VOL.350,JANUARY23,2001 Alday vs. FGU Insurance Corporation G.R.No.138822.January23,2001.

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EVANGELINEALDAY,petitioner, vs.FGUINSURANCE CORPORATION,respondent.

Actions; Jurisdiction; Estoppel; Words and Phrases; Estoppel by laches arises from the negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned or declined to assert it; A party cannot be considered as estopped from assailing the trial courts jurisdiction over the other partys counterclaim where such issue was raised with the trial court itselfthe body where the action is pendingeven before the presentation of any evidence by the parties and definitely, way before any judgment could be rendered by the trial court.Before going into the substantive issues, the Court shall first dispose of some procedural matters raised by the parties. Petitioner claims that respondent is estopped fromquestioninghernonpaymentofdocketfeesbecauseitdidnot raisethisparticular
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* THIRDDIVISION.

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issue when it filed in its first motionthe " Motion to Strike out Answer Compulsory Counterclaim And To Declare Defendant In

Defaultwiththetrialcourt;rather,itwasonlyninemonthsafter receiving petitioners answer that respondent assailed the trial courts lack of jurisdiction over petitioners counterclaims based on the latters failure to pay docket fees. Petitioners position is unmeritorious. Estoppel by laches arises from the negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned or declined to assert it. In the case at bar, respondent cannot be considered as estopped from assailing the trial courts jurisdictionoverpetitionerscounterclaimsincethisissuewasraised byrespondentwiththetrialcourtitselfthebodywheretheaction is pendingeven before the presentation of any evidence by the partiesanddefinitely,waybeforeanyjudgmentcouldberendered bythetrialcourt. Same; Same; Same; Although the lack of jurisdiction of a court may be raised at any stage of the action, a party may be estopped from raising such questions if he has actively taken part in the very proceedings which he questions, belatedly objecting to the courts jurisdiction in the event that the judgment or order subsequently rendered is adverse to him.Meanwhile, respondent questions the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals over the appeal filed by petitioner from the 18 September 1990 and 28 February 1991 ordersofthetrialcourt.Itissignificanttonotethatthisobjectionto the appellate courts jurisdiction is raised for the first time before this Court; respondent never having raised this issue before the appellatecourt.Althoughthelackofjurisdictionofacourtmaybe raised at any stage of the action, a party may be estopped from raising such questions if he has actively taken part in the very proceedings which he questions, belatedly objecting to the courts jurisdiction in the event that that the judgment or order subsequently rendered is adverse to him. In this case, respondent activelytookpartintheproceedingsbeforetheCourtofAppealsby filing its appellees brief with the same. Its participation, when taken together with its failure to object to the appellate courts jurisdiction during the entire duration of the proceedings before suchcourt,demonstratesawillingnesstoabidebytheresolutionof the case by such tribunal and accordingly, respondent is now most decidedly estopped from objecting to the Court of Appeals assumptionofjurisdictionoverpetitionersappeal. Same; Counterclaims; Words and Phrases; Compulsory Counterclaim, Explained.The basic issue for resolution in this case is whether or not the counterclaim of petitioner is compulsory or permissive in nature. A compulsory counterclaim is one which, beingcognizablebythe

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regular courts of hustice, arises out of or is connected with the transaction or occurrence constituting the subject matter of the opposingpartysclaimanddoesnotrequireforitsadjudicationthe presence of third parties of whom the court cannot acquire jurisdiction. Same; Same; Criteria or Tests in Determining Whether a Counterclaim is Compulsory or Permissive; Compelling Test of Compulsoriness;Words and Phrases; Under the compelling test of compulsoriness, a logical relationship between the claim and the counterclaim is required, that is, whether conducting separate trials of the respective claims of the parties would entail a substantial duplication of effort and time by the parties and the court.In Valencia v. Court of Appeals, this Court capsulized the criteria or tests that may be used in determining whether a counterclaim is compulsory or permissive, summarized as follows: 1. Are the issues of fact and law raised by the claim and counterclaim largely the same? 2. Would res judicata bar a subsequent suit on defendants claimabsentthecompulsorycounterclaimrule?3.Willsubstantially the same evidence support or refute plaintiffs claim as well as defendantscounterclaim?4.Isthereany logical relation between the claim and the counterclaim? Another test, applied in the more recent case of Quintanilla v. Court of Appeals, is the compelling test of compulsoriness which requires a logical relationship between the claim and counterclaim, that is, where conducting separatetrialsoftherespectiveclaimsofthepartieswouldentaila substantial duplication of effort and time by the parties and the court. Same; Same; Docket Fees; Rule on the Payment of Filing Fees.There is no need for petitioner to pay docket fees for her compulsory counterclaim. On the other hand, in order for the trial court to acquire jurisdiction over her permissive counterclaim, petitionerisboundtopaytheprescribeddocketfees.Theruleonthe paymentoffilingfeeshasbeenlaiddownbytheCourtinthecase ofSun Insurance Office, Ltd. v. Hon. Maximiano Asuncion 1.Itis not simply the filing of the complaint or appropriate initiatory pleading,butthepaymentoftheprescribeddocketfee,thatvestsa

