Legislative Department 6 Sec.

1/ The legislative power shall be vested in the Congress of the Philippines which shall consist of a Senate and a House of Representatives, except to the extent reserved to the people by the provision on initiative and referendum. Judicial Department 8 Sec. 1/ The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law. Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government. **Art. 8. Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall form a part of the legal system of the Philippines. (n) **Art. 9. No judge or court shall decline to render judgment by reason of the silence, obscurity or insufficiency of the laws. Executive Branch 7 Sec. 1/ The executive power shall be vested in the President of the Philippines Sec. 5/ Before they enter on the execution of their office, the President, the Vice-President, or the Acting President shall take the following oath or affirmation : I do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will faithfully and conscientiously fulfill my duties as President (or VicePresident or Acting President) of the Philippines, preserve and defend its Constitution, execute its laws, do justice to every man, and consecrate myself to the service of the Nation. So help me God. (In case of affirmation, last sentence will be omitted.) Sec. 17/ The President shall control of all the executive departments, bureaus and offices. He shall ensure that the laws be faithfully executed.

1 ENDENCIA v JUGO This is a joint appeal from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila declaring section 13 of Republic Act No. 590 unconstitutional, and ordering the appellant Saturnino David as Collector of Internal Revenue to re-fund to Justice Pastor M. Endencia the sum of P1,744.45, representing the income tax collected on his salary as Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals in 1951, and to Justice Fernando Jugo the amount of P2,345.46, representing the income tax collected on his salary from January 1,1950 to October 19, 1950, as Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeals, and from October 20, 1950 to December 31,1950, as Associate Justice of the Supreme Court, without special pronouncement as to costs. Because of the similarity of the two cases, involving as they do the same question of law, they were jointly submitted for determination in the lower court. Judge Higinio B. Macadaeg presiding, in a rather exhaustive and well considered decision found and held that under the doctrine laid down by this Court in the case of Perfecto vs. Meer, 85 Phil., 552, the collection of income taxes from the salaries of Justice Jugo and Justice Endencia was a diminution of their compensation and therefore was in violation of the Constitution of the Philippines, and so ordered the refund of said taxes. We see no profit and necessity in again discussing and considering the proposition and the arguments pro and cons involved in the case of Perfecto vs. Meer, supra, which are raised, brought up and presented here. In that case, we have held despite the ruling enunciated by the United States Federal Supreme Court in the case of O 'Malley vs. Woodrought 307 U. S., 277, that taxing the salary of a judicial officer in the Philippines is a diminution of such salary and so violates the Constitution. We shall now confine our-selves to a discussion and determination of the remaining question of whether or not Republic Act No. 590, particularly section 13, can justify and legalize the collection of income tax on the salary of judicial officers. According to the brief of the Solicitor General on behalf of appellant Collector of Internal Revenue, our decision in the case of Perfecto vs. Meer, supra, was not received favorably by Congress, because immediately after its promulgation, Congress enacted Republic Act No. 590. To bring home his point, the Solicitor General reproduced what he considers the pertinent discussion in the Lower House of House Bill No. 1127 which became Republic Act No. 590.

For purposes of reference, we are reproducing section 9, Article VIII of our Constitution:. SEC. 9. The members of the Supreme Court and all judges of inferior courts shall hold office during good behavior, until they reach the age of seventy years, or become incapacitated to discharge the duties of their office. They shall receive such compensation as may be fixed by law, which shall not be diminished during their continuance in office. Until the Congress shall provide otherwise, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court shall receive an annual compensation of sixteen thousand pesos, and each Associate Justice, fifteen thousand pesos. As already stated construing and applying the above constitutional provision, we held in the Perfecto case that judicial officers are exempt from the payment of income tax on their salaries, because the collection thereof by the Government was a decrease or diminution of their salaries during their continuance in office, a thing which is expressly prohibited by the Constitution. Thereafter, according to the Solicitor General, because Congress did not favorably receive the decision in the Perfecto case, Congress promulgated Republic Act No. 590, if not to counteract the ruling in that decision, at least now to authorize and legalize the collection of income tax on the salaries of judicial officers. We quote section 13 of Republic Act No. 590: SEC 13. No salary wherever received by any public officer of the Republic of the Philippines shall be considered as exempt from the income tax, payment of which is hereby declared not to be dimunition of his compensation fixed by the Constitution or by law. So we have this situation. The Supreme Court in a decision interpreting the Constitution, particularly section 9, Article VIII, has held that judicial officers are exempt from payment of income tax on their salaries, because the collection thereof was a diminution of such salaries, specifically prohibited by the Constitution. Now comes the Legislature and in section 13, Republic Act No. 590, says that "no salary wherever received by any public officer of the Republic (naturally including a judicial officer) shall be considered as exempt from the income tax," and proceeds to declare that payment of said income tax is not a diminution of his compensation. Can the Legislature validly do this? May the Legislature lawfully declare the collection of income tax on the salary of a public official, specially a judicial officer, not a decrease of his salary, after the Supreme Court has found and decided otherwise? To determine this question, we shall have to go back to the fundamental principles regarding separation of powers.

Under our system of constitutional government, the Legislative department is assigned the power to make and enact laws. The Executive department is charged with the execution of carrying out of the provisions of said laws. But the interpretation and application of said laws belong exclusively to the Judicial department. And this authority to interpret and apply the laws extends to the Constitution. Before the courts can determine whether a law is constitutional or not, it will have to interpret and ascertain the meaning not only of said law, but also of the pertinent portion of the Constitution in order to decide whether there is a conflict between the two, because if there is, then the law will have to give way and has to be declared invalid and unconstitutional. Defining and interpreting the law is a judicial function and the legislative branch may not limit or restrict the power granted to the courts by the Constitution. (Bandy vs. Mickelson et al., 44N. W., 2nd 341, 342.) When it is clear that a statute transgresses the authority vested in the legislature by the Constitution, it is the duty of the courts to declare the act unconstitutional because they cannot shrink from it without violating their oaths of office. This duty of the courts to maintain the Constitution as the fundamental law of the state is imperative and unceasing; and, as Chief Justice Marshall said, whenever a statute is in violation of the fundamental law, the courts must so adjudge and thereby give effect to the Constitution. Any other course would lead to the destruction of the Constitution. Since the question as to the constitutionality of a statute is a judicial matter, the courts will not decline the exercise of jurisdiction upon the suggestion that action might be taken by political agencies in disregard of the judgment of the judicial tribunals. (11 Am. Jur., 714-715.) Under the American system of constitutional government, among the most important functions in trusted to the judiciary are the interpreting of Constitutions and, as a closely connected power, the determination of whether laws and acts of the legislature are or are not contrary to the provisions of the Federal and State Constitutions. (11 Am. Jur., 905.). By legislative fiat as enunciated in section 13, Republic Act NO. 590, Congress says that taxing the salary of a judicial officer is not a decrease of compensation. This is a clear example of interpretation or ascertainment of the meaning of the phrase "which shall not be diminished during their continuance in office," found in section 9, Article VIII of the Constitution, referring to the salaries of judicial officers. This act of interpreting

the Constitution or any part thereof by the Legislature is an invasion of the well-defined and established province and jurisdiction of the Judiciary. The rule is recognized elsewhere that the legislature cannot pass any declaratory act, or act declaratory of what the law was before its passage, so as to give it any binding weight with the courts. A legislative definition of a word as used in a statute is not conclusive of its meaning as used elsewhere; otherwise, the legislature would be usurping a judicial function in defining a term. (11 Am. Jur., 914, emphasis supplied) The legislature cannot, upon passing a law which violates a constitutional provision, validate it so as to prevent an attack thereon in the courts, by a declaration that it shall be so construed as not to violate the constitutional inhibition. (11 Am. Jur., 919, emphasis supplied) We have already said that the Legislature under our form of government is assigned the task and the power to make and enact laws, but not to interpret them. This is more true with regard to the interpretation of the basic law, the Constitution, which is not within the sphere of the Legislative department. If the Legislature may declare what a law means, or what a specific portion of the Constitution means, especially after the courts have in actual case ascertain its meaning by interpretation and applied it in a decision, this would surely cause confusion and instability in judicial processes and court decisions. Under such a system, a final court determination of a case based on a judicial interpretation of the law of the Constitution may be undermined or even annulled by a subsequent and different interpretation of the law or of the Constitution by the Legislative department. That would be neither wise nor desirable, besides being clearly violative of the fundamental, principles of our constitutional system of government, particularly those governing the separation of powers. So much for the constitutional aspect of the case. Considering the practical side thereof, we believe that the collection of income tax on a salary is an actual and evident diminution thereof. Under the old system where the in-come tax was paid at the end of the year or sometime thereafter, the decrease may not be so apparent and clear. All that the official who had previously received his full salary was called upon to do, was to fulfill his obligation and to exercise his privilege of paying his income tax on his salary. His salary fixed by law was received by him in the amount of said tax comes from his other sources of income, he may not fully realize the fact that his salary had been decreased

in the amount of said income tax. But under the present system of withholding the income tax at the source, where the full amount of the income tax corresponding to his salary is computed in advance and divided into equal portions corresponding to the number of paydays during the year and actually deducted from his salary corresponding to each payday, said official actually does not receive his salary in full, because the income tax is deducted therefrom every payday, that is to say, twice a month. Let us take the case of Justice Endencia. As Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals, his salary is fixed at p12,000 a year, that is to say, he should receive P1,000 a month or P500 every payday, fifteenth and end of month. In the present case, the amount collected by the Collector of Internal Revenue on said salary is P1,744.45 for one year. Divided by twelve (months) we shall have P145.37 a month. And further dividing it by two paydays will bring it down to P72.685, which is the income tax deducted form the collected on his salary each half month. So, if Justice Endencia's salary as a judicial officer were not exempt from payment of the income tax, instead of receiving P500 every payday, he would be actually receiving P427.31 only, and instead of receiving P12,000 a year, he would be receiving but P10,255.55. Is it not therefor clear that every payday, his salary is actually decreased by P72.685 and every year is decreased by P1,744.45? Reading the discussion in the lower House in connection with House Bill No. 1127, which became Republic Act No. 590, it would seem that one of the main reasons behind the enactment of the law was the feeling among certain legislators that members of the Supreme Court should not enjoy any exemption and that as citizens, out of patriotism and love for their country, they should pay income tax on their salaries. It might be stated in this connection that the exemption is not enjoyed by the members of the Supreme Court alone but also by all judicial officers including Justices of the Court of Appeals and judges of inferior courts. The exemption also extends to other constitutional officers, like the President of the Republic, the Auditor General, the members of the Commission on Elections, and possibly members of the Board of Tax Appeals, commissioners of the Public Service Commission, and judges of the Court of Industrial Relations. Compares to the number of all these officials, that of the Supreme Court Justices is relatively insignificant. There are more than 990 other judicial officers enjoying the exemption, including 15 Justices of the Court of Appeals, about 107 Judges of First Instance, 38 Municipal Judges and about 830 Justices of the Peace. The reason behind the exemption in the Constitution, as interpreted by the United States Federal Supreme Court and this Court, is to preserve

