SDI 2010 AT: Hot Spots

Impacts

Hot Spots Update

Hot Spots Update........................................................................................................................................................1

Hot Spots Update........................................................................................................................... 1 **No Impact**............................................................................................................................... 3

No Middle East War...................................................................................................................................................3

No Middle East War......................................................................................................................3

No Middle East War...................................................................................................................................................4

No Middle East War......................................................................................................................

No North Korea war....................................................................................................................................................6

No Nort! "orea #ar...................................................................................................................... $

North Korea Not Aggressive/Irratio al.......................................................................................................................!

Nort! "orea Not A%%ressi&e'Irratio(al.......................................................................................)

North Korea N"#es $ No I%pa&t..............................................................................................................................'

Nort! "orea( N*+es , No Impact................................................................................................No I dia/(a#ista War $ )eterre &e........................................................................................................................1*

No I(dia'.a+ista( War , Deterre(ce.........................................................................................10

No I dia/(a#ista War $ )ialog"e Now...................................................................................................................11

No I(dia'.a+ista( War , Dialo%*e No#....................................................................................11

I dia/(a#ista War Not +a"se E,ti &tio .................................................................................................................1-

I(dia'.a+ista( War Not /a*se E0ti(ctio(................................................................................12

No +e tral Asia +o .li&t $ No Es&alatio ................................................................................................................13

No /e(tral Asia /o(1lict , No Escalatio(..................................................................................13

No +hi a War / 0e eral...........................................................................................................................................14

No /!i(a War 2 3e(eral............................................................................................................. 1

No +hi a War $ 1aiwa Spe&i.i&.............................................................................................................................12

No /!i(a War , Tai#a( Speci1ic............................................................................................... 14

No 3"ssia War $ 0e eral..........................................................................................................................................16

No 5*ssia War , 3e(eral............................................................................................................1$

No N"&lear Es&alatio / 0e eral..............................................................................................................................1!

No N*clear Escalatio( 2 3e(eral................................................................................................1) **6es Impact**............................................................................................................................1A14 No 0reat (ower +o .li&t...................................................................................................................................1'

AT: No 3reat .o#er /o(1lict..................................................................................................... 1Middle East +o .li&t I%pa&t.....................................................................................................................................15 1

SDI 2010 AT: Hot Spots

Impacts

Middle East /o(1lict Impact.......................................................................................................17

Asia +o .li&t 6i#el7................................................................................................................................................-*

Asia( /o(1lict 8i+el9...................................................................................................................20

High 3is# o. I dia/(a#ista N"&lear +o .li&t..........................................................................................................-1

Hi%! 5is+ o1 I(dia'.a+ista( N*clear /o(1lict.......................................................................... 21

High 3is# o. I dia/(a#ista N"&lear +o .li&t..........................................................................................................--

Hi%! 5is+ o1 I(dia'.a+ista( N*clear /o(1lict.......................................................................... 22

SDI 2010 AT: Hot Spots

Impacts

**No Impact** No Middle East War

No Middle East #ar , sel12i(terest pre&e(ts. 3a7 Ta+e9!8 S"sa +oo#8 a d S"9a e Malo e78 :ellows at the ;roo#i gs I stit"tio a d Se ior :ellow .or :oreig (oli&7 at the Sa<a +e ter .or Middle East (oli&78 =" e -'8 200)8 I ter atio al Herald 1ri<" e8
http4//www.<roo#i gs.ed"/opi io s/-**!/*6-'ira>?%alo e7.asp, @et: t!e Sa*dis: Ira(ia(s: ;orda(ia(s: S9ria(s: a(d ot!ers are &er9 *(li+el9 to %o to #ar either to prote&t their ow se&t or eth i& gro"p or to preve t o e &o" tr7 .ro% gai i g the "pper ha d i Ira>. 1he reaso s are .airl7 straight.orward. :irst8 Middle Easter( leaders8 li#e politi&ia s ever7where8 are primaril9 i(terested i( o e thi g4 sel12preser&atio(. +o%%itti g .or&es to Ira> is a i here tl7 ris#7 propositio 8 whi&h8 i. the &o .li&t we t <adl78 &o"ld threate do%esti& politi&al sta<ilit7. Moreover8 most Ara< armies are %eared to#ard re%ime protectio( rat!er t!a( pro=ecti(% po#er a(d t!*s !a&e little capa<ilit9 1or se(di(% troops to Ira>. Se&o d8 there is &a"se .or &o &er a<o"t the so/&alled <low<a&# s&e ario i whi&h Aihadis ret"r i g .ro% Ira>
desta<ili9e their ho%e &o" tries8 pl" gi g the regio i to &o .li&t.

