1

Rights of the Accused Right to Meet the Witnesses Face to Face Marinas vs. Siochi Facts: The present controversy arose out of the issuance by the MTC, of a Writ of Execution in a Civil Case for Ejectment, entitled Jose C. Zulueta vs. Gregorio Atienza. Petitioner Antonio Marinas, Deputy Sheriff of Rizal, with his co-petitioners enforced said Writ of Execution by levying upon the personal properties and chattels of private respondents Victoria Lasin Vda. de Atienza and Rosario L. Atienza, and taking out said properties from their rented house. Respondents were also ejected from said house. Respondent Victoria Lasin Vda, de Atienza reported to the police authorities of Pasig that her jewelry had been taken by petitioners without issuing any receipt and she executed a written Statement which was sworn to before Special Counsel Lucila P. Alcoba. Later, respondents re-entered the house they had been ejected from after securing a Court Order and discovered that several pieces of her jewelry and other personal items were missing. She reported the loss to the authorities and subscribed and swore to the same before respondent Municipal Judge Andres S. Siochi. Respondents, then, entered their house again to get their remaining unlevied properties. They claimed, however, that petitioners and their companions forcibly compelled them to deliver the unlevied personal properties found therein, hauled said articles into a truck and left. Private respondents reported the incident to the police authorities. On February 7, 1966, two separate charges for Theft were filed against petitioners and before the MTC where respondent Judge is presiding. A Complaint for Grave Coercion was also lodged against petitioners. Warrants for the arrest of petitioners were issued by respondent Judge in all three cases after preliminary examination conducted by him in Criminal Cases Nos. 12943 and 12944, and by Special Counsel Lucila P. Alcoba in Criminal Case No. 12945.

Issue: Whether or not the right of the accused to meet the witnesses face to face is violated when respondent judge issued the warrant of arrest.

Held: No. What was conducted by the respondent Judge in these cases is the preliminary examination before the issuance of a warrant of arrest pursuant to section 1, Rule 112. The 1935 Constitution, in section l (3), Article III provides that no warrant shall be issued but upon probable cause to be determined by the Judge after examination of witnesses under oath or affirmation of the complaint and the witnesses he may produce. Conformably thereto, Section 87, paragraph 3, of the Judiciary Act, as amended by Republic Act No. 3828, provides that: before a Municipal Judge may issue a warrant of arrest, the following conditions must first be fulfilled: (1) he must examine the witness or witnesses personally; (2) the examination must be under oath; and (3) the examination must be reduced to writing in the form of searching questions and answers. These requirements have been met in the three criminal cases involved herein. Before the warrants of arrest were issued by the respondent Judge in Criminal Cases Nos. 12944 and 12945, he first conducted the necessary preliminary examination required by Section l of Rule 112 by adopting, as his

2
own questions, and by asking the complainants and their witnesses, the same or Identical questions asked of them by the Investigating Police Officer in their written statements before the said Police Investigator and thereafter the respondent Judge required them (the complainants and their witnesses) to subscribe before and make oath to him as to the truth of the answers given by them to the Police Investigator as shown by the fact that in said Annexes, the deponents signed their respective names twice, once before the Investigating Police Officer and the second time before the respondent Judge who also required them to take the jurat to the oath, thereby complying to the requirements of Section 87 of the Judiciary Act of 1948, as amended, providing therein that 'no warrant of arrest shall be issued by any justice of the peace in any criminal case filed with him unless he first examines the witness or witnesses personally, and the examination shall be under oath and reduced to writing in the form of searching questions and answers. The term "searching questions and answers" means only, taking into consideration the purpose of the preliminary examination which is to determine 'whether there is a reasonable ground to believe that an offense has been committed and the accused is probably guilty thereof so that a warrant of arrest may be issued and the accused held for trial', such questions as have tendency to show the commission of a crime and the perpetrator thereof. What would be searching questions would depend on what is sought to be inquired into, such as: the nature of the offense, the date, time, and place of its commission, the possible motives for its commission the subject, his age, education, status, financial and social circumstances, his attitude toward the investigation, social attitudes, opportunities to commit the offense; the victim, his age, status, family responsibilities, financial and social circumstances, characteristics, etc. The points that are the subject of inquiry may differ from case to case. The questions, therefore, must to a great degree depend upon the Judge making the investigation. At any rate, the court a quo found that respondent Judge was satisfied that the questions and answers contained in the sworn statements taken by T-Sgt. Patosa partake of the nature of his searching questions and answers as required by law,' so the respondent Judge adopted them. In De Mulata vs. Irizari, 61 SCRA 210, 213 (1974): The requirement that the investigating judge must examine the witnesses personally, which examination shall be under oath and reduced to writing in the form of searching questions and answers, is fulfilled where the municipal judge examined under oath the witnesses by asking questions that were adopted from a previous investigation and considered by him as sufficiently searching and, which questions and the answers thereto, were in writing and sworn to before him prior to his issuance of the order of arrest.