trialcourtwithjurisdictionoverthesubjectmatterornatureofthe action. Where the filing of the initiatory pleading is not accompanied by payment of the docket fee, the court may allow paymentofthefeewithinareasonabletimebutinnocasebeyond theapplicableprescriptiveorreglementaryperiod.2.Thesamerule applies to permissive counterclaims, thirdparty claims and similar pleadings, which shall not be considered filed until and unless the filingfeeprescribedthereforispaid.Thecourtmayallowpayment of said fee within a reasonable time but also in no case beyond its applicableprescriptiveorreglementary
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period3.Wherethetrialcourtacquiresjurisdictionoveraclaimby thefilingoftheappropriatepleadingandpaymentoftheprescribed filing fee but, subsequently, the judgment awards a claim not specified in the pleading, or if specified the same has been left for determination by the court, the additional filing fee therefor shall constitute a lien on the judgment. It shall be the responsibility of theClerkofCourtorhisdulyauthorizeddeputytoenforcesaidlien andassessandcollecttheadditionalfee. Same; Same; Same; The trial court should give the defendant a reasonable time, but in no case beyond the applicable prescriptive or reglementary period, to pay the filing fees for her permissive counterclaim.The above mentioned ruling in Sun Insurance has beenreiteratedintherecentcaseof Suson v. Court of Appeals. In Suson , the Court explained that although the payment of the prescribed docket fees is a jurisdictional requirement, its nonpayment does not result in the automatic dismissal of the case providedthedocketfeesarepaidwithintheapplicableprescriptive or reglementary period. Coming now to the case at bar, it has not been alleged by respondent and there is nothing in the records to show that petitioner has attempted to evade the payment of the proper docket fees for her permissive counterclaim. As a matter of fact, after respondent filed its motion to dismiss petitioners counterclaim based on her failure to pay docket fees, petitioner immediately filed a motion with the trial court, asking it to declare her counterclaim as compulsory in nature and therefore exempt fromdocketfeesand,inaddition,todeclarethatrespondentwasin defaultforitsfailuretoanswerhercounterclaim.However,thetrial

court dismissed petitioners counterclaim. Pursuant to this Courts rulingin Sun Insurance, the trial court should have instead given petitioner a reasonable time, but in no case beyond the applicable prescriptive or reglementary period, to pay the filing fees for her permissivecounterclaim. Same; Same; Same; Pleadings and Practice; There is no need to file an answer to a permissive counterclaim until the defendant shall have paid the prescribed docket fees for only then shall the court acquire jurisdiction over such claim.Petitioner asserts that the trial court should have declared respondent in default for havingfailedtoanswerhercounterclaim.Insofarasthepermissive counterclaimofpetitionerisconcerned,thereisobviouslynoneedto file an answer until petitioner has paid the prescribed docket fees for only then shall the court acquire jurisdiction over such claim. Meanwhile, the compulsory counterclaim of petitioner for damages based on the filing by respondent of an allegedly unfounded and malicioussuitneednotbeansweredsinceitisinseparablefromthe
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claimsofrespondent.Ifrespondentweretoanswerthecompulsory counterclaim of petitioner, it would merely result in the former pleadingthesamefactsraisedinitscomplaint.

