Soviet Union
49
DETERRENCE TRIAD
perceives development of a war-
winning capability as desirable and
feasible.
The priorities for resource
allocation in the Soviet Union can
serve as a reliable indicator for deter-
mining whether the warwinning com-
ponents are being developed.
If shortcomings exist in the war-
winning capability, corrective actions
will be taken.
Public criticism is used as a
method to focus the attention of local
party officials and government ad-
ministrators on shortcomings.
Therefore, by examining Soviet
statements, resource allocations and
other actions reported in the domestic
news media, it is possible to determine
whether Soviet leaders perceive that
the war-winning capability has been
achieved.
The complete discussion of the
method of operationalizing this logic to
estimate perceptions is aVHilable in a
US Army Command and General Staff
College thesis for those interested in
pursuing the subject further.' For the
scope of this article, the results of that
study are summarized as follows:
A total of 340 Soviet radio and
newspaper items in 1976 were
evaluated against a criteria scale
ranging above and below a perception
. of achieved war-winning capability.
All but 10 of the statements were
evaluated as indicating a Soviet
perception that a warwinning
capability has riot been achieved. The
10 exceptions were evaluated as in-
dicating a possibility that military
requirements for a war-winning
capability might have been achieved.
However, the majority of statements'
on military capability indicated that
there was a perception that further
MILITARY REVIEW
SOVIET STATEMENTS EVALUATED AS TO PERCEPTION
OF AN ACHIEVED WAR-WINNING CAPABILITY
WAR-WINNING CAPABILITY
NOT ACHIEVED
WAR-WINNING CAPABILITY
ACHIEVED
120
110
100
90
80
Number 70
of
statements
60
50
40
30
20
10
Degree of perceived achievement of war-winning capability
Figure 3
improvement was desired.
Figure 3 shows the frequency dis-
tribution of the statements and the
resulting picture of general non-
achievement of the capability to win a
major war at this time.
As might be expected, Soviet
agriculture was the object of frequent
criticism (28 percent of all statements).
50
Typical problems discussed were shqrt-
ages of agrieultural workers; inef-
ficiency in resource management; poor
equipment maintenance; shortages of
repair parts, tires and fuel; and insuf-
ficient capacity for storing the harvest.
In addition to frequent prodding in the
press, it was necessary to divert
massive manpower and transport
I'
resources from industry and the
military to gather the grain crop. In
the Kazak Soviet Socialist Republic
alone, 55,000 army trucks were needed
to move the grain from the fields to
storehouses and' elevators.
Second in frequency, but more
severe in tone, were statements of
dissatisfaction with industrial
achievement. Many of these
statements revealed that the con-
struction of power facilities, heavy
industry plants, and petroleum and
gas industry enterprises was
significantly behind schedule. In many
cases, production rates threatened the
achievement of the current Five-Year
Plan goals.
The conclusion of the study is that
Soviet leaders probably do not perceive
that they could win a strategic nuclear
war in the near term. Without
assurance of national survival and
ability to recover from such a war,
Soviet leaders are precluded from using
strategic nuclear weapons except for
retaliation in kind. Despite any quan-
titative or throw-weight advantage,
Soviet strategic missiles have no
present offensive utility.
While we may draw some comfort
from at least a near-term respite from
strategic nuclear attack, the situation
has some very ominous overtones.
First, the United States is incapable of
conducting a crippling first strike
against the Soviet Union's nuclear
force. Consequently, use of US
strategic missiles and bombers against
the Soviet Union would expose in-
dustrial and population centers to
massive retaliatory attack. Since the
same situation applies to the Soviet
Union, both nations cannot threaten to
cross the strategic nuclear threshold
except to protect those interests most
51
DETERRENCE TRIAD
vital to their nations.
Second, without a strategic first-
strike capability, the consequences of a
decision to use tactical nuclear
weapons first present serious political
problems for NATO. Given Warsaw
Pact doctrine, a NATO decision to use
tactical nuclear weapons on a large
scale would likely result in a Soviet use
of similar but generally larger
weapons. The result could be
devastation far greater than that
Germany received in World War II.
Meanwhile, the United States would
be, at that point, still untouched.
Would an American President decide to
launch strategic nuclear weapons
against the Soviet Union in retaliation
for the devastation of Central Europe?
Possibly not if it meant the assured
destruction of up to 120 million
American civilians." If West European
lpaders doubt American resolve to
punish the Soviet Union for the ex-
pected destruction of Central Europe,
would they ever agree to a first use of
tactical nuclear weapons anyway?
Although the NATO allies have been
content to rely on the deterrent effect of
the US nuclear commitment, an in-
crease in the level of intensified
tension could raise problems in this
rpgard.
There are no easy solutions to these
. difficult political choices. Therefore,
our best hope is to maintain a conven-
tional warfare capability strong'
enough to contain Warsaw Pact forces
without having to resort to use of
tactical nuclear weapons. Unfor-
tunately, the present balance of
military power in Northern and
Central Europe, while not so bad as
comparisons of stated measures of
capability suggest, does raise doubts
about the ability of NATO to defend its
MILITARY REVIEW
Combat and Direct Support Troops
Deployed Main Battle Tanks
Tactical Aircraft .
NATO
635,000
7,000
2,085
Warsaw Pact
910,000
19,000
4,200
Source: The Military Balance, 1976-1977, The International Institute for Strategic Studies. London,
Eng .. 1976. pp 97104.
Mineral
Manganese
Cobalt
Titanium
Chromium
Aluminum
Tantalum
Platinum Group
Tin
Flourine
Nickel
Tungsten
Germanium-Indium
Beryllium
Zirconium
Barium
Petroleum
Iron
Lead
Copper
Percent
Imported
100
98
97
91
88
88
86
86
86
80
60
60
50
50
40
36
23
21
18
Major Foreign Sources
Brazil, Gabon, South Africa, Zaire
Zaire, Finland, Norway, Canada
Australia. India
USSR, South Africa, Turkey, Philippines
Jamaica, Surinam, Dominican Republic
Australia, Canada. Zaire, Brazil
USSR, South Africa, Canada
Malaysia, Thailand, Bolivia
Mexico, Spain, Italy
Canada, Norway, USSR
Canada, Bolivia, Peru, Mexico
USSR, Canada, Japan
Brazil, South Africa, Uganda
Australia, Canada, South Africa
Ireland, Peru, Mexico
Venezuela. Middle East. Africa
Canada. Venezuela, liberia, Brazil
Canada, Peru, Australia, Mexico
Canada, Peru, Chile, South Africa
Source- Statement by General George 5: Brown. To the Congress on the Defense Posture of the
United States for FY 1977. Superintendent of Documents. US Government Printing Office. Washington.
o C .. 20 January 1976. p 6.
Figure 5
52
!,
territory without resort to tactica
nuclear weapons (Figure 4).
The relative weakness of NATO
conventional forces in Europe severely
restricts the ability of the Western
allies to respond to political or military
threats elsewhere. This situation may
become the most 'serious problem of all
should the Soviet Union embark on an
imperialistic strategy.
The Western industrialized nations
have become heavily dependent upon
the natural resources of the Third
World. General George S. Brown
emphasized this point in the Fiscal
Year 1977 Defense Posture Statement.
Shown in Figure 5 are some of the
critical raw materials which the
United States must import.
Even casual examination of the
DETERRENCE TRIAD
sources upon which the United States
is dependent causes concern. Many of
e countries are either already un-
der Communist influence or are
potential areas for US-USSR confron-
tation. With the NATO forces pinned
in Central European defensive
positions, might not the Soviet Union
be able to apply military pressure in
shutting off Free World access to raw
materials? The United States would
have little flexibility to counter such a
move below the nuclear threshold with
present conventional strength.
The danger of an imperialistic
Soviet foreign policy is real. The
results could be far more serious and
lasting than the 1973 oil embargo. The
time has come to restore America's
conventional deterrent capability.'
NOTES
1 "The CIA's Goof m AsseSSing the SOVIets," Busmes& Week,
28 Februnry 1977, p 98
2 The Mll,tar)' Balance. 1976 1977. The InternatIOnal Inatltuu>
for Strategic Studies, London, Eng. 1976, pp 8 and 8081
3 Leomd I Brezhnev, Fifty Years of Great Ach'PlJl!'mentIJ of
SOClall8m, Progress Publishers. Mosc,ow. USSR, 1970. p 63, CIted
by Foy D Kohler. et al , SO/.Jlet Stratl'R)' for the SeucntlPB From
CoLd War to Peaef'{hi CoexHJtenee, Umverslty of MIamI Center for
Advanced internatIOnal StudH'B. Washington. D (' , 1973, p 215
4 Major General K Bochk.arev, "Nuclear Arms nnd thE' Fute
of SoCIal Progress." Sovetska),a Klrglzl),Q 25 Auguat 1970, Cited
b)' Kohler,op ctt, p 195
5 Colonel General A Altunm, "CIVIl Defensp Toda)'," LlUd'l
Dp/a Grazhdanskol Oboron), (The Peop/p and of CIVIl
Defense), EdIted by K A KondratIuk Voemzdat. Moscow, USSR.
1974, p 5, Cited by Leon Goure, Fay D Kohler and Mose L
Harvey, The 01 NUclear Forces m Current ::'Ol.1le( Strategy
Umverslty of Miami Center for Advanced InternatIonal StudIes,
Washlllgton, D C. 1974, P 118
6 P H VIgor, A GIHde to MarXism and Its Effects on Sol.ltet
Deuelopment, Humamtles Press, NY, 1956, pp 28 and 7374
7 Soulet MilItary Strateg}, Edited by V D Sokolovsky, Edtted
and translated by Hamet Fast Scott, Third Edttion, Crane,
Russak & Co . NY, 1975. pp 306,13
8 Elbert C Black III, Curren.t SOlllet PerceptIOns on the
AchIevement of a War Wmmng Capabd,ty, M MAS ThesIs, US
Anny Command and General Staff College, Fort Leaven .... orth.
Kans, 1977
9 See thp tf'sttmony of John E DaVIS. duector, Defensp CivIl
Prepart'dness Agenc),. US Congrf'8S. HOU8t' Committee on Arnlt'd
ServtN'8. Subcommlttt'e on Invt'shgatlOns. CIVIl Defense Panel,
'Cu,d Defense ReView, Heanngs. 94th Cong-ress, Second SesSIon.
Supenntendent of Documents. US Government Pnnting Office.
Washmgton, DC. 9 February 1976. pp 541
Major Elbert C. Black III IS a project
offIcer In the StudIes DiVISIon, Combat
Developments ActiVIty, Fort Rucker, Ala. He
recewed a B.S. from MISSISSIPPI State Unz
verslty and an M.M A.S. from the
USACGSC. class of 1977. He has served m
Vletnam, Europe and Korea. and as com-
mander. Battery A. 2137 FIeld Artillery, Fort
SIll, Okla.
53
from
A Lesson for Today?
Air Power at Kursk
Cai>tain Lonnie O. Ratley III, US Air Force
With the projected deployment of the A 10 closeairsupport aircraft to
Europe. NATO may have the means to counter the massive armored
superiority of the Warsaw Pact. The A 10 can be a highly effective tank
killer. However. the Germans were the first to use air power without
ground support in combating armor. The occasion was the Battle of Kursk.
On 8 July 1943. German aircraft destroyed a Russian armored brigade.
The tactics and operation$ of what has become known as the "Meyer
model" are worthy of serious study by today's planners for the lessons in
the use of aircraft as tank killers.
T
HE projected deployment of A10 close-air-support aircraft to
Europe to augment NATO's air forces has the potential of
sIgnIfIcantly redressing the maSSIve VVarsavv Pact advantage in armor
which presently eXists in Europe. Currently. NATO possesses 6,100
tanks. compared with the Warsaw Pact's 27,000 (mcluding the three
western military regions of the USSR). The A 10 with its 30mm GAUB
cannon has demonstrated a consistently superior tank-killing
capability. With reference to the disparity in the figures above. the
need for NATO to develop an aggressive and mobile antitank force is
obvious.
Condensed from the Journal of the Royal Umted Services Institute for Defence Studies (Great
Britain). June 1977 Copynght 1977
54
AIR POWER AT KURSK
!,
Based on the historical example of the successful air attacks
against Soviet armor In the Battle of Kursk in July 1943, there is proof
that aircraft without the support of ground forces can effectively
neutralize enemy armored formations. It is Important to note that the
Kursk confrontation of aircraft and tank is not a mathematical game or
abstract theory; it is fact. From thiS factual model, one can extract the
elements that constituted success and apply these elements to the
.probable scenario In Europe today.
From the histOrical case, it appears certain that tank-destroying
aircraft can add increased effectiveness and flexibility to NATO. With
properly developed tactics and aggressive implementation of them in
NATO, one could theorize that an airborne antitank weapons system,
which can project the power of NATO well beyond the front lines,
could effect a neutralization of the Warsaw Pact's armored forces
without resorting to the nuclear option.
Zitadelle was the code name given to the last great German
offensive on the Eastern Front in World War II which was aimed at
the Russian salient around the city of Kursk. Ii was during this battle
that tactical aircraft scored the first significant victory over enemy
armored forces without any assistance or contact with friendly ground
troops.
The speCifiC contribution of the antitank aircraft in Zitadelle came
on 8 July 1943 (the fifth day of the German offenSive), culminating In
the destruction of an entire Soviet armored brigade near Belgorod,
Russia, by the 4th (antitank) Gruppe of the 9th Ground Support
Wing. After an overview of the entire Zitadelle battle, an analysis of
4th Gruppe's action at Belgorod will be presented.