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Rights of the Accused Waiver of Rights People vs. Jara Facts: At about 6:00 o'clock in the early morning of June 9, 1978, the waitresses at Alvin's Canteen wondered why their employer, the deceased Amparo Bantigue, did not answer when they called at her door that morning. They went to the kitchen and peeped through a hole. They saw Amparo and Luisa Jara seemingly asleep. They again went to the door and knocked but still no answer came. The waitresses called one of Luisa Jara's waitresses at Aileen's canteen next door. They went back to the kitchen for a second look. They discovered that Amparo and Luisa were both lying in bed; Luisa was dressed only in her underwear and there was dried blood in one of her hands; Amparo, seemingly asleep, lay beside her. Finally, they decided to inform Luisa's daughter, Minerva, about their apprehension. When they met Minerva at the public market, she tearfully accompanied them back to Amparo's room. When no one answered their knocking, Minerva kicked open the door. Inside, they found the two women dead from wounds inflicted on them. The husband of Luisa, appellant Felicisimo Jara, then entered the room and saw the condition of the victims. Inside the room, several ceramic piggy banks belonging to Amparo were missing. Scattered underneath the window of Amparo's bedroom were coins and bits and pieces of what used to be ceramic piggy banks. Later, two suspects in the killing, appellants Reymundo Vergara and Roberto Bernadas, were apprehended. After investigation, they confessed their guilt to the Provincial Commander of the Philippine Constabulary in Palawan and other police investigators. They also positively identified appellant Felicisimo Jara as the mastermind who had plotted the killing and who promised them a fee of P1,000.00 each for their participation. Before the City Fiscal and First Assistant Fiscal of Puerto Princesa City, respectively, appellants Vergara and Bernadas subscribed and swore to their extra-judicial statements wherein they narrated their role and that of Felicisimo Jara in the killing. Felicisimo Jara denied the charge that he was the one who killed his wife, Luisa, together with her friend, Amparo Bantigue. He interposed alibi as a defense and testified that at the time the killings took place at Alvin's Canteen at Malvar Street, Puerto Princesa City, he was fast asleep with his grandchildren at his stepdaughter's house in Pineda Subdivision. The other accused, Reymundo Vergara and Roberto Bernadas retracted their respective extra-judicial confessions admitting their participation in the crimes charged and identifying their "mastermind" as the accused Jara during proceedings before the Inquest Fiscal. They contested the admissibility of the extra-judicial confessions and the subsequent reenactment of the crime on the ground that their participations in these occasions were not free and voluntary and were without the benefit of counsel.

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Issue: Whether or not the alleged extra-judicial confessions of accused-appellants Reymundo Vergara and Roberto Bernadas were taken thru force and without benefit of counsel.

Held: Yes. The waiver with its tired, punctilious, fixed, and artificially stately style does not create an impression of voluntariness or even understanding on the part of the accused. The showing of a spontaneous, free, and unconstrained giving up of a right is missing. Whenever a protection given by the Constitution is waived by the person entitled to that protection, the presumption is always against the waiver. Consequently, the prosecution must prove with strongly convincing evidence to the satisfaction of this Court that indeed the accused willingly and voluntarily submitted his confession and knowingly and deliberately manifested that he was not interested in having a lawyer assist him during the taking of that confession. That proof is missing in this case. The records sustain the appellants' contention that their extra-judicial confessions bear clear earmarks of illegality and improbability. There are other factors to be considered in these cases. Vergara and Bernadas had been detained for more than two (2) weeks before they decided to give "voluntary" confessions. We doubt if it was two weeks of soul-searching and introspection alone which led them to confess. There must have been other persuasions. Apart from their extra-judicial confessions, no other evidence to implicate Bernadas and Vergara as perpetrators of the killing was introduced by the prosecution. Since these confessions are inadmissible in evidence, the two appellants have to be acquitted. The strongest evidence against Felicisimo Jara are the extra-judicial confessions of his two coaccused. Bernadas and Vergara point to Jara as the one who bludgeoned the two victims with a hammer and then used a pair of scissors in inflicting the stab wounds. He was also alleged to have offered them P1,000.00 each if they would help him in the killing of his wife. However, since the confessions of Bernadas and Vergara are inadmissible against them, with more reason can they not be used against Jara.