PETITIONforreviewoncertiorariofadecisionoftheCourt ofAppeals. ThefactsarestatedintheopinionoftheCourt. Cruz, Durian, Alday & CruzMattersforpetitioner. Jacinto Jimenezforrespondent. GONZAGAREYES,J.: On 5 May 1989, respondent FGU Insurance Corporation 1 filedacomplaintwiththeRegionalTrialCourtofMakati alleging that petitioner Evangeline K. Alday owed it P114,650.76, representing unliquidated cash advances, unremittedcostsofpremiumsandotherchargesincurredby petitionerinthecourseofherworkasaninsuranceagent 2 for respondent. Respondent also prayed for exemplary

damages,attorneysfees,andcostsofsuit. Petitioner filed heranswerandbywayofcounterclaim,assertedherright for the payment of P104,893.45, representing direct commissions, profit commissions and contingent bonuses earned from 1 July 1986 to 7 December 1986, and for accumulatedpremiumreservesamountingtoP500,000.00. In addition, petitioner prayed for attorneys fees, litigation expenses, moral damages and exemplary damages for the 4 allegedly unfounded action filed by respondent. On 23 August 1989, respondent filed a Motion to Strike Out Answer With Compulsory Counterclaim And To Declare Defendant In Default because petitioners answer was 5 allegedlyfiledoutoftime. However,thetrialcourtdenied the motion on 25 August 1989 and similarly rejected 6 respondentsmotionforreconsiderationon12March1990. Afewweekslater,on11April1990,respondentfiledamo
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1Branch134. 2DocketedasCivilCaseNo.893816. 3Rollo,4244. 4 Ibid., 5363. 5RTCRecords,3739. 6 Ibid., 46,93.

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tion to dismiss petitioners counterclaim, contending that the trial court never acquired jurisdiction over the same 7 becauseofthenonpaymentofdocketfeesbypetitioner. In response, petitioner asked the trial court to declare her counterclaimasexemptfrompaymentofdocketfeessinceit iscompulsoryandthatrespondentbedeclaredindefaultfor 8 havingfailedtoanswersuchcounterclaim. 9 Inits18September1990Order,thetrialcourt granted respondentsmotiontodismisspetitionerscounterclaimand consequently, denied petitioners motion. The court found petitionerscounterclaimtobemerelypermissiveinnature and held that petitioners failure to pay docket fees prevented the court from acquiring jurisdiction over the 10 same. The trial court similarly denied petitioners motion

forreconsiderationon28February1991. 11 On23December1998,theCourtofAppeals sustained thetrialcourt,findingthatpetitionersownadmissions,as contained in her answer, show that her counterclaim is merely permissive. The relevant portion of the appellate 12 courtsdecision isquotedherewith
Contrary to the protestations of appellant, mere reading of the allegations in the answer a quo will readily show that her counterclaim can in no way be compulsory. Take note of the followingnumberedparagraphsinheranswer:
(14)That,indeed,FGUscauseofactionwhichisnotsupportedbyany document other than the selfserving Statement of Account dated March28,1988xxx (15) That it should be noted that the cause of action of FGU is not the enforcement of the Special Agents Contract but the alleged cash accountabilitieswhicharenotbasedonwrittenagreementxxx. xxxx _______________
7 Ibid., 96102. 8 Ibid., 110125. 9JudgeIgnacioM.Capulong 10Rollo,105. 11 Fourth Division, composed of Justices Jesus M. Elbinias, ponente

andChairman;EugenioS.Labitoria;andMarinaL.Buzon.
12Rollo,3639.

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(19) x x x A careful analysis of FGUs threepage complaint will show thatitscauseofactionisnotforspecificperformanceorenforcementof theSpecialAgentsContractrather,itisforthepaymentofthealleged cashaccountabilitiesincurredbydefendantduringtheperiodform[sic] 1975 to 1986 which claim is executory and has not been ratified. It is the established rule that unenforceable contracts, like this purported money claim of FGU, cannot be sued upon or enforced unless ratified, thusitisasiftheyhavenoeffect.xxx.

To support the heading Compulsory Counterclaim in her answer and give the impression that the counterclaim is compulsory

appellant alleged that FGU has unjustifiably failed to remit to defendant despite repeated demands in gross violation of their Special Agents Contract x x x. The reference to said contract was includedpurposelytomislead.Whileononehandappellantalleged that appellees cause of action had nothing to do with the Special Agents Contract, on the other hand, she claim that FGU violated said contract which gives rise of [sic] her cause of action. Clearly, appellantscashaccountabilitiescannotbetheoffshootofappellees allegedviolationoftheaforesaidcontract.

