Testate Estate of the Deceased MARIANO MOLO Y LEGASPI. JUANA JUAN VDA. DE MOLO, petitioner-appellee, vs.

LUZ, GLICERIA and CORNELIO MOLO, oppositorsappellants. Facts: Mariano Molo y Legaspi died without leaving any forced heir either in the descending or ascending line. He was survived, however, by his wife, and by his nieces and nephew, the oppositors-appellants, all surnamed Molo, who were the legitimate children of Candido Molo y Legaspi, deceased brother of the testator. Mariano Molo y Legaspi left two wills. The latter will contained a revocation clause which expressly revoked the previous will. The widow filed a petition for the probate of the new will. It was admitted to probate but subsequently set aside on ground that the petitioner failed to prove its due execution. Only a carbon copy of the second will was found. As a result, the petitioner filed another petition for the probate of the old will this time. Again the oppositors alleged that said will had already been revoked under the 1939 new will. They contended that despite the disallowance of the 1939 will, the revocation clause is valid and thus effectively nullified the 1918 will. Issue: whether or not there is a valid revocation of a previous will by the testator Held: There was no valid revocation of the previous will. No evidence was shown that the testator deliberately destroyed the original 1918 will, he was just prompted by a false belief that the subsequent will is valid, because of his knowledge of the revocatory clause contained in the subsequent will. And the subsequent will was not validly executed because one of the witnesses was not present during the signing. So there is no revocation by subsequent instrument. Revocation by subsequent instrument to be valid, there is a requirement that the subsequent will must be valid. The earlier will can still be probated under the principle of dependent relative revocation. The doctrine applies when a testator cancels or destroys a will or executes an instrument intended to revoke a will with the intention to make a new testamentary disposition as substitute for the old, and the new disposition fails of effect for some reason. The court applied the doctrine laid down in Samson v. Naval that a subsequent will, containing a clause revoking a previous will, having been disallowed for the reason that it was not executed in accordance with law cannot produce the effect of annulling the previous will, inasmuch as the said revocatory clause is void.

CRISTINA SAMSON, DELFINA NAVAL, and SOR CONSOLACION EUGENIO, petitioners appellants, vs. MONICA NAVAL, ROSA NAVAL, and CELESTINA NAVAL, objectors-appellants.

Facts: Attorney Perfecto Gabriel presented in the Court for allowance as the will of Simeona F. Naval and in which he was appointed executor-1915 will. It was denied on the ground that said document was not duly executed by the deceased as her last will and testament, inasmuch as she did not sign it in the presence of three witness and the two witnesses did not sign it in the presence of each other. Thereafter the nieces and legatees filed for allowance of the testatrix will, another document executed by her.-1914 will. The other oppositors, Monica Naval, Rosa Naval, and Cristina Naval, they contended that the previous will could not be allowed, because of the existence of another will of subsequent date, executed during her lifetime by the same Simeona F. Naval, and because said will has been revoked by another executed subsequently by her during her lifetime, and further, because said will has not been executed with the formalities required by existing laws. The lower court admitted said second document and ordering its allowance as the last will and testament o said deceased. Issue: Whether or not the original will was effectively revoke by the second will Held: In order that second will may constitute a valid revocation, it is necessary to prove that it was executed, attested, and subscribed in due form or it should be valid, that it is executed in accordance with the requirements of the law in cases of wills. In the case at bar the second will was not duly executed by the deceased as her last will and testament, as she did not sign it in the presence of three witness and the two witnesses did not sign it in the presence of each other. Therefore, 1914 will or the original will was the one considered by the court as the last will and testament of said deceased.

