TERRORISM AND PHILIPPINE ARMED GROUPS: NETWORKS, LISTS, AND THE PEACE PROCESS

(Draft of a chapter in a coming book by SSN and Small Arms Survey-Geneva tentatively titled Primed and Purposeful: Armed Groups and Human Security Efforts in the Philippines) A specter is haunting the world Southeast Asia the !hilippines " the specter of terrorism#$ %here are a number of things we have to be clear about regarding the problem of post-&'$$ international terrorism of the Al-Qaeda type as far as the !hilippines is concerned# (ne is that it is a very real problem (as real as the bombings and civilian casualties) regarding which being in a denial mode will not do any good# %he fact that the appeal or spread of international terrorist networks or links in the !hilippines has deeper root causes and a broader historical and situational conte)t should not lead to the brushing off of the problem as merely symptomatic of bigger basic problems of the people# (ne danger would be not to take the terrorism problem seriously enough at its own level where there is already a need for immediate counter-measures# Sometimes effective counter-actions are held back by valid human rights concerns# Still terrorism in the main sense of deliberately targeting civilians to spread terror or e)treme fear among the civilian population is itself a serious violation of human rights including the most basic right to life and freedom from fear# At the same time in many authoritarian states and in undemocratic international conte)ts counter-terrorism has arguably cost more innocent civilian lives and human rights violations than terrorism# And though one should not deny the problem of terrorism neither should one e)aggerate it#* Nor as in the case of the !hilippines conflate it with more fundamental problems of a different nature# %his overview seeks to relate (or perhaps more precisely interrogate) the globally dominant or hegemonic anti-terrorism analysis and discourse with what might be called +the !hilippine front, (encompassing both +the -oro front, and +the .ommunist front,) of the +global war on terror, (G/(%)# %here is a different more grounded and historically informed perspective of the main security problem in the !hilippines# %he case of the !hilippines particularly of its ma0or armed groups raises 1uestions about the dominant notions of a Southeast Asian terrorist network or alliance and about the dominant definitions and listings of terrorist organi2ations# %he differences in perspectives about terrorism and insurgency normally translate into differences in policy approaches# %his is best illustrated in the G/(%3s impingement into and subsuming of
$ *

/ith apologies to 4arl -ar) and 5riedrich 6ngels for their opening line of The Communist Manifesto# .omment by Dr# %imo 4ivimaki Senior 7esearcher Nordic 8nstitute of Asian Studies on *9 :uly *;;<#

the crucial peace processes for resolving decades-old rebellions and internal armed conflicts in the !hilippines# Not the -ain Security !roblem =ere /e have to be clear that terrorism whether international or domestic is not the main national or human security problem in the !hilippines even with regards to the various non-state or anti-state armed groups here# 8t might be so at the international level or even Southeast Asia (S6A) but not in the !hilippines# %he reference in *;;* to the !hilippines (after Afghanistan *;;$ and before 8ra1 *;;>) as the +second front, of the +global war on terror, distorts the picture# 8t may be that big a problem for the ?#S# government which has accordingly become deeply interested in the !hilippines again but it is not that big a problem in the !hilippines# 6ven the Government of the 7epublic of the !hilippines (G7!) knows this but is going along with its ma0or military ally the ?nited States (?#S#) for the !hilippine government3s own security interests# %he latter3s main security or armed conflict problems are the more than three decades-old (since $&<@) ma0or rebellions or insurgencies on two frontsA the Communist front nationwide featuring mainly the .ommunist !arty of the !hilippines (.!!)-New !eople3s Army (N!A) and some breakaway factionsB and the Moro front in -uslim -indanao featuring historically the -oro National Ciberation 5ront (-NC5) the -oro 8slamic Ciberation 5ront (-8C5) and Al-Hara atul !slamiyya a#k#a# A"u Sayyaf Group (ASG)# Not Al-Qaeda not #emmah !slamiyah (:8)# A long-time .olombian observer of !hilippine armed conflicts and peace processes laments how that actual configuration of armed groups in the !hilippines has been distorted by the post-&'$$ G/(% prism and he says this in a way which clearly points out the distortion even without yet getting to the fine points of definition and distinction between terrorism and insurgencyA
A visitor to the !hilippines today ignorant of historical facts could be e)cused if on the basis of his reading of the local press and listening to official speeches he were to conclude that guerrilla warfare and terrorism are one and the same thing " a post New Dork *;;$ September $$ phenomenon# =istory and historians and their time crafted country sub0ects have evaporated from current analysis# -ore than >;; years old engines of conflict in -uslim -indanao and older than $;; years roots of strife in Cu2on have been pushed aside to put in place a domestic reflection of present conflict and strife in Afghanistan and 8ra1# =owever to suddenly e)plain all 5ilipino ongoing armed struggles in terms of what is happening elsewhere in Asia is not only a gross manifestation of ignorance about this country but irresponsible regarding the 1uest for peace# >

(ne ?#S#-based counter-terrorism scholar has in fact advised the ?#S# government thusA +Nonetheless ?#S# officials must recogni2e that neither the ASG nor the -8C5 pose the largest security threat to the G7!# 8ndeed the ASG is a nuisance though were it able to attack -anila on a regular and sustained basis serious economic
>

.omment by 6duardo -arino field consultant and campaigner Eogota .olombia on *F August *;;<#

repercussions would resultG %he single greatest threat to the !hilippine state continues to come from the .!!'N!A#,F %he two biggest -oro rebel groups -NC5 and -8C5 are not as urgent a threat as the .!!'N!A currently is only because of ade1uate ongoing peace processes and ceasefires with the former " which are not obtaining with the latter# Although the .!!'N!A has been designated as +terrorist, by the ?#S# and the 6uropean ?nion (6#?#) the .!!'N!A is not as alarming to the counter-terrorism radar screen because not being 8slamist9 to start with it obviously cannot be part of the AlQaeda network# Eoth ASG and -8C5 are 8slamist and therefore have some basis for linking or being linked with Al-Qaeda and :8# %here would be no Al-Qaeda or :8 links in the !hilippines if there were no groups like ASG and -8C5# Eut there would be in the first place no -8C5 and ASG if there was no -NC5 from which they sprung# 8n other words it is the -oro rebellion or insurgency which provides the milieu the social base and the logistical modalities for Al-Qaeda or :8 to enter so0ourn and operate in the !hilippines esp# in -uslim -indanao# %he currently dominant counter-terrorism discourse and research that has emphasi2ed the Southeast Asian network of Al-Qaeda and :8 including their +coopting, !hilippine armed groups like ASG and -8C5 into this network#< Cess heard are the more balanced and critical perspectives of some scholars on terrorism and insurgency in S6A including their criti1ue of the dominant counter-terrorism perspective#H %he differences in research perspectives or in scholarship itself might be said to parallel differences in policy approaches to and actual engagements with terrorism and insurgency# %imo 4ivimaki of the Nordic 8nstitute of Asian Studies (N8AS) says +Nordic tradition in peace research and softer approaches to security can offer alternatives and new insights to the tougher approaches and more straightforward perceptions of the Anglo-American countries# At the same time it is clear that the regional analysis often succeeds to illuminate the socially constructed reality of political violence more accurately than the analysis of outsiders#, (%o some e)tent the same might be said about insider national or local analysis in relation to outsider regional analysis when dealing with a particular country conte)t#) =e also speaks of the need for a more balanced view on the terrorism issue " for e)ample +on violence caused by terrorism as well as authoritarianism that uses counter-terrorism as an e)cuse#,@
F

Iachary Abu2a $ali -Terrorism: The %eturn of the A"u Sayyaf (.arlisle !AA Strategic Studies 8nstitute ?S Army /ar .ollege *;;9) F$# 9 +8slamist, refers to adherent of the belief that 8slam can and should form the basis of political ideology and who accordingly work for the 8slami2ation of political institutions as well as the whole society based on the discussion of Greg Earton #emaah !slamiyah: %adical !slamism in !ndonesia (SingaporeA 7idge Eooks *;;9) *@-*&# < 7epresented mainly in the writings and discourse of 7ohan Gunaratna Iachary Abu2a -aria A# 7essa Angel 7abasa and the 7AND .orporation and to a lesser e)tent in the research and reports of 4it .ollier Sidney :ones and the 8nternational .risis Group# H 7epresented in the scholarly work of Andrew %an -ark %urner Dwight /right-Neville Natasha =amilton-=art -ichael 4# .onnors :ulkipli -# /adi %imo 4ivimaki and the Nordic 8nstitute of Asian Studies# 7ommel .# Eanlaoi has for the most part been somewhere in between this and the previous grouping# @ %imo 4ivimaki +%errorism in Southeast Asia , N!ASnytt No# > September *;;> p# F#

