Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Respondents: Court of Appeals, CHED, et. al. Facts: - Mr. James Yap, while eating alone at Manangs Restaurant, overheard the conversation of the two men from Tau Gamma Phi Fraternity bad-mouthing at Domino Lux (his fraternity). - When he came home, he informed his brod about what happened and the latter came back to Manangs to confront the two men fr om Tau Gamma Phi. - After this incident, a meeting was conducted between the two heads of the fraternity through the intercession of the Student Council. - Then, 5 members of the Tau Gamma Phi Fraternity went to the tambayan of the Domino Lux Fraternity in the campus to look for Mr. Yap (based on their descriptions.) - March 29, 1995: Mr. Yap was attacked and mauled by respondents Bungubung, Valdes, Reverente and Lee. Mr. Pascual, brod of Mr. Yap, informed Domino Lux about what happened but the latter decided not to do anything. Mr. Pascual, together with Mr. Cano and Perez, was mauled again by the respondents. - The mauling incidents were a result of a fraternity war. The victims, namely: petitioner James Yap and Dennis Pascual, Ericson Cano, and Michael Perez, are members of the Domino Lux Fraternity, while the alleged assailants, private respondents Alvin Aguilar, James Paul Bungubung, Richard Reverente and Roberto Valdes, Jr. are members of Tau Gamma Phi Fraternity, a rival fraternity. - Petitioners filed a complaint to the Disciplinary Board against respondents. - As it appeared that students from DLSU and CSB were involved in the mauling incidents, a joint DLSU-CSB Discipline Board was formed to investigate the incidents. - On May 3, 1995, the DLSU-CSB Joint Discipline Board issued a Resolution finding private respondents guilty. They were meted the supreme penalty of automatic expulsion, pursuant to CHED Order No. 4. - Private respondents separately moved for reconsideration before the Office of the Senior Vice-President for Internal Operations of DLSU. The motions were all denied in a Letter-Resolution. - On June 5, 1995, private respondent Aguilar filed with the RTC, Manila, against petitioners a petition for certiorari and injunction with prayer for temporary restraining order (TRO) and/or writ of preliminary injunction. - The following day, June 6, 1995, respondent Judge issued a TRO24 directing DLSU, its subordinates, agents, representatives and/or other persons acting for and in its behalf to refrain and desist from implementing Resolution dated May 3, 1995 and Letter-Resolution dated June 1, 1995 and to immediately desist from barring the enrollment of Aguilar for the second term of school year (SY) 1995. - Other respondents filed for petitions for intervention. The petitioners, except James Yap, filed a petition to dismiss the petitions-in-intervention. - Respondent-Judge granted the petitions for intervention and denied the petition to dismiss by the petitioners (in this case). - Despite the said order, private respondent Aguilar was refused enrollment by petitioner DLSU when he attempted to enroll on September 22, 1995 for the second term of SY 1995-1996. Thus, on September 25, 1995, Aguilar filed with respondent Judge an urgent motion to cite petitioners (respondents there) in contempt of court. - On October 16, 1995, petitioner DLSU filed with the CA a petition for certiorari with prayer for a TRO and/or writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin the enforcement of respondent Judges order and writ of preliminary injuction. - On April 12, 1996, the CA granted petitioners prayer for preliminary injunction. - On May 14, 1996, the CHED issued its questioned Resolution No. 181-96, summarily disapproving the penalty of expulsion for all private respondents. As for Aguilar, he was to be reinstated, while other private respondents were to be excluded. - DLSU still prevent Mr. Aguilar from enrolling and attending his classes which prompted the latters lawyer to send several de mand letters. - The Court of Appeals said in its decision that the resolution of CHED is immediately executory in character. -On March 27, 2006, private respondent Aguilar filed his manifestation stating that he has long completed his course at petitioner DLSU. He finished and passed all his enrolled subjects but despite having completed all the academic requirements for his course, DLSU has not issued a certificate of completion/graduation in his favor. Issues: 1. Whether it is the DECS or the CHED which has legal authority to review decisions of institutions of higher learning that impose disciplinary action on their students found violating disciplinary rules. 2. Whether or not petitioner DLSU is within its rights in expelling private respondent 2.a Were private respondents accorded due process of law? 2.b Can petitioner DLSU invoke its right to academic freedom? 2.c Was the guilt of private respondents proven by substantial evidence 3. Whether or not the penalty imposed by DLSU on private respondents is proportionate to their misdeed. Ruling: Petitioner DLSU is now faced with the spectacle of having two different directives from the CHED and the respondent Judge CHED ordering the exclusion of private respondents Bungubung, Reverente, and Valdes, Jr., and the Judge ordering petitioner DLSU to allow them to enroll and complete their degree courses until their graduation. According to the SC, This is the reason why we opt to decide the whole case on the merits, brushing aside technicalities, in order to settle the substantial issues involved. This Court has the power to take cognizance of the petition at bar due to compelling reasons, and the nature and importance of the issues raised warrant the immediate exercise of our jurisdiction. 1. It is the CHED, not DECS, which has the power of supervision and review over disciplinary cases decided by institutions of higher learning. 2a. Private respondents were accorded due process of law. The Due Process Clause in Article III, Section 1 of the Constitution embodies a system of rights based on moral principles so deeply imbedded in the traditions and feelings of our people as to be deemed fundamental to a civilized society as conceived by our entire history. The constitutional behest that no person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law is solemn and inflexible. In administrative cases, such as investigations of students found violating school discipline, [t]here are withal minimum st andards which must be met before to satisfy the demands of procedural due process and these are: that (1) the students must be informed in writing of the nature and cause of any accusation against them; (2) they shall have the right to answer the charges against them and with the assistance if counsel, if desired; (3) they shall be informed of the evidence against them; (4) they shall have the right to adduce evidence in their own behalf; and (5) the evidence must be duly considered by the investigating committee or official designated by the school authorities to hear and decide the cas e.
The essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be heard, or as applied to administrative proceedings, an opportunity to explain ones side or an opportunity to seek reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. Private respondents were duly informed in writing of the charges against them by the DLSU-CSB Joint Discipline Board through petitioner Sales. They were given the opportunity to answer the charges against them as they, in fact, submitted their respective answers. They were also informed of the evidence presented against them as they attended all the hearings before the Board. Moreover, private respondents were given the right to adduce evidence on their behalf and they did. Lastly, the Discipline Board considered all the pieces of evidence submitted to it by all the parties before rendering its resolution in Discipline Case No. 9495-3-25121. 2b. Petitioner DLSU, as an institution of higher learning, possesses academic freedom which includes determination of who to admit for study. Section 5(2), Article XIV of the Constitution guaranties all institutions of higher learning academic freedom. This institutional academic freedom includes the right of the school or college to decide for itself, its aims and objectives, and how best to attain them free from outside coercion or interference save possibly when the overriding public interest calls for some restraint.Petitioner DLSU, therefore, can very well exercise its academic freedom, which includes its free choice of students for admission to its school. 2c. The guilt of private respondents Bungubung, Reverente and Valdes, Jr. was proven by substantial evidence. Courts reject alibi when there are credible eyewitnesses to the crime who can positively identify the accused. Alibi is an inherently weak defense and courts must receive it with caution because one can easily fabricate an alibi. The required proof in administrative cases, such as in student discipline cases, is neither proof beyond reasonable doubt nor preponderance of evidence but only substantial evidence. According to Ang Tibay v. Court of Industrial Relations, it means such reasonable evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Respondents were unable to show convincingly that they were not at the scene of the crime on March 29, 1995 and that it was impossible for them to have been there. Moreover, their alibi cannot prevail over their positive identification by the victims. The alibi of Aguilar was supported by a certification signed by an authority. Therefore, alibi assumes commensurate strength. This is but consistent with the presumption of innocence in favor of accused. 3. The penalty of expulsion imposed by DLSU on private respondents is disproportionate to their misdeed. It is true that schools have the power to instill discipline in their students as subsumed in their academic freedom and that the estab lishment of rules governing university-student relations, particularly those pertaining to student discipline, may be regarded as vital, not merely to the smooth and efficient operation of the institution, but to its very survival. This power, however, does not give them the untrammeled discretion t o impose a penalty which is not commensurate with the gravity of the misdeed. If the concept of proportionality between the offense committed and the sanction imposed is not followed, an element of arbitrariness intrudes. That would give rise to a due process question. The petition is partially granted. The Court of Appeals Resolutions dated July 30, 1996 and dated October 15, 1996, and Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 36, Order dated January 7, 1997 are ANNULLED AND SET ASIDE, while CHED Resolution 181-96 dated May 14, 1996 is AFFIRMED. Final: Petitioner DLSU is ordered to issue a certificate of completion/graduation in favor of private respondent Aguilar. On the other hand, it may exclude or drop the names of private respondents Bungubung, Reverente, and Valdes, Jr. from its rolls, and their transfer credentials immediately issued. PHILCOMSAT VS. ALCUAZ [180 SCRA 218; G.R. NO.84818; 18 DEC 1989] Sunday, February 01, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes Labels: Case Digests, Political Law Facts: Herein petitioner is engaged in providing for services involving telecommunications. Charging rates for certain specified lines that were reduced by order of herein respondent Jose AlcuazCommissioner of the National Telecommunications Commission. The rates were ordered to be reduced by fifteen percent (15%) due to Executive Order No. 546 which granted the NTC the power to fix rates. Said order was issued without prior notice and hearing. Issue: Whether or Not E.O. 546 is unconstitutional.
Held: Yes. Respondents admitted that the application of a policy like the fixing of rates as exercised by administrative bodies is quasi-judicial rather than quasi-legislative. But respondents contention that notice and hearing are not required since the assailed order is merely incident al to the entire proceedings and temporary in nature is erroneous. Section 16(c) of the Public Service Act, providing for the proceedings of the Commission, upon notice and hearing, dictates that a Commission has power to fix rates, upon proper notice and hearing, and, if not subject to the exceptions, limitations or saving provisions. It is thus clear that with regard to rate-fixing, respondent has no authority to make such order without first giving petitioner a hearing, whether the order be temporary or permanent, and it is immaterial whether the same is made upon a complaint, a summary investigation, or upon the commission's own motion as in the present case. WHEREFORE, the writ prayed for is GRANTED and the order ofrespondents is hereby SET ASIDE. US vs TURIBIO Facts: Respondent Toribio is an owner of carabao, residing in the town of Carmen in the province of Bohol. The trial court of Bohol found that the respondent slaughtered or caused to be slaughtered a carabao without a permit from the municipal treasurer of themunicipality wherein it was slaughtered, in violation of Sections 30 and 33 of Act No. 1147, an Act regulating the registration, branding, and slaughter of Large Cattle. The act prohibits the slaughter of large cattle fit for agricultural work or other draft purposes for human consumption. The respondent counters by stating that what the Act is (1) prohibiting is the slaughter of large cattle in the municipal slaughter house without a permit given by the municipal treasurer. Furthermore, he contends that the municipality of Carmen has no slaughter house and that he slaughtered his carabao in his dwelling, (2) the act constitutes a taking of property for public use in the exercise of the right of eminent domain without providing for the compensation of owners, and it is an undue and unauthorized exercise of police power of the state for it deprives them of the enjoyment of their private property. Issue: Whether or not Act. No. 1147, regulating the registration, branding and slaughter of large cattle, is an undue and unauthorized exercise of police power. Held: It is a valid exercise of police power of the state. Police power is the inherent power of the state to legislate laws which may interfere with personal liberties. To justify the state in the exercise of its sovereign police power it must appear (1) that the interest of the general public requires it and (2) that the means are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose, and not unduly oppressive upon individuals.
