PHILIP MORRIS - "MARLBORO FRIDAY "

This case was prepared by Professor Keith Ward, as a basis for class discussion.

Overview On 2 April 1993 Philip Morris staggered the business world by announcing a significant price discounting promotion across the USA of the world's most valuable brand, Marlboro cigarettes . On 20 July 1993, this promotion was turned into a permanent price reduction, which was extended across all Philip Morris' full revenue tobacco brands in the USA .

C Copyright Keith Ward, February 1995. All rights reserved.

This move, now generally referred to as 'Marlboro Friday', is likely to go down in history as one of the most dramatic strategic brand management decisions ever taken .

Market Backgroun d The USA cigarette market had for a long time been the world's most profitable market in which Philip Morris (PM) held a dominant share (42 .3% in 1992) . RJR Nabisco Holdings Corporation, through its R J Reynolds (RJR) business, had just under, 30%, with the remainder spread across a number of other companies . '
Although very large (507 billion units in 1992) and highly profitable, the industry had several major problems . First, consumption was declining in volume terms at an average rate of 3% a year. Second, the industry was facing an increasingly hostile business environment with restrictions on marketing, aggressive antismoking legislation at both Federal and State levels, and the threat of a significant increase in excise duty (the excise system in the USA is a specific per unit duty which, by international standards, is set at a low level) to pay for the Clintons' health care programme .

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Fbitip Morris - "Marlboro Friday "

Third, the USA industry had been able to take advantage of increasing export markets due to the opening up of previously closed markets (Japan, Eastern Europe, the former Soviet Union and China) and the global trend towards American tobacco blended cigarettes . Globally the most rapidly growing cigarette brands are US International Brands, most notably Marlboro . These export opportunities had enabled USA based manufacturers to reinvest and even to increase productive capacity, and hence take advantage of significant economies of scale, despite a declining domestic market . Some of these overseas opportunities faced increasing medium term challenges, not least from the continuing GATT negotiations . Fourth, and most significant, there had been a very marked change in the segmentation of the market during the late 1980s and early 1990s . In the early 1980s the market had been dominated by full revenue (FR) brands, but this had changed with the dramatic growth of value for money (VFM) products which created initially 2 price points in the industry . Interestingly, this initial growth in VFM products did not lead to reduced overall profitability as the major players implemented aggressive real price increases on their FR brands ; thus, in fact, the industry and PM, in particular, continued to report increasing profits . These increasing prices on FR brands led to even greater opportunities for price segmentation in the market and resulted in the launch of Extra Low Price (ELP) cigarettes at prices even lower than the initial VFM products . Some of these ELP products were launched as generics or retailer own labels, whereas the original VFM category had been created through the launch of Low Price Branded (LPB) products .

Not surprisingly, the profit margins on these new LPB and ELP categories were substantially lower than those generated from FR brands . By 1992 the combined VFM sector comprised 30.2% of the total market, with its growth expected to continue strongly.
The overall shares of the major players in the industry did not change dramatically during this period, although the VFM category had originally been introduced by smaller competitors attempting to steal share, albeit at lower margins . As the sector grew, both PM and RJR aggressively entered this new category and by the end of 1992 PM had taken a 27% share, with RJR at 33 .2% . This changed the market quite considerably as the number of LPBs increased and more ELPs were developed as brands in their own right . For example, GPC (originally standing for Generic Products Corporation) developed into the third largest brand in the overall market behind Marlboro and RJR's Winston .

The large real price increases on FR brands had meant that the price gap between VFM and FR had grown to over $7 .50 per carton (ie over one third of the FR selling price) by January 1993 .

Marketing Support
As the VFM segment continued to grow, an increasing ,proportion of total promotional spending switched from brand oriented media campaigns focused on building brand loyalty to price promotion activity . This switch was most notable in some of the smaller competitors (American Brands, Brown & Williamson, and Liggett) while PM and RJR continued to market heavily their FR brands ; RJR launched a number of brand extensions such as Winston Select. PM managed, during this period, to increase their share of the FR market segment, primarily through Marlboro, to a record 49% ; however, due to the growth in the overall VFM segment, this increasing share still represented a net decline in sales .

