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Terrorist Attac* Cycle Timeline

F Vie6 Cull Timeline

(etection )oints in the Terrorist Attac* Cycle

Security Weekly T+,-.(A/ MA-C+ # !"#! - "0:#$ d Print 1 Te2t .i3e 4

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By Scott Stewart 5ast 6ee*7s .ecurity 8ee*ly discussed the fact that terrorism is a tactic used 9y many different classes of actors and that 6hile the perpetrators and tactics of terrorism may change in response to shifts in larger geopolitical cycles these changes 6ill never result in the end of terrorism: .ince that analysis 6as 6ritten there have 9een ;ihadist-related attac*s in Afghanistan Nigeria /emen and )a*istan an assassination attempt against the president of A9*ha3ia and a failed timed-incendiary attac* against the Athens su96ay: <The latter incident 6hich militant anarchists claimed reinforces that ;ihadists are not the only ones 6ho practice terrorism:= >ut 6hile terrorism is a continuing concern it can 9e understood and measures can 9e ta*en to th6art terrorist plots and mitigate the effects of attac*s: )erhaps the most important and fundamental point to understand a9out terrorism is that attac*s do not appear out of no6here: ?ndividuals planning a terrorist attac* follo6 a discerni9le cycle -- and that cycle and the 9ehaviors associated 6ith it can 9e o9served if they are 9eing loo*ed for: 8e refer to these points 6here terrorism-related 9ehavior can 9e most readily o9served as vulnera9ilities in the terrorist attac* cycle:

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A )ract ical 'uide to .ituat ional A6areness

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(etect ing Terrorist .urveillance

MAR 1, 2012

(etection )oints in the Terrorist Attac* Cycle

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(ispat ch: 5one 8olf At tac* in >elgium

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Cut ting Through the 5one-8olf +ype

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Agenda: 8ith 'eorge Criedman on t he Tali9an .trategy

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(ispat ch: Tactical 5oo* at t he Em9assy At tac* in La9ul

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Nor6ay: 5essons from a .uccessful 5one 8olf Att ac*er

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The Attac* Cycle

Many different actors can commit terrorist attac*s including sophisticated transnational terrorist groups li*e al @aedaA regional militant groups li*e ?ndia7s Maoist Na2alitesA small independent cells li*e the anarchists in 'reeceA and lone 6olves li*e Oslo attac*er Anders >reivi*: There can 9e great variance in attac* motives and in the time and process reBuired to radicali3e these different actors to the point that they decide to conduct a terrorist attac*: >ut once any of these actors decides to launch an attac* there is remar*a9le similarity in the planning process: Cirst there is the process of selecting or identifying a target: Often an actor 6ill come up 6ith a list of potential targets and then select one to focus on: ?n some cases the actor has preselected a method of attac* such as a vehicle-9orne improvised e2plosive device and 6ants to find a target that 6ould 9e vulnera9le to that specific type of attac*: ?n other cases the actor 6ill pic* a target and then devise a method of attac* 9ased on that target7s characteristics and vulnera9ilities: .imply put the e2ecution of these steps can 9e some6hat fluidA some degree of planning or preparation can come 9efore target selection and sometimes target selection 6ill 9e altered during the planning process: The time reBuired to e2ecute these steps can also vary considera9ly: .ome attac*s can 9e planned and e2ecuted 6ithin hours or days 6hile more comple2 plans such as those used in the DE## or Mum9ai attac*s may ta*e months or even years to complete: CreBuently those planning an attac* 6ill conduct detailed surveillance of potential targets to determine 6hat security measures are in place around the target and to gauge 6hether they have the a9ility to successfully attac* it: ?f the target is too difficult to attac* -- commonly *no6n as a hard target -- the attac* planners 6ill typically move on to their ne2t target 6hich may prove easier to attac*: <8hen they do continue 6ith attac*s against targets 6hose security measures e2ceed the attac*ers7 capa9ilities those attac*s fail:= 8e refer to this stage as preoperational surveillance
A9ove the Tearline: ?nside a )rotect ive Agent 7s Mind
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Al @aeda7s 5eadership in /emen

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+o6 to Tell if /our Neigh9or is a >om9ma*er