The court is of the opinion that the act applies generally to the slaughter of large cattle for human consumption, ANYWHERE, without a permit duly secured from the municipal treasurer, For to do otherwise is to defeat the purpose of the law and the intent of the law makers. The act primarily seeks to protect large cattle against theft to make it easy for the recovery and return to owners, which encouraged them to regulate the registration and slaughter of large cattle. Several years prior to the enactment of the said law, an epidemic struck the Philippine islands which threatened the survival of carabaos in the country. In some provinces seventy, eighty and even one hundred percent of their local carabaos perished due to the said epidemic. This drove the prices of carabaos up to four or five-fold, as a consequence carabao theft became rampant due to the luxurious prices of these work animals. Moreover, this greatly affected the food production of the country which prompted the government to import rice from its neighboring countries. As these work animals are vested with public interest for they are of fundamental use for the production of crops, the government was prompted to pass a law that would protect these work animals. The purpose of the law is to stabilize the number of carabaos in the country as well as to redistribute them throughout the entire archipelago. It was also the same reason why large cattles fit for farm work was prohibited to be slaughtered for human consumption. Most importantly, the respondents carabao was found to be fit for farm work. These reasons satisfy the requisites for the valid exercise of police power. Act No. 1147 is not an exercise of the inherent power of eminent domain. The said law does not constitute the taking of carabaos for public purpose; it just serves as a mere regulation for the consumption of these private properties for the protection of general welfare and public interest. Thus, the demand for compensation of the owner must fail. RESTITUTO YNOT vs. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT (148 SCRA 659) Case Digest Facts: On January 13, 1984, the petitioner transported six carabaos in a pump boat from Masbate to Iloilo when the same was confiscated by the police station commander of Barotac Nuevo, Iloilo for the violation of E.O. 626-A. A case was filed by the petitioner questioning the constitutionality of executive order and the recovery of the carabaos. After considering the merits of the case, the confiscation was sustained and the court declined to rule on the constitutionality issue. The petitioner appealed the decision to the Intermediate Appellate Court but it also upheld the ruling of RTC. Issue: Is E.O. 626-A unconstitutional? Ruling: The Supreme Court found E.O. 626-A unconstitutional. The executive act defined the prohibition, convicted the petitioner and immediately imposed punishment, which was carried out forthright. Due process was not properly observed. Ermita-Malate Hotel/Motel vs. City of Manila (20 SCRA 849) Facts: On June 13, 1963, the Municipal Board of Manila passed Ordinance No. 4760 with the following provisions questioned for its violation of due process: refraining from entertaining or accepting any guest or customer unless it fills out a prescribed form in the lobby in open view; prohibiting admission o less than 18 years old; usurious increase of license fee to P4,500 and 6,000 o 150% and 200% respectively (tax issue also); making unlawful lease or rent more than twice every 24 hours; and cancellation of license for subsequent violation. The lower court issued preliminary injunction and petitioners raised the case to SC on certiorari. Issue: Is the ordinance compliant with the due process requirement of the constitution? Held: Ordinance is a valid exercise of police power to minimize certain practices hurtful to public morals. There is no violation o constitutional due process for being reasonable and the ordinance is enjoys the presumption of constitutionality absent any irregularity on its face. Taxation may be made to implement a police power and the amount, object, and instance of taxation is dependent upon the local legislative body. Judgment of lower court reversed and injunction lifted. City of Manila vs Judge Perfecto Laguio On 30 Mar 1993, Mayor Lim signed into law Ord 7783 entitled AN ORDINANCE PROHIBITING THE ESTABLISHMENT OR OPERATION OF BUSINESSES PROVIDING CERTAIN FORMS OF AMUSEMENT, ENTERTAINMENT, SERVICES AND FACILITIES IN THE ERMITA-MALATE AREA, PRESCRIBING PENALTIES FOR VIOLATION THEREOF, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES. It basically prohibited establishments such as bars, karaoke bars, motels and hotels from operating in the Malate District which was notoriously viewed as a red light district harboring thrill seekers. Malate Tourist Development Corporation avers that the ordinance is invalid as it includes hotels and motels in the enumeration of places offering amusement or entertainment. MTDC reiterates that they do not market such nor do they use women as tools for entertainment. MTDC also avers that under the LGC, LGUs can only regulate motels but cannot prohibit their operation. The City reiterates that the Ordinance is a valid exercise of Police Power as provided as well in the LGC. The City likewise emphasized that the purpose of the law is to promote morality in the City. ISSUE: Whether or not Ordinance 7783 is valid. HELD: The SC ruled that the said Ordinance is null and void. The SC noted that for an ordinance to be valid, it must not only be within the corporate powers of the local government unit to enact and must be passed according to the procedure prescribed by law, it must also conform to the following substantive requirements: (1) must not contravene the Constitution or any statute; (2) must not be unfair or oppressive; (3) must not be partial or discriminatory; (4) must not prohibit but may regulate trade; (5) must be general and consistent with public policy; and
(6) must not be unreasonable. The police power of the City Council, however broad and far-reaching, is subordinate to the constitutional limitations thereon; and is subject to the limitation that its exercise must be reasonable and for the public good. In the case at bar, the enactment of the Ordinance was an invalid exercise of delegated power as it is unconstitutional and repugnant to general laws.
White Light Corp., vs City of Manila on November 22, 2010 Police Power Not Validly Exercised Infringement of Private Rights On 3 Dec 1992, then Mayor Lim signed into law Ord 7774 entitled An Ordinance prohibiting short time admission in hotels, m otels, lodging houses, pension houses and similar establishments in the City of Manila. White Light Corp is an operator of mini hotels and motels who sought to have the Ordinance be nullified as the said Ordinance infringes on the private rights of their patrons. The RTC ruled in favor of WLC. It ruled that the Ordinance strikes at the personal liberty of the individual guaranteed by the Constitution. The City maintains that the ordinance is valid as it is a valid exercise of police power. Under the LGC, the City is empowered to regulate the establishment, operation and maintenance of cafes, restaurants, beerhouses, hotels, motels, inns, pension houses, lodging houses and other similar establishments, including tourist guides and transports. The CA ruled in favor of the City. ISSUE: Whether or not Ord 7774 is valid. HELD: The SC ruled that the said ordinance is null and void as it indeed infringes upon individual liberty. It also violates the due process clause which serves as a guaranty for protection against arbitrary regulation or seizure. The said ordinance invades private rights. Note that not all who goes into motels and hotels for wash up rate are really there for obscene purposes only. Some are tourists who needed rest or to wash up or to freshen up. Hence, the infidelity sought to be avoided by the said ordinance is more or less subjected only to a limited group of people. The SC reiterates that individual rights may be adversely affected only to the extent that may fairly be required by the legitimate demands of public interest or public welfare. RODOLFO S. BELTRAN vs. THE SECRETARY OF HEALTH Posted on June 20, 2013 by winnieclaire Standard Facts: In January of 1994, the New Tropical Medicine Foundation, with the assistance of the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) released its final report of a study on the Philippine blood banking system entitled Project to Evaluate the Safety of the P hilippine Blood Banking System. It was revealed that of the blood units collected in 1992, 6 4.4 % were supplied by commercial blood banks, 14.5% by the PNRC, 13.7% by government hospital-based blood banks, and 7.4% by private hospital-based blood banks ; showing that the Philippines heavily relied on commercial sources of blood. It was further found, among other things, that blood sold by persons to blood commercial banks are three times more likely to have any of the four (4) tested infections or blood transfusion transmissible diseases, namely, malaria, syphilis, Hepatitis B and Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS) than those donated to PNRC. Republic Act No. 7719 or the National Blood Services Act of 1994 was then enacted into law on April 2, 1994. The Act seeks to provide an adequate supply of safe blood by promoting voluntary blood donation and by regulating blood banks in the country. One of the provisions of the said act was the phasing out of commercial blood banks within 2 years from its effectivity. Petitioners, comprising the majority of the Board of Directors of the Philippine Association of Blood Banks assail the constitutionality of RA 7719 on the ground among others that it is an improper and unwarranted delegation of legislative power. According to petitioners, the Act was incomplete when it was passed