SPOUSES RICARDO PASCUAL and CONSOLACION SIOSON, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and REMEDIOS S. EUGENIO-GINO,respondents. August 15, 2003 FACTS: Consolacion and Remedios are the niece and granddaughter of the late Canuto, testator. Canuto and 11 others were co-owners of a parcel of land. The land was registered in the name of Catalina, Canuto and Victoriano each owned 10/70 share. Canuto and Consolacion entered a Kasulatan where Canuto sold his share in favor of Consolacion. Remedios filed a complaint against Consolacion for the cancellation of TCT. Remedios claimed that she is the owner because Catalina devised these lots to her in Catalinas will. Consolacion sought to dismiss the complaint on the ground of prescription. Consolacion claimed that the basis of the action is fraud, and Remedios should have filed the action within 4 years from the registration of Consolacions title on October 28, 1968 and not some 19 years later. Issue: w/n HELD: The action is barred by prescription. The prescriptive period is 10 years counted from registration of adverse title. The four-year prescriptive period relied upon by the trial court applies only if the fraud does not give rise to an implied trust. Remedios does not seek to annul the Kasulatan. Remedios action is based on an implied trust. Remedios is not a real party in interest who can file the complaint. Remedios anchored her claim over the lots on the devise of these lots to her under Catalinas last will. However, the trial court found that the probate court did not issue any order admitting the LAST WILL to probate. Remedios does not contest this finding. Indeed, during the trial, Remedios admitted that Special Proceedings Case No. C-208 is still pending. Since the probate court has not admitted Catalinas last will, Remedios has not acquired any right under the last will. REMEDIOS is thus without any cause of action either to seek reconveyance the lots or to enforce an implied trust over these lots.
RAFAEL E. MANINANG and SOLEDAD L. MANINANG, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. RICARDO L. PRONOVE, JR., as Judge of the Court of First Instance of Rizal and BERNARDO S. ASENETA, respondents.

June 19, 1982 FACTS: Clemencia executed a holographic will. She declared in her will that she does not consider Bernardo as her adopted son, and thus, the latter cannot inherit from her. Petitioner Soledad Maninang filed a Petition for probate of the Will of the decedent to the court. Bernardo opposed the probate of the will on the ground that the holographic will was null and void because he, as the only compulsory heir, was preterited and, therefore, intestacy should ensue or proceed. Issue: w/n the will should be admitted to probate HELD: Probate of the will was allowed. Generally, the probate of a will is mandatory. The law enjoins the probate of the will and

public policy requires it, because unless the will is probated and notice thereof given to the whole world, the right of a person to dispose of his property(as an attribute of ownership ^_^ ) by will may be rendered nugatory( insignificant). Normally, the probate of a Will does not look into its intrinsic validity. The authentication of a will decides no other question than as to the capacity of the testator and the compliance with those requisites or solemnities which the law prescribes for the validity of wills. The questions relating to the intrinsic validity remain entirely unaffected, and may be raised even after the will has been authenticated. Opposition to the intrinsic validity or legality of the provisions of the will cannot be entertained in probate proceedings because its only purpose is merely to determine if the will has been executed in accordance with the requirements of the law.
FRANCISCA ALSUA-BETTS, JOSEPH O. BETTS, JOSE MADARETA, ESTEBAN P. RAMIREZ, and THE REGISTER OF DEEDS FOR ALBAY PROVINCE, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, AMPARO ALSUA BUENVIAJE, FERNANDO BUENVIAJE, FERNANDO ALSUA, represented by his guardian, CLOTILDE S. ALSUA and PABLO ALSUA, respondents.

