Paras v. COMELEC G.R. No.

123169 (November 4, 1996) FACTS: A petition for recall was filed against Paras, who is the incumbent Punong Barangay. The recall election was deferred due to Petitioners opposition that under Sec. 74 of RA No. 7160, no recall shall take place within one year from the date of the officials assumption to office or one year immediately preceding a regular local election. Since the Sangguniang Kabataan (SK) election was set on the first Monday of May 2006, no recall may be instituted. ISSUE: W/N the SK election is a local election. HELD: No. Every part of the statute must be interpreted with reference to its context, and it must be considered together and kept subservient to its general intent. The evident intent of Sec. 74 is to subject an elective local official to recall once during his term, as provided in par. (a) and par. (b). The spirit, rather than the letter of a law, determines its construction. Thus, interpreting the phrase regular local election to include SK election will unduly circumscribe the Code for there will never be a recall election rendering inutile the provision. In interpreting a statute, the Court assumed that the legislature intended to enact an effective law. An interpretation should be avoided under which a statute or provision being construed is defeated, meaningle ss, inoperative or nugatory.

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC

G.R. No. 113107 July 20, 1994 WILMAR P. LUCERO, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and JOSE L. ONG, JR., respondents.

G.R. No. 113509 July 20, 1994

JOSE L. ONG, JR., petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and WILMAR P. LUCERO, respondents. Cesar A. Sevilla & Associates for Wilmar Lucero. Napolean G. Rama and Remollo Melocoton & Associates for Jose L. Ong, Jr.

DAVIDE, JR., J.: After the issues had been joined in these consolidated cases, the Court resolved to give due course to the petitions therein and to decide the cases on the merits. It can no longer allow the parties to delay these cases. Their legal skirmishes, which have unduly magnified uncomplicated issues, have effectively deprived the people of the Second Legislative District of Northern Samar of representation in the House of Representatives for more than two years now. These cases are sequels to G. R. No. 105717, entitled "Jose L. Ong, Jr. vs. Commission on Elections and Wilmar P. Lucero," which we finally resolved on 22 April 1993. 1 The petitioners were two of the five candidates 2 for the Second Legislative District of Northern Samar in the synchronized national and local elections held on 11 May 1992. The canvass of the Provincial Board of Canvassers (PBC) of Northern Samar credited Jose L. Ong, Jr. with 24,272 votes and Wilmar P. Lucero with 24,068 votes, or a lead by Ong of 204 votes. However, this tally did not include the results of Precinct No. 7 of the municipality of Silvino Lobos, where the submitted election returns had not been canvassed because they were illegible; of Precinct No. 13 of Silvino Lobos, where the ballot boxes were snatched and no election was held; and of Precinct No. 16, also of Silvino Lobos, where all copies of the election returns were missing. On 22 May 1992, Lucero asked the Commission on Elections (COMELEC), in SPA No. 92282, to: 1. Forthwith order Respondent Provincial Board of Canvassers for Northern Samar to suspend the proclamation of Private Respondent Jose L. Ong, Jr.; 2. Direct Respondent Provincial Board of Canvassers for Northern Samar to correct the Certificate of Canvass (CEF 20) for Las Navas and, accordingly, to correct the total votes so far counted by it for Petitioner from 24,068 to 24,088, thus reducing the margin it found in favor of Private Respondent Jose L. Ong, Jr. from 204 to 184 votes only; 3. Order a special election in Precinct 13, Barangay Gusaran, Silvino Lobos, pursuant to Section 6 of the Omnibus Election Code;

4. Order a recount of the votes for Representative of the Second District of Northern Samar in Precinct 16, Barangay Tubgon, and Precinct 7, Barangay Camayaan, both of Silvino Lobos, pursuant to Section 234 of the Omnibus Election Code; 5. Order a recount of the votes for Representative in the 52 precincts herein above enumerated in order to correct "manifest errors" pursuant to Section 15 of Republic Act 7166 and for this purpose order the impounding and safekeeping of the ballot boxes of all said precincts in order to preserve the integrity of the ballots and other election paraphernalia contained therein. 3 On 2 June 1992, the COMELEC, acting on Lucero's urgent manifestation, directed the PBC to desist from reconvening until further orders. On 8 June 1992, Ong moved to lift the suspension of the proceedings by the PBC, which Lucero opposed on 10 June 1992 on the ground that the canvass could not be completed even if the PBC were to reconvene because no election was held in Precinct No. 13 (Barangay Gusaran) of Silvino Lobos and there was no canvassing of the votes in Precinct No. 7 (Barangay Camayaan) and Precinct No. 16 (Barangay Tubgon) both of Silvino Lobos. On 13 June 1993, the COMELEC en banc promulgated a resolution, the dispositive portion of which reads: Accordingly, the Commission hereby orders the Provincial Election Supervisor of Northern Samar to bring to the Commission within three (3) days from receipt hereof the ballot boxes from Precinct 7 and 16 of Silvino Lobos, to be escorted by representatives from the petitioner and the respondents as well as other parties who have an interest to protect, and to notify said parties hereof. The Municipal Treasurer of said town is directed to turn over custody of said ballot boxes to the Provincial Election Supervisor, and the keys thereof shall likewise be turned over by the appropriate officials in custody thereof to the PES, who shall in turn give one key for each ballot box to the duly authorized representatives of the petitioner and the respondent. The Commission likewise orders the Election Registrar of Silvino Lobos, Northern Samar, and the Chairman and members of the Boards of Election Inspectors of Precincts 7 and 16 of said municipality to appear before the Commission within three (3) days from receipt hereof. Below the signatures of the Chairman and the six Commissioners, however, Chairman Christian S. Monsod and Commissioners Haydee B. Yorac, Dario C. Rama and Regalado E. Maambong directed as follows:

We vote in favor of this resolution except that portion which denied the correction of the Certificate of Canvass for Las Navas. Correction of the Certificate of Canvass for Las Navas is in order in view of the testimony of the election registrar of Las Navas to the effect that Wilmar Lucero garnered 2,537 votes for Las Navas and not 2,517. Petition for correction was duly filed by Lucero with the Provincial Board of Canvassers of Northern Samar on May 19, 1992. The Provincial Board of Canvassers of Northern Samar is therefore directed to retabulate the total number of votes for Las Navas for Lucero and enter the same in the Provincial Certificate of Canvass. 4 On 15 June 1992, Lucero filed an urgent motion to constitute a Special Board of Election Inspectors (SBEI) to count the votes of Precincts Nos. 7 and 16 of Silvino Lobos. 5 On 20 June 1992, Ong, in a special civil action for certiorari filed with this Court and subsequently docketed as G. R. No. 105717, questioned the order for the recount of ballots in Precincts No. 7 and 16. Despite the pendency of this petition, the COMELEC ordered the recount of the ballots in Precinct No. 16 by a SBEI which recorded 43 votes for Lucero and 2 votes for Ong. 6 On 25 June 1992, this Court issued in G. R. No. 105717 a temporary restraining order against the implementation by the COMELEC of its Order of 2 June 1992 and its Resolution of 13 June 1992. On 23 December 1992, this Court promulgated its decision in G. R. No. 105717, 7 the dispositive portion of which reads: WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is GRANTED and a writ of preliminary injunction is hereby ISSUED directing the COMELEC to CEASE and DESIST from implementing its order of June 2, 1992, and its resolution dated June 13, 1992, and the same are hereby declared NULLIFIED. Consequently, the election returns based on the recounted ballots from Precinct 16 are hereby DISCARDED and in lieu thereof, authentic returns from said precinct should instead be made a basis for the canvassing. The Provincial Board of Canvassers of Northern Samar is hereby directed to PROCEED WITH DISPATCH in the canvassing of ballots until completed and to PROCLAIM the duly elected winner of the congressional seat for the Second District of Northern Samar. This decision is immediately executory. 8 Acting on the motions for reconsideration and clarification respectively filed by the COMELEC and Lucero, this Court, on 22 April 1993, modified 9 its aforesaid disposition in G. R. No. 105717 as follows;

IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the dispositive portion of the December 23, 1992 Decision is hereby MODIFIED to read as follows; "WHEREFORE, THE PETITION IS GRANTED. THE JUNE 2, 1992 ORDER OF RESPONDENT COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS IN SPA NO. 92-282 IS HEREBY ANNULLED AND SET ASIDE. ITS JUNE 13, 1992 RESOLUTION THEREIN IS LIKEWISE ANNULLED AND SET ASIDE INSOFAR AS IT AFFECTS PRECINCT NO. 7 OF SILVINO LOBOS, THE RECOUNT OF VOTES IN THE 52 OTHER PRECINCTS AND THE CORRECTION OF THE CERTIFICATE OF CANVASS OF LAS NAVAS, BUT IS AFFIRMED WITH RESPECT TO THE ISSUE OF HOLDING A SPECIAL ELECTION IN PRECINCT NO. 13 AND THE RECOUNT OF THE BALLOTS IN PRECINCT NO. 16. THE RESPONDENT COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS IS HEREBY DIRECTED TO ASSIGN SPA NO. 92-282 TO ANY OF ITS DIVISIONS PURSUANT TO ITS RULE ON RAFFLE OF CASES FOR IT TO RESOLVE THE PRE-PROCLAMATION ISSUES THEREIN, TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THE ABOVE PRONOUNCEMENTS AND THE EXCEPTIONS PROVIDED FOR IN SECTION 15 OF R. A. NO. 7166. WHENEVER WARRANTED BY THE CIRCUMSTANCES, THE COMMISSION MAY (A) CALL A SPECIAL ELECTION IN PRECINCT NO. 13 OF SILVINO LOBOS, NORTHERN SAMAR, AND (B) RECONVENE THE SPECIAL MUNICIPAL BOARD OF CANVASSERS AND THE SPECIAL PROVINCIAL BOARD OF CANVASSERS IT HAD EARLIER CONSTITUTED OR CREATE NEW ONES. ALL THE FOREGOING SHOULD BE DONE WITH PURPOSEFUL DISPATCH TO THE END THAT THE WINNING CANDIDATE FOR CONGRESSMAN REPRESENTING THE SECOND CONGRESSIONAL DISTRICT OF NORTHERN SAMAR MAY BE PROCLAIMED AS SOON AS POSSIBLE." 10 As to the certificate of canvass of the municipality of Las Navas, this Court explicitly stated; The correction of the certificate of canvass of Las Navas is likewise in order. Even though a pre-proclamation issue is involved, the correction of the manifest error is allowed under Section 15 of R. A. No. 7166. 11 Conformably with the aforesaid modified judgment in G. R. No. 105717, SPA No. 92-282 was raffled to the First Division of the COMELEC which conducted hearings thereon and