by the Legislature, and the latter failed to fix a standard to which the Secretary of Health must conform in the performance of his functions. Petitioners also contend that the two-year extension period that may be granted by the Secretary of Health for the phasing out of commercial blood banks pursuant to Section 7 of the Act constrained the Secretary to legislate, thus constituting undue delegation of legislative power. Issue: WHETHER OR NOT SECTION 7 OF R.A. 7719 CONSTITUTES UNDUE DELEGATION OF LEGISLATIVE POWER Held: In testing whether a statute constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power or not, it is usual to inquire whether the statute was complete in all its terms and provisions when it left the hands of the Legislature so that nothing was left to the judgment of the administrative body or any other appointee or delegate of the Legislature. Except as to matters of detail that may be left to be filled in by rules and regulations to be adopted or promulgated by executive officers and administrative boards, an act of the Legislature, as a general rule, is incomplete and hence invalid if it does not lay down any rule or definite standard by which the administrative board may be guided in the exercise of the discretionary powers delegated to it. Republic Act No. 7719 or the National Blood Services Act of 1994 is complete in itself. It is clear from the provisions of the Act that the Legislature intended primarily to safeguard the health of the people and has mandated several measures to attain this objective. One of these is the phase out of commercial blood banks in the country. The law has sufficiently provided a definite standard for the guidance of the Secretary of Health in carrying out its provisions, that is, the promotion of public health by providing a safe and adequate supply of blood through voluntary blood donation. By its provisions, it has conferred the power and authority to the Secretary of Health as to its execution, to be exercised under and in pursuance of the law. The Secretary of Health has been given, under Republic Act No. 7719, broad powers to execute the provisions of said Act. Specifically, Section 23 of Administrative Order No. 9 provides that the phase-out period for commercial blood banks shall be extended for another two years until May 28, 1998 based on the result of a careful study and review of the blood supply and demand and public safety. This power to ascertain the existence of facts and conditions upon which the Secretary may effect a period of extension for said phase-out can be delegated by Congress. The true distinction between the power to make laws and discretion as to its execution is illustrated by the fact that the delegation of power to make the law, which necessarily involves a discretion as to what it shall be, and conferring an authority or discretion as to its execution, to be exercised under and in pursuance of the law. The first cannot be done; to the latter no valid objection can be made. PHILIPPINE BLOOMING MILLS EMPLOYMENT ORGANIZATION (PBMEO) Versus PHILIPPINE BLOOMING MILLS CO. FACTS: Petitioners herein alleged that they informed the respondent Philippine Blooming Mills of their decision to have a mass demonstration at Malacaang, in protest against alleged abuses of the Pasig police. The company respondent pleaded to exclude the employees in the first shift to join the mass demonstration, however the petitioners still included them. As a result, the company respondent filed a case thru the city prosecutor and charged the demonstrating employees of violation of the CBA. Trial court rendered judgment in favor of the respondent company, and the petitioners failed to file a timely motion for reconsideration. ISSUE: WON the case dismissal as a consequence of a procedural fault violates due process.
HELD: Yes. The decision of the CIR to dismiss the petition based on technicality (being 2 days late) was rendered null and void. (The constitutional rights have dominance over procedural rules.) And, the company was directed to reinstate the eight officers with full backpay from date of separation minus the one day's pay and whatever earnings they might have realized from other sources during their separation from service. (The removal from employment of the officers were deemed too harsh a punishment for their actions) TITLE: Tanada v Tuvera CITATION: L-63915, April 24, 1985| 136 SCRA 27
FACTS: Petitioners seek a writ of mandamus in compelling respondent public officials to publish and/ or cause the publication in the Official Gazette of various presidential decrees, letter of instructions, general orders, proclamations, executive orders, letter of implementation and administrative orders. The general rule in seeking writ of mandamus is that it would be granted to a private individual only in those cases where h e has some private or particular interest to be subserved, or some particular right to be protected, independent of that which he holds with the public at large," and "it is for the public officers exclusively to apply for the writ when public rights are to be subserved . The legal capacity of a private citizen was recognized by court to make the said petition for the reason that the right sought to be enforced by petitioners herein is a public right recognized by no less than the fundamental law of the land. ISSUE: Whether publication in the Official Gazette is still required considering the clause in Article 2 unless otherwise provided. HELD: Unless it is otherwise provided refers to the date of effectivity and not with the publication requirement which cannot b e omitted as public needs to be notified for the law to become effective. The necessity for the publication in the Official Gazette of all unpublished presidential issuances which are of general application, was affirmed by the court on April 24, 1985. This is necessary to provide the general public adequate notice of the various laws which regulate actions and conduct as citizens. Without this, there would be no basis for Art 3 of the Civil Code Ignorance of the law excuses no one from compliance therewith. People vs Nazario Facts: Eusebio Nazario was charged in violation of refusal and failure to pay his municipal taxes amounting to Php 362.62 because of his fishpond operation provided under Ordinance 4, Series of 1955, as amended. He is a resident of Sta. Mesa Manila and just leases a fishpond located at Pagbilao, Quezon with the Philippine Fisheries Commission. The years in question of failure to pay was for 1964, 1965, and 1966. Nazario did not pay because he was not sure if he was covered under the ordinance. He was found guilty thus this petition. Issues: 1. Whether or not Ordinance 4, Series of 1955, as amended null and void for being ambiguous and uncertain 2. Whether or not the ordinance was unconstitutional for being ex post facto Held: 1. No, the coverage of the ordinance covers him as the actual operator of the fishpond thus he comes with the term Manager. He was the one who spent money in developing and maintaining it, so despite only leasing it from the national government, the latter does not get any profit as it goes only to Nazario. The dates of payment are also clearly stated Beginnin and taking effect from 1964 if the fishpond started operating in 1964. 2. No, it is not ex post facto. Ordinance 4 was enacted in 1955 so it can t be that the amendment under Ordinance 12 is being made to apply retroactively. Also, the act of non-payment has been made punishable since 1955 so it means Ordinance 12 is not imposing a retroactive penalty
Villegas vs Hiu Chiong Tsai Pao Ho (1978) Facts: The Municipal Board of Manila enacted Ordinance 6537 requiring aliens (except those employed in the diplomatic and consular missions of foreign countries, in technical assistance programs of the government and another country, and members of religious orders or congregations) to procure the requisite mayors permit so as to be employed or engage in trade in the City of Manila. The permit fee is P50, an d the penalty for the violation of the ordinance is 3 to 6 months imprisonment or a fine of P100 to P200, or both. Issue: Whether the ordinance imposes a regulatory fee or a tax. Held: The ordinances purpose is clearly to raise money under the guise of regulation by exacting P50 from aliens who have be en cleared for employment. The amount is unreasonable and excessive because it fails to consider difference in situation among aliens required to pay it, i.e. being casual, permanent, part-time, rank-and-file or executive. [ The Ordinance was declared invalid as it is arbitrary, oppressive and unreasonable, being applied only to aliens who are thus deprived of their rights to life, liberty and property and therefore violates the due process and equal protection clauses of the Constitution. Further, the ordinance does not lay down any criterion or standard to guide the Mayor in the exercise of his discretion, thus conferring upon the mayor arbitrary and unrestricted powers. ] People Vs cayat Facts/Issue: Accused Cayat, a native of Baguio, Benguet, Mountain Province, and a member of the non-Christian tribes, was found guilty of violating sections 2 and 3 of Act No. 1639 for having acquired and possessed one bottle of A-1-1 gin, an intoxicating liquor, which is not a native wine. The law
made it unlawful for any native of the Philippines who is a member of a non-Christian tribe within the meaning of Act 1397 to buy, receive, have in his possession, or drink any ardent spirits, ale, beer, wine or intoxicating liquors of any kind, other than the so-called native wines and liquors which the members of such tribes have been accustomed to prior to the passage of the law. Cayat challenges the constitutionality of Act 1639 on the grounds that it is discriminatory and denies the equal protection of the laws, violates due process clause, and is an improper exercise of police power.