On 19 May 1999, the appellate court denied petitioners 13 motion for reconsideration, giving rise to the present petition. Beforegoingintothesubstantiveissues,theCourtshall first dispose of some procedural matters raised by the parties. Petitioner claims that respondent is estopped from questioning her nonpayment of docket fees because it did notraisethisparticularissuewhenitfileditsfirstmotion the Motion to Strike out Answer With Compulsory CounterclaimAndToDeclareDefendantInDefaultwith the trial court; rather, it was only nine months after receiving petitioners answer that respondent assailed the trial courts lack of jurisdiction over petitioners counterclaims based on the latters failure to pay docket 14 fees. Petitioners position is unmeritorious. Estoppel by laches arises from the negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption thatthepartyentitledtoassertiteitherhas
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13 Ibid., 41. 14 Ibid., 332.

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abandoned or declined to assert it. In the case at bar, respondentcannotbeconsideredasestoppedfromassailing the trial courts jurisdiction over petitioners counterclaim sincethisissuewasraisedbyrespondentwiththetrialcourt itselfthe body where the action is pendingeven before the presentation of any evidence by the parties and

15

definitely, way before any judgment could be rendered by thetrialcourt. Meanwhile, respondent questions the jurisdiction of the CourtofAppealsovertheappealfiledbypetitionerfromthe 18September1990and28February1991ordersofthetrial court. It is significant to note that this objection to the appellate courts jurisdiction is raised for the first time beforethisCourt;respondentneverhavingraisedthisissue beforetheappellatecourt.Althoughthelackofjurisdiction ofacourtmayberaisedatanystageoftheaction,aparty may be estopped from raising such questions if he has actively taken part in the very proceedings which he questions, belatedly objecting to the courts jurisdiction in the event that that the judgment or order subsequently 16 rendered is adverse to him. In this case, respondent actively took part in the proceedings before the Court of 17 Appeals by filing its appellees brief with the same. Its participation,whentakentogetherwithitsfailuretoobject to the appellate courts jurisdiction during the entire durationoftheproceedingsbeforesuchcourt,demonstrates awillingnesstoabidebytheresolutionofthecasebysuch tribunalandaccordingly,respondentisnowmostdecidedly estoppedfromobjectingtotheCourtofAppealsassumption 18 ofjurisdictionoverpetitionersappeal. The basic issue for resolution in this case is whether or not the counterclaim of petitioner is compulsory or permissiveinnature.A
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15 Philippine

National Construction Corporation v. National Labor

RelationsCommission,307SCRA218(1999).
16

National Steel Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 302 SCRA 522

(1999).
17CARecords,88115. 18

ABSCBN Supervisors Employees Union Members v. ABSCBN

Broadcasting Corporation, 304 SCRA 489 (1999). See also Stilianopulos v.CityofLegaspi,316SCRA523 (1999); Pantranco North Express, Inc. v.CourtofAppeals,224SCRA477(1993). 121

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compulsorycounterclaimisonewhich,beingcognizableby the regular courts of justice, arises out of or is connected withthetransactionoroccurrenceconstitutingthesubject matteroftheopposingpartysclaimanddoesnotrequirefor its adjudication the presence of19 third parties of whom the courtcannotacquirejurisdiction.20 InValencia v. Court of Appeal, thisCourtcapsulizedthe criteriaorteststhatmaybeusedindeterminingwhethera counterclaim is compulsory or permissive, summarized as follows: 1. Are the issues of fact and law raised by the claim andcounterclaimlargelythesame? 2. Would res judicata bar a subsequent suit on defendants claim absent the compulsory counterclaimrule? 3. Will substantially the same evidence support or refute plaintiffs claim as well as defendants counterclaim? 4. Isthereany logical relationbetweentheclaimand thecounterclaim? Anothertest,appliedinthemorerecentcaseof Quintanilla 21 v. Court of Appeals, is the compelling test of compulsoriness which requires a logical relationship between the claim and counterclaim, that is, where conducting separate trials of the respective claims of the parties would entail a substantial duplication of effort and timebythepartiesandthecourt. As contained in her answer, petitioners counterclaims areasfollows: (20) That defendant incorporates and repleads by reference all the foregoing allegations as may be materialtoherCounterclaimagainstFGU. (21) That FGU is liable to pay the following just, valid andlegitimateclaimsofdefendant:
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19Rule6,section7;BAFinancev.Co,224SCRA163(1993);Javier v.