July 30, 1979 FACTS: Pablo, Fernando and Francisca agreed in writing that their father, Don Jesus, be appointed by the court executor of the will of their mother. Thereafter, Don Jesus cancelled his holographic will and executed a new one. After his death, Francisca filed a petition for the probate of the new will. It was opposed by Pablo and Fernando, on the ground that Don Jesus was not of sound mind at the time of the execution of the will. The will was disallowed. The daughter argued that the other children, Pablo and Fernando, are in estoppel to question the competence of Don Jesus by virtue of the agreement previously entered. Issue: w/n the principle of estoppel is applicable in the probate proceedings HELD: The principle of estoppel is not applicable in probate proceedings. Probate proceedings involve public interest, and the application therein of the rule of estoppel, when it will block the ascertainment of the truth as to the circumstances, surrounding the execution of a testament, would seem inimical (contrary) to public policy. The controversy as to the competency of Don Jesus to execute his will cannot be determined by the acts of his sons to the will in formally agreeing in writing with Francisca that their father be appointed by the court executor of the will of their mother. The SC allowed the probate of the will upon finding that Don Jesus complied with the requirements of law as to the execution of the will. RUFINA LUY LIM petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, AUTO TRUCK TBA CORPORATION, SPEED DISTRIBUTING, INC., ACTIVE DISTRIBUTORS, ALLIANCE MARKETING CORPORATION, ACTION COMPANY, INC. respondents. January 24, 2000 FACTS: Petitioner Rufina Luy Lim is the surviving spouse of the late Pastor Y. Lim whose estate is the subject of probate proceedings.

In the inventory of the estate of Pastor, it included some properties belonging to some business entities. The said corporations filed a motion for the exclusion of their property form the inventory. Rufina argued that Pastor owned the said business entities. It follows that he also own the properties of the corporations. Issue: w/n the issue of the exclusion and inclusion of property from the inventory is within the competence of the probate court. HELD: The issue on the exclusion and inclusion of property from the inventory is within the competence of the probate court. The determination of which court exercises jurisdiction over matters of probate depends upon the gross value of the estate of the decedent. However, the courts determination is only provisional in character, not conclusive, and is subject to the final decision in a separate action which may be instituted by the parties. In this case, the real properties sought to be excluded from the inventory were duly registered under the Torrens system in the name of the private corporations, and as such were to be afforded the presumptive conclusiveness of title. The probate court in denying the motion for exclusion acted in complete disregard of the presumption of conclusiveness of title in favor of private respondents. A corporation is clothed with personality separate and distinct from that of the persons composing it. Consequently, the assets of the corporation are not the assets of the estate of Pastor Lim. LEVISTE vs. CA January 30, 1989 FACTS: Leviste received a letter from Ms. Del Rosario, informing him that she was terminating their
attorney-client relationship due to "conflicting interest." Wherein the brother-in-law, Gaudencio M. Llanes, whom Del Rosario and the other parties in the probate proceeding intended to eject as lessee of the property which was bequeathed to Del Rosario under the will.

Atty. Leviste filed a Motion to Intervene to Protect his Rights to Fees for Professional Services. Issue: whether or not an attorney Leviste who was engaged on a contingent fee intervene on the
probate proceeding for the collection of his attorney fees

HELD: Leviste cannot intervene. Leviste was not a party to the probate proceeding in the lower court. He had no direct interest in the probate of the will. His only interest in the estate is an indirect interest as former counsel for a prospective heir. One who is only indirectly interested in a will may not interfere in its probate. LOURDES L. DOROTHEO, petitioner,vs vs. COURT OF APPEALS, NILDA D. QUINTANA, for Herself and as Attorney-in-Fact of VICENTE DOROTHEO and JOSE DOROTHEO, respondents. December 8, 1999 FACTS: Private respondents were the legitimate children of the testator.

Alejandros will was admitted to probate in a petition filed by Lourdes. Nilda files a Motion to Declare the Will Intrinsically Void after 2 years arguing that Lourdes was not the legal wife of the decedent. The order declaring the will intrinsically void was affirmed. Lourdes failed to file her appellants brief. An entry of judgment was made. However, an order was issued by the probate judge setting aside the above order on the ground that it was merely interlocutory; hence, not final in character. Issue: w/n a last will and testament admitted to probate but declared intrinsically void in an order that
has become final and executory still be given effect

HELD: A probated will cannot be given effect if it was later on declared intrinsically void. There is nothing to execute where the testamentary provisions have been declared void in an order that has become final and executory. Even if the will was validly executed, if the testator provides for dispositions that deprives or impairs the lawful heirs of their legitime or rightful inheritance according to the laws on succession, the unlawful provisions/dispositions thereof cannot be given effect. The intrinsic validity is another matter and questions regarding the same may still be raised even after the will has been authenticated.
A final judgment on probated will, albeit erroneous, is binding on the whole world. In setting aside the order declaring the will intrinsically void, the trial court nullified the entry of judgment made by the CA. A lower court cannot reverse or set aside decisions of a superior court.