David /right-Neville of -onash ?niversity has noted that +the bulk of terrorismrelated research consists mainly of a cataloguing of individual terrorists and the organi2ations and networks to which they belong#,& !=A7 4im Eeng of the .ity ?niversity of =ong 4ong says +the tendency has been to connect seemingly unrelated dots to form a vast network, and to use terrorism as +the conceptual blueprint to e)plain religious and political violence, in the region#$; +8n 0oining up the dots to uncover the Al Jaeda network in the region , says Andrew %an of Nanyang %echnological ?niversity +it is important to bear in mind that given the comple) nature of the -oro rebellion and the presence of fundamental grievances not every -uslim rebel in the region is a dedicated Al Jaeda operative#,$$ 8n other words don3t miss the indigenous or locali2ed roots of the conflicts in the region# At the same time %an notes that some local scholarship has been too inwardlooking has failed to engage broader scholarship and to relate to broader global developments and perspectives#$* 4it .ollier of the 8nternational .risis Group (8.G) and Australian National ?niversity notes the reluctance of many country specialists steeped deeply in local history and culture to take terrorism seriously as a legitimate field of in1uiry even 1uestioning the value of this field# =e also criti1ues the perspectives of global and regional specialists for their al-Qaeda-centric and :8-centric paradigms respectively#$> Eut .ollier and 8.G have been 1uite :8-centric themselves# %he Juestion of %errorist Networks Speaking of the 1uestion of terrorist networks Iachary Abu2a of the ?#S# 8nstitute of !eace (?S8!) speaks of Al-Qaeda3s global +network of subsidiaries , alternatively +affiliates, or +franchisees , with :8 as its regional affiliate in S6A#$F %his sounds almost like a multinational or transnational corporation which might be called AlQaeda 8nc# 7ohan Gunaratna of the Singapore-based 8nternational .entre for !olitical Kiolence L %errorism 7esearch (8.!K%7) also speaks of Al-Jaeda3s +global network of
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David /right-Neville +Dangerous dynamicsA activists militants and terrorists in Southeast Asia , The Pacific %e&ie' Kol# $H No# $ -arch *;;F p# *&# $; !=A7 4im Eeng +8s %here an al Jaeda Network in Southeast AsiaM , N!ASnytt No# > September *;;> p# <# $$ Andrew %an +%he 8ndigenous 7oots of .onflict in Southeast AsiaA %he .ase of -indanao, in 4umar 7amakrishna and See Seng %an (eds#) After $ali: The Threat of Terrorism in Southeast Asia (SingaporeA 8nstitute of Defence and Strategic Studies *;;>) $$*# $* .omment by !rof# Andrew %#=# %an Senior Cecturer 4ing3s .ollege ?niversity of Condon and :oint Services .ommand and Staff .ollege ?4 (now with ?niversity of New South /ales-Asia in Singapore) on $* :uly *;;<# $> 4it .ollier +%errorismA 6volving 7egional Alliances and State 5ailure in -indanao, in Dal0it Singh and Corraine .# Sala2ar (eds#) Southeast Asian Affairs ())* (SingaporeA 8nstitute of Southeast Asian Studies *;;<) *H-*@# =ere .ollier identifies 7ohan Gunaratna as a globalist Iachary Abu2a and David /rightNeville as regionalists and Natasha =amilton-=art as a country specialist# %he identification of these three ways of looking at terrorism in S6A are attributed by him to .arlyle A# %hayer# $F Iachary Abu2a +Al-Jaeda3s Asian /eb of %error , T!ME & December *;;* p# >;# See also Iachary Abu2a +%entacles of %errorA Al Jaeda3s Southeast Asian Network , Contemporary Southeast Asia Kol# *F No# > December *;;* pp# F*H-<9#

terror, inc# in the Asia-!acific 7egion#$9 Congtime .able News Network (.NN) :akarta Eureau .hief -aria A# 7essa has put the networking most specifically this wayA
N(%6A :emaah 8slamiyah3s leaders created a clandestine umbrella organi2ation known as 7abitatul -u0ahidin which includes all the armed -uslim groups in the regionA the -8C5 Abu Sayyaf Caskar :undullah and several others# Although each of these groups has a separate leadership structure for specific operations they act essentially as part of the #emaah !slamiyah and al-Qaeda terror net'or #$< (italics supplied)

Eut those who know the situation and armed groups in -uslim -indanao will tell youA that is simply not true for the -8C5 and even the ASG (as discussed later and elsewhere)# 8t is hard to imagine as there have basically been no indications of +a clandestine umbrella organi2ationG which includes all the armed -uslim groups in the region#, 6ven 0ust those in the !hilippines have no clandestine umbrella organi2ation# (n the 1uestion of the e)istence of an Al-Qaeda network in S6A !=A7 4im Eeng says +it is one thing to affirm the e)istence of al Jaeda and yet another to attest to its network# 8n fact such a loose definition may even be parado)ical as terrorist cells are by nature hyper-e)clusiveG Networks on the other hand imply swift e)change of information even 0oint planning# Eut if such groups do indulge in these networking activities their e)istence would be unduly compromised#,$H (ne danger of course with loose talk about terrorist networks is to implicate even the most incidental or minimal links or contacts made by true Al-Qaeda or :8 operatives including with otherwise legitimate non-governmental organi2ations (NG(s) and personalities# Sidney :ones of 8.G which has done the most published research on the :8 inc# +0oining up the dots, of its network in S6A has already recently writtenA +Eut :8 was never an al-Jaeda franchiseB there were always parts of :8 that ob0ected to the bin Caden interpretation of 0ihad at least as it applied to Southeast AsiaG# No one looking at :8 after *;;* could reasonably conclude that its identity was bound up with bin Caden and even during the period of closest ties N$&&H-*;;*O :8 was very much an independent organi2ation with its own agenda#, %he +al-Qaeda affiliate, label of :8 wrongly +suggests that :83s use of violence is e)ternally induced rather than an intrinsic part of the organi2ation since its inception#, $@ Speaking of agendas the 8.G has also already clarified in recent years that :83s focus +continues to be on establishing an 8slamic state in 8ndonesia , not a larger daulah islamiyah nusantara encompassing -alaysia 8ndonesia %hailand Singapore and the !hilippines or some kind of Southeast Asian caliphate " :83s +emphasis on 0ihad in 8ndonesia remains strong#,$& 8n this regard a top -8C5 leader recently said that the
$9 $<

7ohan Gunaratna !nside Al Qaeda: +lo"al net'or of terror (New DelhiA 7oli Eooks !vt# Ctd# *;;*)# -aria A# 7essa Seeds of Terror: An Eye'itness Account of Al-Qaeda,s Ne'est Center of -perations in Southeast Asia (New DorkA 5ree !ress *;;>) )ii# $H !=A7 4im Eeng +8s %here an al Jaeda Network in Southeast AsiaM, H# $@ Sidney :ones +%he changing nature of :emaah 8slamiyah , Australian #ournal of !nternational Affairs Kol# 9& No# * :une *;;9 pp# $H* $HF# $& 8nternational .risis Group +:emaah 8slamiyah in South 6ast AsiaA Damaged but Still Dangerous , 8.G Asia 7eport No# <> :akarta'Erussels *< August *;;> p# $#

