The Security Dimension of Sino-Japanese Relations: Warily Watching One Another Author(s): Wu Xinbo Source: Asian Survey, Vol.

40, No. 2 (Mar. - Apr., 2000), pp. 296-310 Published by: University of California Press Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3021134 . Accessed: 24/11/2013 13:05
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OF THE SECURITYDIMENSION RELATIONS SINO-JAPANESE

Warily WatchingOne Another

Wu Xinbo
Since the founding of the People's Republic of China (PRC) in 1949, Sino-Japaneserelations have gone through several different periods. In the 1950s and 1960s, Beijing and Tokyo relied upon economic diplomacy, with trade serving as a bridge in place of formal diplomaticrelations. From normalizationin 1972 to JapaneseEmperorAkihito's visit to the PRC in 1992, the relationshipmay be characterizedas having been one of good-neighborly friendship marked by expanding economic links and frequent exchanges of visits by political leaders. However, as a result of changes in both the internationalenvironmentand Japan's domestic political structuresince 1992, Sino-Japaneserelations have entered a period of competitive coexistence. Although each state wishes to maintain stable and strong links, the two governmentshave reached the limit of the present relationship. In particular,both are becoming increasingly uncomfortablewith the security aspects of their bilateral ties. This article explores the state of the Sino-Japanrelationshipfrom a security perspective. It first considers the security concerns that China has with respect to Japan, then reverses perspective to show Japan's concerns over China. It concludes with some observationsregardingwhy each countryhas the views it does of the other and what factors may help ameliorateconcerns and maintainstability in the relationship.

Wu Xinbo is Professorat the Centerfor AmericanStudies, FudanUniversity, Shanghai,China, and currentlyVisiting Fellow at the Centerfor NortheastAsian Policy Studies, The Brookings Institution,Washington,D.C. Asian Survey, 40:2, pp. 296-310. ISSN: 0004-4687 ( 2000 by The Regents of the University of California/Society. All rights reserved. Send Requests for Permission to Reprint to: Rights and Permissions, University of California Press, JournalsDivision, 2000 Center St., Ste. 303, Berkeley, CA 94704-1223.

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China's Security Concerns over Japan

In the 1990s, China's perceptionof Japanwas influencedby a chain of developments there. These included growing conservatism in domestic politics; Japan's more active security policy, including the redefinitionof Japan-U.S. alliance; and the tougher stance, from the Chinese perspective, that Tokyo took in dealing with Beijing. Since the end of the cold war, Japanesedomestic politics have shifted in a conservative direction.1 There have been ever-louder voices advocating a revision of Japan's postwar peace Constitution-so-called because Article 9 forbids Japanfrom possessing a regular army and deprives it of the right to declare war-that would enable the countryto exercise the right of collective defense. Conservative politicians have made more frequent efforts to deny the history of Japanese aggression leading up to and war crimes committed during World War II and the continental conflict that preceded it. On the matter of security issues, Tokyo has altered the low profile it had through much of the postwarperiod and taken a more active postureboth unilaterally and bilaterally (that is, within the context of the Japan-U.S. alliance). Spurredby the PersianGulf War and drivenby the desire to become a major global political power, Japan dispatched minesweepers to the Gulf in April 1991. This constituted the first overseas operationsby the country's Maritime Self-Defence Forces (SDF) in their history, and the Peace-Keeping Operation (PKO) Bill passed by the Diet in June 1992 legitimized making such overseas dispatchesin the future. In addition,the reaffirmation of the JapanU.S. security alliance in 1995-96 provided Tokyo with a framework for building up its military capabilities and becoming more actively involved in regional security affairs. Beijing has come to fear that the strengthenedalliance is largely intendedto constraina rising China, given that numerousJapanese politicians, academics, and members of the media have stirredup the idea of a Chinese threat. This leads to the final point, which is that since 1994 Japanhas moved away from dealing with the PRC in the conciliatory mannerit had adoptedin the 1970s and 1980s. Tokyo toughened its position on such issues as the Taiwan question and Chinese nucleartests. This change has led one observer to comment that Japan's China policy has shifted from "commercialliberalism to reluctantrealism."2 China's currentsecurityconcerns with Japanare threefold:(1) the possibility thatJapanmight become a majormilitarypower; (2) the hidden agenda of U.S.-Japansecurity alliance, i.e., to constrainand, when necessary, contain a
1. For a descriptionof the conservative trend in Japan's internalpolitics, see, among others, Wu Jinan,Japan: Standingat the Thresholdto the 21st Century(Shanghai:ShanghaiEducation Press, 1998), pp. 61-65. 2. Michael Green and Benjamin Self, "Japan'sChanging China Policy: From Commercial Liberalismto Reluctant Realism," Survival 38:2 (Summer 1996).