received the arguments and evidence of both parties who then submitted their respective memoranda on 25 June 1994. However, during the consultations on the case by the Members of the First Division, the concurrence of at least two of them could not be obtained; accordingly, pursuant to the COMELEC Rules, the case was elevated for proper disposition to the COMELEC en banc to which the parties submitted their respective memoranda on 19 November 1993. 12 On 7 January 1994, the COMELEC en banc promulgated a resolution 13 whose dispositive portion reads as follows: 1. To direct the special Provincial Board of Canvassers for Northern Samar (a) to include in the municipal certificate of canvass of Silvino Lobos the forty-three (43) votes of petitioner Lucero and the two (2) votes of private respondent Ong as reflected in the election returns of Precinct No. 16 (Barangay Tubgon) prepared by the special Board of Election Inspectors constituted by the Commission to recount the votes (ballots) in said precinct, as canvassed by the special Municipal Board of Canvassers for Silvino Lobos; (b) to include in the municipal certificate of canvass of Silvino Lobos, the sixty-one (61) votes of private respondent Ong and 29, 30, or 31 votes of petitioner Lucero as reflected in the election returns (MBC Copy submitted as "Comelec Copy") of Precinct No. 7 (Barangay Camaya-an), as canvassed by the special Municipal Board of Canvassers for Silvino Lobos; (c) to retabulate the total number of votes of petitioner Lucero for the Municipality of Las Navas and to enter in the provincial certificate of canvass the correct total which is two thousand five hundred thirty-seven (2,537) as reflected in the Statement of Votes (C. E. Form 20-A) prepared and submitted by the Municipal Board of Canvassers for Las Navas; and (d) to submit to the Commission a computation of the votes of the contending parties including therein all the votes of petitioner Lucero (with alternative totals) and private respondent Ong, in Precinct Nos. 7 and 16 of Silvino Lobos and the total votes of petitioner Lucero in the Municipality of Las Navas as corrected. However, under no circumstances should the Board proclaim any winning candidate until instructed to do so by the Commission; 2. To issue an Order calling for a special election in the last remaining Precinct No. 13 (Barangay Gusaran) of the Municipality of Silvino Lobos if justified by the result of the canvass by the Provincial Board of Canvassers for Northern Samar, and to notify the parties of the schedule of election activities for that precinct; and 3. After including in the tabulation the results of the special election of Precinct No. 13, to decide the issue of the recount of the votes (ballots) of Precinct No. 7 of Silvino Lobos, pursuant to Section 236 of the Omnibus Election Code, to resolve the discrepancy of the votes of petitioner Lucero in the same return, if such discrepancy of votes of the candidates concerned

would affect the over-all results of the election after the totality of the votes of the contending parties shall have been determined. Both Lucero and Ong have come to this Court by way of separate special civil actions for certiorari to challenge the Resolution. In G. R. No. 113107, Lucero maintains that (1) the count of the ballots in Precinct No. 7 of Silvino Lobos must be unconditional because the election returns therefrom are invalid; and (2) his chances in the special election in Precinct No. 13 of Silvino Lobos would be spoiled if the returns for Precinct No. 7 were to be included beforehand in the canvass. In G. R. No. 113509, Ong questions (1) the authority of the COMELEC to order the correction of the alleged manifest error in the Municipal Certificate of Canvass of Las Navas despite the absence of any appeal; and (2) the authority of the COMELEC to call for a special election in Precinct No. 13 almost two years after the regular election. As we see it, the core issues in these consolidated cases are: (1) Whether there should first be a count of the ballots of Precinct No. 7 of Silvino Lobos before determining the necessity of holding a special election in Precinct No. 13 of Silvino Lobos: (2) Whether the COMELEC acted with grave abuse of discretion in ordering the correction of the alleged manifest error in the Municipal Certificate of Canvass of Las Navas; and (3) Whether the COMELEC acted with grave abuse of discretion in calling for a special election in Precinct No. 13 after almost two (2) years, or more specifically after one (1) year and ten (10) months, following the day of the synchronized elections. We shall take up these issues seriatim. I. The answer to the first issue is in the affirmative. We find the COMELEC's disposition regarding Precinct No. 7 to be unclear. In the first paragraph of the dispositive portion of the challenged resolution, it directs the Provincial Board of Canvassers "to include in the municipal certificate of canvas of Silvino Lobos the sixty-one (61) votes of private respondent Ong and 29, 30, or 31 votes of petitioner Lucero as reflected in the election returns (MBC copy submitted as "COMELEC Copy") of Precinct

No. 7 (Barangay Camaya-an), as canvassed by the special Municipal Board of Canvassers for Silvino Lobos," and "to submit to the Commission a computation of the votes of the contending parties including therein all the votes of petitioner Lucero (with alternative totals) and private respondent Ong, in Precinct Nos. 7 and 16 of Silvino Lobos. . . ." On the other hand, in the fourth paragraph of the said dispositive portion, it orders the Provincial Board of Canvassers, after "including in the tabulation the results of the special election of Precinct No. 13," to "decide the issue of the recount of the votes (ballots) of Precinct No. 7 of Silvino Lobos, pursuant to Section 236 of the Omnibus Election Code [and] to resolve the discrepancy of the votes of petitioner Lucero in the same return, if such discrepancy of votes of the candidate concerned would affect the over-all results of the election after the totality of the votes of the contending parties shall have been determined." Obviously, instead of ordering an outright recount of the ballots of Precinct No. 7, the COMELEC would first give full faith and credit to the questioned election returns thereof, which it describes as the "Comelec Copy," and, accordingly, direct the PBC to include in the municipal certificate of canvass of Silvino Lobos the 61 votes for Ong and the uncertain votes for Lucero 29, 30, or 31. The recount would only be made if after a special election in Precinct No. 13 shall have been held, it shall be determined that such a recount would be necessary. We fail to grasp the logic of the proposition. First, it is clear to us that the COMELEC, which has in its possession the so-called "Comelec Copy" of the questioned election returns of Precinct No. 7 and heard the witnesses who testified thereon, doubts the authenticity of the so-called "Comelec Copy" of the election returns of Precinct No. 7; 14 hence, it authorizes the PBC to decide the issue of a recount "pursuant to Section 236 of the Omnibus Election Code." Since it doubts such authenticity, it could not, without arbitrariness and abuse of discretion, order the inclusion of the "votes" of Ong and Lucero found in the doubtful "Comelec Copy" of the election returns in the municipal certificate of canvass. Second, it is an uncontroverted fact that an election was held in Precinct No. 7. None was held in Precinct No. 13 for reasons the parties fully knew. Pursuant to Section 6 of the Omnibus Election Code (B.P. Blg. 881), a special election may be held in Precinct No. 13 only if the failure of the election therein "would affect the result of the election." This "result of the election" means the net result of the election in the rest of the precincts in a given constituency, such that if the margin of a leading candidate over that of his closest rival in the latter precincts is less than the total number of votes in the precinct where there was failure of election, then such failure would certainly affect "the result of the election"; hence, a special election must be held. Consequently, the holding of a special election in Precinct No. 13 can only be determined after the votes in Precinct No. 7 shall have been included in the canvass by the Provincial Board of Canvassers. We may further state that the so-called "Comelec Copy" of the election returns of Precinct No. 7 can by no means be validly included in the municipal canvass. The summary of the evidence in the "preparation" of the election returns of Precinct No. 7, both in the challenged Resolution and in the separate Concurring and Dissenting Opinion of Commissioners Gorospe and Claravall, leaves no room for doubt that there was actually no counting of the votes in Precinct No. 7. Quoted in the challenged Resolution is a portion of