interest of the -8C5 +starts and finishes, with the fate of the $an+samoro Nthe -oro nation in -uslim -indanao Southern !hilippinesO +As far as we are concerned there is no point in interfering in a bigger problem Nto create an 8slamic state across S6AO#,*; And neither is there a point for the -8C5 in interfering with establishing an 8slamic state in 8ndonesia it being hard enough to establish one in -uslim -indanao# (ne might say the same for the ASG with its own agenda of establishing an 8slamic state in the whole of -indanao# 8t is then perhaps no wonder that there appear to be no 5ilipinos or %hais among the members of :8 which on the other hand includes 8ndonesians Singaporeans and -alaysians#*$ :8 is essentially and largely an 8ndonesian organi2ation with an 8ndonesian agenda# 8ts .arul !slam (D8) roots there date back to the $&9;s its spiritual leader Abu Eakar Ea3asyir sees himself as the intellectual heir of D8 and many :8 operatives come from families connected with the failed D8 pro0ect#** 8t simply is e)traneous to the !hilippines even if it has operatives here# /hat is more even 8.G reports in *;;> that +many 8ndonesians still 1uestion whether :8 e)ists as a formal organi2ation#,*> %he obvious 1uestion to us isA can too many 8ndonesians be wrong about a phenomenon in their own countryM .ollier more recently notes that :8 +has become a convenient shorthand for the terrorist threat in 8ndonesia , where non-:8 +freelance, 0ihadis are already the more +immediate threat to /estern targets in particular#,*F %he problem with +0oining up the dots, is that this often partakes of the nature of military'police intelligence work rather than social'political science work what .ollier himself called +intelligence laundering by persons too close to security services for comfort#,*9 Social' political science work and investigative 0ournalism which rely too on much military'police intelligence sources are not only of dubious academic'0ournalistic integrity but also of dubious accuracy because of the limitations of their intelligence sources# 5or e)ample the 0ournalistic claim to be +an eyewitness account,*< but actually second- or third-handedly based on such sources# !=A7 4im Eeng has critici2ed much of the dominant counter-terrorism related literature on this score saying +true verification has to come from rigorous research rather than from the confessions of -uslim clerics e)tracted by the state# %he 1uality of the confession is further sub0ect to doubt as most were given under coerced conditions#,*H 8n addition to these confessions and intelligence debriefings much so-called evidence has come from illegal wiretaps that +wouldn3t stand up in court , as admitted by the police intelligence officials who conducted them#*@ Some of the resulting
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5abio Scarpello +!hilippinesA Al-Jaeda-linked groups undermining peace talks with rebels , Adnkronos 8nternational (A48) news dispatch *@ April *;;<# *$ :ones +%he changing nature of :emaah 8slamiyah, $H9# ** .omment by !rof# %an# *> 8.G +:emaah 8slamiyah in South 6ast Asia, *&# *F .ollier +%errorismA 6volving 7egional Alliances, >F# *9 8bid *H# *< 7essa3s book title# *H !=A7 4im Eeng +8s %here an al Jaeda Network in Southeast AsiaM, <# *@ 5or e)ample !hilippine !olice .olonel 7odolfo +Eoogie, -endo2a according to 7essa Seeds of Terror $$ $>*# -endo2a3s unpublished book Philippine #ihad !nc/ (*;;*) was a ma0or reference for the said

intelligence reports have been actually contested even within the broader intelligence and police communities# (ne high-profile police raid of an alleged 8slamic terrorist front organi2ation resulting in the arrest of $H suspected terrorists in -anila in :anuary *;;9 was based on such intelligence reports which turned out to be mistaken flawed or inade1uate ($9 of those arrested were released soon enough for lack of evidence)# %his resulted in a congressional investigation and the sacking of the main police officer concerned#*& %his is not to necessarily underestimate or look down on analysis coming from police and intelligence sources in comparison with academic analysis# 8ndeed good intelligence analysts have got it better than many academics in terms of wiser understanding of the human condition in times of war and terrorism and knowing the heart and not only mind of the matter including the operational tricks#>; 8ntelligence details which +0oin up the dots , cross-checked with a variety of government nongovernment public private and even non-state armed group sources in the hands of competent grounded and open-minded country specialists +become vital clues in understanding the real world face-to-face relationships that make specific terrorist attacks possible#,>$ Still confessions and intelligence debriefings of captured terrorists as well as alleged photographic evidence from high-tech surveillance has led to assertions like +it was clear to me that the main al-Jaeda ally in the !hilippines was the -8C5,>* and that the -8C5 continues to harbor the :8 in -indanao particularly in the :8 training .amp :abal Juba in -ount .ararao#>> (rdinarily +!ictures don3t lie,>F but much e)perience and wisdom has also shown that pictures do not necessarily reveal +the truth the whole truth and nothing but the truth#, %wo (now retired) 5ilipino generals who have up close and personally engaged with the -8C5 leaders (the .entral .ommittee no less) and commanders (especially the crucial base commanders) through the ongoing peace process assess whatever -8C5-:8 link to be +peripheral limited to individuals or small groups , not involving +the mainstream -8C5 which has shed such links if any they had before#,>9

7essa book# *& .hristian 6sguerra +!olice 7evampA !N! sacks controversial .8DG chief in botched antiterror raid , Philippine .aily !n0uirer ** 5ebruary *;;9 p# A9# %he then .hief of the .riminal 8nvestigation and Detection Group (.8DG) of the !hilippine National !olice (!N!) referred to is the same Senior Superintendent 7odolfo +Eoogie, -endo2a# >; .omment by -arino# >$ .ollier +%errorismA 6volving 7egional Alliances, *@# >* 7essa Seeds of Terror $> $*F# >> 7euters +7! -alaysia 8ndonesia urged to dismantle :8 terror camps , Philippine .aily !n0uirer ** April *;;< p# A$$# %he attribution is to 7ohan Gunaratna# %his point was also presented by him with some powerpoint photographs at the +-eeting on -indanao, on & :une *;;< at the National Defense .ollege of the !hilippines (ND.!) .amp Aguinaldo Jue2on .ity# >F 7essa Seeds of Terror H# >9 Ct# Gen# 7odolfo 7# Garcia A5! (7et#) and ?ndersecretary 7amon G# Santos in reactions to Gunaratna at the +-eeting on -indanao, on & :une *;;< at the ND.!#

%hey even likened the -8C5 to any big organi2ation like the Armed 5orces of the !hilippines (A5!) in the sense of having its own recalcitrants like the (akwood mutineers of which it would be unfair to e1uate to the whole A5!# %hey noted that the counter-terrorism e)pert himself (Gunaratna) whom they were responding to had made the update about +:83s unhappiness with the -8C5, because of its distancing from :8# %hey spoke of the field inspection of -t# .ararao conducted by the civil society network Eantay .easefire which found the supposed -8C5-:8 training camp area to be unviable or unsustainable among others because of no near water source# %hey said that the -8C5 base commander Samir =ashim whom the e)pert alleged to be hosting such training there has been in ill health and was based in Euliok several hundred kilometers away from -t# .ararao#>< All told whatever -8C5 links with :8 and Al-Qaeda especially in terms of the former hosting training camps for the latter appear to be things of the past# %he same may not be said of ASG links with Al-Qaeda and :8# 8n any case those links were not as part of a tight network of a center and its affiliates but essentially relationships among independent organi2ations with their own agendas and which link up in varying degrees at different 0unctures for +mutual advantage and reciprocal assistance , to use 8.G3s description of :83s relationship with Al-Qaeda#>H As the case of the ASG best shows these are at most tactical alliances of convenience more pragmatic than ideological referred to in the vernacular as +amitan (using each other) or +coopting, each other to use the terms of counter-terrorism literature# 8n the longer view such networks are more incidental rather than critical to !hilippine insurgency and -indanao rebellion#>@ %he Juestion of %errorist (rgani2ations Eefore really going into this 1uestion it might be noted that the +dangerous dynamics, of terrorism has to do not only with destruction (whether terrorist or counterterrorist) but also with the discourse of definitions (of terrorism) and designations (of terrorist organi2ations)# /right-Neville has a most interesting tentative typology of 8slamist groups in S6A to begin the process of developing a deeper understanding of the attitudinal dynamics which might lead to the transformation of unarmed struggle to armed struggle to terrorism# Eased on increasing degree of political alienation he has three classificationsA
$# acti&ists - usually contain their action safely within the parameters of e)isting laws *# militants " more inclined to push past the boundaries of e)isting laws but with a selflimiting nature which reflects moral and ethical boundaries

><

8bid# See also the Eantay .easefire field report on .amp .ararao and Euliok 8slamic .enter based on field monitoring dine on < November and &-$; December *;;># >H 8.G +:emaah 8slamiyah in South 6ast Asia, >;# >@ .omment by !rof# :ulkipli -# /adi 8nstitute of 8slamic Studies ?niversity of the !hilippines on *9 September *;;<#

