Strategic Relation in Military Between US, China &india @21st Century

Pa!s!
stra University of Cambodia
The strategic relationship in military terms between the US, Russia, China and India in the twenty-first century
RESEARCH PAPER
Written By: LONG KimKhorn Master of Arts in International Relations and Diplomacy Pa!s!stra University of Cambodia The Relationship Between Superpowers
Instructed By: Dr. TROND Gilberg, PhD and Dean of PUC Social Science and International Relations Faculty
Phnom Penh, August 15, 2012
Prof. Dr. TROND, PhD.

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Student: LONG KimKhorn, MA.!
Pa!s!stra University of Cambodia
TABLES OF CONTENT I. II. III. IV. V. VI. VII. VIII. IX. Abstract Acknowledgement Introduction Literature Review Methodology Scope of Research Facts and Findings References 3 5 5 8 11 11 11 18 26
Conclusion &Recommendation
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I.
Abstract
The US became as the one of the most powerful and influential nations in the world after math of World War II and has been the global hegemon since the end of the Cold War in 1991. In 2011, the US President declared a shift of US focus to the Pacific to maintain its regional leadership against the rising of China and India in Asia-Pacific (McDaniel, 2012: 16). The Obama doctrine has been considered as the pivot back to the Asia-Pacific with the aim of remaining the major strategic power in the region. This pivot1 is main effort essentially to refocus US diplomatic and military from the Middle East to Asia to maintain a consistent Asian presences and demonstrate the power of the US diplomatic policy, economic and military machinery. The recent visits by US Defense Secretary Panetta to India and Vietnam reflect the ongoing US effort to reinforce and in some cases reinvigorate pre-existing agreements in accordance with national strategy (McDaniel, 2012: 16). US has several objectives in the Indian Ocean region as: preventing Iran or China from threatening US interests; setting up red line for extremist groups from threatening US and its allies interests; enlarging its diplomatic relations network to achieve influence and military and trade relations; ensuring access to natural resources and markets and ensuring the security of Sea Lines Of Communication and maritime chokepoints. Main objective of US is to maintain the existing world order favorable to US interests. This is where that make the three big bosses concern within this Indo-Pacific strategic triangle (McDaniel, 2012: 17). Even though, India shared democratic values during the first fifty years of its independence but there is a loophole within India-U.S. relation regarding a state of estrangement (Rajamony, 2002: 1-47). It is the reason that India, so far, pursuing a policy of non-alignment, decided not to join the West in its effort against Communism that offended the U.S. deeply2. The 1960s and 1970s, the United States veering towards Pakistan while the former Soviet Union offered political, military and economic support to India. India U.S. relations hit rock bottom in 1971 during the war with Pakistan over the liberation of Bangladesh (Chatterjee, 2011: 76-81).
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Colonel Dan McDaniel, India, China and the United States in the Indo-Pacific
region: coalition, co-existence or clash?, (Australia: 2012) p.16 &17. Prof. Dr. TROND, PhD.
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America concerns about the Chinas military modernization and its fast economic development. This has introduced an increasingly self-assured, rich, and potentially powerful actor into the Asian strategic geopolitical environment. When China improved its military capabilities to guarantee its regional major power, it viewed as threats in the continental-maritime balance among Asian main powers. When combined with its growing economic and concomitant diplomatic influence, China is a major player in every aspect of Asian security3. By gradual military capability improvement on its offshore, even for strategically defensive purposes, China is beginning to establish a presence in the maritime region that has been the preserve of the United States and its allies for the past half-century (Cossa, Glosserman, McDavitt, Patel, Przystup, Roberts, 2009: 23). There are few complex motives behind the current Indian-Chinese rivalry. While Indias economy is several times smaller than Chinas and its modern military capabilities making India concern about its role in the Asia-Pacific region in the next decade. Beijing has begun to take notice of Indias growing global political and economic clout, as well as the broad-based American support for expanding strategic ties with India. For its part, India, long suspicious of Chinas close relations and military support for Pakistan, views an increased Chinese presence in northern Pakistan and expanded civil nuclear cooperation between Beijing and Islamabad as particularly worrisome. Indian military strategists believe they must plan for the possibility of a two-front war with Pakistan and China even as they actively seek dialogues with both to diminish the chances of such a dire scenario (Curtis &Cheng, 2011: 2,5). Noticing Chinas muscle in economic and military capabilities, the U.S. try to engage with India in order to set up barrier in the road ahead of China and balance the power of China in Asia preventing China from dominating the region and be the only God of the Pacific ocean4.
Ananya Chatterjee, India-China-United States: The Post-Cold War Evolution of a
Strategic Triangle Political Perspectives, (University of Reading, 2011) p.76-81.