Held: It is an established principle of constitutional law that the guaranty of the equal protection of the laws is not violated by a legislation based on reasonable classification. (1) must rest on substantial distinctions; (2) must be germane to the purposes of the law; (3) must not be limited to existing conditions only; and (4) must apply equally to all members of the same class.
Act No. 1639 satisfies these requirements. The classification rests on real or substantial, not merely imaginary or whimsical distinctions. It is not based upon accident of birth or parentage, as counsel for the appellant asserts, but upon the degree of civilization and culture. The term non-Christian tribes refers, not to religious belief but in a way, to the geographical area and more directly, to natives of the Philippine Islands of a low grade of civilization, usually living in tribal relationship apart from settled communities. (Rubi vs. Provincial Board of Mindora, supra.) This di stinction is unquestionably reasonable, for the Act was intended to meet the peculiar conditions existing in the non-Christian tribes.
The prohibition enshrined in Act 1397 is designed to insure peace and order in and among non-Christian tribes. It applies equally to all members of the class evident from perusal thereof. That it may be unfair in its operation against a certain number of non-Christians by reason of their degree of culture, is not an argument against the equality of its application. Ormoc Sugar Company Inc. vs Ormoc City et al on November 15, 2010 Equal Protection In 1964, Ormoc City passed a bill which read: There shall be paid to the City Treasurer on any and all productions of centri fugal sugar milled at the Ormoc Sugar Company Incorporated, in Ormoc City a municipal tax equivalent to one per centum (1%) per export sale to the United States of America and other foreign countries. Though referred to as a production tax, the imposition actually amounts to a tax on the expor t of centrifugal sugar produced at Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc. For production of sugar alone is not taxable; the only time the tax applies is when the sugar produced is exported. Ormoc Sugar paid the tax (P7,087.50) in protest averring that the same is violative of Sec 2287 of the Revised Administrative Code which provides: It shall not be in the power of the municipal council to impose a tax in any form whatever, upon goods and merchan dise carried into the municipality, or out of the same, and any attempt to impose an import or export tax upon such goods in the guise of an unreasonable charge for wharfage, use of bridges or otherwise, shall be void. And that the ordinance is violative to equal protection as it singled out Ormoc Sugar As being liable for such tax impost for no other sugar mill is found in the city. ISSUE: Whether or not there has been a violation of equal protection. HELD: The SC held in favor of Ormoc Sugar. The SC noted that even if Sec 2287 of the RAC had already been repealed by a latter statute (Sec 2 RA 2264) which effectively authorized LGUs to tax goods and merchandise carried in and out of their turf, the act of Ormoc City is still violative of equal protection. The ordinance is discriminatory for it taxes only centrifugal sugar produced and exported by the Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc. and none other. At the time of the taxing ordinances enactment, Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc., it is true, was the only sugar central in the cit y of Ormoc. Still, the classification, to be reasonable, should be in terms applicable to future conditions as well. The taxing ordinance should not be singular and exclusive as to exclude any subsequently established sugar central, of the same class as plaintiff, from the coverage of the tax. As it is now, even if later a similar company is set up, it cannot be subject to the tax because the ordinance expressly points only to Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc. as the entity to be levied upon.
Search for Cases and Other Legal Resources Philippine Judges Association et al vs DOTC Secretary Pete Prado et al on November 6, 2010 Equal Protection Franking Privilege of the Judiciary A report came in showing that available data from the Postal Service Office show that from January 1988 to June 1992, the total volume of frank mails amounted to P90,424,175.00, of this amount, frank mails from the Judiciary and other agencies whose functions include the service of judicial processes, such as the intervenor, the Department of Justice and the Office of the Ombudsman, amounted to P86,481,759. Frank mails coming from the Judiciary amounted to P73,574,864.00, and those coming from the petitioners reached the total amount of P60,991,431.00. The p ostmasters conclusion is that because of this considerable volume of mail from the Judiciary, the franking privilege must be withdrawn from it. Acting from this, Prado implemented Circ. No. 9228 as the IRR for the said law. PJA assailed the said law complaining that the law would adversely impair the communication within the judiciary as it may impair the sending of judicial notices. PJA averred that the law is discriminatory as it disallowed the franking privilege of the Judiciary but has not disallowed the franking privilege of others such as the executive, former executives and their widows among others. ISSUE: Whether or not there has been a violation of equal protection before the law.