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within rising China;and (3) the possibility that Taiwan might be incorporated the scope of Japan-U.S. defense guidelines. Growing Japanese Military Strength Beijing long has harboredstrong suspicions over the growth of Japan's military strength. Japanmaintainsa small but highly professionalforce equipped with the most advancedconventionalweapons in Asia. The SDF's naval and air capabilities far exceed those of the People's Liberation Army (PLA). Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, Japan's defense expenditureshave ranked the second highest in the world, behind only those of the U.S. Although Japanhas no nuclearweapons, long-rangemissiles, or nuclear submarines,its strong technology base would enable it to develop such weapons systems rapidly should the political will arise. Chinese observersbelieve that since the end of the cold war, Japan's conservativeshave been trying to generate the necessary will to turn the country into a major military power through their advocacy of removing Article 9 from the Constitution,which would make Japan a so-called normal country. The PRC is particularly concernedwith some recent developments. In August 1999, Japan's Diet passed a bill enshrining the Hinomaru flag and "Kimigayo" anthem, both associated with past Japanese militarism, as the country's official symbols. In October, Prime Minister Obuchi Keizo indicated his governmentwanted to revise the relevantlaws and allow the SDF to participate in broader U.N. PKOs. Chinese analysts suggest that Japan's right-wingershave adopteda piecemeal approachto revising the Constitution of which the above developmentsdemonstratethat they have quickenedtheir pace.3 The Japan-U.S. SecurityAlliance Regardless of the constraintsimposed by the peace Constitution,Japan experts in the PRC believe that the reaffirmedJapan-U.S. security alliance has its militarymusalreadyprovidedJapanwith a basis for furtherstrengthening cle and pursuinga more active security policy. Following the joint declaration PresidentBill Clinton and Prime Minister Hashimoto Ryutaromade in April 1996, defense experts from Washingtonand Tokyo engaged in intense discussions over the revision of the U.S.-Japan defense cooperation guidelines. The new guidelines, signed in September 1997, marked a significant adjustmentin Japan's defense posture. The support Japanese forces were
3. Xin Bei, "No-WarTenet Rocked," China Daily, August 14, 1999, p. 4; and Feng Yingzi, "WhatLaw Does JapanWant to Revise?" (in Chinese), Jiefangjunbao (PLA daily), October31, 1999, p. 6. The 1992 PKO bill presently in force permits the SDF to participateonly in the and logistical parts of such operations. humanitarian

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committed to provide expanded from the exclusive defense of Japan to include dealing with contingencies in areas surroundingit. Legislation was initiated to facilitate implementationof Japan's new obligations, namely, to assist U.S. troops in a militaryconflict in the area aroundJapan. Both houses of the Diet passed the so-called related bills in the spring of 1999, thus making Japaneligible to help the U.S. police East Asia. Adoption of the related bills also gave a strong boost to the transformation of Japan's SDF into a more active and powerful military force and spurredthe momentumof those pushing for revision of the Constitution.4 PRC analysts have noted that Japan's new defense policy-formed on the basis of the New Defence ProgramOutline and the Mid-Term (1996-2000) Defence Forces ReconstructionPlan, both worked out in 1995-will have a significant impact on the SDF's future development. First, the policy calls for Japanto furtherimprove its defense technologies and military equipment while reducing personnel. Second, the SDF's operational parametershave been broadened;as a result, the SDF is seeking to develop better capabilities for fighting conflicts in areas distantfrom the home islands. Given that Japan is a strongeconomic power and possesses advancedtechnology, Chinese analysts argue that the new policy will make it possible for Japanto become a major military power in the Asia-Pacific region.5 Japanappearsto be seizing every opportunityto take actions aimed at improving its defense capabilities. For instance, when a North Korean longrange missile flew over northernJapan in August 1998, Tokyo decided it needed to launch its own reconnaissance satellite and join the U.S. in research and development (R&D) on a theatermissile defense (TMD) system.6 Chinese analysts believe that Japan's having its own reconnaissancesatellite will reduce the country's dependence on provision of intelligence data from the U.S. and greatly improve the country's own efforts to collect data on China and North Korea. Furthermore,such a satellite would also provide Japan with early-warningcapabilities, an importantcomponent for a TMD system. Japanese participationin TMD R&D serves two purposes, Chinese analysts believe. First, Japanwill gain a kind of strategicbalance with respect to the PRC by using a TMD system to nullify the threat from China's limited
4. Zhu Feng, "Bills Related to the U.S.-JapanDefense CooperationGuidelines and Trendsin Japan's Policy," ContemporaryAsia-Pacific Studies, no. 9, 1999, pp. 14-15. 5. Sun Cheng, "Japan'sNew Defense Policy and Its Impacton Asia-Pacific Security,"Pacific Journal, no. 1, 1998, pp. 86-87. 6. In August 1999, Japan and the U.S. signed a memorandumof understandingon research for a sea-based system that uses satellites to pinpointincoming missiles and shoot them down. A "basic outline" of the research had already been established. "U.S., Japan OK Anti-Missile Deal," Xinhua News Agency, Tokyo bureau,August 17, 1999.