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Philip Morris - "Marlboro Friday "

Corporate and Competitive Strategies of Philip Morri s Its overall corporate mission is "to be the most successful consumer packaged goods company in the world" . A key strategy in accomplishing this mission is by building and then protecting the company's brand franchises . In financial terms, the key objective is to maximise shareholder value and this had been translated into a 20% pa growth rate for earnings per share . In 1992, the group had sales revenues of $59 .1 bn from which it generated net income of $4 .9 bn (its eps growth rate had exceeded 20% pa over the preceding 15 years) . Of these group totals, the North American domestic tobacco business contributed $12 bn in sales revenues and over $5 bn in operating income [the international tobacco operations represented a further $13 .7 bn of sales and $2 bn in operating income ; total group operating income was $10 .9 bn] . The commitment to a branded products strategy is illustrated by the following statements from their 1992 published financial statements : "After our people, our brands are our most important assets . To ensure that every one of our brands is a leader in its category, we invested approximately $1I billion in world-wide marketing activities" . "Many of our products faced intensified price competition in 1992 . When necessary, we maintained our market position by adjusting our prices and expanding our discount alternatives . " The domestic tobacco business was clearly the profit driver of the group and PM (USA) was the industry leader for the ninth consecutive year in 1992 . Indeed for the third consecutive year, PM (USA) accounted for over "half the USA cigarette industry's profits", although both their shipments to retailers and ofltake from retailers were down more than the industry in total. Thus for Marlboro, shipments were down 5 .6%, with retail sales volume 2 .5% lower ; however the brand still held a 35% share of the FR segment and ended 1992 with 24 .4% of the total market . The international tobacco operations continued to grow well and set new records . Cigarette volume sales totalled 421 .2 billion units and the group increased market shares around the world ; in Western Europe to over 25%, in Japan to around 12%, in Argentina to over 50%, etc . Approximately 26% of these 1992 international sales consisted of US exports; contributing $3 .8 billion to the USA balance of payments . The growth of the other divisions within the PM group had been rapid and had involved several major acquisitions. General Foods (1985), Kraft (1988) and Jacobs Suchard AG (1990) had made PM into one of the largest food products groups in the world with sales revenues of $29 bn and operating income of over $3 .2 bn . An interesting consequence of this was that, for the first time, the new Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of the group, Michael Miles, had not come from the tobacco side of the business .

Competitor Analyse s RJR Nabiso Holdings Corporation (RJR) RJR had been subject to the highly publicised leveraged buy-out in 1989 by Kohlberg Kravis Roberts & Co (KKR), which had left the group with a massive debt burden . However strong organic cash flow, some disposals and financial restructuring had reduced the total outstanding debt to around $1 4

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Philip Morris - "Marnwro Friday "

bn. The group had returned to the New York Stock Exchange in 1991 but with KKR still owning over 50% and its share price had oscillated from $5 to over S12 before falling back to S9 at the end of 1992 .
RJR had, on 2 March 1993, announced plans to raise S 1 .5 bn from the issue of new shares pegged to the performance of its foods division (ie'smoke free' shares) ; this would have represented around 25% of the food companies' equity . The cash inflow would obviously have helped to reduce further the outstanding debt and have provided funds for future international investments. Also IBM, early in 1993, recruited Lou Gerstner as its new Chairman and Chief Executive Officer . Gerstner had been running RJR since the buy-out and had been widely credited as being the key manager behind the successful post-buy-out strategy to date .

Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corporation (B & W)

A wholly owned subsidiary of BAT Industries and hence driven by BAT's stated mission to be the 'premier tobacco company in the world' . BAT Industries had itself, in 1989, been the target of an attempted leveraged buy-out by a special purpose vehicle (Hoylake, set up by Messrs Goldsmith, Rothschild and Packer) . As part of its response BAT had demerged its UK retailing interests (Argos), its paper business (Wiggins Teape Appleton) and sold its US retailing division . Thus the group now consisted of world-wide tobacco businesses and financial services interests which were primarily focused in the UK (Allied Dunbar and Eagle Star) and the USA (Farmers Insurance) . B & W (with around 12% share of the USA market) had been very successful in building share in the VFM segment but some of its FR brands had been under pressure . Also an interesting aspect of the tobacco industry is that B & W did not own the brand Lucky Strike in the USA although this brand was being used as BATs main US International Brand around the world .