># terrorists " no such self-limiting nature leads to a moral disengagement that makes it easier to ignore the conventional distinction between combatant and non-combatant and to 0ustify committing violence against a wider audience >&

?sing this typology the -NC5 and -8C5 would be militant and the ASG and :8 in the !hilippines would be terrorist# %hat seems fair enough but there are some problems with the term +militant , for one# 8n other conte)ts like in 4ashmir or Ga2a it is almost synonymous to +terrorist , or at the very least an armed rebel or insurgent# A -alaysian academic writing on militant 8slam in -alaysia uses +militant, to describe the use of unlawful force and violent acts to achieve one3s political ob0ectives which acts would create either public fear or hatred against the other or would result in public disorder with possible detrimental effects on societal cohesion#F; Eut in the !hilippines +militant, has a very different connotation associated with the +peaceful but militant vigorous but non-violent, struggle of open and legal cause-oriented groups against the -arcos dictatorship# %his connotation has been carried over to the post--arcos period up to the present where it refers mainly to open and legal +national-democratic, (nat-dem) organi2ations and activism associated with $a+on+ Alyansan+ Ma a"ayan (EADAN)# 8n fact its activism is often referred to as +militant activism, to distinguish it from the moderate activism of the +social-democrats, (soc-dems)# So if someone in 4ashmir or Ga2a were to read a !hilippine news report about +the militant EADAN , s'he would probably mistake this to be an 8slamist group# 8nterestingly the term +militant, has for the most part had no local application to the -oro front of struggle whether to pre-martial law -oro student activism or to the -NC5 and -8C5# %he more +dangerous dynamics, of discourse definitions and designations comes with the use of +the % word#, /right-Neville3s concept of +terrorists, is fair enough# 8n fact he draws on the definition of terrorism in the ?#S# .riminal .odeA +premeditated politically motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets by sub-national groups or clandestine agents usually intended to influence an audience#,F$ %his however e)cludes states as sub0ects (perpetrators) of the violence# %he emerging definition in the ?nited Nations (?N) as paraphrased by SecretaryGeneral 4ofi Anan is any action +intended to cause death or serious bodily harm to civilians or non-combatants with the purpose of intimidating a population or compelling a Government or an international organi2ation to do or abstain from doing any act#, %his does not e)clude states as sub0ects as Anan in fact says categorically +States can be guilty of terrorism#, Eut he also addresses possible terrorism by national liberation

>& F;

/right-Neville +Dangerous dynamics, >$# Dr# 4amarulni2am Abdullah +-ilitant 8slam and the 7ise of !olitical Kiolence in -alaysia, (.ase study prepared for the Southeast Asian .onflict Studies Network 7egional /orkshop on 6thnic and 7eligious .onflict in Southeast Asia Dogyakarta 8ndonesia *F-*@ September *;;$) F# F$ /right-Neville +Dangerous dynamics, >;#

movementsA +As for the right to resist occupation it must be understood in its true meaning# 8t cannot include the right to deliberately kill or maim civilians#,F* (ur own attempt at a core legal definition of terrorism based on a number of sources and references including international humanitarian law (8=C) is thisA the systematic empl yme!t by states groups or individuals of acts or threats of violence or use of weapons "eli#e$ately ta$%etti!% t&e ci'ilia! p p(lati ! individuals or infrastructure for the primary purpose of sp$ea"i!% te$$ $ $ e)t$eme *ea$ am !% t&e ci'ilia! p p(lati ! in relation to s me p litical $ +(asi,p litical #-ecti'e and undertaken .it& a! i!te!"e" a("ie!ce (key elements in boldface type)/ Ey systematic we mean not 0ust a few isolated terrorist acts but a clear and consistent pattern1 plan or policy of terrorist acts or methods which makes it a terrorist or+ani2ation#F> 8t is important that terrorism is defined without limiting the sub0ect or perpetrator of that activity# %he ?#S# State Department as well as 6#?# definitions limit the sub0ect or perpetrator e#g# +sub-national groups#, As a result there might be dynamics where civilian targeting by one side is treated as terrorism while civilian targeting by the other side is not#FF 8ndeed the most important common element in these several different definitions is the targeting of non-combatants# Det it is precisely this element which is missing in the new !hilippine Anti-%errorism Caw called the +=uman Security Act#,F9 %his would considerably widen the net as it were therefore making it potentially dangerous for abuse by state authorities# /right-Neville complains that +too often anecdotal evidence has been taken out of conte)t and used to demoni2e individuals and groups that do not meet most standard definitions of terrorism even though such groups might see violence as an important part of their political strategy#,F< 8n other words armed struggle is not necessarily terrorism# !eace studies postgraduate 7uben %horning of the ?niversity of Eradford notes that +8n 8ndonesia separatists in Aceh and !apua are consistently labeled as terrorists although none of the groups are known to deliberately target civiliansG %he problem with this categori2ation is that it gives legitimacy to campaigns against many groupings that in a different time would have been categori2ed as legitimate political opposition#,FH %errorist labeling or listing has unfortunately for the most part has been at best very sub0ective and at worst a tool for power politics nationally and internationally#

F*

See Soliman -# Santos :r# +%errorismA an emerging definition and framework for handling it, (manuscript $$ September *;;9)# F> Soliman -# Santos :r# +%errorismA %oward a Cegal Definition , Philippines 3ree Press *@ December *;;* pp# *@-*&# FF .omment by Dr# 4ivimaki# F9 7epublic Act No# &>H* approved on < -arch *;;H# F< /right-Neville +Dangerous dynamics, >;# FH 7uben %horning +%errorism and .ounter-%errorism in Southeast AsiaA /hich is the Greater %hreatM , N!ASnytt No# > September *;;> p# $;#

=owever the +new terrorism, paradigm or school of analysts led by Eruce =offmanF@ characteri2es this post-&'$$ terrorism as resembling a global insurgency which may be unsystematic and may target not 0ust civilians but also iconic government and military targets# %he ob0ective is not so much political as religious and is not so much for an intended audience but to punish and destroy targets# %his school of thought is critical of the narrow approach of the G/(% but wants it e)panded into a +Global .ounter-8nsurgency#,F& Det the latter would be even more worrisome in terms of dangerously widening the net# Apparently an internationally acceptable encompassing legal definition of terrorism continues to be elusive while there is now a bothersome drift to conflate terrorism and insurgency " as has already been happening on the !hilippine front# As a 5ilipino -uslim scholar says even +%errorism has its own distinct nuances the world over and the case of the !hilippines strongly shows the need to bear such distinctions#,9; Cet us take first the most prominent list with the most far reaching conse1uences and sanctions " the ?#S# State Department3s list of terrorist organi2ations with its three classifications " in this case as concerns !hilippine armed groups as of :une *;;<A $# 3orei+n Terrorist -r+ani2ations (5%(s) " Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) New !eople3s Army (N!A) *# Terrorist E4clusion 5ist (%6C) " Ale) Eoncayao Erigade (AEE) 7a0ah Solaiman -ovement (7S-) !entagon Gang ># -ther Terrorist -r+ani2ations ((%() - AEE 7S-9$ Eased on the local knowledge of the track record of these several armed groups and on the afore-cited definitions of terrorism inc# that of the ?#S# .riminal .ode only the ASG and the 7S- can be rightly classified as terrorist organi2ations with their resort to bombings of urban population centers civilian transport and passenger terminals# %he !entagon Gang is basically a criminal kidnap-for-ransom (457) syndicate but composed of former -oro rebels# %he N!A and the AEE (now merged with fellow N!A breakaway group the 7evolutionary !roletarian Army as 7!A-AEE) do not have a track record of systematically targeting civilians# %he AEE no longer e)ists as AEE but as 7!A-AEE under the %e"olusyonaryon+ Partido n+ Man++a+a'a-Pilipinas (7!--! 7evolutionary /orkers !arty-!hilippines) which had split from the .ommunist !arty of the !hilippines (.!!)# %he 7!--!'7!AAEE is currently in a peace process with a ceasefire with the !hilippine government for several years now# %he 7!A-AEE3s recent armed hostilities have actually been more with the rival N!A than with any other armed force# 8n its heyday in the late $&@;s and early $&&;s as the N!A3s armed city partisan unit in -etro -anila the old AEE had
F@