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Ralph A. Cossa, Brad Glosserman, The United States and the Asia-Pacific Region: %! Prof. Dr. TROND, PhD. Student: LONG KimKhorn, MA.!
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Security Strategy for the Obama Administration (CNAS, 2009) p.23. New Delhinot unlike many other capitals in Asiabalks at the idea of being part of an American-led China containment strategy. Some Indian strategists even favor a go-slow approach to the U.S.Indian partnership in order to avoid raising Chinese ire. But Chinas recent posturing on its border disputes with India leaves New Delhi few options other than to play all the strategic cards at its disposal, including deepening and expanding ties with the U.S. One must also calculate that Chinese alarms over containment may in part be a tactic to prevent closer Indian cooperation with nations in the Pacific, including the U.S (Curtis &Cheng: 2011: 6,11). II. Acknowledgement
The paper acknowledges the guides under the instruction of Dr. Trond and the handful of documents/ sources/ data from the academia, scholars, researchers through PUC library and accessible e.library via internet. III. Introduction
On 6 June 2012, US Defense Secretary Leon Panetta stated in New Delhi cooperation with India was a linchpin in American grand strategy towards Asia. He expressed Washingtons willingness to expand bilateral ties with India to protect the same interest against China. Enemy of my enemy is my friend. The following week, at the third annual India-US Strategic dialogue, both countries agreed on measures to stabilize Afghanistan, combat nuclear proliferation, enhance maritime security, upgrade intelligence liaison on counterterrorism, and cooperate against organized crime (Zurich, 2012: 1). Even the geostrategic positions of the US and India are very different5 but U.S. and India has no other choice beside being friend with each other in front of Beijing giant. Being a continent- sized fortress, protected by oceans and friendly neighbors on its land borders, the United States is not nearly as vulnerable to overland military attack as India. The latter country has a history of failing to defend its frontiers from invasion, and perceives itself to be diplomatically isolated since it lacks a cultural-civilizational link Prof. Dr. TROND, PhD.
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Lisa Curtis, Dean Cheng, The Heritage Foundation The China Challenge: A Strategic
Vision for U.S.India Relations (July 18, 2011 No. 2583) p.2-11. with other states. For this reason, the Indian security establishment is extremely reluctant to use force for purposes other than internal security and territorial defense (Zurich, 2012: 2-3). While one hand is shaking with New Delhi, the other is catching up with Beijing. Early day at office both two elected terms, the Obama Administration has repeatedly called for a stronger military-to-military relationship with China. Leaving the military dimension of our dialogue underdeveloped on both sides causes us to run unnecessary risk, Vice President Joe Biden argued in July 2013, observing that Chinas military is expanding its presence in Asia at the same time that the United Sates is implementing its rebalancing to the Asian Pacific, bringing the two militaries into greater proximity. Dialogue, exchanges, and cooperation between the two militaries must expand, he said, because We have to know what each other are doing.6 A 2009 U.S.-China joint statement issued in the name of President Obama and his counterpart at the time, then-Chinese President Hu Jintao, pledged the two countries to take concrete steps to advance sustained and reliable military-to-military relations in the future. A 2011 joint statement similarly pledged the two governments to pursue a healthy, stable, and reliable military-to-military relationship. Moves to strengthen the military-to-military relationship did not begin to gain momentum until after the 2011 joint statement, however, as the transition from Hu Jintao to Xi Jinping as Chinas top leader began unfolding. Some analysts believe an unusual visit to the Pentagon accorded to Xi in February 2012, when he visited the United States as Vice President, may have helped win his support for more regular exchanges, and that his strong relationship with the Chinese military has allowed him to bring the Chinese military along with him (Lawrence, 2013: 14).
ETH Zurich, India-US Relations: Progress Amidst Limited Convergence (Center for
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Security Studies, 2012 No. 117) p.1-3.