Rights of the Accused Right to Bail Paderanga vs. CA Facts: Miguel P. Paderanga was included in an amended information for the crime of multiple murder as the mastermind. Paderanga, through his counsel, filed a Motion for Admission of Bail before a Warrant of Arrest could be issued by the lower court. Copies of the motion were furnished to the State Prosecutor, the Regional Prosecutors office and the Private Prosecutor. The lower c ourt proceeded to hear the application for bail, four of the petitioners counsels appeared before the court but only Erlindo Abejo, the Assistant Prosecutor of the Regional State Prosecutions Office appeared. Paderanga was unable to appear for the hearing due to an ailment that needed medical attention. His counsel manifested that they were submitting custody over the person of their client to the local chapter president of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and that, for purposes of said hearing, he considered being in the custody of the law. Prosecutor Abejo, in accordance to the stand of the Regional State prosecutor informed the court that the prosecution was neither supporting nor opposing the application for bail, and that they were submitting the same to the sound discretion of the court. He also waived the presentation of evidence in the prosecutions behalf, leading to the grant of bail with P200,000.00 as bail bond. Later, a motion for reconsideration was filed by Henrick Guingoyon, the State Prosecutor, who alleged that he received his copy of the petition for admission to bail on the day after the hearing but his motion was denied. With this, he elevated the matter to the Court of Appeals through the special civil action of certiorari. The Court of Appeals reasoned that Paderanga was granted bail when was not in the custody of the law, thus not eligible for the grant of the petition. Then, it annulled the order granting Paderanga bail. The latter challenged the judgment of the Appellate court, hence the case at bar. Issue: Whether or not Paderangas petition for bail is admissible. Held: Yes. An arrest of the second kind exists, that is by submission to the custody of the person making the arrest. It is enough that the person, although not physically restrained, has surrendered himself to the jurisdiction of the court. Other procedures in this case are followed.

In the case, it may be conceded that Paderanga had indeed filed his motion for admission to bail before he was actually and physically placed under arrest. He may, however, at that point and in the factual ambience therefore, be considered as being constructively and legally under custody. Thus in the likewise peculiar circumstance which attended the filing of his bail application with the trail court, for purposes of the hearing thereof he should be deemed to have voluntarily submitted his person to the custody of the law and, necessarily, to the jurisdiction of the trial court which thereafter granted bail as prayed for. In fact, an arrest is made either by actual restraint of the arrestee or merely by his submission to the custody of the person making the arrest. The latter mode may be exemplified by the so-called house arrest or, in case of military offenders, by being confined to quarters or restricted to the military camp area. It should be stressed herein that petitioner, through his counsel, emphatically made it known to the prosecution and to the trail court during the hearing for bail that he could not personally appear as he was then confined at the nearby Cagayan Capitol College General Hospital for acute costochondritis, and could not then obtain medical clearance to leave the hospital. The prosecution and the trial court, notwithstanding their explicit knowledge of the specific whereabouts of petitioner, never lifted a finger to have the arrest warrant duly served upon him. Certainly, it would have taken but the slightest effort to place petitioner in the physical custody of the authorities, since he was then incapacitated and under medication in a hospital bed just over a kilometer away, by simply ordering his confinement or placing him under guard. The undeniable fact is that petitioner was by then in the constructive custody of the law. Apparently, both the trial court and the prosecutors agreed on that point since they never attempted to have him physically restrained. Through his lawyers, he expressly submitted to physical and legal control over his person, firstly, by filing the application for bail with the trail court; secondly, by furnishing true information of his actual whereabouts; and, more importantly, by unequivocally recognizing the jurisdiction of the said court. Moreover, when it came to his knowledge that a warrant for his arrest had been issued, petitioner never made any attempt or evinced any intent to evade the clutches of the law or concealed his whereabouts from the authorities since the day he was charged in court, up to the submission application for bail, and until the day of the hearing thereof.