American Brands, Lorillard and Ligget t American Brands is a large diversified group with major tobacco interests in the USA (through American Tobacco) and the UK (through Gallaghers) . American Tobacco (7% market share) had been under pressure on its FR brands and had concentrated on its lower price segment as well as going into the private label (Retailers Brand) business . One of its branding problems was that it did not own the international rights to its main USA brand franchise (eg Pall Mall and Lucky Strike) .
Lorillard (7%) was also a USA focused tobacco company which had to date not entered the VFM segment, instead concentrating its support on Newport (its main brand).

Liggett (3%) had, by contrast, concentrated heavily in the VFM segment (including Private Label) but was still consistently losing market share . The business had in the late 1980s been bought out of Grand Metropolitan and it was widely rumoured that the parent company was in financial difficulties .

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Philip Morris - "Atari aro Friday "

Strategic Issue s This brief comparative analysis of the key USA tobacco companies hides a number of important differences between PM and its main competitors . On a world scale BAT Industries ranks as a major competitor but it has achieved this using a very different competitive strategy . PM can be regarded as a USA based multi-national business which applies its very successful competitive strategy consistently in a growing number of international markets . For example, it was stated above that PM achieved in 1992 over 50% share in the cigarette market in Argentina . [Not surprisingly, given the predominance of highly priced Marlboro in its product mix, PM always concentrates on its value share in a market, rather than its volume share .] This high share represented a dramatic rate of growth in very recent years and followed a very aggressive marketing campaign by Marlboro, particularly in the major cities within Argentina . This aggressive campaign coincided with the incredible fall in inflation in the country and the corresponding substantial growth in real GDP and US dollar equivalent disposable incomes . In other words, PM attacked when the market was attractive for their main product offering . Conversely, BAT Industries has developed a strong world-wide tobacco business through a large number of nationally and regionally based companies, such as Souza Cruz in Brazil which has around 80% of the Brazilian cigarette market . (BAT tends to quote its share in volume rather than value terms .) This strategy is not too surprising given that, due to its historical creation, BAT did not sell cigarettes in its own domestic market (ie the UK) . Another strategic difference is that, in several major markets (again Brazil is a good example), BAT is heavily involved in tobacco leaf operations . While it does not itself grow tobacco, it causes it to be grown by providing technical assistance to farmers and processing the green leaf itself . Indeed Souza Cruz has a very substantial tobacco leaf exporting business ; selling both to other group companies and to tobacco leaf brokers (hence ultimately selling leaf to competitors) . Parts of BAT are vertically integrated in other ways as well, producing cigarette paper and packaging materials, etc . Philip Morris buys its tobacco leaf from brokers (although it does have a close relationship with one main broker) and does not try to be vertically integrated . It sees itself as a cigarette manufacturer and buys in the necessary raw materials ; despite producing a high priced brand where consistency of quality is of critical importance .

Marlboro Frida y In 1989 Marlboro achieved an overall market share of 26 .3% in the USA and this brand franchise had formed the basis of PM's remarkably successful international growth strategy . However the increasing share of the VFM segment and the aggressive price increases applied to Marlboro had resulted in declines in overall share (1992 - 24 .4%) . The price differentials were, in some stores, running at over $1 per pack [Marlboro retailing at around $2 .15 to $2 .20 with ELPs at around Si] . Thus although PM was gaining share in this VFM segment, the switching impact on net profitability was becoming dramatic . In December 1992, PM initiated a test market in Portland, Oregon where for 4 weeks the price of Marlboro was discounted by 40 cents per pack (being approximately a 20% price reduction) . Over the test period Marlboro regained market share while elsewhere it continued to decline .