the testimony of Sabina T. Jarito, Precinct Chairman of Precinct No. 7, which clearly shows that on questions by COMELEC Chairman Christian S. Monsod and Commissioner Vicente B. de Lima, the witness candidly admitted that the election returns were prepared at the "munisipyo" or municipal building and not at the polling place of Precinct No. 7 in barangay Camaya-an. 15 This "munisipyo" is located at the poblacion of Silvino Lobos. Under the law, the board of election inspectors shall prepare the election returns simultaneously with the counting of votes in the polling place. 16 There is no evidence whatsoever that the COMELEC had, for valid reasons, authorized the transfer of venue of the counting of the votes of Precinct No. 7 from the polling place in barangay Camaya-an to the municipal building and that the counting did in fact take place at the latter. Although in the Concurring and Dissenting Opinion of Commissioners Gorospe and Claravall there is a reference to Exhibit "E," the Joint Affidavit of Sabina Jarito and Mevilyn Surio wherein they declare that after the voting the Board of Election Inspectors unanimously approved to transfer the counting of votes to the Municipal Building in the Poblacion of Silvino Lobos, which was allegedly concurred in by all the watchers of political parties and the candidates present, the alleged "counting" at the municipal building was denied by no less than the Municipal Election Officer of Silvino Lobos, Antonio Tepace, and the Municipal Treasurer thereof, Mr. Gabriel Basarte, in their affidavits marked as Exhibit "F" and Exhibit "G," respectively. 17 Since there was no counting of the votes of Precinct No. 7, no valid election returns could be made and any copy of election returns purporting to come therefrom is a fabrication. A recount thereof, which presupposes a prior count, would obviously be unwarranted. Only a count then of the votes of Precinct No. 13 would heretofore be in order. Sections 234, 235, and 236 of the Omnibus Election Code are thus still inapplicable. And, in the light of what we stated before in relation to the holding of a special election, such a count of the votes of Precinct No. 7 must, perforce, precede the special election in Precinct No. 13. II. Ong's first grievance in G. R. No. 113509 is without merit. The order of the COMELEC for the correction of the manifest error in the municipal certificate of canvass of Las Navas was made pursuant to the declaration made by this Court in G. R. No. 105717 (Ong vs. COMELEC) 18 that: The correction of the certificate of canvass of Las Navas is likewise in order. Even though a pre-proclamation issue is involved, the correction of the manifest error is allowed under Sec. 15 of R. A. No. 7166. Since no motion for reconsideration was filed in that case, the decision therein became final and entry of judgment was made on 4 August 1993. Consequently, Ong cannot now relitigate the issue of the correction of the certificate of canvass of Las Navas.

III On the authority of the COMELEC to order the holding of a special election, Section 6 of the Omnibus Election Code provides: Sec. 6. Failure of election. If, on account of force majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud, or other analogous causes the election in any polling place has not been held on the date fixed, or had been suspended before the hour fixed by law for the closing of the voting, or after the voting and during the preparation and the transmission of the election returns or in the custody or canvass thereof, such election results in a failure to elect, and if in any of such cases the failure or suspension of election would affect the result of the election, the Commission shall, on the basis of a verified petition by any interested party and after due notice and hearing, call for the holding or continuation of the election not held, suspended or which resulted in a failure to elect on a date reasonably close to the date of the election not held, suspended or which resulted in a failure to elect but not later than thirty days after the cessation of the cause of such postponement or suspension of the election or failure to elect. The first paragraph of Section 4 of R. A. No. 7166 likewise provides: Sec. 4. Postponement, Failure of Election and Special Elections. The postponement, declaration of failure of election and the calling of special elections as provided in Sections 5, 6 and 7 of the Omnibus Election Code shall be decided by the Commission sitting en banc by a majority votes of its members. The causes for the declaration of a failure of election may occur before or after the casting of votes or on the day of the election. There are, therefore, two requisites for the holding of special elections under Section 6 of the Omnibus Election Code, viz., (1) that there is a failure of election, and (2) that such failure would affect the results of the election. The parties admit that the failure of the election in Precinct No. 13 was due to ballot-box snatching and do not dispute the finding of the COMELEC as to the necessity and inevitability of the holding of a special election in said precinct, even if the result of Precinct No. 7 should be based on the questionable "Comelec Copy" of its election returns. The COMELEC held: Based on the adjudged correction of the votes in favor of petitioner Lucero in the Municipality of Las Navas, the results of the recount of votes (ballots) of Precinct No. 16 (Silvino Lobos), and the votes reflected in the available copy of the election returns for Precinct No. 7 (Silvino Lobos), it is safe to predict that when the special Provincial Board of Canvassers will reconvene to sum up the votes of the contending parties, the original lead of private respondent Ong of two hundred four (204) votes against petitioner Lucero 24,272 as against

24,068 will be reduced to either 175 or 173 depending on whether Lucero will be credited a low of 29 or a high of 31 votes as reflected in the election returns of Precinct No. 7. Without preempting the exact figures which only the special Provincial Board of Canvassers can correctly determine, undoubtedly it is inevitable that a special election will have to be held in Precinct No. 13 (Barangay Gusaran) of the Municipality of Silvino Lobos. ... Given the established lead of private respondent Ong over petitioner Lucero, We answer in the affirmative. According to Comelec records, the number of registered voters in Precinct No. 13 is two hundred thirteen (213). Since the lead of respondent Ong is less than the number of registered voters, the votes in that precinct could affect the existing result because of the possibility that petitioner Lucero might get a majority over Ong in that precinct and that majority might be more than the present lead of Ong. 19 On the basis of the additional votes credited so far to the parties, 20 the following computation is in order: to Ong's 24,272 votes will be added 2 more from Precinct No. 16, to make a total of 24,274, while to Lucero's 24,068 votes will be added 20 more from Las Navas and 43 from Precinct No. 16, for a total of 24,131. Ong's earlier lead will thus be reduced to 143, which is admittedly less than the 213 registered voters in Precinct No. 13.
21

The two requirements then for a special election under Section 6 of the Omnibus Election Code have indeed been met. In fixing the date of the special election, the COMELEC should see to it that: (1) it should be not later than thirty days after the cessation of the cause of the postponement or suspension of the election or the failure to elect, and (2) it should be reasonably close to the date of the election not held, suspended, or which resulted in failure to elect. The first involves questions of fact. The second must be determined in the light of the peculiar circumstances of a case. In the instant case, the delay was not attributable to the poor voters of Precinct No. 13 or to the rest of the electorate of the Second Legislative District of Northern Samar. The delay was, as stated in the opening paragraph of this ponencia, primarily caused by the legal skirmishes or maneuvers of the petitioners which muddled simple issues. The Court takes judicial notice of the fact that G. R. No. 113509 is the third case Ong has brought to this Court. 22 Considering then that the petitioners themselves must share the blame for the delay, and taking into account the fact that since the term of the office of the contested position is only three years, the holding of a special election in

Precinct No. 13 within the next few months may still be considered "reasonably close to the date of the election not held." Ong's postulation should then be rejected. In the course of the deliberations on these cases, the Court considered the possible application, by analogy, of Section 10, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution providing that no special election in the event of a vacancy in the Offices of the President and Vice President "shall be called if the vacancy occurs within eighteen months before the date of the next presidential election," and of the second paragraph of Section 4 of R. A. No. 7166 which provides: In case a permanent vacancy shall occur in the Senate or House of Representatives at least one (1) year before the expiration of the term, the Commission shall call and hold a special election to fill the vacancy not earlier than sixty (60) days nor longer than ninety (90) days after the occurrence of the vacancy. However, in case of such vacancy in the Senate, the special election shall be held simultaneously with the next succeeding regular election. A view was expressed that we should not hold the special election because the underlying philosophy for the prohibition to hold the special election if the vacancy occurred within a certain period before the next presidential election or the next regular election, as the case may be, is obviously the avoidance of the expense to be incurred in the holding of a special election when a regular election is, after all, less than a year away. The Court ultimately resolved that the aforesaid constitutional and statutory proscriptions are inapplicable to special elections which may be called under Section 6 of the Omnibus Election Code. First, the special election in the former is to fill permanent vacancies in the Office of the President, Vice President, and Members of Congress occurring after the election, while the special election under the latter is due to or by reason of a failure of election. Second, a special election under Section 6 would entail minimal costs because it is limited to only the precincts involved and to the candidates who, by the result of the election in a particular constituency, would be affected by the failure of election. On the other hand, the special election for the Offices of the President, Vice President, and Senators would be nation-wide, and that of a Representative, district-wide. Third, Section 6, when specifically applied to the instant case, presupposes that no candidate had been proclaimed and therefore the people of the Second Legislative District of Northern Samar would be unrepresented in the House of Representatives until the special election shall ultimately determine the winning candidate, such that if none is held, they would have no representation until the end of the term. under the aforesaid constitutional and statutory provisions, the elected officials have already served their constituencies for more than one-half of their terms of office. Fourth, if the law had found it fit to provide a specific and determinate time-frame for the holding of a special election under Section 6, then it could have easily done so in Section 4 of R. A. No. 7166.

