J

Questions for GAO Interviews on U.S. Embassy

Non-Immigrant Visas (NIV) Policies and Procedures (as of 4/17/02)

Name: Andrew T. Simkin

Date: April 19, 2002 Post: American Embassy Kuwait Q j

Comments in blue are from an in-person interview with Andrew Simkin on April 24,2002.
Mr. Simkin was in town for training.

1) Has your post made any of the following changes to the NFV application and approval process
since September 11, 2001 ? (Check all that apply)

Yes No N/A
a.
b. X
applicant's same and date of birth must match the name and date
of birth returned by CLASS (before consular officers submit

X
to are

e. Other (please specify) X

f. Other (please specify)

Please provide additional comments, if any.

e. Closer scrutiny of applicants' previous activities in U.S., thereby identifying more INA
212a9B ineligibilities and more returning students who are found unqualified after review of
transcripts of previous studies (which we now require).
- More annotations on visas to help INS
Saving job letters and invitation letters to file with application forms
Scanning in refused applicants' photos into database.

During our interview, Mr. Simkin elaborated on his answers. Mr. Simkin is the chief of the
consular section in Kuwait; the post has a total of 4 American officers and 6 FSNs. He has been
there for 1 '/2 years. Before Kuwait, he served in Ciudad Juarez, Abu Dhabi, Madrid, Guadalajara,
and Havana.

la. Mr. Simkin has installed several new anti-fraud measures in Kuwait. He recently met with
officials from "friendly" countries' embassies (U.K. and Canada) to discuss how to strengthen
anti-fraud programs. Many travelers transit in Kuwait, especially in the middle of the night.
Often the airlines will have questions as to the identity of these passengers. Mr. Simkin set up a
program in which a consular officer (CO) would always be on call during the nights and
weekends so that airlines could call them if they thought they saw a phony visa. If the CO gets a
call, then he would go to the embassy and check the Consular Consolidated Database (CCD).
Mr. Simkin passed this idea on to Consular Affairs in Washington in the hopes that the new
Consular Call Center could incorporate this function. Therefore, airline officials could have a
State official check the CCD to see if the visa were legitimate. Mr. Simkin said that the
Australians are already doing this.

Ib. In terms of CLASS standards, Mr. Simkin said that he and his staff have been looking more
carefully at CLASS hits, although post does not have any written standards on checking CLASS.

Ic. Kuwait does not have a travel agency referral program (it used to have one but it fell into
disuse and was discontinued). There is also no drop box. The post offers one-day, one-stop
service for applicants. Kuwaiti applicants usually bring in their applications personally or have a
relative or driver drop it off. In general, the policy is to waive interviews for Kuwaitis.

Since 9-11, the post has been calling in more Kuwaitis for interviews. The DS-157 is a driving
force since most applicants do not fill it in correctly; thus they have to be called in for an
interview. The post started a blanket policy: anyone who is required to complete a DS 157 must
be interviewed.

Mr. Simkin said that they also started looking more closely at Kuwaiti students as a potentially
dangerous population (i.e., he is concerned about what young Kuwaiti students are doing in their
spare time in the U.S. He is asking Kuwaiti students to bring in transcripts to show that they are
legitimate, serious students and that they are not dropping classes or flunking out of class.)

Id. Mr. Simkin and his staff are also calling in more women and older men for interviews on a
case-by-case basis.

About 50% of the NIV applicant pool is TCN. The policy at post has always been to interview
TCNs.

le. Other steps that Mr. Simkin has taken: he is scanning in photos of returned overstayers. He is
also putting more annotations on visas since it gives more information to INS.
2) About what percent of NIV applicants were interviewed at your post (a) in the 12 months
prior to September 11, 2001, and (b) since September 11, 2001?

a. 12 months prior to September 11, 2001 Approximately 70 percent

b. Since September 11, 2001 Approximately 85 percent

Please provide additional comments, if any.

Post's workload is split nearly evenly between Kuwaitis and third country nationals (TCNs).
Our prior policy was to require interviews of TCNs, but waive them for most Kuwaitis. Since
Sept. 11, we have instituted a requirement of personal interview for those Kuwaitis who are
subject to the DS-157 supplemental application (males aged 16-45). We have also required
many of the female Kuwaiti applicants and older males to come in for interview, on a case by
case basis, whenever the application did not contain sufficient information to make a proper
adjudication.

Mr. Simkin said that of the 70 percent interviewed prior to 9-11, about 40 percent were Kuwaitis.
Of the 85 percent interviewed since 9-11, about 70 percent are Kuwaitis.
3) In your opinion, to what extent, if any, do the following security procedures and requirements
help your post's consular officers identify potential terrorists?
(Please check one box in each row.)