Operation Zitadelle
The basIc Idea of Zitadelle was to strike the Russians a blow of
limited scope before they had time to recover from the losses In the
winter campaign of 1942-43. For thiS operation, all available armor
was to be concentrated In two great pincers. The objective of the
attack was to encircle the enemy forces in the Kursk area by means of
a well-coordinated and rapid threat of two attacking armies a'nd to
annihilate them with concentric attack. General Model (subordinated
to Field Marshal von Kluge, commander of Army Group Center) with
his 9th Army was to attack from the north. General Hoth (subor-
dinated to Field Marshal von Manstein, commander of Army Group
Captam Lonme 0 Ratley III. US Air Force. IS an ammunition program manager
for the A 10 close-air-support aircraft at Wright Patterson Air Force Base, OhiO.
55
MILITARY REVIEW
South) with the 4th Panzerarmee was to attack from the south.
Neighboring fronts had to be thinned out In order to provide
sufficient forces for the offenSive Lagging equipment deliveries,
conflicting opinions at headquarters and Hitler's vacillations post-
poned the offensive until 4 July 1943. The final disposition of forces
allotted to Hoth In the south consisted of ten panzer diVISions, one
Panzergrenadier division 'and seven Infantry diVISions. The northern
thrust delivered by Model consisted of seven panzer, two Pan-
zergrenadter and nine Infantry divisions Kluge, Mansteln and
Guderian (Inspector general of Armored Troops) all urged Hitler at this
time (early July) to abandon the offenSive as It was obVIOUS the
RUSSians were aware of German preparations and the attack would
not. In their profeSSional military opinion, succeed. Hitler was
unmoved: Zitadelle commenced as scheduled.
After Hitler's deCISion, the two army group commanders deter-
mined to make Zitadelle a success. In the lull follOWing the third Battle
of Kharkov, German units were Withdrawn from the front and given
extensive training In the latest tactics Combat formations were at full
strength. No Single prevIous battle on the Eastern Front had had such
a concentration of German men and equipment. The combined
stnklng force had a IOtal of 3,000 tanks and self-propelled guns In
addition to 1,800 tactical aircraft.
The actual conduct of operations by the Germans was successful
tactically, conSidering the RUSSian casualties were four times those of
Germany However, the RUSSians could afford the losses; the
Germans could not. Zitadelle was a strategic defeat for the Wehr-
macht and marked the end for any pOSSible German victory in the
Eastern Front.
In the north, Model's forces qUickly became bogged down in the
extensive RUSSian defenSive pOSItionS, advanCing only 9 miles in two
.days After regrouping, a second attack deepened the penetration a
few more miles. However, the start of the Russian counterstroke at
.the German Orel salient to the north and northeast on 11 July 1943
precluded any further German advance from the northern wing of
Zttadelle In order to support hiS 2d Panzerarmee to the north, Model
was forced to dIvert forces from the Zl!adelle operation, thus bringing
all German offenSive action on the northern pincer to a premature
end
Operations at the German southern pincer developed more
favorably By 11 July, the armored forces had broken through the last
defenSive positions and Into the area of Prokhorovka and Oboyan.
Lieutenant Colonel Kark Ullrich, With the 3d Battalion, 6th 55
Panzergrenadter Regiment of diviSion Totenkopf, personally led hiS
men forward Late on the evening of 10 July, they stormed the village
of Krasnyy Oktyabr and formed a bridgehead across the Psel River.
Simultaneously, on the right of Totenkopf, divisions Liebstandarte
56
AIR POWER AT KURSK
!,
Adolf Hitler and Das Reich advanced toward Prokhorovka. To the
south of Hoth's 4th Panzerarmee, Gruppe Kempf was to Intercept
Soviet forces attempting to relieve the hard-pressed Russians
engaged by Hoth. The sltuatlolil rapidly developed around the village of
Prokhorovka where a decIsion was forced
On the Soviet side, the commander of the 5th Guards Tank Army,
Lieutenant General Rotmlstrov, was Hoth's counterpart. Rotmlstrov
saw Prokhorovka Inexorably loom as the critical axis of the entire
Kursk battle To counter Hoth's 600 tanks. Rotmlstrov had amassed
approximately 850 In all, there were some 1.500 Russian and
German tanks and assault guns committed to the battle at
Prokhorovka which began on 12 July 1943.
Prokhorovka
ThiS battle developed Into a gargantuan mass of intertwined armor
of both Sides. in such close confines as to preclude maneuver In the
classIc style of German panzer operations The German advantage In
mobile operations was severely restricted Operations In formation
ceased. and It was Impossible for either Side to disengage and reform
in battle order. At such close range. there was no protection In armor.
Overhead. a fUrious air battle developed.
To support the heavily engaged units of Hoth's 4th Panzerarmee.
the 6th Panzer DIVISion attacked the Soviet defenSive zone between
the Donets River and the town of Korocha and established a
bridgehead across the Donets at the Village of Rzhavets Tanks from
the 6th, 7th and 19th Panzer DIVISions poured across the river and
headed northward to the battlefield at Prokhorovka The 6th Panzer
DIVISion had moved so SWiftly across the Donets that ItS commander
and hiS diVISional staff were bombed by the Luftwaffe which had not
been Informed that units of the 6th Panzer DIVISion were positIOned
on the northern bank of the Donets. The path was now open for
German armored formations from Gruppe Kempf to move un-
obstructed northward to Prokhorovka
It was at thIS critical Juncture. on 13 July 1943. that Hitler
summoned the commanders of Army Gro.up Center and South (Kluge
and Mansteln) to Rastenburg In East Prussia. The Allies had landed in
SICily. and resistance to them had crumbled. Hitler. WOrried about an
Allied landing on the Italian mainland. wanted to Withdraw troops
from Kursk and suspend Zitadelle. Kluge reported that 9th Army was
making no headway and uSing all hiS mobile reserves to counter
Soviet attacks Into the German Orel salient to the north of Kursk
Mansteln was less pessimistic and felt that to Withdraw would be
tantamount to thrOWing a victory away. But Hitler would not be
57
MILITARY REVIEW
persuaded. and so the last great German offensive came to an
inconclusive end Zitadelle became one more case of German tactical
brilliance being defeated by strategic misdirection.
To backtrack In time from 13 July 1943 to 8 July 1943, an
Important phase of Ziladelle must be examined In more detail In light
of the Luftwaffe's antitank successes The Soviet 2d Guards Army had
been placed between Hoth's 4th Panzerarmee and Gruppe Kempf to
prevent a JOining of the two German forces. However, the situation
was developing at such a fast pace to the north that the Soviets had to
do something Immediately to relieve the pressure being brought to
bear by Hausser's II SS Panzer Corps As the 8th of July dawned, the
battle had not yet reached ItS climax, but the II SS Panzer Corps was
courting disaster.
Meyer's Success
An armored brigade was formed and dispatched to strike at the
fight rear flank of the II SS Panzer Corps. The hastily assembled
brigade consisted of 60 134 medium tanks and several rifle battalions.
The Soviet brigade was marched off In perfect formation on the
morning of 8 July 1943. The operation probably would have done
considerable damage to Hausser and. more Importantly, upset the
timetable for Zitadelle had the Luftwaffe not saved the day by using
the HS 1295 of the 4th (antitank) Gruppe of the 9th Ground Support
Wing to destroy the Soviet formation.
Captain Bruno Meyer was leading a Rotta (a formation of three
aircraft) of HS 1295 on a reconnaissance mission over the wooded
area of Gostlshchevo, Russia, In the early morning of 8 July 1943. As
commander of the 4th Gruppe, Meyer was PriVY to the dispositions of
all German ground forces In the area When he spotted the Soviet
b"gade, he Instantly realIZed the threat to the II Panzer Corps
Meyer alerted the other Staffeln (formations of nine machines) of
his Gruppe. via r a d l o ~ to prepare for battle ThiS was to be the first
confrontation in history of an armored force on the ground bemg
attacked from the air alone with no coordination or support from
friendly ground units Meyer also alerted Major Druschel's FW190
ground support Gruppe which was to assist In attacking the accom-
panYing Russian Infantry and flak guns with high-fragmentation
bombs
In order to keep constant pressure on the enemy and aVOid a
premature disengagement ,by the Soviets, Meyer formed his Gruppe
Into four flYing Staffeln As the one Staffel was returning to the
airfield after expending its ordnance on the Russians, the second
Staffel was engaged with the enemy, the third was en route to the
58
AIR POWER AT KURSK
I'
battle and, finally, the fourth was refueling and arming on the ground.
Simultaneously, FW190s would concentrate on attacking associated
personnel and emplacements
The HS129 pilots' tactrcs'were to attack from very low level and
f,re their 30mm cannon at the side, rear and engine decking of the
H\Jsslan tanks. The penetration capability of the Mk 10130mm round,
with the tungsten-carbide core, was 80mm of armor which was
sufficIent to knock out a T34 from the rear hull (45mm of armor) or
hull roof (18 to 22mm of armor). It was only possible for the HS 129s
to use these lOW-level tactics and fire at minimum slant range
because the FW190s coordinated to suppress the ground fire from
,rltlalrcraft guns and from Infantry small arms and automatic
weapons. The RUSSian tanks got mixed up, drove across each other's
'Iaths and were easy' targets for Meyer's aircraft
ReCipe for Success
The RUSSian armored brrgade was destroyed by the qUick and
deCISive interdiction of the antitank 4th Gruppe The entire operation
was over In one hour The elements of success on the German Side
were due maInly to the authority and competence possessed by lower
echelon Luftwaffe field commanders, as well as the skill and
aggression of the IndiVidual pilots Bruno Meyer, only a captain at the
time, used hiS initiative and aggressively employed hiS forces to
counter a massed enemy concentration of armor. He did not request
authorrty from a d,stant command center RealiZing the crrtlcal
position of the II SS Panzer Corps, he took Immediate action to redress
the crrtrcal situation faCing hiS comrades on the ground
Meyer accentuated hiS unit's success by careful coordinatron of
hiS four indiVidual Staffeln so that the enemy was never given an
opportunity to rest. regroup or disengage. Meyer also contacted
'I;lportlng Laftwaffe units to suppress ground fire, enabling the
/S129s to operate at optimum effectiveness-that IS, low altitude and
-n:nlmum slant range at f,rrng. Meyer must have had an excellent
\Jround maintenance organization which could rapidly refuel, reload
Clnd relaunch the returning HS129s.
In recounting the successes of thiS h,storrc first aircraft/tank
battle, the winning Side possessed several noteworthy characterrstlcs
The German HS129 pilots used aggressive tactics, close coordination,
rapid generation of sorties and the old Prusslan dictum "Schussfeld
geht var Deckung" ("Obtain a field of fire before obtaining cover ")
The higher echelon Luftwaffe commands also were cognizant of the
fact that, In order to use resources at the optrmum level, the lower
echelon commanders must be given authorrty commensurate With
59
MILITARY REVIEW
theIr responsibilities. In a resource-poor army, every attempt must be
made to use those resources available In the most efficIent and
effectIve manner possIble.
Central Front
VIewing the sItuatIon in Europe today, with the masses of Soviet
armor opposing the qualItatIvely superior NATO formations, Bruno
Meyer's operation of 8 July 1943 can be a valuable core of ex-
perience Of course, one can never fIght a battle before It begins.
Frequently, however, the successful fIeld commander is the one who
can take advantage of an unforeseen opportunIty that develops after
the battle has begun Prior to the battle, one can only use what
information IS avaIlable at that time.
The assumptIon here IS that NATO can use the A10 (or SImIlar
30mm cannon-equIpped tactIcal aIrcraft) to combat effectIvely the
dIsproportIonate number of Warsaw Pact tanks. The actions of the
HS129s at iitadelle proved the practIcality of using aircraft-even If
unsupported by friendly ground troops-to destroy large enemy
armored formatIons. An analogous sItuation exists today in Europe
WIth NATO faCing a numerically superior, but qualitatively inferior,
Warsaw Pact. All that IS needed to complete the formula for NATO
success in uSing aIrcraft against tanks IS an update of the same basic
tactIcs used by Meyer In July 1943
Among unclaSSIfIed sources, the "Sokolovsky papers" are a prime
Informant of contemporary RUSSIan mIlitary thought. Sokolovsky
emphaSIzes that the massing of armor IS stili the VItal component In
the "mass assault In the necessary locale" However, WIth the advent
of nuclear weapons, these forces must be dIspersed prIor to and after
the massing for a breakthrough in order to preclude a tempting
nuclear target. Sokolovsky stresses the need for "exceptional flex-
IbilIty" so that forces are able qUIckly to concentrate and quickly
dIsperse again It IS at thIS pOint of qUIck concentration of Soviet
forces that NATO antitanK dln.:rdft can be rnost effective If the
RUSSIans do Indeed follow these tactICS, then speed is of utmost
critIcality In countering the massed SovIet armored formatIons If the
SovIets can concentrate rapIdly, attack and subsequently disperse,
then NATO must counter these formatIons at the cfltlcal time frame of
concentratIon prior to attack. At thIS c r ~ c l l Juncture, flYing antItank
artillery is a weapon whIch can be used most effectively.
The Luftwaffe historlcal.experlence indIcates the need for forward
basing of aIrcraft assets and the need for a rapid generatIon of sorties.