the independence of the Judiciary, not only of this High Tribunal but of the other courts, whose present membership number more than 990 judicial officials. The exemption was not primarily intended to benefit judicial officers, but was grounded on public policy. As said by Justice Van Devanter of the United States Supreme Court in the case of Evans vs. Gore The primary purpose of the prohibition against diminution was not to benefit the judges, but, like the clause in respect of tenure, to attract good and competent men to the bench and to promote that independence of action and judgment which is essential to the maintenance of the guaranties, limitations and pervading principles of the Constitution and to the administration of justice without respect to person and with equal concern for the poor and the rich. Such being its purpose, it is to be construed, not as a private grant, but as a limitation imposed in the public interest; in other words, not restrictively, but in accord with its spirit and the principle on which it proceeds. Having in mind the limited number of judicial officers in the Philippines enjoying this exemption, especially when the great bulk thereof are justices of the peace, many of them receiving as low as P200 a month, and considering further the other exemptions allowed by the income tax law, such as P3,000 for a married person and P600 for each dependent, the amount of national revenue to be derived from income tax on the salaries of judicial officers, were if not for the constitutional exemption, could not be large or substantial. But even if it were otherwise, it should not affect, much less outweigh the purpose and the considerations that prompted the establishment of the constitutional exemption. In the same case of Evans vs. Gore, supra, the Federal Supreme Court declared "that they (fathers of the Constitution) regarded the independence of the judges as far as greater importance than any revenue that could come from taxing their salaries. When a judicial officer assumed office, he does not exactly ask for exemption from payment of income tax on his salary, as a privilege . It is already attached to his office, provided and secured by the fundamental law, not primarily for his benefit, but based on public interest, to secure and preserve his independence of judicial thought and action. When we come to the members of the Supreme Court, this excemption to them is relatively of short duration. Because of the limited membership in this High Tribunal, eleven, and due to the high standards of experience, practice and training required, one generally enters its portals and comes to join its membership quite late in life, on the

aver-age, around his sixtieth year, and being required to retire at seventy, assuming that he does not die or become incapacitated earlier, naturally he is not in a position to receive the benefit of exemption for long. It is rather to the justices of the peace that the exemption can give more benefit. They are relatively more numerous, and because of the meager salary they receive, they can less afford to pay the income tax on it and its diminution by the amount of the income tax if paid would be real, substantial and onerous. Considering exemption in the abstract, there is nothing unusual or abhorrent in it, as long as it is based on public policy or public interest. While all other citizens are subject to arrest when charged with the commission of a crime, members of the Senate and House of Representatives except in cases of treason, felony and breach of the peace are exempt from arrest, during their attendance in the session of the Legislature; and while all other citizens are generally liable for any speech, remark or statement, oral or written, tending to cause the dishonor, discredit or contempt of a natural or juridical person or to blacken the memory of one who is dead, Senators and Congressmen in making such statements during their sessions are extended immunity and exemption. And as to tax exemption, there are not a few citizens who enjoy this exemption. Persons, natural and juridical, are exempt from taxes on their lands, buildings and improvements thereon when used exclusively for educational purposes, even if they derive income therefrom. (Art. VI, Sec. 22 [3].) Holders of government bonds are exempted from the payment of taxes on the income or interest they receive therefrom (sec. 29 (b) [4], National Internal Revenue Code as amended by Republic Act No. 566). Payments or income received by any person residing in the Philippines under the laws of the United States administered by the United States Veterans Administration are exempt from taxation. (Republic Act No. 360). Funds received by officers and enlisted men of the Philippine Army who served in the Armed Forces of the United States, allowances earned by virtue of such services corresponding to the taxable years 1942 to 1945, inclusive, are exempted from income tax. (Republic Act No. 210). The payment of wages and allowances of officers and enlisted men of the Army Forces of the Philippines sent to Korea are also exempted from taxation. (Republic Act No. 35). In other words, for reasons of public policy and public interest, a citizen may justifiably by constitutional provision or statute be exempted from his ordinary obligation of paying taxes on his income. Under the same public policy and perhaps for the same it not

higher considerations, the framers of the Constitution deemed it wise and necessary to exempt judicial officers from paying taxes on their salaries so as not to decrease their compensation, thereby insuring the independence of the Judiciary. In conclusion we reiterate the doctrine laid down in the case of Perfecto vs. Meer, supra, to the effect that the collection of income tax on the salary of a judicial officer is a diminution thereof and so violates the Constitution. We further hold that the interpretation and application of the Constitution and of statutes is within the exclusive province and jurisdiction of the Judicial department, and that in enacting a law, the Legislature may not legally provide therein that it be interpreted in such a way that it may not violate a Constitutional prohibition, thereby tying the hands of the courts in their task of later interpreting said statute, specially when the interpretation sought and provided in said statute runs counter to a previous interpretation already given in a case by the highest court of the land. In the views of the foregoing considerations, the decision appealed from is hereby affirmed, with no pronouncement as to costs. 2 SJS v Dangerous Drugs Board and PDEA In these kindred petitions, the constitutionality of Section 36 of Republic Act No. (RA) 9165, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002,insofar as it requires mandatory drug testing of candidates for public office, students of secondary and tertiary schools, officers and employees of public and private offices, and persons charged before the prosecutors office with certain offenses, among other personalities, is put in issue. As far as pertinent, the challenged section reads as follows: SEC. 36. Authorized Drug Testing.Authorized drug testing shall be done by any government forensic laboratories or by any of the drug testing laboratories accredited and monitored by the DOH to safeguard the quality of the test results. x x x The drug testing shall employ, among others, two (2) testing methods, the screening test which will determine the positive result as well as the type of drug used and the confirmatory test which will confirm a positive screening test. x x x The following shall be subjected to undergo drug testing: xxx(c) Students of secondary and tertiary schools. Students of secondary and tertiary schools shall, pursuant to the related rules and regulations as

contained in the schools student handbook and with notice to the parents, undergo a random drug testing x (d) Officers and employees of public and private offices.Officers and employees of public and private offices, whether domestic or overseas, shall be subjected to undergo a random drug test as contained in the companys work rules and regulations, x x x for purposes of reducing the risk in the workplace. Any officer or employee found positive for use of dangerous drugs shall be dealt with administratively which shall be a ground for suspension or termination, subject to the provisions of Article 282 of the Labor Code and pertinent provisions of the Civil Service Law; xxxx (f) All persons charged before the prosecutors office with a criminal offense having an imposable penalty of imprisonment of not less than six (6) years and one (1) day shall undergo a mandatory drug test; (g) All candidates for public office whether appointed or elected both in the national or local government shall undergo a mandatory drug test. In addition to the above stated penalties in this Section, those found to be positive for dangerous drugs use shall be subject to the provisions of Section 15 of this Act.

G.R. No. 161658 (Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr. v. Commission on Elections) On December 23, 2003, the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) issued Resolution No. 6486, prescribing the rules and regulations on the mandatory drug testing of candidates for public office in connection with the May 10, 2004 synchronized national and local elections. The pertinent portions of the said resolution read as follows: WHEREAS, Section 36 (g) of Republic Act No. 9165 provides: SEC. 36. Authorized Drug Testing.x x x x (g) All candidates for public office x x x both in the national or local government shall undergo a mandatory drug test. WHEREAS, Section 1, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution provides that public officers and employees must at all times be accountable to the people, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency;

WHEREAS, by requiring candidates to undergo mandatory drug test, the public will know the quality of candidates they are electing and they will be assured that only those who can serve with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency would be elected x x x. NOW THEREFORE, The [COMELEC], pursuant to the authority vested in it under the Constitution, Batas Pambansa Blg. 881 (Omnibus Election Code), [RA] 9165 and other election laws, RESOLVED to promulgate, as it hereby promulgates, the following rules and regulations on the conduct of mandatory drug testing to candidates for public office[:] SECTION 1. Coverage.All candidates for public office, both national and local, in the May 10, 2004 Synchronized National and Local Elections shall undergo mandatory drug test in government forensic laboratories or any drug testing laboratories monitored and accredited by the Department of Health. SEC. 3. x x x On March 25, 2004, in addition to the drug certificates filed with their respective offices, the Comelec Offices and employees concerned shall submit to the Law Department two (2) separate lists of candidates. The first list shall consist of those candidates who complied with the mandatory drug test while the second list shall consist of those candidates who failed to comply x x x. SEC. 4. Preparation and publication of names of candidates.Before the start of the campaign period, the [COMELEC] shall prepare two separate lists of candidates. The first list shall consist of those candidates who complied with the mandatory drug test while the second list shall consist of those candidates who failed to comply with said drug test. x x x SEC. 5. Effect of failure to undergo mandatory drug test and file drug test certificate.No person elected to any public office shall enter upon the duties of his office until he has undergone mandatory drug test and filed with the offices enumerated under Section 2 hereof the drug test certificate herein required. (Emphasis supplied.) Petitioner Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr., a senator of the Republic and a candidate for re-election in the May 10, 2004 elections,[1] filed a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition under Rule 65. In it, he seeks (1) to nullify Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 and COMELEC Resolution No. 6486 dated December 23, 2003 for being unconstitutional in that they impose a qualification for candidates for senators in addition to those already

provided for in the 1987 Constitution; and (2) to enjoin the COMELEC from implementing Resolution No. 6486. Pimentel invokes as legal basis for his petition Sec. 3, Article VI of the Constitution, which states: SECTION 3. No person shall be a Senator unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, and, on the day of the election, is at least thirty-five years of age, able to read and write, a registered voter, and a resident of the Philippines for not less than two years immediately preceding the day of the election. According to Pimentel, the Constitution only prescribes a maximum of five (5) qualifications for one to be a candidate for, elected to, and be a member of the Senate. He says that both the Congress and COMELEC, by requiring, via RA 9165 and Resolution No. 6486, a senatorial aspirant, among other candidates, to undergo a mandatory drug test, create an additional qualification that all candidates for senator must first be certified as drug free. He adds that there is no provision in the Constitution authorizing the Congress or COMELEC to expand the qualification requirements of candidates for senator. G.R. No. 157870 (Social Justice Society v. Dangerous Drugs Board and Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency) In its Petition for Prohibition under Rule 65, petitioner Social Justice Society (SJS), a registered political party, seeks to prohibit the Dangerous Drugs Board (DDB) and the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA) from enforcing paragraphs (c), (d), (f), and (g) of Sec. 36 of RA 9165 on the ground that they are constitutionally infirm. For one, the provisions constitute undue delegation of legislative power when they give unbridled discretion to schools and employers to determine the manner of drug testing. For another, the provisions trench in the equal protection clause inasmuch as they can be used to harass a student or an employee deemed undesirable. And for a third, a persons constitutional right against unreasonable searches is also breached by said provisions. G.R. No. 158633 (Atty. Manuel J. Laserna, Jr. v. Dangerous Drugs Board and Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency) Petitioner Atty. Manuel J. Laserna, Jr., as citizen and taxpayer, also seeks in his Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition under Rule 65 that Sec. 36(c), (d), (f), and (g) of RA 9165 be struck down as unconstitutional for infringing on the constitutional right to privacy, the right against unreasonable search and seizure, and the right against self-incrimination, and for being contrary to the due process and equal protection guarantees.

