ARATUC V. COMELEC G.R. No. L-49705-09 February 8, 1979 TOMAT C ARATUC, !ERG O TOCAO, C !

COLAR O " A#, FRE" TAMULA, MANGONTA$AR GURO a%& 'ON FAC O LEGA!( , petitioners, vs. T)e COMM !! ON ON ELECT ON!, REG ONAL 'OAR" OF CANVA!!ER! *or Re+,o% - .Ce%/ra0 M,%&a%ao1, A'"ULLA2 " MA(ORO, 3E!U! AM(ARO, ANACLETO 'A"O4, e/ a0., respondents Na/ure5 Petition for certiorari to review the decision of the respondent Comelec resolving their appeal from the respondent Regional Board of Canvassers for Region XII regarding the canvass of the results of the election in said region for representatives to the I.B.P. held on April 7, 1 7!. Fa6/75 "omatic Aratuc et al. sought the suspension of the canvass then #eing underta$en #% respondent Board in Cota#ato cit%. A supervening panel headed #% Commissioner of &lections, 'on( )enancio *. +u,ue, had conducted of the complaints of the petitioners therein of alleged irregularities in the election records in the voting centers. Before hearing, the canvass was suspended. After hearing the parties, the Court allowed resumption of the canvass #ut issued guidelines to #e followed #ut thereafter modified. -n .ul% 11, 1 7!, respondent Board terminated its canvass and declared the result of the voting. "he petitioners #rought the resolution of respondent Board to the Comelec. 'earing was held on April /0, 1 7!, after which , the case was declared su#mitted for decision. In order to ena#le the Commission to decide the appeal properl% 1 a. It will have to go deeper into the e2amination of the voting records and registration records and in the case of voting centers whose voting and registration records which have not %et #een su#mitted for the Commission to decide to open the #allot #o2es3 and #. "o interview and get statements under oath of impartial and disinterested persons from the area to determine whether actual voting too$ place on April 7, 1 7!, as well as those of the militar% authorities in the areas affected. -n .anuar% 14, 1 7 , the Comelec rendered its resolution #eing assailed in these cases, declaring the final result of the canvass. 77ue5 5-6 there is grave a#use of discretion amounting to lac$ of 7urisdiction on the part of C-8&9&C. 2e0&5 :nder *ection 1;! of the Revised &lection Code of 1 7!, <the Commission =on &lections> shall have direct control and supervision over the #oard of canvassers< and that relatedl%, *ection 170 of the same Code provides that it <shall #e the sole 7udge of all pre(proclamation controversies.<

"he fact of the matter is that the authorit% of the Commission in reviewing actuations of #oard of canvassers does not spring from an% appellate 7urisdiction conferred #% an% specific provision of law, for there is none such provision an%where in the &lection Code, #ut from the plenar% prerogative of direct control and supervision endowed to it #% the a#ove(,uoted provisions of *ection 1;!. And in administrative law, it is a too well settled postulate to need an% supporting citation here, that a superior #od% or office having supervision and control over another ma% do directl% what the latter is supposed to do or ought to have done. 5e cannot fault respondent Comelec for its having e2tended its in,uir% #e%ond that underta$en #% the Board of Canvass -n the contrar%, it must #e stated that Comelec correctl% and commenda#l% asserted its statutor% authorit% #orn of its envisaged constitutional duties vis(a(vis the preservation of the purit% of elections and electoral processes and in doing what petitioner it should not have done.

MACE"A V. ENERG4 REGULATOR4 'OAR" G.R. No. 98988 3u0y 18, 1991 ERNE!TO M. MACE"A, petitioner, vs. ENERG4 REGULATOR4 'OAR", CALTE- .(),0,::,%e71, NC., ( L ( NA! !2ELL (ETROLEUM COR(ORAT ON AN" (ETRON COR(ORAT ON, respondents. Na/ure5 Petition for nullification of the &nerg% Regulator% Board =&RB> -rders dated +ecem#er 0 and ;, 1 ? on the ground that the hearings conducted on the second provisional increase in oil prices did not allow herein petitioner su#stantial cross( e2amination, in effect, allegedl%, a denial of due process. Fa6/75 -n August /, 1 ?, private respondents oil companies filed with the &RB their respective applications on oil price increases. -n *eptem#er /1, 1 ?, the &RB issued an order granting a provisional increase of P1.@/ per liter. Petitioner 8aceda filed a petition for Prohi#ition on *eptem#er /;, 1 ?. 'earing for the presentation of the evidence(in(chief commenced on 6ovem#er /1, 1 ?. &RB su#se,uentl% outlined the procedure as follows1 .. it has #een traditional and it is the intention of the Board to act on these applications on an industr%(wide #asis, whether to accept, re7ect, modif% or whatever, the Board will do it on an industr% wide #asis, so, the #est wa% to have the oppositors and the Board a clear picture of what the applicants are as$ing for is to have all the evidence(in(chief to #e placed on record first and then the e2amination will come later, the cross(e2amination will come later.. Petitioner 8aceda maintains that this order of proof deprived him of his right to finish his cross(e2amination of PetronAs witnesses and denied him his right to cross( e2amine each of the witnesses of Calte2 and *hell. 'e points out that this rela2ed procedure resulted in the denial of due process.