Forward baSing IS necessary In order to achIeve the mInimum tIme
between the call for, and the actual employment of, aIr support. AIr
60
AIR POWER AT KURSK
!,
power offers the most effective means of rapidly concentrating
firepower on an armored breakthrough where ground forces are not
strong enough to counter tile enemy formations As such, every
minute IS vital. and the only way to close potential gaps IS to have
aircraft close to the frontline ground units
NATO does not possess unlimited air resources. and the most
effiCient and effective use of available assets IS necessary In some
Important ways. the number of aircraft possessed IS irrelevant; what
IS Important IS how many sorties can be generated and how qUickly.
For example, a squadron With 10 aircraft that can each fly five times a
day IS more effective than a squadron With 20 aircraft which only fly
tWice a day The same line of reasoning IS true of pilots. The sortie
generation rate IS Important in keeping pressure on the enemy tank
force precluding ItS disengagement as Illustrated In the "Meyer
model."
The AIO
TactiCS for the envisaged A 70 mission have to be bUilt around an
optimum slant range of 4.000 feet for the 30mm GAUB cannon. The
relatively close slant range puts the attacking aircraft Within the range
of Just about every antiaircraft weapons system possessed by the
enemy However. the situation IS not so bleak as It initially appears.
Because the A 10 must operate close to the ground. It has several
advantages' terrain masking from threat radar. exposure to limited
observation (the aircraft can only be seen from the immediate area
over which It is flYing). and Within easy reach at the low-altitude blind
areas of many surface-to-alr missile systems (It IS difficult to track an
aircraft on radar at treetop level) EspeCially Important IS the fact that
assets that the enemy puts Into surface-to-alr missile systems and
61
MILITARY REVIEW
sophisticated radar warnings are assets that he takes away from
conventional antiaircraft artillery defense with probable significant
Increase In the of the A 10 because the main threat, with
which the A 10 IS concerned, IS barrage antiaircraft artillery fire
In order to detect concealed enemy tanks, the A 10 In some tactical
situations will have to fly slowly so that the pilot will be able to spot
the tanks on the ground The slow speed requirement IS a case of the
pilots having to "bite the bullet." There IS no way to discover a well-
hidden enemy by flYing over him at supersonic speeds A pilot
becomes a fighting man similar to the basIc Infantryman whom he
supports The NATO air forces cannot hope to make their presence
felt,unless they are wllhng to employ their pilots In a manner where
they can bnng pressure to bear on the enemy, In the context of the
A 10, this pressure requires an aggressive willingness to seek out the
enemy on the ground and destroy him
Once the enemy IS discovered, It IS absolutely cntlcal that he IS not
allowed to escape If the NATO air forces are to carry out their
antitank role In Europe, enemy armor must be destroyed, preferabl':
before It has the chance to come Into contact with fnendly ground
forces Once'dlscovered by air, a constant pressure must be kept 1I
until the enemy's armored formations are destroyed The enemy must
not be given a chance to regroup, disengage or seek cover, he must be
ruthlessly destroyed
The Warsaw Pact ground forces have shortcomings relative to
their logistics support The lSU23,4, for example, carries only 65
rounds per magazine for each barrel, and, therefore, "the 23-4 can
fire but three short bursts against an incoming target and possibly one
more as It recedes" This IS one example which supports the pOint
that NATO air forces, to be used at the optimum level, must keep
constant pressure on the enemy once he has executed his Initial push
and expended or substantially reduced his first Issue of ammunition
A corollary would be that NATO commanders must not get "cold feet"
after the first rather heavy losses encountered by fnendly air Units,
for, If the initial losses are to be made good, the follow-on sorties
must be made In order to take advantage of reduced air defense
strength and exposure of the armored formations to close-range
attack from airborne cannon
The conSiderations above indicate that NATO field commanders
can expect a Significant boost In their antitank capability through the
use of antitank aircraft such as the A 10 The "Meyer model
Illustrates the utility of antitank aircraft when the proper tactics and
aggressive employment of those tactics are present The adaptation 01
the hlstoncal example, modified by present conditions added to a flft"
determination on the part NATO's military and political leaders, hi"
the potential of making the successful defense of Western Europe
more of a reality without resorting to Immediate nuclear escalation "1..
62
"G
'Ice
Through
Retention
Intervention
fa
ii1Jo
,
IJ
+
I
Lieutenant Colonel Moss M. Ikeda, US Army Reserve
Army Reserve re-enlistments have
been falling since the demise of the
draft. The USAR IX Corps (Augmen-
tation) took some unique steps to
reverse this trend. Teams from higher
headquarters were made available to
commanders to help counsel soldiers
whose term of service was expiring.
Duping an t 8-month period, the
retention rate increased from 45 to 63
percent. By October 1978, each unit
will h,\ve its own retention counseling
team. The retention-through-
intervention program is a success
story that may have application Army-
wide.
W
ITH the advent of the zero draft
on 1 July 1972, the US Army
Reserve (USAR) has heen faced with a
two-pronged problem. The long waiting
lists to join the Reserve components
disappeared along with the draft on
one hand. On the other hand, par-
63
ticularly in 1976 and 1977, there has
be on a mass exodus of Reserve
Enlistment Program, 1963 (REP 63)
personnel. The retention rate among
REP 63s fell below 20 percent, a
retention rate which, if applied to all
USAR personnel, would jeopardize the
survival of the entire Army Reserve
program. This exodus of REP 63s was
anticipated since several studies
showed that over 90 percent of REP
63s had entered the Reserve program
by way of the draft inducement.
Because of severe personnel
strength problems, recruiting efforts
were accelerated, using unit personnel
and by placing available reservists on
active duty for training in an attempt
to bolster the faltering USAR strength.
At times, this was done at the expense
of training and administrative func-
tions. Allout efforts in recruiting were
successful, but it was discovered very
soon that, although new acquisitions
were welcomed at the front door of the
MILITARY REVIEW
Reserve centers, end term service per-
sonnel were clearing the units and
leaving through the back' door faster
than new personnel were reporting in.
In other words, after tallying the gains
a,nd losses, units were showing net
losses.
The problems of recruiting and
retention in the Army Reserve are not
peculiar to Hawaii and the Pacific, but
problems faced by all Reserve com-
ponents throughout our nation. The
USAR program in Hawaii embarked
upon a unique concept to deal with the
retention problem. "
Installation of Intervention Teams
To curb this ebb tide of personnel
leaving the USAR program, Brigadier
General Forrest C. Murphy, com-
mander, IX Corps (Augmentation),
devised and implemented a plan of
"Retention Through Intervention."
The IX Corps (Augmentation) Head-
quarters also serves in a second
capacity as the US Army Reserve
General Officer Command for all
USAR units in the Pacific, with the
command stretching from Hawaii to
Guam, more than 2,000 miles away.
Because of the severity of the
retention problem, General Murphy
organized a Retention Lounseiing
Group (RCG) from junior officer and
noncommissioned officer (NCO)
resources from his own headquarters
staff and the 322d Civil Affairs Group.
These units were maintaining high
personnel strength levels and could
afford to assist other units which were
having difficulty with retention.
The RCG was organized into three
teams under the direct supervision of
64
the assistant Gl, IX Corps (Augmen-
tation), to assist the 100th Battalion,
442d Infantry; the 4llth Engineer Bat-
talion (Combat Heavy); the 114th
Military Intelligence Detachment; the
342d Finance Section (Disbursing) and
the 62lst Administrative Services
Detachment (Figure 1). Each company
in the infantry and engineer battalions
was assigned two counselors, and each
smaller unit was assigned one
counselor.
The intervention aspect comes in
when personnel from a higher head-
quarters and another higher level
command commit their resources to
help a lower level command. This
arrangement on face value can be
threatening unless the proper
guidelines and rapport are established.
Unit commanders needed help
desperately, but from what source?
Anyone who has been a battalion or
company commander or a key NCO in
a unit knows full well that personal
contacts with reservists during unit
training assemblies (UTAs), par-
ticularly contacts on a one-to-one basis,
are limited. The inactive duty training
(lDT) requirements from higher head-
quarters, inspectors, visitors and
urgent personnel, logistics and
training matters quickly eat up a four-
hour UTA. The myriad of tasks re-
quired of unit leaders during IDT
assemblie:s keeps leaders from per-
forming the vital function of in-
teracting with troops. A way must be
found to free leaders of time-consuming
administrative chores so that they may
work with their men and women. The
intervention of extra unit resources was
conceived as a measure to assist com-
manders in wading their way through
the mire of requirements.
Although unit commanders were
RETENTION
I'
HEADQUARTERS IX CORPS (AUGMENTATION)'
RETENTION COUNSELING GROUP
HHC Co A Co C cs Co HHC Co A Co C 114.h MID 342d FSD 621 ASD
Two counselors each Two counselors each One counselor each
Figure 1
not convinced of the place and value of
the ReG initially, periodic reports
showed that acceptance grew as the
reten tion counselors became es-
tablished. In periodic reports, the
acceptance level of the ReG by com-
man'ders, staffs and counselees was on
a five-point scale with 1 being low and
Commanders
Staff
Counselees
OVERAll
January 1977
3.6
3.1
3.7
3.46
5 being high (Figure 2).
Although there were many
problems initially in installing the
ReG program, a clear trend appeared
from a slightly above average level of
acceptance across the board in the
early stages of development to a very
high level of acceptance indicated by
March 1977
4.2
4.2
4.0
4.13
May 1977
4.5
4.5
4.6
4.53
Figure 2
65
MILITARY REVIEW
the most recent report.
Any suspicions of "spying" or
"snooping" were allayed as retention
counselors quickly estab1ished rapport
with counselees. Counselors were
highly visible in both garrison and
field situations and furnished re-
quested information, assisted troops
with a variety of problems and became
people with whom the troops could
relate on a nonthreatening basis. Com-
manders and staff officers who were
not comfortable with outside personnel
having free access to their unit areas
now welcome the help of the counselors
and are working with them on
retention.
Phased Program
The Retention-ThroughInterven
tion plan was developed as a four-
phase program:
Phase I-Organizatzon, Training
and Initial Contacts-September
Df'cf'mber 1976.
During this initial phase, the RCG
was organized and trained. The
training sessions concentrated on
counseling techniques, approaches to
working with unit commanders and
other unit leaders, study of Army
Regulation 140-111, Enlistment and
Reenlistment, and review of unit
retention policies and procedures.
RCG personnel made initial con
tacts with unit commanders, staffs and
unit members to establish rapport.
Limited retention counseling took
place during this period.
Phase Il-RCG Counseling and
Assistance-JanuaryJune 1977 ..
During this period, RCG counselors
concentrated on one-toone counseling
66
and assisted counselees in resolving
problems. The idea was to supplement
those retention capabilities which
already exist in the unit, not to
supplant unit retention respon-
sibili ties.
This period of concentrated
counseling yielded an improved re-
enlistment rate as compared with a
previous three-year average.
Phase IlI-RCG Phase Out-July
1977September 1978.
During this period, RCG personnel
will continue to provide one-to-one
counseling services. Additional man-
day spaces are being provided so that
counseling services can continue and a
new emphasis can be initiated. The
emphasis for this period is to have
each unit develop its own intraunit
retention team capabilities. Unit com-
manders will call upon the experience
and expertise of the RCG personnel to
develop and train unit retention
counselors.
As this phase progresses, unit
retention personnel will assume more
responsibility for retention activities,
with the intent that RCG personnel
will phase out in October 1978. Unit
reten tion personnel will assume full
responsibility for conducting retention
activities on 1 October 1978.
An Organizational Effectiveness
Assistance Team (OEAT) will be
developed during this phase by IX
Corps (Augmentation) Headquarters.
The OEAT will have personnel ex-
perienced in retention counseling as
part of the team. This team will act as
troubleshooters on organizational
effectiveness matters and strive to
improve Hawaii's USAR units to such
an extent that good retention will be
one of the major outcomes.
Phase IV-Retention Activities
Revert to Units-October 1978.
All retention activities will be
assumed by unit commanders in Oc-
tober 1978. Commanders may reques't
or be assigned the OEAT when the
commander desires assistance or when
it becomes evident that OEAT
assistance is needed.
Throughout all phases, unit com-
manders, all officers and NCOs are
reminded that retention is the business
of every officer and NCO and that it is
a command responsibility. Even
within each unit, unit retention
counselors will not supplant retention
efforts of commanders and unit officers
and NCOs.
Results of ReG
At the outset of the program,
General Murphy set are-enlistment
rate goal of 60 percent. This goal at
that time seemed lofty in that the
average retention rate for the past
three years was 44.6 percent. High yet
realistic goals are often necessary if
significant progress is the intent.
As of the latest strength data
available, the command has attained a
reenlistment rate of 62.6 percent. A
new re-enlistment rate goal of 80
percent was set in June 1977, and
RETENTION
again this new goal seems lofty. But,
with the success experienced and
lessons learned during this year with
the RCG, it is anticipated that the new
goal will become a reality.
Another significant factor at-
tributed to the increased retention rate
was Continental United States (CON-
US) annual training (AT) for the two
largest units in USAR Hawaii. The
100th Battalion, 442d Infantry, had a
highly successful AT at Fort Benning,
Georgia, and the 411th Engineer Bat-
talion (Combat Heavy) conducted its
AT at Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri.