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Philip Morris - "Marllwro Friday "

By March 1993 Marlboro share was down to 22 .1 % and on 2 April PIvl implemented the Portland promotion nationwide . In addition PM announced that they would forego any price increases, for the foreseeable future, on premium brands and would extend the Marlboro's Adventure Team promotions . RJR very rapidly made a similar price reduction on its leading brand, Winston, as did several other competitors .

The strategy certainly increased the share of Marlboro and by June it was back to around a 25% market share . Much of this increased share appeared to come from consumers returning to Marlboro from the cheaper products as the VFM actually declined during this period . On 20 July PM announced that it was permanently reducing the price of its FR brands by 40 cents per pack . PM also adjusted the prices of its VFM products by slightly increasing the prices (by around 6 cents) of its cheapest products, while moving its mid-range brands down to this new level . This was a clear attempt to move the market to a two tier pricing structure with a single differential of around 30 cents per pack . The much lower original profitability of the VFM sector made it impossible for a similar price decrease and the PM price move retained some profitability even at the ELP level .

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1Mrilip Morris - "Alarlbnru Friday"

APPENDIX 1
(in millions of dollars, except per share data)

1992
Operating revenues Earnings before cumulative effect of accounting change $59,131 4,939

1991
$56,458 3,927

1990
$51,169 3,540

1989
$44,080 2,946

198 8
$31,273 2,064

Nei earnings
Earnings per share before cumulative effect o f accounting change

4,939
5 .45

3 .006
4 .24

3 .540
3 .83

2,946
3 .18

2,33 7
2 .2 2

Net earnings per share

Dividends declared per share Percent Increase Over Prior Yea r Operating revenues Earnings before cumulative effect of accounting change Net earnings Earnings per share before cumulative effect o f

5 .45
2 .35 4 .7% 25 .8% 64 .3% 28 .5% 67 .7% 23 .0% $12,010

3 .25
1 .91 10 .3% 10.9% (15 .1)% 10.7% (15 .1)% 23 .2% $11,589

3 .83
1 .55 16 .1% 20 .2% 20 .2% 20 .4% 20 .4% 24 .0% $10 .370

3 .18
1 .25 41 .0% 42 .7% 26 .1% 43 .2% 26 .7% 23 .8% $ 9 .474

2 .5 1
1 .0 1 13 .1 % 12 .1 % 26 .9 % 14 .4 % 29 .4 % 28 .6 % S 8,49 1

accounting change
Net earnings per share Dividends declared per share Operating Revenue s

Domestic tobacco
International tobacco North American food International food Beer Financial services and real estate

13,667
20,325

12,251
20,244

8,723 3,976
430 $59,131 $ 5,185 '2,018 2,194

7,934 4 .056
384 $56,458 $ 4 .774 1,694 2,071

10 .720 20 .071 6,014 3,534

460 $51,169 $ 4 .206 1,394 1 .984

8,375
18,750

8,08 5
8,79 9

3,623 3 .342
516 $44,080 $ 3 .606 1,007 1,769

2,09 9 3 .17 7
62 2 $31,27 3 $ 3 .08 7 77 4 684

Total operating revenues

Operating Companies Income Domestic tobacco International tobacco North American food International food Beer Financial services and real estate

1,083
260 220 10,960

891
301 179

664
285 197

369
226 173

16 5
190 163 -

Operating companies income

Gain on sale of Rothmans International p .l .c . Restructurings of food operations Amortization of goodwill Unallocated corporate expenses Interest and other debt expense, net

(521) (380) (1,451) S 8,608 1992-1987 16 .4% 21 .8% 22 .9%

9,910 -

8,730 -

7,150 455
(179) (385) (252) (1,731) S 5,058

5,063 (348) (125 ) (193) (670) S 3,72 7 1992-197 7 17 .6 % 19 .6 % 20 .1 %

(455) (499) (448) (334) (336) (1,651) _ (1,635)_ $ 6,971 5 6,311 1992-1982 17 .6% 20.2% 21 .5%

Earnings before income taxes and cumulativ e

effect of accounting change Compounded Average Annual Growth Rate

Operating revenues
Net earnings Net earnings per share Total return to stockholders
See notes to the consolidated financial statements regarding the 1991 adoption of SFAS No . 106, the 1991 restructuring of food operations, and the 1990 acquisition of Jacobs Suchard AG . In 1989 . the Company charged S179 million . primarily for the cost of combining Kraft and General Foods . In addition, the Company sold its equity investment in Rothmans International p.l .c. for a pretax gain of S455 million . The net impact of these items was an increase to net earnings of $152 million, or S.16 per share .