See Eruce =offman !nside Terrorism (New DorkA .olumbia ?niversity !ress rev# ed# *;;<) and +%he New %errorism, in Andrew %#=# %an and 4umar 7amakrishna (eds#) The Ne' Terrorism: Anatomy1 %ends and Counter-Strate+ies (SingaporeA 6astern ?niversities !ress *;;*) >;-F&# F& .omment by !rof# %an# 9; .omment by !rof# /adi# 9$ As accessed through the ?#S# National -emorial 8nstitute for the !revention of %errorism (-8!%) %errorism 4nowledge Ease (%4E) website at www#tkb#org#

conducted numerous urban guerrilla assassination-type operations against mainly police targets and some ?#S# military personnel# %he most prominent such ?#S# victim of the old AEE was .ol# :ames N# 7owe Deputy .ommander of the :oint ?#S# -ilitary Assistance Group (:?S-AG) in $&@&# %he ?#S# has never forgotten this about the old AEE even as it doesn3t seem to have updated itself about the 7!A-AEE# /hen the ?#S# first listed the AEE in *;;$ this is what the 7!A-AEE had to say among othersA +%he inclusion of the PAEE 3 presently the 7!A-AEE in the list of terrorist groups is utterly condemnable# (n closer look many of those included in the list are legitimate revolutionary organi2ations worldwide that are waging revolutionary struggle against oppression and e)ploitation in their respective countries# %he ?#S# government3s deliberate mi)ing up of revolutionary organi2ations with bandits criminal syndicates and terrorist groups can only be taken as an attempt to malign revolutionary movements if not e)poses its distorted and biased definition of terrorism#,9* %he N!A terrorist listing not only by the ?#S# but also by the 6#?# the Netherlands ?nited 4ingdom (?#4#) .anada and Australia in *;;* has become particularly controversial because the issue has resulted in the suspension of peace talks at the instance of the .!!-led National Democratic 5ront (ND5) since *;;F# ?nlike with the ASG and the -8C5 the N!A has no 8slamic connection that could possibly put it in the network of Al-Qaeda or :8# Eut the N!A has been the most avowedly +anti-?#S# imperialist, among the !hilippine armed groups even more than the ASG which has also killed not only ?#S# military personnel but even civilians# %his must largely e)plain the inclusion of the N!A in the ?#S# list# Cong before this ?#S# list the !hilippine government since the -arcos dictatorship has often referred to the N!A as +communist terrorists, (.%s) or +dissident terrorists, (D%s) while referring to the -NC5 and -8C5 as +-uslim terrorists, or +secessionist terrorists#, Eut in fairness to the overall historical record of the N!A in its conduct of armed struggle it has not as a policy and has not generally in practice engaged in terrorism or acts of terrorism by deliberately targeting civilians# %his would go against its strategy of building a wide and deep peasant mass base in the countryside as the main political re1uirement for rural guerrilla warfare# A mass base based mainly on fear rather than on winning the hearts and minds of the people would only be counter-productive to the -aoist protracted people3s war " either by making it more protracted or by unwittingly helping the government3s +war of 1uick decision#, %he long-time N!A practice of li1uidation of civilian informers (to be distinguished from military deep penetration agents) and other +bad elements, (e#g# cattle rustlers rapists and other criminals) and the more recent N!A practices of +revolutionary ta)ation, (e)tortion to many esp# the government) and of attacks on civilian infrastructure (usually business company cell sites vehicles and e1uipment for refusal to pay +revolutionary ta)es,) are grey or borderline areas as to whether these constitute terrorism or acts of terrorism#
9*

.arapali Cualhati .ommanding (fficer 7evolutionary !roletarian Army-Ale) Eoncayao Erigade (7!AAEE) !ress Statement @ December *;;$#

Some of these acts may be characteri2ed as violations of !hilippine criminal law though what are ordinarily common crimes like murder and grave coercion are considered absorbed in the political offense of rebellion#9> Some may also be considered violations of 8=C like the attacks or reprisals on civilian ob0ects and infrastructure which do not serve valid military ob0ectives#9F Serious violations of 8=C (i#e# war crimes) and for that matter acts of terrorism can'should not however be considered to be validly in furtherance of rebellion#99 Still on the overall balance of things it would be inaccurate if not unfair to characteri2e the N!A as a +terrorist organi2ation#, Actually the same conclusion was already made $; years ago (in $&&<) by a ?#S# counter--aoist insurgency e)pert who definitely has no love lost for the N!A# /hile saying that the N!A made use of terror to maintain the insurgent infrastructure in its guerrilla fronts he also says that the actions +have not yet become terrorism#, Should it become this +it would indicate the death of the insurgency# At the moment this point has not been reached#, %en years hence the N!A seems to have become bigger and stronger# %he e)pert took pains to +differentiate properly between terrorism and terror#, 8t is not the means but the ends which differentiates the two because the means are often similar in form# %errorism is small-group violence carried out in pursuance of certain political goals and usually serving some intended message# %error is undertaken by members of an insurgent movement (implying mass recruitment) in furtherance of maintaining its political infrastructure#9< Some 5ilipino socialist cadres (who split from the .!!) citing K#8# Cenin Ceon %rotsky and .he Guevara say that +%errorism as a strategy has no place in the revolutionary socialist or -ar)ist movementG As -ar)ists we are not opposed to the use of acts of terror (or guerrilla actions) under conditions of insurrection or civil war# =owever we are opposed to terrorist acts " whether as strategy or tactics " i#e# acts carried out outside the conte)t of an insurrectionary situation or civil war or acts carried out by individuals or small groups separated from a mass armed struggle#,9H %hese socialist cadres now identified with the Partido n+ Man++a+a'an+ Pilipino (!-! 5ilipino /orkers !arty) advocate the primacy of mass struggle over military or armed struggle as strategy# Going back to terrorist listing there is also the ?#S# National -emorial 8nstitute for the !revention of %errorism (-8!%) %errorism 4nowledge Ease (%4E) which in turn draws much from 7AND .orporation databases# %he %4E in :une *;;< lists the terrorist organi2ations in the !hilippines in the following orderA Abdura0ak :an0alani Erigade
9>

%he political offense doctrine in the !hilippines was established by the Supreme .ourt decision in People &s/ Hernande2 (&& !hil# 9$9) in the conte)t of the old =uk rebellion the historical antecedent of the N!A# 9F Article 9* !rotocol 8 of the Geneva .onventions# 99 /aldemar A# Solf +%he Status of .ombatants in Non-8nternational Armed .onflicts under Domestic Caw and %ransnational !ractice , American 6ni&ersity 5a' %e&ie' Kol# >> No# $ $&@> pp# <;-<9# 9< %homas A# -arks Maoist !nsur+ency Since 7ietnam (CondonA 5rank .ass $&&<) $9$-H> which is .hapter > +%he 7ole of %errorA %he .ase of the !hilippines#, 9H Sonny -elencio and 7eihana -ohideen +.riti1ue of the politico-military strategy , 5in s No# $H :anuary-April *;;$#