HELD: The SC ruled that there is a violation of the equal protection clause. The judiciary needs the franking privilege so badly as it is vital to its operation. Evident to that need is the high expense allotted to the judiciarys franking needs. The Postmaster cannot be sustained in contending that th e removal of the franking privilege from the judiciary is in order to cut expenditure. This is untenable for if the Postmaster would intend to cut expenditure by removing the franking privilege of the judiciary, then they should have removed the franking privilege all at once from all the other departments. If the problem of the respondents is the loss of revenues from the franking privilege, the remedy is to withdraw it altogether from all agencies of the government, including those who do not need it. The problem is not solved by retaining it for some and withdrawing it from others, especially where there is no substantial distinction between those favored, which may or may not need it at all, and the Judiciary, which definitely needs it. The problem is not solved by violating the Constitution. The equal protection clause does not require the universal application of the laws on all persons or things without distinction. This might in fact sometimes result in unequal protection, as where, for example, a law prohibiting mature books to all persons, regardless of age, would benefit the morals of the youth but violate the liberty of adults. What the clause requires is equality among equals as determined according to a valid classification. By classification is meant the grouping of persons or things similar to each other in certain particulars and different from all others in these same particulars. In lumping the Judiciary with the other offices from which the franking privilege has been withdrawn, Sec 35 has placed the courts of justice in a category to which it does not belong. If it recognizes the need of the President of the Philippines and the members of Congress for the franking privilege, there is no reason why it should not recognize a similar and in fact greater need on the part of the Judiciary for such privilege.
Taxicab Operators vs Board of Transportation on November 22, 2010 Police Power Petitioner Taxicab Operators of Metro Manila, Inc. (TOMMI) is a domestic corporation composed of taxicab operators, who are grantees of Certificates of Public Convenience to operate taxicabs within the City of Manila and to any other place in Luzon accessible to vehicular traffic. On October 10, 1977, respondent Board of Transportation (BOT) issued Memorandum Circular No. 77-42 which reads: SUBJECT: Phasing out and Replacement of Old and Dilapidated Taxis On January 27, 1981, petitioners filed a Petition with the BOT, docketed as Case No. 80-7553, seeking to nullify MC No. 77-42 or to stop its implementation; to allow the registration and operation in 1981 and subsequent years of taxicabs of model 1974, as well as those of earlier models which were phased-out, provided that, at the time of registration, they are roadworthy and fit for operation. ISSUES: A. Did BOT and BLT promulgate the questioned memorandum circulars in accord with the manner required by Presidential Decree No. 101, thereby safeguarding the petitioners constitutional right to procedural due process? B. Granting arguendo, that respondents did comply with the procedural requirements imposed by Presidential Decree No. 101, would the implementation and enforcement of the assailed memorandum circulars violate the petitioners constitutional rights to. (1) Equal protection of the law; (2) Substantive due process; and (3) Protection against arbitrary and unreasonable classification and standard? HELD As enunciated in the preambular clauses of the challenged BOT Circular, the overriding consideration is the safety and comfort of the riding public from the dangers posed by old and dilapidated taxis. The State, in the exercise of its police power, can prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals, peace, good order, safety and general welfare of the people. It can prohibit all things hurtful to comfort, safety and welfare of society. It may also regulate property rights. In the language of Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando the necessities imposed by public welfare may justify the exercise of governmental authority to regulate even if thereby certain groups may plausibly assert that their interests are disregarded. Tablarin vs. Gutierrez [G.R. No. 78164, July 31, 1987] Post under case digests, Political Law at Tuesday, February 21, 2012 Posted by Schizophrenic Mind Facts: The petitioners seek admission into colleges or schools of medicine. However the petitioners either did not take or did not successfully take the National Medical Admission Test (NMAT). Republic Act 2382 as amended by R.A. 4224 and 5946, known as the Medical Act of 1959 created, among others, the Board of Medical Education (BME) whose functions include "to determine and prescribe requirements for admission into a recognized college of medicine" (Sec. 5 (a). Section 7 of the same Act requires from applicants to present a certificate of eligibility for entrance (cea) to medical school from the BME. MECS Order No. 52, s. 1985, issued by the then Minister of Education, Culture and Sports, established a uniform admission test called National Medical Admission Test as additional requirement for issuance of a certificate of eligibility. Petitioners then filed with the RTC a petition for Declaratory Judgment and Prohibition with a prayer Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction seeking to enjoin the Sec. of educ, BME from enforcing Sec. 5(a) and (f) of R.A. 4224 and MECS Order no. 2 and from requiring the taking and passing of the NMAT as condition for securing (cea). Issue: Whether or not Sec. 5(a) and (f) of R.A. 4224 and MECS Order no. 2 violate the constitution as they prescribe an unfair, unreasonable and inequitable requirement Held: The legislative and administrative provisions impugned in this case constitute a valid exercise of the police power of the state. Perhaps the only issue that needs some consideration is whether there is some reasonable relation between the prescribing of passing the NMAT as a condition for admission to medical school on the one hand, and the securing of the health and safety of the general community, on the other hand. This
question is perhaps most usefully approached by recalling that the regulation of the practice of medicine in all its branches has long been recognized as a reasonable method of protecting the health and safety of the public. That the power to regulate and control the practice of medicine includes the power to regulate admission to the ranks of those authorized to practice medicine, is also well recognized. Thus, legislation and administrative regulations requiring those who wish to practice medicine first to take and pass medical board examinations have long ago been recognized as valid exercises of governmental power. Similarly, the establishment of minimum medical educational requirements-i.e., the completion of prescribed courses in a recognized medical school-for admission to the medical profession, has also been sustained as a legitimate exercise of the regulatory authority of the state. What we have before us in the instant case is closely related: the regulation of access to medical schools. MECS Order No. 52, s. 1985, articulates the rationale of regulation of this type: the improvement of the professional and technical quality of the graduates of medical schools, by upgrading the quality of those admitted to the student body of the medical schools. That upgrading is sought by selectivity in the process of admission, selectivity consisting, among other things, of limiting admission to those who exhibit in the required degree the aptitude for medical studies and eventually for medical practice. The need to maintain, and the difficulties of maintaining, high standards in our professional schools in general, and medical schools in particular, in the current state of our social and economic development, are widely known. The Court believes that the government is entitled to prescribe an admission test like the NMAT as a means of achieving its stated objective of "upgrading the selection of applicants into [our] medical schools" and of "improv[ing] the quality of medical education in the country."