Another serious obstacle to Ong's proposition is that, considering the COMELEC's disposition of Precinct No. 7 in the challenged Resolution, he would then be declared and proclaimed the duly elected Representative of the Second Legislative District of Northern Samar despite the fact that as earlier observed, there was no counting of the votes of Precinct No. 7, and the results of the district elections for Representative would be affected by the failure of the election in Precinct No. 13. To accept the proposition is to allow a proclamation based on an incomplete canvass where the final result would have been affected by the uncanvassed result of Precinct No. 7 and by the failure of the election in Precinct No. 13 and to impose upon the people of the Second Legislative District of Northern Samar a Representative whose mandate is, at the very least, uncertain, and at the most, inexistent. IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, judgment is hereby rendered: I. DISMISSING, for lack of merit, the petition in G. R. No. 113509; and II. In G. R. No. 113107, DIRECTING the respondent Commission on Elections to: (1) Reconvene, in its main office of Manila, within five (5) days from notice hereof, the Special Board of Canvassers of the municipality of Silvino Lobos, Northern Samar, which shall then, as a special Board of Election Inspectors of Precinct No. 7 of said municipality, within forty-eight (48) hours from its reconvening, count the ballots of said Precinct No. 7, and deliver to the special Provincial Board of Canvassers of the said Province a copy of the election returns; (2) Reconvene, in its main office in Manila, within the same period as aforestated, the special Provincial Board of Canvassers of Northern Samar which shall then, within seventy-two (72) hours from its reconvening: (a) Include in the Municipal Certificate of Canvass of Silvino Lobos (1) the total number of votes for petitioner Wilmar P. Lucero and for petitioner Jose L. Ong, Jr., respectively, in Precinct No. 7 of Silvino Lobos as recorded in the election returns submitted by the aforementioned special Municipal Board of Canvassers, and (2) the forty-three (43) votes for petitioner Wilmar P. Lucero and the two (2) votes for petitioner Jose L. Ong, Jr. as reflected in the election returns of Precinct No. 16 (Barangay Tubgon) prepared, after a recount of the ballots, by the special Board of Canvassers; and after such inclusions to enter the new totals of the votes for the petitioners in the Certificate of Provincial Canvass; (b) Retabulate the total number of votes for Wilmar P. Lucero for the Municipality of Las Navas, Northern Samar, which shall

be two thousand and five hundred thirty-seven (2,537) as reflected in the Statement of Votes (C.E. Form 20-A) prepared and submitted by the Municipal Board of Canvassers of Las Navas, and to enter the same in the Certificate of Provincial Canvass; (c) After the accomplishment of all the foregoing, to sum up anew in the Certificate of Provincial Canvass the canvassed municipal certificates of canvass of all the municipalities of the Second Legislative District of Northern Samar and if the same would establish that the difference in votes between petitioner Wilmar P. Lucero and petitioner Jose L. Ong, Jr. is less than two hundred and thirteen (213), hence the failure of the election in Precinct No. 13 would unavoidably and inevitably affect then the result of the election, to report to the Commission on Elections such fact and to furnish the latter with a certified photocopy of the Certificate of Provincial Canvass; (3) Within three (3) days after receipt of the aforesaid report from the special Provincial Board of Canvassers, to CALL a special election in Precinct No. 13 of Silvino Lobos, which shall be held not later than thirty (30) days from such call; a copy of the election returns of said special election shall forthwith be transmitted to the Special Provincial Board of Canvassers of Northern Samar, which shall then enter the results thereof in its canvass and make a final summation of the results in the Certificate of Provincial Canvass, and thereafter, pursuant to the Omnibus Election Code, pertinent election laws and rules and resolutions of the Commission, proclaim the winning candidate for Representative of the Second Legislative District of Northern Samar. If for any reason whatsoever it would not be possible to immediately reconvene the Special Municipal Board of Canvassers of Silvino Lobos and the Special Provincial Board of Canvassers of Northern Samar, the COMELEC may create new ones. No pronouncements as to costs. SO ORDERED.

SUBIC BAY METROPOLITAN AUTHORITY vs. COMELEC

G.R. No. 125416 September 26, 1996FACTS:

On March 13, 1992, Congress enacted RA. 7227 (The Bases Conversionand Development Act of 1992), which created the Subic EconomicZone. RA 7227 likewise created SBMA to implement the declarednational policy of converting the Subic military reservation intoalternative productive uses.

On November 24, 1992, the American navy turned over the Subicmilitary reservation to the Philippines government. Immediately,petitioner commenced the implementation of its task, particularly thepreservation of the sea-ports, airport, buildings, houses and otherinstallations left by the American navy.

On April 1993, the Sangguniang Bayan of Morong , Bataan passed Pambayang Kapasyahan Bilang 10

, Serye 1993 , expressing therein itsabsolute concurrence, as required by said Sec. 12 of RA 7227, to jointhe Subic Special Economic Zone and submitted such to the Office of the President.

On May 24, 1993, respondents Garcia filed a petition with theSangguniang Bayan of Morong to annul

Pa mbayang Kapasyahan Blg.10, Serye 1993 .

The petition prayed for the following: a) to nullify PambayangKapasyang Blg. 10 for Morong to join the Subic Special Economi Zone,b) to allow Morong to join provided conditions are met.

The Sangguniang Bayan ng Morong acted upon the petition bypromulgating

Pambayang Kapasyahan Blg. 18, Serye 1993 , requestingCongress of the Philippines so amend certain provisions of RA 7227.

Not satisfied, respondents resorted to their power initiative under theLGC of 1991.

On July 6, 1993, COMELEC denied the petition for local initiative on theground that the subject thereof was merely a resolution and not anordinance.

On February 1, 1995, the President issued Proclamation No. 532 defining the metes and bounds of the SSEZ including therein theportion of the former naval base within the territorial jurisdiction of theMunicipality of Morong.

On June 18, 19956, respondent Comelec issued Resolution No. 2845and 2848 , adopting a "Calendar of Activities for local referendum andproviding for "the rules and guidelines to govern the conduct of thereferendum

On July 10, 1996, SBMA instituted a petition for certiorari contestingthe validity of Resolution No. 2848 alleging that public respondent isintent on proceeding with a local initiative that proposes anamendment of a national law

ISSUE: 1.

WON Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion in promulgatingResolution No. 2848 which governs the conduct of the referendum proposing to annul or repeal Pambayang Kapasyahan Blg. 10 2.

WON the questioned local initiative covers a subject within the powersof the people of Morong to enact; i . e ., whether such initiative "seeksthe amendment of a national law." HELD: 1.

YES. COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion.FIRST. The process started by private respondents was an INITIATIVE butrespondent Comelec made preparations for a REFERENDUM only.In fact, in the body of the Resolution as reproduced in the footnote below,the word "referendum" is repeated at least 27 times, but "initiative" is notmentioned at all. The Comelec labeled the exercise as a "Referendum"; thecounting of votes was entrusted to a "Referendum Committee"; thedocuments were called "referendum returns"; the canvassers, "ReferendumBoard of Canvassers" and the ballots themselves bore the description"referendum". To repeat, not once was the word "initiative" used in saidbody of Resolution No. 2848. And yet, this exercise is unquestionably anINITIATIVE.As defined, Initiative is the power of the people to propose bills and laws,and to enact or reject them at the polls independent of the legislativeassembly. On the other hand, referendum is the right reserved to the peopleto adopt or reject any act or measure which has been passed by a legislativebody and which in most cases would without action on the part of electorsbecome a law.In initiative and referendum, the Comelec exercises administration andsupervision of the process itself, akin to its powers over the conduct of elections. These law-making powers belong to the people, hence therespondent Commission cannot control or change the substance or thecontent of legislation. 2.

The local initiative is NOT ultra vires because the municipal resolution isstill in the proposal stage and not yet an approved law. The municipal resolution is still in the proposal stage. It is not yet anapproved law. Should the people reject it, then there would be nothing tocontest and to adjudicate. It is only when the people have voted for it and ithas become an approved ordinance or resolution that rights and obligationscan be enforced or implemented thereunder. At this point, it is merely aproposal and the writ or prohibition cannot issue upon a mere conjecture orpossibility. Constitutionally speaking, courts may decide only actual controversies, not hypothetical questions or cases.In the present case, it is quite clear that the Court has authority to reviewComelec Resolution No. 2848 to determine the commission of grave abuse of discretion. However, it does not have the same authority in regard to theproposed initiative since it has not been promulgated or approved, or passedupon by any "branch or instrumentality" or lower court, for that matter. The Commission on Elections itself has made no reviewable pronouncementsabout the issues brought by the pleadings. The Comelec simply included verbatim the proposal in its questioned Resolution No. 2848. Hence, there is really no decision or action made by a branch, instrumentality or court whichthis Court could take cognizance of and acquire jurisdiction over, in the exercise of its review powers.

PERALTA vs. COMELEC Case Digest PERALTA vs. COMELEC 82 SCRA 30 Facts: Section 4 of the 1978 Election Code provides that the election period shall be fixed by the Commission on Elections in accordance with Section 6, Article XII[C] of the Constitution. The period of campaign shall not be more than forty-five days immediately preceding the election, excluding the day before and the day of the election. Petitioners questioned the constitutionality of the 45-day campaign period because: (a) it was decreed by the President and not by the Commission on Elections as provided by Section 6 of Article XII-C and (b) the period should cover at least ninety days (90). They argue that Section 6 of Article XII-C of the Constitution provides that the election period shall commence ninety days before the day of election and shall end thirty days thereafter. Issue: Whether or not the 45-day period is unconstitutional Held: The 45-day campaign period is constitutional. Although the campaign period prescribed in the 1978 Election Code for the election of the representatives to the interim Batasang Pambansa is less than 90 days and was decreed by the President and not by the Commission on Elections as provided by Section 6 of Article XII-C of the Constitution, the same does not violate the Constitution, because under Amendment 1, the manner of election of members of the interim Batasang Pambansa shall be prescribed and regulated by law, and the incumbent President under Amendment No. 5, shall continue to exercise legislative power until martial law shall have been lifted. Moreover, the election for members in the interim Batasang Pambansa is an election in a state of emergency requiring special rules, and only the incumbent President has the authority and means of obtaining information on the peace and order condition of the country within which an electoral campaign may be adequately conducted in all regions of the nation. But even assuming that it should be the Commission on Elections that should fix the period of campaign, the constitutional mandate is complied with by the fact that the Commission has adopted and is enforcing the period fixed in Section 4, Article 1, of the 1978 Election Code.