(A:E) ASG AEE 5ree Kietnam 7evolutionary Group 8ndigenous !eople3s 5ederal Army (8!5A) :8 4abataang -akabayan (4-) 4umpulan -u0ahidin -alaysia (4--) -8C5 -NC5 N!A !eople3s 7evolutionary 5ront 7S- 7ebolusyonaryong =ukbong Eayan (7=E) and al-Jaeda# 8t must be noted however that not all of these notably the -8C5 are in the ?#S# State Department3s list of terrorist organi2ations indicating that it does not necessarily follow what is indicated in the %4E#9@ /e have already commented about the ASG 7S- AEE and N!A# %he A:E is really 0ust another name military-coined for the ASG# %he 5ree Kietnam 7evolutionary Group and the !eople3s 7evolutionary 5ront if they ever e)isted have long become defunct# %he 8!5A has been largely inactive and could hardly be characteri2ed as +terrorist, " its closest claim to this was the planting of a few intentionally ineffectual (as in dud) +bombs, and telephone calls to announce their location along with an indigenous peoples3 demand for federalism# :8 4-- and al-Jaeda 1ualify as terrorist but they are not 5ilipino organi2ations nor have known 5ilipino members though they operate here# 4- is the underground but basically unarmed nat-dem youth organi2ation affiliate of the ND5# %he -8C5 and -NC5 are -oro rebel groups not terrorist organi2ations# 7=E is a communist rebel group which broke away from and currently has active hostilities (like the 7!A-AEE) with the N!A# 8ncidentally in the %4E group profile of the 7=E among others the -aoist N!A is repeatedly referred to as the +!CA , apparently confused with the .hinese !eople3s Ciberation Army# %he obvious point is about 1uestions of accuracy and 1uality of supposed +indepth information, in the %4E as shown especially regarding a country (in this case the !hilippines) which the ?#S# ought to know better because of its long-time special relations and even military presence here# (ne can only imagine the dire conse1uences of such information +for researchers policymakers emergency responders and the general public#, .learly as regards such a +knowledge base , local knowledge knows better# %errorism and the !eace !rocess with the -8C5 (ne dire conse1uence of such information has been in its translation into an overriding post-&'$$ anti-terrorism policy# 8n the !hilippines this started with !resident Arroyo3s -emorandum (rder No# >H providing for a $F-pillar anti-terrorism policy in (ctober *;;$ " +but this plan in the main emphasi2es military measures# 5undamental grievances such as -oro landlessness poverty unemployment widespread discrimination and .atholic militia abuses remain unaddressed#,9& 8ncidentally this was also when the peace negotiations with the -8C5 started to slow down# And by December *;;> she would say that +%he government will not allow the peace process to stand in the way of the overriding fight against terrorism#,

9@ 9&

.omment by !rof# %an# %an +%he 8ndigenous 7oots of .onflict in Southeast Asia, $$$#

(ther similar lines of thinking show that the anti-terrorism syndrome has become an obstacle or threat to the viability of various peace processes esp# peace negotiations with rebel groups# /e 1uote some nowA +5rom these intelligence reports it is very clear :emaah 8slamiyah and al-Jaeda have a solid presence in the !hilippines# Det the government in its peace talks continues to offer autonomy to the -8C5 in its stronghold#,<; +And it is these N-8C5-:8O bonds that now present perhaps the most serious obstacle to a peace agreement in the southern !hilippines#,<$ +A central parado) of the southern !hilippines peace process is that it presents the main short-term obstacle to rooting out the terrorist network and an indispensable element in any long-term remedy#,<* +Genuine and fully implemented autonomy for !hilippine -uslims is a sine 0ua non for winning the long-term war on terror in -indanao#,<>

8n short the war on terror is more important than the peace process such that the latter should even serve and not become an obstacle to the former# 8t is the peace process now which is the main obstacle# 8n the !hilippines there is a vernacular e)pression for thisA "ali+tad na an+ mundo (the world is now upside down)# %he thing with the war on terror is its overarching focus on terrorism to the neglect of other issues# 8t is programmed to look for and find terrorists and terrorist links and neutrali2ing them is all that matters# /hen those links even if peripheral are found or strongly believed to be found based mainly on intelligence reports with regards to a particular rebel group like the -8C5 negotiating peace with the government the logic of the war on terror is to downgrade or even scrap negotiations in favor of military offensives or +all-out war#, %he conventional wisdom is not to negotiate with terrorists# %he +militari2ation of the response to terrorism ,<F (e#g# the ASG) is carried over to the militari2ation of the response to rebellion (e#g# the -8C5 and the N!A)# ?nderlying this is the 1uestion of understanding the roots and nature of the rebellion in order to address it properly# And if this is not understood and operationali2ed the peace process 0ust becomes part of the collateral damage# 5rom the perspective of peace advocacy it is therefore hard to go along with the view that +%o date the impact of the /ar on %errorism is mi)ed but on balance
<; <$

7essa Seeds of Terror $F;# 8nternational .risis Group +Southern !hilippines EackgrounderA %errorism and the !eace !rocess , 8.G Asia 7eport No# @; Singapore'Erussels $> :uly *;;F p# $> <* 8bid 9# <> 8bid *<# <F Nick =owen +-ilitary 5orce and .riminal :usticeA %he ?#S# 7esponse to $$ September L 8nternational Caw, (!aper prepared for the 8nternational .ouncil on =uman 7ights !olicy 8nternational -eeting on Global %rends and =uman 7ights " Eefore and After September $$th Geneva :anuary $;-$* *;;*)#

positiveG the current positive international conditions,<9 and see it even as a +window of opportunity, for the -indanao peace process or that +the seminal events of $$ September *;;$ appear to have given the peace process in -indanao a boost given the -8C53s apparent reevaluation of its stand#,<< (n the contrary among the several ma0or reasons for the persistence of the -indanao conflict are such +complications under the current global orderA, the rise of international terrorism e)emplified by Al-Qaeda and the ?#S#-led global war on terror both of which create conditions that lead only to more violence and destructive policies#<H (ne of the grave conse1uences of the government3s anti-terrorism campaign has been widespread cases of human rights violations the brunt of which is borne by the -uslim minority community including aggravation of long-standing .hristian ma0ority discrimination against them#<@ %o these politico-military and socio-legal factors one might add the cultural factor of a self-fulfilling +clash of civili2ations, between the /est and 8slam aggravating centuries-old .hristian--uslim cleavages in -indanao# 8t is then no wonder that the issue of alleged -8C5-:8 links had become one cause for the delays in the peace negotiations with the -8C5 in the recent past# %hat issue was not in the substantive agenda of the talks but was an issue of trust and confidence# %he distrust on the government side reflected thinking like that the -8C5 was pursuing a +mi)ed Nor hedgedO political strategy, of +maintain(ing) military capacity and international 0ihadist solidarity at the same time as they negotiate , using the :8 card to +bring new international urgency to solving the southern !hilippines conflict#,<& Eut if one looks at and thinks of it well the -8C5 does not really need :8 for military build-up and more so for peace negotiations and diplomatic work " :8 is even a liability for the latter purposes# 7ather it is :8 which has needed the -8C5 more for its infrastructure in .entral -indanao# %he claim in early *;;9 that +:83s strategic base Nmain training ground and refuge of key :8 leadersO has now shifted to the !hilippines, is anchored on its access to the infrastructure of -8C5 camps in .entral -indanao#H; Eut the proffered evidence for this so far has not been compelling# 6ven the 8.G assessed in late *;;9 that the -8C5 +is distancing itself from partnership, with :8#H$

<9

Dr# !aul (1uist +-indanao and EeyondA .ompeting !olicies !rotracted !eace !rocess and =uman Security, (7eport on !eace and Development in -indanao prepared for the ?nited Nations Development !rogramme *> (ctober *;;*) *@# << %an +%he 8ndigenous 7oots of .onflict in Southeast Asia, $$$# <H -iriam .oronel 5errer +%he !hilippine State and -oro 7esistanceA Dynamics of a !ersistent .onflict, in 4amarul2aman Askandar and Ayesah Abubakar (eds#) The Mindanao Conflict (!enang -alaysiaA Southeast Asian .onflict Studies Network *;;9) *<# <@ Atty# Iainudin S# -alang +%he !hilippines3 Anti-%errorism .ampaign and its 8mpact on the 7ights of the -uslim .ommunity, (manuscript n#d#)# <& 8.G +Southern !hilippines Eackgrounder, @ *<# H; -aria A# 7essa +%he New Strategic Ease of :emaah 8slamiyah , Ne's"rea *9 April *;;9 pp# $<-$H# H$ 8nternational .risis Group +!hilippines %errorismA %he 7ole of -ilitant 8slamic .onverts , 8.G Asia 7eport No# $$; :akarta'Erussels $& December *;;9 6)ecutive Summary and 7ecommendations p# i#

