For Arguments Sake

For Arguments Sake: Speaker Evaluation in Modern Political Discourse

By

Douglas Mark Ponton

For Arguments Sake: Speaker Evaluation in Modern Political Discourse, by Douglas Mark Ponton This book first published 2011 Cambridge Scholars Publishing 12 Back Chapman Street, Newcastle upon Tyne, NE6 2XX, UK

British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library

Copyright 2011 by Douglas Mark Ponton All rights for this book reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without the prior permission of the copyright owner. ISBN (10): 1-4438-2937-4, ISBN (13): 978-1-4438-2937-3

Teach me the Grecian arts of soft persuasion Samuel Johnson

TABLE OF CONTENTS

FOREWORD .................................................................................................. XI PART I: SPEAKER EVALUATION IN POLITICAL RHETORIC CHAPTER ONE .............................................................................................. 3 INTRODUCTION 1. Introduction: Persuasive Political Rhetoric 1.i. Introduction (ii): the power of the word 1.ii. Persuasion that and persuasion to: epistemic and deontic modality 1.iii.The speech act of persuasion 1.iv. A traditional perspective on persuasion: ethos, pathos and logos 1.v. Context of Situation CHAPTER TWO ........................................................................................... 15 SPEAKER EVALUATION IN EVERYDAY INTERACTION 2.i. Evaluation in You-tube communities and blogs 2.ii. Margaret Thatcher on You-tube 2.iii. The political blog: Iain Dales Diary 2.iv. A basic distinction in evaluative language: Social Esteem vs. Social Sanction CHAPTER THREE ........................................................................................ 27 THE APPRAISAL FRAMEWORK 3.i. Affect: the emotional realm 3.i.i. un/happiness 3.i.ii. in/security 3.i.iii. dis/satisfaction 3.ii. Judgement: behavioural norms 3.iii. Appreciation CHAPTER FOUR .......................................................................................... 37 APPROACHES TO THE ANALYSIS OF POLITICAL RHETORIC 4.i. Logos: logical argument in political speeches; the Toulmin model 4.ii. The role of speaker evaluation in argumentation

VIII

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PART II: BLACK AND WHITE: MODERN POLITICAL RHETORIC CHAPTER FIVE ............................................................................................ 47 MALCOLM X: THE BLACK REVOLUTION (NEW YORK, JUNE 1963) 5.i. Context: 1960s America 5.ii. Context: Malcolm X 5.iii. The Black Revolution 5.iii.i. Structure of the speech 5.iv. Argumentation 5.v. Data 5.vi. Claim 5.vii.Warrant 5.viii. Backing 5.ix. Conclusion: Evaluation in argumentation CHAPTER SIX.............................................................................................. 67 THE DREAMER OF INTEGRATION: MARTIN LUTHER KING, I HAVE A DREAM: WASHINGTON, AUGUST 28TH, 1963 6.i. Context: Martin Luther King 6.ii. Introduction: I have a dream 6.iii. I have a dream: metaphor 6.iv. I have a dream: sections 6.iv.i. Part One: cashing a check 6.iv.ii. Part two: the necessity for non-violence 6.iv.iii. Part three: I have a dream today 6.iv.iv. Let freedom ring 6.v. Argumentative structure 6.v.i. Data 6.v.ii. Claim 6.v.iii. Warrant 6.v.iv. Backing 6.vi. Conclusions CHAPTER SEVEN ........................................................................................ 87 BARACK OBAMA: CAN WE BELIEVE IN CHANGE? ON ENERGY AND ENVIRONMENT, JAN. 2009 7.i. Context 7.ii. Barack Hussein Obama 7.iii. Introduction: A break with the past 7.iv. Speaker Evaluation in the energy speech 7.v. Sections of the speech

FOR ARGUMENTS SAKE

IX

7.v.i. Setting the context (1 13) 7.v.ii. Section two: the importance of the energy question (14 52) 7.v.iii. The American Recovery and Reinvestment Plan (53-85) 7.v.iv. Action on greenhouse gases (86 107) 7.v.v. Americas global role (108-127) 7.vi. Energy and the Environment: Argumentation 7.vii. Conclusion CHAPTER EIGHT ....................................................................................... 107 WINSTON CHURCHILL: THE UNHEEDED WARNINGS. THE LOSS OF AIR PARITY, HOUSE OF COMMONS MAY 2ND, 1935 8.i. Context: Winston Churchill 8.i.i. Context: Churchill in the 30s 8.ii. Framing in the speech 8.iii. Sections of the speech 8.iii.i. Section One: lines 1 74 8.iii.ii. Section two: lines 75 to 239 8.iii.iii. Section three: Churchills proposals, lines 240-298 8.iv. Argumentation and evaluation 8.v. Conclusion CHAPTER NINE ......................................................................................... 127 TONY BENN: A GRAVE BREACH OF THE CONSTITUTION (LONDON, MARCH 1972) 9.i. Context: Britain and the Common Market 9.i.i. Context: Tony Benn 9.ii. Sections of the speech analysed 9.ii.i. Section One: Heaths unconstitutional behaviour (1 25) 9.ii.ii. Section Two: Negative consequences of Britains membership (26 40) 9.ii.iii. Section 3: Reflections on parliament and society (41 91) 9.ii.iv. Section 4: final peroration (92-119) 9.iii. Benn on Europe: Argumentation 9.iv. Conclusion CHAPTER TEN .......................................................................................... 145 WILLIAM HAGUE: DEBATE ON THE LISBON TREATY (LONDON, JAN 2008) 10.i. Context: William Hague 10.i.i.Context: The Lisbon Treaty 10.ii. Introduction 10.iii. Section One: the purpose of the treaty (1-24)