No escalatio( , No dra#2i(: US a(d 5*ssia #ill ma(a%e co(1lict. )r. S"<hash "apila8 +o s"lta t8 Strategi& A..airs with So"th Asia A al7sis 0ro"p8 =" e 28 200-8 BMI))6E
EAS14 1HE S13A1E0I+ (CWE3/(6A@ ;E1WEEN UNI1E) S1A1ES AN) 3ESU30EN1 3USSIA8D http4//www.so"thasiaa al7sis.org/E2+papers-'E2+paper-!-2.ht%l Strate%ic po#er2pla9 does (ot (ecessaril9 impl9 militar9 co(1ro(tatio( a d ar%ed &o .li&t. (ower/pla7 i%plies the "se o. politi&al8 e&o o%i& a d strategi& leverages to get the appropriate res"lts .or o es atio al se&"rit7 i terests i a regio . E&e( at t!e !ei%!t o1 t!e /old War a(d t!e #ars i( t!e Middle East: t!e U(ited States a(d 5*ssia *sed <ac+ c!a((el diplomac9 a(d co(s*ltatio(s 1or co(1lict2escalatio( pre&e(tio( . C e &o"ld sa7 that t!ere #as so%e sort o. Bs!ared strate%ic ma(a%eme(t> o1 t!e Middle East. 1here.ore8 e&e( toda9 o(e ca( reaso(a<l9 assert t!at despite t!e po#er2pla9 i( actio( <et#ee( t!e U(ited States a(d 5*ssia i( t!e Middle East: some si%(i1ica(t strate%ic co(&er%e(ces e0ist <et#ee( t!ese t#o %lo<al pla9ers.

SDI 2010 AT: Hot Spots

Impacts

No Middle East War

No ma=or Middle East co(1lict , (o co*(tr9 #ill ris+ escalatio(. (atri&# Seale8 leadi g ;ritish writer o the Middle East with a degree spe&iali9i g i the Middle East .ro% C,.ord8 April -28 200-8 BWill the Mideast 0o Up i :la%es this S"%%erFD http4//www.%iddle/east/o li e.&o%/e glish/F
idG-2223 T!ese are da(%ero*sl9 *(settled times i( t!e Middle East. 1here are so %a 7 <itter s&ores to settle8 so %"&h viole t disse sio 8 s"&h i%pla&a<le hatreds8 that it #o*ld ta+e o(l9 a spar+ to set t!e #!ole re%io( ali%!t. Or so it would seem. Ma 7 o<servers predi&t a hot a d <lood7 s"%%er. What the7 have i %i d is ot o l7 a &o ti "atio o. the &ala%ito"s wars i Ira> a