MALOLES vs. PHILIPS January 31, 200 FACTS: Dr. de Santos filed a petition for the probate of his will. He alleged that he had no compulsory heirs. The petition was granted. Shortly after, he died. Octavio, his nephew, filed a Motion for Intervention. He argued that as the nearest of kin and creditor of the testator, his interest in the matter is material and direct. HELD: In order for a person to be allowed to intervene in a proceeding, he must have an interest in the estate or in the will or in the property to be affected by it. He must be an interested party or one who would be benefited by the estate such as an heir or one who has a claim against the estate like a creditor, and whose interest is material and direct. Octavio is not an heir or legatee under the will of the decedent. Neither is he a compulsory heir of the decedent. As the only and nearest collateral relative of the decedent, he can inherit from the latter only in case of intestacy. He can only inherit if the will is annulled. His interest is therefore not direct or immediate. His claim to being a creditor is belated as it has been raised for the first time only in his reply to the opposition to his motion to intervene and is not supported by evidence. A probate proceeding is terminated upon the issuance of the order allowing the probate of a will. In cases for the probate of wills, it is well-settled that the authority of the court is limited to ascertaining the extrinsic validity of the will, i.e., whether the testator, being of sound mind, freely executed the will in accordance with the formalities prescribed by law.

Ordinarily, probate proceedings are instituted only after the death of the testator. However, Article 838 of the Civil Code authorizes the filing of a petition for probate of the will filed by the testator himself. PASTOR vs. CA June 24, 1983 FACTS The petition for probate was granted. The hearing on the intrinsic validity of the will was opposed on the ground that there was a pending reconveyance suit over the ownership of shares in Atlas mining. The court resolved the question of ownership of the royalties payable by Atlas mining to the estate of the decedent and ordered the payment of the legacy. HELD: The probate order cannot resolve with finality the questions of ownership of properties involved in the proceeding. The determination is merely provisional. Hence, the legacy should not be given yet. As a rule, the question of ownership is an extraneous matter which the probate court cannot resolve with finality. Thus, for the purpose of determining whether a certain property should or should not be included in the inventory of estate properties, the probate court may pass upon the title thereto, but such determination is provisional, not conclusive, and is subject to the final decision in a separate action to resolve title. In a special proceeding for the probate of a will, the issue by and large is restricted to the extrinsic validity of the will. Nowhere in the dispositive portion is there a declaration of ownership of specific properties. On the contrary, it is manifest therein that ownership was not resolved for it confined itself to the question of extrinsic validity of the will, and the need for and propriety of appointing a special administrator. CORONADO vs. CA January 24, 2002 FACTS: Juana claims that a portion of the property in question was inherited by her as provided in the will of her grandfather Melecio. Leonida claims that the property in question was bequeathed to her under a will executed by Dr. Monterola, who was allegedly in possession thereof even before the outbreak of World War II. Said will was probated. Juana opposed the probate. HELD: While it is true that no will shall pass either real or personal property unless it is proved and allowed in the proper court, the questioned will, however, may be