77ue5 5-6 the &BR acted in grave a#use of discretion amounting to lac$ of 7urisdiction. 2e0&5 *uch a rela2ed procedure is especiall% true in administrative #odies, such as the &RB which in matters of rate or price fixing is considered as exercising a quasilegislative, not ,uasi(7udicial, function As such administrative agenc%, it is not #ound #% the strict or technical rules of evidence governing court proceedings. In fact, *ection /, Rule I of the Rules of Practice and Procedure Boverning 'earings Before the &RB provides that C "hese Rules shall govern pleadings, practice and procedure #efore the &nerg% Regulator% Board in all matters of in,uir%, stud%, hearing, investigation andDor an% other proceedings within the 7urisdiction of the Board. However, in the broader interest of justice, the Board may, in any particular matter, except itself from these rules and apply such suitable procedure as shall promote the objectives of the Order. 5e dismissed the petition on +ecem#er 1!, 1 ?, reaffirming &RBAs authorit% to grant provisional increase even without prior hearing, pursuant to *ec. ! of &.-. 6o. 17/, under &2ecutive -rder 6o. 17/, a hearing is indispensa#le, it does not preclude the Board from ordering, ex-parte, a provisional increase, as it did here, su#7ect to its final disposition of whether or not1 =1> to ma$e it permanent3 =/> to reduce or increase it further3 or =4> to den% the application. Mar,a E0e%a Ma0a+a, e/ a0. ;7. Ma%ue0 R. (e%a6)o7 3r. e/ a0. GR No. 88895 !e:/e<ber =, 1999 FACT!5 "he Iloilo *tate College of Eisheries =I*C-E> through its Pre(,ualification, Bids and Awards Committee =PBAC> caused the pu#lication for an Invitation to Bid for the construction of a 8icro 9a#orator% Building. "he notice announced that the last da% for su#mission of pre(,ualification re,uirements =PR&(C1> was / +ecem#er 1 !!, and that the #ids would #e opened on 1/ +ecem#er 1 !! at 4 pm. Petitioners 8alaga and 6a7arro su#mitted their PR&(C1 at /pm of / +ecem#er 1 !! while petitioner -ccena su#mitted on 0 +ecem#er 1 !!. All three were not allowed to participate in the #idding #ecause their documents were considered late, having #een su#mitted after the cut(off time of 1? am of / +ecem#er 1 !!. -n 1/ +ecem#er, petitioners file a complaint with the R"C against the chairman and PBAC mem#ers, claiming that although the% su#mitted their PR&(C1 on time, the PBAC refused without 7ust cause to accept them. -n the same date, respondent .udge 9a#a,uin issued a restraining order prohi#iting PBAC from conducting the #idding and awarding the pro7ect. -n 1; +ecem#er, defendants filed a motion to lift the restraining order on the ground that the Court was prohi#ited from issuing restraining orders, preliminar% in7unctions and preliminar% mandator% in7unctions #% P+ 6o. 1!1!, which provides1 F*ection 1. 6o court in the Philippines shall have 7urisdiction to issue an% restraining orderG in an% case, dispute, or controvers% involving an infrastructure pro7ectG of the governmentG to prohi#it an% person or persons, entit% or government official from proceeding with, or continuing the e2ecution or implementation of an% such pro7ectGH Plaintiffs argue against the applica#ilit% of P+ 6o. 1!1!, pointing out that while I*C-E was a state college, it had its own charter and separate e2istence and was not part of the national government or of an% local political su#division3 that even if P+ 6o. 1!1! were applica#le, the prohi#ition presumed a valid and legal government pro7ect, not one tainted with anomalies li$e the pro7ect at #ar. -n / .anuar% 1 ! , the R"C lifted the restraining order and denied the petition for preliminar% in7unction. It declared that the #uilding sought to #e constructed was an infrastructure pro7ect of the government falling within the coverage of P+ 1!1!.

!!UE5 5hether or not the I*C-E is considered a government instrumentalit% such that it would necessaril% fall under the prohi#ition in P+ 1!1!. 2EL"5 Ies, the 1 !7 Administrative Code defines a government instrumentalit% as follows1 Instrumentalit% refers to an% agenc% of the 6ational Bovernment, not integrated within the department framewor$, vested with special functions or 7urisdiction #% law, endowed with some if not all corporate powers, administering special funds, and en7o%ing operational autonom%, usuall% through a charter. "his includes regulator% agencies, chartered institutions, and B-CCJs. "he same Code descri#es a chartered institution thus1 Chartered InstitutionCrefers to an% agenc% organiKed or operating under a special charter, and vested #% law with functions relating to specific constitutional policies or o#7ectives. "his includes state universities and colleges, and the monetar% authorit% of the state. It is clear from the a#ove definitions that I*C-E is a chartered institution and is therefore covered #% P+ 1!1!. HOW ! ", it is apparent that the present controvers% did not arise from the discretionar% acts of the administrative #od% nor does it involve merel% technical matters. 5hat is involved here is non(compliance with the procedural rules on #idding which re,uired strict o#servance. P+ 1!1! was not intended to shield from 7udicial scrutin% irregularities committed #% administrative agencies such as the anomalies in the present case. 'ence, the challenged restraining order was not improperl% issued #% the respondent 7udge and the writ of preliminar% in7unction should not have #een denied.

'e>a !r. ;7. Cour/ o* A::ea07 907 !CRA 889 FACT!5 Eidencio Be7a *r. an emplo%ee of Philippine ports authorit%, hired as Arrastre supervisor in 1 70. and later on appointed as terminal supervisor in 1 !!. -n -cto#er /1, 1 !!, the Beneral 8anager, Rogelio A. +a%an filed administrative case against Be7a *r. and )illaluK for grave dishonest%. Brave misconduct willful violation of reasona#le office rules and regulations and conduct pre7udicial to the #est interest of the service. Conse,uentl% the% were preventivel% suspended for the charges. After preliminar% investigation conducted #% the district attorne% for region X, administrative case no. 11(?@(!! was considered closed for lac$ of merit. -n +ecem#er 14, 1 !! another administrative case was filed against Be7a #% the PPA manager also for dishonest% grave misconduct violation of office rules and regulations, conduct pre7udicial to the #est interest of the service and for #eing notoriousl% undesira#le. Be7a was also placed under preventive suspension pursuant to sec. @1/ of P+ 6o. !?7. "he case was redoc$eted as administrative case n o. PPA(AAB(1(?@ (! and thereafter, the PPA indorsed it to the AAB for appropriate action. "he AAB proceeded to hear the case and gave Be7a an opportunit% to present evidence. 'owever, on Ee#ruar% /?, 1 ! , Be7a filed petition for certiorari with preliminar% in7unction #efore the Regional "rial Court of 8isamis -riental. "wo da%s later, he filed with the ABB a manifestation and motion to suspend the hearing of administrative case no. PPA(AAB(1(?@ (! on account of the pendenc% of the certiorari proceeding #efore the court. AAB denied the motion and continued with the hearing of the administrative case. "hereafter, Be7a moved for the dismissal of the certiorari case and proceeded to file #efore the Court for a petition for certiorari with preliminar% in7unction andDor temporar% restraining order. !!UE5 5ether or not the Administrative Action Board of +-"C has 7urisdiction over administrative cases involving personnel #elow the ran$ of Assistant Beneral