IntermediateAppellateCourt,171SCRA609(1989).
20263SCRA275(1996). 21279SCRA397(1997).

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(a) the sum of at least P104,893.45 plus maximum interest thereon representing, among others, direct commissions, profit commissions and contingent bonuses legally due to defendant;and (b) the minimum amount of P500,000.00 plus the maximum allowable interest representing defendants accumulated premiumreservefor1985andpreviousyears, which FGU has unjustifiably failed to remit to defendant despite repeated demands in gross violation of their Special Agents Contract and in contravention of the principle of law that every personmust,intheexerciseofhisrightsandintheperformanceof his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honestyandgoodfaith. (22) That as a result of the filing of this patently baseless, malicious and unjustified Complaint, and FGUs unlawful, illegal and vindictive termination of their Special Agents Contract, defendant was unnecessarily dragged into this litigation and to defense[sic]hersideandassertherrightsandclaimsagainstFGU, she was compelled to hire the services of counsel with whom she agreed to pay the amount of P30,000.00 as and for attorneys fees and stands to incur litigation expenses in the amount estimated to at least P20,000.00 and for which FGU should be assessed and madeliabletopaydefendant. (23) That considering further the malicious and unwarranted action of defendant in filing this grossly unfounded action, defendant has suffered and continues to suffer from serious anxiety,mentalanguish,frightandhumiliation.Inadditiontothis, defendants name, good reputation and business standing in the insurance business as well as in the community have been besmirchedandforwhichFGUshouldbeadjudgedandmadeliable to pay moral damages to defendant in the amount of P300,000.00 asminimum. (24) That in order to discourage the filing of groundless and malicioussuitslikeFGUsComplaint,andbywayofserving[as]an exampleforthepublicgood,FGUshouldbepenalizedandassessed exemplary damages in the sum of P100,000.00 or such amount as the Honorable Court may deem warranted under the 22 circumstances.

Tested against the abovementioned standards, petitioners counterclaim for commissions, bonuses, and accumulated premium reserves is merely permissive. The evidence requiredtoprovepetitionersclaimsdiffersfromthatneeded toestablishrespondents
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22Rollo,6162.

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demands for the recovery of cash accountabilities from petitioner, such as cash advances and costs of premiums. The recovery of respondents claims is not contingent or dependentuponestablishingpetitionerscounterclaim,such that conducting separate trials will not result in the substantial duplication of the time and effort of the court andtheparties.Onewouldsearchtherecordsinvainfora logical connection between the parties claims. This conclusion is further reinforced by petitioners own admissions since she declared in her answer that respondentscauseofaction,unlikeherown,wasnotbased 23 upon the Special Agents Contract. However, petitioners claims for damages, allegedly suffered as a result of the 24 filingbyrespondentofitscomplaint,arecompulsory. Thereisnoneedforpetitionertopaydocketfeesforher 25 compulsorycounterclaim. Ontheotherhand,inorderfor the trial court to acquire jurisdiction over her permissive counterclaim, petitioner is bound to pay the prescribed 26 docketfees. Theruleonthepaymentoffilingfeeshasbeen laiddownbytheCourtinthecaseof Sun Insurance Office, 27 Ltd. v. Hon. Maximiano Asuncion 1. It is not simply the filing of the complaint or appropriateinitiatorypleading,butthepaymentof the prescribed docket fee, that vests a trial court withjurisdictionoverthesubjectmatterornatureof the action. Where the filing of the initiatory pleading is not accompanied by payment of the docket fee, the court may allow payment of the fee withinareasonabletimebutinnocasebeyondthe

applicableprescriptiveorreglementaryperiod. 2. The same rule applies to permissive counterclaims, thirdparty claims and similar pleadings, which shall not be considered filed until and unless the filingfeeprescribedthereforispaid.Thecourtmay allowpaymentofsaidfeewithinareasonabletime butalsoinnocasebeyonditsapplicableprescriptive orreglementaryperiod.
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23 Ibid., 5859,60. 24 Santo Tomas University Hospital v. Surla, 294 SCRA 382 (1998);

Intestate Estate of Amado B. Dalisay v. Marasigan, 257 SCRA 509 (1996).