sustained on the basis of Article 1056 of the Civil Code of 1899, which was in force at the time said document was executed by Melecio in 1918. In this case, nowhere was it alleged nor shown that Leonida is entitled to legitime from Melecio. The truth of the matter is that the record is bereft of any showing that Leonida and the late Melecio were related to each other. Juana is not estopped from questioning the ownership of the property in question, notwithstanding her having objected to the probate of the will executed by Monterola under which Leonida is claiming title to the said property. CAYETANO vs. LEONIDAS May 30, 1984 FACTS: Nenita, sister of the testatrix, filed a petition for the reprobate of a will allegedly executed by Adoracion in the US. Adoracion was a US citizen. The petition was granted. Hermogenes, father of Adoracion, maintained that since the reprobate was allowed, he was divested of his legitime which was reserved by law for him. HELD: The probate court can rule upon the issue on preterition, although such issue deals with the validity of the provisions of the will. As a general rule, the probate court's authority is limited only to the extrinsic validity of the will, the due execution thereof, the testatrix's testamentary capacity and the compliance with the requisites or solemnities prescribed by law, The intrinsic validity of the will normally comes only after the court has declared that the will has been duly authenticated. However, where practical considerations demand that the intrinsic validity of the will be passed upon, even before it is probated, the court should meet the issue. Although on its face, the will appeared to have preterited Hermogenes, and thus, reprobate should have been denied. But it was sufficiently established that Adoracion, at the time of her death, was a US citizen resident. As regards the intrinsic validity of the will, the national law of the decedent must apply. SOLIVIO vs. CA February 12, 1990 FACTS: Celedonia, maternal aunt of the deceased, was declared as the sole heir. 4 months later, Concordia, sister of the deceaseds father file a MFR claiming that she too was an heir of the deceased. Instead of appealing, Concordia sued Celedonia for partition, recovery of possession, ownership and damages. The

suit was initiated while the probate proceedings were still pending. Branch 26 granted Concordias prayers. HELD: Branch 26 was incorrect in taking cognizance of the case because it was the probate court that had the exclusive jurisdiction to make a just and legal distribution of the estate. It is the order of distribution directing the delivery of the residue of the estate to the persons entitled thereto that brings to a close the intestate proceedings. The order declaring Celedonia as the sole heir of the estate did not toll the end of the proceedings. In the interest of orderly procedure and to avoid confusing and conflicting dispositions of a decedents estate, a court should not interfere with probate proceedings pending in a co-equal court. AJERO vs. CA September 16, 1994 FACTS: The probate of a will was opposed on the ground that the testatrix cannot validly dispose of the house and lot because she shared the property with her fathers other heirs. HELD: As a general rule, courts in probate proceedings are limited to pass only upon the extrinsic validity of the will sought to be probated. However, in exceptional instances, the courts are not powerless to do what the situation constrains them to do, and pass upon certain provisions of the will. In this case, the decedent herself stated in her holographic will that the property is in the name of her late father. Thus, the testatrix cannot validly dispose of the whole property, which she shares with her fathers other heirs. MAGALLANES vs. KAYANAN January 20, 1976 FACTS: Lucena filed a solicitud praying that certain lots be partitioned and distributed among the heirs of the deceased Filomena. The heirs of Eligio filed a motion to dismiss claiming ownership over the parcels of land in question and raising the issue that the trial court is devoid of jurisdiction to resolve the issues raised in the pleadings. The heirs of Eligio filed a petition for summary judgment on the pleadings praying that their absolute right of ownership over the properties in question be recognized and confirmed. It was granted.

HELD: The lower court has no jurisdiction to pass finally and definitely upon the title or ownership of the properties involved in the summary settlement of the estate of the deceased Filomena. The probate court may only rule upon the title to property in the following cases: 1. For the purpose of determining whether or not a given property should be included in the inventory of the estate of the deceased. But such determination is not conclusive. 2. If the parties voluntarily submitted to its jurisdiction and introduced evidence to prove ownership. In the case at bar, the action instituted by the petitioner was not for the purpose of determining whether or not a given property should be included in the inventory of the estate of the deceased. The action was for partition and distribution of the properties left by the deceased. Neither have all of the parties voluntarily submitted the issue of ownership for resolution by the court. As a matter of fact, the petitioner opposed the petition of private respondents to have the issue of ownership or title decided in the proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the deceased. It was therefore erroneous for the lower court to resolve the question of title or ownership over the properties in said proceeding. It could only pass upon such a question in the exercise of its general jurisdiction in an ordinary action. ETHEL GRIMM ROBERTS vs. LEONIDAS April 27, 1984 FACTS: Grimm, a US citizen of Manila, executed 2 will in San Francisco, California. One will disposed of his Philippine estate and the other disposed of his estate outside the Philippines. Ethel, Grimms daughter by a first marriage, filed a petition for intestate proceeding. Maxine, Grimms 2nd wife, opposed on the ground of the pendency of the probate proceedings in Utah. She later filed a petition for probate of the 2 wills, already probated in Utah and prayed that the partition approved by Branch 20, the intestate court, be set aside. This was approved by Branch 38. HELD: Such petition for the probate of the 2 wills and the annulment of the partition approved by Branch 20 can be entertained by Branch 38. A testate proceeding is proper in this case. The probate of the will is mandatory. It is anomalous