TABLE OF CONTENTS

10.iii.i. Section two: Tony Blair as President of European Council? (25-50) 10.iii.ii. Section Three: ineffectiveness of limitations (51-74) 10.iii.iii. Section four: the need for a referendum (56-69) 10.iv. Argumentation 10.v. Discussion CHAPTER ELEVEN .................................................................................... 159 CONCLUSIONS 11.i. Negative Judgements 11.ii. Rhetorical genre 11.iii. Speaker evaluation in Argumentation 11.iv. Other issues 11.v. Finally APPENDIX A ............................................................................................. 171 MALCOLM X: THE BLACK REVOLUTION, NEW YORK CITY, JUNE 19 1963 APPENDIX B ............................................................................................. 177 MARTIN LUTHER KING, I HAVE A DREAM: LINCOLN MEMORIAL, WASHINGTON, AUGUST 28, 1963 APPENDIX C ............................................................................................. 181 OBAMAS SPEECH ON ENERGY AND ENVIRONMENT, THE WHITE HOUSE, WASHINGTON, JANUARY 26, 2009 APPENDIX D ............................................................................................. 185 WINSTON CHURCHILL, THE LOSS OF AIR PARITY, LONDON, HOUSE OF COMMONS, MAY 2, 1935 APPENDIX E ............................................................................................. 193 TONY BENN, A GRAVE BREACH OF THE CONSTITUTION, CHRISTIAN SOCIALIST MOVEMENT, LONDON 17 MARCH 1972 APPENDIX F.............................................................................................. 197 WILLIAM HAGUE ON THE LISBON TREATY, LONDON, HOUSE OF COMMONS 21 JANUARY 2008 NOTES .................................................................................................... 201 BIBLIOGRAPHY ......................................................................................... 205

FOREWORD

The topic of this book is persuasive rhetoric in political discourse. It asks a familiar, though as yet only partially answered question how is it that human beings can be persuaded to do things through language? We may be certain that language is involved somehow in the process of persuasion, but unclear as to the precise mechanisms involved. Why do we find certain speakers, certain arguments convincing, while we reject others almost without a second thought? Is there any connection between the substance of an argument and its persuasive force; or do we acquiesce to propositions on largely subconscious grounds, influenced by factors such as the physical attractiveness of the speaker, the indefinable air of authority they exude, or because of their mastery of some rhetorical tricks? I began exploring questions like these while doing my phd; this book suggests one possible answer. It is clearly the case that politicians formulate their propositions in the form of an argument; equally, one cannot listen to a politician or anyone using persuasive rhetoric (a salesman, a Jehovahs witness, a personal trainer, etc.) for very long before coming across examples of evaluative language. The book, then, sets out to argue the case that these two features are closely involved in the persuasiveness of an argument. Naturally, this is not to claim that other factors are not involved in such a complex business. However, it is my hope that the work undertaken here will be able to make a contribution to an eventual understanding of such important questions. Modica 10th February 2011