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strategicforces. Presently,Japanis ahead of China in terms of conventional capabilities, yet it feels vulnerable in the face of China's strategic weapons. A TMD system, once proven technologically effective and deployed, could minimize the PRC's strategic deterrencethreat, which certainly would reinforce Tokyo's position vis-a-vis Beijing. Second, a TMD R&D effort would raise the level of Japan'sdefense technologies and enhance its militarycapabilities. The U.S. hopes that by involving Japan in the TMD project it will not only get Japanto share the expected high development costs but also be able to drawupon Japan'shigh-tech capabilities. In returnfor contributingto the project,Japanwill reap the researchresults, both technologically and militarily. Furthermore, while TMD is defensive in nature, the technology behind it can be used to develop offensive weapons systems. It is importantto keep in perspective China's concern with Japan's development into a major military power. For historic reasons compounded by Japan'sreluctanceto seek a genuine reconciliationwith the PRC on the matter of World War II history, the Chinese public views Japanas a country of uncertainties. In Germany, Nazism was completely liquidated after World War II, but in Japanthe same did not take place with respect to militarism. It still has some currencywith a tiny portion of the populationeven today. The frequentefforts by some conservative politicians to deny Japan's aggression in the PRC as proof of Japan's failure against Asian countriesare interpreted to provide a correct view of history to its people. Moreover, remarks by some political figures that the Japan-U.S.alliance should cover Taiwan have alarmedthe Chinese, who stronglybelieve that a handful of Japaneseremain addictedto its aggressive past. For instance, on August 17, 1997, then-Cabinet SecretaryKajiyamaSeiroku said on a television programthat the alliance would not survive if Japandid not assist U.S. forces should they get involved in an armed conflict between China and Taiwan. Ozawa Ichiro, chief of the Liberal Party, made similar comments on January 14, 1999.7 Meanwhile, Japan's enormous economic might and advanced technological capabilities provide a strongmaterialbasis for the revival of militarism. All these factors suggest that under certain circumstances,Japan could attempt to turn itself into a major military power that would pose a threatto its neighbors. Yet, despite these indicatorsmost policy and academic elites in China do not embrace the idea that Japan will become remilitarizedand aggressive. On the one hand, they share the public's concern over the growth in Japan's military strength and the possibility that the country will become a major militarypower. Some even argue that, given Japan's huge defense expendi7. ZhangGuocheng, "JapaneseCabinetSecretaryTalks Wildly, Claiming that Japan-U.S.Alliance Covers Taiwan,"People's Daily, August 19, 1997, p. 6; and Yu Qing, "JapaneseLiberal Party Chief Talks Wildly, Claiming that 'The SurroundingAreas of Japan' Includes China," People's Daily, January16, 1999, p. 3.