Ishmael Himagan vs People of the Philippines & Judge Hilario Mapayo on November 6, 2010 Equal Protection Suspension of PNP Members Charged with Grave Felonies Himagan is a policeman assigned in Camp Catititgan, Davao City. He was charged for the murder of Benjamin Machitar Jr and for the attempted murder of Benjamins younger brother, Barnabe. Pursuant to Sec 47 of RA 6975, Himagan was placed into suspension pending the murder case. The law provides that Upon the filing of a complaint or information sufficient in form and substance against a member of the PNP for grave felonies where the penalty imposed by law is six (6) years and one (1) day or more, the court shall immediately suspend the accused from office until the case is terminated. Such case shall be subject to continuous trial and shall be terminated within ninety (90) days from arraignment of the accused. Himagan assailed the suspension averring that Sec 42 of PD 807 of the Civil Service Decree, that his suspension should be limited to ninety (90) days. He claims that an imposition of preventive suspension of over 90 days is contrary to the Civil Service Law and would be a violation of his constitutional right to equal protection of laws. ISSUE: Whether or not Sec 47, RA 6975 violates equal protection guaranteed by the Constitution. HELD: The language of the first sentence of Sec 47 of RA 6975 is clear, plain and free from ambiguity. It gives no other meaning than that the suspension from office of the member of the PNP charged with grave offense where the penalty is six years and one day or more shall last until the termination of the case. The suspension cannot be lifted before the termination of the case. The second sentence of the same Section providing that the trial must be terminated within ninety (90) days from arraignment does not qualify or limit the first sentence. The two can stand independently of each other. The first refers to the period of suspension. The second deals with the time from within which the trial should be finished. The reason why members of the PNP are treated differently from the other classes of persons charged criminally or administratively insofar as the application of the rule on preventive suspension is concerned is that policemen carry weapons and the badge of the law which can be used to harass or intimidate witnesses against them, as succinctly brought out in the legislative discussions. If a suspended policeman criminally charged with a serious offense is reinstated to his post while his case is pending, his victim and the witnesses against him are obviously exposed to constant threat and thus easily cowed to silence by the mere fact that the accused is in uniform and armed. the imposition of preventive suspension for over 90 days under Sec 47 of RA 6975 does not violate the suspended policemans const itutional right to equal protection of the laws.
Suppose the trial is not terminated within ninety days from arraignment, should the suspension of accused be lifted? The answer is certainly no. While the law uses the mandatory word shall before the phrase be terminated within ninety (90) days, there is nothing in RA 6975 that suggests that the preventive suspension of the accused will be lifted if the trial is not terminated within that period. Nonetheless, the Judge who fails to decide the case within the period without justifiable reason may be subject to administrative sanctions and, in appropriate cases where the facts so warrant, to criminal or civil liability. If the trial is unreasonably delayed without fault of the accused such that he is deprived of his right to a speedy trial, he is not without a remedy. He may ask for the dismissal of the case. Should the court refuse to dismiss the case, the accused can compel its dismissal by certiorari, prohibition or mandamus, or secure his liberty by habeas corpus. CENTRAL BANK V. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY (2004) EN BANC [G.R. NO. 148208, DECEMBER 15, 2004] CENTRAL BANK (NOW BANGKO SENTRAL NG PILIPINAS) EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, INC., PETITIONER, vs. BANGKO SENTRAL NG PILIPINAS AND THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, RESPONDENTS.
FACTS: On July 3, 1993, R.A. No. 7653 (the New Central Bank Act) took effect. It abolished the old Central Bank of the Philippines, and created a new BSP. On June 8, 2001, almost eight years after the effectivity of R.A. No. 7653, petitioner Central Bank (now BSP) Employees Association, Inc., filed a petition for prohibition against BSP and the Executive Secretary of the Office of the President, to restrain respondents from further implementing the last proviso in Section 15(c), Article II of R.A. No. 7653, on the ground that it is unconstitutional. Article II, Section 15(c) of R.A. No. 7653 provides: Section 15, Exercise of Authority -In the exercise of its authority, the Monetary Board shall:
(c) Establish a human resource management system which shall govern the selection, hiring, appointment, transfer, promotion, or dismissal of all personnel. Such system shall aim to establish professionalism and excellence at all levels of the Bangko Sentral in accordance with sound principles of management. A compensation structure, based on job evaluation studies and wage surveys and subject to the Boards approval, shall be instituted as an integral component of the Bangko Sentrals human resource development program: Provided, That the Monetary Board shall make its own sy stem conform as closely as possible with the principles provided for under Republic Act No. 6758 [Salary Standardization Act]. Provided, however, that compensation and wage structure of employees whose positions fall under salary grade 19 and below shall be in accordance with the rates prescribed under Republic Act No. 6758. The thrust of petitioners challenge is that the above proviso makes an unconstitutional cut between two classes of employees in the BSP, viz: (1) the BSP officers or those exempted from the coverage of the Salary Standardization Law (SSL) (exempt class); and (2) the rank-and-file (Salary Grade [SG] 19 and below), or those not exempted from the coverage of the SSL (non-exempt class). It is contended that this classification is a classic case of class legislation, allegedly not based on substantial distinctions which make real differences, but solely on the SG of the BSP personnels position.
Petitioner also claims that it is not germane to the purposes of Section 15(c), Article II of R.A. No. 7653, the most important of which is to establish professionalism and excellence at all levels in the BSP. Petitioner offers the following sub-set of arguments: a. the legislative history of R.A. No. 7653 shows that the questioned proviso does not appear in the original and amended versions of House Bill No. 7037, nor in the original version of Senate Bill No. 1235; b. subjecting the compensation of the BSP rank-and-file employees to the rate prescribed by the SSL actually defeats the purpose of the law of establishing professionalism and excellence eat all levels in the BSP; c. the assailed proviso was the product of amendments introduced during the deliberation of Senate Bill No. 1235, without showing its relevance to the objectives of the law, and even admitted by one senator as discriminatory against low-salaried employees of the BSP; d. GSIS, LBP, DBP and SSS personnel are all exempted from the coverage of the SSL; thus within the class of rank-and-file personnel of government financial institutions (GFIs), the BSP rank-and-file are also discriminated upon; and e. the assailed proviso has caused the demoralization among the BSP rank-and-file and resulted in the gross disparity between their compensation and that of the BSP officers. In sum, petitioner posits that the classification is not reasonable but arbitrary and capricious, and violates the equal protection clause of the Constitution. Petitioner also stresses: (a) that R.A. No. 7653 has a separability clause, which will allow the declaration of the unconstitutionality of the proviso in question without affecting the other provisions; and (b) the urgency and propriety of the petition, as some 2,994 BSP rank-and-file employees have been prejudiced since 1994 when the proviso was implemented. Petitioner concludes that: (1) since the inequitable proviso has no force and effect of law, respondents implementation of such amounts to lack of jurisdiction; and (2) it has no appeal nor any other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course except through this petition for prohibition, which this Court should take cognizance of, considering the transcendental importance of the legal issue involved. Respondent BSP, in its comment, contends that the provision does not violate the equal protection clause and can stand the constitutional test, provided it is construed in harmony with other provisions of the same law, such as fiscal and administrative autonomy of BSP, and the mandate of the Monetary Board to establish professionalism and excellence at all levels in accordance with sound principles of management. The Solicitor General, on behalf of respondent Executive Secretary, also defends the validity of the provision. Quite simplistically, he argues that the classification is based on actual and real differentiation, even as it adheres to the enunciated policy of R.A. No. 7653 to establish professionalism and excellence within the BSP subject to prevailing laws and policies of the national government.