Rights of the Accused Right to Bail People vs. Donato Facts: Private respondent and his co-accused were charged of rebellion on October 2, 1986 for acts committed before and after February 1986. Private respondent filed with a Motion to Quash alleging that: (a) the facts alleged do not constitute an offense; (b) the Court has no jurisdiction over the offense charged; (c) the Court has no jurisdiction over the persons of the defendants; and (d) the criminal action or liability has been extinguished. This was denied. May 9, 1987 Respondent filed a petition for bail, which was opposed that the respondent is not entitled to bail anymore since rebellion became a capital offense under PD 1996, 942 and 1834 amending ART. 135 of RPC. On 5 June 1987 the President issued Executive Order No. 187 repealing, among others, P.D. Nos. 1996, 942 and 1834 and restoring to full force and effect Article 135 of the Revised Penal Code as it existed before the amendatory decrees. Judge Donato now granted the bail, which was fixed at P30,000.00 and imposed a condition that he shall report to the court once every two months within the first ten days of every period thereof. Petitioner filed a supplemental motion for reconsideration indirectly asking the court to deny bail to and to allow it to present evidence in support thereof considering the "inevitable probability that the accused will not comply with this main condition of his bail. It was contended that: 1. The accused has evaded the authorities for thirteen years and was an escapee from detention when arrested; (Chairman of CPP-NPA) 2. He was not arrested at his residence as he had no known address;

3. He was using the false name "Manuel Mercado Castro" at the time of his arrest and presented a Driver's License to substantiate his false identity;

4. The address he gave "Panamitan, Kawit, Cavite," turned out to be also a false address; 5. He and his companions were on board a private vehicle with a declared owner whose identity and address were also found to be false;

6. Pursuant to Ministry Order No. 1-A dated 11 January 1982 , a reward of P250,000.00 was offered and paid for his arrest. This however was denied. Hence the appeal. Issue: Whether Held: Yes. or Not the private respondent has the right to bail.

Bail in the instant case is a matter of right. It is absolute since the crime is not a capital offense, therefore prosecution has no right to present evidence. It is only when it is a capital offense that the right becomes discretionary. However it was wrong for the Judge to change the amount of bail from 30K to 50K without hearing the prosecution. Republic Act No. 6968 approved on 24 October 1990, providing a penalty of reclusion perpetua to the crime of rebellion, is not applicable to the accused as it is not favorable to him. Accused validly waived his right to bail in another case(petition for habeas corpus). Agreements were made therein: accused to remain under custody, whereas his co-detainees Josefina Cruz and Jose Milo Concepcion will be released immediately, with a condition that they will submit themselves in the jurisdiction of the court. Said petition for HC was dismissed. Bail is the security given for the release of a person in custody of the law. Ergo, there was a waiver. We hereby rule that the right to bail is another of the constitutional rights which can be waived. It is a right which is personal to the accused and whose waiver would not be contrary to law, public order, public policy, morals, or good customs, or prejudicial to a third person with a right recognized by law.

Rights of the Accused Right to Bail Marzan-Gelacio vs. Flores Facts: Juana Marzan-Gelacio filed two counts of rape against Emmanuel Artajos before RTC, Branch 20, Vigan, Ilocos Sur, wherein the respondent Judge Alipio Flores is the presider of the sala. After going over the records of the case and the recommendation of the 1 Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Redentor Cardenas, the Judge concluded that the evidence of guilt was weak but made a finding of probable cause. Consequently he issued warrants of arrest with a recommendation of P200,000.00 bail bond in both cases. Gelacio through her private prosecutor filed an urgent motion to deny bail. On a later date, the accuseds counsel filed a petition to reduce bail bond to P100,000.00 for each case. After a series of exchange motions by the counsels of Gelacio and Artajos, and the Judges recalls of his previous orders, the Judge ordered the grant of the Motion to reduce bail by the accused. Gelacio through her counsel filed an Administrative Complaint against the Judge for Gross Ignorance of the Law and Evident Partiality for granting the bail without any hearing. Issue: Whether or not a Judge can grant an accuseds petition for bail without a hearing. Held: No. A judge cannot grant a petition for bail without a trial. The procedural necessity of a hearing relative to the grant of bail cannot be dispensed with especially in this case where the accused is charged with a capital offense. Utmost diligence is required of trial judges in granting bail especially in cases where bail is not a matter of right. Certain procedures must be followed in order that the accused would be present during trial. As a responsible judge, respondent must not be swayed by the mere representations of the parties; instead, he should look into the real and hard facts of the case. To do away with the requisite bail hearing especially in those cases where the applicant is charged with a capital offense is to dispense with this time-tested safeguard against arbitrariness. It must always be remembered that imperative justice requires the proper observance of indispensable technicalities
st