The Issue on Locus Standi First off, we shall address the justiciability of the cases at bench and the matter of the standing of petitioners SJS and Laserna to sue. As respondents DDB and PDEA assert, SJS and Laserna failed to allege any incident amounting to a violation of the constitutional rights mentioned in their separate petitions.[2] It is basic that the power of judicial review can only be exercised in connection with a bona fide controversy which involves the statute sought to be reviewed.[3] But even with the presence of an actual case or controversy, the Court may refuse to exercise judicial review unless the constitutional question is brought before it by a party having the requisite standing to challenge it.[4] To have standing, one must establish that he or she has suffered some actual or threatened injury as a result of the allegedly illegal conduct of the government; the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action; and the injury is likely to be redressed by a favorable action.[5] The rule on standing, however, is a matter of procedure; hence, it can be relaxed for non-traditional plaintiffs, like ordinary citizens, taxpayers, and legislators when the public interest so requires, such as when the matter is of transcendental importance, of overarching significance to society, or of paramount public interest.[6] There is no doubt that Pimentel, as senator of the Philippines and candidate for the May 10, 2004 elections, possesses the requisite standing since he has substantial interests in the subject matter of the petition, among other preliminary considerations. Regarding SJS and Laserna, this Court is wont to relax the rule on locus standi owing primarily to the transcendental importance and the paramount public interest involved in the enforcement of Sec. 36 of RA 9165. The Consolidated Issues The principal issues before us are as follows: (1) Do Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 and COMELEC Resolution No. 6486 impose an additional qualification for candidates for senator? Corollarily, can Congress enact a law prescribing qualifications for candidates for senator in addition to those laid down by the Constitution? and (2) Are paragraphs (c), (d), (f), and (g) of Sec. 36, RA 9165 unconstitutional? Specifically, do these paragraphs violate the right to privacy, the right against unreasonable searches and seizure, and the equal protection clause? Or do they constitute undue delegation of legislative power? Pimentel Petition (Constitutionality of Sec. 36[g] of RA 9165 and COMELEC Resolution No. 6486) In essence, Pimentel claims that Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 and COMELEC Resolution No. 6486 illegally impose an additional qualification on candidates for senator. He points out that, subject to the provisions on nuisance candidates, a candidate for senator needs only to meet the qualifications laid down in Sec. 3, Art. VI of the Constitution, to wit: (1) citizenship, (2) voter registration, (3) literacy, (4) age, and (5) residency. Beyond these stated qualification requirements, candidates for senator need not possess any other qualification to run for senator and be voted upon and elected as member of the Senate. The Congress cannot validly amend or otherwise modify these qualification standards, as it cannot disregard, evade, or weaken the force of a constitutional mandate,[7] or alter or enlarge the Constitution. Pimentels contention is well-taken. Accordingly, Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 should be, as it is hereby declared as, unconstitutional. It is basic that if a law or an administrative rule violates any norm of the Constitution, that issuance is null and void and has no effect. The Constitution is the basic law to which all laws must conform; no act shall be valid if it conflicts with the Constitution.[8] In the discharge of their defined functions, the three departments of government have no choice but to yield obedience to the commands of the Constitution. Whatever limits it imposes must be observed.[9] Congress inherent legislative powers, broad as they may be, are subject to certain limitations. As early as 1927, in Government v. Springer, the Court has defined, in the abstract, the limits on legislative power in the following wise: Someone has said that the powers of the legislative department of the Government, like the boundaries of the ocean, are unlimited. In constitutional governments, however, as well as governments acting under delegated authority, the powers of each of the departments x x x are limited and confined within the four walls of the constitution or the charter, and each department can only exercise such powers as are necessarily implied from the given powers. The Constitution is the shore of legislative authority against which the waves of legislative enactment may dash, but over which it cannot leap.[10]

Thus, legislative power remains limited in the sense that it is subject to substantive and constitutional limitations which circumscribe both the exercise of the power itself and the allowable subjects of legislation.[11] The substantive constitutional limitations are chiefly found in the Bill of Rights[12] and other provisions, such as Sec. 3, Art. VI of the Constitution prescribing the qualifications of candidates for senators. In the same vein, the COMELEC cannot, in the guise of enforcing and administering election laws or promulgating rules and regulations to implement Sec. 36(g), validly impose qualifications on candidates for senator in addition to what the Constitution prescribes. If Congress cannot require a candidate for senator to meet such additional qualification, the COMELEC, to be sure, is also without such power. The right of a citizen in the democratic process of election should not be defeated by unwarranted impositions of requirement not otherwise specified in the Constitution.[13] Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165, as sought to be implemented by the assailed COMELEC resolution, effectively enlarges the qualification requirements enumerated in the Sec. 3, Art. VI of the Constitution. As couched, said Sec. 36(g) unmistakably requires a candidate for senator to be certified illegal-drug clean, obviously as a pre-condition to the validity of a certificate of candidacy for senator or, with like effect, a condition sine qua non to be voted upon and, if proper, be proclaimed as senator-elect. The COMELEC resolution completes the chain with the proviso that *n+o person elected to any public office shall enter upon the duties of his office until he has undergone mandatory drug test. Viewed, therefore, in its proper context, Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 and the implementing COMELEC Resolution add another qualification layer to what the 1987 Constitution, at the minimum, requires for membership in the Senate. Whether or not the drug-free bar set up under the challenged provision is to be hurdled before or after election is really of no moment, as getting elected would be of little value if one cannot assume office for non-compliance with the drug-testing requirement. It may of course be argued, in defense of the validity of Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165, that the provision does not expressly state that non-compliance with the drug test imposition is a disqualifying factor or would work to nullify a certificate of candidacy. This argument may be accorded plausibility if the drug test requirement is optional. But the particular section of the law, without exception, made drug-testing on those covered mandatory, necessarily suggesting that the obstinate ones shall have to suffer the adverse consequences for not adhering to the statutory command. And since the

provision deals with candidates for public office, it stands to reason that the adverse consequence adverted to can only refer to and revolve around the election and the assumption of public office of the candidates. Any other construal would reduce the mandatory nature of Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 into a pure jargon without meaning and effect whatsoever. While it is anti-climactic to state it at this juncture, COMELEC Resolution No. 6486 is no longer enforceable, for by its terms, it was intended to cover only the May 10, 2004 synchronized elections and the candidates running in that electoral event. Nonetheless, to obviate repetition, the Court deems it appropriate to review and rule, as it hereby rules, on its validity as an implementing issuance. It ought to be made abundantly clear, however, that the unconstitutionality of Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 is rooted on its having infringed the constitutional provision defining the qualification or eligibility requirements for one aspiring to run for and serve as senator. SJS Petition (Constitutionality of Sec. 36[c], [d], [f], and [g] of RA 9165) The drug test prescribed under Sec. 36(c), (d), and (f) of RA 9165 for secondary and tertiary level students and public and private employees, while mandatory, is a random and suspicionless arrangement. The objective is to stamp out illegal drug and safeguard in the process the well being of *the+ citizenry, particularly the youth, from the harmful effects of dangerous drugs. This statutory purpose, per the policy-declaration portion of the law, can be achieved via the pursuit by the state of an intensive and unrelenting campaign against the trafficking and use of dangerous drugs x x x through an integrated system of planning, implementation and enforcement of anti-drug abuse policies, programs and projects.[14] The primary legislative intent is not criminal prosecution, as those found positive for illegal drug use as a result of this random testing are not necessarily treated as criminals. They may even be exempt from criminal liability should the illegal drug user consent to undergo rehabilitation. Secs. 54 and 55 of RA 9165 are clear on this point: Sec. 54. Voluntary Submission of a Drug Dependent to Confinement, Treatment and Rehabilitation.A drug dependent or any person who violates Section 15 of this Act may, by himself/herself or through his/her parent, [close relatives] x x x apply to the Board x x x for treatment and rehabilitation of the drug dependency. Upon such application, the Board shall bring forth the matter to the Court which shall order

that the applicant be examined for drug dependency. If the examination x x x results in the certification that the applicant is a drug dependent, he/she shall be ordered by the Court to undergo treatment and rehabilitation in a Center designated by the Board x x x. xxxx Sec. 55. Exemption from the Criminal Liability Under the Voluntary Submission Program.A drug dependent under the voluntary submission program, who is finally discharged from confinement, shall be exempt from the criminal liability under Section 15 of this Act subject to the following conditions: xxxx School children, the US Supreme Court noted, are most vulnerable to the physical, psychological, and addictive effects of drugs. Maturing nervous systems of the young are more critically impaired by intoxicants and are more inclined to drug dependency. Their recovery is also at a depressingly low rate.[15] The right to privacy has been accorded recognition in this jurisdiction as a facet of the right protected by the guarantee against unreasonable search and seizure[16] under Sec. 2, Art. III[17] of the Constitution. But while the right to privacy has long come into its own, this case appears to be the first time that the validity of a state-decreed search or intrusion through the medium of mandatory random drug testing among students and employees is, in this jurisdiction, made the focal point. Thus, the issue tendered in these proceedings is veritably one of first impression. US jurisprudence is, however, a rich source of persuasive jurisprudence. With respect to random drug testing among school children, we turn to the teachings of VernoniaSchool District 47J v. Acton (Vernonia) and Board of Education of Independent School District No. 92 of Pottawatomie County, et al. v. Earls, et al. (Board of Education),[18]both fairly pertinent US Supreme Court-decided cases involving the constitutionality of governmental search. In Vernonia, school administrators in Vernonia, Oregon wanted to address the drug menace in their respective institutions following the discovery of frequent drug use by school athletes. After consultation with the parents, they required random urinalysis drug testing for the schools athletes. James Acton, a high school student, was denied participation in the football program after he refused to undertake the urinalysis drug testing. Acton forthwith sued, claiming that the schools drug testing policy