PART I: SPEAKER EVALUATION IN POLITICAL RHETORIC

CHAPTER ONE INTRODUCTION

1. Introduction: persuasive political rhetoric

Discourse analysts offer a variety of approaches to accounting for the persuasive effects of political rhetoric. Halmari and Virtanen (2005: 19), for example, emphasise the Aristotelian factors ethos, pathos and logos. The role of evidentiality, in the form of numerical data, is also emphasised. In an important study Atkinson (1984) examines components of spellbinding oratory, identifying specific persuasive techniques; some linguistic, such as the use of tri and di-colons, and some non-linguistic, like the ability to do without a script and make eye contact with the audience. Political discourse has also received attention from critical discourse analysts, who attempt to account for underhand persuasive techniques used by politicians what Chilton (2004: 17) terms Machiavellian communication. Important studies in this field are those of Chilton (2004), Fairclough (2000), Chilton and Schffner (1997), Wilson (1990) and Sauer (2002). Other analysts use the analytical tools of the rhetorical tradition itself Charteris-Black (2005) provides a comprehensive study of the role of metaphor in political discourse, while Gill and Whedbee (1997) compare rhetorical criticism with discourse analysis as tools for text analysis. My answer to these ambitious questions follows a discourse semantics approach, in the footsteps of Martin and White, who have demonstrated the application of their theories to political rhetoric (e.g. 2005: 171-209). Evaluative language, I suggest, plays a crucial role in attempts to persuade listeners. This is not, of course, to suggest that other factors are not involved as well. I am certainly not trying, in this work, to supplant other approaches, or to offer a comprehensive answer to the question. I simply wish to explore the role of evaluative language in political persuasion, advancing the thesis that the construction of speaker stance, connected with argumentation, does indeed go some way to accounting for the persuasive force of political rhetoric. In the first part of the book I explore issues relating to the methodology used; the second part is taken up by actual analyses carried out on six

CHAPTER ONE

speeches by modern rhetors celebrated for their oratorical skills: Malcolm X, Martin Luther King, Barack Obama, Winston Churchill, Tony Benn and William Hague. Three black, American speakers are discussed before three white, British ones. The study, then, also explores historical themes, pitting the great civil rights speakers King and Malcolm X against one of Britains greatest ever orators, Winston Churchill. There are thematic parallels, too, between Malcolm Xs contention that black Americans should separate entirely from white America and Tony Benns opposition to the project of further European integration, a topic picked up by William Hague. I have tried to select speakers, and speeches, of great intrinsic interest as well as historical importance, though my main criterion has been the suitability of the speech for analysis in the terms of the study.

1.i. Introduction (ii): the power of the word

Rhetorical studies date back at least as far as the ancient Greeks. Aristotle drew attention to the close link between this verbal art and persuasiveness:
Rhetoric may be defined as the faculty of observing, in any given case the available means of persuasion. (Aristotle 1954: 24)

However enthusiastic Aristotle, the father of rhetorical studies, may have been about rhetoric, his tutor Plato was far less so. In an important dialogue, Gorgias, he explores the topic, advancing the thesis that rhetoric is essentially mendacious, as it permits a novice in any subject to triumph over an expert simply because of his verbal dexterity:
Socrates I had that in my admiring mind, Gorgias, when I asked what is the nature of rhetoric, which always appears to me, when I look at the matter in this way, to be a marvel of greatness. Gorgias A marvel, indeed, Socrates, if you only knew how rhetoric comprehends and holds under her sway all the inferior arts. [] I say that if a rhetorician and a physician were to go to any city, and had there to argue in the Ecclesia or any other assembly as to which of them should be elected state-physician, the physician would have no chance; but he who could speak would be chosen if he wished; and in a contest with a man of any other profession the rhetorician more than any one would have the power of getting himself chosen, for he can speak more persuasively to the multitude than any of them, and on any subject. Such is the nature and power of the art of rhetoric1

INTRODUCTION

Aristotle distinguished several different kinds of rhetoric: in the legal sphere (genus iudiciales); pro-con debating to decide on policy (genus deliberativum) and finally ceremonial rhetoric (epideictic addresses). Kennedys (1994: 81) summary of rhetoric in Greek political life seems to shed light on the situation in modern democracies, where decision-making has moved away from the people into the hands of their elected representatives
There were, indeed, few opportunities for deliberative oratory on the scale of the orations of Pericles or Demosthenes addressing an assembly of citizens with the freedom to act on the basis of their collective decisions. A great deal of political debate now took place away from public view, for example in conference between a ruler and his advisers. An orator might then have the task of announcing policy to the public or of arousing public opinion in favour of the ruler.

These last two characteristics of epideictic oratory the announcing of policy to the public, and seeking to arouse their enthusiasm, no longer for a ruler but instead for a political leader still occupy central roles in political discourse today, and constitute an important focus of the current work. In the study of President Obamas talk on alternative energy sources, for example, the speaker is both announcing a policy and trying to arouse public opinion in its favour. Tony Benn, on the other hand, is trying, in his speech against Edward Heaths policy towards the Common Market, to arouse public opinion against a ruler, at the same time as he attacks a specific policy. Though the social contexts in which political decisions are made have changed since the days of the Greek assemblies, then, the power of the word remains a central tool in political processes. At the level of legislation, acts are argued about, amendments proposed and debated, agreement and consensus are sought in committees and in parliament. In manifestoes and on television and radio the approval of the public is sought for measures which have been taken (Wilson 1990: 10; Van der Valk 2003: 314; Bayley 2004: 8). In order to achieve electoral success at all, a politician needs to be able to master, to some degree, the business of persuading his audience through oratory that he or she would be a worthy public representative. Elections are sometimes won and lost on such comparatively trivial factors as the oratorical ability of the leading politicians. In the 1983 British general election, Michael Foot, though regarded as a better speaker than the more pedestrian Margaret Thatcher, was defeated because of his poor performance in the head to head televised debates (Atkinson 1984:

CHAPTER ONE

147-51). Thatcher read from a teleprompter, using simple cues and snappy phrases, while Atkinson describes Foot as
a hunched figure, glued to the lectern, seldom able to raise his head from a script he was finding difficult to read (148)

Mastery of the art of verbal persuasion, then, is just as important in our modern democracies as ever it was in the ancient world.

1.ii. Persuasion that and persuasion to: epistemic and deontic modality
Political rhetoric frequently attempts to assert the factuality of propositions about the real world, backing assertions with a variety of supporting resources. This is, technically speaking, the realm of epistemic modality, which connotes, in Palmers terms (1986: 54-55), the status of the proposition in terms of the speakers commitment to it. Politicians argue about complex social realities the domestic or global economy, the health service, the causes of unemployment, and so on presenting facts that sometimes seem contradictory. Governments generally claim that negative socio-economic indicators such as inflation, unemployment and crime are falling, while living standards, job opportunities and family allowances are all on the increase. Oppositions tend to do the reverse, perhaps disputing the governments figures, or presenting figures that tell a different story. Consider, for example, Mrs Thatcher attacking Labours record on inflation and unemployment:
The truth is that every Labour Government since the war, [] has left more people out of work when it was forced from office than when it came to power.[] By contrast, every Conservative Government since the war has left more people in work than when it came to power. That's a very much better record to have behind you. And the truth is that unemployment under Labour rose from what we left, 629,000 in February 1974, to 1,340,000, more than double in April 1979, five years later2.

Thatcher twice uses a formula here, the truth is, a lexical marker of explicit factuality (Fairclough 2003: 164), backing her assertion with evidentiality in the form of statistics, a common rhetorical tactic. The importance of establishing factuality for ones depictions of the real world is that, on the basis of such descriptions a politician will often build a case for action. Epistemic modality gives place to deontic, which Lyons (1977: 823) describes as the necessity or possibility of acts

INTRODUCTION

performed by morally responsible agents, and Fairclough (2003: 164) simply as what is necessary. The philosopher Searle (1969: 175), in a different context, speaks of arguing from is to ought. In the Thatcher example, the speakers reason for arguing as she does is to advance the proposition that, since Labour have been so hopeless in government, listening voters should vote for her party at the next opportunity. To the extent that they find her description of social realities convincing, they may feel more inclined to do so. In Van Eemerens and Grootendorsts terms (1983: 48), once listeners have been convinced of, they may be persuaded to. A skilfully constructed speech selects and presents epistemic description in order to give maximum support to a deontic proposal, as in the following harmonious fragment from Gladstone:
We have given Ireland a voice: we must all listen for a moment to what she says3

The first clause here is epistemic; the deontic proposal in the second would seem a natural, logical sequel with which it would be churlish to quarrel. In this particular instance, the speakers use of metaphor renders it so persuasive (see Charteris-Black 2005: 13). A final example of the connection between epistemic and deontic modality can be observed in Tony Blairs many speeches on the Iraqi conflict. Both before and after the invasion, Blair was at pains to establish that Saddam Hussein did indeed possess weapons of mass destruction. In 2003, for example, he told Egypts Al-Ahram newspaper:
After more than a decade of Saddam's deceit and delay, the UN gave him a final opportunity to disarm peacefully through Security Council Resolution 1441 in November. Once again he refused. The choice the international community then faced was to disarm Saddam by force and oust his regime or to back down and to leave Saddam hugely strengthened to attack or intimidate his neighbours and to pass on these weapons to extremist terrorist groups4. (Blair 30 03 03)

The proposition formed an important part of an argument for military action against Iraq, which, in its simplest form, ran as follows5:

CHAPTER ONE

Data i) Saddam possesses weapons of mass destruction. SO ii) He refuses to cooperate with UN agents in a programme of voluntary dis-armament. SINCE Claim We ought to make war on Iraq to disarm him.

Warrant It is vital for world peace that he be disarmed.

Figure i.i. Blairs argument on Saddam and WMD

The factual status of the first proposition is crucial to the persuasive force of the argument, which would collapse if it were somehow refuted. Of course, if Saddam has no weapons of mass destruction, he cannot possibly co-operate with the UN in a programme of disarmament, and, posing no threat to world peace, there is no logical reason why we should make war on him.