%he government understandably wanted validation or verification of the -8C53s :une *;;> avowed renunciation of terrorism and terrorist links# No less than the -8C5 imam (religio-political leader) Salamat =ashim had stated it this way 0ust a few weeks before his death (thus like some kind of +dying declaration,)A +%here can be no more strong ground for the -8C5 to condemn terrorism than that it is anathema to the teachings of 8slam# %o stress seriously this point 8 hereby reiterate our condemnation and abhorrence of terroristic tendencies in order to eschew the reverse side of the language of endemic state violence# .onse1uently we re0ect and deny any link with terrorist organi2ations or activities in this part of the Asian region particularly in South !hilippines and elsewhere in the world#,H* Kalidation and trust eventually came and continues to come in the form of -8C5A5! intelligence cooperation and 0oint action in the interdiction of criminal'terrorist elements and also up close and personal interaction between the counterparts of both sides in the ceasefire maintenance and in the peace talks# A 5ilipino general on the government side of this peace process attributes much of the mutual confidence to its being built by close personal interaction# =e said there is a way of gauging the sincerity of the other side in and out of the peace negotiations# Cike a +certain honor among warriors , he is certain about the mainstream -8C5 +negotiating on a sincere basis, and having +shed terrorist links if they had before#,H> 8n the final analysis it is the !hilippine government3s perceived sincerity of the -8C5 (in contrast to its perceived insincerity of the ND5) which has been holding back its endorsement of a ?#S# listing of the -8C5 as a terrorist organi2ation# Some counter-terrorism e)perts and 1uarters have only recently had to eat their words about (declaring) the -8C5 as a terrorist organi2ation which is part of the AlQaeda or :8 network in S6A# /hereas before the line was to chide +the government in its peace talks (for) continu(ing) to offer autonomy to the -8C5 in its stronghold ,HF now some of them already say that +there is a need to move forward with the peace process, albeit in the frame of it being +one way to de-radicali2e these groups ,H9 and not so much because there is a centuries-old Eangsamoro problem to be solved# 7ather than being +the main short-term obstacle to rooting out the terrorist network ,H< the peace process provides both a short-term and long-term remedy# 8n the short-term +attempts to move directly against terrorists embedded in -8C5-controlled or influenced territory ,HH like the successful A5! air strike against the !entagon gang in August *;;F are best done in the conte)t of peace process-inspired cooperation and coordination# 8n the long-term +without a successful peace agreement the region will
H*

Salamat =ashim +%errorism is Anathema to the %eachings of 8slam , statement on *; :une *;;> reprinted in Ash-Shay Ash-Shaheed Salamat =ashim 89e must 'in the stru++le:; (.amp Abubakre AsSiddi1ue -indanao Eansamoro Darul :ihadA Agency for Douth Affairs " -8C5 *;;9) @-&# H> Ct# Gen# 7odolfo 7# Garcia A5! (7et#) in reaction to 7ohan Gunaratna at the +-eeting on -indanao, on & :une *;;< at the ND.!# Also Ct# Gen# 7odolfo 7# Garcia A5! (7et#) interview by Soliman -# Santos :r# on *> :une *;;< in !asig .ity# HF 7essa Seeds of Terror $F;# H9 Gunaratna remarks at the +-eeting on -indanao, on & :une *;;<# H< 8.G +Southern !hilippines Eackgrounder, 9# HH 8bid#

continue as a 2one of lawlessness in which terrorism can thrive ,H@ especially if the conditions which give rise to terrorism are not addressed# 8n fine and in perspective the peace process can provide collateral benefits for the war on terror even as this is not and should not be the main ob0ective of the peace process# %o paraphrase 7obert 5# 4ennedy some of us see +sanctuaries of terror,H& in -indanao and ask why we would rather look at the +sanctuaries of peace,@; there and ask why not more# %errorism and the !eace !rocess with the ND5 %he G/(% has also added fuel to the other local war situation involving the N!A - both its protracted people3s war and the government3s counter-insurgency war# %here is a local conte)t here that does not 1uite fit the ?#S#-led anti-terrorism approach#@$ Eut the !hilippine government3s counter-insurgency war has been framed as a counterterrorist war " esp# with the ?#S# +terrorist, listing of the .!! the N!A and ND5 .hief !olitical .onsultant !rof# :ose -aria Sison (whom most believe to actually be the .!! .hairman) in August *;;*# %he Arroyo administration has welcomed and taken advantage of this listing as shown soon thereafter by the +Nine-!oint Guidelines 8ssued by the !resident 7eA the .!!,@* and by her order for redeployment of the A5! against the N!A in August *;;* (her order renewed in :une *;;<)#@> Among the guidelines wereA
*# %he .!!-N!A has engaged in terrorist acts against civilian targetsG as part of the overall aim to overthrow the duly constituted government and the democratic systemB F# <# %he government welcomes the action of the ?#S# declaring the .!!-N!A as a terrorist organi2ationB this is not interference in the internal affairs of the !hilippinesB %he government will maintain open lines of communication with the .!!-N!A in the hope of ending the employment of violence and terrorism as a means to attain political ends and to achieve national unity and reconciliation under the .onstitutionB %here is no ceasefire between the government and the .!!-N!AB military and police operations will continueB %he government calls on other communist organi2ations that are not engaged in unlawful acts to condemn the violence and terrorism being perpetrated by the .!!N!AB

H# @#

H@ H&

8bid# 4it .ollier and -alcolm .ook +%he !hilippines3 sanctuaries of terror , Philippine .aily !n0uirer < -ay *;;< p# A$># @; +Sanctuaries of peace, are what some people-initiated community-based peace 2ones in .entral -indanao are called# 5or more on such peace 2ones see Soliman -# Santos :r# Peace <ones in the Philippines: Concept1 Policy and !nstruments (Jue2on .ity !hilippinesA Gaston I# (rtigas !eace 8nstitute *;;9)# @$ .omment by !rof# %an# @* As published in the Philippine Star $F August *;;*# @> !ress Eriefing of Secretary 8gnacio Eunye 9 August *;;* from the (ffice of the !ress Secretary#

&#

%he government calls upon the entire citi2enry to get involved in the fight against the .!!-N!AG

Sison then instantly reciprocated in kind with a call for +all-out resistance, against the +?#S#-directed -acapagal-Arroyo regime , and for strengthening +all types of alliances to isolate and remove the -acapagal-Arroyo ruling cli1ue#,@F %he +terrorist, tagging seems to have had the effect of some kind of siege mentality on the ND5 side especially as far as Sison himself is concerned#@9 8n an irony of sorts the ><th .!! anniversary statement of *< December *;;F said that the N!A +is now trying to develop the ability to make and use the weapons that the 8ra1i resistance is now usingG rocket-propelled grenades improvised e)plosive devices mortars and other close range weapons#,@< %he worst-case scenario this seems to con0ure is of the !hilippines as not only a +second Afghanistan, but also a +second 8ra1#, 8t was clear from the +Nine-!oint Guidelines 8ssued by the !resident 7eA the .!!, that the Arroyo government was putting military action over peace negotiations in dealing with the .!!-N!A which it treats more as +terrorist, than as +communist#, And while it +will maintain open lines of communication with the .!!-N!A , there was no more even mention of peace negotiations# Still it is worth noting how the then !residential Adviser on the !eace !rocess (!A!!) now 6)ecutive Secretary tried to nuance the !resident3s Nine-!oint GuidelinesA
(n the issue of terrorist groups government has adopted a policy of not dealing or negotiating with such criminal groups 'hose main moti&ation is neither political1 ideolo+ical or reli+ious# %herefore such groups as the Abu Sayyaf the !entagon and other kidnap-for ransom bands are dealt with through military and police operations# 7ecently however the government has had to review this policy in the light of the ?#S# State Department3s recent designation of the .!!-N!A as a foreign terrorist organi2ationG (italics supplied) %he ?#S#3 action must be seen in the conte)t of the ?#S# role in spearheading the global campaign against terrorism and of the CPP-NPA issue as an internal matter 'hich must "e addressed throu+h our o'n internal policy/ 8n a &-point policy guide on dealing with this issue the government stated that while it condemns the acts of the CPP-NPA 'hich constitute terrorist acts and demands that these acts cease immediately open communication lines however shall continue to be maintained in pursuance of the peace efforts 'ith the said or+ani2ation#@H (italics supplied)
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:ose -aria Sison ND5! .hief !olitical .onsultant +%he !eople3s All-(ut 7esistance /ill Defeat the All-(ut /ar of the 6nemy , !ress Statement < August *;;*# @9 See e#g# :ose -aria Sison 6/S/ Terrorism = 9ar in the Philippines (!hilippinesA Aklat ng Eayan 8nc# *;;>)B and !ublic 8nterest Caw .enter +Caws Cabels and CiberationA %he .ase of :ose -aria Sison, (n#d#)# @< .entral .ommittee .ommunist !arty of the !hilippines +Avail of the /orsening .risis and 8ntensify the Guerrilla (ffensives to Advance the New Democratic 7evolution , *< December *;;F N>< th Anniversary StatementO#