violated, inter alia, the Fourth Amendment[19] of the US Constitution. The US Supreme Court, in fashioning a solution to the issues raised in Vernonia, considered the following: (1) schools stand in loco parentis over their students; (2) school children, while not shedding their constitutional rights at the school gate, have less privacy rights; (3) athletes have less privacy rights than non-athletes since the former observe communal undress before and after sports events; (4) by joining the sports activity, the athletes voluntarily subjected themselves to a higher degree of school supervision and regulation; (5) requiring urine samples does not invade a students privacy since a student need not undress for this kind of drug testing; and (6) there is need for the drug testing because of the dangerous effects of illegal drugs on the young. The US Supreme Court held that the policy constituted reasonable search under the Fourth[20] and 14th Amendments and declared the random drug-testing policy constitutional. In Board of Education, the Board of Education of a school in Tecumseh, Oklahoma required a drug test for high school students desiring to join extra-curricular activities. Lindsay Earls, a member of the show choir, marching band, and academic team declined to undergo a drug test and averred that the drug-testing policy made to apply to non-athletes violated the Fourth and 14th Amendments. As Earls argued, unlike athletes who routinely undergo physical examinations and undress before their peers in locker rooms, nonathletes are entitled to more privacy. The US Supreme Court, citing Vernonia, upheld the constitutionality of drug testing even among nonathletes on the basis of the schools custodial responsibility and authority. In so ruling, said court made no distinction between a non-athlete and an athlete. It ratiocinated that schools and teachers act in place of the parents with a similar interest and duty of safeguarding the health of the students. And in holding that the school could implement its random drugtesting policy, the Court hinted that such a test was a kind of search in which even a reasonable parent might need to engage. In sum, what can reasonably be deduced from the above two cases and applied to this jurisdiction are: (1) schools and their administrators stand in loco parentis with respect to their students; (2) minor students have contextually fewer rights than an adult, and are subject to the custody and supervision of their parents, guardians, and schools; (3) schools, acting in loco parentis, have a duty to safeguard the health and

well-being of their students and may adopt such measures as may reasonably be necessary to discharge such duty; and (4) schools have the right to impose conditions on applicants for admission that are fair, just, and non-discriminatory. Guided by Vernonia and Board of Education, the Court is of the view and so holds that the provisions of RA 9165 requiring mandatory, random, and suspicionless drug testing of students are constitutional. Indeed, it is within the prerogative of educational institutions to require, as a condition for admission, compliance with reasonable school rules and regulations and policies. To be sure, the right to enroll is not absolute; it is subject to fair, reasonable, and equitable requirements. The Court can take judicial notice of the proliferation of prohibited drugs in the country that threatens the well-being of the people,[21] particularly the youth and school children who usually end up as victims. Accordingly, and until a more effective method is conceptualized and put in motion, a random drug testing of students in secondary and tertiary schools is not only acceptable but may even be necessary if the safety and interest of the student population, doubtless a legitimate concern of the government, are to be promoted and protected. To borrow from Vernonia, *d+eterring drug use by our Nations schoolchildren is as important as enhancing efficient enforcement of the Nations laws against the importation of drugs; the necessity for the State to act is magnified by the fact that the effects of a drug-infested school are visited not just upon the users, but upon the entire student body and faculty.[22] Needless to stress, the random testing scheme provided under the law argues against the idea that the testing aims to incriminate unsuspecting individual students. Just as in the case of secondary and tertiary level students, the mandatory but random drug test prescribed by Sec. 36 of RA 9165 for officers and employees of public and private offices is justifiable, albeit not exactly for the same reason. The Court notes in this regard that petitioner SJS, other than saying that subjecting almost everybody to drug testing, without probable cause, is unreasonable, an unwarranted intrusion of the individual right to privacy,[23] has failed to show how the mandatory, random, and suspicionless drug testing under Sec. 36(c) and (d) of RA 9165 violates the right to privacy and constitutes unlawful and/or unconsented search under Art. III, Secs. 1 and 2 of the Constitution.[24] Petitioner Lasernas lament is just as simplistic, sweeping, and gratuitous

and does not merit serious consideration. Consider what he wrote without elaboration: The US Supreme Court and US Circuit Courts of Appeals have made various rulings on the constitutionality of mandatory drug tests in the school and the workplaces. The US courts have been consistent in their rulings that the mandatory drug tests violate a citizens constitutional right to privacy and right against unreasonable search and seizure. They are quoted extensively hereinbelow.[25] The essence of privacy is the right to be left alone.[26] In context, the right to privacy means the right to be free from unwarranted exploitation of ones person or from intrusion into ones private activities in such a way as to cause humiliation to a persons ordinary sensibilities. [27] And while there has been general agreement as to the basic function of the guarantee against unwarranted search, translation of the abstract prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures into workable broad guidelines for the decision of particular cases is a difficult task, to borrow from C. Camara v. Municipal Court.[28] Authorities are agreed though that the right to privacy yields to certain paramount rights of the public and defers to the states exercise of police power.[29] As the warrantless clause of Sec. 2, Art III of the Constitution is couched and as has been held, reasonableness is the touchstone of the validity of a government search or intrusion.[30] And whether a search at issue hews to the reasonableness standard is judged by the balancing of the government-mandated intrusion on the individuals privacy interest against the promotion of some compelling state interest.[31] In the criminal context, reasonableness requires showing of probable cause to be personally determined by a judge. Given that the drug-testing policy for employeesand students for that matterunder RA 9165 is in the nature of administrative search needing what was referred to inVernonia as swift and informal disciplinary procedures, the probable-cause standard is not required or even practicable. Be that as it may, the review should focus on the reasonableness of the challenged administrative search in question. The first factor to consider in the matter of reasonableness is the nature of the privacy interest upon which the drug testing, which effects a search within the meaning of Sec. 2, Art. III of the Constitution, intrudes. In this case, the office or workplace serves as the backdrop for the analysis of the privacy expectation of the employees and the reasonableness of drug testing requirement. The employees privacy interest in

an office is to a large extent circumscribed by the companys work policies, the collective bargaining agreement, if any, entered into by management and the bargaining unit, and the inherent right of the employer to maintain discipline and efficiency in the workplace. Their privacy expectation in a regulated office environment is, in fine, reduced; and a degree of impingement upon such privacy has been upheld. Just as defining as the first factor is the character of the intrusion authorized by the challenged law. Reduced to a question form, is the scope of the search or intrusion clearly set forth, or, as formulated in Ople v. Torres, is the enabling law authorizing a search narrowly drawn or narrowly focused?[32] The poser should be answered in the affirmative. For one, Sec. 36 of RA 9165 and its implementing rules and regulations (IRR), as couched, contain provisions specifically directed towards preventing a situation that would unduly embarrass the employees or place them under a humiliating experience. While every officer and employee in a private establishment is under the law deemed forewarned that he or she may be a possible subject of a drug test, nobody is really singled out in advance for drug testing. The goal is to discourage drug use by not telling in advance anyone when and who is to be tested. And as may be observed, Sec. 36(d) of RA 9165 itself prescribes what, in Ople, is a narrowing ingredient by providing that the employees concerned shall be subjected to random drug test as contained in the companys work rules and regulations x x x for purposes of reducing the risk in the work place. For another, the random drug testing shall be undertaken under conditions calculated to protect as much as possible the employees privacy and dignity. As to the mechanics of the test, the law specifies that the procedure shall employ two testing methods, i.e., the screening test and the confirmatory test, doubtless to ensure as much as possible the trustworthiness of the results. But the more important consideration lies in the fact that the test shall be conducted by trained professionals in access-controlled laboratories monitored by the Department of Health (DOH) to safeguard against results tampering and to ensure an accurate chain of custody.[33] In addition, the IRR issued by the DOH provides that access to the drug results shall be on the need to know basis;[34] that the drug test result and the records shall be [kept] confidential subject to the usual accepted practices to protect the confidentiality of the test results.[35] Notably, RA 9165 does not oblige the employer concerned to report to the prosecuting agencies any information or evidence relating to the

violation of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act received as a result of the operation of the drug testing. All told, therefore, the intrusion into the employees privacy, under RA 9165, is accompanied by proper safeguards, particularly against embarrassing leakages of test results, and is relatively minimal. To reiterate, RA 9165 was enacted as a measure to stamp out illegal drug in the country and thus protect the well-being of the citizens, especially the youth, from the deleterious effects of dangerous drugs. The law intends to achieve this through the medium, among others, of promoting and resolutely pursuing a national drug abuse policy in the workplace via a mandatory random drug test.[36] To the Court, the need for drug testing to at least minimize illegal drug use is substantial enough to override the individuals privacy interest under the premises. The Court can consider that the illegal drug menace cuts across gender, age group, and social- economic lines. And it may not be amiss to state that the sale, manufacture, or trafficking of illegal drugs, with their ready market, would be an investors dream were it not for the illegal and immoral components of any of such activities. The drug problem has hardly abated since the martial law public execution of a notorious drug trafficker. The state can no longer assume a laid back stance with respect to this modernday scourge. Drug enforcement agencies perceive a mandatory random drug test to be an effective way of preventing and deterring drug use among employees in private offices, the threat of detection by random testing being higher than other modes. The Court holds that the chosen method is a reasonable and enough means to lick the problem. Taking into account the foregoing factors, i.e., the reduced expectation of privacy on the part of the employees, the compelling state concern likely to be met by the search, and the well-defined limits set forth in the law to properly guide authorities in the conduct of the random testing, we hold that the challenged drug test requirement is, under the limited context of the case, reasonable and, ergo, constitutional. Like their counterparts in the private sector, government officials and employees also labor under reasonable supervision and restrictions imposed by the Civil Service law and other laws on public officers, all enacted to promote a high standard of ethics in the public service.[37] And if RA 9165 passes the norm of reasonableness for private employees, the more reason that it should pass the test for civil servants, who, by constitutional command, are required to be accountable at all times to the people and to serve them with utmost responsibility and efficiency.[38]

Petitioner SJS next posture that Sec. 36 of RA 9165 is objectionable on the ground of undue delegation of power hardly commends itself for concurrence. Contrary to its position, the provision in question is not so extensively drawn as to give unbridled options to schools and employers to determine the manner of drug testing. Sec. 36 expressly provides how drug testing for students of secondary and tertiary schools and officers/employees of public/private offices should be conducted. It enumerates the persons who shall undergo drug testing. In the case of students, the testing shall be in accordance with the school rules as contained in the student handbook and with notice to parents. On the part of officers/employees, the testing shall take into account the companys work rules. In either case, the random procedure shall be observed, meaning that the persons to be subjected to drug test shall be picked by chance or in an unplanned way. And in all cases, safeguards against misusing and compromising the confidentiality of the test results are established. Lest it be overlooked, Sec. 94 of RA 9165 charges the DDB to issue, in consultation with the DOH, Department of the Interior and Local Government, Department of Education, and Department of Labor and Employment, among other agencies, the IRR necessary to enforce the law. In net effect then, the participation of schools and offices in the drug testing scheme shall always be subject to the IRR of RA 9165. It is, therefore, incorrect to say that schools and employers have unchecked discretion to determine how often, under what conditions, and where the drug tests shall be conducted. The validity of delegating legislative power is now a quiet area in the constitutional landscape.[39] In the face of the increasing complexity of the task of the government and the increasing inability of the legislature to cope directly with the many problems demanding its attention, resort to delegation of power, or entrusting to administrative agencies the power of subordinate legislation, has become imperative, as here. Laserna Petition (Constitutionality of Sec. 36[c], [d], [f], and [g] of RA 9165) Unlike the situation covered by Sec. 36(c) and (d) of RA 9165, the Court finds no valid justification for mandatory drug testing for persons accused of crimes. In the case of students, the constitutional viability of the mandatory, random, and suspicionless drug testing for students emanates primarily from the waiver by the students of their right to privacy when they seek entry

to the school, and from their voluntarily submitting their persons to the parental authority of school authorities. In the case of private and public employees, the constitutional soundness of the mandatory, random, and suspicionless drug testing proceeds from the reasonableness of the drug test policy and requirement.

