Men Without Hats: Dialogue, Discipline and Discontent in the Madras Army, 18061807 (review)

Kaushik Roy

The Journal of Military History, Volume 72, Number 3, July 2008, pp. 948-949 (Article) Published by Society for Military History DOI: 10.1353/jmh.0.0051

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conqueror..., and ultimately an enigma, a combination of eighteenth century rationalism and ambitions characteristic of nineteenth century romanticism (p. 1). In terms of this book, however, Schneids analysis of the Emperor has less to do with his personality than with his role as a Clausewitzian statesman-commander, operating to achieve his goals in both diplomatic and military theaters. Schneid argues that we cannot adequately understand Napoleons actions in 1805 without a clear sense of the circumstances which developed from British and continental politics long predating his rise to power, and of the situation he inherited from the Revolution and the Directory. The book adopts an interesting approach to the diplomatic background, focusing in turn on each of the central issues of the 1803-5 period and unraveling its roots. Chapters 2 and 3 center on Spain, whose silver and naval resources were important to the campaign against England. Despite Spanish reluctance to ally with Bonaparte, the Franco-Spanish relationship cannot and could not then be separated from the longer history of the Bourbon Family Compact and consequent English distrust of Spain. The next two chapters examine Napoleons use of the opportunities created by modernization within the Holy Roman Empire and the resulting changes in borders and sovereignty. Napoleon eectively exploited the tensions between key south German states and both Austria and Prussia. Chapter 6 introduces the role of Italy and the Mediterranean, drawing on the authors earlier work on the Italian campaigns. The cash nexus plays a central role in Schneids analysis of international politics. He portrays a complex web of indemnities, subsidies, contributions, and loans underlying the shifting diplomatic commitments of the era. The level of detail is sometimes exhaustive, but the result is to restore a sense of the multifaceted contingency of events during this era. The last part of the book details the battles of Ulm, Caldiero, and Austerlitz. The author writes brisk operational history, made even clearer by Jack Gills well-drawn maps. Schneid avoids ascribing victory to Napoleons genius. Logistics occupies an important role in the discussion, as does his opponents lack of eective planning and communication. Ultimately, Schneid argues, Napoleons victory was won as much in prewar diplomacy as on the battleeld. Shoddy editing weakens Schneids solid work. Numerous annoying misspellings, typographical errors, and misplaced apostrophes clog the text, and the treaties of San Ildefonso are consistently rendered San Ildefenso. In a book which is otherwise handsome, Praegers editors have done a great disservice to its author and its readers. Dale Lothrop Cliord University of North Florida Jacksonville, Florida

Men Without Hats: Dialogue, Discipline and Discontent in the Madras Army, 1806-1807. By James W. Hoover. New Delhi: Manohar, 2007. ISBN 81-7304-725-1. Pp. 314. Rs 750. In 1857, the Bengal Army blew up, triggering a crisis for the Raj. In the end, the Bengal Army Mutiny collapsed partly because the Bombay and Madras armies remained loyal to the East India Company. However, the paradox is that the Madras Army was rocked by a series of mutinies in 1806. The disturbances among the Madras sepoys and

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sowars (Indian infantry and cavalry) in 1806, known as the Vellore Mutiny, are the subject matter of the book under review. James W. Hoover, in his Ph.D. thesis turned monograph, argues that the Vellore Mutiny and related disturbances in Hyderabad were apolitical in nature. It is erroneous to argue that the sepoys were instigated by Tipu Sultans sons. In fact, the mutineers were not interested in destroying the Company Raj but merely wanted to redress their grievances. However, cautions Hoover, it is wrong to assume, as did the British commanding ocers, that the sepoys were merely simpletons led astray by their irrational religions. Hoover builds up his case on the basis of depositions by the Madras soldiers before the court martial after the suppression of the mutiny. The sepoys and sowars were angry because of the decreasing real value of their pay. Further, the introduction of Western style tight breeches and hat shaped turbans made them the laughing stock of local society. This was part of the Madras Army high commands programme of Europeanizing the native contingents. The common people jeered that the sepoys and sowars were becoming Christians. The local communities refused to allow these sepoys and sowars to marry their daughters. All their cultural and economic grievances were clothed in religious idioms. Since the new generation of British ocers were no more interested in having a dialogue with the Indian soldiers in order to negotiate and compromise, the only option open for the latter to show their dissatisfaction against the new order in the Madras Army was to get violent. The net result was the outbreak of the mutiny on 10 July 1806. The Madras authorities quickly crushed the mutiny but learnt from the mistakes. Most of the historians of the military mutinies in India, from Eric Stokes to C.A. Bayly, including Tapti Roy and Gautam Bhadra, attempt to link these events with changes in the agrarian tenures and caste structures in Indian society. Credit is due to Hoover for showing that there was no relationship between the caste and religious backgrounds of the soldiers and the Vellore Uprising. What started as a series of military grievances snowballed into a mutiny because the British commanding ocers were rigid and lacked knowledge about the local south Indian culture. The blessing in disguise was that the Madras authorities learnt from it. Hence, when the great uprising occurred at Barrackpur, Meerut, Ambala, etc., during May-June 1857, the Madras sepoys shouldered their muskets and agreed to follow their British ocers. Kaushik Roy International Peace Research Institute Oslo, Norway Mr. Jeersons Hammer: William Henry Harrison and the Origins of American Indian Policy. By Robert M. Owens. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2007. ISBN 9780-80613842-8. Maps. Photographs. Illustrations. Notes. Bibliography. Index. Pp. xx, 311. $34.95. As we approach the bicentennial of the War of 1812, studies of the conict, its causes and consequences, and its personalities are bound to accumulate. Robert M. Owens adds to this growing corpus with a ne study of William Henry Harrisons role in the political, diplomatic, economic, and social aspects of the Old Northwest.

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