that the estate of a person who died testate should be settled in an intestate proceeding. The intestate case should be consolidated with the testate proceeding and the judge assigned to the testate proceeding should continue hearing the 2 cases. VDA. DE KILAYKO vs. JUDGE TENGCO March 27, 1992 FACTS: In the settlement of the estate of Lizares, a project partition was submitted. In accordance with the said project of partition, the heirs executed an agreement of partition and subdivision. Later, a motion was filed to reopen the testate estate proceedings of Lizares. HELD: The testate proceedings cannot anymore be reopened because the Lizares sisters recognized the decree of partition sanctioned by the probate court and in fact reaped the fruits thereof. Hence, they are now precluded from attacking the validity of the partition or any part of it in the guise of a complaint for reconveyance. In testate succession, there can be no valid partition among the heirs until after the will has been probated. A project partition is merely a proposal for the distribution of the hereditary estate which the court may accept or reject. It is the court that makes that distribution of the estate and determines the persons entitled thereto. It cannot be denied that when they moved for the reopening of the testate estate proceedings of Maria, the judicial decree of partition and the order of closure of such proceedings was already final and executory. CANIZA vs. CA February 24, 1997 FACTS: Through her guardian, Carmen sued the Spouses Estrada for ejectment from her property alleging that she already had urgent need of the house on account of her advanced age and failing health. The Estradas insist that the devise of the house to them by Carmen clearly denotes her intention that they remain in possession thereof since their ouster be inconsistent with the Carmens holographic will. HELD: A legal guardian can validly sue on behalf of her ward for ejectment where the same property is urgently needed by her ward. A will is essentially ambulatory. At any time prior to the testators death, it may be changed or revoked, and until admitted to probate, it has no effect whatever and no right can be claimed thereunder.

An owners intention to confer title in the future to persons possessing property by his tolerance, is not inconsistent with the formers taking back possession in the meantime for any reason deemed sufficient. In this case, there was sufficient cause for the owners resumption of possession. CAMAYA vs. PATULANDONG February 23, 2004 FACTS: Rufina executed a notarized will where she devised a parcel of land to her grandson Anselmo. Later, she executed a codicil which stated that her 4 children and Anselmo would inherit the above parcel of land. Anselmo filed an action for partition against the Patulandongs. It was granted, subject to the result of the probate of the codicil. Anselmo then sold the land to the Camayas. The probate court then issued an order wherein the title issued to the Camayas were declared void and it voided the sale as well. The Camayas contended that the probate court has no power to declare null and void the sale and their title. HELD: The probate court does not have the power to annul the title to lands subject of a testate proceeding pending before it. The probate court exceeded its jurisdiction when it further declared the deed of sale and the titles of the Camayas null and void, it having had the effect of depriving them possession and ownership of the property. A probate court cannot adjudicate or determine title to properties claimed to be a part of the estate and which are equally claimed to belong to outside parties. All that said court could do as regards such properties is to determine whether they should or should not be included in the inventory. Though the judgment in the partition case had become final and executory as it was not appealed, it specifically provided in its dispositive portion that the decision was without prejudice to the probate of the codicil. The rights of the prevailing parties in said case were subject to the outcome of the probate of the codicil.