Both units received superlative ratings
for AT and letters of commendation
from - the respective commanding
generals of these training sites. In
feedback from RCG personnel, CONUS
AT was clearly a factor in retaining
personnel through the month of July
1977 when the engineer battalion com-
pleted its AT. RCG personnel report
that possible CONUS training for AT
in the future remains a selling point for
retention. The impact of effective
counseling with a resultant increased
interest and involvement in retention
activities should result in better com-
munication, improved training, better
personnel actions and more care for
the soldiers in the ranks-all of which
should lead ultimately to a sustained
. high re-enlistment rate.
Lieutenant Colonel Moss M. Ikeda. US
Army Reserve, IS currently a hIgh school
prmclpal in Kailua, Hawazi. He received a
B.Ed. and an M.Ed from the Unwersity of
Hawall. an M.M.A.S. from the USACGSC,
and IS a graduate of the Army War College
HIS Reser"e assIgnment IS WIth Head
quarters, IX Corps (Augmentation), Fort
DeRussy. Hawall.
I
67
Captain Richard M. Saunders, US Army
The debate as to why the US ,failed to
intervene in Indochina on behalf of the
French in 1954 has never been resolved.
Was it a case of "extreme American in
decision" or an affirmative policy action?
The US was unwilling to "go it alone:' our
allies wanted no part of a proposal to
intervene and the French refused to
renounce colonial claims to the area,
President Eisenhower's decision not to in
tervene appears to have been a sound one
based on valid reasoning
! ntraduction
I
N MARCH and April 1954, the
Eisenhower admonlstratlon was deeply
concerned with a CriSIS on Indoch ona
French Union forces, which had been
fighting the V,etmonh for seven years,
faced immonent defeat at the fortress of
Dlen Bien Phu. The President was
pressured by both the French
68
Government and members of his own
admonlstratlon to Intervene in the war
with military forces Despite these
pressures, Eisenhower did not intervene.
The decISion has been criticized by the
French as being an example of "extreme
American ondeclsion."1 Some histOrians
have seen it as an illustration of the
bankruptcy of the administration's
strategic policy, showing an onability to
translate tough talk into action.' Still
others claim the deCISion IS Just another
example of the lack of leadership
provided by President Eisenhower
This article IS a study of the Indochona
CriSIS and the accompanying policy
debate wlthon the Eisenhower ad-
ministration It examines the theSIS that
the deCISion not to ontervene was actually
an affirmative policy action which
reflected Eisenhower's views on military
Involvements in Asia and hiS desire to
pursue a less costly military policy.
I'
Furthermore, the decision process Itself
shows a leadership technique that was
used often by the President In the
tradition of staff operations, he cori-
sldered the views of all his advisers and
did not commit himself to a policy until
the full Implications had been examined.
While the final decIsion was his own, It
was reached In such a way that
Eisenhower's personal role appeared
secondary
Background
The spring of 1954 was crucial for
French Involvement for several reasons
The war, In ItS seven years, had cost the
French close to $5 billion and had caused
150,000 casuailles 3 The French were
fighting a colonial struggle aimed at the
establishment of a close-knit French
Union In the face of growing nationalist
pressures For thiS reason, support
among the Indochinese for the French
and the Bao-Dal regime was tenuous.
France's military record In the war also
was poor. General Glap and his Vletmlnh
forces were able to make significant
gains In Laos and Northern Vietnam
Furthermore, the guerrilla forces seized
the initiative In many Instances and
demonstrated mobility superior to the
French. The situatIOn further deteriorated
1954 INDOCHINA CRISIS
when the end of the Korean War enabled
China to Increase ItS military aid to the
Vletmlnh.
French domestic support for the war
was faltering. The Laniel government had
come to power without strong political
support. Since domestic opposition to the
war was high, the governmeflt's
weakness prevented decIsive actIOn and
threatened to turn any setback' into a
major CriSIS 4
Additional problems were caused by
the inclUSion of the Indochina Issue Into
the agenda of the Geneva Conference
which would begin on 26 April. The
conference would be attended by the
United States, the Soviet Union, the
People's Republic of China, the United
Kingdom and France, and would discuss
the problem of restoring peace In
Southeast ASia. ThiS strengthened the
position of groups In France calling for a
negotiated end to the war The Laniel
government thus became reluctant to do
anything which might Jeopardize the
conference or widen the war. On the
other hand, the proposed conference
gave the Vletmlnh a definite timetable
under which to achieve a decIsive
military victory that could be used for
political purposes Secretary of State
John Foster Dulles warned the French of
thiS when the deciSIOn was made to
discuss the Indochina Issue at Geneva S
Against thiS background, the French
Captain Richard M Saunders IS currently
studYing for a Master of PublIC Affairs degree at
the Woodrow WI/son School of Public and
InternatIOnal Affairs. Princeton Unillerslty He IS
a graduate of the USMA and has served as a
cavalry platoon leader and a troop executive
officer With the 3d Armored Callalrv Regiment.
Fort Bliss. Tex
69
MILITARY REVIEW
forces had Iniliated a new program for
achieving a military end to the war The
plan was advanced by General Navarre
who commanded all forces In the area
Under the plan, the French would send
nine additional battalions of non
Vietnamese troops to Indochina, bringing
the total of such forces to 250,000
France also would expand the Viet-
namese Army to 300,000 and attempt to
Improve Its morale and training, The
changes would give French forces a
numerical superiority which they hoped
to use In open battle to end the war by
1955,"
An Important first step In the program
was the occupation of Olen Bien Phu by
French paratroopers Navarre's purpose
for thiS move was probably both mllilary
and political The French hoped that the
Isolated fortress would serve as bait to
draw Glap's forces Into a set piece battle
In which superior French weapons could
become deCISive, The fortress also could
help shore up the Laotian regime which
had been so badly shaken by recent
Vletmlnh successes 7 While these
strategic goals have been debated, the
tactical. planning of the operatIOn was
unquestionably flawed The fortress was
placed on the floor of a valley bisected by
a small river ThiS was a good location for
an airstrip but Violated convenllonal
military conSiderations of key terrain The
site was surrounded by high ground from
which arllilery could easily dominate the
fortress The area prOVided the defenders
With no natural cover or concealment
and left the French artillery dangerously
exposed 8 The Vletmlnh saw In the
POSition a great opportunity for achieVing
the victory they wanted
US Involvement In the war .had
started very early On 1 May 1950,
PreSident Truman approved $10 million
In aid for urgently needed military ilems
70
An economic aid misSion was set up,
Later, military assistance and liaison
groups were added. By 1954, the aid had
risen to $1,063 million which made up
78 percent of the total war costs'"
Despite the generous aid, France and
the United States never fully agreed on
war alms The chief Issue was the
colonial nature of the war, PreSident
Roosevelt had been opposed to efforts at
reestablishJng overseas colonies after
World War II During the Truman ad-_
mlnlstrallon, a need to stop Communist
expansion In Indochina was recognized,
The United States aided the French In the
hope that they might defeat the Com-
munists and allow strong democratiC
regimes to develop In the region. Con
tlnual pressure to change French goals
accompanied the aid, Nevertheless, the
French largely Ignored American deSires
and maintained a policy of fighting to
retain Indochina In the French Union.
While the debate over the purposes of
the war continued, both nations con
cluded that the war could best be ended
through a military victory 10 The
Eisenhower administration inherited thiS
poliCY and all the contradictions that
went With It
The Eisenhower Administration
The new PreSident. however, had
certain political and personal views
which became crUCial In the debate over
expanding the American commilment.
One must remember that Eisenhower
was a soldmr, not a politiCian In fact, he
had an obVIOUS dislike for .pracllcal
pollHCS
EIsenhower accepted the PresidentIal
nomination because he was persuaded
that he was the only person who could
sustain the national consensus es-
tablished by Roosevelt on domestic, but
above all, on foreign policy. Maintained
by Truman m the early years of his
Presidency, the political consensus was
endangered by the American m-
volvement in Korea, the chief symbol of
the frustratingly mdeclslve Cold War. I I
Eisenhower was elected. In part, as a
peace candidate on the promise to end
the Korean War. He fully realized this
mandate and was very reluctant to con-
sider involving the United States In new
wars.
Elsenhower's military background
affected his views on the role of the
Presidency. One high member of the
administration characterized
Elsenhower"s declslonmaklng procedure
as being similar to that seen In a military
staff where the commander gets the
opinions of each staff member before
making the final decIsion himself. It also
has been said that E,senhower"s belief In
the value of staff work caused him to
choose John Foster Dulles to serve as an
effective secretary of state. General
Andrew Goodpaster. who worked closely
wltD Eisenhower, observed that the
President made the key decIsions
However
[he was] a man who knew how to
delegate and when he delegated, ex-
pected people to carry out the respon-
Sibilities he had given to them, while
keepmg the whole thmg in a context of
overall policy and direction 12
Eisenhower also strongly believed In
the preservation of good relations
between the Executive and Congress,
thinking that Congress must partiCipate
In the decision making process Foreign
poliCY was only to be formulated after
consulting with Congress and with
proper regard for public opinion."
To understand the debate on the
71
1-954 INDOCHINA CRISIS
Indochina CriSIS, it is necessary to look at
the larger framework of the. ad-
ministration's strategic policy. This policy
was a result both of the President's
views and some conflicting political
demands. Much of the Republican Party
thought that Truman's administration
had been "soft" on communism. The
new administration was expected to
correct this fault by presenting more
forthright opposition to Communist
aggression. On the other hand, many
were deeply frustrated over Korea and
felt a growing disenchantment with the
old containment doctrine. Containment, It
was argued, implied the Impossible task
of stopping Communist power plays over
the entire rim of the Eurasian Continent.
The administration's "new look"
strategy tned to reconcile these views. It
called for a military posture based on
massive nuclear retaliation, ground force
commitments were to be avoided.
Overwhelming air and sea power and the
threat of nuclear weapons would deter
further Communist advances at a
relatively low cost to the United States
The aim was clearly to avoid the
repetitIOn of Korea.'
However, the change In strategic
poliCY brought no change In the desire to
stop the spread of communism In In-
dochina. If anything, conservative
elements In the Republican Party inten-
Sified the view. Dulles had said before
the election that Indochina was the key
to security In Southeast Asia.
Eisenhower felt much the same way,
writing In his memoirs that
the loss of all Vietnam, together
with Laos on the west and Cambodia in
the southwest, would have meant the
surrender to Communist enslavement of
millions. On the material side, it would
have spelled the loss of invaluable
deposits of tin and prodigious supplies of
MILITARY REVIEW
rubber and flce It would have meant that
Thailand, enjoying buffer territory
between itself and Red China, would be
exposed on Its entlfe eastern border to
infiltratIOn or attack. 15
The military balance In Europe also
. affected the administration's views on
the Indochina War As early as 1951,
Eisenhower was Critical of the French for
sending troops to Indochina which might
better have been used in NATO.'6 By
1954, hiS position had changed
somewhat The formation of the Eu
ropean Defense Community was being
debated at the time This arrangement.
which would have helped combine Eu
ropean armies Into a Single defenSive
organization, was strongly supported by
Eisenhower It both reflected hiS views
on European unification and promised to
Increase security while greatly redUCing
the need and expense of American
presence France was the malor nation
opposed to the plan The
administration hoped that underWriting
French needs In Indochina might help
Win French support for the community 17
The Olen Bien Phu Crisis
Eisenhower probably would have
been content to sustain the status quo of
largescale aid to the French had not
events !n 1954 made a V!9tmlnh vIctory
seem likely The French position at Olen
Bien Phu became precarious as Glap took
advantage of favorable terrain around the
fortress and employed massive amounts
of artillery which had come from China.
While the garrison at Olen Bien Phu
actually was a very small portion of the
total French Army In Indochina: the
specter of ItS defeat threatened to shatter
morale throughout the entire force and
72
collapse remaining support in France for
the war and the Lamel government.
The first serious debate Within the
administration about military intervention
took place at the Department of Defense
In January. Opinions were diVided. Chief
of Naval Operations Admiral R. Anderson
proposed to the secretary of defense that
"the U.S. deCide Immediately to employ
combat forces In Indochina. . . .. Other
senior officers Within the Office of the
Secretary of Defense warned that such
intervention could not be successful with'
air power alone. If the United States
deCided to Intervene, they said, It must be
prepared to send ground troopS.'B While
the In itia I debate had few effects outside
the department. it did cause General
Matthew Ridgway, the Chief of Staff of
the Army, to begin gathering information
on the likely costs and problems of
intervention The information was to be
used In the subsequent debate.
On 6 February, the administration
announced ItS first real move to Widen
support for the French. The United States
was sending 40 826 bombers and 200
American techniCians to Indochlna.'9
Reaction In the United States was SWift
Members of Congress protested that they
had not been properly adVised of the
move. Other statements accused the
administration of moving toward In'
terventlOn Without properly consulting
Congress or the people Assurances were
hurnedly gIven that the men would be
Withdrawn by June. At a 10 February
news conference, Eisenhower flatly re'
lected the Idea of an intervention poliCY 20
At a later conference, he stated that:
there IS going to be no in-
volvement of Ameflca In war unless it IS
a result of the Constltuttonal process that
is placed in Congress to declare it. 21
By the middle of March, the French
situation at Olen Bien Phu had grown
f'
desperate General Paul Ely, the
chairman of the French JOint Chiefs of
Staff, came to Washington on 20 March
to brief the Departments of State and
Defense on the French tactical position.
He also sought a restatement of an
earlier agreement calling for Intervention
with American air power If the Chinese
Air Force should enter the war."