33 .7%

30 .5%

25 .5 %

In 1988 . the Company acquired Kraft . Inc . Consolidated results of the Company include the operating results of Kraft . Inc . since its acquisition . In 1988, the Company adopted the method of accounting for income races prescribed by SFAS No . 96. resulting in a cumulative effect of accounting change that increased net earnings by 5273 million . or 5.29 per share. Total return to stockholders includes stock appreciation and dividends .

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Selected Financial Data-

Fifteen-Year Review
Summary of Operations :
Operating revenues

tin millions of dollars, except per share data)

1992
$ 59,131

1991
$ 56,458

1990
$ 51 .169

1989
$ 44,080 S

1988
31,273

United States export sales Cost of sales Federal excise taxes on products

Foreign excise taxes on products

Operating income Interest and other debt expense, ne t (consumer products) Earnings before income taxes and cumulativ e

3,797 26,082 2,879 6,157 10,059 1,451 8,608 14 .6%

3,061

2,928

2,288

1,863

25,612
2,978 5,416 8,622 1,651

24,430
2,159 . 4,687 7,946 1,635

21,868'
2,140 3,608 6,789 1,731

13,565
2,12 7 3,75 5 4,39 7 67 0

effect of accounting change

Pretax profit margin

6,971
12 .3%

6,311
12 .3%

5,058
11 .5%

3,72 7
11 .9%

Provision for income taxes

Earnings before cumulative effect of accounting change

$ 3,669
4,939

$ 3,044
3,927

$ 2,771
3,540

$ 2,112
2,946

1,663
2,064

Cumulative effect of accounting change r :arnings

Earnings per share before cumulative effect of

4,939 5 .45 5 .45

2 .35 906 $ 1,573 963 10,530
7,785

(921) 3,006 4 .24 ( .99)

3 .25

3,540 3 .83
3 .83

2,946 3 .18
3 .18

273 2,337 2 .22 .29

2,5 1

accounting change
Per share cumulative effect of accounting change

Net earnings per share

Dividends declared per share Weighted average shares (millions) Capital expenditures (consumer products) Depreciation (consumer products)

1 .91 925
$ 1,562 938 9,946 7,445 47,384 14,213 15,289 1,611 1,803

1 .55 925
$ 1,355 876 9,604 7,153 46,569 16,121 17,182 1,560 2,083

1 .25 927
$ 1,246 755 8,457 5,751 38,528 14,551 14,887 1,538 1,732 S

1 .0 1 932
1,024 60 8 8,64 8 5,38 4 36,96 0 16,81 2 16,44 2 1,504 1,559

Property, plant and equipment, ne t

(consumer products)
Inventories (consumer products)

Total assets Total long-term debt Total debt-consumer products -financial services and real estate Tc deferred income taxes

50,014 14,583 16,269 1,934 2,248

Stockholders equity
Common dividends declared as a % of net earnings Book value per common share Market price of common share- high/low Closing price of common share at year-end

12,563
43 .0% S 14 .07

12,512 58 .7%
S 13 .60

11,947 40 .5%
S 12 .90

9,571 39.3%
S 10 .31

7,67 9 40 .3%
$ 6 .3 1

86%-691k
77'/s

Price/earnings ratio at year-end

Number of common shares outstandin g at year-end (millions) Number of employees

14
893 161,000

811/4 .481/4 801/4 19

920 166,000

52-36
511/4

45'/2-25
41 s/a

14
926 168,000

13
929 157,000

25'/2-20Vs 25th 11
92 4 155,000

See notes to the consolidated financial statements regarding the 1991 adoption of SFAS No. 106, the 1991 restructuring of food operations, and the 1990 acquisition of Jacobs Suchard AG . In 1989 . the Company charged $179 million, primarily for the cost of combining Kraft and General Foods. In addition, the Company sold its equity investment in Rothmans International p.l.c. for a pretax gain of $455 million . The net impact of these items was an increase to net earnings of SI52 million, or 5 .16 per share .