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Susan V. Lawrence, U.S.-China Relations: An Overview of Policy Issues
(Congressional Research Service, 2013) p.14-15. After days of agreement, operational cooperation between the two main military powers extremely limited, but in remarks in Singapore in June 2013, Secretary of Defense Hagel characterized dialogue between the two militaries as steadily improving. Among the positive developments in the relationship that he cited in his remarks were: Xis February 2012 Pentagon visit and visits to China by the chief of the Pacific Command Navy Adm. Samuel J. Locklear III (July 2012); then-Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta (September 2012); and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Martin Dempsey (April 2013); Chinas first ever participation as an observer of the U.S.-Philippine Balikatan joint military exercise in April 2013; A first-ever U.S.-China joint anti-piracy exercise in the Gulf of Aden in September 2012; A firstever U.S. invitation to China to participate in the United States largest military exercises in the Pacific, the Rim of the Pacific or RIMPAC exercise, in the summer of 2014, and Chinas April 2013 acceptance of the invitation; An agreement for the United States and China to co-host a Pacific Army Chiefs Conference for the first time (Lawrence, 2013: 15). As for the US relationship with India plays as an example model of its willingness and ability to rapidly realign its relationships to suit its interests7. A former Cold War proxy competitor, the US had imposed sanctions to limit Indias nuclear development, however changed its legislation to allow the sharing of civilian nuclear material and technology with India, as a balance to Chinas power and its nuclear relationship with Pakistan. Despite Indias refusal to sign the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, one of only four nuclear non-signatory nations, the US successfully lobbied the International Atomic Energy Agency to grant India special status to trade in the technology under the India Safeguards and Nuclear Suppliers Group agreements (McDaniel, 2012: 1819). But so far as what we have being seen and known that the rise of China and India is the cause of the relative decline of the United States (US) and the subject of increased strategic review and analysis in the last decade. Prof. Dr. TROND, PhD.
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Colonel Dan McDaniel, India, China and the United States in the Indo- Pacific
region: coalition, co-existence or clash? (Australia: October 2012) p.18-19. While for much of the last decade the US has been focused on wars in the Middle East, China and India have been rising in the Asia-Pacific region, factors acknowledged by the US President during his 2011 declaration of an American strategic pivot to the Indo-Pacific Region. The US, China and India have all declared, through strategy, an intent to remain diplomatically, economically and militarily engaged in the region, making it a point of strategic intersection. The extent to which they are in coalition, co-existence or they clash in the region could set the agenda for global security in what many nations have dubbed the Asian Century8. Why U.S. and China seems interesting so much with India? Beside the second single biggest market country in Asia, the Indian Ocean has four of the six major maritime chokepoints and serves as a maritime super highway for in-demand energy resources that drive the worlds largest economies. Almost 68 percent of Indias, 80 percent of Chinas and 25 percent of the US oil is shipped from the Indian Ocean Region. While important in its own right, the Indian Oceans Eastern border with the Pacific is increasingly irrelevant as shifts occur in the global balance and the Indo-Pacific Region grows in geo-strategic significance (McDaniel, 2012: 1-4). IV. Literature Review
In the last fifty years, Indian diplomacy had significant change and maturation toward the region and the world. India has moved from a Cold War relationship with the USSR to establishment as a nuclear power, a burgeoning relationship with the US and a shift in its regional relationships based on a new Look East9 policy. There are also indications that Indian diplomacy is moving beyond its pre-occupation with border security, specifically at its North Eastern and North Western land borders with China and Pakistan respectively. This is evidenced by developing relations with South-East Asia and its maturing diplomatic approach to its traditional enemies, Pakistan and China, and its newest friend, the US (McDaniel, 2012: 6-8). Prof. Dr. TROND, PhD.
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region: coalition, co-existence or clash? (Australia: 2012) p.1-8. When India changed its foreign policy toward the region and the world, U.S. adjusted its foreign policy toward Asia-Pacific, especially China. According to US Foreign Secretary Hillary Clinton, ...in competition with China10, and the extent to which it is prepared to act to protect its position in the regional order is to be seen. There is nothing in public US policy to suggest that the US intends to curb Chinas growth or contain China in a Cold War fashion. On the contrary, it is US public foreign policy to integrate China into the existing world order and confidential US policy discussions support that position (McDaniel, 2012: 19). Further more, Washingtons secret in the Hillary Clintons confidential discussions with the then Australian Prime Minister Kevin Rudd in March 2009 has been revealed as instructive for their insight into classified US thinking on rising China. In this leaked diplomatic cable, Clinton outlines the US desire for a ...successful China... but one that takes greater responsibility in the areas of global economic behavior, free markets and human rights. The US and China are aware of each others specific diplomatic red lines, such as over Taiwan and Tibet, and are unlikely to press each other in these areas; They are likely to remain issues of co-existence for at least the next decade in the status quo (McDaniel, 2012: 19). It is not the first time in history that U.S. and China has confrontation in foreign policy between each other. However, it started when Sino-US relations have been strained since the Korean War, however China softened its anti-US diplomacy and rhetoric following the September 11, 2001, Islamist terrorist attacks on the US mainland. China lacks the deep alliance and agreement network of the US and the regional trust that the US and India enjoy11. Indo-Pacific nations seek Chinese economic engagement but fear Chinese diplomatic and military dominance. Assertive Chinese behavior plays into those fears and will prompt ASEAN countries to Prof. Dr. TROND, PhD.
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encourage India and particularly the US to remain diplomatically, economically and militarily engaged in the Indo-Pacific, counter to Chinese strategic objectives (McDaniel, 2012: 31-33).
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region: coalition, co-existence or clash? (Australia: 2012) p.19-33. Unlike China, U.S. has better foreign policy record with India because India is an indispensable partner for the United States12. Geographically, it sits between the two most immediate problematic regions for U.S. national interests. The arc of instability that begins in North Africa, goes through the Middle East, and proceeds to Pakistan and Afghanistan ends at Indias western border. To its east, India shares a contested land border with the other rising Asian power of the twenty-first century, China. India despite continuing challenges with internal violence is a force for stability, prosperity, democracy, and the rule of law in a very dangerous neighborhood. With the rise of Asian economies, the Indian Ocean is home to critical global lines of communication, with perhaps 50 percent of world container products and up to 70 percent of ship-borne oil and petroleum traffic transiting through its waters (Blackwill, Chandra, Clary, 2011: 3) India needs the United States because U.S. is the crucially preeminent global power for India to compliment its economic and military effort to be the major power in the region competing China. America remains the critical stabilizing force in Asia through its military and diplomatic power projection and commitments to the region. The United States and India have a shared vital national interest in preventing a unipolar Asia. The twentieth century bore witness to a multigenerational U.S. effort to prevent the emergence of any hostile hegemon on the Eurasian landmass, a function that the United States continues to fulfill today with the help of its Asian partners. No other nation can play that role on which Indias rise depends (Blackwill, Chandra, Clary, 2011: 7). Even though, Beijing knew the secret deal between U.S. and India toward China in so Prof. Dr. TROND, PhD.
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what it called containment but China still use soft diplomatic approach to world affairs in order to present as a powerful and peaceful friend rather than an aggressive challenger13.
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Robert D. Blackwill, Naresh Chandra, Christopher Clary, The United States and
India A Shared Strategic Future (Council on Foreign Relations &Aspen Institute India, September 2011) p.3-7.
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region: coalition, co-existence or clash? (Australia: 2012) p.29. It has accepted institutions and multilateralism as necessary features of engagement in the region and while preferring a bilateral approach; Chinas willingness to conduct diplomatic business multilaterally is evidence of its shift. While China has many regional relationships, its relations with India and the US will determine regional stability. V. Methodology
The paper will use all secondary data to write literature review, consult fact and finding, discuss, compare, and contrast the arguments. Furthermore, paper is the social research text, so I will use qualitative method to write the text. VI. Scope of Research
Due to time limit and depend on the purpose of the paper, text will focus only on the current strategic relation in military between US, China and India in the 21st century. VII. Facts and Findings
After the oath of Barack Obama to be the President of United States, Hillary Clinton, Secretary of State, and Indias external affairs minister agreed to further strengthen the excellent bilateral relationship between the United States and India. Soon after, President Obama issued a statement asserting that, Our rapidly growing and deepening friendship with India offers benefits to all the worlds citizens and that the people of India should know they have no better friend and partner than the people Prof. Dr. TROND, PhD.
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of the United States.14 As part of her confirmation hearing to become Secretary of State, Clinton told Senators she would work to fulfill President Obamas commitment to establish a true strategic partnership with India, increase our military cooperation, trade, and support democracies around the world (Alan, Kerr, Martin, Vaughn, 2010: 2-5).
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K. Alan Kronstadt, Paul K. Kerr, Michael F. Martin, Bruce Vaughn, India-U.S.
Relations (Congressional Research Service, 2010) p.2-5. Strengthen relationship between U.S. and India is the diplomatic alert for China. Beside new deal between U.S. and India, China concern about Indias military buildup so far since the past 10 years. China also expressed the most concern over Indias increasing strategic nuclear strike capability, primarily its land-based missiles, and the next- most concern over its efforts to develop its own nuclear missile submarines. Several PLA analysts whose writings on the Indian military were examined for this study have focused their concern on what they see as its expansionist intentions and offense-oriented doctrinal development. Beyond the actual military capabilities of these missiles, Chinese analysts expressed deeper concern that India, in their view, has been actively publicizing the threat these missiles could pose to China (Tanner, Dambaugh, Easton, 2011: 31-34). China not sleep while India is shaking hands with U.S. The last 10 years China speeded up its military capabilities in all fields and it made Indian security specialists primarily concerned and considered it as the long-term issues in particular, Chinas economic capacity to support a much more rapid military modernization and buildup than India can sustain. They were also concerned about the long-term possibility of China developing more aggressive and expansionist strategic intentions, as well as the prospect of future rivalry or even conflict between the two countries. These specialists were not nearly as concerned about the threat of a direct military confrontation with China in the near future. This balance of relatively sanguine short-term views with Prof. Dr. TROND, PhD.
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longer- range concern has also been reflected in the recent public statements of senior Indian officials, including Defense Minister Antony, who said in February 2011 that India should not be unduly concerned about Chinas military modernization, but should carry out a comprehensive review of its defense preparedness while remaining vigilant at all times.15 Most of these interviewees appeared to take as a given that the future bilateral relationship would be characterized by intense strategic, economic, and diplomatic competition, both bilaterally and regionally (Tanner, Dambaugh, Easton, 2011: 35-37).
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Murray Scot Tanner, Kerry B. Dumbaugh, Ian M. Easton, Wary Partners: China and
India Assess their Security Relations (Center for Naval Analyses, 2011) p.31-37. Chinas military modernization has been fueled by two decades of steadily increasing military spending. According to the DOD report to Congress, Chinas officially disclosed military budget increased an average of 9.7% annually in inflation-adjusted terms over the decade from 2003 to 2012. At $114 billion, Chinas officially announced budget for 2013 represents an increase of 10.7% over 2012. The Pentagon believes Chinas actual military spending is higher than the officially disclosed figures, with the report to Congress estimating that Chinas military spending for 2012 was in the range of $135 billion to $215 billion (Lawrence, 2013: 16). In its 2013 report to Congress on military developments involving the PRC, the Department of Defense (DOD) stated that it believed Chinas military modernization is designed to improve the capacity of [Chinas] armed forces to fight and win shortduration, high-intensity regional military conflict.16 DOD assessed that the principal focus and primary driver of Chinas military investment is preparing for a contingency involving Taiwan, over which the PRC claims sovereignty. The DOD report observed, though, that Chinas military modernization also appears increasingly focused on developing capabilities for extended-range power projection and operations in emerging domains such as cyber, space, and electronic warfare, as well as other missions, including anti-piracy missions, peacekeeping, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, and regional military operations (Lawrence, 2013: 17). "$! Prof. Dr. TROND, PhD. Student: LONG KimKhorn, MA.!
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When China seem to accomplish their modernized military goal, the United States and India signed a 10-year Defense Pact in Washington D.C on June 28, 2005 to strengthen defense and military relations between the two countries. That landmark agreement was a productive instrument for India and would help to facilitate joint weapons production, co-operation on missile defense and the transfer of civil and military technology to India. This agreement has paved the way for the possible lifting of US export controls for sensitive military technology to India without signing CTBT. The agreement is designed to achieve two main objectives17: (a) To help India to advance Americas strategic goals in Asia; (b) To help India to become a major world power this may project its military presence beyond its border.
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Susan V. Lawrence, U.S.-China Relations: An Overview of Policy Issues
(Congressional Research Service, 2013) p.16-17. The both countries decided to formulate a defense procurement and production group to examine defense trade, as well as prospects for co-production and technology collaboration, research development, testing and evaluation and naval pilot training (Fani, 138). Dependent diplomatic or military relations with the United States is not yet enough for India to secure its security. Self-reliant is a way for India to make sure that the ball always in Indias court. All three main military services are currently instituting reforms in order to meet Indias expanding strategic horizons18. The military is moving toward intra- and inter-service network-centric organization aimed at increasing interoperability. India also continues to improve its nuclear weapons delivery systems and aims to acquire a triad of land, air, and sea-based nuclear strike options by 2014. The attention of Indias army and air force leaders has been shifting steadily to the east; in 2010, the army was given an explicit directive from Defense Minister Antony to prepare for a two-front war. According to the 2011-2012 MOD Annual Report, the Indian Army (Kronstadt &Pinto, 2013: 8-9). In 2011, India ranked as the sixth largest military spender in the world, accounting for 2.8% of total global military spending (by comparison, the United States was the largest military spender at 41%, followed by China at 8.2%). India remains South "%! Prof. Dr. TROND, PhD. Student: LONG KimKhorn, MA.!
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Asias biggest defense spender by a large margin, accounting for more than threequarters of regional spending in 2011 (Pakistan accounted for about one-eighth). New Delhi allocated just under $40.5 billion for defense expenditures in its FY2012/13 budget (Kronstadt &Pinto, 2013: 12-13). Even though, U.S. has India in its line of containment strategies toward China but U.S. still maintain and improved its decisive combat force - the US Department of Defense employs 3.2 million people - its status as the largest single employer in the world is a useful comparison to the place its military holds as the most powerful in the world.
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Muhammad Ishaque Fani, The Indo- US Strategic Partnership in Post 9/11:
Implication for Pakistan (Pakistan: Vol. 10 No. 2) p.138.