1.iii.The speech act of persuasion

In Austins (1962) terms, language can be a form of action - speakers use it to insult, to make complaints, promises, warnings, and so on. Austin distinguished three ways of looking at an utterance; in terms of its locution, illocution, and perlocution (Levinson 1983: 236). Locution refers to the referential sense of the words used. In the example from Blair: to pass on these weapons to extremist terrorist groups, the locution can be found in the surface meaning of the words - that Saddam possesses weapons and might pass them on to terrorists. The illocution refers to what Blair is trying to do with his utterance - in this case, probably, he is warning his hearers of the dire consequences that might follow if terrorist groups received the weapons. Levinson (1983: 236) describes the perlocutionary act as:
the bringing about of effects on the audience by means of uttering the sentence, such effects being special to the circumstances of utterance

INTRODUCTION

This would refer to the real-world effects of Blairs discourse on hearers convinced young male readers putting down the paper and rushing out to join the army, for example. In the case of Blairs rhetoric on Saddam, it is extremely difficult to weigh up with any certainty the perlocutionary consequences of his discourse. As a specimen of epideictic rhetoric, Blairs purposes relate to the announcing of policy to the public, rallying support for the course he has taken. Consensus-seeking of this kind is essentially a posteriori, with the aim being to maintain political popularity rather than, as was the case with rhetoric of the genus deliberativum variety, to win support for a favoured policy against competing proposals. Although many speech acts can be referred to in nominalised form (a threat, promise, request, etc.), this is not possible for the speech act of persuasion. Nevertheless, rhetorical performances that aim to persuade listeners clearly do have perlocutionary force; they are speech acts in which the speaker aims to get the hearer to do something (Levinson 1983: 240); or, in Searles terminology, directive speech acts. Thus, in the famous fictional example offered by Shakespeare in his Julius Caesar, Mark Anthonys rhetoric operates by a) convincing hearers that Caesar was not ambitious, and therefore his assassins were ambitious (locution); b) accusing Brutus and the rest of killing a leader revered for his benevolence (illocution); c) getting them to form an angry posse seeking revenge for the deed (perlocution). Chilton (2004: 122) gives an example showing how politicians, though they might wish their words to have perlocutionary effects, sometimes wish to avoid responsibility for the consequences of their words. He examines the notorious Rivers of Blood speech by Enoch Powell, one perlocutionary effect of which could have been incitement to acts of racist violence. By concealing any explicit proposition in that sense, however, the speaker is enabled to distance himself from responsibility; to claim that he never said that.

1.iv. A traditional perspective on persuasion: ethos, pathos and logos

Brief mention must be made of Aristotles own theories of persuasion, which Charteris-Black (2005: 11) summarises as follows:

10

CHAPTER ONE Central to classical rhetoric were the notions of ethos, logos and pathos. Aristotle argued that in addition to taking a stance that was morally worthy (ethos) and proofs to support argument (logos) the successful rhetorician should also be able to arouse the feelings (pathos). This could be done both through considering fundamental human experiences such as life and death and an argument that appealed to the feelings

Ethos also derives from the respect an audience feels for the moral character of the speaker himself, beyond the propriety of the proposal in question, though such factors can vary greatly for different audiences. Gerry Adams would be well-received in most Irish meetings with Republican sympathies, while the same speaker might struggle to be heard if he was addressing a meeting with a Protestant bias. A speakers ethos can vary considerably during their political career. Churchill and Neville Chamberlain offer contrasting examples of this: in 1938 Chamberlains ethos was sky-high when he returned from the Munich conference promising the British people peace in our time; when he died only a few years later his popularity had sunk considerably. Churchill, on the other hand, was viewed by many as an unreliable warmonger during the 1930s, and the greatest Englishman of his time by 19456. In this study I take ethos to be a sort of pre-condition for political persuasion, in the absence of which no speaker can hope to succeed. Aristotle (1954: 25) wrote that persuasion may come through the hearers, when the speech stirs their emotions, and the appeal to the emotions, or pathos, has consistently played an important part in all kinds of rhetoric through the ages. We have to distinguish, however, between two kinds of emotion in considering political discourse. The first kind is a local use of emotion, within the speech itself. Humour, for example, is part of the rhetorical weaponry of many politicians (Swain 1999: 81; Fairclough 2000: 104), creating a positive emotional response that can dispose hearers at least to like the speaker, if not to accept his/her message. It can also bridge the gap that separates politicians from ordinary people, as in this example from the 19th century:
Mr. Gladstone paused here to refresh his voice from a small bottle of restoratives. As he did so, a voice in the crowd was heard exclaiming, Give us some, to which the right honourable gentleman rejoined, amidst much laughter, Yes, you would want some if you had to do what I have.7

Humour can also be used to make telling attacks on an opponents position. A justly celebrated example of this was Ronald Reagans quip in the 1984 presidential head-to-head with Walter Mondale. The president

INTRODUCTION

11

was asked if he was not getting too old to deal with the pressures of the Cold War, and responded:
I want you to know that [] I will not make age an issue of this campaign. I am not going to exploit for political purposes my opponent's youth and inexperience8.