8anager of the Philippine Ports Authorit%, an attached agenc% of +-"C. 2EL"5 "he PPA Beneral 8anager is the disciplining authorit% who ma%, #% himself and without the approval of the PPA Board of +irectors, su#7ect a respondent in an administrative case to preventive suspension. 'is disciplining powers are sanctioned not onl% #% *ec.! of P+ no. !07 #ut also #% *ec. 47 of P+ no. !?7 granting the heads of agencies the F.urisdiction to investigate and decide matters involving disciplinar% actions against officers and emplo%ees in the PPA. 5ith respect to the issue, the Court ,ualifiedl% rules in favor of the petitioner. "he PPA was created through P+ no. 0?0 dated .ul% 1 7@. :nder the 9aw, the corporate powers of the PPA were vested in a governing Board of +irectors $nown as the Philippine Ports Authorit% Council. *ec. 0=i> of the same decree gave the council the power Fto appoint, discipline and remove, and determine the composition of the technical staff of the authorit% and other personnelH. -n +ecem#er /4, 1 70, P+ no. 0?0 was su#stituted #% P+ no. !07 sec. @=a> thereof created the Philippine Ports Authorit% which would #e attached to the then +epartment of Pu#lic 5or$s, "ransportation and Communication. 5hen &2ecutive order no. 1/0 dated .anuar% 4?, 1 !7 reorganiKing the 8inistr% of "ransportation and Communication was issued, the PPA retained its attached status. Administrative Code of 1 !7 classiffied PPA as an attached agenc% to the +-"C. Boo$ I) of the Administrative Code of 1 !7, the other two #eing supervision and control and administrative supervision, FAttachmentH is defined as the Flateral relationship #etween the department or its e,uivalent and the attached agenc% or corporation for purposes of polic% and program coordinationH. An attached agenc% has a larger measure of independence from the +epartment to which it is attached than one which is under departmental supervision and control or administrative supervision. "his is #orne out #% the Flateral relationshipH #etween the +epartment and the attached agenc%. "he attachment is merel% for polic% and program coordination.H 5ith respect to administrative matters, the independence of an attached agenc% from the department control and supervision is furthermore reinforced #% the fact that even an agenc% under a +epartmentJs administrative supervision is free from +epartmental interference with respect to appointments and other personnel actions F in accordance with the decentraliKation of personnel functionsH under the administrative Code of 1 !7. "he 9aw impliedl% grants the general 8anager with the approval of the PPA #oard of +irectors the power to investigate its personnel #elow the ran$ of Assistant 8anager who ma% #e charged with an administrative offense. +uring such investigation, the PPA Beneral 8anager, ma% su#7ect the emplo%ee concerned to preventive suspension. "he investigation should #e conducted in accordance with the procedure set out in *ec. 4! of P+ no. !?7. "he +ecision of the Court of Appeal is AEEIR8&+ as so far as it upholds the power of the PPA Beneral 8anager to to su#7ect petitioner to preventive suspension and R&)&R*&+ insofar as it validates the 7urisdiction of the +-"C andDor the AAB to act on administrative case no. PPA LAAB(1(?@ (! . "he AAB decision in said cased is here#% declared 6:99 and )-I+ and the case is R&8A6+&+ to the PPA whose Beneral 8anager shall conduct with dispatch its reinvestigation.

Audit, and the 8inister of .ustice from ta$ing an% action implementing Batas Pam#ansa Blg. 1/ . BP 1/ mandates that .ustices and 7udges of inferior courts from the Court of Appeals to municipal circuit courts, e2cept the occupants of the *andigan#a%an and the Court of "a2 Appeals, unless appointed to the inferior courts esta#lished #% such Act, would #e considered separated from the 7udiciar%. It is the termination of their incum#enc% that for petitioners 7ustifies a suit of this character, it #eing alleged that there#% the securit% of tenure provision of the Constitution has #een ignored and disregarded. %ssue$ 5hether the a#olition of the e2isting inferior courts collides with the securit% of tenure en7o%ed #% incum#ent .ustices and 7udges :nder Article X, *ection 7 of the Constitution. Held$ "he Batasang Pam#ansa is e2pressl% vested with the authorit% to reorganiKe inferior courts and in the process to a#olish e2isting ones. "he termination of office of their occupants, as a necessar% conse,uence of such a#olition, is hardl% distinguisha#le from the practical standpoint from removal, a power that is now vested in the *upreme Court. Removal is, of course, to #e distinguished from termination #% virtue of the a#olition of the office. "here can #e no tenure to a non(e2istent office. After the a#olition, there is in law no occupant. In case of removal, there is an office with an occupant who would there#% lose his position. It is in that sense that from the standpoint of strict law, the ,uestion of an% impairment of securit% of tenure does not arise. 6onetheless, for the incum#ents of inferior courts a#olished, the effect is one of separation. As to its effect, no distinction e2ists #etween removal and the a#olition of the office. Realisticall%, it is devoid of significance. 'e ceases to #e a mem#er of the 7udiciar%. In the implementation of the assailed legislation, therefore, it would #e in accordance with accepted principles of constitutional construction that as far as incum#ent 7ustices and 7udges are concerned, the *upreme Court #e consulted and that its view #e accorded the fullest consideration. 6o fear need #e entertained that there is a failure to accord respect to the #asic principle that the *upreme Court does not render advisor% opinions. 6o ,uestion of law is involved. If such were the case, certainl% the *upreme Court could not have its sa% prior to the action ta$en #% either of the two departments. &ven then, it could do so #ut onl% #% wa% of deciding a case where the matter has #een put in issue. 6either is there an% intrusion into who shall #e appointed to the vacant positions created #% the reorganiKation. "hat remains in the hands of the &2ecutive to whom it properl% #elongs. "here is no departure therefore from the tried and tested wa%s of 7udicial power. Rather what is sought to #e achieved #% this li#eral

1.