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(ispat ch: ,:.: Airmen .hot in 'ermany

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6hich means surveillance that is conducted 9efore the operation is fully planned: After the target has 9een selected a second round of surveillance is conducted: This round 6ill 9e far more detailed and is intended to provide all the details necessary for planning the attac*: Cor e2ample if the attac* is 9eing planned against a static facility this round of surveillance 6ill generally try to o9tain a detailed description of the target7s physical security features and security force procedures: ?t 6ill also focus on esta9lishing a 9aseline understanding of the activity that can 9e e2pected around the facility at the time of day the attac* is anticipated: ?f the target of the attac* is an individual the individual7s residence office and other places the individual freBuents 6ill 9e surveilled: Additionally the surveillance team 6ill loo* for patterns and routines that the target follo6s 9et6een these *no6n locations: The team 6ill often analy3e the target7s usual routes loo*ing for cho*e points or places the target must pass to get from one point to another: ?f the surveillance team identifies a cho*e point that the target passes through predicta9ly it 6ill then try to determine 6hether that point 6ill allo6 the attac*ers to deploy in secret permit them to spot and control the target and provide them 6ith good escape routes: ?f it does this point 6ill freBuently 9e chosen as the attac* site: ?n the case of large organi3ations different groups or individuals may conduct different phases of the surveillance: Many organi3ations use speciali3ed operatives for surveillance though the operational planner 6ill often attempt to get eyes on the target to help 6ith the planning process: Cor instance it is *no6n from court testimony in the Mum9ai case that (avid +eadley made five e2tended trips to Mum9ai as those attac*s 6ere 9eing planned: The repeated trips 6ere reBuired 9ecause the operational commanders in )a*istan considered ?ndia a hostile environment and the operational planners could not go there to conduct the surveillance themselves: As a result +eadley 6as sent to o9serve and report on specific things as planning for the attac*s progressed: (uring the planning phase the personnel to 9e used in the attac*s are identified and trained in any special s*ills they may reBuire for the mission including languages mar*smanship hand-to-hand com9at small-9oat handling or land navigation: To protect operational security the operatives may not 9e 9riefed in any great detail a9out the target of their operation until they are very close to 9eing deployed: Many times the planning phase 6ill end 6ith a dry run as the preparation did for the DE## attac*s 6hen some of the hi;ac*ers too* their assigned flights in August !""#: 8hile conducting a dry run the attac*ers 6ill generally 9e unarmed to ensure they do not needlessly 9ring la6 enforcement attention to themselves: .ometimes an attac*er 6ill have acBuired 6eapons for the attac* 9efore the planning phase: Other times the concept of the operation 6ill 9e constrained 9y the 6eapons and money availa9le: >ut Buite freBuently the 6eapons for the attac* 6ill 9e acBuired during the planning phase after the target has 9een selected and the means of attac* have 9een esta9lished: Once planning training and 6eapons acBuisition are complete the attac* team can 9e deployed: The attac* team freBuently 6ill again conduct surveillance of the target especially if the target is mo9ile and the attac* team is deployed and 6aiting at a predetermined attac* site: ?f it 6as properly planned an attac* is very li*ely to succeed once it has moved to the operational phase: .ometimes attac*s do fail 9ecause of mista*es or 9ad luc* 9ut 9y and large there is no 6ay to stop an attac* once it has 9een set in motion: At the attac*7s conclusion the attac*ers 6ill see* to escape the scene: The e2ception is suicide attac*s or 6hen li*e >reivi* the attac*er intends to 9e captured as part of the media e2ploitation phase the final step in the cycle: -egardless of 6hether the attac* is a suicide attac* against a church in Nigeria or a timedincendiary attac* against a su96ay in Athens the same attac* cycle is follo6ed: 8ith an eye to6ard averting future attac*s a thoughtful o9server can use the attac* cycle model to understand ho6 an attac* 6as planned and e2ecuted:

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,:.: and ?ranian -ealit ies

>alancing .hia and .unni -adicalisms

The ?slamic -evolut ionary 'uard Corps )art #: An ,nconvent ional Milit ary

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(et ect ing Terrorist .urveillance

The Terrorist At t ac* Cycle: Operat ional )lanning The Terrorist At t ac* Cycle: (eployment and At t ac*

-E5ATE( .?T,AT?ON -E)O-T.