At one meeting with the French
geAeral, President Eisenhower told Ad-
miral Radford, the chairman of the JOint
Chiefs of Staff, to do everything possible
to expedite eXisting aid programs. At the
end of his VISit, Ely had another meeting
with Radford about American assistance.
At that meeting, Radford discussed a
plan for commitment of American air
power against the forces attacking Olen
Bien Phu. A combined French and
American staff working In Indochina had
developed a plan for a night air strike by
60 829 heavy bombers from bases In the
Philippines and 160 Jet aircraft from
American carners In the South China
Sea. A great many of the details had
already been worked out, including the
sending of the mission commander to
reconnOiter the target 23
Radford's proposal sharply Increased
the level of American Involvement under
discussion between the governments and
took Ely somewhat by surpriSe. Unfor-
tunately, the proposal led to a mis-
understanding. It IS fairly clear that the
aIr strike plan vvas advanCed on Radford's
own Initiative and was not a part of an
administration poliCY It also is clear that
Radford did not intend for the plan to be
perceived as an actual offer of military
ald. Radford stated several years later
that Ely should have realized that he was
diSCUSSing the pOSSibility of an American
action and not making a concrete offer.
24
Nevertheless, Ely apparently mistook the
Intentions. When the general returned to
73
1954 INDOCHINA CRISIS
Pans and adVised his government of the
proposal, It was treated as a serious
option.
In fact, Radford's view was only one
of several pOSitions being debated within
the administration at the time. The ad-
miral was the most outspoken advocate
of intervention He had been a chief
architect of the "new look" policy and
saw Olen Bien Phu as a "first chance" to
put It to a test He believed that an all:
strike could save the garnson at a
relatively low cost to the United States.
As David Halberstam pointed out, "like
many high Air Force supporters and
converts, he believed In the InvlnclblllN'
of his weapon "25
There was Opposition to Radford's
position from within the Defense
Department Itself The major critic was
General Ridgway. Long an opponent of
the "new look," he argued that air power
by Itself would be ineffective against the
Vletmlnh at Olen Bien Phu. It had been
similarly Ineffective In Korea.
Furthermore, he feared that an indecisive
employment of air power would lead to
calis for the commitment of ground
troops The United States could Win such
a war but only at a ternble COS!.'6
Dulles' position on Intervention was
largely contained In a speech given at the
Overseas Press Club on 29 March. The
speech, which was a major policy
statement, outlined, the reasons for
concern aboul events In the region
If the Communist forces were to win
uncontested control over Indochina or
any substantial part thereof. they would
surely resume the same pattern of
aggression agaihst other free peoples in
that region 27
Dulles claimed that the Chinese were
plaYing a crUCial role in the conflict and
rejected the Idea of relYing on the
Geneva Conference for settlement. In-
MILITARY REVIEW
terventlon might become necessary If It
did, the Amencans, French and British
should act together In a "unlted action"
to counter the Chinese threat This
signaled both a conviction that the
Navarre plan, In ItS present form, could
not be successful and a willingness for
the United States to take unprecedented
steps to help the French 28
Eisenhower shared Dulles' and Rad-
ford's views on the Importance of In-
dochina He was very skeptical, however,
of a unilateral Intervention by air power
He regarded any military intervention as
an act of war which had to be weighed
carefully A special danger lay In the
pOSSibility that an air stnke might fall
This would fate the United States with a
choice between losing prestige by having
entered the war and lost or escalating
the commitment by sending ground
forces He would not agree to any in-
tervention policy that did not havEl a good
chance of success.'9
Eisenhower desired allied par-
ticipation In such a venture
Having avoided one total war with
Red China the year before In Korea when
he had United NatIOns support, he was In
no mood to provoke another one In
Indochina by gOing It alone In a mrlltary
actIOn without the Bfltlsh and other
allies 30
Eisenhower read and approved
Dulles' united action speech before It
was given 31 Allhough he was more
reluctant to Intervene than was Dulles.
the two were In close contact with the
debate which was gOing on Eisenhower
later stated that he spoke with Dulles
"between eight and ten times a day"
dunng the cnsls."
Eisenhower also was Influenced by a
report on the costs of ground troop
intervention which was compiled by
General Ridgway After the initial dls-
74
CUSSlOn of Intervention In January,
Ridgway had sent a team of combat
commanders, engineers, logisticians and
medical personnel to Indochina to
ascertain problems that would be en-
countered If ground forces were com-
mitted The group concluded that the
United States could Win a land war
against the Vletmlnh. However, between
500,000 and 1,000,000 men would be
needed The entire port, transportation
and communication system of Vietnam
would have to be rebuilt to support the
needs of a modern army. Draft calls
might reach 100,000 a month, and the
United States would have to mobilize for
an effort greater than the Korean War.
33
Ridgway personally bnefed the PreSident
on the findings. He felt that the Infor-
mation made a great Impression on the
PreSident who, he said, could absorb
military information "at a glance.""
While Eisenhower must have realized on
his own the military costs of intervention,
Rldgway's report helped to support his
views
At the end of March, Eisenhower's
personal position on intervention can be
summed up as follows
Unilateral Amencan intervention In
Indochina would not be successful
Without the use of ground forces.
The use of ground forces was
logistically and politically undeSifable
The United States should only In
,ervene as part of an allied effort which
would broaden political approval of the
action
Stopping Communist expansion In
Indochina was still seen as Important.
but united action was necessary 35
Furthermore, the PreSident would not
send troops until the French had
renounced all colonial claims In the
region and had begun meaningful steps
toward establishing independent
"
French troops debark
from US Air Force
C 124 at Tourane.
Indochina. 1954
French paratroopers check
bundles to be airdropped
In Indochina. August 1954
1954 INDOCHINA CRISIS
Members of the French Foreign Legion Honor
Guard stand at attention somewhere in Indo-
china. August 1954
US Air Force Photos
75
MILITARY REVIEW
regimes The United States could not
participate In what appeared to be a
colonial battle.
In the meantime, the Congress had
not been silent on the Issue. While
Dulles' 29 March speech had received a
mixed reaction, the comments showed a
general desire to discover a clear
statement of administration policy. On 31
March. Senator Hubert Humphrey
charged publically that the administration
was reluctant to Inform responsible com-
mittees In Congress about the situation 36
Eisenhower had always thought that
Congress must playa key role In foreign
policy decIsion making. He had stated In
prevIous weeks that he would not Involve
the Unltecj States In acts of war without
the consent of Congress There was also
the Issue of the Bricker Amendment
which had been defeated a short time
before The debate about the amendment
clearly showed that Congress was dis-
satisfied with the amount of power that
Roosevelt and Truman had exerted over
foreign policy The bill would have
reduced the Executive's power and ex
panded the Congressional role While the
Eisenhower administration opposed the
bill, It recognized the seriousness of the
Issue and resolved to consult with the
Congress whenever pOSSible 37
The PreSident asked Dulles to inVite a
group of Congressional leaders to a
secret meeting at the State Department
on 3 April Eight members attended,
including the Senate majority and mi-
nOrity leaders and the speaker of the
House Dulles and Radford represented
the administration. Eisenhower did not
attend
Dulles opened the meeting by ex-
plaining his view on the Importan'ce of
Indochina and saying that the PreSident
sought a JOint CongressIOnal resolution
permitting the use of air and naval forces
76
In the area, Radford then spoke of the air
strike plan as It had been described to
Generaly Ely. He said that additional
strikes would be made If the first one
fa iled but did not take a definitive stand
on the use of ground troops When asked
how many of the JOint Chiefs agreed
with him, Radford said that he was the
only one who advocated such a strike
The reason, he claimed, was that he had
more Far Eastern experience than the
others and "understood the situation.
better" Dulles supported the In-
tervention plan but admitted that no
allies had been consulted on the Issue.
JS
The Congressmen did not accept the
interventIOn plan as It was outlined. They
were concerned that this would be a
costly and uncertain step and laid down
several conditions for Congressional ap-
proval. First, unilateral
rejected Intervention must take the rm
of a coalition effort including the B tish,
French and other allies Second, F ance
would have to change ItS alms In th war
by speeding the move toward in-
dependence of the Indochinese states.
Finally, the French would have to agree
to continue thEHr Involvement In the war
With Sizable ground forces 39
At a meeting With Radford and Dulles
the next day, Eisenhower readily
accepted these conditions Th IS es-
tablished the administration's policy. In-
tervention was not ruled out However,
Ihe PreSident insisted upon Con-
gressional approval which depended on
united action and on an agreement With
the French to change their war alms.
The way Eisenhower made thiS
decIsion IS Significant. The plan dis-
cussed at the CongressIOnal meeting was
close to Radford's extreme view of uni-
lateral air intervention. It was quite dif-
ferent from Eisenhower's own desires
By not attending the meeting, the
t<
President avoided being Identified with
the plan In this form It IS likely that he
anticipated the rejection of unilateral
intervention and the demand for a mor.e
cautious policy Involving greater
cooperation and fewer risks In the end,
the Congressional leaders advocated a
policy that was qUite similar to the
President's own outlook. Eisenhower
saw intervention as a grave step with
potentially enormous costs He would
take thiS step only after gaining the
broadest possible domestic and inter-
national support Acceptance of the Con-
gressmen's demands formalized this
view and overruled the call for in-
tervention by the United States alone
As the President was reaching his
policy conclusion, the French
Government decided to request
American interventIOn on the terms that
Radford had proposed to Ely a week
earlier The French stili wanted an air
strike to save D,en Bien Phu and to buy
time until negotiations could begin at
Geneva. On 5 April, before being fully
adVised of the actual American position,
the French Government formally reo
quested an American air strike as the
onTy means by which a Communist
victory could be prevented. On 8 April.
after some further inconclUSive debate In
Washington. Dulles told the French that
no American action would be taken on
behalf of Dien Bien Phu Without the
formation of a common \AJestern
posltlon.
4o
By thiS time, the French had
rejected the united action Idea. They
feared that China might perceive a
coalition action as a direct threat. ThiS
would Jeopardize chances for gaining an
acceptable settlement at Geneva. In ad-
dition, the French were still reluctant to
change their war alms In a way that
would please the United States.
In the meantime,' Dulles talked With
77
1954 INDOCHINA CRISIS
the British Government to determine ItS
opinion on a united action plan. While
initial discussions seemed encouraging,
It soon became apparent that the British
wanted to seek a negotiated settlement
at Geneva before confronting the
Chinese in a coalition. By 10 April, both
Prime Minister Churchill and Foreign
Secretary Anthony Eden had .told Dulles
that they would not support any allied
Intervention In Indochina before
Geneva 41
NegotiatIOns between the United
States and France continued through
April as the French repeated their re-
quest for an air strike to save Dlen Bien
Phu The United States. however, would
not budge from ItS position of requiring a
coalition agreement before any action
was taken Since both the British and the
French had rejected the coalitIOn Idea,
the United States would not Intervene
On 23 April, Dulles turned down the
French request for a Unilateral air strike
for a final time. He re-emphaslzed the
PreSldent's pOSitIOn on the need for
Congressional approval and for allred
support He added that the US military
leaders felt that It was now too late to
save D,en Bien Phu no matter what was
done 42 The fortress fell In early May, and
the French qUit the war soon after the
Geneva Conference ended
Conciusion
The United States did not Intervene In
the Indochina War either to save the
garrison at Dlen Bien Phu or to stop
Communist expansion Nevertheless,
Eisenhower had not totally rejected in-
tervention as an option Instead, he set a
series of conditIOns which had to be met
before military action could be taken.
MILITARY REVIEW
Eisenhower would not Intervene without
Congressional approval Congress and
the President agreed that allied par-
ticipation was necessary Virtually
everyone agreed that the French would
have to change their political and military
policies In Indochina before the United
States could become directly Involved.
These conditions made It appear that the
administration was prevented from in-
tervening by outside Influences Indeed.