Mondale sportingly joined in the laughter and applause at the presidents presence of mind, but the overall effect of the pleasantry was to completely reverse the questioners inference, and show the American people that Reagans debating skills, at least, were not waning. Politicians as frequently try to touch a pathetic chord, as did G. W. Bush after the September 11th attacks:
For those who lost loved ones it has been a year of sorrow, of empty places, of newborn children who will never know their fathers here on earth.9

Using the Appraisal Framework, outlined more fully below, it is possible to code such references to assess the kind of emotion accessed, and to give an indication of their intensity. Gladstones would register as (t) + Affect: Happiness, while the Bush reference is Affect: Unhappiness (intens.). However, it is important to distinguish such references, which can be codified, and can be included within an analytical model whose scope is to assess the persuasive impact of political speeches, from the more general emotional impact which any speech may be intended to have. This second kind of emotion is more elusive. We might hypothesise that Martin Luther King intended his I have a dream speech to arouse a strong, positive, emotion in his hearers. We might find instances, within the discourse in which such emotions are accessed explicitly. But it is impossible to pin down the precise emotion/s that derive from a single speech as a whole, firstly because, from the diverse, possibly conflicting emotional effects present in any speech, it is hard to see any principled way they could be combined to give a sort of overall reading. Secondly, since emotional responses are subjective, one would need some form of access to the audiences reactions a problematic methodological issue, to say the least. Aristotle gave pride of place, however, to logos, or the rational structure of an argument, and this, of the three, is the quality that I focus on mainly in this study. As I have said, it is hard to measure ethos with any precision, and much the same goes for pathos. Logos, on the other

12

CHAPTER ONE

hand, would seem to be principally dependent on the actual words used by a speaker; the texts can therefore be analysed and sifted in terms of lexicogrammatical choices, the framing of an argument, and so on. Aristotle believed that a speech would be persuasive to the extent that the argument was felt to be water-tight from a logical perspective, and much scholarly effort has since been devoted to the identification of false arguments and logical fallacies. John Major, ex-Prime Minister of Great Britain, made a speech on foxhunting during which he argued the case that, since fox-hunting was on the whole beneficial, it should not be outlawed. It will be useful to consider the way he constructs his argument as he tackles the alternative proposition, that they should be shot instead:
Shooting may seem humane, but it is often ineffective. A fox that is wounded and not killed - that often happens - might linger and suffer for a long time, perhaps even days (Major 20/12/2000)10

His argument, then, rests on the same ethical principle as that of the abolitionists, as can be seen from the diagram:
When foxes are shot, a fox that is wounded and not killed can linger and suffer for days

SO SINCE

We should continue to hunt them with dogs

Prevention of cruelty to foxes is of paramount importance

Figure i.ii. Majors argument on fox-hunting (i)

The main flaw in this argument is that it makes no reference to the level of cruelty to the fox in traditional hunting. Being hunted by a pack of dogs is, one would imagine, a terrifying and painful experience, and foxes, if asked, might well prefer taking their chances with a bullet. In order for the argument to be coherent, Major would need to establish more clearly the proposition that shooting foxes is crueller than the current method. Major provides another example of fallacious logic in this next extract:
Many emotive arguments, including some hoary old chestnuts, will undoubtedly be made by Labour Members to advocate the end of hunting. Many of those are conventional wisdom, but that does not make them right. I

INTRODUCTION remember that the concept of a not-for-profit lottery operator was conventional wisdom and the view of almost every right-thinking person. Anyone who did not agree was viewed as sleazy and self-interested, but we are now in different circumstances: the chase is over and the wrong fox has been killed.

13

This is a logical fallacy of the kind identified by van Eemeren et al (1997: 211). Major argues that conventional wisdom is sometimes mistaken, and no doubt it is, but a glance at the structure of his argument will show that his conclusion does not follow.
The arguments raised against foxhunting are conventional wisdom These arguments are wrong

SO SINCE

Conventional wisdom is sometimes wrong (as in the case of non-profit lotteries)

Figure i.iii. Majors argument on fox-hunting (ii)