?ran: Ne6 Cy9er Attac* (etected
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Afghanistan: Camp >astion Attac*ed

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?srael: ?nvestigations )oint To Cemale Attac*er

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Vulnera9ilities
8hile plots are occasionally th6arted at the last second for the most part la6 enforcement and security personnel must detect and interdict the plot 9efore it gets to the attac* phase to have any chance of stopping it: Once the 9ullets fly or the e2plosive device is detonated there is little security forces can do 9ut initiate their immediate action drills in an effort to reduce the 9ody count: This

means that an emphasis must 9e placed on identifying attac*ers earlier in the process 6ell 9efore they are in a position to stri*e: ,nless security forces have a source inside the group that is planning the attac* or manage to intercept the group7s communications the only 6ay to identify attac* planners is 9y noting their actions: This is especially true of a lone 6olf attac* 6here no e2ternal communication occurs: The earliest point in the attac* cycle that the attac*ers can 9e identified 9y their actions is during the preoperational surveillance reBuired for target identification: There is a 6idely held conception that terrorist surveillance is generally sophisticated and almost invisi9le 9ut 6hen vie6ed in hindsight it is freBuently discovered that individuals 6ho conduct terrorist surveillance tend to 9e Buite sloppy and even amateurish in their surveillance tradecraft: 8e 6ill discuss 6hat 9ad surveillance loo*s li*e and ho6 to recogni3e it in more detail ne2t 6ee* 9ut for no6 it is sufficient to say that poor surveillance tradecraft is a significant vulnera9ility in the terrorist attac* cycle: As noted a9ove additional surveillance is often conducted at later stages of the attac* cycle such as in the planning stage and even sometimes in the attac* stage as the attac*ers trac* the target from a *no6n location to the attac* site: Each instance of surveillance provides an additional opportunity for the assailants to 9e identified and the attac* to 9e prevented: (uring the planning phase and as the operatives prepare to deploy communication 9et6een and movement of group mem9ers often increases: Additionally group mem9ers may engage in outside training that can attract attention such as playing paint9all visiting the firing range or as 6as the case 6ith the DE## pilots attending flight schools: This increase in activity 6hich also might include money transfers leaves signs that could tip off the authorities: Another significant vulnera9ility during the attac* cycle is 6eapons acBuisition: This vulnera9ility is especially pronounced 6hen dealing 6ith ine2perienced grassroots operatives 6ho tend to aspire to conduct spectacular attac*s that are far 9eyond their capa9ilities: Cor e2ample they may decide they 6ant to conduct a 9om9ing attac* even though they do not *no6 ho6 to ma*e improvised e2plosive devices: ?t is also not uncommon for such individuals to try to acBuire .tinger anti-aircraft missiles automatic firearms or hand grenades: 8hen confronted 9y this gap 9et6een their capa9ility and their aspirations grassroots operatives 6ill often reach out to someone for help 6ith their attac* instead of settling on an attac* that is 6ithin their a9ility: ?ncreasingly the people such 6ould-9e attac*ers are encountering 6hen they reach out are police or domestic security agency informants: As far 9ac* as !"#" ;ihadist leaders such as Nasir al-8ahayshi of al @aeda in the Ara9ian )eninsula recogni3ed this pro9lem and 9egan to encourage grassroots ;ihadists to focus on conducting simple attac*s against soft targets: Nevertheless grassroots ;ihadists are consistently dra6n to6ard spectacular attac*s as seen in the Ce9: #K arrest near the ,:.: Capitol of a Moroccan man 6ho thought his handler 6ho 6as in fact an C>? informant had eBuipped him for a suicide attac*: ,nli*e most ;ihadists other types of grassroots militants such as anarchists are far more comforta9le conducting simple attac*s 6ith readily availa9le items: )ersonality traits and psychological profiles aside anyone desiring to plan a terrorist attac* must follo6 the attac* planning cycle 6hich at certain stages 6ill necessarily open them up to detection: Clic* here for The Myth of the End of Terrorism: Clic* here for (etecting Terrorist .urveillance:

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