We find the situation entirely different in the case of persons charged before the public prosecutors office with criminal offenses punishable with six (6) years and one (1) day imprisonment. The operative concepts in the mandatory drug testing are randomness and suspicionless. In the case of persons charged with a crime before the prosecutors office, a mandatory drug testing can never be random or suspicionless. The ideas of randomness and being suspicionless are antithetical to their being made defendants in a criminal complaint. They are not randomly picked; neither are they beyond suspicion. When persons suspected of committing a crime are charged, they are singled out and are impleaded against their will. The persons thus charged, by the bare fact of being haled before the prosecutors office and peaceably submitting themselves to drug testing, if that be the case, do not necessarily consent to the procedure, let alone waive their right to privacy.[40] To impose mandatory drug testing on the accused is a blatant attempt to harness a medical test as a tool for criminal prosecution, contrary to the stated objectives of RA 9165. Drug testing in this case would violate a persons right to privacy guaranteed under Sec. 2, Art. III of the Constitution. Worse still, the accused persons are veritably forced to incriminate themselves.

WHEREFORE, the Court resolves to GRANT the petition in G.R. No. 161658 and declares Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 and COMELEC Resolution No. 6486 asUNCONSTITUTIONAL; and to PARTIALLY GRANT the petition in G.R. Nos. 157870 and 158633 by declaring Sec. 36(c) and (d) of RA 9165 CONSTITUTIONAL, but declaring its Sec. 36(f) UNCONSTITUTIONAL. All concerned agencies are, accordingly, permanently enjoined from implementing Sec. 36(f) and (g) of RA 9165. No costs.

3 PESCA v PESCA Submitted for review is the decision of the Court of Appeals, promulgated on 27 May 1998, in C.A. G.R. CV. No. 52374, reversing the decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Caloocan City, Branch 130, which has declared the marriage between petitioner and respondent to be null and void ab initio on the ground of psychological incapacity on the part of respondent. Petitioner Lorna G. Pesca and respondent Zosimo A. Pesca first met sometime in 1975 while on board an inter-island vessel bound for Bacolod City. After a whirlwind courtship, they got married on 03 March 1975. Initially, the young couple did not live together as petitioner was still a student in college and respondent, a seaman, had to leave the country on board an oceangoing vessel barely a month after the marriage. Six months later, the young couple established their residence in Quezon City until they were able to build their own house in Caloocan City where they finally resided. It was blissful marriage for the couple during the two months of the year that they could stay together when respondent was on vacation. The union begot four children, 19-year old Ruhem, 17-year old Rez, 11-year old Ryan, and 9-year old Richie. It started in 1988, petitioner said, when she noticed that respondent surprisingly showed signs of psychological incapacity to perform his marital covenant. His "true color" of being an emotionally immature and irresponsible husband became apparent. He was cruel and violent. He was a habitual drinker, staying with friends daily from 4:00 o'clock in the afternoon until 1:00 o'clock in the morning. When cautioned to stop or, to at least, minimize his drinking, respondent would beat, slap and kick her. At one time, he chased petitioner with a loaded shotgun and threatened to kill her in the presence of the children. The children themselves were not spared from physical violence. Finally, on 19 November 1992, petitioner and her children left the conjugal abode to live in the house of her sister in Quezon City as they could no longer bear his violent ways. Two months later, petitioner decided to forgive respondent, and she returned home to give him a chance to change. But, to her dismay, things did not so turn out as expected. Indeed, matters became worse. On the morning of 22 March 1994, about eight oclock, respondent assaulted petitioner for about half an hour in the presence of the children. She was battered black and blue. She submitted herself to medical examination at the Quezon City General Hospital, which diagnosed her injuries as contusions and abrasions.

Petitioner filed a complaint with the barangay authorities, and a case was filed against respondent for slight physical injuries. He was convicted by the Metropolitan Trial Court of Caloocan City and sentenced to eleven days of imprisonment. This time, petitioner and her children left the conjugal home for good and stayed with her sister. Eventually, they decided to rent an apartment. Petitioner sued respondent before the Regional Trial Court for the declaration of nullity of their marriage invoking psychological incapacity. Petitioner likewise sought the custody of her minor children and prayed for support pendente lite. Summons, together with a copy of the complaint, was served on respondent on 25 April 1994 by personal service by the sheriff. As respondent failed to file an answer or to enter his appearance within the reglementary period, the trial court ordered the city prosecutor to look into a possible collusion between the parties. Prosecutor Rosa C. Reyes, on 03 August 1994, submitted her report to the effect that she found no evidence to establish that there was collusion between the parties. On 11 January 1995, respondent belatedly filed, without leave of court, an answer, and the same, although filed late, was admitted by the court. In his answer, respondent admitted the fact of his marriage with petitioner and the birth of their children. He also confirmed the veracity of Annex "A" of the complaint which listed the conjugal property. Respondent vehemently denied, however, the allegation that he was psychologically incapacitated. On 15 November 1995, following hearings conducted by it, the trial court rendered its decision declaring the marriage between petitioner and respondent to be null and void ab initio on the basis of psychological incapacity on the part of respondent and ordered the liquidation of the conjugal partnership. Respondent appealed the above decision to the Court of Appeals, contending that the trial court erred, particularly, in holding that there was legal basis to declare the marriage null and void and in denying his motion to reopen the case. The Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the trial court and declared the marriage between petitioner and respondent valid and subsisting. The appellate court said: "Definitely the appellee has not established the following: That the appellant showed signs of mental incapacity as would cause him to be truly incognitive of

the basic marital covenant, as so provided for in Article 68 of the Family Code; that the incapacity is grave, has preceded the marriage and is incurable; that his incapacity to meet his marital responsibility is because of a psychological, not physical illness; that the root cause of the incapacity has been identified medically or clinically, and has been proven by an expert; and that the incapacity is permanent and incurable in nature. The burden of proof to show the nullity of marriage lies in the plaintiff and any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity."[1] Petitioner, in her plea to this Court, would have the decision of the Court of Appeals reversed on the thesis that the doctrine enunciated in Santos vs. Court of Appeals,[2] promulgated on 14 January 1995, as well as the guidelines set out in Republic vs. Court of Appeals and Molina,[3] promulgated on 13 February 1997, should have no retroactive application and, on the assumption that the Molina ruling could be applied retroactively, the guidelines therein outlined should be taken to be merely advisory and not mandatory in nature. In any case, petitioner argues, the application of the Santos and Molina dicta should warrant only a remand of the case to the trial court for further proceedings and not its dismissal. Be that as it may, respondent submits, the appellate court did not err in its assailed decision for there is absolutely no evidence that has been shown to prove psychological incapacity on his part as the term has been so defined in Santos. Indeed, there is no merit in the petition. The term psychological incapacity, as a ground for the declaration of nullity of a marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code, has been explained by the Court in Santos and reiterated in Molina. The Court, inSantos, concluded: "It should be obvious, looking at all the foregoing disquisitions, including, and most importantly, the deliberations of the Family Code Revision Committee itself, that the use of the phrase `psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Code has not been meant to comprehend all such possible cases of psychoses as, likewise mentioned by some ecclesiastical authorities, extremely low intelligence, immaturity, and like circumstances (cited in Fr. Artemio Balumad's `Void and Voidable Marriages in the Family Code and their Parallels in Canon Law, quoting form the Diagnostic Statistical Manuel of Mental Disorder by the American Psychiatric Association; Edward Hudson's `Handbook II

for Marriage Nullity Cases). Article 36 of the Family Code cannot be taken and construed independently of, but must stand in conjunction with, existing precepts in our law on marriage. Thus correlated, `psychological incapacity should refer to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage which, as so expressed by Article 68 of the Family Code, include their mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity and render help and support. There is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of `psychological incapacity to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. This psychologic condition must exist at the time the marriage is celebrated." The "doctrine of stare decisis," ordained in Article 8 of the Civil Code, expresses that judicial decisions applying or interpreting the law shall form part of the legal system of the Philippines. The rule follows the settled legal maxim legis interpretado legis vim obtinet that the interpretation placed upon the written law by a competent court has the force of law.[4] The interpretation or construction placed by the courts establishes the contemporaneous legislative intent of the law. The latter as so interpreted and construed would thus constitute a part of that law as of the date the statute is enacted. It is only when a prior ruling of this Court finds itself later overruled, and a different view is adopted, that the new doctrine may have to be applied prospectively in favor of parties who have relied on the old doctrine and have acted in good faith in accordance therewith[5] under the familiar rule of lex prospicit, non respicit. The phrase psychological incapacity, borrowed from Canon law, is an entirely novel provision in our statute books, and, until the relatively recent enactment of the Family Code, the concept has escaped jurisprudential attention. It is in Santos when, for the first time, the Court has given life to the term. Molina, that followed, has additionally provided procedural guidelines to assist the courts and the parties in trying cases for annulment of marriages grounded on psychological incapacity. Molina has strengthened, not overturned, Santos. At all events, petitioner has utterly failed, both in her allegations in the complaint and in her evidence, to make out a case of psychological incapacity on the part of respondent, let alone at the time of solemnization of

the contract, so as to warrant a declaration of nullity of the marriage. Emotional immaturity and irresponsibility, invoked by her, cannot be equated with psychological incapacity. The Court reiterates its reminder that marriage is an inviolable social institution and the foundation of the family[6] that the State cherishes and protects. While the Court commisserates with petitioner in her unhappy marital relationship with respondent, totally terminating that relationship, however, may not necessarily be the fitting denouement to it. In these cases, the law has not quite given up, neither should we. WHEREFORE, the herein petition is DENIED. No costs.