25Quintanillav.CourtofAppeals, supra. 26Susonv.CourtofAppeals,278SCRA284(1997). 27170SCRA274(1989).

124

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SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED Alday vs. FGU Insurance Corporation 3. Where the trial court acquires jurisdiction over a claim by the filing of the appropriate pleading and payment of the prescribed filing fee but, subsequently, the judgment awards a claim not specifiedinthepleading,orifspecifiedthesamehas been left for determination by the court, the additional filing fee therefor shall constitute a lien onthejudgment.Itshallbetheresponsibilityofthe Clerk of Court or his duly authorized deputy to enforce said lien and assess and collect the additionalfee.

The above mentioned ruling in Sun Insurance has been 28 reiteratedintherecentcaseof Suson v. Court of Appeals. InSuson,theCourtexplainedthatalthoughthepaymentof theprescribeddocketfeesisajurisdictionalrequirement,its nonpayment does not result in the automatic dismissal of the case provided the docket fees are paid within the applicableprescriptiveorreglementaryperiod.Comingnow tothecaseatbar,ithasnotbeenallegedbyrespondentand

there is nothing in the records to show that petitioner has attemptedtoevadethepaymentoftheproperdocketfeesfor her permissive counterclaim. As a matter of fact, after respondent filed its motion to dismiss petitioners counterclaim based on her failure to pay docket fees, petitioner immediately filed a motion with the trial court, asking it to declare her counterclaim as compulsory in nature and therefore exempt from docket fees and, in addition, to declare that respondent29 was in default for its failure to answer her counterclaim. However, the trial court dismissed petitioners counterclaim. Pursuant to this CourtsrulinginSun Insurance,thetrialcourtshouldhave instead given petitioner a reasonable time, but in no case beyond the applicable prescriptive or reglementary period, topaythefilingfeesforherpermissivecounterclaim. Petitioner asserts that the trial court should have declared respondent in default for having failed to answer 30 hercounterclaim. Insofar as the permissive counterclaim ofpetitionerisconcerned,thereisobviouslynoneedtofile an answer until petitioner has paid the prescribed docket feesforonlythenshallthecourtacquire
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28 Supra.

See also Cabaerov.Cantos,271SCRA391(1997).

29RTCRecords,110125. 30Rollo,342343.

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jurisdiction over such claim. Meanwhile, the compulsory counterclaim of petitioner for damages based on the filing byrespondentofanallegedlyunfoundedandmalicioussuit neednotbeansweredsinceitisinseparablefromtheclaims ofrespondent.Ifrespondentweretoanswerthecompulsory counterclaim of petitioner, it would merely result in the 32 formerpleadingthesamefactsraisedinitscomplaint. WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision of the Court of Appealspromulgatedon23December1998andits19May 1999 Resolution are hereby MODIFIED. The compulsory counterclaim of petitioner for damages filed in Civil Case No. 893816 is ordered REINSTATED. Meanwhile, the

31

Regional Trial Court of Makati (Branch 134) is ordered to require petitioner to pay the prescribed docket fees for her permissive counterclaim (direct commissions, profit commissions, contingent bonuses and accumulated premium reserves), after ascertaining that the applicable 33 prescriptiveperiodhasnotyetsetin. SOORDERED. Melo (Chairman), Vitug, Panganibanand Sandoval Gutierrez, JJ.,concur. Judgment and resolution counterclaim reinstated. modified. Compulsory

Notes.A counterclaim for attorneys fees partakes of thenatureofacompulsorycounterclaim.(Intestate Estate of Amado B. Dalisay vs. Marasigan,257SCRA509[1996]) An appeal from the dismissal of the counterclaim, althoughnottotallyunavailable,couldwellbeineffective,if not futile, as far as the petitioner is concerned where no single piece of evidence has yet been presented by it, that opportunityhavingbeenforeclosedbythetrialcourt,onthe dismissedcounterclaimwhichcouldform
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31Gegarev.CourtofAppeals,297SCRA587(1998). 32 Ballecer v. Bernardo, 18 SCRA 291 (1966); Navarro v. Bello, 102

Phil.1019(1958).
33Susonv.CourtofAppeals, supra.

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part of the records to be reviewed by the appellate court. (Santo Tomas University Hospital vs. Surla,294SCRA382 [1998]) o0o

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