d A.gha ista 8 a d the possi<le e,te sio o. the A.gha &o .li&t to the tri<al areas o. (a#ista 8 <"t rather a %aAor war i the 6eva t. 1he .ear i the regio is o. a other war <rea#i g o"t <etwee Israel a d its eigh<o"rs8 a war whi&h wo"ld e g"l. 6e<a o 8 S7ria a d the o&&"pied (alesti ia territories // a d eve ris# a i terve tio <7 Ira . I view o. A%eri&aHs &lose allia &e with Israel8 A%eri&a i terests wo"ld i evita<l7 <e a..e&ted. I a ew war i g this wee#8 the US State )epart%e t "rged A%eri&a s to de.er traveli g to 6e<a o a d advised those i the &o" tr7 to I&o sider &are."ll7 the ris# o. re%ai i g.I So !o# immi(e(t is t!e t!reat o1 #ar? /o*ld t!e Ara<s start a #ar? T!at m*st <e =*d%ed !i%!l9 *(li+el9. Hi@<*lla! i 6e<a o a(d Hamas i 0a9a !a&e t!e a<ilit9 to pro&o+e Israel #it! pi(pric+s8 <*t whatever the7 %ight %a age to do // sa78 i the wa7 o. Jassa% ro&#ets or hit/a d/r" &ross/<order atta&#s // t!e i(itiati&e to escalate t!e co(1lict i to a %aAor war #o*ld al#a9s lie #it! Israel. S9ria is t!e o(l9 o(e o1 IsraelAs (ei%!<o*rs #it! a(9 serio*s militar9 capa<ilit9. Mi%!t S9ria t!e( start a #ar? T!is8 too8 is !i%!l9 impla*si<le8 <eca*se o1 t!e r"%o"red di&isio(s #it!i( its top arm9 cadres: <*t also <eca*se Israel is so m*c! stro(%er . Israel has highl7/ developed %ilitar7 i d"stries o. its ow a d re&eives %assive aid a d adva &ed weapo r7 .ro% the U ited States. I deed8 S9riaAs c*rre(t sta(ce #o*ld seem to <e merel9 de1e(si&e. It .ailed8 or was " a<le8 to respo d whe the Israeli air .or&e8 i a s"rprise a d " provo#ed atta&# // o do"<t i te ded to i ti%idate )a%as&"s // destro7ed a %ilitar7 i stallatio i easter S7ria last Septe%<er. :ar .ro% wa ti g war: S9ria !as o the &o trar7 so*%!t to de1*se te(sio(s <7 &alli g repeatedl7 .or pea&e tal#s with Israel // %ost re&e tl7 i the %essage it &o ve7ed last wee# thro"gh .or%er US (reside t =i%%7 +arter. S7riaHs (reside t ;ashar al/Asad told +arter that he <elieved that a<o"t '2 per&e t o. the iss"es <etwee S7ria a d Israel had <ee resolved i egotiatio s i the 155*s8 a d that he was eager to &o &l"de a deal as soo as possi<le. T!e a(s#er8 there.ore8 to t!e B*estio( o1 #!et!er #ar #ill <rea+ o*t t!is s*mmer m*st lie #it!

Israel. I

parti&"lar8 it will depe d o whether Israel &o ti "es to &hoose to resolve so%e o. its strategi& dile%%as <7 .or&e. 1hree o. these dile%%as see% parti&"larl7 pressi g. 1he7 relate to4 K the " pre&ede ted rise o. the Isla%i& 3ep"<li& o. Ira as a %aAor regio al powerL K the &halle ge posed <7 Hi9<allah a d Ha%as8 two %ilita t o /state a&tors o IsraelHs <ordersL a d8 K the possi<le &ha ges whi&h a ew A%eri&a preside t %ight %a#e e,t 7ear to A%eri&aHs Middle East poli&7. Ira has e%erged as a regio al rival8 ot o l7 o. Israel <"t also o. the U ited States. Its i .l"e &e is h"ge i Ira>8 i &reasi g i S7ria a d 6e<a o 8 a d is ow rea&hi g i to the (alesti ia 1erritories a d the 0"l. States. It poses a threat to the regio al hege%o 7 the U ited States has e Ao7ed si &e the &ollapse o. the Soviet U io . :oolishl78 the U ited States did ot .oresee that <7 atta&#i g a d destro7i g Ira> // with IsraelHs eager e &o"rage%e t // it wo"ld &reate the &o ditio s .or Ira Hs e%erge &e. 1he U ited States a d Israel %"st ow live with the &o se>"e &es o. their strategi& <l" der. +o trar7 to Israeli .ears a d propaga da8 Ira Hs "&lear progra%%e poses o # ow Ie,iste tial threatI to the =ewish state. ;"t it &o"ld # o&# Israel o.. its per&h as the Middle EastHs %ost power."l "&lear a d %ilitar7 state8 there<7 li%iti g its .reedo% o. a&tio agai st s"&h lo&al adversaries as S7ria8 Hi9<"llah a d Ha%as. Will Israel // with or witho"t US help // attac+ Ira(As (*clear 1acilities F I spite o. the