"e MBR

0a 07!!4,

L0a%a 1/

;7. 8arch

A0ba 1 !/N

&n Banc, Eernando =.>1 / concur, 1 concurs with condition, 7 concur in separate opinions, 1 dissents in separate opinion #acts$ +e la 9lana, et al. filed a Petition for +eclarator% Relief andDor for Prohi#ition =considered #% this Court as an action for prohi#ition>, see$ing to en7oin the 8inister of the Budget, the Chairman of the Commission on

interpretation is to preclude an% plausi#ilit% to the charge that in the e2ercise of the conceded power of reorganiKing the inferior courts, the power of removal of the present incum#ents vested in this "ri#unal is ignored or disregarded. "he challenged Act would thus #e free from an% unconstitutional taint, even one not readil% discerni#le e2cept to those predisposed to view it with distrust. 8oreover, such a construction would #e in accordance with the #asic principle that in the choice of alternatives #etween one which would save and another which would invalidate a statute, the former is to #e preferred. "here is an o#vious wa% to do so. "he principle that the Constitution enters into and forms part of ever% act to avoid an% unconstitutional taint must #e applied. Batas Pam#ansa Blg. 1/ could stand the most rigorous test of constitutionalit%. Eurther, it is of the essence of constitutionalism to assure that neither agenc% is precluded from acting within the #oundaries of its conceded competence. "hat is wh% it has long #een well(settled under the constitutional s%stem we have adopted that the *upreme Court cannot, whenever appropriate, avoid the tas$ of reconciliation. It is a cardinal article of faith of our constitutional regime that it is the people who are endowed with rights, to secure which a government is instituted. Acting as it does through pu#lic officials, it has to grant them either e2pressl% or impliedl% certain powers. "hose the% e2ercise not for their own #enefit #ut for the #od% politic. "he Constitution does not spea$ in the language of am#iguit%1 <A pu#lic office is a pu#lic trust.< "hat is more than a moral ad7uration. It is a legal imperative. "he law ma% vest in a pu#lic official certain rights. It does so to ena#le them to perform his functions and fulfill his responsi#ilities more efficientl%. It is from that standpoint that the securit% of tenure provision to assure 7udicial independence is to #e viewed. "here is no reason to assume that the failure of this suit to annul BP 1/ a#olition in good faith would #e attended with deleterious inferior courts e2cept the conse,uences to the administration of 7ustice. It does not follow that the of the e2isting *andigan#a%an and the Court of "a2 Appeals and the creation of new ones will result in a 7udiciar% una#le or unwilling to discharge with independence its solemn dut% or one recreant to the trust reposed in it. 6or should there #e an% fear that less than good faith will attend the e2ercise of the appointing power vested in the &2ecutive. It cannot #e denied that an independent and efficient 7udiciar% is something to the credit of an% administration. 5ell and trul% has it #een said that the fundamental principle of separation of powers assumes, and 7ustifia#l% so, that the three departments are as one in their determination to pursue the ideals and aspirations and to fulfill the hopes of the sovereign people as e2pressed in the Constitution.