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tures and the sophisticatedweaponry of its forces, it already is one.8 On the other hand, these same elites believe that in light of the opposition of various Asian countriesand the U.S. to Japanbecoming such a power, the constraints of the peace Constitution,the pacifist tendency among Japan' s general populace, and the country's multiparty democratic system, militarism-though still attractiveto a tiny segment of the population-is unlikely to be revived.9 What really concerns Chinese elites is that the increase in Japan's military capabilities will shift the balance of power in Japan's favor. A militarily powerful Japanis more likely to invoke its alliance with the U.S. to intervene should a military conflict arise in the Taiwan Strait. China also is concerned that an enhanced Japanese military would constraina rising China and produce a security architecturefor East Asia that is jointly dominatedby the U.S. and Japan.10 To be sure, both countries claim that the redefinitionof the bilateral security alliance was spurredby the Persian Gulf War as well as the 1994 North Koreannuclear crisis. But the Chinese believe to the contrary. They arguethat the alliance is a relic of the cold war; now that it is over and the regional security environment has been greatly relaxed, there is no reason for the alliance to be strengthened. Chinese analysts noticed that the alliance's redefinitionoccurredat a time when people both in the U.S. and Japan were airing concerns about a potential Chinese threat. For example, in October 1995, then-ForeignMinister Kono Yohei told the Diet that China's military modernizationand territorialpolicies could be a source of instability in Asia. Commenting on the reaffirmation of the Japan-U.S.alliance, Kono noted franklythat the China factor was "quite significant from the viewpoints of Japanese security, the U.S.-Japan security regime, and the future of Asia,""1while in March 1996, then-Prime MinisterHashimotoexpressed his concern that Chinese policies in the region "might be heading in the wrong direction."12As for the U.S, the period of 1994-95 was also an eventful time for PRC-U.S. relations. Beijing and Washingtoncontinually quarrelledover human rights, arms sales, trade, and Taiwan. Sino-U.S. relationsreachedtheir nadir at this time when Taiwanese leader Lee Teng-hui visited Cornell University in June 1995. The constant
8. See, for instance, Yan Shi, "Japan'sSDF Expands Vigorously," Global Times, October 1, 1999, p. 21. 9. Wu Jinan, Japan. Standing at the Threshold to the 21st Century, pp. 248-52; and Pan Zhengqiangand Xia Liping, WorldMilitary Trends(Beijing: National Defense University Press, 1994), pp. 278-80. 10. Jianwei Wang and Xinbo Wu, Against U.S. or with U.S.? The Chinese Perspective of America's Alliances with Japan and Korea, Asia/Pacific Research Center (A/PARC) Project WorkingPaper (Stanford:StanfordUniversity, A/PARC, May 1999), pp. 31-32. 11. Asahi shinbun, October 27, 1995 (evening edition). 12. Tokyoshinbun, March 2, 1996.

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frictions aroused hot debate in the U.S. about its China policy and containment frequently was recommendedas an option. Such statementscoming from Japanand the U.S. lent supportto Beijing's interpretation of Tokyo's and Washington's motives for redefiningthe bilateral security alliance. The Chinese policy elites assume that both wanted to strengthenthe ties so as to bettercope with any potentialchallenges posed by the PRC. In a word, it is believed that the reaffirmationof the Japan-U.S. alliance contains a strong anti-Chinarationale. From the Chinese perspective, this is indicative of a significantproblem in the PRC's security environment that will impose great strategic pressures upon it. Moreover, a strong Japan-U.S. relationship also curtails China's influence in regional political and security affairs. Another Chinese concern is that the alliance's redefinition will serve American and Japaneseintentionsto establish an Asia-Pacific security architecture based on the bilateralrelationship. This would result in joint JapanU.S. dominationof the regional security order. The regional security landscape during the cold war was shaped largely along ideological lines. With the Soviet Union's collapse, the U.S. saw a chance to reshape the security order and enhance its leadershiprole. The bilateralalliance holds the key to fulfilling that objective. Some Chinese analysts suggest that by reaffirming its security ties with Tokyo and maintaining its bilateral security arrangements with South Korea, Thailand, and Australia,Washingtonis attempting to replicatea security structurelike that of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in Asia. Such a development would present the PRC with a difficult choice: either join a U.S.-led security framework or confront it alone. Neither option is attractive. What's more, argue the Chinese, the attemptto establish a U.S.-Japan condominium over the regional security architecture also runs against the ongoing multipolarizationprocess in the Asia-Pacific and makes it difficult to cultivate mutualtrustand promotecooperativesecurity in NortheastAsia. Although the Chinese have expressed strong disapprovalover the redefinition of the Japan-U.S. alliance, it is not their intention that the relationship should immediately cease to exist. Some analysts suggest that the alliance does have a positive impact on regional security.13 For one thing, it puts a lid on the growth of Japan'smilitarycapabilities. Even thoughthe U.S. has been urging Japanto play a more positive role in regional security and the redefined alliance provides Japanwith a legitimate excuse to furtherstrengthenits militarymight, the alliance also imposes a limit on how far Japancan go. In a sense, the strong ties assure the region that Japanremains pacifist and will
13. See, for instance, Wang Hongbin and Ni Feng, "U.S.-JapanAlliance and Securityin AsiaPacific Area," ContemporaryAsia-Pacific Studies, no. 3, 1998, p. 7.