<elli&ose rhetori& o. so%e Israeli leaders8 t!is seems !i%!l9 *(li+el9. T!e predicta<le co(seB*e(ces .or the regio o. s"&h a a&t8 1or Israel itsel. a d .or A%eri&a i terests8 are too !orre(do*s to &o te%plate. 1he U ited States a d Israel will pro<a<l7 have to %a#e do with &o tai %e t a d deterre &e8 while &o ti "i g their e..orts to " der%i e Ira Hs e&o o%7 a d to %o<ili9e Ara< states agai st it // as US Se&retar7 o. State +o dolee99a 3i&e was atte%pti g to do i K"wait this wee#. Israel #o*ld: o. &o"rse8 li+e to destro9 <ot! Hi@<*lla! a(d Hamas. C*t t!is is (o eas9 tas+8 si &e the two %ove%e ts are deepl7 i%pla ted i the lo&al pop"latio s a d wage a .or% o. as7%%etri& g"errilla war.are8 #it! whi&h a co(&e(tio(al a(d i(creasi(%l9 dise(c!a(ted arm9 li+e IsraelAs is ill2 eB*ipped to deal. Israel tried // a d .ailed // to s%ash Hi9<"llah i its &ostl7 6e<a o war o. -**6. C l7 a ver7 rash Israeli leader wo"ld tr7 agai i
the prese t &ir&"%sta &es. Israel will o do"<t have to live with a power."l Hi9<"llah8 <a&#ed <7 Ira a d S7ria8 di&tati g the politi&al order i 6e<a o . Mea while8 Israel &o ti "es to atte%pt to <ri g dow the Ha%as gover %e t <7 <esiegi g8 starvi g8 a d <o%<ardi g the 1.2 %illio i ha<ita ts o. 0a9a. ;"t this <r"tal poli&7 shows o sig o. s"&&ess. :or Ha%as to a&&ept the siege wo"ld eve t"all7 %ea a slow death. It is8 there.ore8 &halle gi g the <lo&#ade <7 atta&#i g Israeli &rossi g poi ts whe it &a 8 %"&h as it did last =a "ar7 whe it <ro"ght dow the .e &e o the Eg7ptia <order8 leadi g to a %ass <rea#/o"t o. so%e !**8*** h" gr7 (alesti ia s. A ."rther %aAor worr7 o the Israeli hori9o is that the e,t A%eri&a preside t %ight ot <e as aggressivel7 pro/Israeli as 0eorge W. ;"sh. 1he possi<ilit7 o. a A%eri&a withdrawal .ro% Ira> a d o. a US Igra d <argai I with Ira %"st also <e a so"r&e o. great a ,iet7. It is ot s"rprisi g that US/Israeli lo<<7ists8 i &l"di g the <ig g" s o. the Washi gto I stit"te8 stro gl7 s"pport =oh M&+ai 8 s%ear ;ara&# C<a%a a d have %o" ted a ve o%o"s &a%paig agai st =i%%7 +arter. Has Israel got a alter ativeF @es8 the alter ative is a &o%prehe sive pea&e. ;"t Israel is " willi g // i deed " a<le // to pa7 the pri&e o. s"&h a pea&e8 whi&h wo"ld re>"ire a withdrawal to the 156! <orders. No Israeli leader has the politi&al visio or the %oral a"thorit7 to &o te%plate s"&h a %ove. 1oo %a 7 .a&ts have <ee &reated o the gro" d o (alesti ia territor7. 1he %essia i& Israeli drea% o. &o trolli g the whole o. histori& (alesti e re%ai s ver7 %"&h alive. Nor &a Israel &o sider a&&epti g the ter%s proposed <7 Ha%as8 whi&h are a e,&ha ge o. priso ers8 a li.ti g o. the 0a9a siege a d a %"t"al te /7ear tr"&e. 1o a&&ept s"&h ter%s wo"ld %ea a&&epti g a .or% o. %"t"al deterre &e8 so%ethi g Israel has traditio all7 reAe&ted. 1he tr"th wo"ld see% to <e that Israel ca( (eit!er #a%e a