Great extent Some extent No extent Not sure No basis to judge

a) Security Advisory X
Opinion for selected
individuals from States
Sponsoring International
Terrorism (see State
109933)
b) Visas Viper Committees X
c) CLASS name check s X
d) The 20-day waiting X
period for selected
applicants (see State
196355)
e) Requirement that X
applicants provide
information on the DS-157
form
f) The Visas Condor X
process (see State 015702)

Please provide additional comments, if any.

What I'd like to stress here is the fact that CLASS is the key to identifying known terrorists. I
haven't yet seen a case where I figured out based on the application or the interview that an
individual was a terrorist. I may get bad vibes, and suspicions, but the person is not going to
admit to being a terrorist, and nothing in the application is going to provide that information.
Visas Viper committees are important as a source of input for CLASS.
The 20-day waiting period has not yet resulted in a "hit" here in Kuwait. The reason is that this
wait involves an NCIC check, and apparently we do not have many applicants here who are
wanted on criminal charges in the U.S. and who apply for visas. I expect that this is different in
some other posts though, and I feel much better knowing that we have a mechanism for spotting
a wanted criminal when he applies for a visa.
Another thing I'd like to stress is that, while we may not KNOW that a person is a terrorist, and
he/she may not be in CLASS, I believe that we may well have denied visas to many
POTENTIAL terrorists because they came across as likely overstayers, either because of their
tenuous situations here (weak economic/family ties, youth, etc.) or because their stated travel
plans do not seem credible, or because they just seem nervous or deceptive. These people could
already be active terrorists; they could also be the sort of people who would be likely to overstay
visas and could, at some point, be ripe for recruitment by terrorist organizations.
For this reason, I feel that one of the most important things we can do in the visa function to
combat terrorism is to cultivate good traditional consular interview skills and practices (see 4a on
next page).
3a. Mr. Simkin wanted to differentiate between the terms "known terrorists" and "potential
terrorists." For known terrorists, he said that the only way to detect them is CLASS. For potential
terrorists, he thinks that a lot more can be done. He would like to receive more information sent
to posts about terrorists in general - such as patterns of their ages, geographic origin, etc. He
would like consular sections to receive profiles of the terrorists. For example, he would like to
see profiles of suspected terrorists rounded up by the FBI after 9-11.

3b. Mr. Simkin said that he views Visas Vipers as a subset of CLASS. Vipers are essentially the
inputs for CLASS. In his experience, most information has come from the CIA and therefore
goes through TIPOFF.

3d. Kuwait has not yet had any hits on the 20-day name checks.

3e. Mr. Simkin thought the DS 157 was sometimes useful in that it gives the consular officer a
line of inquiry for the interview.

3f. Kuwait has had one hit from a Condor and that case is still pending.
4) For your post, to what extent, if any, would the following proposed changes to the NIV
application process help identify potential terrorists? (Please check one box in each row.)

Very Some-what •Not: •)• •:• ':.

helpful helpful helpful N6t«ure->-
a. Interview all applicants X
(If you checfc'i^^tt^Mfflia^ftat "^eftrfH please -
indicate the percentage %)
b. Interview all applicants : ',?-,$, '• • • ~, ~ X
c. Fingerprint a percentage of all applicants (If you X
check very or somewhat helpful, please indicate the
percentage %)
d. Fingerprint all applicants : >*,; -.^j" ^ X
e. Improve training for consular officers in identifying X
suspected terrorists, cooperating witb other agencies/ »
international organizations, and cultural sensitivity
g. Make the visa process a law enforcement X
function (If you check yes, please elaborate in the
comments section on how this should be •-«:* . •'
accompUshed,e,g., should the function remain
within State or be moved to another agency)
h. Other (please specif =
t. Other (please specify) . -*

Please provide additional comments, if any.

For this post, I don't think we would identify any more potential terrorists, or deny any more
applicants, by interviewing all the children, Kuwaiti women, and Kuwaiti old men who currently
get interviews waived. We are better off spending our time focusing more intently on the TCN
population and on Kuwaiti men 16-45, all of whom we currently interview. I might revise this
opinion if/when we had any evidence of terrorist activity by Gulf Arab women.

The primary benefit of fingerprinting would be to be more sure of applicants' identities. I would
need to know more about how we would use the fingerprint data, in order to form an opinion
about whether it would help us identify terrorists.