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K. Alan Kronstadt, Sonia Pinto, U.S.-India Security Relations: Strategic Issues
(Congressional Research Service, 2013) p.8-13. Equally comparable is that the Peoples Liberation Army is the second largest single employer in the world, at 2.3 million. The US is economically engaged with China but is planning to rebalance its current naval disposition to 60 percent in the Pacific and 40 percent in the Atlantic by 2020 (McDaniel, 2012: 21-23). But the US National Military Strategy acknowledges the risks of growing national debt and the challenges associated with the rise of India and China. While the strategy does not mention India, it singles out China, specifically the challenges posed by the existing friction points of anti-access/area denial capability development, missile technology, the Taiwan Strait, competition in the space and cyber domains and Chinas more assertive behavior in its claims to maritime areas of various surrounding seas. The US military does however express the need for closer military ties with China including security effort, specifically counter-piracy, counter proliferation of WMD, disaster assistance, countering terrorism and influencing North Korea to maintain a stable Korean Peninsula (McDaniel, 2012: 24-25). The U.S. use two-face swords strategy in Asia-Pacific to contain China. One way is to pivot India into the throat of China and another is to buildup military-to-military tie. But without a formal military-to-military relationship between the PLA and US Prof. Dr. TROND, PhD.
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forces, the opportunities to increase transparency are reduced to initiatives such as the India/US/China participation in anti-piracy operations in the Gulf of Aden. Piracy is an issue in the Malacca Straits and, given the importance of this SLOC20 (Sea Lines of Commerce) chokepoint to future geopolitical interaction between the strategic triangle of the US, China and India, a cooperative operation mirroring the Gulf of Aden would be a prime opportunity to increase transparency and familiarity (McDaniel, 2012: 34-36). It is not arm race, we may say, but military race among the three. India boasts some of the largest individual military services, and the fourth largest overall military, in the world, behind that of both the US and China. Size however, does not necessarily equate to capability. Indias 2012-13 Defense budget is set to consume 1.9% of its sample GDP, an increase of 17% from 2011-12, yet its military lacks an expeditionary
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region: coalition, co-existence or clash? (Australia: 2012) p.21-25 &34-36. capability, operates with outdated and redundant equipment and has such inefficient acquisition processes that it returns billions of dollars annually in underspend; USD1.1 billion in 2009. Indias status as a nuclear state has afforded it greater influence and confidence21. India declared that its nuclear capability was a response to Chinas rise and its nuclear arming of Pakistan, which dislocated China as the US used the opportunity to engage India more closely. Certainly its more aggressive response to the threat of Chinese containment has surprised Beijing (McDaniel, 2012: 9-10). For China, since the founding of the Peoples Republic of China (PRC), till the end of the Cold War, Chinas relations with the United States were overshadowed by ideological rivalry in the context of the East-West balance of power (Hook, 2005: 34). Sino-American tensions lessened in the 1970s following the Sino-Soviet rift of late 1960s and the opening up of China by the efforts of Nixon-Kissinger duo22. Despite the beginning of the economic modernization programme under Deng Xiaoping after 1976, Sino-U.S. bilateral relations continued to be plagued by U.S. complaints about Beijings human rights policy, neglect of environmental problems, weapons transfers "'! Prof. Dr. TROND, PhD. Student: LONG KimKhorn, MA.!
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and arms sales to Iran, Pakistan and others and maintenance of protectionist trade policies (Chatterjee, 2011: 82). To project Chinas major power and reduce the strategic weight of U.S. to herself, China mature its relationship with India into one of the most important bilateral relationships in world politics and their continuing economic growth are projecting them to influential positions within the global market. According to the United States National Intelligence Council Report on emerging global trends, by 2015, international community will have to confront the military, political and economic dimensions of the rise of China and India. How these two countries manage their relationship will have a tremendous impact on peace and stability in the regional and, increasingly, global context (Chatterjee, 2011: 84).
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region: coalition, co-existence or clash? (Australia: 2012) p.9-10.