1*ll2scale #ar agai st its oppo e ts (or ma+e peace with the%. It is t!ere1ore co(dem(ed to co(ti(*e to rel9 o( its prese(t policies o. <esiegi g 0a9a8 i ti%idati g its oppo e ts <7 lo g/dista &e air a d &o%%a do stri#es8 a d de&apitati g hostile resista

&e %ove%e ts <7 assassi atio . S"&h s#ir%ishes see% <o" d to &o ti "e8 #eepi g the regio i a high state o. te sio a d ta#i g a heav7 toll o &ivilia s8 espe&iall7 (alesti ia s. ;arri g a %is&al&"latio <7 o e side or a other8 this low-level warfare would8 however8 have the merit of sparing the region a major conflagration. T!e s*mmer ma9 (ot8 a.ter all8 <e as <lood9 as some 1ear.

SDI 2010 AT: Hot Spots

Impacts

SDI 2010 AT: Hot Spots

Impacts

No Nort! "orea #ar

No ris+ o1 Nort! "orea( War , Deterre(ce c!ec+s "a(% 03 M)avid8 asso&iate pro.essor o. gover %e t a d adA" &t asso&iate pro.essor at the
1"&# S&hool o. ;"si ess8 )art%o"th +ollege8 B1he Avoida<le +risis i North KoreaD8 +ol"%<ia U iversit7 (ress8 -**38 S&ie &e)ire&tN Nort! "orea !as (ot attac+ed So*t! "orea 1or 1i1t9 9ears <eca*se deterre(ce #or+s. Despite t!e te(sio( t!at !as e0isted o( t!e pe(i(s*la: t!e armistice li(e !as !eld. Neither side has atte%pted to %o" t a %aAor %ilitar7 operatio 8 or has either side atte%pted to &halle ge deterre &e o the pe i s"la. 6 Deterre(ce #ill co(ti(*e to !old e&e( i1 Nort! "orea de&elops a(d deplo9s a (*clear #eapo(. Deterre(ce reB*ires <ot! sides to +(o# t!at t!e ot!er side ca( i(1lict *(accepta<le costs o( it. Si &e 1523 North Korea has .a&ed <oth a deter%i ed So"th Korea %ilitar78 a d %ore i%porta t8 U.S. %ilitar7
deplo7%e ts that at their height &o%prised 1**8*** troops a d "&lear/tipped 6a &e %issiles a d eve toda7 i &l"de 3'8*** troops8 "&lear/ &apa<le air<ases8 a d aval .a&ilities that g"ara tee U.S. i volve%e t i a 7 &o .li&t o the pe i s"la. T!e res*lt !as (ot <ee( s*rprisi(%: alt!o*%! te(sio( is !i%!: t!e <ala(ce o1 po#er !as <ee( sta<le. :ar .ro% <ei g a " sta<le OOpowder #eg8HH .or .ive de&ades <oth sides have %oved &a"tio"sl7 a d avoided %aAor %ilitar7 %o<ili9atio s that &o"ld spiral o"t o. &o trol. 1!e <ala(ce o1 po#er !as !eld <eca*se a(9 #ar o( t!e pe(i(s*la #o*ld !a&e disastro*s co(seB*e(ces 1or <ot! sides. 1he &apitals o. Seo"l a d (7o g7a g are less tha 12* %iles apartP&loser tha New @or# a d ;alti%ore. Seo"l is 3* %iles .ro% the de%ilitari9ed 9o e that separates the North a d the So"th Q)MRS8 a d easil7 withi rea&h o. North KoreaHs artiller7 t"<es. U.S. 0e eral 0ar7 6"&# esti%ates that a war o the Korea pe i s"la wo"ld &ost the UST1 trillio i e&o o%i& da%age a d res"lt i o e %illio &as"alties8 i &l"di g 2-8*** U.S. %ilitar7 &as"alties. T!e Nort!: alt!o*%! it !as (*mericall9 lar%er armed 1orces: 1aces m*c! more !i%!l9 trai(ed