Improved training for consular officers is extremely important.

I see the visa process as an adjudicative process, analogous to other areas of administrative law.
It is really not an enforcement process, because we don't have, and are unlikely ever to have, the
authority to use force against foreign nationals in friendly foreign countries. But I think we
should give more emphasis to the judicial character of consular work. I believe we could learn a
lot from other administrative-law processes. We should train visa officers to think of themselves
as judges.

In the interview, Mr. Simkin made these comments:

4a. Interviewing more people is useful if you target certain groups for interviews. He said that it
would not help to interview old ladies, for example.
Mr. Simian felt that there is an overlap between the population that is an intending
immigrant risk and the population that might be a security risk. The rootless young man
who does not appear to have a specific reason for traveling to the U.S. is likely to overstay his
visa and may also be susceptible to terrorist recruiting. Therefore he thinks it is very important to
interview these young men and make sure that they have a credible reason for traveling to the
U.S.

4c. Mr. Simkin thought that the utility of fingerprinting applicants depends on what the post does
with the fingerprints. It would be useful if State had a database of fingerprints.

4e. Mr. Simkin was in favor of improving consular officers' training. In particular, he thought that
COs should receive more information on terrorist profiles, interviewing skills, and more
systematic training in general.

4g. Mr. Simkin is a lawyer by training so he was quick to point out that consular officers do not
have the right to actually enforce U.S. law in other countries. He said that the strongest
"enforcement" tool that a CO has is to deny someone a visa Essentially, COs are applying the law
and rendering judgment, but they cannot actually enforce the law and he did not think it should
be their role.
5) How feasible would it be for your post to implement the following proposed changes to the
NIV process? (Please check one box in each row.)

Very Some- Not Not

feasible what feasible feasible sure"
"- " V-< V ; ;:

a. Interview a greater percentage of all applicants (If X

you check very or somewhat helpful, please Indicate
the percentage 90
b. Interview all applicants X
c.Fmgerprint a percentage of all applicants flf^ou • X
check very or somewhat helpful, please indicate the ••-"
percentagetOQ ^9& / ;
d. Fingerprint all applicants : X
e. Improve training for consular officers Iff identifying X
suspected terrorists, cooperating with other agencies/ :
international organizations; and cultural sensitivity • - :
f. Make the visa pwreess a law enforcement ftmctio^ X
X
biometric such as fingerprints ; •
h.Ottier (please specify) *
i. Other (please specify) ,

Please provide additional comments, if any.

We have the facilities to interview and fingerprint all applicants. We would need more
personnel, but we have a good physical facility, and our volume is not too high.

5a, b, c, d: Consular officers in Kuwait could interview and fingerprint all applicants but it would
be very time consuming. The post already does some fingerprinting for immigrant visas.

5e. Increased training would be feasible but he would have to make time available for COs to
take more training.

5f. Mr. Simkin thought that the law enforcement option is not feasible because COs cannot do
law enforcement overseas.

5g. He thought a secure travel document would be feasible; it's already being done in Mexico.
6) Would any of the following factors make it difficult for your post to fully implement the
proposed changes listed in questions 4 and 5? (Please check one box in each row.)

Yes, to a great extent Yes, to some extent No Not sure

a. Consular staffing shortages X
b. Lack of space, facilities X
c. An adverse effect on U.S. interests X
in the host country (please elaborate
in comments section)
d. Host country would require same X
of U.S. citizens (reciprocity)
e. Other (please specify)

Please provide additional comments, if any.

c. We can have a huge impact on the view of the U.S. held by the population of Kuwait. People
tend to remember, and take personally, their experiences interacting with the consular section.
We try very hard to be seen as fair, efficient, courteous, and service-oriented. The population
here has been generally cooperative with and sympathetic to the various changes we have
imposed in the visa process since Sept. 11. We now make men present photos without their
traditional Arab headgear. We delay most male applicants by 30 days. We require interviews.
We are asking for more documents and more forms from many applicants.
These steps do run a risk of antagonizing some people. Additional measures, such as
fingerprinting, would be seen by some applicants as excessive.

6a. To implement any of the proposed changes, staffing would a big issue. The post's staff size
would have to be increased.

6b. Space is not a constraint in Kuwait.

6c. Mr. Simkin said that the U.S. is fighting a public diplomacy battle in the Middle East already.
We already ask a lot of questions on the DS 157 and we need to be careful that we don't
Kuwaitis think that we think they are the enemy. There is a need for treating them courteously.

6d. He did not think that the Kuwaiti government would start to discriminate against U.S.
citizens.