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precisely designed to ensure it proper dispensation. In this regard, it needs be stressed that the grant or the denial of bail in capital offenses hinges on the issue of whether or not the evidence of guilt of the accused is strong and the determination of whether or not the evidence is strong is a matter of judicial discretion which remains with the judge.

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Rights of the Accused Right to Bail People vs. Cabral Facts: Offended party Cecille Buenafe rode in the jeepney then driven by the accused Roderick Odiamar on July 20, 1994 at about 8:00 oclock from the Poblacion, Lagonoy, Camarines Sur. The said jeepney proceeded to the Pilapil Beach resort at Telegrafo, San Jose, Camarines Sur instead of Sabang where she and Stephen Florece intended to go. And when the said jeepney was already inside that resort, Cecille even followed the accused in going down from the jeepney without protest. In that resort, when the accused and companions allegedly forced the offended party to drink gin, the latter, at first, refused and even did not swallow it but later on voluntarily took four (4) shots and they also allegedly forced the said offended party to inhale smoke, out of a small cigarette, presumably marijuana. In a cottage, the accused allegedly was able to consummate the alleged offense of rape by removing the two (2) hands of the offended party, placed them on her knee, separating them thereby freeing the said hand and consequently pushed the head of the accused and proceeded to rape the offended party. After the alleged commission of rape at about 3:00 oclock morning of July 21, 1994, the offended party and the latters companions all boarded the same jeepney going back to the Poblacion of Lagonoy, without the said offended party, protesting, crying or in any way showing sign of grief regarding the alleged commission of the offense of rape until the jeepney reached the house of the accused. The offended party had herself physically examined and her medical certificate and it states that there was a healed laceration on the hymen, her laceration might have been sustained by the said offended party, a month, six (6) months, and even a year, prior to the said examination and that the said laceration might have been caused by repeated penetration of a male sex organ probably showing that the offended party might have experienced sexual intercourse. Accused-respondent was then charged with rape upon the

complaint of offended party. In a bid to secure temporary liberty, accused-respondent filed a motion praying that he be released on bail which petitioner opposed by presenting real, documentary and testimonial evidence. The lower court, however, granted the motion for bail in an order on the ground that the evidence of guilt is not strong. Believing that accused-respondent was not entitled to bail as the evidence against him was strong, the prosecution filed the two motions which the lower court disposed of. The above-cited orders prompted petitioner to file a petition before the Court of Appeals with prayer for temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction. The Court of Appeals denied the petition. Issue: Whether or not the right to bail of the accused was violated in this case.