Radford later blamed Congressional re-
qUirements and the subsequent Bntlsh
and French intransigence for precluding
what would otherwise have been a Viable
policy 43
A close look at Elsenhower's role.
however. suggests that establishing the
conditions themselves was the key to the
actual policy deCISion Eisenhower clearly
was unWilling to Intervene unilaterally
As a military man. he realiled that air
NOTES
1 Bernara B Fall Hell ,n a Very SmalfPlace Ranaom HOll::', Inc
N '( 1966 p 293
2 Dall1d B Cap.tanch,k rhe and
Ame"can for{>,gn POIIC"V Humanll,es Prebb Inc. N Y 1969 p
3 DW'qht Da,,'d bsenhower Mandate for Change Onubleday &
Co Inc N V 1963 p 337
4 Rober! F Randle 1954 The Settlement of rtle In
dorh,nese War P"nrelon Unn"ers,ly Press Pronceton N J 1969 p
,
'5 V,ernilm Cr'SIS A H,SWfy Volume I 19401956
Ed, led b". Allan "IV Cilmeron Cornell UnI\lNSI!\, Press Ilhara N If
1971 p])1
6 bsenhower op etf p 338
7 Mallhew 8 R,dgwa" SoldIer The MemOirs 01 Matthew B
R,dqwa'l (urt,s PublishIng Co N V 1956 P 27'0
B Bernard Fall dP'5crlbE", the ta(.\lc.dl problems 01 the pOS.tlon ,n
the vallev at length m Fal! op CIt
') U ... reG Stares 1l,ertlam Ralat,on, 1945 196," Part II US
Departl"lent of Defense Wash,ngton D C p'lnted for the use of the
House Comm.ttee on Armed Services 1958 pp A 17 and A 35
10 IbId p A 2
11 Cap'tanch.k op c,t p 16
12 TranSCript of .nten,,,ew w!\h Gen'Tal Andrew GOOdpaster The
Dulles Oral Hlstorv PrOject Firestone Llbraf\, Prrnceton UniverSltv
PTinceton N J
13 C;apltanchlk op Cit pp 37 and 48
14 MelVin Gurtov The FITst V,etnam C"SIS Chmese Communist
Strategy and Umted States 1953 1954 Columb.a
UmverSltv Press N Y 1967 pp 53 '04
15 Eisenhower op CIt p 333
15 Transc.rlpt of onle'\rlew w.th DWlghl Dav'd E.senhoV:el The
Dulles Oral H,'StOTv PrOject !'<restone lIbrar\, Pronceton UmverSltv
Princeton N J
17 Sherman Adams F,rsthand Report The Star.,. 0/ the
EIsenhower Administration Harper & Brothers N Y 1951 pp 120
21
78
strikes were likely to be ineffective But-
tressed by the Ridgway report. he knew
that a ground intervention would be
prohibitively costly He did not feel thill
hiS political mandate allowed him to seek
such an Involvement unless he could
gain Widespread support. By setting
these conditions, Eisenhower overruled
Radford's posItion on intervention. He
also showed less enthusiasm for sending
troops than Dulles. If the PreSident had
wanted to Intervene, he would not have
acquiesced to the Congressional leaders'
demands but probably would have tried
to sell an intervention policy to them
Eisenhower saw intervention as a se-
rious step which he did not particularly
want to take. He used Congress' de-
mands and British and French reluctance
to Justify hiS refusal to intervene. The
actual deCISion not to send forces was
his own.
18 Umted States VIetnam ReliJtlOns 1945 1967 OD Cit P B 6
19 DaVid Halberstam The Best and the Bn9htest. Random House
Inc N Y 1973 pp 138 39
20 Gurtov op CIt pp 69 70
21 VIetnam CTISIS A Documentary Hlstor,( Volume I 19401956
OD CIt
n op Cit pp 297 98
23 GUTtOV op Cit pp 79 80
24 Trans(.npt of InterView With Admual Arthur Rddford The Duties
Oral Hl'5torv Pro\ect f,rPstone llbrarv Princeton UmverSlty
Prrnceton N J
25 Hatberstam op Cit p 138
26 Rldgwa\, op CIt p 275
27 Gurfov op ctf P 81
281b,d
29 Eisenhower Mandate for Change. op Cit p 341
30 Adams Of) C.It P 121
31 narldle up (,t p 61
32 Eisenhower The Dulles Oral History PrOJect, op Cit
33 United States Vletnqm Refal,on5, 19451967 op Cit p 8 10
34 Transcript 01 .nterV!eW With General Mallhew 8 Rldgwav fhe
Dulles Oral Hlstorv Project flre'Stone Llbrar\, Princeton UnIVerSity
Pronceton N J
35 UmtecJ States VIetnam ReliJtlons 1945 1961 Of) Cit pp B 20
and B 21
35 Gurtov op Cit pp 9] 94
37 Randle Of) CIt pp 32 33
38 Chalmers M Roberts The Day We Dldn t Go to War The
ReDorte1 14 September 1954 p 31
39 United States V'etnam RelatIons 1945 1961 Of) Cll pp B 23
and 8 24
40 f-all op Cit pp 302 5
41 Gurtml Of) Cit plOD
42 Roberts Of) Cit p 3b
43 Radford The Ora! ProjE'c! op Cit
!,
~ V I W S
How Do the French See
Their Defense?
Defense Nat/Onale
AugustSeptember 1977 (France)
This issue of France's largest and best
known defense journal includes four papers
presented by various authors at the
seminar titled "Public Opinion and
Defense" held 25 May 1977 and sponsored
by Ie Comite d'Etudes de Defense
Nationale. The articles deal with a
century's worth of politics of defense, public
opmlOn, Parliament and defense, the
evolution of the opinion of the French
people about defense from 1972 to 1976, and
notes apropos of public opinion and
defense.
Attack on Prepared Defences
in Skirmish Order
By Lt Gol N. K. Mayne
U.S.!. Journal
ApnlJune 1977 (India)
This is an interesting and well-thought-
out analysis and explanation of the proper
method of attacking a prepared defense.
The author confines himself to small-unit
tactics and avoids the temptation to
expand his thesis to include larger
formations. The material, as he himself
concedes, is not new; he draws heavily from
S. L. A. Marshall and other historians. But
the material is presented in a sprightly,
readable and clearly understandable
manner. In short, he synthesizes well and
has a clear grasp of historical precedent.
Interesting also (and a trifle blood-
chilling if the reader happens to be a junior
leader) is the author's cheerful advocacy of
79
leadfrom-the-front officer heroics perhaps
more suited to the style of Wellington's
army or, for that matter, the Waffen-88
than present-day armies. Of course, an
enthusiastic adherence to this style of
leadership would make reductions in force
unnecessary, so one supposes that there are
benefits to anything.
Repeating Ourselves:
The Philippine Insurrection
and the Vietnam War
By 0100 J. Gatennl
ForeIgn ServIce Journal
December 1977
Most Americans don't realize that, at
the beginning of the 20th Century, America
was engaged in a guerrilla war very much
like the Vietnamese War. Historians refer
to the war as the Philippine Insurrection,
the bitter, extended American effort to
defeat the Filipino guerrillas following the
US occupation of the islands in the wake of
the Spanish-American War.
By the time the Vietnamese War began
a half century later, America had
conveniently forgotten the Philippine
campaigns. According to the author, we are
now going through a period in which we
are [aot furgetting Vietnam. Yet the
similarities are eerily striking. Caterini
draws parallels between such things as the
common issues, guerrilla tactics, American
response, public opinion and the press and
our country's Messianic spirit.
The big difference between the two,
however, is that we won the first war.
Which all goes to prove that, even though
we can profit' from mistakes of the past
when history repeats itself, the end resul\
may still wind up disaster. (
MILITARY REVIEW
Kampftruppen (West Germany)
September:October 1977
This issue of Kampftruppen focuses on
logistics. Articles include discussions on
the logistical system of the German Army,
medical services' care of the combat troops
i'n case of war, the logistical responsibility
of the battalion commander in peacetime
and in wartime, logistics in East Germany,
the technical troops' materiel maintenance
in the modern army and supply for the
army and logistics in the past. Overall, the
magazine provides a good review of the
German Army's logistical systems.
NATO Arms Standardization:
Two Views
By Dewey F. Bartlett and James K Polk
AEI Defense RevIew
Number 6
Standardization of military equipment
among NATO forces is the key to the
survival of the NATO Alliance says Dewey
F. Bartlett ranking Republican
congressman on the Research and
Development Subcommittee of the Senate
Armed Services Committee.
General James K. Polk takes an
opposing view, arguing that, beyond
specific areas such as ammunition, talk of
standardization is window dressing. It is
not worth the time, trouble and money
required.
In prp"pnting the case for NATO
standardization, long a basic goal of the
Alliance, Senator Bartlett argues for long
range total commitment to the goal and
discusses actions and changes needed to
accelerate progress. The senator is author
of an earlier study on NATO reform.
General Polk served as commander in
chief of the US Army in Europe and
Seventh Army until his retirement in 1971,
and also commanded the NATO Central
Army Group. He takes the position that the
longrange goal is neither attainable nor
desirable, and urges NATO to concentrate
on enabling member nations to supply each
other's forces with such essentials as fuel
and ammunition.
1985: Where Did All the Young Men Go?
By lCDR R. T. E. Bowler III
Untted States Naval Instttute Proceedings
December 1977
The rate of growth of the US population
has been in a longterm decline. That,
along with other societal factors, presents a
gloomy picture for future armed forces'
recruiting efforts. For the Navy,
Commander Bowler suggests a series of
options which could be used to
accommodate the shortages which are
certain to occur in the coming decade. They
are: cut back on commitments to make up
for the shortfall; accelerate efforts to design
future weapon systems which require fewer
operators; significantly change the mix of
men and women recruits; improve the
retention rate; expand the recruiting effort
through increased funding and manning;
and, finally, reinstate the draft. Some of the
options, of course, are unacceptable. The
common thread between them, however, is
that they all require time to implement.
Bowler feels that the services should start
bringing their management and planning
talent to bear on the problem before the
situation reaches crisis magnitude.
These' s y o p ~ p s aT", pubh!-.hed as a SPTV1('P to the readers Every effort IS made
to pnbure 3(l'Urnte translatIOn' and summarizatIOn However, for mOTe detatled
accounts. rpade-rs should refer to the ongmal articles No offiCIal endorsement of
thE" vipws. OpIniOnS or factual statements 10 these Items IS mtendpd or should bE"
mferred -Editor
80

Unattended/Expendable Electronic Countermeasures (U/E ECM). This is
a US Army Training and Doctrine Command Concept Evaluation Program which
is now considering UIE ECM systems for a broad range of possible Army
applications. .
Army communications jammers now used in field operations have several
disadvantages. They are generally large, require considerable setup and teardown
time, require a dedicated primary power generator and present a distinctive and
easily located electronic signature on the battlefield. Current communications
jammers normally are controlled from division or higher levels which make them
less than immediately responsive to the needs of the individual battalion
commander. Additionally, the probability of interference with friendly communi-
cations is great due to the proximity of friendly units and high-power outputs. The
UIE is a supplement to these high-power, stand-off jammers.
Expendable jammers would be operated in the immediate vicinity of their
targets, producing the desired jamming effects with only a fraction of the power
radiated by conventional jammers. Interference with friendly communications
and electromagnetic signature problems would be greatly reduced. Since the U IE
ECM would be operating near the enemy communication and jamming sources,
an additional and desirable screening capability would also be achieved. Testing
of brass board models has indicated the feasibility of emplacing the devices by
hand or artillery, mounting them in remotely piloted vehicles (RPVs) or drones or
delivering jamming chaff by 155mm artillery projectiles.
The UIE ECM units under evaluation weigh only about 3 pounds each and are
designed to jam both communications and radar frequencies. The projected cost
per copy is estimated to be about $125 for the high-frequency/very-high-frequency
jammers and about $1,500 for the radar jammers.
The UIE ECM Concept Evaluation Program is being directed by the Combined
Arms Combat Developments Activity and the US Army and
School with representatives from the US Army Materiel Development and
Readiness Command, US Army Forces Command and the Marine Corps Devel-
oPluent and Education Command. Testing of brassboard models and formulation
of concepts of employment and organization are scheduled to continue this
summer with RPV delivery at Fort Huachuca, Ariz., and 155 chaff at Tonopah,
Nev. Some models also have been furnished to US Army Forces Command units
for limited field testing. If the program meets final approval, material acquisition
is planned for the early part of next year, with delivery to troop units by 1981.
Item& In thIS department are sum manes of studIes underway or planned In the Army community. While
every E'ffort is made to ensure accuracy, publication lead time may result In differences between the
8ummanps and the actual study program
81
~ T T R S
Railroad Update
I would like to update my article on the
Baikal-Amur Railroad ("Unlocking
Siberia's Natural Wealth: The Baikal-Amur
Main Line," Mllztary Review, November
1977). The Soviet Military Review, May
1977, reported that 500 kilometers had been
completed, of which some 110 kilometers
had been laid by Soviet Railway Troops,
working the eastern sector from Tynda to
Komsomolsk-onAmur. Thus, Railway
Troops have been responsible for about 20
percent of the work accomplished on BAM
to date. They also have built about 500
kilometers of roads and over 100
structures-bridges, tunnels and culverts.
Clearly, the Soviet Army is committed to
doing its share in developing this
strategically vital region.
Maj Eugene D 8';tlt, USA
Community Relations No Good
Captain Lowndes F. Stephens is to be
congratulated for his lucid summary of
enlistment Incentives for personnel in the
Reserves and National Guard ("Citizen
Soldiers: Why They Enlist and ReEnlist,"
Mihtary Re1'iew, December 1977). Such
information is relevant to both Reserve and
active components if the total force concept
i ~ to be vigorously pursued. .
I contest, however, one of the
conclusions drawn by Captain Stephens.
82
Citing troop discontent with "dull" and
"boring" training, he recommends that-
National Guard and Reserve units be
"allowed and encouraged to get involved in
community relations projects." While it
cannot be argued that community relations
and disaster relief (also proposed in the
article) are worthy activities, such a role
could only dissipate the modicum of effort
now applied by those forces to prepare
themselves for their primary mission: to
fight.
The key objective of the Army with
respect to its Reserve force structure
should be to provide challenging, realistic
training. I propose that the achivement of
that goal would not only directly enhance
unit readiness, but would also render
auxiliary benefits with respect to morale,
enlistment and retention. Current
operational forces training vigorous
physical challenges and realistic field
exercises, including live fires, capture the
attention and interest of the citizen-soldier.
Dismounted drill, character training and
similar routines that currently clog
weekend schedules do not. We should not
underestimate the latent "John Wayne
factor" in our citizen-soldiers that will
respond to realistic, effective training. Our
citizen-soldiers want to be weekend
warriors, not weekend Beetle Baileys.
Adequate preparation of our Reserve
forces for war will not preclude a disaster
relief role. Any unit prepared for combat
can cope with a flood or tornado. Let's
prepare the National Guard and Reserves
for war-the ultimate disaster.