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Ananya Chatterjee, India-China-United States: The Post-Cold War Evolution of a
Strategic Triangle/ Political Perspectives (University of Reading, 2011) p.82-84. According to triangular relationship theories23, several requirements should be satisfied to establish a strategic triangle relationship: First, the three parties forming the triangle are global or regional powers, with high status in the international system. Second, the development of each partys national power is different in its direction or speed, which results in the different perceptions of their national interest, especially in terms of national security. Third, each party has a different attitude to the other two parties. Factors affecting their attitudes to one another include history, ideology, political system and culture. Fourth, each bilateral relationship has overt or covert influences on the third party, resulting in reciprocal checks and balances among the three parties. In the case of the China-India-US triangle, the United States is the only global superpower; China and India are regional powers. Therefore, the first requirement is satisfied. Chinas rapid economic development, and its rising political influence over the past decade, worries both the United States and India; they definitely feel the Prof. Dr. TROND, PhD.
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pressure from China. China and India had a conflict over border disputes in 1962. Since then, India has regarded China as one of its biggest threats. The United States is the largest capitalist country in the world and China is the largest communist country, while India regards itself as the largest democracy in the world. Thus, on the ideology front, Americans see India as their natural ally. Although the first three requirements of a strategic triangle are met, we cannot say that, between China, India, and the US, each bilateral relationship has significant effects on the third party. The China-India-US relationship is not like the ChinaSoviet-US strategic triangle formed during the Cold War, because, at that time, both the Sino-Soviet and Soviet-American bilateral relationships were actually in situations of cold or hot military confrontation but triangle between U.S., China &India is not direct military confrontation. But any change in any one of the bilateral relationships would have had a material influence on the national security or national economic interest of the third party (Zongyi, 2012: 2). However, the China-India-US strategic triangle relation doesnt like the China-SovietUS formation. The reason is that each of the bilateral relationships has only weak implications for the third party. For a long time, the core issue between China and the United States has been the Taiwan issue, but India has no interest in Taiwan. Now, though, with more and more global issues intruding on the bilateral relations of China and the United States, some of Indias national interests have also become involved (Zongyi, 2012: 3). It is undeniable that United States enjoys some more advantages than China and India in triangle relationship because U.S. is only superpower even though it is relatively. Both China and India want to maintain a good relationship with the United States, as the only superpower, because both of them are trying to avoid becoming contained by US policies. At the same time, both China and India want to gain some support from the US. This might be where Seema Sirohis romantic triangle comes from. But, in the current trilateral relationship between China, India and the US, Chinas rapid rise has provoked concern and even problematic sentiments in the United States (Zongyi, 2012: 4). VIII. Conclusion and Recommendation Prof. Dr. TROND, PhD.
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To ensure success in the military relationship in triangle, U.S. uses several principles to guide its force and program development. First, because U.S. cannot predict how the strategic environment will evolve with absolute certainty, U.S. will maintain a broad portfolio of military capabilities that, in the aggregate, offer versatility across the range of U.S. main objectives in the Asia-Pacific region. Second, U.S. has sought to differentiate between those investments that should be made today and those that can be deferred. Third, U.S. is determined to maintain a ready and capable force, even as they reduce our overall capacity. We will resist the temptation to sacrifice readiness in order to retain force structure, and will in fact rebuild readiness in areas. Fourth, the Department of Defense must continue to reduce the cost of doing business. This entails reducing the rate of growth of manpower costs, finding further efficiencies in overhead and headquarters, business practices, and other support activities before taking further risk in meeting the demands of the strategy to reduce collateral damages.
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Liu Zongyi, The China-India-US Relationship: Where Will It Go? (Future
International Direction, 2012) p.2-4. Finally, U.S. Department of Defense suggest to examine how this triangle strategy will influence existing campaign and contingency plans so that more limited resources may be better tuned to fulfill the objectives. This will include a renewed emphasis on the need for a globally networked approach to deterrence and warfare. Sixth, the Department will need to examine the mix of Active Component (AC) and Reserve Component (RC) elements best suited to the triangle US-China-India strategy. Chinas military modernization and objective are not a secret it keeps from the region and the world. Until today top Chinese leaders not yet know whether China will become the United States friend or enemy in the decades ahead. Its next generation of leaders, other internal developments, and the future of cross-Strait relations will ultimately determine chinas military destiny, yet Americas strategic response will Prof. Dr. TROND, PhD.
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also shape the future of the U.S.-China relationship. In this given strategic uncertainty, the United States has no choice but to pursue a two-face policy toward China. One way is to engage China and encourage it to responsible its overall actions as world major power in the international affairs. The second is to set up China in containment strategy against competitive or aggressive behavior by China, pursuing continued engagement rather than treating the country as an enemy because China is too big for America and Beijingers are not kid that U.S. can fool around. Mao Zedong gave the Peoples Liberation Army (PLA) a strategy of Peoples War the idea was to draw invading armies deep into Chinese territory, envelop them, and destroy them slowly in a protracted war of attrition. In contrast, Deng Xiaoping and his successors have advocated new theories of Local War (versus total war) and Rapid War, Rapid Resolution (as opposed to war of attrition). First step to modernize Chinese military capability is the Moist legacy downsizing the PLA and making Chinas defense R&D system and military industry more efficient. Chinas reforms aim to increase the readiness of selected PLA units, train them intensively, and perform realistic exercises (including joint exercises with Russia and other nations). The second step is to bring Chinas three military services into the age of joint operations. The Chinese further stress the need for informationization, what the United States calls command, control, communications, computer, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (C4ISR). To this end, the 2004 White Paper replicates the US emphasis on satellite and airborne sensors, unmanned aerial vehicles, and information warfare. Finally, China plans to maintain strategic nuclear deterrence and challenge American dominance wherever possible. Despite Americas overwhelming military superiority, China aims to exploit vulnerabilities in key US capabilities using counter-space, counter-carrier, counter- air, and information warfare to prevent the United States from dominating a military confrontation or achieving quick and easy victory. Chinas recent anti-satellite missile test demonstrated its commitment to reducing Americas advantage in space. Prof. Dr. TROND, PhD.
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Sino-Indian frictions are growing, and the potential for conflict remains high. Alarm is rising in India because of frequent and strident Chinese claims about the Line of Actual Control in Arunachal Pradesh and Sikkim, where Indians have complained of a dramatic rise in Chinese intrusions into Indian Territory over the last few years, most along the border in Arunachal Pradesh, which China refers to as Southern Tibet. China has upped the ante on the border issue. It has been regularly protesting against the Indian prime ministers visit to Arunachal Pradesh, asserting its claims over the territory. Even though, Pakistan has always been a crucial foreign policy asset for China, but with Indias rise and U.S.-India rapprochement, its role in Chinas grand strategy is bound to grow even further. Not surprisingly, recent revelations about China's shift away from a three-decades old cautious approach on Jammu and Kashmir, its increasing military presence in Pakistan, planning infrastructure linking Xinjiang and Gwadar, issuing stapled visas to residents of Jammu and Kashmir and supplying nuclear reactors to Pakistan, all confirm a new intensity behind Chinas old strategy of using Pakistan to secure its interests in the region. Chinas economic transformation has given it the capability to emerge as a major military power, spending as much as $65 billion a year on its defense forces. Chinas military may or may not be able to take on the United States in the next few years; it will surely become the most dominant force in Asia. As a consequence of its growing capabilities, China has started asserting its military profile more significantly than before. Beijing is also considering sending combat troops abroad in support of United Nations peacekeeping efforts. Chinese military officers are openly talking of building the worlds strongest military and displacing the United States as global hegemon, by means of a war if need be. This might be a bit premature, as the U.S. military still remains far more advanced than Chinas, which does not yet possess the capability to challenge the United States far from Chinese shores. Its Chinas neighbors, however, who are bearing the brunt of Chinas new assertiveness. Chinas sustained military build-up will continue over the next few years and will pose a challenge to Indian military planners as the Indian militarys modernization program is fast losing momentum. India needs to urgently review its defense preparedness vis--vis China. As the policy paralysis post-Mumbai has revealed, it Prof. Dr. TROND, PhD.