Occena vs. Commission on Elections case digest (Consti-1) Occena vs. Commission on Elections [GR 56350, 2 April 1981]; also Gonzales vs. National Treasurer [GR 56404] En Banc, Fernando (CJ): 8 concur, 1 dissents in separate opinion, 1 on official leave Facts: The challenge in these two prohibition proceedings against the validity of three Batasang Pambansa Resolutions proposing constitutional amendments, goes further than

merely assailing their alleged constitutional infirmity. Samuel Occena and Ramon A. Gonzales, both members of the Philippine Bar and former delegates to the 1971 Constitutional Convention that framed the present Constitution, are suing as taxpayers. The rather unorthodox aspect of these petitions is the assertion that the 1973 Constitution is not the fundamental law, the Javellana ruling to the contrary notwithstanding. Issue: Whether the 1973 Constitution was valid, and in force and effect when the Batasang Pambansa resolutions and the present petitions were promulgated and filed, respectively. Held: It is much too late in the day to deny the force and applicability of the 1973 Constitution. In the dispositive portion of Javellana v. The Executive Secretary, dismissing petitions for prohibition and mandamus to declare invalid its ratification, this Court stated that it did so by a vote of six to four. It then concluded: "This being the vote of the majority, there is no further judicial obstacle to the new Constitution being considered in force and effect." Such a statement served a useful purpose. It could even be said that there was a need for it. It served to clear the atmosphere. It made manifest that as of 17 January 1973, the present Constitution came into force and effect. With such a pronouncement by the Supreme Court and with the recognition of the cardinal postulate that what the Supreme Court says is not only entitled to respect but must also be obeyed, a factor for instability was removed. Thereafter, as a matter of law, all doubts were resolved. The 1973 Constitution is the fundamental law. It is as simple as that. What cannot be too strongly stressed is that the function of judicial review has both a positive and a negative aspect. As was so convincingly demonstrated by Professors Black and Murphy, the Supreme Court can check as well as legitimate. In declaring what the law is, it may not only nullify the acts of coordinate branches but may also sustain their validity. In the latter case, there is an affirmation that what was done cannot be stigmatized as constitutionally deficient. The mere dismissal of a suit of this character suffices. That is the meaning of the concluding statement in Javellana. Since then, this Court has invariably applied the present Constitution. The latest case in point is People v. Sola, promulgated barely two weeks ago. During the first year alone of the effectivity of the present Constitution, at least ten cases may be cited.

Laban ngDemokratikong Pilipino vs COMELEC

G.R. No. 161265

Facts: The General Counsel ofthe Laban ngDemokratikong Pilipino (LDP) informed the COMELEC by way of Manifestation that only the Party Chairman, Senator Edgardo J. Angara, or his authorized representative may endorse the certificate of candidacy of the partys official candidates. The same Manifestation stated that Sen. Angara had placed the LDP Secretary General, Representative Agapito A. Aquino, on "indefinite forced leave." In the meantime, Ambassador Enrique A. Zaldivar was designated Acting Secretary General. However, Rep. Aquino filed his comment, contending that the Party Chairman does not have the authority to impose disciplinary sanctions on the Secretary General. As the Manifestation filed by the LDP General Counsel has no basis, Rep. Aquino asked the COMELEC to disregard the same. Prior to the May 2004 elections, the Laban ngDemokratikong Pilipino (LDP) has been divided because of a struggle of authority between Party Chairman Edgardo Angara and Party Secretary General Agapito Aquino, both having endorsed two different sets of candidates under the same party, LDP. The matter was brought to the COMELEC. The Commission in its resolution has recognized the factions creating two sub-parties: LDP Angara Wing and LDP Aquino Wing. Issue: Whether or not the COMELEC committed a grave abuse of discretion in recognizing the two sets of nominations and endorsements by the same party. Held:

Yes. The COMELEC erred in its resolution. Only those Certificates of Candidacy (COC) signed by the LDP Party Chairman Angara or his duly authorized representative/s shall be recognized.

G.R. No. 147589 June 26, 2001 ANG BAGONG BAYANI vs. Comelec x---------------------------------------------------------x G.R. No. 147613 June 26, 2001

BAYAN MUNA vs. Comelec Facts Petitioners challenged the Comelecs Omnibus Resolution No. 3785, which approved the participation of 154 organizations and parties, including those herein impleaded, in the 2001 party-list elections. Petitioners sought the disqualification of private respondents, arguing mainly that the party-list system was intended to benefit the marginalized and underrepresented; not the mainstream political parties, the non-marginalized or overrepresented. Unsatisfied with the pace by which Comelec acted on their petition, petitioners elevated the issue to the Supreme Court. Issue: 1. Whether or not petitioners recourse to the Court was proper. 2. Whether or not political parties may participate in the party list elections. 3. Whether or not the Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion in promulgating Omnibus Resolution No. 3785. Ruling: 1. The Court may take cognizance of an issue notwithstanding the availability of other remedies "where the issue raised is one purely of law, where public interest is involved, and in case of urgency." The facts attendant to the case rendered it justiciable. 2. Political parties even the major ones -- may participate in the party-list elections subject to the requirements laid down in the Constitution and RA 7941, which is the statutory law pertinent to the Party List System. Under the Constitution and RA 7941, private respondents cannot be disqualified from the party-list elections, merely on the ground that they are political parties. Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution provides that members of the House of Representatives may "be elected through a party-list system of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations . It is however, incumbent upon the Comelec to determine proportional representation of the marginalized and underrepresented, the criteria for participation, in relation to the cause of the party list applicants so as to avoid desecration of the noble purpose of the party-list system. 3. The Court acknowledged that to determine the propriety of the inclusion of respondents in the Omnibus Resolution No. 3785, a study of the factual allegations was necessary which was beyond the pale of the Court. The Court not being a trier of facts. However, seeing that the Comelec failed to appreciate fully the clear policy of the law and the Constitution, the Court decided to set some guidelines culled from the law and the Constitution, to assist the Comelec in its work. The Court ordered that the petition be remanded in the Comelec to determine compliance by the party lists.

PERALTA VS COMELEC

FRIVALDO VS. COMELEC, digested Posted by Pius Morados on November 9, 2011 GR # 87193, June 23, 1989 (Constitutional Law Recovery of Citizenship) FACTS: Private respondent questioned petitioner governors candidacy and election for being null and void ab initio due to his alienage. Petitioner governor contends that his active participation in the elections had divested him of American citizenship under the laws of the US, and restored him of his Philippine citizenship. ISSUE: Whether or not the filing of a certificate of candidacy by a naturalized American effectively recovers his Philippine citizenship. HELD: No, Philippine citizenship previously disowned is not that cheaply recovered. Citizenship once lost may be reacquired either by naturalization or repatriation or by direct grant by law (CA 63) which was not invoked by the petitioner. LABO VS. COMELEC, digested Posted by Pius Morados on November 9, 2011 GR No. 86564, August 1, 1989 (Constitutional Law Loss of Citizenship) FACTS: Herein petitioner, claiming for recognition as a Philippine citizen is a mayor-elect who, through his marriage with an Australian national, was naturalized and took an oath of allegiance as an Australian citizen. Said marriage was found to be bigamous and therefore was annulled. Petitioner claims that his naturalization made him only a dual national and did not divest him of his Philippine citizenship. ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner was divested of his Philippine citizenship. HELD: Yes, because Commonwealth Act No. 63 clearly stated that Philippine citizenship may be lost through naturalization in a foreign country; express renunciation of citizenship; and by oath of allegiance to a foreign country, all of which are applicable to the petitioner. Caasi vs. Comelec Digest

FACTS: Mateo Caasi is seeking the disqualification of Merito Miguel as candidate for municipal mayor of Bolinao, Pangasinan on the ground that he (Miguel) is a green card holder, hence, a resident of the United States. Miguel admits possessing a green card but contends that he only uses it for convenience to freely enter US for his medical treatment and to visit his children. He also alleges that he voted in all previous elections, including the plebiscite on 2 February 1987 for the ratification of the 1987 Constitution, and the congressional elections on 18 May 1987. ISSUE: WON a green card is a proof that the holder is a US resident HELD: In Miguels Application for Immigrant Visa and Alien Registration" (Optional Form No. 230, Department of State) which he filled up in his own handwriting and submitted to the US Embassy in Manila before his departure for the United States in 1984, Miguel's answer to Question No. 21 therein regarding his "Length of intended stay (if permanently, so state)," Miguel's answer was, "Permanently." On the green card itself, it identifies Miguel as a Resident Alien. Miguels immigration to the United States in 1984 constituted an abandonment of his domicile and residence in the Philippines. To be qualified to run for elective office in the Philippines, the law requires that the candidate who is a green card holder must have waived his status as a permanent resident or immigrant of a foreign country. Also, Miguel only resided in Bolinao for 3 months after returning to the country which is in violation of the 1 year residency requirement. *Miguel is disqualified to run for mayor.