As Van Eemeren et al (1997: 211) comment on fallacious syllogisms of this kind, while the conclusion is possibly true, it is not necessarily true; it is plain, in fact, that if conventional arguments are only sometimes wrong, they must also sometimes be right - and there is therefore no way of telling, a priori, that the arguments against fox hunting fall into the one rather than the other category. I have highlighted the efforts of a politician who appears to make a rather unsuccessful attempt to construct logical arguments in support of his proposition. Politicians, however, are not bound by the strict canons which apply to the dialectician, and their speeches can be effective and even persuasive though riddled with logical fallacies of this kind. If we are, in good conscience to reject Majors conclusion, however, we seem honour bound to consider, and eventually to refute, his argument. Political discourse, as we saw in the example from Blair, can attempt to pass off propositions, as it were, by rhetorical sleight of hand; to persuade listeners against their better judgements, to confound common sense by rhetorical juggling tricks. In this case, for example, Major has presented animal rights activists with a conundrum: final passage of the bill on foxhunting, for which they have pressed for so long and with such passion,

14

CHAPTER ONE

will only lead to an increase in suffering for the fox! To refute such propositions it is necessary to concentrate attention on the logical relations involved, a task more suited to an analyst after the event than for an audience during it. Since such textual processing is difficult in real time, speakers who use phony logic as the bases for their arguments will generally not only get away with it, but may also achieve some kind of persuasive success.

1.v. Context of Situation

In studying political discourse, we clearly need to know not just the text in question, but also a fair amount of context knowledge we need to know something about the speakers ideological outlook, the historical and social circumstances in which the speech was made, and as much knowledge of the group culture shared by speaker and audience. All this information will assist us in achieving an understanding of the rhetorical features that interest us. The problem is, as Van Dijk has pointed out:
[] there is of course no a priori limit to the scope and level of what counts as being relevant context (Van Dijk 1997: 14).

In the studies that follow I have followed Hyatt (2005), who lists four aspects of context to be considered. Although his study looks at newspaper language, his categories are relevant to a study of political rhetoric, since they provide a framework for the provision of information about:
i) Immediate socio-political context. This refers to the state of contemporary actuality, what is in the news at the moment; ii) Medium-term socio-political context. This covers influential contexts that survive for a longer period than the individual [] story but still are too temporary to be considered aspects of the wider context of culture; iii) Contemporary socio-political individuals, organizations and structures; iv) Epoch [] or what counts as knowledge or truth in a particular era. This might include the various assumptions of order, structures of inclusion and exclusion and generally how a society legitimates itself and achieves its social identity. (Hyatt 2005: 521-523)

With these outlines as my guide I have prefaced each of the six studies in the second part of the work with a short introduction, trying to contextualise the speaker and the speech in historical and socio-cultural terms.

CHAPTER TWO SPEAKER EVALUATION IN EVERYDAY INTERACTION

Before we look at evaluative language in a specifically political context, it will be useful to consider its role in ordinary discourse in normal, everyday interaction. First of all, what exactly is meant by speaker evaluation? Hunston and Thompson (2003: 5) give the following definition:
Evaluation is the broad cover term for the expression of the speaker or writers attitude or stance towards, viewpoint on, or feelings about the entities or propositions that he or she is talking about

They then give a cogent answer to the rhetorical question why is evaluation important?, arguing that it performs the following functions: 1) to express the speakers or writers opinion, and in doing so to reflect the value system of that person and their community; 2) to construct and maintain relations between the speaker or writer and hearer or reader (ibid: 6)11 Since it is hard for humans to interact linguistically without recourse to evaluation, it is not difficult to find data containing examples of it. Here are a few examples, collected at random from the internet, with the instances of evaluation underlined:
1) "It was Bobby Fischer who had, single-handedly, made the world recognize that chess on its highest level was as competitive as football, as thrilling as a duel to the death, as aesthetically satisfying as a fine work of art, as intellectually demanding as any form of human activity,"12 2) You've made a major contribution to the field of computer science for example in concurrency, with communicating sequential processes, you've been influential with Algol. Which one will you yourself say "This is my favorite child!", if that's possible?13

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CHAPTER TWO 3) "I understand sincerity," is what he said. John spoke with a rough, coarse attitude, yet had an appreciative twinkle in his eye.14