9AC*-6( 8ABA99A6&* Co., Inc.vs PAO-Eacts1I n 1 4 / , . o s e 8 g a l l a n e s w a s a p e r m i t t e e a n d a c t u a l o c c u p a n t i n " a m l a n g o n , Bansalan, +avao. -n .anuar% 1 04, he ceded his rights and interests to a portion =4 /.70; hectares> of the pu#lic land to 9acson( 8agallanes, Inc. -n April 1 0@, the portionwas officiall% released from the forest Kone as pasture land and declared agriculturalland.-n .an 1 00, .ose Pano and other 1 claimants applied for the purchase of ? hectares of the released area.-n 8arch 1 00, 9acson( 8agallanes Co. filed its own sales pplication covering the entire released area. "his was protested #% .ose Pano and his 1 companion upon theavermentthet the% are actual occupants of th%e part thereof covered #% their own sales application.- n . u l % 1 0 ; , t h e + i r o f 9 a n d s r e n d e r e d a decision. It gave due course to thea p p l i c a t i o n o f p l a i n t i f f c o r p o r a t i o n a n d t h e n d i s m i s s e d t h e c a l i m o f P a n o a n d h i s companions. A move to reconsider f a i l e d . - n . u l % 1 0 7 , t h e * e c o f A g r i c u l t u r e a n d 6atural Resources held that the appeal was without merit and dismissed the same." h e c a s e w a s elevated to the Pres of the Philippines. -n .une 1 0!, &2ec * e c .uan Pa7o reversed the decision of +ir of 9ands.Issue18 a % t h e & 2 e c u t i v e * e c r e t a r % , a c t i n g # % a u t h o r i t % o f t h e P r e s i d e n t r e v e r s e a decision of the +irector of 9ands that had #een affirmed #% the *ecretar% of Agricultureand 6atural Resources.'eld1Ies."he PresidentJs dut% to e2ecute the law is of constitutional origin. *o, too, is hisc o n t r o l o f a l l e 2 e c u t i v e d e p a r t m e n t s . " h u s , i t i s , t h a t d e p t h e a d s a r e m e n o f h i s confidence. 'is is the power to appoint them3 his too, is the privilege to dismiss them at pleasure. 6aturall%, he controls and directs their acts. Implicit then is his authorit% to goover, confirm, confirm, modif% or reverse the action ta$en #% his dept secretaries. In thisconte2t, it ma% not #e said that the President cannot rule on the correctness of a decisionof a department secretr% T,o ;7. V,&eo+ra< 151 !CRA 908 FACT!1 )alentino "io is a videogram operator who assailed the constitutionalit% of P+ 1 !7 entitled FAn Act Creating the )ideogram Regulator% BoardH with #road powers to regulate and supervise the videogram industr%. "he P+ was also reinforced #% P+1 @ which amended the 6ational Internal Revenue Code. "he amendment provides that Fthere shall #e collected on each processed video(tape cassette, read% for pla%#ac$, regardless of length, an annual ta2 of five pesos3 Provided, "hat locall% manufactured or imported #lan$ video tapes shall #e su#7ect to sales ta2.H "he said law was #rought a#out #% the need to regulate the sale of videograms as it has adverse effects to the movie industr%. "he proliferation of videograms has significantl% lessen the revenue #eing ac,uired from the movie industr%, and that such loss ma% #e recovered if videograms are to #e ta2ed. "io countered that there is no factual nor legal #asis for the e2ercise #% the President of the vast powers conferred upon him #% the Amendment and that there is an undue delegation of legislative power to the President. !!UE5 5hether or not there is an undue delegation of power. 2EL"5 It cannot #e successfull% argued that the P+ contains an undue delegation of legislative power. "he grant in *ec 11 of the P+ of authorit% to the Board to <solicit the direct assistance of other agencies and units of the government and deputiKe, for a fi2ed and limited period, the heads or personnel of such agencies and units to perform enforcement functions for the Board< is not a delegation of the power to legislate #ut merel% a conferment of authorit% or discretion as to its e2ecution, enforcement, and implementation. <"he true distinction is #etween the delegation of power to ma$e the law, which necessaril% involves discretion as to what it shall #e,

and conferring authorit% or discretion as to its e2ecution to #e e2ercised under and in pursuance of the law. "he first cannot #e done3 to the latter, no valid o#7ection can #e made.< Besides, in the ver% language of the decree, the authorit% of the Board to solicit such assistance is for a <fi2ed and limited period< with the deputiKed agencies concerned #eing <su#7ect to the direction and control of the Board.< "hat the grant of such authorit% might #e the source of graft and corruption would not stigmatiKe the P+ as unconstitutional. *hould the eventualit% occur, the aggrieved parties will not #e without ade,uate remed% in law. COMELEC ;7. E7:a?o0 417 !CRA 554 FACT!5 +uring the 8a% 11, 1 !, Elorentino A. Bautista, 9a$as candidate for 8a%or of Pawit, Cavite. 'e e2ecuted an Affidavit(Complaint charging the incum#ent 8unicipal 8a%or Att%. Eederico F'itH Po#lete and other candidate of violation of paragraphs=a> and =#> of *ection /;1 of the -mni#us &lection Code =vote #u%ing> and filed the same with the 9aw +epartment of the C-8&9&C.C-8&9&CJs 9aw +epartment filed an Information against the respondents with the Regional "rial Court of Cavite. In the meantime, Berardo 8acapagal and Inocencio Rodelas filed a criminal complaint for violation of *ection /;1=a> of the -mni#us &lection Code =vote selling> against the witnesses of Elorentino A. Bautista. An information was filed #efore the R"C.C-8&9&C now claims that it has the Fe2clusive powerH to review, motu proprio or through an appeal, the Frecommendation or resolution of investigating officersH in the preliminar% investigation since it has Fe2clusive power to conduct preliminar% investigation of all election offenses and to prosecute the sameH and to review their commendation or resolution of investigating officers. !!UE5 5hether or not the C-8&9&C e2clusive power to prosecute election casesQ 2EL"5 :nder Article IX, *ection /=#> of the Constitution, the petitioner is empowered to investigate and, when appropriate, prosecute election offenses. "he grant #% the Constitution to the petitioner of the e2press power to investigate and prosecute election offenses is intended to ena#le the petitioner to assure the people of a fine, orderl%, honest, peaceful and credi#le election. :nder *ection /;0 of the -mni#us &lection Code, the petitioner, through its dul% authoriKed legal officers, has the e2clusive power to conduct preliminar% investigation of all election offenses punisha#le under the -mni#us &lection Code, and to prosecute the same. "he petitioner ma% avail of the assistance of the prosecuting arms of the government #ut as held in 8argare7o vs. &scoses until revo$ed, the continuing authorit% of the Provincial or Cit% Prosecutors sta%s Abe>o ;7. "e0a Cru@ 149 !CRA 870, May 19, 1987 FACT!5 *pouses .ose and Aurora A#e7o are the principal stoc$holders of the corporation Poc$et Bell Philippines, Inc. and the purchaser "electronic *%stems, Inc. of 144,??? minorit% shareholdings =for 0 million> and of ;4,??? shares registered in the name of )irginia Braga and covered #% five stoc$ certificates endorsed in #lan$ #% her for P1,;7@.@0?.?? and *pouses Agapito Braga and )irgina Braga, erstwhile ma7orit% stoc$holders holding 0;R of the outstanding stoc$ and voting power of the corporation Poc$et Bell. In 1 !/, "electronics re,uested the corporate secretar% to register and transfer to its name and those of its nominees the total 1 ;,??? Poc$et Bell shares #ut 6or#erto Braga =son of Agapito>, the corporate secretar% refused to register the aforesaid transfer of shares in the corporate #oo$s asserting that their claim preemptive rights over the A#e7o shares and that )irginia Braga never transferred her ;4,??? shares to "eletronics #ut had lost the five stoc$ certificates representing those shares. "he intertwined actions #etween the protagonists,