Dela Torre vs COMELEC [258 SCRA 485] Posted by Pius Morados on November 6, 2011 (Municipal Corporation, Disqualification of Local Elective Officials, Moral Turpitude) Facts: Section 40 (a) of Republic Act 7160 (Local Government Code of 1991) provides that a prior conviction of a crime becomes a ground for disqualification from running for any elective local position i.e. when the conviction is for an offense involving moral turpitude. Citing above as ground, the COMELEC in a resolution, declared petitioner disqualified from running for the position of Mayor of Cavinti, Laguna. COMELEC held that petitioner was

found guilty by the MTC for violation of the Anti-Fencing Law, an offense whose nature involves moral turpitude. Petitioner claimed that Section 40 (a) of the Local Government Code does not apply to his case inasmuch as the probation granted him by the MTC which suspended the execution of the judgment of conviction and all other legal consequences flowing therefrom, rendered inapplicable Section 40 (a) as well. However, he admits all the elements of the crime of fencing. Issue: WON the petitioner applicant is disqualified for the coming elections due to a crime involving moral turpitude. Held: Yes. Moral turpitude is defined as an act of baseness, vileness, or depravity in the private duties which a man owes his fellow men, or to society in general, contrary to the accepted and customary rule of right and duty between man and woman or conduct contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals. From the definition of fencing in Sec. 2 of PD 1612, an element of the crime of fencing may be gleaned that the accused knows or should have known that the said article, item, object or anything of value has been derived from the proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft. Moral turpitude is deducible from this. Actual knowledge by the fence of the fact that property received as stolen displays the same degree of malicious deprivation of ones rightful property as that which animated the robbery or theft which, by their very nature, are crimes of moral turpitude. And although the participation of each felon in the unlawful taking differs in point in time and in degree, both the fence and the actual perpetrator/s of the robbery or theft invaded ones peaceful dominion for gain thus deliberately reneging the process private duties they owe their fellowmen in a manner contrary to accepted and customary rule of right and duty, justice, honesty and good morals. Note: In determining whether a criminal act involves moral turpitude, the Court is guided by one of the general principle that crimes mala in se involve moral turpitude while crimes mala prohibita do not. However, SC admitted that it cannot always be ascertained whether moral turpitude does or does not exist by merely classifying as crime as mala in se or as mala prohibita. Whether or not a crime involves moral turpitude is ultimately a question of fact and frequently depends on all the circumstance

Grego vs COMELEC [274 SCRA 481] Posted by Pius Morados on November 6, 2011 (Municipal Government, Disqualification, Non-Retroactive effect)

Facts: Sec 40 (b) of Republic Act 7160 (the Local Government Code) which took effect on January 1, 1992, disqualifies a person for any elective position on the ground that had been removed from office as a result of an administrative case. On October 31, 1981, Basco was removed from his position as Deputy Sheriff upon a finding of serious misconduct in an administrative complaint. He ran as a candidate for Councilor, won and assumed office for three terms during the Elections of January 18, 1988; May 11, 1992 and May 8, 1995. As in the past, respondents right to office was contested. On May 13, 1995, petitioner, seeks for the respondents disqualification, pursuant to the above provision, contending that as long as a candidate was once removed from office due to an administrative case, regardless of whether it took place during or prior to the effectivity of the Code, the disqualification applies. Respondent contends that the petitioner is not entitled to said relief because Section 40 par. b of the LGC may not be validly applied to persons who were dismissed prior to its effectivity. To do so would make it ex post facto, bill of attainder, and retroactive legislation which impairs vested rights Issue: WON Section 40 (b) of Republic Act No. 7160 applies retroactively to those removed from office before it took effect on January 1, 1992. Held: No. It is a settled issue that Section 40 (b) of Republic Act No. 7160 does not have any retroactive effect. Laws operate only prospectively and not retroactively. A statute, despite the generality in its language, must not be so construed as to overreach acts, events or matters which transpired before its passage: Lex prospicit, non respicit. The law looks forward, not backward.

Reyes v. COMELEC, June 25, 2013, G.R. No. 207264 (Jurisdiction of the COMELEC v. HRET) According to petitioner, the COMELEC was ousted of its jurisdiction when she was duly proclaimed because pursuant to Section 17, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution, the HRET has the exclusive jurisdiction to be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the Members of the House of Representatives. Contrary to petitioners claim, however, the COMELEC retains jurisdiction for the following reasons:

First, the HRET does not acquire jurisdiction over the issue of petitioners qualifications, as well as over the assailed COMELEC Resolutions, unless a petition is duly filed with said tribunal. Petitioner has not averred that she has filed such action. Second, the jurisdiction of the HRET begins only after the candidate is considered a Member of the House of Representatives, as stated in Section 17, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution: Section 17. The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an Electoral Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of their respective Members. x x x As held in Marcos v. COMELEC, the HRET does not have jurisdiction over a candidate who is not a member of the House of Representatives, to wit: As to the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunals supposed assumption of jurisdiction over the issue of petitioners qualifications after the May 8, 1995 elections, suffice it to say that HRETs jurisdiction as the sole judge of all contests relating to the elections, returns and qualifications of members of Congress begins only after a candidate has become a member of the House of Representatives. Petitioner not being a member of the House of Representatives, it is obvious that the HRET at this point has no jurisdiction over the question. (Emphasis supplied.) The next inquiry, then, is when is a candidate considered a Member of the House of Representatives? In Vinzons-Chato v. COMELEC, citing Aggabao v. COMELEC and Guerrero v. COMELEC, the Court ruled that: The Court has invariably held that once a winning candidate has been proclaimed, taken his oath, and assumed office as a Member of the House of Representatives, the COMELECs jurisdiction over election contests relating to his election, returns, and qualifications ends, and the HRETs own jurisdiction begins. (Emphasis supplied.) This pronouncement was reiterated in the case of Limkaichong v. COMELEC, wherein the Court, referring to the jurisdiction of the COMELEC vis-a-vis the HRET, held that: The Court has invariably held that once a winning candidate has been proclaimed, taken his oath, and assumed office as a Member of the House of Representatives, the COMELEC's jurisdiction over election contests relating to his election, returns, and qualifications ends, and the HRET's own jurisdiction begins. (Emphasis supplied.) This was again affirmed in Gonzalez v. COMELEC, to wit: After proclamation, taking of oath and assumption of office by Gonzalez, jurisdiction over the matter of his qualifications, as well as questions regarding the conduct of election and contested returns were transferred to the HRET as the constitutional body created to

pass upon the same. (Emphasis supplied.) From the foregoing, it is then clear that to be considered a Member of the House of Representatives, there must be a concurrence of the following requisites: (1) a valid proclamation, (2) a proper oath, and (3) assumption of office. Indeed, in some cases, this Court has made the pronouncement that once a proclamation has been made, COMELECs jurisdiction is already lost and, thus, its jurisdiction over contests relating to elections, returns, and qualifications ends, and the HRETs own jurisdiction begins. However, it must be noted that in these cases, the doctrinal pronouncement was made in the context of a proclaimed candidate who had not only taken an oath of office, but who had also assumed office. For instance, in the case of Dimaporo v. COMELEC, the Court upheld the jurisdiction of the HRET against that of the COMELEC only after the candidate had been proclaimed, taken his oath of office before the Speaker of the House, and assumed the duties of a Congressman on 26 September 2007, or after the start of his term on 30 June 2007, to wit: On October 8, 2007, private respondent Belmonte filed his comment in which he brought to Our attention that on September 26, 2007, even before the issuance of the status quo ante order of the Court, he had already been proclaimed by the PBOC as the duly elected Member of the House of Representatives of the First Congressional District of Lanao del Norte. On that very same day, he had taken his oath before Speaker of the House Jose de Venecia, Jr. and assumed his duties accordingly. In light of this development, jurisdiction over this case has already been transferred to the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET). (Emphasis supplied.) Apparently, the earlier cases were decided after the questioned candidate had already assumed office, and hence, was already considered a Member of the House of Representatives, unlike in the present case. Here, the petitioner cannot be considered a Member of the House of Representatives because, primarily, she has not yet assumed office. To repeat what has earlier been said, the term of office of a Member of the House of Representatives begins only at noon on the thirtieth day of June next following their election. Thus, until such time, the COMELEC retains jurisdiction.

MERCADO VS.MANZANO, digested Posted by Pius Morados on November 9, 2011 307 SCRA 631, May 26, 1999 (Constitutional Law Dual Citizenship, Dual Allegiance) FACTS: In the case at bar, petitioner was seeking the disqualification of respondent to hold elective office on the ground that he is a dual citizen, having been born in the United States

of Filipino parents. Pursuant to Local Government Code of 1991 (RA 7160), those with dual citizenship are disqualified from running any elective local position. ISSUE: Whether or not dual citizenship is a ground for disqualification. HELD: No, because dual citizenship is different from dual allegiance. What is inimical is not dual citizenship per se, but with naturalized citizens who maintain their allegiance to their countries of origin even after their naturalization. Hence, the phrase dual citizenship in RA 7160 must be understood as referring to dual allegiance. Consequently, persons with mere dual citizenship do not fall under this disqualification.

Mar 31, 2009 Valles vs. COMELEC G.R. No. 137000, Aug. 9, 2000

Principle of jus sanguinis How Philippine citizenship is acquired Effect of filing certificate of candidacy: express renunciation of other citizenship

FACTS: Rosalind Ybasco Lopez was born on May 16, 1934 in Australia to a Filipino father and an Australian mother. In 1949, at the age of fifteen, she left Australia and came to settle in the Philippines, where she later married a Filipino and has since then participated in the electoral process not only as a voter but as a candidate, as well. In the May 1998 elections, she ran for governor but Valles filed a petition for her disqualification as candidate on the ground that she is an Australian. ISSUE:

Whether or not Rosalind is an Australian or a Filipino

HELD:

The Philippine law on citizenship adheres to the principle of jus sanguinis. Thereunder, a child follows the nationality or citizenship of the parents regardless of the place of his/her birth, as opposed to the doctrine of jus soli which determines nationality or citizenship on the basis of place of birth. Rosalind Ybasco Lopez was born a year before the 1935 Constitution took into effect and at that time, what served as the Constitution of the Philippines were the principal organic acts by which the United States governed the country. These were the Philippine Bill of July 1, 1902 and the Philippine Autonomy Act of Aug. 29, 1916, also known as the Jones Law. Under both organic acts, all inhabitants of the Philippines who were Spanish subjects on April 11, 1899 and resided therein including their children are deemed to be Philippine citizens. Private respondents father, Telesforo Ybasco, was born on Jan. 5, 1879 in Daet, Camarines Norte.... Thus, under the Philippine Bill of 1902 and the Jones Law, Telesforo Ybasco was deemed to be a Philippine citizen. By virtue of the same laws, which were the laws in force at the time of her birth, Telesforos daughter, herein private respondent Rosalind Ybasco Lopez, is likewise a citizen of the Philippines. The signing into law of the 1935 Philippine Constitution has established the principle of jus sanguinis as basis for the acquisition of Philippine citizenship, xxx So also, the principle of jus sanguinis, which confers citizenship by virtue of blood relationship, was subsequently retained under the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions. Thus, the herein private respondent, Rosalind Ybasco Lopez, is a Filipino citizen, having been born to a Filipino father. The fact of her being born in Australia is not tantamount to her losing her Philippine citizenship. If Australia follows the principle of jus soli, then at most, private respondent can also claim Australian citizenship resulting to her possession of dual citizenship. Marquez vs Comelec Post under Disqualification from office , Fugitive from justice , Political Law Case Digests

Facts:

Bienvenido Marquez and Eduardo Rodriguez were candidates for Governor of the province of Quezon in 1992. Rodriguez won, and this prompted Marquez to file a quo warranto proceedings against Marquez for being disqualified as a candidate because he is a fugitive from justice which is against Sec. 40 (e) of the Local Government Code.