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Held: No. In this case, accused-respondent was being charged with rape qualified by the use of a deadly weapon punishable by reclusion perpetua to death. As such, bail is discretionary and not a matter of right. The grant or denial of an application for bail is, therefore, dependent on whether the evidence of guilt is strong which the lower court should determine in a hearing called for the purpose. The determination of whether the evidence of guilt is strong, in this regard, is a matter of judicial discretion. While the lower court would never be deprived of its mandated prerogative to exercise judicial discretion, this Court would unhesitatingly reverse the trial courts findings if found to be laced with grave abuse of discretion. By judicial discretion, the law mandates the determination of whether proof is evident or the presumption of guilt is strong.[6] Proof evident or Evident proof in this connection has been held to mean clear, strong evidence which leads a well-guarded dispassionate judgment to the conclusion that the offense has been committed as charged, that accused is the guilty agent, and that he will probably be punished capitally if the law is administered. Presumption great exists when the circumstances testified to are such that the inference of guilt naturally to be drawn therefrom is strong, clear, and convincing to an unbiased judgment and excludes all reasonable probability of any other conclusion.[8] Even though there is a reasonable doubt as to the guilt of accused, if on an examination of the entire record the presumption is great that accused is guilty of a capital offense, bail should be refused. The present Constitution, as previously adverted to, provides that in crimes punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong, bail is not a matter of right. This Court has reiterated this mandate in Section 7, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court. Recently, this Court laid down the following rules in Basco v. Judge Rapatalo[17]which outlined the duties of a judge in case an application for bail is filed: (1) Notify the prosecutor of the hearing of the application for bail or require him to submit his recommendation; (2) Conduct a hearing of the application for bail regardless of whether or not the prosecution refuses to present evidence to show that the guilt of the accused is strong for the purpose of enabling the court to exercise its discretion; (3) Decide whether the evidence of guilt of the accused is strong based on the summary of evidence of the prosecution; (4) If the guilt of the accused is not strong, discharge the accused upon the approval of the bailbond. Otherwise, petition should be denied. Based on the above-cited procedure and requirements, after the hearing, the courts order granting or refusing bail must contain a summary of the evidence for the prosecution. A summary is defined as a comprehensive and usually brief abstract or digest of a text or statement.

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Rights of the Accused Habeas Corpus Ampatuan v. Macaraig Facts: Petitioner Nurhida Juhuri Ampatuan filed a petition for the issuance of a Writ of Habeas Corpus for the release of her husband, Police Officer I Basser B. Ampatuan (PO1 Ampatuan). The petitioner alleged that on 14 April 2008, PO1 Ampatuan, who was then assigned at Sultan Kudarat Municipal Police Station, was asked by the Chief of Police to report to the Provincial Director of Shariff Kabunsuan. He was then brought to the Provincial Director of the Philippine National Police (PNP) Maguindanao where he was restrained of his freedom without cause. The next day, 15 April 2008, PO1 Ampatuan was brought to the General Santos City Airport and was made to board a Philippine Airlines plane bound for Manila. Upon landing at the Manila Domestic Airport, PO1 Ampatuan was turned over to policemen of Manila and brought to Manila Mayor Alfredo Lim by Police Director Geary Barias and General Roberto Rosales. A press briefing was then conducted where it was announced that PO1 Ampatuan was arrested for the killing of two (2) Commission on Elections (COMELEC) Officials. Thereafter, PO1 Ampatuan was brought to inquest Prosecutor Renato Gonzaga of the Office of the City Prosecutor of Manila due to the alleged murder of Atty. Alioden D. Dalaig, head of the Law Department of the COMELEC. However, on 21 April 2008, Chief Inquest Prosecutor Nelson Salva ordered the release for further investigation of PO1 Ampatuan. The Order was approved by the City Prosecutor of Manila. But Police Senior Superintendent Co Yee Co, Jr., and Police Chief Inspector Agapito Quimson refused to release PO1 Ampatuan. Hence the petition for habeas corpus. Respondents for their part, alleged that on the evening of 10 November 2007, a sixty-four-yearold man, later identified as Atty. Alioden D. Dalaig, Head of the COMELEC Legal Department, was killed at the corner of M. H. Del Pilar and Pedro Gil Streets, Ermita, Manila. The investigation conducted by the Manila Police District (MPD) Homicide Section yielded the identity of the male perpetrator as PO1 Ampatuan. Consequently, PO1 Ampatuan was commanded to the MPD District Director for proper disposition. Likewise, inquest proceedings were conducted by the Manila Prosecutors Office. On 18 April 2008, PO1 Ampatuan was charged with the administrative offense of grave misconduct for the alleged killing of Atty. alaig. On the same day, Police irector General Avelino I. Razon, Jr. ordered that PO1 Ampatuan be placed under restrictive custody. Acting on the orders of General Razon, Jr., Special Order No. 921 was issued by Police irector Edgardo E. Acu a, placing PO1 Ampatuan under restrictive custody of the Regional Director, NCRPO, effective 19 April 2008. Meanwhile, on 21 April 2008, the City Prosecutor of Manila recommended that the case against PO1 Ampatuan be set for further investigation and that the latter be released from custody unless he is being held for other charges/legal grounds. However, on 25 April 2008, Judge Virgilio V. Macaraig denied the petition for habeas corpus and held that the placement of PO1 Ampatuan under restrictive custody pursuant to Section 52, par. 4 of Republic Act No. 8551 (otherwise known as the Philippine National Police Reform and Reorganization Act of 1998) constitutes a valid restraint of his liberty.