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not become a militarypower thatposes a threatto its neighbors. The alliance has also proved useful in dealing with some regional crises; for instance, to get North Korea to quit its nuclear program,Tokyo joined Washington and Seoul to help build two light-water reactors for Pyongyang. On the whole, Beijing sees the alliance as a relationshipwhose functions should be strictly bilateral and not target any third party (i.e., China) or serve as a means for dominatingregional security affairs.14 The Japan-U.S. Defense Guidelines and Taiwan The Taiwan issue stands as the most importantproblem in Sino-Japanese relations. Because of Japan's colonization of Taiwan from 1895-1945, China is very sensitive to Japan's interactionswith the island. For example, Beijing protested strongly in 1994 when Japaninvited Taiwanese Vice-Premier Hsu Li-teh to attend the opening ceremonies of the Asian Games in Hiroshima. Many Chinese believe that Japan does not want to see Taiwan return to China for both historical and pragmatic reasons. These Chinese believe that, having colonized Taiwan for a half-century,the Japaneseharbor a special feeling about the island and at the bottom of their hearts want it to remainseparatefrom the mainland. From a realpolitikperspective,if Taiwan reunites with China, the PRC will become much strongerand the balance of power between China and Japanwill tilt to the former. More over, unification also would renderJapan's maritimelines of communicationin the western Pacific subject to Beijing's control. The aforementionedconcerns on Beijing's part explain why it urged Tokyo to state that Taiwan was not included in the operationalparametersof revised Japan-U.S.defense guidelines. However, Japanintentionallytook an ambiguousposition on this issue, saying that the "areas surroundingJapan" concept used in the guidelines was a scenario-specificratherthan geographic formulation. That said, some conservativeJapanesepoliticians have claimed openly that Taiwan certainly is covered by the guidelines. This worries the PRC in two respects: (1) militarily,it must be preparedto cope with a potential joint U.S.-Japaninterventionin the case of a military conflict across the Taiwan Strait;and (2) any hint of incorporatingTaiwan into the guidelines' operationalparametersmay abet the secessionist momentumon Taiwan and make it even harderto secure a peaceful unification. It is therefore understandablethat China continues pressing Japanon the coverage issue; so long as Tokyo rejects making such a statement,Taiwan will remaina sensitive and difficult issue in Beijing-Tokyo relations. Nonetheless, Beijing does understandthe limits of what adjustmentsare possible in Tokyo's Taiwan policy. Japan's booming trade with and invest14. Xu Yang, "Cui Urges Japan:Be Prudent,"China Daily, June 11, 1997, p. 1.

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ment in the Chinese mainland,as well as the steady growth of China's material strength, mean it is unlikely to jeopardize relations with the PRC for Taiwan's sake. Also, Japanusually looks to the U.S. for the orientationof its Taiwan policy. If Washingtondecides to heighten relations with Taipei, Tokyo may feel encouraged to do the same; if Washington behaves circumspectly on the Taiwan issue, Tokyo is unlikely to take bold steps in its own relations with the island. Therefore, while China will continue to watch closely Japan's interactionswith Taiwan, Beijing will still consider the U.S. to be the breakwaterand accordingly maintainits pressure on Washington.

Japan's Security Concerns over China

Several developments have shaped Japan's perceptions of the PRC in the post-cold war era. First and foremost was the demise of the Soviet threat, which dominated Japan's security concerns throughoutthe cold war years. Tokyo is now able to thinkabout other sources of threat,real or potential,in a differentsecurityenvironment. Second, there is the strongdesire for Japanto become a normalcountryin the post-cold war era. This has changed Japan's postwar neoliberalist way of thinking and led its policy makers to partially accept realist logic. As a result, concerns over balance of power, geopolitical competition, and military-strategicrivalry constantly inform Tokyo's thinking about the PRC. Third, China's rapid economic growth and pursuit of defense modernizationraises some questions for both Japaneseelites and the public: what are the implications of a strong PRC for Japan? How will Beijing exercise its growing materialstrength? Since Japanhas long been accustomed to living with weaker neighbors, the prospect of China emerging as a strong power poses a new challenge. There are in fact two possible scenarios that Japanmust consider with respect to its security concerns over China: one in which China is strong but also one in which it is weak. Regarding the first scenario, Japan's biggest concern is over the PRC's rising military capabilities. Some Japanese observers have noted that China's military spending has increased at a doubledigit rate since 1989. Chinese nuclear tests conducted between 1990 and 1996 drew strong opposition from the Japanese public, and in August 1995 the Japanesegovernmentdecided to suspendgrantassistanceto China to protest the continuedtesting. Moreover, the PRC's spring 1996 ballistic missile exercises in the Taiwan Straitalarmedthe Japaneseand aggravatedtheir concerns over Chinese militarypower. While Tokyo is not greatly worriedabout Beijing's conventionalforces, it does monitorChina's programto upgradeits nuclear and missile weaponry. And Japan's decision to join the U.S. in developing a TMD system, allegedly aimed at coping with the North Korean missile threat,is in fact a reactionto China's attemptsto modernizeits strategic arsenal. That said, Japan'sintellectualelites are not as alarmedat China's