In 1988 . the Company acquired Kraft, Inc . Consolidated results of the Company include the operating results of Kraft . Inc. since its acquisition . In 1988 . the Company adopted the method of accounting for income taxes prescribed by SFAS No. 96 . resulting in a cumulative effect of accounting change that increased net earnings by $273 million, or 1 .29 per share. In 1988 . the Company provided for restructuring charges for its food operations of $348 million .

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Philip Morri%- ".1arihorn Friday"

a
1987 1986 1985 1984 1983 1982 1981 1980 1979 1978

$ 27,650 $ 25,542
1,592 1,193

$ 16,158
923

$ 14,102
925

$ 13,256
970

$ 11,720
978

$ 10,886 S 9,822
834 702

$ 8,303
521

$ 6,63 3
42 4

12,183
2,085 3,331

11,901
2,075 2,653

6,709
2,049 1,766

5,840
2 .041 1,635

5,665
1,983 1,527

5,532
1,180 1,435

5,253
1,169 1,411

4,675
1,105 1,389

3,857
1,037 1,122

3,13 4
96 1 70 3

3,990 646
3,344

3,537 772
2.765

2,664 .311
2,353

1,908 276
1,632

1,840 230
1,610

1,547 244
1,303

1,312 232
1 .080

1,144 205
939

1,096 190
906

88 3 13 7
74 6

12.1%

10.8%

14 .6%

11 .6%

12.1%
$ 706

11 .1%
$ 521

9.9%
$ 420

9.6%
$ 390

10.9%
$ 398

11 .2 %
$ 33 7

$ 1,502 $ 1,287 S 1,098 $ 743

1,842 1,478 1,842 1,478

1 .94 1 .55 1 .94 . 1 .55

1,255 1,255
1 .31 ' 1 .31

889 889
.91 .91

904 904
.90 .90

782 782
.78 .78

660 660
.66 .66

549 549
.55 .55

508 508
.51 .51

409 409
.4 2 .4 2

.79

. .62

.50
959 $ 347

.43
981 $ 298

.36
1,008 $ 566

.30
1,005 $ 918

.25
999 $ 1,019

.20
997 $ 751

.16
996 $ 629

.1 3
966 $ 566

951 954 $ 718 S 678

564 514
6,582 6,237

367
5,684

341
4,014

294
4,381

250
4,178

211
3,583

178
2,806

133
2,214

105
1,723

4,154 3,836 21,437 19,482

983 6,887

3,827
18,712 8,035

2,653
9,880 2,239

2,599
9,908 2,549

2,834
9,756 3,776

2,922
9,180 3,499

2,499
7,362 2,598

2,235
6,379 2,448

2,077
5,608 2,147

6,355 6,889
1,378 1,141 2,044 1,519 6,823 5,655 40 .6% 39 .9%

7,887
944 1,233 4,737 38 .1%

2,566
436 907 4,093 46 .8%

3,054
141 825 4,034 40 .5%

3,728
83 627 3,663 38.6% $ 3 .64 8112-51h 7'h 9 1 .007 72,000

3,804
3 455 3,234 37 .9% $ 3 .22 67/a-51/4 6'/e 9 1,003

2,800
1 327 2,837 36.3%

2,507
9 234 2,471 30 .6%

2,365
7 150 2,11 5 30 .6%

$ 7 .21 $ 5 .94
31''/s-18'/a IM-1 1 21% 18

$ 4 .96
11 %-9

.4 .21
I0%-7%/% 10% 11 971

$ 4 .03
9-63A

$ 2 .84
6-35/s 53%

$ 2 .48
41h-3T/s
4'h

$ 2 .1 3
. 41/4.31h
4i/e

11
8 955 114,000

11 11
947 951

9 10 1,000

9
998

8
996

10
99 4

113,000 111,000

68,000

68,000

72,000

72,000

65,000

60,00 0

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Philip Morris 'Martborn Friday "