Sec. 40. Disqualifications. The following persons are disqualified from running for any elective local position: xxx (e) Fugitive from justice in criminal or non-political cases here or abroad

Allegedly, at the time Rodriguez filed his certificate of candidacy, a criminal charge against him for 10 counts of insurance fraud or grand theft of personal property was still pending before the Municipal Court of Los Angeles, USA. A warrant was issued for his arrest, but which remained unserved because he already went to the Philippines then.

Marquez argued that Section 40(e) of RA 7160 is rather clear. "Fugitive from justice" includes not only those who flee after conviction to avoid punishment but likewise those who, after being charged flee to avoid prosecution.

Rodriguez, on the other hand, cites the Congressional Oversight Committee who drafted the IRR for the Local Government Code. In the deliberations, it could be seen that there was confusion as to the implications of defining what a fugitive from justice really is. There was a pronouncement from the Chairman that fugitive means somebody who is convicted by final judgment, and this was adapted verbatim in Art. 73 of the IRR.

Issue:

What is the definition of fugitive from justice that should be followed?

Held:

"Fugitive from justice" includes not only those who flee after conviction to avoid punishment but likewise those who, after being charged flee to avoid prosecution. This definition truly finds support from jurisprudence and it may be so conceded as expressing the general and ordinary connotation of the term.

Article 73 of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Local Government Code of 1991, to the extent that it confines the term "fugitive from justice" to refer only to a person (the fugitive) "who has been convicted by final judgment" is an inordinate and undue circumscription of the law.

Private respondent reminds us that the construction placed upon law by the officials in charge of its enforcement deserves great and considerable weight. The Court certainly agrees; however, when there clearly is no obscurity and ambiguity in an enabling law, it must merely be made to apply as it is so written. An administrative rule or regulation can neither expand nor constrict the law but must remain congruent to it.

There was no clear ruling on the instance of Rodriguez because Comelec never made a determination as to his status as a fugitive from justice. Case was remanded to Comelec. (G.R. No. 112889, April 18, 1995)

Rodriguez vs. Comelec Post under Disqualification from office , Election law , Fugitive from justice , Political Law Case Digests

Facts:

In 1992, petitioner Rodriguez and respondent Marquez ran for Governor of Quezon Province. Rodriguez won. Marquez challenged Rodriguez victory via a Quo Warranto on the ground that there is a charge pending against him at the Los Angeles Municipal Court for fraudulent insurance claims, grand theft, etc. Thus, he is a fugitive from justice.

COMELEC dismissed the case. Upon certiorari to the Supreme Court, it was held that: Fugitive from justice includes not only those who flee after conviction to avoid punishment, but also those who after being charged, flee to avoid prosecution. The case was remanded to the COMELEC to determine WON Rodriguez is a fugitive from justice.

In 1995, Rodriguez and Marquez again ran for Governor. Marquez filed a Petition for Disqualification against Rodriquez on the same ground that he is a fugitive from justice. COMELEC then consolidated both cases and found Rodriguez guilty based on the authenticated copy of the warrant of arrest at LA Court and of the felony complaint.

Rodriguez won again, and despite a Motion to suspend his proclamation, the Provincial Board of Canvassers proclaimed him.

Upon motion of Marquez, the COMELEC nullified the proclamation. Rodriguez filed a petition for certiorari.

Issue:

Is Rodriguez a fugitive from justice as defined by the Court in the MARQUEZ Decision?

Held:

No. A fugitive from justice is defined as not only those who flee after conviction to avoid punishment but likewise who, after being charged, flee to avoid prosecution. This indicates that the intent to evade is the compelling factor that makes a person leave a particular jurisdiction, and there can only be intent to evade prosecution or punishment when the fleeing person knows of an already instituted indictment, or of a promulgated judgment of conviction. Intent to evade on the part of a candidate must therefore be established by proof that there has already been a conviction or at least, a charge has already been filed, at the time of flight. This cannot be applied in the case of Rodriguez. Rodriguez arrived in the Philippines on June 25, 1985, five months before the filing of the felony complaint in the Los Angeles Court on November 12, 1985 and of the issuance of the arrest warrant by that same foreign court. It was clearly impossible for Rodriguez to have known about such felony complaint and arrest warrant at the time he left the US, as there was in fact no complaint and arrest warrant much less conviction to speak of yet at such time.

Not being a "fugitive from justice" under this definition, Rodriguez cannot be denied the Quezon Province gubernatorial post. (G.R. No. 120099. July 24, 1996)

EN BANC [G.R. No. 148075. February 4, 2002] PANGKAT LAGUNA, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and TERESITA NINGNING LAZARO, respondents. DECISION BUENA, J.: In this specie of controversy which involves, to a large extent, the determination of the true will of the electorate and, which by its very nature, touches upon the ascertainment of the peoples choice as gleaned from the hallowed medium of the ballot, this Court finds cogency to reiterate at the outset that the factual findings and determinations of the Commission on Elections

(COMELEC) ought to be accorded great weight and finality, in the absence of any remarkable trace of grave abuse of discretion in the exercise of its constitutionally mandated tasks. Sought to be reversed in this special civil action for certiorari is the Resolutioni[1] of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) en banc in S.P.A. 01-218 promulgated on 24 May 2001, which set aside the Resolutionii[2] of the COMELEC Second Division dated 11 May 2001, ordering the disqualification of herein private respondent Teresita Ningning Lazaro as candidate for Governor of the Province of Laguna in the 14 May 2001 Elections. The antecedents unfold. On 30 January 2001, respondent Lazaro, who was then Vice Governor of Laguna, assumed by succession the office of the Governor, when then Laguna Governor Jose D. Lina, Jr. was appointed Secretary of Interior and Local Government by President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo. On 28 February 2001, respondent Lazaro filed her certificate of candidacyiii[3] for the gubernatorial position of Laguna. On 04 May 2001, herein petitioner Pangkat Laguna, a duly registered political party, filed with the COMELEC a petitioniv[4] which sought to disqualify respondent Lazaro as candidate in the gubernatorial race. Docketed as SPA No. 01-218, the disqualification petition alleged in the main that respondent Lazaro committed acts violative of Section 80 (Election campaign or partisan political activity outside the campaign period) and Section 261(v) (Prohibition against release, disbursement or expenditure of public funds) of the Omnibus Election Code. In its petition for disqualification, petitioner Pangkat Laguna specifically alleged that private respondent Lazaro, upon assuming by succession the Office of the Governor on 30 January 2001, publicly declared her intention to run for governor in the May 2001 elections. Thus, according to petitioner, respondent Lazaro on 07 February 2001, ordered the purchase of 14,513 items such as trophies, basketballs, volleyballs, chessboard sets, and t-shirts, allegedly worth Four Million Five Hundred Fifty Six Thousand and Five Pesos (P4,556,005.00) serving no public purpose but to promote her popularity as a candidate.v[5] In addition, petitioner alleged that on 08 February 2001, respondent directed the purchase and distribution of 1,760 medals and pins valued at One Hundred Ten Thousand Pesos (P110,000.00) to various schools in Laguna, serving no meaningful public purpose but to again promote her forthcoming candidacy.vi[6] According to petitioner, the abovementioned acts, in effect, constituted premature campaigning inasmuch as the same were done prior to the start of the campaign period on 30 March 2001. Petitioner adds that these acts constitute a ground for disqualification under Section 68, in relation to Section 80 of the Omnibus Election Code. Moreover, petitioner argues that respondent Lazaro violated Section 261 (v) of the Omnibus Election Code, as implemented by COMELEC Resolution No. 3479, when the latter caused the bidding of seventy nine (79) public works projects on 28 March 2001. On 08 May 2001, respondent Lazaro filed an answer denying the allegations in the petition for disqualification. In a Resolution dated 11 May 2001, the COMELEC Second Division granted