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growing militarymuscle as the Japanesemay be in a general sense. As Sato Hideo puts it, few are worried about Chinese military power itself or a Chinese security threatin the narrowmilitary-strategicsense of the term (i.e., a PRC invasion of or missile attack on Japan). In the opinion of these elites, in China's military spending the main problems are the lack of transparency and uncertainpolitical conditions that contributeto the country's image as a potential security threat.15 On the whole, it is fair to say that while Japan does not view the PRC as an imminentand serious militarythreat,Japandoes harbor concerns over improvements to China's military capabilities, especially its nuclear and missile prowess. Another security concern is Beijing's stance on disputed territories. In waters and contiguFebruary1992, the PRC promulgateda law on territorial ous zones. In it, Beijing claimed sovereignty over the Diaoyu (also claimed by Japan as the Senkaku Islands) and the Nansha Islands (the Spratlys, as disputed by Vietnam, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Brunei). In the 1970s and 1980s, Beijing had suggested shelving its territorial disputes over the two island chains. As a consequence, its promulgationof the 1992 law was seen by Tokyo as an importantdeparturefrom the earlier position and the Japanese began to worry about Chinese territorialambitions. In early 1995, Chinabroughtundercontrol Mischief Reef (also claimed by the Philippines), which is partof the Nansha chain. To Japaneseeyes, this was not an isolated incident;rather,it was seen as part of a Chinese strategyto gain control over all the islands in dispute.16 The Taiwan issue also features prominentlyin Japan's security concerns over China. From a geopolitical perspective,Japandoes not really favor Taiwan's reunificationwith the Chinese mainland. Tokyo has aired its anxiety that the PRC might use force to resolve the issue. A military conflict in the Taiwan Strait certainly would have an impact on Japan's security environif the PRC chose to blockade Taiwan or a militaryconflict ment; furthermore, across the Straitturnedout to be a protractedone, Japan'slines of communication throughthe channel would be jeopardized. Moreover, if a war broke out between Beijing and Taipei, no matter who provoked it the U.S. would likely intervene. In such a case, Washington in turn would ask Tokyo to provide assistance to U.S. troops as the terms of the bilateralalliance oblige. This would put Japanin a very difficult position: if it agreed to provide support, it would run the risk of joining a fight against China, which, needless to
15. Hideo Sato, "Japan'sChina Perceptions and Its Policies in the Alliance with the U.S." (paper preparedfor conference on America's Alliances with Japan and Korea in a Changing NortheastAsia, A/PARC, StanfordUniversity, August 1997), p. 12. Imperatives"in Asian Security 16. Yoshihide Soeya, "NormativeConstraintversus Structural Practice: Material and Ideational Influences,ed. MuthiahAlagappa(Stanford:StanfordUniversity Press, 1998), p. 204.

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say, would have a catastrophicimpact on Sino-Japaneserelations. But if Japan did not agree to assist the U.S., the bilateral security alliance would be damaged greatly, perhapsbeyond repair. To address Japan's concerns over the Taiwan issue, Hisahiko Okazaki, a formerJapanesediplomat,suggested revising the Constitutionto allow Japan the right of collective self-defense. This, he argued, would permit Japan to join the U.S. in military action on a contingency basis in the Taiwan Strait and would effectively deter China from using force even if Taiwan declared independence.17The implicationsof Okazaki's position are that opening the prospect of Japanjoining the U.S. in a fight against the PRC over Taiwan will make certain that (a) Taiwan will never be reunified with the PRC and (b) China will dare not use force against the island. The questions that remain, however, are whether it is politically possible for Okazaki's proposed constitutionalrevision to be achieved and whether China would be intimidated on the Taiwan issue even in the face of possible U.S.-Japanjoint military support for Taipei. For one thing, Okazaki may be underestimating Beijing's resolve in its quest for achieving national unity. The greatest and most fundamentalof Japan's security concerns vis-a'-vis China is the latter's rise and the resultantshift in the balance of power in East Asia. Japan fears that the steady growth of China's material strength will challenge Japan's long-held superior position in the region. Furthermore, against the backdropof China's emergence and Japan's aspirationsto play a bigger role in regional and internationalaffairs, some Japanese policy and intellectual elites believe that a period of political and strategic competition between Beijing and Tokyo has commenced.18 Such a contest will have a long-term impact on not only bilateral relations but also the broader East Asian strategiclandscape. Under these circumstances,the realist's option in Tokyo's strategic calculations is to preserve the Japan-U.S. alliance, for it will constitute an effective counterpoiseto rising Chinese power and narrow China's strategicspace. As Okazakiwrites, "Whenthe Japan-U.S.alliance is firm, China's strategicchoices are extremely limited."19 To extend his logic, a strong PRC not only would abstain from challenging U.S. and Japanese interests but also might follow the course of development that Washington and Tokyo desire. The other security scenario over which Japanis concernedis one in which Beijing fails to addressa wide range of internalissues that could arise in the process of its rapideconomic growth and social transformation.For instance,
17. Hisahiko Okazaki, "China:Function of Japan-U.S.Alliance," Daily Yomiuri,August 28, 1995. 18. This analysis draws on discussions with some JapaneseChina specialists duringa visit to Japanby the authorin March 1999. 19. Okazaki, "China."