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seems to have lost even its conventional superiority over Pakistan. The real challenge for India, however, lies in Chinas rise as a military power. India is speeding up its defense procurement but the process remains mired in bureaucratese and lacks any sense of strategic direction. Between 2010 and 2016, India is expected to spend $112 billion on capital defense acquisitions in what is being described as one of the largest procurement cycles in the world. The Indian Army is raising two new specialized infantry mountain divisions (35,000 soldiers) and an artillery brigade for Arunachal Pradesh, designed to redress the imbalance on the Sino-Indian border. It is also revising its conventional war-fighting doctrine that is aimed at deterringas opposed to dissuadingChina, though its meaning in operational terms remains far from clear. The Indian military is currently refining a two-front war doctrine to fend off Pakistan and China simultaneously. China is acquiring naval facilities along the crucial choke points in the Indian Ocean not only to serve its economic interests but also to enhance its strategic regional presence. There is evidence to suggest that China is comprehensively building up its maritime power in all dimensions. Its growing reliance on bases across the Indian Ocean region is a response to its perceived vulnerability, given the logistical constraints that it faces due to the distance of the Indian Ocean waters from its own area of operation. Yet, China is consolidating power over the South China Sea and the Indian Ocean with an eye on India. This power consolidation was expressed in an oftcited secret memorandum issued by the director of the General Logistic Department of the PLA: We can no longer accept the Indian Ocean as only an ocean of the Indians ... We are taking armed conflicts in the region into account. China deployed its Jin class submarines in 2008 at a submarine base near Sanya in the southern tip of Hainan Island in South China Sea, raising alarm in India as the base is merely 1,200 nautical miles from the Malacca Strait. The base will be its closest access point to the Indian Ocean. The base also has an underground facility that can hide submarine movement. The concentration of strategic naval forces at Sanya will further propel China towards a consolidating its control over the surrounding Indian Ocean region. The presence of access tunnels on the mouth of the deep water base is particularly troubling for India. This is because of the strategic implications, allowing China to interdict shipping at the three crucial choke points in the Indian Ocean. The Prof. Dr. TROND, PhD.
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choice of Hainan is poor, but no alternatives exist as other places are hemmed in by islands. So Chinas chief maritime nuclear base is also currently her southernmost point. She would want the waters around clear so that, among other things, no one can track her submarines. The Indian Navy is aiming for a total fleet of 140-145 vessels over the next decade, built around two carrier battle groups: Admiral Gorshkov which will now be handed over to India only by 2013 and the indigenous carrier, the 37, 500-tonne STOBAR Air Defense Ship likely to be completed by 2015. Indias ambition to equip its navy with two or more aircraft carriers over the next decade, as well as its decision to launch its first indigenous nuclear submarine in 2009, is seen as crucial for power projection and to achieve a semblance of strategic autonomy. Indias emerging capability to put a carrier task force as far as the South China Sea and the Persian Gulf has given boost to Indian Navys blue-water aspirations and India hopes to induct a third aircraft carrier by 2017, ensuring that the Indian Navy has two operational carriers at any given point. The deployment of the Jin class submarine at Hainan by China will also force India to speed up its indigenous nuclear submarine project that has been in the making for more than a decade now with the Indian Navy, rather ambitiously, aiming at the induction of five indigenous Advanced Technology Vehicle (ATV) nuclear submarines. A submarine-based nuclear arsenal is considered critical by Indian strategists to retain a second-strike capability. While a focus on augmenting its platforms, systems and weapons is clearly visible in the Indian Navy, concomitant changes in doctrine and organization have been relatively slow to come. India is using its naval forces to advance its diplomatic initiatives overseas and in particular towards shaping the strategic environment in and around the Indian Ocean. Indian interests converge with those of the United States in the Indian Ocean region and it is trying to use the present upswing in U.S.-India ties to create a more favorable strategic environment for itself in the region despite its historical sensitivities to the presence of U.S. forces in the Indian Ocean. The United States has also recognized the importance of Indias role in the region, viewing it as crucial in maintaining peace and stability in the Indian Ocean and its vast periphery. The U.S. and Indian navies have stepped up their joint exercises and the United States has sold India the USS Trenton (renamed INS Jalashwa), the first of its class to be inducted into the Indian Prof. Dr. TROND, PhD.
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Navy. The United States would like India to join its Container Security Initiative (CSI) and Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) but India remains reluctant. PSI is viewed as a U.S.-led initiative outside the United Nations mandate while the CSI would result in the presence of U.S. inspectors in Indian ports, making it politically radioactive. However, India has indicated that it would be willing to join the U.S.proposed 1,000-ship navy effort to combat illegal activities on the high seas, given the informal nature of the arrangement. India is seen as a balancer in the Asia-Pacific where the U.S. influence has waned relatively even as Chinas has risen. Indias ties with Japan have also assumed a new dynamic with some even mooting a concert of democracies proposal involving the democratic states of the Asia-Pacific working towards their common goals of a stable Asia-Pacific region. While such a proposal has little chance of evolving into anything concrete in the near term, especially given Chinas sensitivities, Indias decision to develop natural gas with Japan in the Andaman Sea and recent military exercises involving United States, Japan, India and Australia does give a sense of Indias emerging priorities. China remains the only major power that refuses to discuss nuclear issues with India for fear of implying a de facto recognition of Indias status as a nuclear power. It continues to insist on the sanctity of the UN resolution 1172 which calls for India (and Pakistan) to give up its nuclear weapons program and join the Nuclear NonProliferation Treaty (NPT) as a non-nuclear weapon state. The U.S.-India civilian nuclear energy cooperation pact came as a shock to Beijing. China made every possible effort to scuttle the deal until the last minute. It made its displeasure with the nuclear pact clear by asking India to sign the NPT and dismantle its nuclear weapons. Since the U.S.-India deal is in many ways a recognition of Indias rising global profile, China, not surprisingly, was not happy with the outcome and quickly declared that it would be selling new nuclear reactors to Pakistan. This was a not so subtle message to the United States that if Washington decided to play favorites, China also retained the same right. China has vigorously asserted its old claims along the border with India and has combined it with aggressive patrolling. Violating the 1993 India-China agreement on peace and tranquility on the Line of Actual Control, Chinese troops have been Prof. Dr. TROND, PhD.
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engaging Indian troops in verbal abuses, asking them to leave their own territory. Even as India considered the Sikkim border issue settled, repeated Chinese incursions in the Finger Area in northern Sikkim, in the past few years, are aimed at opening a fresh front against India. Beijing is also determined to put the historically undisputed border with Sikkim back in contestation. Concerns are growing about covert Chinese intrusions into the Indian territory to strengthen its claims on the disputed border areas. Chinese forces regularly intrude into Bhutanese territory at the tri-junction with India and destroy Indian Army posts. These incursions are strategic as they are precariously close to Indias chicken-neckthe Siliguri corridor which links the Northeast Passage. Chinese intrusions into the non-delineated parts of Bhutans northern border with Tibet are also aimed at forcing Bhutan to settle its boundary issue with China. There are set of general recommendations for triangle military relation between US, China and India: (1) Set a long-term vision for the overall military relationship as well as strategic end states for each area of service cooperation; (2) Each service should have a dialogue about strategic trends and developments within the Indo-Pacific region that would include, as two prominent examples, regular conversations on Chinese military power and Afghanistans stability. These discussions will not craft binding policy but rather serve as a vehicle to better inform both sides about their respective positions on key strategic issues; (3) Develop a mutually agreed-on understanding about the concept of
interoperability to include alternate terminology and required minimum capabilities; (4) Develop common protocols for disaster response contingencies across the air force, army, and navy. Topics to be covered include command and control, communications protocol, equipment standardization, and common training. Resurrect the Disaster Response Working Group as a vehicle for this purpose; (5) Work toward instituting joint operations across all service exercises and engagements; (6) Conduct multilateral security activities across air, land, and sea domains with other Asian and Oceanic powers, including Japan, Australia, Singapore, Indonesia, and South Korea; (7)
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Explore the idea of complementary posture by examining how the U.S. and
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Indian militaries can use each others berthing and intelligence facilities throughout the Indian Ocean Region. Reciprocal use of the Andaman and Nicobar Islands as well as Diego Garcia could be possibilities; (8) Conduct joint maritime security patrols with India in the South Asia maritime region, which includes Sri Lanka, Maldives, and Bangladesh, among other states. Also work with India to establish a corollary to the highly successful Pacific Partnership program in the Indian Ocean; (9) Both countries air forces should examine possibilities for closer cooperation on Space Situational Awareness, which is increasingly important due to the large amount of space debris that could threaten U.S. and Indian space-based assets; (10) Commence a discussion about missile defense policy. More specifically, both sides should have a policy discussion aimed at exchanging perspectives on the effective deployment and operation of missile defense systems; (11) Both armies should explore the possibility of joint capacity building in areas related to disaster response, peacekeeping, police training, and principles of civilmilitary; (12) Work together on building maritime capacity for other naval forces; focus could be on coastal security, vessel boarding, and maritime law enforcement, with each side addressing topics in which they have expertise; (13) Work toward improved Maritime Domain Awareness in the South Asia
maritime region through the use of technologies and information exchanges not only bilaterally but also with Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, and the Maldives; (14) Work more closely on building the Indian Navys human capital in naval architecture to assist Indias ship design and shipbuilding capabilities; (15) Establish an officer exchange program whereby U.S., Indian and Chines officers would serve tours in the other sides respective bureaucracies. For example, U.S. officers could perhaps serve on the Integrated Defense Staff while Indian and Chines officers could serve on the Pacific Command (PACOM) staff. Implementing such a recommendation would be a daunting challenge because both sides would need to work out the modalities of access to sensitive spaces and information. However, merely having the discussion would be a good exercise in enhancing the mutual understanding of bureaucratic procedures.