the petition to disqualify respondent as candidate for the gubernatorial post of Laguna, prompting respondent Lazaro to file a motion for reconsideration before the COMELEC en banc. On May 17, 2001, petitioner filed a Motion to Suspend Proclamation Under Sec. 6, R.A. 6646.vii[7] On 19 May 2001, the Provincial Board of Canvassers proclaimed respondent Lazaro as the duly elected Governor of Laguna in the 14 May 2001 Elections. On 22 May 2001, petitioner Pangkat Laguna filed a Motion to Annul Proclamation and/or to Suspend Effect of Proclamation under Sec. 6, R.A. 6646.viii[8] On 24 May 2001, the COMELEC en banc promulgated a resolution, the dispositive portion of which declares: WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Motion for Reconsideration filed by respondent Lazaro is hereby granted. The resolution issued by the Second Division dated 11 May 2001 is hereby correspondingly REVERSED AND SET ASIDE. SO ORDERED. Through the expediency of Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, petitioner now assails the Resolution of the COMELEC en banc dated 24 May 2001, for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. The petition is devoid of merit. Doctrinally entrenched is the rule that in a petition for certiorari, findings of fact of administrative bodies, such as respondent COMELEC in the instant case, are final unless grave abuse of discretion has marred such factual determinations.ix[9] Stated differently, factual findings of the COMELEC based on its own assessments and duly supported by evidence, are conclusive upon the Court, more so, in the absence of a substantiated attack on the validity of the same. The COMELEC, as the government agency tasked with the enforcement and administration of election laws, is entitled to the presumption of regularity of official acts with respect to the elections.x[10] First, as to the issue of premature campaigning, this Court holds that respondent Lazaro was not guilty of violating the provisions of Section 80 of the Omnibus Election Code, to wit: SEC. 80. Election campaign or partisan political activity outside campaign period. It shall be unlawful for any person, whether or not a voter or candidate, or for any party, or association of persons, to engage in an election campaign or partisan political activity except during the campaign period: Provided, that political parties may hold political conventions or meetings to nominate their official candidates within thirty days before the commencement of the campaign period and forty-five days for Presidential and Vice-Presidential election.

On this score, it bears stressing that the act of respondent Lazaro as Chief Executive of the Province of Laguna in ordering the purchase of various items and the consequent distribution thereof to the constituents of Laguna, in line with the local government units sports and education program, is to our mind not constitutive of the act of election campaigning or partisan political activity contemplated and explicitly proscribed under the pertinent provisions of Section 80 of the Omnibus Election Code. To this end, we quote with affirmance respondent COMELECs observation on the matter: Not every act of beneficence from a candidate may be considered campaigning. The term campaigning should not be made to apply to any and every act which may influence a person to vote for a candidate, for that would be stretching too far the meaning of the term. Examining the definition and enumeration of election campaign and partisan political activity found in COMELEC Resolution 3636, the Commission is convinced that only those acts which are primarily designed to solicit votes will be covered by the definition and enumeration. In this present case, the respondent was not in any way directly (or) indirectly soliciting votes. Respondent Lazaro was merely performing the duties and tasks imposed upon her by law, which duties she has sworn to perform as the Governor of the Province of Laguna. Respondent has satisfactorily shown the regularity of the implementation of the questioned sports and education programs. The number of items purchased and the amount involved were within the regular purchases of the provincial government. How the funds were sourced and how the program was implemented, as correctly pointed out by respondent, (are) not for us to resolve for such issue is way beyond our constitutionally mandated jurisdiction.xi[11] (Emphasis ours). In Lozano vs. Yorac,xii[12] this Court in upholding the findings of the COMELEC negating the charge of vote-buying, in effect, affirmed the dismissal of the petition for disqualification filed against Makati mayoralty candidate Jejomar Binay, thus: We uphold the foregoing factual findings, as well as the conclusions reached by respondent COMELEC, in dismissing the petition for the disqualification of respondent Binay. No clear and convincing proof exists to show that respondent Binay was indeed engaged in vote buying. The traditional gift-giving of the Municipality of Makati during the Christmas Season is not refuted. That it was implemented by respondent Binay as OIC Mayor of Makati at that time does not sufficiently establish that respondent was trying to influence and induce his constituents to vote for him. This would be stretching the interpretation of the law too far. Petitioner deduces from this act of gift-giving that respondent was buying the votes of the Makati residents. It requires more than a mere tenuous deduction to prove the offense of vote buying. There has to be concrete and direct evidence, or, at least, strong circumstantial evidence to support the charge that respondent was indeed engaged in votebuying. We are convinced that the evidence presented, as well as the facts obtaining in the case at bar, do not warrant such finding. (Emphasis ours.)

Notably, upon a close perusal of the entirety of circumstances attendant in the instant case, this Court is of the firm view that herein petitioner failed to establish by clear and convincing evidence that the questioned purchase and distribution of the aforesaid items were, in any significant way, perpetrated for the purpose of promoting the candidacy of respondent Lazaro or were, in any manner, calculated to directly or indirectly solicit votes on behalf or in favor of respondent. Similarly, the records are bereft of any clear and convincing proof that the purchase and distribution of the items were deliberately or consciously done to influence and induce the constituents of Laguna to vote for respondent, in direct violation of the provisions of the Omnibus Election Code. To us, respondents acts do not fall within, and are not contemplated by, the prohibition embodied in Section 80 of the Code so as to effectively disqualify her from the elections and bar her from holding office. Second, as to the charge of violation of the 45-Day Public Works Ban,xiii[13] petitioner asserts that respondent Lazaro transgressed the provisions of Section 261 (v) of the Omnibus Election Code, as implemented by COMELEC Resolution No. 3479, when the latter caused or directed the bidding of 79 public works projects on 28 March 2001. We do not agree. Section 261 (v) of the Omnibus Election Code is explicit: Sec. 261. Prohibited Acts. The following shall be guilty of an election offense: x x x (v) Prohibition against release, disbursement or expenditure of public funds. Any public official or employee including barangay officials and those of government-owned or controlled corporations and their subsidiaries, who, during forty-five days before a regular election and thirty days before a special election, releases, disburses or expends any public funds for: (1) Any and all kinds of public works, except the following: x x x (b) Work undertaken by contract through public bidding held, or by negotiated contract awarded, before the forty-five day period before election: Provided, that work for the purpose of this section undertaken under the so-called takay or paquiao system shall not be considered as work by contract; x x x. Beyond this, evidence is wanting to sufficiently establish and substantiate petitioners bare allegation that in furtherance of the public bidding conducted on 28 March 2001 public funds were ever released, disbursed or expended during the 45-day prohibitive period provided under the law and the implementing rules. Absent such clear and convincing proof, we find no cogent reason to disturb the factual findings and conclusions of respondent COMELEC the constitutional body tasked by no less than the fundamental law to decide, except those involving the right to vote, all questions affecting elections.xiv[14]

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant petition is DENIED. ACCORDINGLY, the Resolution of the Commission on Elections en banc dated 24 May 2001 is hereby AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED. Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Pardo, Ynares-Santiago, De Leon, Jr., Sandoval-Gutierrez, and Carpio, JJ., concur.

i[1]

Rollo, pp. 81-87. Ibid., pp. 32-35. Rollo, p. 99. Annex F; Rollo, pp. 88-98. Records, p. 4. Ibid., p. 5. Annex C, Rollo, pp. 71-75. Annex D, Rollo, pp. 76-80.

ii[2]

iii[3]

iv[4]

v[5]

vi[6]

vii[7]

viii[8]

ix[9]

Rivera vs. Commission on Elections, 199 SCRA 178 (1991). Mohammad vs. Commission on Elections, 320 SCRA 258 ( 1999). Rollo, pp. 83-84. 203 SCRA 256 (1991).

x[10]

xi[11]

xii[12]

Under Section 261 (v) [Prohibited Acts] of the Omnibus Election Code, as implemented by COMELEC Resolution No. 3479.
xiii[13] xiv[14]

Article IX-C, Section 2 par. (3) of the Constitution.

PNOC EDC vs NLRC

Posted on March 14, 2013

FACT: PNOC-Energy Development Corporation, to augment its need for manpower hired persons on varying dates and for varying purposes. The earliest person who was contracted for the purpose was Roberto Renzal, as a pipe fitter, in January 1995, and like the others concerned, his contract was renewed or extended every time his contract expires. Later, PNOC-EDC informed DOLE, Regional Sub-branch No. VII in Dumaguete City, that 6 of its employees will be terminated. Subsequently, Roberto Renzal and 5 others were furnished with letters stating that their employment will be terminated on June 1998. Renzal, et. al., filed a complaint for illegal dismissal with the NLRC against PNOC. The Labor Arbiter found the group of Renzals, claim to lack merit, hence their termination legal on the ground that they were dismissed because their contract with PNOC expired. The NLRC, upon Renzals appeal, adjudged contrary to the decision of the Labor Arbiter stating among others that Renzal and the others were regular non-project employees for having worked for more than one year in positions that required them to perform activities necessary and desirable in the normal business or trade of petitioner. The CA affirmed the NLRCs decision. ISSUES:
1. Whether or not Renzal, et.al., were project employees or regular employees. 2. Whether or not they were illegally dismissed from employment.

HELD:
1. Renzal, et.al, are Regular Employees. 2. Yes, Renzal, et.al, being Regular Employees are entitled to security of tenure, were unjustly dismissed from work.

RATIO: 1. PNOCs act of repeatedly and continuously hiring respondents to do the same kind of work belies its contention that respondents were hired for a specific project or undertaking. The absence of a definite duration for the project/s has led the Court to conclude that Renzal, et.al, are, in fact, regular employees.

2. In termination cases, it is incumbent upon the employer to prove by the quantum of evidence required by law that the dismissal of an employee is not illegal; otherwise the dismissal would be unjustified. In the case at bar, PNOC failed to discharge the burden. The notices of termination indicated that PNOC services were terminated due to the completion of the project. However, this allegation is contrary to the statement of petitioner in some of its pleadings that the project was merely substantially completed. There is likewise no proof that the project, or the phase of work to which respondents had been assigned, was already completed at the time of their dismissal.