centered on the ,uestion of 7urisdiction over the dispute which were culminate in filing two cases at #ar. !!UE5 5'&"'&R -R 6-" "'& R"C A6+ *&C 'A* "'& -RIBI6A9 A6+ &XC9:*I)& .:RI*+IC"I-6 -)&R "'& PRI6CIPA9 *"-CP'-9+&R* -E P-CP&" B&99. 2EL"5 :nder *ection 0 of Presidential +ecree ?/(A, the original and e2clusive 7urisdiction of the said case clearl% fall within the *&C. As stressed #% the *olicitor Beneral on #ehalf of the *&C, the Court has held that F6owhere does the law =P.+. ?/(A> empower an% Court of Instance =R"C> to interfere with the orders of the Commission and an% ruling #% the trial court on the issue of ownership of the share of stoc$ is not #inding on the commission for want of 7urisdiction.

RE!T TUTO 4NOT ;7. NTERME" ATE A((ELLATE COURT Posted on .une /?, /?14 #% winnieclaire * tandard BR. 6o. 7@@07 8arch /?, 1 !7 Eacts1 "he petitioner had transported si2 cara#aos in a pump #oat from 8as#ate to Iloilo on .anuar% 14, 1 !@, when the% were confiscated #% the police station commander of Barotac 6uevo, Iloilo, for violation of *ec 1 of &- ;/;(A & '(%O) *+ xecutive Order )o+ ,-, is hereby amended such that henceforth, no carabao regardless of age, sex, physical condition or purpose and no carabeef shall be transported from one province to another+ (he carabao or carabeef transported in violation of this xecutive Order as amended shall be subject to confiscation and forfeiture by the government, to be distributed to charitable institutions and other similar institutions as the 'hairman of the )ational .eat %nspection 'ommission may ay see fit, in the case of carabeef, and to deserving farmers through dispersal as the /irector of 0nimal %ndustry may see fit, in the case of carabaos+ "he petitioner sued for recover% and the Regional "rial Court after considering the merits of the case, sustained the confiscation of the cara#aos. "he thrust of his petition is that the e2ecutive order is unconstitutional insofar as it authoriKes outright confiscation of the animals without according the owner a right to #e heard #efore a competent and impartial court as guaranteed #% due process. "here is also a challenge to the improper e2ercise of the legislative power #% the former President under Amendment 6o. ; of the 1 74 Constitution. "he petitioner appealed the decision to the Intermediate Appellate Court, which upheld the trial court Issue1 5hether or not there is an invalid delegation of legislative power.

'eld1 5e find that the challenged measure is an invalid e2ercise of the police power #ecause the method emplo%ed to conserve the cara#aos is not reasona#l% necessar% to the purpose of the law and, worse, is undul% oppressive. +ue process is violated #ecause the owner of the propert% confiscated is denied the right to #e heard in his defense and is immediatel% condemned and punished. "he conferment on the administrative authorities of the power to ad7udge the guilt of the supposed offender is a clear encroachment on 7udicial functions and militates against the doctrine of separation of powers. "here is, finall%, also an invalid delegation of legislative powers to the officers mentioned therein who are granted unlimited discretion in the distri#ution of the properties ar#itraril% ta$en. 5e also mar$ the ,uestiona#le manner of the disposition of the confiscated propert% as prescri#ed in the ,uestioned e2ecutive order. It is there authoriKed that the seiKed propert% shall F#e distri#uted to charita#le institutions and other similar institutions as the Chairman of the 6ational 8eat Inspection Commission ma% see fit, in the case of cara#eef, and to deserving farmers through dispersal as the +irector of Animal Industr% ma% see fit, in the case of cara#aos.H =&mphasis supplied.> "he phrase Fma% see fitH is an e2tremel% generous and dangerous condition, if condition it is. It is laden with perilous opportunities for partialit% and a#use, and even corruption. -ne searches in vain for the usual standard and the reasona#le guidelines, or #etter still, the limitations that the said officers must o#serve when the% ma$e their distri#ution. "here is none. "heir options are apparentl% #oundless. 5ho shall #e the fortunate #eneficiaries of their generosit% and #% what criteria shall the% #e chosenQ -nl% the officers named can suppl% the answer, the% and the% alone ma% choose the grantee as the% see fit, and in their own e2clusive discretion. +efinitel%, there is here a Froving commission,H a wide and sweeping authorit% that is not FcanaliKed within #an$s that $eep it from overflowing,H in short, a clearl% profligate and therefore invalid delegation of legislative powers Eor these reasons, we here#% declare &2ecutive -rder 6o. ;/;(A unconstitutional. A#a$ada Buro Part% 9ist, et al vs &2ec. *ec. &rmita AbaAa&a Guro (ar/y L,7/, e/ a0 ;7 EBe6. !e6. Er<,/a Post under case digests, Political 9aw at 8onda%, 8arch #% *chiKophrenic 8ind

for certiorari and prohi#ition ,uestioning the constitutionalit% of the new law.

"he challenged section of R.A. 6o.

447 is the common proviso in *ections @, 0 and

;1 F"hat the President, upon the recommendation of the *ecretar% of Einance, shall, effective .anuar% 1, /??;, raise the rate of value(added ta2 to 1/R, after an% of the following conditions has #een satisfied1

=i> )alue(added ta2 collection as a percentage of Bross +omestic Product =B+P> of the previous %ear e2ceeds two and four(fifth percent =/ @D0R>3

or =ii> 6ational government deficit as a percentage of B+P of the previous %ear e2ceeds one and one(half percent =1SR>H

Petitioners allege that the grant of stand(#% authorit% to the President to increase the )A" rate is an a#dication #% Congress ofits e2clusive power to ta2 #ecause such delegation is not covered #% *ection /! =/>, Article )I Consti. "he% argue that )A" is a ta2 levied on the sale or e2change of goods and services which canJt #e included within the purview of tariffs under the e2emption delegation since this refers to customs duties, tolls or tri#ute pa%a#le upon merchandise to the government and

?0,

/?1/ Posted

usuall% imposed on importedDe2ported goods. "he% also said that the President has powers to cause, influence or create the conditions provided #% law to #ring a#out

Fa6/75 -n 8a% /@, /??0, the President signed into law Repu#lic Act 447 or the )A" Reform Act. Before the law too$ effect on .ul% 1, /??0, the Court issued a "Ren7oining government from implementing the law in response to a slew of petitions

the conditions precedent. 8oreover, the% allege that no guiding standards are made #% law as to how the *ecretar% ofEinance will ma$e the recommendation.