Issue: Whether or not the placement of PO1 Ampatuan under restrictive custody pursuant to Section 52 of Republic Act No. 8551 is unlawful or illegal for which the remedy of habeas corpus is proper.

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Held: No. The writ of habeas corpus applies only to cases of illegal confinement or detention by which any person is deprived of his liberty The objective of the writ is to determine whether the confinement or detention is valid or lawful. If it is, the writ cannot be issued. What is to be inquired into is the legality of a persons detention as of, at the earliest, the filing of the application for the writ of habeas corpus, for even if the detention is at its inception illegal, it may, by reason of some supervening events, such as the instances mentioned in Section 4 of Rule 102, be no longer illegal at the time of the filing of the application. Plainly stated, the writ obtains immediate relief for those who have been illegally confined or imprisoned without sufficient cause. The writ, however, should not be issued when the custody over the person is by virtue of a judicial process or a valid judgment. The most basic criterion for the issuance of the writ, therefore, is that the individual seeking such relief is illegally deprived of his freedom of movement or placed under some form of illegal restraint. If an individuals liberty is restrained via some legal process, the writ of habeas corpus is unavailing. Fundamentally, in order to justify the grant of the writ of habeas corpus, the restraint of liberty must be in the nature of an illegal and involuntary deprivation of freedom of action. Habeas corpus applies to any form of illegal or unlawful restraint of liberty In general, the purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is to determine whether or not a particular person is legally held. A prime specification of an application for a writ of habeas corpus, in fact, is an actual and effective, and not merely nominal or moral, illegal restraint of liberty. The writ of habeas corpus was devised and exists as a speedy and effectual remedy to relieve persons from unlawful restraint, and as the best and only sufficient defense of personal freedom. A prime specification of an application for a writ of habeas corpus is restraint of liberty. The essential object and purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is to inquire into all manner of involuntary restraint as distinguished from voluntary, and to relieve a person therefrom if such restraint is illegal. Any restraint which will preclude freedom of action is sufficient. Habeas Corpus: judicial inquiry and discretion In passing upon a petition for habeas corpus, a court or judge must first inquire into whether the petitioner is being restrained of his liberty. If he is not, the writ will be refused. Inquiry into the cause of detention will proceed only where such restraint exists. If the alleged cause is thereafter found to be unlawful, then the writ should be granted and the petitioner discharged. Needless to state, if otherwise, again the writ will be refused. While habeas corpus is a writ of right, it will not issue as a matter of course or as a mere perfunctory operation on the filing of the petition. Judicial discretion is called for in its issuance and it must be clear to the judge to whom the petition is presented that, prima facie, the petitioner is entitled to the writ. It is only if the court is satisfied that a person is being unlawfully restrained of his liberty will the petition for habeas corpus be granted. If the respondents are not detaining or restraining the applicant or the person in whose behalf the petition is filed, the petition should be dismissed. Restrictive custody under R.A. No. 6975, as amended by R.A. No. 8551 is not an unlawful or illegal restraint on liberty Under Section 52 of R.A. No. 8551, the Chief of the PNP has the authority to place police personnel under restrictive custody during the pendency of a grave administrative case filed against him or even after the filing of a criminal complaint, grave in nature, against such police personnel.

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Given that PO1 Ampatuan has been placed under restrictive custody, such constitutes a valid argument for his continued detention. This Court has held that a restrictive custody and monitoring of movements or whereabouts of police officers under investigation by their superiors is not a form of illegal detention or restraint of liberty. Restrictive custody is, at best, nominal restraint which is beyond the ambit of habeas corpus. It is neither actual nor effective restraint that would call for the grant of the remedy prayed for. It is a permissible precautionary measure to assure the PNP authorities that the police officers concerned are always accounted for. Since the basis of PO1 Ampatuans r estrictive custody is the administrative case filed against him, his remedy is within such administrative process. DISPOSITIVE: The Supreme Court dismissed the petition for lack of merit.