ISSUE: Thus, the sole - albeit significant - issue to be resolved in this case is whether the last paragraph of Section 15(c), Article II of R.A. No. 7653, runs afoul of the constitutional mandate that "No person shall be . . . denied the equal protection of the laws." RULING: A. UNDER THE PRESENT STANDARDS OF EQUAL PROTECTION, SECTION 15(c), ARTICLE II OF R.A. NO. 7653 IS VALID.
Jurisprudential standards for equal protection challenges indubitably show that the classification created by the questioned proviso, on its face and in its operation, bears no constitutional infirmities. It is settled in constitutional law that the "equal protection" clause does not prevent the Legislature from establishing classes of individuals or objects upon which different rules shall operate - so long as the classification is not unreasonable. B. THE ENACTMENT, HOWEVER, OF SUBSEQUENT LAWS - EXEMPTING ALL OTHER RANK-AND-FILE EMPLOYEES OF GFIs FROM THE SSL - RENDERS THE CONTINUED APPLICATION OF THE CHALLENGED PROVISION A VIOLATION OF THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE. While R.A. No. 7653 started as a valid measure well within the legislatures power, we hold that the e nactment of subsequent laws exempting all rankand-file employees of other GFIs leeched all validity out of the challenged proviso. The constitutionality of a statute cannot, in every instance, be determined by a mere comparison of its provisions with applicable provisions of the Constitution, since the statute may be constitutionally valid as applied to one set of facts and invalid in its application to another. A statute valid at one time may become void at another time because of altered circumstances. Thus, if a statute in its practical operation becomes arbitrary or confiscatory, its validity, even though affirmed by a former adjudication, is open to inquiry and investigation in the light of changed conditions. The foregoing provisions impregnably institutionalize in this jurisdiction the long honored legal truism of "equal pay for equal work." Persons who work with substantially equal qualifications, skill, effort and responsibility, under similar conditions, should be paid similar salaries.
Congress retains its wide discretion in providing for a valid classification, and its policies should be accorded recognition and respect by the courts of justice except when they run afoul of the Constitution. The deference stops where the classification violates a fundamental right, or prejudices persons accorded special protection by the Constitution. When these violations arise, this Court must discharge its primary role as the vanguard of constitutional guaranties, and require a stricter and more exacting adherence to constitutional limitations. Rational basis should not suffice. Furthermore, concerns have been raised as to the propriety of a ruling voiding the challenged provision. It has been proffered that the remedy of petitioner is not with this Court, but with Congress, which alone has the power to erase any inequity perpetrated by R.A. No. 7653. Indeed, a bill proposing the exemption of the BSP rank-and-file from the SSL has supposedly been filed. Under most circumstances, the Court will exercise judicial restraint in deciding questions of constitutionality, recognizing the broad discretion given to Congress in exercising its legislative power. Judicial scrutiny would be based on the rational basis test, and the legislat ive discretion would be given deferential treatment. But if the challenge to the statute is premised on the denial of a fundamental right or the perpetuation of prejudice against persons favored by the Constitution with special protection, judicial scrutiny ought to be more strict. A weak and watered down view would call for the abdication of this Courts solemn duty to strike down any law repugnant to the Constitution and the rights it enshrines. This is true whether the actor committing the unconstitutional act is a private person or the government itself or one of its instrumentalities. Oppressive acts will be struck down regardless of the character or nature of the actor. Accordingly, when the grant of power is qualified, conditional or subject to limitations, the issue on whether or not the prescribed qualifications or conditions have been met, or the limitations respected, is justifiable or non-political, the crux of the problem being one of legality or validity of the contested act, not its wisdom. Otherwise, said qualifications, conditions or limitations - particularly those prescribed or imposed by the Constitution would be set at naught. What is more, the judicial inquiry into such issue and the settlement thereof are the main functions of courts of justice under the Presidential form of government adopted in our 1935 Constitution, and the system of checks and balances, one of its basic predicates. As a consequence, we have neither the authority nor the discretion to decline passing upon said issue, but are under the ineluctable obligation - made particularly more exacting and peremptory by our oath, as members of the highest Court of the land, to support and defend the Constitution - to settle it. In the case at bar, the challenged proviso operates on the basis of the salary grade or officer-employee status. It is akin to a distinction based on economic class and status, with the higher grades as recipients of a benefit specifically withheld from the lower grades. Officers of the BSP now receive higher compensation packages that are competitive with the industry, while the poorer, low-salaried employees are limited to the rates prescribed by the SSL. The implications are quite disturbing: BSP rank-and-file employees are paid the strictly regimented rates of the SSL while employees higher in rank - possessing higher and better education and opportunities for career advancement - are given higher compensation packages to entice them to stay. Considering that majority, if not all, the rank-and-file employees consist of people whose status and rank in life are less and limited, especially in terms of job marketability, it is they - and not the officers - who have the real economic and financial need for the adjustment This is in accord with the policy of the Constitution "to free the people from poverty, provide adequate social services, extend to them a decent standard of living, and improve the quality of life for all. Any act of Congress that runs counter to this constitutional desideratum deserves st rict scrutiny by this Court before it can pass muster. To be sure, the BSP rank-and-file employees merit greater concern from this Court. They represent the more impotent rank-and-file government employees who, unlike employees in the private sector, have no specific right to organize as a collective bargaining unit and negotiate for better terms and conditions of employment, nor the power to hold a strike to protest unfair labor practices. These BSP rank-and-file employees represent the politically powerless and they should not be compelled to seek a political solution to their unequal and iniquitous treatment. Indeed, they have waited for many years for the legislature to act. They cannot be asked to wait some more for discrimination cannot be given any waiting time. Unless the equal protection clause of the Constitution is a mere platitude, it is the Courts duty to save them from reasonless discrimination .