Consolidated Balance Sheets

at December 31 , Asset s

(in millions of dollars, except per share data)

1992 199 1

Consumer product s Cash and cash equivalents Receivables, ne t Inventories:

.$ 1,021 $ 126 4,147 4,12 1

Leaf

tobacco

3,139

2,91 2

Other raw materials 1,790 1,795 Finished product 2,856 2,73 8 7,785 7,445

Other current assets

953 902

Total current assets 13,906 12,59 4 Properly, plant and equipment, at cost: Land and land improvements 747 72 5 Buildings and building equipment . 4,453 4 .21 0 Machinery and equipment 10,063 9,11 4 Construction in progress 1,249 1,23 2

16,512 15,28 1
Less accumulated depreciation 5,982 ' 5,33 5

10,530 9,94 6 Goodwill and other intangible assets (less accumulated amortization of $2,182 and $1,673)
Other assets 1,758

.18,523 18,62 4
1,68 2

Total consumer products assets 44,717 42,84 6

Financial services and real estat e

Finance assets, net 4,622 3,84 7 Real estate held for development and sale 489 47 1 Other assets 186 22 0 Total financial services and real estate assets 5,297 4 .538

TOTAL ASSETS $50,014 $47,384 (51 O

See notes to consolidated financial statements . C )

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t'bitip Atorru "\birtboro Friday"

1992 Liabilities Consumer product s Short-term borrowings Current portion of long-term debt Accounts payable Accrued liabilities: Marketing

199 1

S 1,348 1,514 2,401 1,461

S 51 4 1,355 2,820 1,396

Taxes, except income taxes

Employment costs

1,268
915

781
895

Other
come taxes Dividends payable Total current liabilities Long-term debt

1,963 1,810 583 13,263 13,407

1,974
1 .603 486 11,824 13,420

Deferred income taxes

Accrued postretirement health care costs Other liabilities Total consumer products liabilities Financial services and real estate

701
1,995 3,785 33,151

73 1
1,854 3,51 5 31,344

Short-term borrowings
Long-term debt Deferred income taxes

758
1,176 2,187

81 8
793 1,743

Other liabilities
Total financial services and real estate liabilities Total liabilities Contingencies (Note 14 ) Stockholders' Equit y Common stock, par value $1 .00 per share (935,320,439 shares issued) Earnings reinvested in the business Currency translation adjustments Less cost of treasury stock (42,563,254 and 15,469,198 shares)

179
4,300 37,451

174
3,528 34,872

935 14,867 (34) 15,768 3,205

93 5 12,03 8 453 13,42 6 91 4

Total stockholders equity

12,563

12,51 2

TOTAL LIABILITIES AND STOCKHOLDERS' EQUITY

$50,014

$47,384

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Pt,itip Morris . "Marlboro Friday '

Consolidated Statements of Earnings

for the years ended December 31 :

(in millions of dolla rs . except per share data)

1992

1991

1990

Operating revenues Cost of sales

Excise taxes on products Gross profit Marketing, administration and research costs Amortization of goodwill .Operating income .erest and other debt expense, net

$59,131 26,082 :9,036 24,013

13,433 521 10,059 1,451 8,608 3,669 4,939

$56,458 25,612
8,394

$51,16 9 24,43 0
6,84 6

22,452
13,331 499 8,622 1,651 6,971' 3,044 3,927

19 .89 3
11,49 9 44 8 7,946 1,635 6,31 1 2,77 1 3,54 0

Earnings before income taxes and cumulativ e

effect of accounting change Provision for income taxes Earnings before cumulative effect of accounting change

Cumulative effect of change in method o f

accounting for postretirement benefits other than pension s

(net of income tax benefit of $572 million) Net earnings

Per share data: Earnings before cumulative effect of accounting change

$-4,939

(921) _ $ 3,006

$ 3,54 0

3 5 .45 $ 5 .45

S 4 .24

S 3.83 $ 3 .83

Cumulative effect of accounting change

Net earnings

(.99)
S' 3.25

._e notes to consolidated financial statements .

12

.1~

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Philip Morris 'Ntnrlhoro Frid ;n '

Consolidated Statements of Cash Flows

for the years ended December 31 .