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the PRC's remarkableongoing socioeconomic progress will force Beijing to undertakepolitical reform, sooner or later. However, it remains an open question as to how a democratic system can be smoothly established in a country as populous as China. Some Japaneseobservershave cited the failure of political democratizationin Japan in the 1920s as demonstratingthe high risk of political change in a rapidly modernizingsociety.20 On the economic side, even though China has enjoyed a high rate of growth for two decades, this does not mean that Beijing can expect anothertwo decades of such. In fact, the PRC's problematicfinancial system, money-losing stateowned enterprises,mismanagedmacroeconomicpolicy, and poor transportation and other infrastructural deficiencies are underminingthe prospects for rapid and sustainableeconomic growth in the years to come. On the societal level, widening income disparitiesbetween the coastal and interiorareas and among individuals from different walks of life, widespread corruption,increasing peasant unrest against local authoritiesover the collection of unreasonable fees, the uncontrolledflow of surpluslabor from ruralareas to major economic hubs, the growing numberof laid-off workers, and other problems have createdgreat pressureon social stability. Japan's China Watcherswarn that if the PRC fails to cope with these challenges, it will experience serious domestic conflict and possibly even political disintegration, a result that could send millions of refugees to neighboringcountries, including Japan.21 Concernsover the strong and fragile China scenarios coexist in Japan,but they attractvarying degrees of attentionin differentperiods. In the early and mid-1990s, Japan appearedprimarilyanxious over the prospect of a strong China; after 1997, as China's economic growth slowed and its reform of state-ownedenterprisesentered a crucial period, Japanbecame more worried about its fragility. If Beijing succeeds in reforming its state-owned enterprises and the financial system and regains momentumfor economic growth, the image of an ever more powerful China will once again loom large in Japan's perceptions.

Some Observations
In considering these various mutual security concerns, the question arises: why is there such strong suspicion between these two Asian giants? For the PRC, its perceptions of Japan are still strongly affected by the memory of Japan's aggression against China from 1895-1945. The difficulty Japanhas had in sincerely and adequatelyaddressingthe history issue consolidates such negative perceptions. Moreover,the Chinese seem to hold a negative view of
20. This also draws on the author's discussion with some Japanese experts of international studies in March 1999. 21. Sato, "Japan'sChina Perceptions,"p. 14.

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Japan's national character,which they view as exclusivist and resistant to externalpressure. They believe that, althoughJapanhas changed much both politically and economically since the end of World War II, the prewarcharacteristicsthat led Japanto grow into an aggressive power survived the huge and visible transformation of Japanesesociety. Such a belief, corrector not, has contributedto China's mistrustof Japan. More importantly,China seems not yet ready to accept a "normal" Japan. Beijing has long been accustomed to Japanbeing a mainly economic power that avoids taking an active role in political and security affairs abroad and deals with the PRC basically in a conciliatorymanner. But it also has long suspected that Japan,after becoming an economic power, would seek to turnitself into a political and military one. As a result, should Japantry to walk out of the shadow cast by World War II and seek normalcy without having to come to terms with its war record, or should Japanesenationalismarise and Tokyo adopt an assertive stance vis-a-vis the PRC, Beijing would be deeply upset and seriously concerned about the role Japanmight play in China's future. For theirpart,the Japanesesuspect that China still embracesthe traditional "Middle Kingdom mentality" (chuka shiso), a kind of Sino-centric view about East Asian relations that assumes a central position for China and assigns an inferiorone to Japan. The Japanesealso believe that China adopts a great-powerapproachto foreign policy and practices realpolitikin the international arena, again to Japan's detriment. Regarding the history question, some Japanesefeel that the PRC plays this card to take advantageof Japan's war guilt and keep it in an inferiorposition. Such individuals feel Japanhas been made to apologize for too long and that China treats Japanunfairly on this issue.22 These views, combined with such other factors as the PRC's political system and the lack of transparency over its military modernization drive, have sustained Japanese mistrust of China. Moreover, Japanremains anxious about how to deal with a China that continues to get strongerand is at a loss over how to manage relations with a power that had (and has) been the focus of the region for centuries. And Japan' s lack of self-confidencehas made it skeptical of Beijing's intentions and strategy in East Asia. Seen in broad context, the absence of a regional mechanism that encompasses both the PRC and Japanis anotherimportantreason that the mistrust between the two Asian giants stubbornlypersists. In the case of postwar Franco-German relations, Paris and Bonn built their mutual trust in the process of WesternEuropeanintegration,which increasinglyhas intertwinedthe interests of these two historic rivals and forced them to learn to work with
22. With regard to China-Japanbickering over the history issue, see, for instance, BeijingTokyo negotiationsin preparations for Chinese PresidentJiang Zemin's visit to Japanin November 1998. Seiichiro Takagi, "In Search of a SustainableEqual Partnership: Japan-ChinaRelations in the Post-Cold-WarEra,"Japan Review of InternationalAffairs 13:1 (Spring 1999).