The first speaker is expressing his opinion through his evaluations of chess, namely, that it is competitive, thrilling, aesthetically satisfying, and intellectually demanding. This is in the area of Thompson and Hunstons first principle. However, these evaluations also serve to augment another evaluation, that of Bobby Fischer, the famous American chess master who had just died. To identify the value-systems expressed in such evaluations, we need first to identify the community whose values are involved here. On the one hand, Fischer was an American sporting icon, whose greatest achievement was in 1972, when he won the world title against a Russian champion. At the height of the Cold War, the games were followed around the world, creating an intense, and lasting, interest in chess. The values, therefore, are those typified by athletes in general dedication, perfecting a talent, making sacrifices, hard work, competitiveness, and so on. The values in question, then, are values widely recognised throughout American society. However, as well as engaging with a general public, reminding them that Fischer embodied values they too cherish, we could see Schonbergs words here as engaging with the narrower, chess-playing community, reminding them that it is thanks to Fischer that there are now a multitude of chess-professionals making a living from what was once a minority sport, and that serious attention is paid to the game. Fischers controversial, anti-American and anti-Semitic views, as well as his touchiness as a tournament player, made him an ambivalent figure for fellow professionals; the writer reminds chess-players that Bobbys achievements in this area were carried out single-handedly. Evaluation thus engages with readers, creating communities whose contours are determined by the degree to which readers share the evaluations, as well as to their specific circumstances. In the second interaction, an interview, we can see how the interviewers positive evaluations illustrate Thompson and Hunstons second principle, that of construct[ing] and maintain[ing] relations between the speaker and hearer. Sir Tony Hoare will, no doubt, be flattered by the social importance attributed to his work on concurrency, communicating sequential processes, and Algol. Positive evaluation oils the wheels of interaction here, making the interview more likely to succeed. It also places Hoares work within a system of wider social values (the first principle), since the interviewer refers to Hoares major contribution to the field of computer science: the comments place him within a muchadmired social category, that of scientific research.

SPEAKER EVALUATION IN EVERYDAY INTERACTION

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In one sense, the third example works in a similar way: Bob Dylan has just been invited to sing some of his songs for John Hammond, a prestigious gate-keeper in the world of recorded music. The evaluative comment, implying that the speaker has seen that Dylan, though young, possesses a quality he values above all others sincerity - will serve to reassure the nervous young artist before an important performance. However, the anecdote is told by Dylan in his autobiographical book, Chronicles therefore, we need also to consider the fragments operation in terms of the writers interaction with his readers. We could see it as a covert claim to sincerity made by Dylan himself. Dylans early fame, in fact, came as the archetypical protest singer, aligning himself against social injustices of all kinds. For his likely readership what Coulthard (1994: 4) called his imagined audience, sincerity will probably represent an important value, and one which, perhaps, has helped orient their musical tastes in the direction of Bob Dylan.

2.i. Evaluation in You-tube communities and blogs

Communities are not static entities; on the contrary, they are in constant evolution. Nor are systems of values set in stone, like the ten commandments; they are objects of discussion, of negotiation, even areas of dispute. Evaluative language will be found at the cutting edge of such processes, as we can see by paying attention to the phenomenon of blogging, and to the kind of virtual communities that are constructed by textual comments to videos on You-tube. Users of such interactive media create virtual communities by exchanging their views and feelings, constructing affiliations with some, and distinguishing themselves from others. The death of Michael Jackson led not only to an upsurge in interest for his music, but also to an outpouring on You-tube of sentiments about the star. Some of these express eulogistic evaluations:
- Michael Jackson is not dead... he lives in our memories and the dreams of todays children hellian1975 - True that man R.I.P the king of pop joelinkatrin2 - he IS The King of Pop nyne9998 - Michael Jackson will never be forgotten. He is unforgettable, I love Michael Jackson! PeDrowStyleviP15

By expressing their positive evaluations (the king of pop) and feelings (I love Michael Jackson), the speakers are interacting with each other to create a sort of community, on the basis of shared values. To extrapolate the system of values shared by these contributors to the forum,

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we can infer that, for them, Michael Jackson represented a supreme entertainer, an unforgettable performer, someone who had a permanent effect on their lives, and who they feel will continue to live on, influencing future generations with his music. A darker note is visible in some posts, for example:
personal life aside, no one can deny that he was an amazing musician ActorSlashNinja

This contributors stance towards the gradually emerging community is ambivalent. On the one hand, s/he clearly has a positive feeling towards Jackson, and aligns with the admirers. However, the contrast between Jacksons amazing musicianship and his personal life reveal that there is something not quite so admirable in this latter area. The posts now begin to explore this aspect, with one contributor raising a specific objection:
maybe if you used real words someone would take heed. But for real dudes a child molester. LOCCZCARDZ

To accuse someone of molesting children is a kind of negative evaluation that relates, not to their ability as did the evaluation of Jacksons musical and entertaining skills but to their morality, a weightier kind of assessment. Fans, recognising that the admiring community they are in the process of creating is endangered by such judgements, now begin to repair by comments like:
he actually isnt, if you watched the news the kid who claimed he was molested said he was lying for the money. An innocent man was found not guilty. Backhymen

An innocent man is an effective evaluative counter to the child molester of the former post.

2.ii. Margaret Thatcher on You-tube

Most virtual communities sustained around the You-tube performances of show-business personalities express aesthetic or emotional evaluations, as in these examples. The world of politics has its blogs and You-tube channels too, where the system of values around which interaction occurs is rather more elaborate, including aspects of philosophy, belief, and political ideology. Just as there are shades of affiliation to the Jackson fan club community, so contributors to such channels of