4 GAMBOA v FINANCE SEC

5 ABAKADA Guro Party List v HON PURISIMA 63 It has been suggested by Mr. Justice Antonio T. Carpio that Section 12 of RA 9335 is likewise unconstitutional because it violates the principle of separation of powers, particularly with respect to the executive and the legislative branches. Implicit in this claim is the proposition that the ability of the President to promulgate implementing rules to legislation is inherent in the executive branch. There has long been a trend towards the delegation of powers, especially of legislative powers, even if not expressly permitted by the Constitution. (I. Cortes, Administrative Law, at 12-13.) Delegation of legislative powers is permissible unless the delegation amounts to a surrender or abdication of powers. (Id.) Recent instances of delegated legislative powers upheld by the Court include the power of the Departments of Justice and Health to promulgate rules and regulations on lethal injection (Echegaray v. Secretary of Justice, 358 Phil. 410 [1998]); the power of the Secretary of Health to phase out blood banks (Beltran v. Secretary of Health, G.R. No. 133640, 133661, & 139147, 25 November 2005, 476 SCRA 168); and the power of the Departments of Finance and Labor to promulgate Implementing Rules to the Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act. (Equi-Asia Placement v.DFA, G.R. No. 152214, 19 September 2006, 502 SCRA 295.) The delegation to the executive branch of the power to formulate and enact implementing rules falls within the class of permissible delegation of legislative powers. Most recently, in Executive Secretary v. Southwing Heavy Industries (G.R. Nos. 164171, 164172 &168741,

20 February 2006, 482 SCRA 673), we characterized such delegation as "confer[ring] upon the President quasi-legislative power which may be defined as the authority delegated by the law-making body to the administrative body to adopt rules and regulations intended to carry out the provisions of the law and implement legislative policy." (Id., at 686, citing Cruz, Philippine Administrative Law, 2003 Edition, at 24.) Law book authors are likewise virtually unanimous that the power of the executive branch to promulgate implementing rules arises from legislative delegation. Justice Nachura defines the nature of the rule-making power of administrative bodies in the executive branch as "the exercise of delegated legislative power, involving no discretion as to what the law shall be, but merely the authority to fix the details in the execution or enforcement of a policy set out in the law itself." (A.E. Nachura, Outline Reviewer in Political Law [2000 ed.], at 272.) He further explains that rules and regulations that "fix the details in the execution and enforcement of a policy set out in the law" are called "supplementary or detailed legislation". (Id., at 273.) Other commentators such as Fr. Bernas (Bernas, supra note 48, at 611), De Leon and De Leon (H. De Leon & H. De Leon, Jr., Administrative Law: Text and Cases (1998 ed), at 79-80; citing 1 Am. Jur. 2d 891) and Carlos Cruz (C. Cruz, Philippine Administrative Law (1998 ed), at 1920, 22, 23) have similar views. The Congress may delegate the power to craft implementing rules to the President in his capacity as the head of the executive branch, which is tasked under the Constitution to execute the law. In effecting this delegation, and as with any other delegation of legislative powers, Congress may impose conditions or limitations which the executive branch is bound to observe. A usual example is the designation by Congress of which particular members of the executive branch should participate in the drafting of the implementing rules. This set-up does not offend the separation of powers between the branches as it is sanctioned by the delegation principle. Apart from whatever rule-making power that Congress may delegate to the President, the latter has inherent ordinance powers covering the executive branch as part of the power of executive control ("The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus and offices" Section 17, Article VII, Constitution.). By its nature, this ordinance power does not require or entail delegation from Congress. Such faculty must be distinguished from the authority to issue implementing rules to legislation which does not inhere in the

presidency but instead, as explained earlier, is delegated by Congress. The marked distinction between the Presidents power to issue intrabranch orders and instructions or internal rules for the executive branch, on one hand, and the Presidents authority by virtue of legislative delegation to issue implementing rules to legislation, on the other, is embodied in the rules on publication, as explained in Taada v. Tuvera (G.R. No. L-63915, 29 December 1986, 146 SCRA 446). The Court held therein that internal regulations applicable to members of the executive branch, "that is, regulating only the personnel of the administrative agency and not the public, need not be published. Neither is publication required of the so-called letters of instructions issued by administrative superiors concerning the rules or guidelines to be followed by their subordinates in the performance of their duties." (Id., at 454) The dispensation with publication in such instances is rooted in the very nature of the issuances, i.e., they are not binding on the public. They neither create rights nor impose obligations which are enforceable in court. Since they are issued pursuant to the power of executive control, and are directed only at members of the executive branch, there is no constitutional need for their publication. However, when the presidential issuance does create rights and obligations affecting the public at large, as implementing rules certainly do, then publication is mandatory. In explaining why this is so, the Court went as far as to note that such rules and regulations are designed "to enforce or implement existing law pursuant to a valid delegation." (Id., at 254.) The Court would not have spoken of "valid delegation" if indeed the power to issue such rules was inherent in the presidency. Moreover, the creation of legal rights and obligations is legislative in character, and the President in whom legislative power does not reside cannot confer legal rights or impose obligations on the people absent the proper empowering statute. Thus, any presidential issuance which purports to bear such legal effect on the public, such as implementing rules to legislation, can only emanate from a legislative delegation to the President. The prevalent practice in the Office of the President is to issue orders or instructions to officials of the executive branch regarding the enforcement or carrying out of the law. This practice is valid conformably with the Presidents power of executive control. The faculty to issue such orders or instructions is distinct from the power to promulgate implementing rules to legislation.

The latter originates from a different legal foundation the delegation of legislative power to the President. Justice Carpio cites an unconventional interpretation of the ordinance power of the President, particularly the power to issue executive orders, as set forth in the Administrative Code of 1987. Yet, by practice, implementing rules are never contained in executive orders. They are, instead, contained in a segregate promulgation, usually entitled "Implementing Rules and Regulations," which derives not from the Administrative Code, but rather from the specific grants in the legislation itself sought to be implemented. His position does not find textual support in the Administrative Code itself. Section 2, Chapter 2, Title 1, Book III of the Code, which defines "Executive orders" as "[a]cts of the President providing for rules of a general or permanent character in the implementation or execution of constitutional or statutory powers". Executive orders are not the vehicles for rules of a general or permanent character in the implementation or execution of laws. They are the vehicle for rules of a general or permanent character in the implementation or execution of the constitutional or statutory powers of the President himself. Since by definition, the statutory powers of the President consist of a specific delegation by Congress, it necessarily follows that the faculty to issue executive orders to implement such delegated authority emanates not from any inherent executive power but from the authority delegated by Congress. It is not correct, as Justice Carpio posits, that without implementing rules, legislation cannot be faithfully executed by the executive branch. Many of our key laws, including the Civil Code, the Revised Penal Code, the Corporation Code, the Land Registration Act and the Property Registration Decree, do not have Implementing Rules. It has never been suggested that the enforcement of these laws is unavailing, or that the absence of implementing rules to these laws indicates insufficient statutory details that should preclude their enforcement. (See DBM v.Kolonwel Trading, G.R. Nos. 175608, 175616 & 175659, 8 June 2007, 524 SCRA 591, 603.) In rejecting the theory that the power to craft implementing rules is executive in character and reaffirming instead that such power arises from a legislative grant, the Court asserts that Congress retains the power to impose statutory conditions in the drafting of implementing rules, provided that such conditions do not take on the character of a legislative veto. Congress can designate which officers or entities

should participate in the drafting of implementing rules. It may impose statutory restraints on the participants in the drafting of implementing rules, and the President is obliged to observe such restraints on the executive officials, even if he thinks they are unnecessary or foolhardy. The unconstitutional nature of the legislative veto does not however bar Congress from imposing conditions which the President must comply with in the execution of the law. After all, the President has the constitutional duty to faithfully execute the laws. 5 SULTAN CAMID v OP This Petition for Certiorari presents this Court with the prospect of our own Brigadoon1 the municipality of Andong, Lanao del Surwhich like its counterpart in filmdom, is a town that is not supposed to exist yet is anyway insisted by some as actually alive and thriving. Yet unlike in the movies, there is nothing mystical, ghostly or anything even remotely charming about the purported existence of Andong. The creation of the putative municipality was declared void ab initio by this Court four decades ago, but the present petition insists that in spite of this insurmountable obstacle Andong thrives on, and hence, its legal personality should be given judicial affirmation. We disagree. The factual antecedents derive from the promulgation of our ruling in Pelaez v. Auditor General2 in 1965. As discussed therein, then President Diosdado Macapagal issued several Executive Orders3 creating thirty-three (33) municipalities in Mindanao. Among them was Andong in Lanao del Sur which was created by virtue of Executive Order No. 107.4 These executive orders were issued after legislative bills for the creation of municipalities involved in that case had failed to pass Congress.5 President Diosdado Macapagal justified the creation of these municipalities citing his powers under Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code. Then Vice-President Emmanuel Pelaez filed a special civil action for a writ of prohibition, alleging in main that the Executive Orders were null and void, Section 68 having been repealed by Republic Act No. 2370,6 and said orders constituting an undue delegation of legislative power.7 After due deliberation, the Court unanimously held that the challenged Executive Orders were null and void. A majority of five justices, led by the ponente, Justice (later Chief Justice) Roberto Concepcion, ruled that Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code did not meet the well-settled requirements for a valid delegation of legislative power to the executive branch,8 while three justices opined that the nullity of

the issuances was the consequence of the enactment of the 1935 Constitution, which reduced the power of the Chief Executive over local governments.9 Pelaez was disposed in this wise: WHEREFORE, the Executive Orders in question are declared null and void ab initio and the respondent permanently restrained from passing in audit any expenditure of public funds in implementation of said Executive Orders or any disbursement by the municipalities above referred to. It is so ordered.10 Among the Executive Orders annulled was Executive Order No. 107 which created the Municipality of Andong. Nevertheless, the core issue presented in the present petition is the continued efficacy of the judicial annulment of the Municipality of Andong. Petitioner Sultan Osop B. Camid (Camid) represents himself as a current resident of Andong,11 suing as a private citizen and taxpayer whose locus standi "is of public and paramount interest especially to the people of the Municipality of Andong, Province of Lanao del Sur."12 He alleges that Andong "has metamorphosed into a full-blown municipality with a complete set of officials appointed to handle essential services for the municipality and its constituents,"13 even though he concedes that since 1968, no person has been appointed, elected or qualified to serve any of the elective local government positions of Andong.14 Nonetheless, the municipality of Andong has its own high school, Bureau of Posts, a Department of Education, Culture and Sports office, and at least seventeen (17) "barangay units" with their own respective chairmen.15 From 1964 until 1972, according to Camid, the public officials of Andong "have been serving their constituents through the minimal means and resources with least (sic) honorarium and recognition from the Office of the then former President Diosdado Macapagal." Since the time of Martial Law in 1972, Andong has allegedly been getting by despite the absence of public funds, with the "Interim Officials" serving their constituents "in their own little ways and means."16 In support of his claim that Andong remains in existence, Camid presents to this Court a Certification issued by the Office of the Community Environment and Natural Resources (CENRO) of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) certifying the total land area of the Municipality of Andong, "created under Executive Order No. 107 issued [last] October 1, 1964."17 He also submits a Certification issued by the Provincial Statistics Office of Marawi City concerning the population of Andong,