=d> delegation to local governments 77ue5 5hether or not the RA 447As stand(#% authorit% to the &2ecutive to increase the )A" rate, especiall% on account of the recommendator% power granted to the *ecretar% of Einance, constitutes undue delegation of legislative powerQ 6=e> delegation to administrative #odies

2e0&5 "he powers which Congress is prohi#ited from delegating are those which are strictl%, or inherentl% and e2clusivel%, legislative. Purel% legislative power which can never #e delegated is the authorit% to ma$e a complete law( complete as to the time when it shall ta$e effect and as to whom it shall #e applica#le, and to determine the e2pedienc% of its enactment. It is the nature of the power and not the lia#ilit% of its use or the manner of its e2ercise which determines the validit% of its delegation.

Eor the delegation to #e valid, it must #e complete and it must fi2 a standard. A sufficient standard is one which defines legislative polic%, mar$s its limits, maps out its #oundaries and specifies the pu#lic agenc% to appl% it.

In this case, it is not a delegation of legislative power B:" a delegation of ascertainment of facts upon which enforcement and administration of the increased rate under the law is contingent. "he legislature has made the operation of the 1/R rate effective .anuar% 1, /??;, contingent upon a specified fact or condition. It

"he e2ceptions are1

leaves the entire operation or non(operation of the 1/R rate upon factual matters outside of the control of the e2ecutive. 6o discretion would #e e2ercised #% the President. 'ighlighting the a#sence of discretion is the fact that the word *'A99 is used in the common proviso. "he use of the word *'A99 connotes a mandator%

=a> delegation of tariff powers to President under Constitution

order. Its use in a statute denotes an imperative o#ligation and is inconsistent with the idea of discretion.

=#> delegation of emergenc% powers to President under Constitution "hus, it is the ministerial dut% of the President to immediatel% impose the 1/R rate upon the e2istence of an% of the conditions specified #%Congress. "his is a dut%, =c> delegation to the people at large which cannot #e evaded #% the President. It is a clear directive to impose the 1/R )A" rate when the specified conditions are present.

"here is no undue delegation of legislative power #ut onl% of the discretion as to the e2ecution of a law. "his is constitutionall% permissi#le. Congress did not delegate Congress 7ust granted the *ecretar% of Einance the authorit% to ascertain the e2istence of a fact((( whether #% +ecem#er 41, /??0, the )A" collection as a percentage of B+P of the previous %ear e2ceeds / @D0 R or the national government deficit as a percentageof B+P of the previous %ear e2ceeds one and 1S R. If either of these two instances has occurred, the *ecretar% of Einance, #% legislative mandate, must su#mit such information to the President. A@ar6o% ;. !a%&,+a%baya% B.R. 6o. 11;?44 Ee#ruar% /;, 1 7 Pangani#an, .. FACT!5 Alfredo AKarcon owned and operated a hauling #usiness. -ccasionall%, he engagedthe services of su#(contractors li$e .aime Ancla whose truc$s were left at the formerJspremises A 5arrant of +istraint of Personal Propert% was issued #% the 8ain -ffice of the BIRaddressed to the Regional +irector or his authoriKed representative of Revenue Region 1?,Butuan Cit% commanding the latter to distraint the goods, chattels or effects and otherpersonal propert% of Ancla, a su#(contractor of accused AKarcon and, a delin,uent ta2pa%er. "he 5arrant of Barnishment was issued to AKarcon ordering him to transfer, surrender,t r a n s m i t a n d D o r r e m i t t o B I R t h e p r o p e r t % i n h i s p o s s e s s i o n o w n e d # % t a 2 p a % e r A n c l a . AKarcon, in signing the FReceipt for Boods, Articles, and "hings *eiKed :nder Authorit% of t h e 6 a t i o n a l I n t e r n a l R e v e n u e , H a s s u m e d t h e u n d e r t a $ i n g s s p e c i f i e d i n t h e r e c e i p t . *u#se,uentl%, however, Ancla too$ out the distrained truc$ from AKarconJs custod%. Eor thisreason, AKarcon was charged #efore the *andigan#a%an with the crime of malversation of pu#lic funds or propert% under Article /17 in relation to Article /// of the Revised Penal Code. Can AKarcon #e considered a pu#lic officer #% reason of his #eing designated #% theBIR as a depositar% of distrained propert%Q 2EL"5 Article //4 of the RPC defines a pu#lic officer as Fan% pers on who, #% &,re6/: r o ; , 7 , o % o * / ) e 0 a C , :o:u0ar e0e6/,o% , or a::o,%/<e%/ by 6o<:e/e%/ au/)or,/y ,shall ta$e part in the performance of pu#lic functions in the Bovernment of the PhilippineIslands, or shall perform in said Bovernment or in an% of its #ranches pu#lic duties as anemplo%ee, agent, or su#ordinate official, of an% ran$ or classesH. AKarcon o#viousl% ma% not#e deemed authoriKed #% popular election. 6either can his designation #% the BIR as a custodian of distrained propert% ,ualifies as appointment #% direct provision of law, or #%c o m p e t e n t authorit%. 5hile it is true that *ec. /?; of the 6IRC, as pointed o u t # % t h e prosecution, authoriKes the BIR to effect a constructive distraint #% re,uiring Fan% personH topreserve a distrained propert% there is no provision in the 6IRC constituting such person ap u # l i c o f f i c e r # % r e a s o n o f s u c h r e , u i r e m e n t . " h e B I R J s p o w e r a u t h o r i K i n g a p r i v a t e individual to act as a depositar% cannot #e stretched to include the power to appoint him asa pu#lic officer. "he charge against AKarcon should forthwith #e dismissed "ar,o ;7. M,7o% .19891 Fa6/75 the power to ta2 #ut the mere implementation of the law.