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IX.
References India, China and the United States in the Indo-Pacific
1. McDaniel, D. (2012).
region: coalition, co-existence or clash? 16 &17. 2. Chatterjee, A. (2011). University of Reading. India-China-United States: The PostCold War Evolution of a Strategic Triangle Political Perspectives. 76-81. 3. Cossa, Ralph A., Glosserman B. (2009). CNAS. The United States and the AsiaPacific Region: Security Strategy for the Obama Administration. 23. 4. Curtis, L., Cheng, D. (2011). The Heritage Foundation The China Challenge: A Strategic Vision for U.S.India Relations. 2-11. 5. Zurich, E. (2012). Center for Security Studies. India-US Relations: Progress Amidst Limited Convergence. 1-3. 6. Lawrence, Susan V. (2013). Congressional Research Service. U.S.-China Relations: An Overview of Policy Issues. 14-17. 7. McDaniel, D. (2012). Australia. India, China and the United States in the IndoPacific region: coalition, co-existence or clash? 1-8 &18-33. 8. Blackwill, Robert D., Chandra, N., Clary, C. (2011). Council on Foreign Relations &Aspen Institute India. The United States and India A Shared Strategic Future. 3-7. 9. Kronstadt, Alan K., Kerr, Paul K., Martin, Michael F., Vaughn, B. (2010). Congressional Research Service. India-U.S. Relations. 2-5. 10. Tanner, Murray S., Dumbaugh, Kerry B., Easton, Ian M. (2011). Center for Naval Analyses. Wary Partners: China and India Assess their Security Relations. 31-37. 11. Fani, Muhammad I. Pakistan. The Indo- US Strategic Partnership in Post 9/11: Implication for Pakistan. 138. 12. Kronstadt, Alan K., Pinto, Sonia. (2013). Congressional Research Service. U.S.India Security Relations: Strategic Issues. 8-13. 13. McDaniel, D. (2012). Australia. India, China and the United States in the IndoProf. Dr. TROND, PhD.
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Pacific region: coalition, co-existence or clash? 9-10, 21-25 &34-36. 14. Chatterjee, A. (2011). University of Reading. India-China-United States: The Post-Cold War Evolution of a Strategic Triangle/ Political Perspectives. 82-84. 15. Zongyi, L. (2012). Future International Direction. The China-India-US Relationship: Where Will It Go? 2-4.