%here was a small window of opportunity here for those who would advocate the primacy of peace negotiations over military action in dealing with the ma0or rebel groups not 0ust the .!!-N!A-ND5 but also the -8C5# %hus the conventional wisdom of +not negotiating with terrorists, should not be absoluti2ed# %here must be more nuancing even where there is a +foreign terrorist organi2ation, designation# A designation whether +terrorist, or otherwise is not all there is about an organi2ation# 8t3s actual actuations should be more controlling for the setting of policy about it# Domestic policy is or should be distinct from the policy of a foreign country# %he issue of +terrorist, designation or listing is distinct from the issue of peace negotiations# Arguably the best current e)ample is the Sri Canka peace process with the Ciberation %igers of %amil 6elam (C%%6)# %he C%%6 has long been designated by the ?#S# and most recently in *;;< by the 6#?# as +terrorist#, Det without necessarily lifting this designation both the ?#S# and 6#?# have e)pressed support for the continued pursuance of the Sri Canka peace process# Eut such above-1uoted dovish views appear to have lost much of the policy battle at the .abinet level to the hawks as shown when the !resident lays down the hard line# As we already indicated in the case of the -8C5 the campaign against terrorism reflects a drift toward the militari2ation of the response to terrorism and predominance of the military and military solutions in addressing not only terrorism but also rebellion and internal armed conflict# %his is due not only to pro-war vested or institutional interests in the military but also to something more ideological# At another more comprehensive or encompassing level the counter-terrorism syndrome has reinforced an already dominant or hegemonic ideology of national security particularly its thrust of counter-insurgency as the framework to address insurgency or rebellion# 6ven the peace process has become subsumed under a national or internal security framework# %he peace negotiations in particular through the !A!! have been sub0ect to the .abinet (versight .ommittee (.(.) on 8nternal Security created by 6)ecutive (rder No# *$ with a counter-insurgency +Strategy of =olistic Approach#,@@ At least in the case of the ND5 it seems that the Arroyo government3s ob0ective for the peace process is no longer so much addressing the root causes of rebellion as it is demobili2ing the rebel forces# 6ven before Arroyo there has been the persistent militarist mentality of degrading the military capability of the rebels in order to be able to impose a peace settlement on them#

@H

Sec# 6duardo 7# 6rmita +%he !eace !rocessA Addressing Separatism %errorism 8nsurgency and Development , paper delivered at the 9th Cecture Series of the 7amos !eace and Development 5oundation 8nc# -akati .ity September < *;;*# @@ !resident Gloria -acapagal-Arroyo 6)ecutive (rder No# *$ +.reating a .oordinative and 8ntegrative System on 8nternal Security , $& :une *;;$#

And now as of :une *;;< there is !resident Arroyo3s +all-out war, order to the A5! and !N! to crush the N!A +in two years,@& " of course with a little help from ?#S# anti-terrorist logistics support which also funds the A5!3s moderni2ation aspirations# Nearly four decades of armed conflict should have shown to both sides now the futility illusion and great cost of aspiring for a military victory over the other side# %o set the record straight though it was at the ND53s initiative that the formal peace talks have been suspended since August *;;F# %he ND5 blamed the government mainly for not complying with its confidence-building commitments to take effective measures for the lifting of the foreign listings of the .!! N!A and Sison as +terrorist, which are adverse to the talks saying this matter was the first of several +pre0udicial 1uestions, for their resumption#&; At most the government panel had asked the ?#S# the 6#?# and the Dutch Government +to 0udge the .!!-N!A'ND5 through its participation in the peace processG (this) will be the ultimate benchmark to determine the validity of its negative labeling by other nations#,&$ 8t also told the ND5 panel +that by participating in the peace talks it can better convince the world that the ND5 is sincerely interested to walk the road to peace rather than terrorism#,&* /hile it may be true that the +terrorist, listing of the .!! N!A and Sison create an unfavorable climate for peace negotiations the latter should not have been held hostage to the ND5 demand for the lifting of the said +terrorist, listing which ultimately are policy decisions of sovereign foreign entities# Again the case of the C%%6 vis-a-vis the Sri Canka peace process comes to mind# 8n Sri Canka as with the !hilippines there is a history including a history of peace negotiations which cannot 0ust be disregarded# 8n the case of the !hilippine government and the ND5 there have been on-and-off peace negotiations since $&&* although more off than on but which have at least produced a substantive $&&@ Comprehensi&e A+reement on %espect for Human %i+hts and !nternational Humanitarian 5a' (.A7=78=C)#&> %his of course includes the 8=C prohibitions against +measures of terrorism,&F and +acts of terrorism#,&9
@&

.hristine (# Avendano +G-A orders 7eds crushed in * yearsA !$E to A5! !N! kicks off all-out war vs N!A , Philippine .aily !n0uirer $H :une *;;< p#A$# &; !rof# :ose -aria Sison .hief !olitical .onsultant ND5! Negotiating !anel +!re0udicial Juestions and !roposals of the ND5! , *$ :une *;;9 ?trecht %he Netherlands# See also 7ey .laro .asambre 6)ecutive Director !hilippine !eace .enter +An (verview of the G7!-ND5! !eace Negotiations, (!aper prepared for the /orkshop on the !eace !rocess and =uman 7ights !hilippine !olitical !arties .onference *& :une *;;9)# &$ (ffice of the !residential Adviser on the !eace !rocess !ress 7elease +G7! !anel Appeals for .!!N!A , $H August *;;F# &* Government of the 7epublic of the !hilippines !eace Negotiating !anel for %alks with the .!!'N!A'ND5 (G!N!-.NN) +G7! 7egrets ND5 !eace %alk !ostponement , $$ August *;;F# &> Comprehensi&e A+reement on %espect for Human %i+hts and !nternational Humanitarian 5a' "et'een the Go&ernment of the %epu"lic of the Philippines and the National .emocratic 3ront of the Philippines dated $< -arch $&&@# &F $&F& Gene&a Con&ention 7 Article >* first paragraph# &9 $&HH Additional Protocol !! Art# F par# *(d)#

8n the light of this recent history and the rich resource of even 0ust domestic e)perience (though often more negative than positive) in peace negotiations not only with the ND5 initially in $&@<-@H but also with the -NC5 from $&H9-&< the indigenous .ordillera !eople3s Ciberation Army (.!CA) in $&@< the military rebels of %e"olusyonaryon+ Alyansan+ Ma a"ansa (7A-) and Alyansan+ Tapat sa Sam"ayanan (AC%AS) from $&&*-&9 the -8C5 from $&&H-present the communist breakaway factions %e"olusyonaryon+ Partido n+ Man++a+a'a-Pilipinas (7!--!) from $&&&present and %e"olusyonaryon+ Partido n+ Man++a+a'a-Mindanao (7!---) from *;;9-present " most of which groups incidentally have been called +terrorist, at one time or another - the 1uestion of peace negotiations with the ND5 (representing the +terrorist, .!!-N!A) deserves more enlightened treatment than is currently being given " by both sides and all concerned# %here is a need to get it right about terrorism as there is a need to get it right about peace whether in a country like the !hilippines or globally# %his is what we have tried to do in this overview using the case of !hilippine armed groups to criti1ue the dominant anti-terrorism analysis and discourse of definitions designations listings and networks# 8t shows that the hegemonic G/(% prism misses or does not properly consider specific and comple) local and conte)tual variables#&< As a result a ma0or casualty of +collateral damage, with this approach is the 1uest for a 0ust lasting and comprehensive peace which addresses the root causes of internal armed conflicts# And because this is tied up in some aspects with the root causes of terrorism the legitimate fight against terrorism loses ground strategically even if it seems to have gained ground tactically# %he key insight from the !hilippine case is the need to distinguish decades-old socially-based rebellion'insurgency from post-&'$$ terrorism# And one good way to get the distinction is to look well at the armed groups concerned since these are the vehicles or embodiment of rebellion and'or terrorism as the case may be# Q

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