which is pegged at fourteen thousand fifty nine (14,059) strong. Camid also enumerates a list of governmental agencies and private groups that allegedly recognize Andong, and notes that other municipalities have recommended to the Speaker of the Regional Legislative Assembly for the immediate implementation of the revival or re-establishment of Andong.18 The petition assails a Certification dated 21 November 2003, issued by the Bureau of Local Government Supervision of the Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG).19 The Certification enumerates eighteen (18) municipalities certified as "existing," per DILG records. Notably, these eighteen (18) municipalities are among the thirty-three (33), along with Andong, whose creations were voided by this Court in Pelaez. These municipalities are Midaslip, Pitogo, Naga, and Bayog in Zamboanga del Sur; Siayan and Pres. Manuel A. Roxas in Zamboanga del Norte; Magsaysay, Sta. Maria and New Corella in Davao; Badiangan and Mina in Iloilo; Maguing in Lanao del Sur; Gloria in Oriental Mindoro; Maasim in Sarangani; Kalilangan and Lantapan in Bukidnon; and Maco in Compostela Valley.20 Camid imputes grave abuse of discretion on the part of the DILG "in not classifying [Andong] as a regular existing municipality and in not including said municipality in its records and official database as [an] existing regular municipality."21 He characterizes such non-classification as unequal treatment to the detriment of Andong, especially in light of the current recognition given to the eighteen (18) municipalities similarly annulled by reason ofPelaez. As appropriate relief, Camid prays that the Court annul the DILG Certification dated 21 November 2003; direct the DILG to classify Andong as a "regular existing municipality;" all public respondents, to extend full recognition and support to Andong; the Department of Finance and the Department of Budget and Management, to immediately release the internal revenue allotments of Andong; and the public respondents, particularly the DILG, to recognize the "Interim Local Officials" of Andong.22 Moreover, Camid insists on the continuing validity of Executive Order No. 107. He argues that Pelaez has already been modified by supervening events consisting of subsequent laws and jurisprudence. Particularly cited is ourDecision in Municipality of San Narciso v. Hon. Mendez,23 wherein the Court affirmed the unique status of the municipality of San Andres in Quezon as a "de facto municipal corporation."24 Similar to Andong, the municipality of San Andres was created by way of executive order, precisely the manner which the Court

in Pelaez had declared as unconstitutional. Moreover, San Narciso cited, as Camid does, Section 442(d) of the Local Government Code of 1991 as basis for the current recognition of the impugned municipality. The provision reads: Section 442. Requisites for Creation. - xxx (d) Municipalities existing as of the date of the effectivity of this Code shall continue to exist and operate as such. Existing municipal districts organized pursuant to presidential issuances or executive orders and which have their respective sets of elective municipal officials holding office at the time of the effectivity of (the) Code shall henceforth be considered as regular municipalities.25 There are several reasons why the petition must be dismissed. These can be better discerned upon examination of the proper scope and application of Section 442(d), which does not sanction the recognition of just any municipality. This point shall be further explained further on. Notably, as pointed out by the public respondents, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), the case is not a fit subject for the special civil actions of certiorari and mandamus, as it pertains to the de novo appreciation of factual questions. There is indeed no way to confirm several of Camids astonishing factual allegations pertaining to the purported continuing operation of Andong in the decades since it was annulled by this Court. No trial court has had the opportunity to ascertain the validity of these factual claims, the appreciation of which is beyond the function of this Court since it is not a trier of facts. The importance of proper factual ascertainment cannot be gainsaid, especially in light of the legal principles governing the recognition of de facto municipal corporations. It has been opined that municipal corporations may exist by prescription where it is shown that the community has claimed and exercised corporate functions, with the knowledge and acquiescence of the legislature, and without interruption or objection for period long enough to afford title by prescription.26 These municipal corporations have exercised their powers for a long period without objection on the part of the government that although no charter is in existence, it is presumed that they were duly incorporated in the first place and that their charters had been lost.27 They are especially common in England, which, as well-worth noting, has existed as a state for over a thousand years. The reason for the development of that rule in England is understandable, since that country was settled long

before the Roman conquest by nomadic Celtic tribes, which could have hardly been expected to obtain a municipal charter in the absence of a national legal authority. In the United States, municipal corporations by prescription are less common, but it has been held that when no charter or act of incorporation of a town can be found, it may be shown to have claimed and exercised the powers of a town with the knowledge and assent of the legislature, and without objection or interruption for so long a period as to furnish evidence of a prescriptive right.28 What is clearly essential is a factual demonstration of the continuous exercise by the municipal corporation of its corporate powers, as well as the acquiescence thereto by the other instrumentalities of the state. Camid does not have the opportunity to make an initial factual demonstration of those circumstances before this Court. Indeed, the factual deficiencies aside, Camids plaint should have undergone the usual administrative gauntlet and, once that was done, should have been filed first with the Court of Appeals, which at least would have had the power to make the necessary factual determinations. Camids seeming ignorance of the principles of exhaustion of administrative remedies and hierarchy of courts, as well as the concomitant prematurity of the present petition, cannot be countenanced. It is also difficult to capture the sense and viability of Camids present action. The assailed issuance is theCertification issued by the DILG. But such Certification does not pretend to bear the authority to create or revalidate a municipality. Certainly, the annulment of the Certification will really do nothing to serve Camids ultimate cause- the recognition of Andong. Neither does the Certification even expressly refute the claim that Andong still exists, as there is nothing in the document that comments on the present status of Andong. Perhaps the Certification is assailed before this Court if only to present an actual issuance, rather than a longstanding habit or pattern of action that can be annulled through the special civil action of certiorari. Still, the relation of theCertification to Camids central argument is forlornly strained. These disquisitions aside, the central issue remains whether a municipality whose creation by executive fiat was previously voided by this Court may attain recognition in the absence of any curative or reimplementing statute. Apparently, the question has never been decided before, San Narciso and its kindred

cases pertaining as they did to municipalities whose bases of creation were dubious yet were never judicially nullified. The effect of Section 442(d) of the Local Government Code on municipalities such as Andong warrants explanation. Besides, the residents of Andong who belabor under the impression that their town still exists, much less those who may comport themselves as the municipalitys "Interim Government," would be well served by a rude awakening. The Court can employ a simplistic approach in resolving the substantive aspect of the petition, merely by pointing out that the Municipality of Andong never existed.29 Executive Order No. 107, which established Andong, was declared "null and void ab initio" in 1965 by this Court in Pelaez, along with thirty-three (33) other executive orders. The phrase "ab initio" means "from the beginning,"30 "at first,"31 "from the inception."32 Pelaez was never reversed by this Court but rather it was expressly affirmed in the cases of Municipality of San Joaquin v. Siva,33Municipality of Malabang v. Benito,34 and Municipality of Kapalong v. Moya.35 No subsequent ruling by this Court declared Pelaez as overturned or inoperative. No subsequent legislation has been passed since 1965 creating a Municipality of Andong. Given these facts, there is hardly any reason to elaborate why Andong does not exist as a duly constituted municipality. This ratiocination does not admit to patent legal errors and has the additional virtue of blessed austerity. Still, its sweeping adoption may not be advisedly appropriate in light of Section 442(d) of the Local Government Code and our ruling in Municipality of San Narciso, both of which admit to the possibility of de facto municipal corporations. To understand the applicability of Municipality of San Narciso and Section 442(b) of the Local Government Code to the situation of Andong, it is necessary again to consider the ramifications of our decision in Pelaez. The eminent legal doctrine enunciated in Pelaez was that the President was then, and still is, not empowered to create municipalities through executive issuances. The Court therein recognized "that the President has, for many years, issued executive orders creating municipal corporations, and that the same have been organized and in actual operation . . . ."36 However, the Court ultimately nullified only those thirty-three (33) municipalities, including Andong, created during the period from 4 September to 29 October 1964 whose existence petitioner Vice-President Pelaez had specifically assailed before this Court. No pronouncement was made as to the other

municipalities which had been previously created by the President in the exercise of power the Court deemed unlawful. Two years after Pelaez was decided, the issue again came to fore in Municipality of San Joaquin v. Siva.37 The Municipality of Lawigan was created by virtue of Executive Order No. 436 in 1961. Lawigan was not one of the municipalities ordered annulled in Pelaez. A petition for prohibition was filed contesting the legality of the executive order, again on the ground that Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code was unconstitutional. The trial court dismissed the petition, but the Supreme Court reversed the ruling and entered a new decision declaring Executive Order No. 436 void ab initio. The Court reasoned without elaboration that the issue had already been squarely taken up and settled in Pelaez which agreed with the argument posed by the challengers to Lawigans validity.38 In the 1969 case of Municipality of Malabang v. Benito,39 what was challenged is the validity of the constitution of the Municipality of Balabagan in Lanao del Sur, also created by an executive order,40 and which, similar to Lawigan, was not one of the municipalities annulled in Pelaez. This time, the officials of Balabagan invoked de facto status as a municipal corporation in order to dissuade the Court from nullifying action. They alleged that its status as a de facto corporation cannot be collaterally attacked but should be inquired into directly in an action forquo warranto at the instance of the State, and not by a private individual as it was in that case. In response, the Court conceded that an inquiry into the legal existence of a municipality is reserved to the State in a proceeding for quo warranto, but only if the municipal corporation is a de facto corporation.41 Ultimately, the Court refused to acknowledge Balabagan as a de facto corporation, even though it had been organized prior to the Courts decision in Pelaez. The Court declared void the executive order creating Balabagan and restrained its municipal officials from performing their official duties and functions.42 It cited conflicting American authorities on whether a de facto corporation can exist where the statute or charter creating it is unconstitutional.43 But the Courts final conclusion was unequivocal that Balabagan was not a de factocorporation.1awphi1.nt In the cases where a de facto municipal corporation was recognized as such despite the fact that the statute creating it was later invalidated, the decisions could fairly be made to rest on the consideration that there was some other valid law giving corporate vitality to the

organization. Hence, in the case at bar, the mere fact that Balabagan was organized at a time when the statute had not been invalidated cannot conceivably make it a de facto corporation, as, independently of the Administrative Code provision in question, there is no other valid statute to give color of authority to its creation.44 The Court did clarify in Malabang that the previous acts done by the municipality in the exercise of its corporate powers were not necessarily a nullity.45 Camid devotes several pages of his petition in citing this point,46 yet the relevance of the citation is unclear considering that Camid does not assert the validity of any corporate act of Andong prior to its judicial dissolution. Notwithstanding, the Court in Malabang retained an emphatic attitude as to the unconstitutionality of the power of the President to create municipal corporations by way of presidential promulgations, as authorized under Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code. This principle was most recently affirmed in 1988, in Municipality of Kapalong v. Moya.47 The municipality of Santo Tomas, created by President Carlos P. Garcia, filed a complaint against another municipality, who challenged Santo Tomass legal personality to institute suit. Again, Santo Tomas had not been expressly nullified by prior judicial action, yet the Court refused to recognize its legal existence. The blunt but simple ruling: "Now then, as ruled in the Pelaez case supra, the President has no power to create a municipality. Since [Santo Tomas] has no legal personality, it can not be a party to any civil action."48 Nevertheless, when the Court decided Municipality of San Narciso49 in 1995, it indicated a shift in the jurisprudential treatment of municipalities created through presidential issuances. The questioned municipality of San Andres, Quezon was created on 20 August 1959 by Executive Order No. 353 issued by President Carlos P. Garcia. Executive Order No. 353 was not one of the thirty-three issuances annulled by Pelaez in 1965. The legal status of the Municipality of San Andres was first challenged only in 1989, through a petition for quo warranto filed with the Regional Trial Court of Gumaca, Quezon, which did cite Pelaez as authority.50 The RTC dismissed the petition for lack of cause of action, and the petitioners therein elevated the matter to this Court. In dismissing the petition, the Court delved in the merits of the petition, if only to resolve further doubt on the legal status of San Andres. It noted a circumstance which is not present in the case at barthat San Andres was in existence for nearly thirty (30) years before its