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Pa!s!

stra University of Cambodia

Phnom Penh, August 15, 2012

Prof. Dr. TROND, PhD.

Student: LONG KimKhorn, MA.!

Pa!s!stra University of Cambodia

Prof. Dr. TROND, PhD.

Student: LONG KimKhorn, MA.!

Pa!s!stra University of Cambodia

Student: LONG KimKhorn, MA.!

Pa!s!stra University of Cambodia

Ananya Chatterjee, India-China-United States: The Post-Cold War Evolution of a

Strategic Triangle Political Perspectives, (University of Reading, 2011) p.76-81.

Pa!s!stra University of Cambodia

Student: LONG KimKhorn, MA.!

Pa!s!stra University of Cambodia

Prof. Dr. TROND, PhD.

Student: LONG KimKhorn, MA.!

Pa!s!stra University of Cambodia

Security Studies, 2012 No. 117) p.1-3.

Susan V. Lawrence, U.S.-China Relations: An Overview of Policy Issues

Student: LONG KimKhorn, MA.!

Pa!s!stra University of Cambodia

Student: LONG KimKhorn, MA.!

Pa!s!stra University of Cambodia

Student: LONG KimKhorn, MA.!

Pa!s!stra University of Cambodia

Student: LONG KimKhorn, MA.!

Pa!s!stra University of Cambodia

Student: LONG KimKhorn, MA.!

Pa!s!stra University of Cambodia

K. Alan Kronstadt, Paul K. Kerr, Michael F. Martin, Bruce Vaughn, India-U.S.

Student: LONG KimKhorn, MA.!

Pa!s!stra University of Cambodia

Pa!s!stra University of Cambodia

Susan V. Lawrence, U.S.-China Relations: An Overview of Policy Issues

Pa!s!stra University of Cambodia

Muhammad Ishaque Fani, The Indo- US Strategic Partnership in Post 9/11:

Implication for Pakistan (Pakistan: Vol. 10 No. 2) p.138.

K. Alan Kronstadt, Sonia Pinto, U.S.-India Security Relations: Strategic Issues

Student: LONG KimKhorn, MA.!

Pa!s!stra University of Cambodia

Pa!s!stra University of Cambodia

region: coalition, co-existence or clash? (Australia: 2012) p.9-10.

Ananya Chatterjee, India-China-United States: The Post-Cold War Evolution of a

Student: LONG KimKhorn, MA.!

Pa!s!stra University of Cambodia

Student: LONG KimKhorn, MA.!

Pa!s!stra University of Cambodia

Liu Zongyi, The China-India-US Relationship: Where Will It Go? (Future

Student: LONG KimKhorn, MA.!

Pa!s!stra University of Cambodia

Student: LONG KimKhorn, MA.!

Pa!s!stra University of Cambodia

Student: LONG KimKhorn, MA.!

Pa!s!stra University of Cambodia

Student: LONG KimKhorn, MA.!

Pa!s!stra University of Cambodia

Student: LONG KimKhorn, MA.!

Pa!s!stra University of Cambodia

Student: LONG KimKhorn, MA.!

Pa!s!stra University of Cambodia

Prof. Dr. TROND, PhD.