In ma$ing his recommendation to the President on the e2istence of either of the two conditions, the *ecretar% of Einance is not acting as the alter ego of the President or even her su#ordinate. 'e is acting as the agent of the legislative department, to determine and declare the event upon which its e2pressed will is to ta$e effect. "he*ecretar% of Einance #ecomes the means or tool #% which legislative polic% is determined and implemented, considering that he possesses all the facilities to gather data and information and has a much #roader perspective to properl% evaluate them. 'is function is to gather and collate statistical data and other pertinent information and verif% if an% of the two conditions laid out #% Congress is present.

Congress does not a#dicate its functions or undul% delegate power when it descri#es what 7o# must #e done, who must do it, and what is the scope of his authorit%3 in our comple2 econom% that is fre,uentl% the onl% wa% in which the legislative process can go forward.

/. "he separation must #e due to an% of the three situations mentioned a#ove. 5hen President Cor% A,uino came into power, she proceeded to reorganiKe the government, upon which 8ison, the Commissioner of Customs sent notices of termination to 4 @ Customs officials. *ome sought reinstatement from the C*C which the latter granted to /7 of them while the others went directl% to the *upreme Court. 8ison also filed a petition ,uestioning the decision of the C*C. Also, RA ;;0; was passed, providing that all officers and emplo%ees who are found #% the Civil *ervice Commission to have #een separated in violation of the provisions of this Act, shall #e ordered reinstated or reappointed. "he validit% of this law is also put into ,uestion. 2e0&5 All the parties agree on the validit% of reorganiKation per se, leaving the ,uestion onl% on its nature and e2tent. Invaria#l%, transition periods are characteriKed #% provisions for <automatic< vacancies. "he% are dictated #% the need to hasten the passage from the old to th e new Constitution free from the <fetters< of due process and securit% of tenure .At this point, we must distinguish removals from separations arising from a#olition of office =not #% virtue of the Constitution> as a result of reorganiKation carried out #% reason of econom% or to remove redundanc% of functions. In the latter case, the Bovernment is o#liged to prove good faith. In case of removals underta$en to compl% with clear and e2plicit constitutional mandates, the Bovernment is not o#liged to prove an%thing #ecause the Constitution allows it. &videntl%, the ,uestion is whether or not *ection 1; of Article X)III of the 1 !7 Constitution is a grant of a license upon the Bovernment to remove career pu#lic officials it could have validl% done under an <automatic<(vacanc%(authorit% and to remove them without rh%me or reason. *impl%, the provision #enefits career civil service emplo%ees separated from the service. And the separation contemplated must #e due to or the result of =1> the reorganiKation pursuant to Proclamation 6o. 4 dated 8arch /0, 1 !;, =/> the reorganiKation from Ee#ruar% /, 1 !7, and =4> the resignations of career officers tendered in line with the e2isting polic% and which resignations have #een accepted. "he phrase <not for cause< is clearl% and primaril% e2clusionar%, to e2clude those career civil service emplo%ees separated <for cause.< In other words, in order to #e entitled to the #enefits granted under *ection 1; of Article X)III of the Constitution of 1 !7, two re,uisites, one negative and the other positive , must concur, to wit1 1. "he separation must not #e for cause, and B% its terms, the authorit% to remove pu#lic officials under the Provisional Constitution ended on Ee#ruar% /0, 1 !7, advanced #% 7urisprudence to Ee#ruar% /, 1 !7. 7? It can onl% mean, then, that whatever reorganiKation is ta$ing place is upon the authorit% of the present Charter, and necessaril%, upon the mantle of its provisions and safeguards. 'ence, it cannot #e legitimatel% stated that we are merel% continuing what the revolutionar% Constitution of the Revolutionar% Bovernment had started. 5e are through with reorganiKation under the Ereedom Constitution ( the first stage. 5e are on the second stage ( that inferred from the provisions of *ection 1; of Article X)III of the permanent #asic document. 5hat must #e understood, however, is that notwithstanding her immense revolution ar% powers, the President was, nevertheless, magnanimous in her rule. "his is apparent from &2ecutive -rder 6o. 17, which esta#lished safeguards against the strong arm and ruthless propensit% that accompanies reorganiKations ( notwithstanding the fact that removals arising therefrom were <not for cause,< and in spite of the fact that such removals would have #een valid and un,uestiona#le. 6oteworth% is the in7unction em#odied in the &2ecutive -rder that dismissals should #e made on the #asis of findings of inefficienc%, graft, and unfitness to render pu#lic service. Assuming, then, that this reorganiKation allows removals <not for cause< in a manner that would have #een permissi#le in a revolutionar% setting as Commissioner 8ison so purports, it would seem that the Commissioner would have #een powerless, in an% event, to order dismissals at the Customs Bureau left and right. 9astl%, reorganiKations must #e carried out in good faith. In this case, 8ison failed to prove that the reorganiKation was indeed made in good faith #ecause he hired more people to replace those that he fired and no legitimate structural changes have #een made. "o sum up, the President could have validl% removed officials #efore the effectivit% of the 1 !7 Constitution even without cause #ecause it was a revolutionar% government. 'owever, from the effectivit% of the 1 !7 Constitution, the *tate did not lose its right to reorganiKe resulting to removals #ut such reorganiKation must #e made in good faith.