legality was challenged. The Court did not declare the executive order creating San Andres null and void. Still, acting on the premise that the said executive order was a complete nullity, the Court noted "peculiar circumstances" that led to the conclusion that San Andres had attained the unique status of a "de facto municipal corporation."51 It noted that Pelaez limited its nullificatory effect only to those executive orders specifically challenged therein, despite the fact that the Court then could have very well extended the decision to invalidate San Andres as well.52 This statement squarely contradicts Camids reading ofSan Narciso that the creation of San Andres, just like Andong, had been declared a complete nullity on the same ground of unconstitutional delegation of legislative power found in Pelaez.53 The Court also considered the applicability of Section 442(d)54 of the Local Government Code of 1991. It clarified the implication of the provision as follows: Equally significant is Section 442(d) of the Local Government Code to the effect that municipal districts "organized pursuant to presidential issuances or executive orders and which have their respective sets of elective municipal officials holding office at the time of the effectivity of (the) Code shall henceforth be considered as regular municipalities." No pretension of unconstitutionality per se of Section 442(d) of the Local Government Code is preferred. It is doubtful whether such a pretext, even if made, would succeed. The power to create political subdivisions is a function of the legislature. Congress did just that when it has incorporated Section 442(d) in the Code. Curative laws, which in essence are retrospective, and aimed at giving "validity to acts done that would have been invalid under existing laws, as if existing laws have been complied with," are validly accepted in this jurisdiction, subject to the usual qualification against impairment of vested rights. (Emphasis supplied)55 The holding in San Narciso was subsequently affirmed in Municipality of Candijay v. Court of Appeals56 and Municipality of Jimenez v. Baz57 In Candijay, the juridical personality of the Municipality of Alicia, created in a 1949 executive order, was attacked only beginning in 1984. Pelaez was again invoked in support of the challenge, but the Court refused to invalidate the municipality, citing San Narciso at length. The Court noted that the situation of the Municipality of Alicia was strikingly similar to that in San Narciso; hence, the town should likewise "benefit from the effects of Section 442(d) of the Local Government Code, and should [be] considered as a regular, de juremunicipality." 58

The valid existence of Municipality of Sinacaban, created in a 1949 executive order, was among the issues raised in Jimenez. The Court, through Justice Mendoza, provided an expert summation of the evolution of the rule. The principal basis for the view that Sinacaban was not validly created as a municipal corporation is the ruling inPelaez v. Auditor General that the creation of municipal corporations is essentially a legislative matter and therefore the President was without power to create by executive order the Municipality of Sinacaban. The ruling in this case has been reiterated in a number of cases later decided. However, we have since held that where a municipality created as such by executive order is later impliedly recognized and its acts are accorded legal validity, its creation can no longer be questioned. In Municipality of San Narciso, Quezon v. Mendez, Sr., this Court considered the following factors as having validated the creation of a municipal corporation, which, like the Municipality of Sinacaban, was created by executive order of the President before the ruling in Pelaez v. Auditor General: (1) the fact that for nearly 30 years the validity of the creation of the municipality had never been challenged; (2) the fact that following the ruling in Pelaez no quo warranto suit was filed to question the validity of the executive order creating such municipality; and (3) the fact that the municipality was later classified as a fifth class municipality, organized as part of a municipal circuit court and considered part of a legislative district in the Constitution apportioning the seats in the House of Representatives. Above all, it was held that whatever doubt there might be as to the de jure character of the municipality must be deemed to have been put to rest by the Local Government Code of 1991 (R. A. No. 7160), 442(d) of which provides that "municipal districts organized pursuant to presidential issuances or executive orders and which have their respective sets of elective officials holding office at the time of the effectivity of this Code shall henceforth be considered as regular municipalities." Here, the same factors are present so as to confer on Sinacaban the status of at least a de facto municipal corporation in the sense that its legal existence has been recognized and acquiesced publicly and officially. Sinacaban had been in existence for sixteen years when Pelaez v. Auditor General was decided on December 24, 1965. Yet the validity of E.O. No. 258 creating it had never been questioned. Created in 1949, it was only 40 years later that its existence was questioned and only because it had laid claim to an area that apparently is desired for its revenue. This fact must

be underscored because under Rule 66, 16 of the Rules of Court, a quo warranto suit against a corporation for forfeiture of its charter must be commenced within five (5) years from the time the act complained of was done or committed. On the contrary, the State and even the Municipality of Jimenez itself have recognized Sinacaban's corporate existence. Under Administrative Order No. 33 dated June 13, 1978 of this Court, as reiterated by 31 of the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980 (B. P. Blg. 129), Sinacaban is constituted part of a municipal circuit for purposes of the establishment of Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in the country. For its part, Jimenez had earlier recognized Sinacaban in 1950 by entering into an agreement with it regarding their common boundary. The agreement was embodied in Resolution No. 77 of the Provincial Board of Misamis Occidental. Indeed Sinacaban has attained de jure status by virtue of the Ordinance appended to the 1987 Constitution, apportioning legislative districts throughout the country, which considered Sinacaban part of the Second District of Misamis Occidental. Moreover, following the ruling in Municipality of San Narciso, Quezon v. Mendez, Sr., 442(d) of the Local Government Code of 1991 must be deemed to have cured any defect in the creation of Sinacaban.591awphi1.nt From this survey of relevant jurisprudence, we can gather the applicable rules. Pelaez and its offspring cases ruled that the President has no power to create municipalities, yet limited its nullificatory effects to the particular municipalities challenged in actual cases before this Court. However, with the promulgation of the Local Government Code in 1991, the legal cloud was lifted over the municipalities similarly created by executive order but not judicially annulled. The de facto status of such municipalities as San Andres, Alicia and Sinacaban was recognized by this Court, and Section 442(b) of the Local Government Code deemed curative whatever legal defects to title these municipalities had labored under. Is Andong similarly entitled to recognition as a de facto municipal corporation? It is not. There are eminent differences between Andong and municipalities such as San Andres, Alicia and Sinacaban. Most prominent is the fact that the executive order creating Andong was expressly annulled by order of this Court in 1965. If we were to affirm Andongs de facto status by reason of its alleged continued existence despite its nullification, we would in effect be condoning defiance of a valid order of this Court.l^vvphi1.net Court decisions cannot obviously

lose their efficacy due to the sheer defiance by the parties aggrieved. It bears noting that based on Camids own admissions, Andong does not meet the requisites set forth by Section 442(d) of the Local Government Code. Section 442(d) requires that in order that the municipality created by executive order may receive recognition, they must "have their respective set of elective municipal officials holding office at the time of the effectivity of [the Local Government] Code." Camid admits that Andong has never elected its municipal officers at all.60 This incapacity ties in with the fact that Andong was judicially annulled in 1965. Out of obeisance to our ruling in Pelaez, the national government ceased to recognize the existence of Andong, depriving it of its share of the public funds, and refusing to conduct municipal elections for the void municipality. The failure to appropriate funds for Andong and the absence of elections in the municipality in the last four decades are eloquent indicia of the non-recognition by the State of the existence of the town. The certifications relied upon by Camid, issued by the DENR-CENRO and the National Statistics Office, can hardly serve the purpose of attesting to Andongs legal efficacy. In fact, both these certifications qualify that they were issued upon the request of Camid, "to support the restoration or re-operation of the Municipality of Andong, Lanao del Sur,"61thus obviously conceding that the municipality is at present inoperative.1awphi1.nt We may likewise pay attention to the Ordinance appended to the 1987 Constitution, which had also been relied upon in Jimenez and San Narciso. This Ordinance, which apportioned the seats of the House of Representatives to the different legislative districts in the Philippines, enumerates the various municipalities that are encompassed by the various legislative districts. Andong is not listed therein as among the municipalities of Lanao del Sur, or of any other province for that matter.62 On the other hand, the municipalities of San Andres, Alicia and Sinacaban are mentioned in the Ordinance as part of Quezon,63 Bohol,64 and Misamis Occidental65 respectively. How about the eighteen (18) municipalities similarly nullified in Pelaez but certified as existing in the DILGCertification presented by Camid? The petition fails to mention that subsequent to the ruling in Pelaez, legislation was enacted to reconstitute these municipalities.66 It is thus not surprising that the DILG certified the existence of these eighteen (18) municipalities, or that these towns are among the

municipalities enumerated in the Ordinance appended to the Constitution. Andong has not been similarly reestablished through statute. Clearly then, the fact that there are valid organic statutes passed by legislation recreating these eighteen (18) municipalities is sufficient legal basis to accord a different legal treatment to Andong as against these eighteen (18) other municipalities. We thus assert the proper purview to Section 442(d) of the Local Government Codethat it does not serve to affirm or reconstitute the judicially dissolved municipalities such as Andong, which had been previously created by presidential issuances or executive orders. The provision affirms the legal personalities only of those municipalities such as San Narciso, Alicia, and Sinacaban, which may have been created using the same infirm legal basis, yet were fortunate enough not to have been judicially annulled. On the other hand, the municipalities judicially dissolved in cases such as Pelaez, San Joaquin, and Malabang, remain inexistent, unless recreated through specific legislative enactments, as done with the eighteen (18) municipalities certified by the DILG. Those municipalities derive their legal personality not from the presidential issuances or executive orders which originally created them or from Section 442(d), but from the respective legislative statutes which were enacted to revive them.1a\^/phi1.net And what now of Andong and its residents? Certainly, neither Pelaez or this decision has obliterated Andong into a hole on the ground. The legal effect of the nullification of Andong in Pelaez was to revert the constituent barrios of the voided town back into their original municipalities, namely the municipalities of Lumbatan, Butig and Tubaran.67 These three municipalities subsist to this day as part of Lanao del Sur,68 and presumably continue to exercise corporate powers over the barrios which once belonged to Andong. If there is truly a strong impulse calling for the reconstitution of Andong, the solution is through the legislature and not judicial confirmation of void title. If indeed the residents of Andong have, all these years, been governed not by their proper municipal governments but by a ragtag "Interim Government," then an expedient political and legislative solution is perhaps necessary. Yet we can hardly sanction the retention of Andongs legal personality solely on the basis of collective amnesia that may have allowed Andong to somehow pretend itself into existence despite its judicial dissolution. Maybe those who insist

Andong still exists prefer to remain unperturbed in their blissful ignorance, like the inhabitants of the cave in Platos famed allegory. But the time has come for the light to seep in, and for the petitioner and like-minded persons to awaken to legal reality. WHEREFORE, the Petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit. Costs against petitioner.