1 st Lt David A. Fastabend, USA
!,

SOLAR POWER UNIT
UNITED STATES
A folding solar power unit which
IS sized to fit in a standard radio
backpack is being developed by the
US Army Mobility Equipment
Research and Development
Command (MERADCOM) to reduce
the logistics involved with battery-
powered combat communications
and navigation equipment.
The unit, which weighs 3h
pounds, can be used to recharge the
12 and 24-volt battenes used in
radios and other electronic
equipment. The current life of these
battenes IS short. whether they are
powering equipment or standing
Idle.
Th/il Unit folds Into a compact
package measuring 11 h x lOY, x 1
Inches. When set up for operation
on a built-In stand, It is 23 inches
wide and 1OY, inches high. In full
sunlight, the unit produces 24 volts
at .8 amps and 12 volts at 1.6 amps.
An 'Integral meter indicates the
relative current, permitting troops to
onent the unit toward the brightest
part of the sky .
The panel was built by Solarex,
Inc., to specifications engineered by
MERADCOM.
The MILITARY REVIEW and the US Army Command and General Staff College assume no
responsibility for accuracy of information contained in the NEWS section of this publi-
cation. Items are printed as a service to the readers. No official of the views,
opinions or factual statements IS tntended.-Editor
83
MIlITARY REVIEW
CODE OF CONDUCT CHANGED
The Code of Conduct, governing
service members while prisoners of
war (PWs), and the United States
Manual for Courts-Martial have
been amended by two executtve
orders signed by the president on 3
November 1977
Article V of the code has been
changed to read, In part, "I am
requIred to give name, rank, service
number. and date of birth." Previous-
ly. this section read, "I am bound to
give only name, rank, service
number. and date of birth."
A second order established the
senior ranking Individual of any
armed service (except for medical
officers or chaplainS) in a prison
camp as the lawful superior of all
NEW NAVY VSTOt
lower ranking personnel, regardless
of branch of service. This amends
the current Courts-Martial Manual
and the Uniform Code of Military
Justice (Chapter 47 of Title 10, US
Code). which did not specifically
delineate the senior ranking indi-
vidual In a JOint service prisoner
situation
A Department of Defense Review
Committee for the Code of Conduct
felt the article of the code about
disclosure of Information to a captor
should be changed for increased
clarity and the wording In the
CourtsMartial Manual needed
strengthening in regard to the
senior ranking PW.
The US Navy's revolutionary new XFV12A aircraft, built by the Columbus Aircraft
DIVISion of Rockwell International Corporation, IS deSigned to take off and land
vertically, yet fly at supersonic speeds in straight and level flight
The plane. which also can hover. is powered by a Single Pratt & Whitney F401
engine equipped With a standard afterburner for high-speed fltght and a special
exhaust flow dlverter system for vertical and short take-ofts and landings
(VSTOLs) The F401 has the same gas generator used in the Pratt & WhitneyF100
engine powering the US Air 'Force F15 and F16 fighters. but its fan and
afterburner are slightly larger and It produces about 20 percent more thrust -
Untted Technologies BeeHIve
84
NEWS
f'
POLAND
NEW SOVIET AMPHIBIOUS TRACTOR
MT-L
A recent Polish magazine
,contained an unusually detailed
description and photograph of a
new Soviet tracked transporter, the
MT-L The new 2.5-ton payload
vehicle IS the first of a family of
vehicles that includes the MT-LB.
an armored artillery
tractor larmored personnel carrier
Both the MT-L and the MT-LB
are light. fast, amphibious vehicles
with a low profile A major variatIOn
of both vehicles involves the ability
to use an extra wide track to
facilitate snow and swamp
movement
MT-LB
85
The MT-L's most unique feature
IS the use of aluminum In the body.
As far as known, this IS the only
tracked vehicle constructed
primarily of aluminum In any of the
Communist countries.
The approximate weight of the
MT-L and ItS variation is about
9.000 pounds. Both vehicles have a
land speed of 61 5 kilometers per
hour and a water speed of 5.6
kmph. The approximate height of
the MT-L IS 2.000 millimeters. It IS
powered by a V-8 diesel englne.-
AFSTC news Item
MILITARY REVIEW
FRANCE
LMT TANK GUNFIRE SIMULATOR
An LMT tank driving simulator. The simulator cabin is at the rear of the instructor's desk.
LMT, a subsIdIary of the French company Thomson-CSF, has developed a
tank gunnery Simulator which can be Installed in a shelter, a trailer or indoors
This Simulator IS designed for gunner trainees as well as for more advanced
students It duplicates the gunner's station in any type of tank and simulates
cannon gunfire. It offers the trainee a wide range of landscapes and moving
targets which can be selected from the IIlstructor's station Simulated gunfire
conditions Include gun recoil, shell Impact on target or landscape, smoke and
combat nOise LMT also makes a tank driving Simulator now III use In several
foreign armies
The LMT tank gunnery simulator uses a computer for instructor control. From
one console, the IIlstructor can select the landscape, move the target,
IIltroduce parameters of fire and possible malfunctions. He also can mOnitor
and record student reactions for evaluation.
86
(,
TV synthetic Image
presented in an
LMT's gunnery
simulator
Below: An artist's view of a tank
driving simulator developed by LMT.
The simulator and the instructor
desk is on the left. On the right:
This mockup of the terrain is used to
simulate various landscape and driVing conditions.
87
NEWS
~ O O S
An Asian Potpourri
THE UNITED STATES AIR FORCE IN SOUTHEAST ASIA. 19611973 Edited by Carl Berger 369 Pages US Government Printing.
OffICe. Washington. D C 1977
With over 120 pages entirely of illustrations or maps and a good portion of the
remaining pages also illustrated, this book is a picture account of the air war in
Vietnam. While a few of the photographs are rather small, most are large and sharp
and many are in color. The book is attractively presented; the large slick paper text is
bound in blue with silver lettering. The narrative is divided into 21 topical chapters
written from a noncontroversial and Air Force point of view. While the chapters dealing
with aerial combat leave something to be desired, those on air rescue, base defense and
the prisoners of war are well-done.
Potential readers should note two aspects of this book. First: as the text lacks
footnotes and analysis, it is, in fact, little more than an illustrated account. Second, the
authors have attempted with great skill to avoid controversy. For example, the Lavelle
affair is relegated to a terse footnote that states: "General La velie was recalled from his
post in April 1972, charged with having authorized certain 'protective reaction' strikes
beyond those permitted by the rules of engagement." While the authors refer to other
political restrictions, they fail to meet the limited war (political) issue head on. This may
lead Some to see the shadow of a "stab in the back" theory in the text.
Airmen (especially those who participated in the war) may well find this book
attractive and appealing. Serious students of the war, however, will be frustrated.
Teased by what is stated and by what is not, they will have to await a true history of the
air war. Casual readers will be well-advised to balance this official Air Force account
(and all that implies) with other versions of the air war.
In any event, The United States Air Force in Southeast Asia. 1961-1973. is an
attractively illustrated narrative. We all look forward to a more substantial history of
the air war in Vietnam.
Kenneth P Werrell.
Department of Untfled and Combmed Operations. USACGSC
88
BOOKS
f'
JAPANESE-TRAINED ARMIES IN SOUTHEAST ASIA by Joyce C Lebra 226 Pages. Columbia University Press. N. Y.
1977. $1500
Military and political developments during and immediately after World War II are
a fertile field for scholars. Controversy swirls not only over the significance of those
developments, but even whether or not a number of those alleged events actually took
place. Lebra, an academician who specializes in Japanese history, has crammed a
great deal of extraordinary scholarship about a heretofore ignored aspect of the area
into a deceptively thin volume. She describes and evaluates the training of
independence and volunteer armies by the Japanese in India, Burma, Indonesia,
Malaya, Sumatra, Indochina, Borneo and the Philippines. She concludes that
Japan's motive for training these armies was not altruism but, rather, attainment of
diversified military and political objectives which had in common furtherance of
Japan's Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere. For example, the Indian National
Army was developed primarily to encourage disloyalty to Great Britain.
Users of others, the Japanese, in turn, were used. Southeast Asian nationalist and
independence movement leaders used the military training the Japanese imparted for
their own political purposes. As Lebra puts it:
... this military experience equipped officers and men to wage wars of in-
dependence against Western colonial powers. It also gave them the expertise to staff
and train armies of newly independent nations.
Among the best known graduates of Japanese-sponsored military units and schools
are Ne Win in Burma, Suharto in-Indonesia and Park Chong-Lee in Korea. Certainly,
the Japanese planners did not envision that the training they were giving would have
such far-reaching results. Today, army officers in many Southeast Asian nations
acknowledge their debt to that training, albeit in voices no louder than absolutely
necessary.
Lebra does not suggest that revolution would not have occurred had Japan not
conquered and occupied Burma, Indonesia and other parts of Southeast Asia during
World War II. She does, however, state that the Japanese forces were a catalyst without
which revolution in the region would have been attenuated and retarded. From the
JapanesE' point of view, the revolutionary armies they trained were not an unqualified
success. They undertook no military aetions against Japan's enemies independent of
the Japanese, and, in fact, two ofthem revolted against their Japanese mentors. Thus,
Japan's large investment in these national revolutionary armies did not yield a
satisfactory rate of return.
To conclude, Lebra's study is scholarly, extremely interesting and useful. It is one
which our planners at the Department of the Army and Department of Defense level
89
MILITARY REVIEW
ought study very carefully in the light of our present and contemplated investments in
military support in various countries around the world.
Col Sidney Klein, USAR,
Consultmg Faculty, USACGSC
INDOCHINE ROUGE: Le message d'H6 Chi Minh by Raoul Salan 190 Pages Presses De La Cite. Pans, France
The author lived in Indochina almost 30 years. It is, therefore, apparent that he
knows the country, its inhabitants and their language. Ho Chi Minh and Giap, the two
heads of the Communist government, happened to be his friends before they went into
open revolt against the French power. If we add that he was commander in chief ofthe
French forces in Indochina, one cannot deny he knows what he is talking about.
In the first lines of his book, he points out that his aim is to have the reader share his
anxiety about the future of the Free World facing a relentless enemy who has shown his
capabilities in Indochina.
After recalling the events which took place from 1940 to 1975, this book is first and
foremost an accurate description of the strategy and tactics of the "Viets" (Vietminh
against the French, Vietcong against the Americans, but still the same opponent) to
reach the objective expressed by Ho Chi Minh in an address of1952 of taking over all of
Indochina. We see how, aimed atthe conquest of the population, the whole Viet policy is
sustained by the Communist Party to which everything is subordinated. The political
and military organization is described in detail as is the procedure of indoctrination.
Special attention is given to the buildup of the army which became in time a
powerful and faithful tool in the hands of its leaders who are portrayed by the
author as "proficient. logical and fanatical."
Salan thinks that Indochina, newly unified under the Communist yoke, will
reorganize quickly due to strict discipline and the huge amount of American materiel
left behind. The country will become an immediate threat for the whole of Southeast
Asia, thus realizing President Kennedy's 1963 prediction.
Throughout the book, the reader can sense the two deep feelings of the author-
anxiety and admiration.
Anxiety is expressed for the formidable efficiency of a system which merges a
mystic faith with the human qualities of a people long used to suffering.
Admiration is shown for the people of the former "French Indochina," with regret
that such talent is now serving so bad an ideal.
In addition, a warning is given to soldiers of the Western World who have a strong
tendency to believe that a unit exists as soon as the table of organization and equipment
is filled and that superior equipment alone automatically guarantees good fortune in
war.
Lt Col Roland DubOIS,
French Liaison Officer, USA Signal Center and School, Fort Monmouth, N. 1.
90
BOOKS
(,
Soviet Views Reviewed
SOVIET ARMED FORCES REVIEW ANNUAl. Edited by David R Jones. 278 Pages. Academic InternatIOnal Press, Gulf
Breeze, Fla 1977 $29.50.
The first impression the professional reader receives from this volume is that it is
very ambitious and expensive, Upon a complete review, it contains numerous well-
written and informative articles by an impressive list of writers and scholars, But it is '
disappointing in its subject matter, at least by omission. Another criticism is
warranted. The volume is an annual review, but it appears to be at leasttwo years out of
date. The focal year throughout is 1974.
While there are some excellent status offorces writeups, including those of the Soviet
ground forces, navy and air defense forces, there is little analysis in them. The military
capabilities remain one-dimensional. For instance, the book does not really assess the
Soviet rationale for its incredible military growth rate over the past decade, except to
state that it is in keeping with ideological pronouncements. Such a statement is
ludicrous in its simplicity. The review contains no discussion of the political
implications of Soviet military power, even with respect to the lucrative, Third World
arms market. Yet the political currency of the Soviet military colossus is one of the
single most important developments in the East-West politico-economic imbroglio.
On the other hand, the Soviet area specialist will profit from the expository articles
"Soviet Think Tanks" and "Ballistic Missile Defense, the Evolution of Soviet Concepts,
Research and Development." Both are written by Carl G. Jacobsen. For the student of
Soviet military affairs, however, the book is largely historical and, therefore, not
terribly useful for timely research purposes.