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each other. In East Asia, however, a process of meaningful political and economic integrationhas not yet really started and there does not exist an institutionakin to the EuropeanUnion. As a result, Beijing and Tokyo have interactedwith one anotherpredominantlyin a bilateralcontext. They lack a multilateralmechanism through which they can examine their relationship from different perspectives and build some degree of mutual trust on a new basis. With respect to the relationship's security dimension, there is both bad news and good. The bad news is that each side has strong security concerns about the other and those concerns, well-founded or not, have affected perceptions and public opinion in both countries, informed policy-making process in both capitals, and produced tension in the relationship at certain junctures. The good news is that most of these concerns are based on speculation over possible developments on the other side ratherthan being rooted in hard facts. In other words, they reflect worries on what may happen, not on what has already taken place. Strictly speaking, there does not exist at present a real conflict of security interests between China and Japan. Some worrisome scenarios may never become reality, while others, even if they develop, may have their negative impact minimized if bilateralties are wellmanaged. Security factors in the Sino-Japanrelationshipdo not operate in a vacuum. They interactwith and are constrainedby bilateraland multilateral variables, one of the most importantof which is the growing economic link between the two countries. Japanis China's largest tradingpartneras well as a major source of foreign direct investment, while the PRC ranks second among Japan's trade partners. Strong economic ties have deepened the two countries' mutual interdependenceand caused Beijing and Tokyo to take a pragmatic attitude toward bilateral relations. The growing benefits issuing from reciprocal economic interactions also provide the relationship with a kind of grease that can smooth any frictions that may arise over political and security issues. Furthermore,the incipient military exchanges and regular security dialogue between China and Japan will help reduce suspicion and build mutual trust,thus enabling each side to view the other througha more accurateand objective lens. The U.S. is anotherimportantfactor affecting Sino-Japaneserelations. In the post-cold war era, Beijing, Tokyo, and Washingtonhave dealt with each other more and more in a trilateralcontext. When China considers its relations with Japan,it has to take into account both the U.S. and the Japan-U.S. alliance. Likewise, as Japanponders ties with the PRC, it keeps one eye on both the U.S. and Sino-U.S. ties. Washington's posture of constraint and deterrencevis-a'-visChina can help alleviate Tokyo's concerns over Beijing's growing strengthon the one hand; on the other, the U.S.-Japansecurity alliance can, in Beijing's eyes, prevent Japanfrom becoming a full-fledged, in-

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dependent military power. Also, so long as the U.S. maintains its military presence in East Asia and thus preserves its paramountinfluence in regional political and security affairs, Sino-Japanese political-strategic competition will be tempered. The U.S. role in Sino-Japaneserelations functions like a two-sided coin: while it can stir up Chinese suspicions of Japan-as has been the case with respect to the redefinitionof the Japan-U.S. alliance-it also can mitigate the distrust and curb competition between Beijing and Tokyo. The burgeoningmultilateralsecuritymechanismin East Asia also helps in this regard. The Association for Southeast Asian Nations' Regional Forum (ARF)-in which both China and Japan now participate-urges all participants to undertakeconfidence-buildingmeasures(CBMs) with respect to military matters (such as increasing transparency over defense capabilities) and seek to resolve territorialdisputes by peaceful means. With its goals of promoting preventive diplomacy and conflict resolution as well as CBMs, ARF can exercise some constrainton the behavior of the major powers. At the same time, other security forums, such as the Council on Security Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific and the track two level China-U.S.-Japantrilateral security dialogue, may also prove useful in reducing misperceptions and building mutual trust. In the long term, as the neoliberalist school would argue, such cooperative security initiatives in East Asia will help addressthe security concerns that exist between Beijing and Tokyo and may create an atmospherein which these two Asian giants can live with one anotheron a pragmatic,stable, and reciprocallyrespectful basis.

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