(in millionsordollars)

1992 $ 4,799 .140 4,939

1991 $ 2,889 117 3,006

199 0 $ 3,400 140 3,54 0

Cash Provided By (Used In) Operating Activitie s Net earnings-Consumer products -Financial services and real estate Net earnings Adjustments to reconcile net earnings to operating cash flows : Consumer product s Depreciation and amortization

1,542

1,497

1,36 7

Deferred income tax provision (benefit)

Gains on sales of businesses Restructuring charges Cumulative effect of accounting change Cash effects of changes, net of the effects from acquired and divested companies : Receivables, net Inventories Accounts payable Income taxes Other working capital items Other Financial services and real estate Cumulative effect of accounting change Deferred income tax provision Decrease in real estate receivables Increase in real estate held for development and sale Other Net cash provided by operating activities Cash Provided By (Used In) Investing Activitie s Consumer product s Purchase of Jacobs Suchard AG, net of acquired cash of $825 Purchase of other businesses, net of acquired cash Proceeds from sales of investments and businesses Capital expenditures Other

137
(162)

(715)
(5) 45 5 1,48 7 (139) (468) 395 443 (212) 140 6

108
(104 )

(57) (304) (421) 368 30 331

(249) (699) 100 16 8 56 2 37 8

446 68 (22) (13) 6,882

357 58 (57) 11 6,259

27 7 32 (41 ) (54 ) 5,38 5

(727) 255 (1,573) (98) (1,577) 775 (2,944) $ 3,938

(162) 29 (1,562) 9 (936) 308 (2,314) S 3,945

(3,116 ) (171 ) 159 (1,355) 24 6 (523 ) 11 1 (17 ) (4,666 ) $ 71 9

Financial services and real estat e

investments in finance assets Proceeds from other finance assets Other Net cash used in investing activities Net cash provided by operating and investing activities
See notes to consolidated financial statements.

13

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Philp Morris - "Marlboro Friday"

1992 Cash Provided By (Used In) Financing Activitie s Consumer products Net repayment of short-term borrowings Long-term debt proceeds Long-term debt repaid
Financial services and real estat e

1991

1990

$ (683) 3,832 (2,130) (60) 58 5 (208) (2,449) (2,028) 115

$(4,129)

3,850
(1,486) 94 (12) . (703) (1,678) 119

S (994 ) 3,562
(1,776 ) 91 (182 ) (221 ) (1,351 ) 80

Net (repayment) issuance of short-term borrowings

Long-term debt proceeds Long-term debt repaid Purchase of treasury stock Dividends paid Issuance of shares

Net cash used in financing activities Effect of exchange rate changes on'cash and cash equivalents
Increase (decrease) in cash and cash equivalents Cash and cash equivalents at beginning of year

(3,026) (17)
895 126 $ 1,021

- (3,945) (20)
(20) 146 S 126

(791 ) 100
28 11 8 $ 14 6

Cash and cash equivalents at end of year Cash paid : Interest-Consumer products
-Financial services and real estate Income taxes

$ 1,362
$ 70 $ 2,717

S 1,465
$ 76 $ 2,229

$ 1,51 1
$ 100 $ 2,027

14

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Philip Morris - "Marllmro Friday"

PHILIP MORRIS HISTORICAL INCOME STATEMEN T

1922 Sales Domestic Tobacco International Tobacco Food

1991

1990 0

$12,010 13,667 29,048

$11,589 12,251 28,178

$10,370 10,720 26,08 5

Beer
Financial Services

3,976
430 59,131
35,118

4,056
384 56,458
34,006

3,53 4
46 0 51,169
31,27 6

Cost of Sales Operating Income Domestic Tobacco International Tobacco

Food

5,185 2,018
3,277

4,774 1,694
2,962

4,20 6 1,39 4
2,64 8

Beer Financial Services

260 212 10,952 1,451 901 8,600 23 .37%

301 179 9,910 1,651 1,288 6,971 10 .46%

28 5 19 7 8,73 0 1,63 5 78 4 6,31 1 24 .77 %

Interest Other Net Income Growth

IS

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