A. W McMaster III,
Office of the Deputy Ch,ef of Staff for OperatIOns, ReadIness and IntellIgence, TRADOC
CIVil DEFENSE: A Soviet View by P T Yegorov, I A Shlyakhov and N. I Alabm. 374 Pages. US Government Prlntmg
Office, Washmgton, D C $345
Civil Defense: A Soviet View, 10th in the series of "Soviet Milifary Thought," is a
translation from Russian and is intended for use in the Soviet institutions of higher
learning. This volume is essentially a civil defense text providing not only the
theoretical information concerning the operations and the destructive potential of
nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, but also practical guidelines for civil defense
operations during an attack and the procedures for rescue operations following one.
91
MILITARY REVIEW
In the framework of the Soviet understanding that "N 0 country can set itselfthe aim
of defeating the enemy at the cost of its own destruction," the buildup of Soviet defense
capability has been r o w i ~ in parallel to its military power. In fact, as the American
editor of this volume, Dr. Leon Goure, notes, "The Soviet Civil Defense has an equal
status with the other main services of the Soviet Armed Forces, and since October 1972
its chief holds the post of Deputy Minister of Defense"; he is now equal in status to the
(')ther chiefs. At a time when civil defense is losing favor in the United States, this book
allows some insight into the extent to which the Soviet state organs and the Communist
Party seem to be preoccupied with the total concept of offense and defense.
This volume not only provides a general discussion of the nuclear, chemical and
biological agents and their capabilities, but also offers a practical means of combating
them. The book itself is divided into 12 chapters covering such diverse topics as
"Characteristics of Weapons of Mass Destruction" and "Individual Means of'
Protection," with probably the most interesting section being on the methods of
population protection through dispersal and evacuation.
While the present volume is planned as a text to be used in the institutions of
higher learning, relating only to a fraction of the population, it would only be logical
to conclude that similar works exist which provide direction to other segments of
Soviet society. A question that arises, however, is whether the population will follQw
the dictum of the party, or whether it will attempt to survive the conflict on its own
in order to search out a better life on the other side as did a large number of people
during World War II.
Mal Orest M Kraus. USAR
WWII: A Cast of Characters
GERMAN GENERALS OF WORLD WAR II: As I Saw Them by F W von Mellen!hm 300 Pages. University ot Oklahoma
Press. Norman. Okla 1977 $895
Field Marshal Erich von Manstein described his standards for measuring field
commanders in these words:
Intelligence, knowledge and experience are telling prerequisites. Lack of these may,
if necessary. be compensated for by good general staff officers. Strength of character
and mner fortitude, however, are decisive factors. The confidence of the men in the
ranks rests upon a man's strength of character.
Previously noted for Panzer Battles, published in 1956, the author has drawn on
personal experience to put together a collection of provocative portraits of 14
distinguished Wehrmacht armoredcommanders. He measures each of them from the
perspective of a principal subordinate measuring their accomplishments as field
commanders against Manstein's dictum.
92
BOOKS
!,
From the most comprehensive analysis of General Hermann Balck, whom the
author served repeatedly as chief of staff, to the tantalizing glimpses of the infamous
SS General "Sepp" Dietrich, this book draws on an invaluable body of empirical
firsthand data to give us insight into the nature of these military notables.
General Mellenthin has written a fascinating account of key soldiers whose names
read like a "Who's Who" in soldiering-Von Manstein, Rommel, Guderian, Paulus,
Model, Balck and Von Manteuffel. It is a unique narrative of firsthand experiences by a
noteworthy participant. The reader will find a series of unique personality sketches
compellingly rendered by a talented armored officer who served each of these
Wehrmacht greats.
Lt Col Joel E. l Roberts,
Department of Resource Management, USACGSC
LONElY VIGil: Coastwatchers of the Solomons by Walter Lord 322 Pages Vlkmg Press, N Y 1977 $1250
Current doctrine at the US Army Command and General Staff College endorses all
measures by which the commander can "see the battlefield." But the array of
sophisticated electronic devices available today presents a sharp contrast to the limited
resources of the coastwatchers who were the eyes of the battlefield in the Solomon
Islands in World War II. Walter Lord's previous writings demonstrated his ability to
gather eyewitness accounts and compress them into moving and coherent stories. Day
of Infamy gives us the embarrassment and chaos of the attack on Pearl Harbor;
Incredible Victory describes the Battle of Midway; and The Dawn's Early Light
recounts from historical sources the War of 1812. Selections from his A Night to
Remember, about the sinking of the Titanic, are often quoted in college writing
textbooks. This same prose style, characterized by genteel and readable descriptions,
sustains the necessarily episodic structure of Lonely Vigil.
Lord's twofold task was awesome: to capture the importance of the coastwatchers on
the strategic level of the Pacific theater and, at the same time, to convey the drama of
combat and individual hardship on the tactical level. Of the hundreds of participants
Lord interviewed, a few key figures emerge;providing a focus and giving the author
control. Perhaps the subtlest strength of Lord's book lies in the personal anecdotes
showing the dedication and variety of the unconventional participants in the drama
and adding an ironic connotation to the military term "theater": the Catholic priest
who, finding himself in an indefensible position, obtained permission from his bishop
to lead a combat attack against roving Japanese jungle patrols; the ensign who just
went along for the ride as an extra man on John Kennedy's illfated PT109; and the
humorously incongruous civility and decorum of British and Australian officers under
intense combat situations. More than a collection of war stories, the book, nevertheless,
imparts the timeless fascination with storytelling .
. Readers with military backgrounds might want to see more details on the logistics,
often hazardous, of keeping the coastwatchers supplied; we also would be interested in
93
MILITARY REVIEW
the communications security measures-codes, procedures, coordination-used to
prevent Japanese interception and direction finding of the remarkably reliable
teleradios used in the coastwatching network. In the account of the assassination of
Admiral Yamamoto, missing is any mention of the use of Ultra to pinpoint his location.
Instead, Lord-who knows better-ascribes this coup to "CINCPAC's dazzling code-
breakers" as though the operation were spontaneous.
. These desires for more detail are understandably secondary to the needs of a more
general readership. But whether general readers, military readers or historians, all who
read this worthy book will find entertaining and gripping stories masterfully told.
PhIlip W. Leon,
Department of English, The Citadel
A Worm's-Eye View
THE WAR IN THE TRENCHES by Alan Lloyd 200 Pages DaVid McKay, N Y 1976 $1250.
World War I-a totally bloody and frustrating war. Alan Lloyd's book presents a
fresh approach to this catastrophe as it is not a dry rehash of all the battles. Rather, he
takes you into the "heart and soul" of the individual soldiers through a unique and
thoroughly interesting set of photographs and paintings which are expertly placed
throughout his book to blend with the narrative situations. Many of these illustrations
tell a story in themselves such as the German/British troops and their Christmas 1914
fraternization and "trench foot" photographs,
As Mr. Lloyd emphasizes, the war began as a great adventure, but, as it progressed,
it degenerated into the most horrible type of combat-trench warfare. As one British
soldier relates:
Here I was in this horrible clay cavity, cold wet through and covered with mud . ...
Everything was damp, cold and dark; candle guttering . .. there doesn't seem the
slightest chance of living except in an ambulance.
Not only was the individual soldier unhappy, his British and French superiors were
constantly bickering, although in more comfortable surroundings. This bickering and
inability to achieve a united war plan along with the advent of machine guns and mass
artillery barrages kept the casualty figures high. The Battle of Somme, for example,
counted 620,000 British and French casualties.
The large casualty figures were not the only headliners. New war machines were
introduced, inc! uding the flamethrower and tanks known affectionately as Big Willies.
The most shocking new device was the use of gas-chlorine and mustard. Lloyd gives a
deeply vivid description of that horrible occurrence at Ypres on 22 April 1915 as he
quotes a French soldier caught in that first of many chlorine attacks:
94
BOOKS
r,
It burned in my throat. caused pain in my chest and made breathing all but
impossible. I spat blood and suffered dizziness. We all thought that we were lost.
These glimpses of the war bring the reader down into the trenches and dramatically
portray the true meaning of "trench warfare." I encourage all World War! history buffs
not to miss this one-the photographs and paintings alone are well worth the price of
the book.
Mal Wayne C Boyd,
Commander, Fort Wmgate Depot ActIVIty
NEW BOOKS RECEIVED
ABOVE THE BATILE: War-Making In America From Appomat-
tox to Versailles by Thomas C Leonard 260 Pages Oxford
UniverSity Press. N Y 1978 $12.95
AMERICAN ESPIONAGE. From Secret Service to CIA by Rhodn
Jeffreys-Jones 276 Pages Free Press. N Y 1977 $1000
AMERICAN FORTS: Architectural Form and FunctIOn by
William B Robinson 229 Pages UniverSity of illinoIS Press.
Urbana. III 1977 $1500
ANOTHER WORLD. 1897-1917 by Anthony Eden 175 Pages
Doubleday & Co. N Y 1977 $795
THE ARMIES OF IGNORANCE by William R Corson 640 Pages
0131 Press/James Wade Books. N Y 1977 $1195
BIG STORY' How the American Press and TelevISIon Reported
and Interpreted the CriSIS of Tet 1968 In Vietnam and
Washington by Peter Braestrup Volume 1. 740 Pages. Volume
2, 706 Pages Westview Press. Boulder, Colo 1977 $5000 a set
'BONEY' FULLER Soldier, StrategISt, and Writer, 1878-1966
by Anthony John Trythall 314 Pages Rutgers UniverSity Press.
New BrunswICk, N J 1977 $1395
BUGl.S, BANNERS AND WAR BONNETS by Ernest Ll5le
Reedstrom 400 Pages Caxton Pnnters. Caldwell, Ind 1977
$1795
BUNCH OF FIVE by Frank KItson 306 Pages faber & faber
Salem, N H 1977 $1295
CHECKMATE AT RUWEISAT Auchlnleck's Finest Hour by
Donald Grey Brownlow 209 Pages Chnstopher Publishing
House. North Qumcy, Mass 1977 $975.
CHANG TSOlIN IN NORTHEAST CHINA, 1911-1928. China,
Japan, and the Manchunan Idea by Gaven McCormack 334
Pages Stanford UniverSity Press, Stanford, Calif 1977 $1650
CLIMATIC CHANGE ANO WORLD AFFAIRS by Crlspm Tlckell 78
Pages Harvard UOIverSlty, Center for International Affa"s,
Cambndge. Mass 1977 $395 paperbound $895 clothbound
CONFLICT ANO CRISIS- The PreSidency of Harry S. Truman,
1945-1948 by Robert Donovan 473 Pages W W Norton & Co.
N Y 1977 $1295
CONGRESS ANO THE NATION: Volume VI, 1973-1976. Edited
by PatnCla Ann O'Connor 1.217 Pages CongresSional Quarterly.
Washmgton. 0 C 1977 $4950
CUSTOOIANS OF THE COAST by Lynn M Alperin 318 Pages
Galveston DIStllct, US Army Corps of Engmeers, Galveston. Tex
1977
95
THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INFANTRY WEAPONS OFWORLDWAR
II by Ian Hogg Thomas Y Crowell, N Y $15.95
ENGLES, ARMIES, AND REVOLUTION' The Revolutionary
TactiCS of ClassICal MarXISm by Martin Berger 239 Pages
Shoe String Press, Hamden, Conn 1977 $1500
FERROCEMENT: Building With Cement, Sand and Wne Mesh
by Stanley Abercrombie Schocken, N Y $1295
FIGHTER PILOTS OF WORLD WAR I by Robert Jackson 152
Pages St Martin's Press. N Y 1977 $895
FIGHTING GLIDERS OF WORLD WAR II by James E. Mrazek 207
Pages St Marlin's Press. N Y 1977 $10.00
FLOATING EXCHANGE RATES ANO INTERNATIONAL
MONETARY REFORM by Thomas D Willett 146 Pages Amencan
Enterpnse Institute for Public PolICY Research. Washington. D C
1977 $325
FLYING BUCCANEERS, The Illustrated Story of Kenney's
Fifth An Force by Steve Birdsall Foreword by General George
C Kenney 312 Pages Doubleday & Co. N Y 1977 $1500
FORTRESS' A HIStory of MIlitary Defense by Ian Hogg 160
Pages St Martin's Press. N Y 1977 $1500
THE FRfNCH fORCES IN AMERICA. 1780-1783 by Lee
Kennett foreword by JacquesGodechot 188 Pages Greenwood
Press. Westport. Conn 1977 $1595
GEHEIM-WOZU NOCH? by Hemz Wiechmann 131 Pages
Bernard & Graefe Verlag MUnich. fRG 1977 DM 18
THE GIANTS: RUSSia and the United States by Richard J
. Barnet 190 Pages Simon & Schuster. N Y 1977 $795
THE GERMAN WARS: 1914-1945 by D J Goodspeed 561
Pages Houghton Mifflin Co. Boston. Mass 1977 $17 50
HEll ON WHEElS: The 2d Armored O,vlslOn by Donald E
Houston 460 Pages PreSIdiO Press. San Rafael. Calif 1977
$1495
HUMAN AGGRESSION by Robert A Baron 298 Pages Plenum
Publishing Corp N Y 1977 $1495
HUMANITARIAN POLITICS: The International Committee of
the Red Cross by DaVid P forsythe 298 Pages Johns HopkinS
UnrverSity Press. Baltimore, Md 1977 $17 95
101 AMIN: Death-Light of Africa by DaVid Gwyn 240 Pages
Little. Brown & Co. Boston. Mass. 1977 $895
THE ZAPPING OF AMERICA. MICrowaves. Then Deadly Risk,
and the Cover-Up by Paul Brodeur 343 Pages W W Norton &
Co, N Y 1977 $10.00

You might also like