a(d capa<le U.S.2So*t! "orea( armed 1orces. Wit! t!e Nort! %ro#i(% co(ti(*all9 #ea+er relati&e to t!e So*t!: t!e c!a(ces 1or #ar <ecome e&e( slimmer. Nort! "orea (e&er !ad t!e material capa<ilities to <e a serio*s co(te(der to t!e U.S.2So*t! "orea( allia(ce: a(d it 1ell 1*rt!er <e!i(d earl9 . So the real >"estio has ot <ee
whether North Korea wo"ld e gage i a preve tive atta&# as So"th Korea &a"ght "p8 <"t wh7 North Korea %ight .ight as it .ell ."rther a d ."rther <ehi d.

Nort! "orea does (ot #a(t #ar , ass*mes t!eir e&ide(ce 6o+ota 10 M1a#ashi8 BNo War With North KoreaD8 Newswee#. New @or#4 =" !8 -*1*. Uol. 1228 Iss. -38
pro>"estN T!e t#o "oreas !a&e seemed !eaded 1or a serio*s collisio( e&er si(ce i(ter(atio(al i(&esti%ators co(1irmed t!at it #as a Nort! 2"orea( torpedo t!at sa(+ t!e So*t!Ds #ars!ip /!eo(a( o( Marc! 2$. 6ast wee# (7o g7a gVs
Natio al )e.e se +o%%issio threate ed Iall/o"t warI i. Seo"l is s"&&ess."l i its p"sh .or ew i ter atio al sa &tio s agai st the regi%e. A d as So"th Korea (reside t 6ee M7" g/<a# &"t o.. trade with the North a d threate ed to res"%e <road&asti g propaga da a&ross the de%ilitari9ed 9o e8 .o"r North Korea s"<%ari es a<r"ptl7 le.t port8 p"tti g the So"th Korea Nav7 o high alert. Still8 this .ra&as %a7 ot <e all it see%s. I .a&t8 Nort! "orea( leader "im ;o(%2Il seems to <e see+i(% a 1ace2sa&i(% #a9 o*t. E&e( as t!e Nort!Ds

1ire2<reat!i(% %e(erals &o#ed to res*me t!e 1i%!t t!at <e%a( i( 1740: a stateme(t 1rom t!e re%imeDs political leaders!ip esc!e#ed tal+ o1 #ar: merel9 1ree@i(% relatio(s a(d scrappi(% a (o(a%%ressio( a%reeme(t . Wester( i(telli%e(ce reported (o si%(s t!at .9o(%9a(% #as mo<ili@i(% 1or a( act*al armed s!o#do#(. A(d t!e Nort!Ds Eorei%( Mi(istr9 iss*ed its o#( stateme(t: mostl9 de(o*(ci(% t!e U(ited States: <*t e(di(% #it! a re(e#ed pled%e to de(*cleari@e t!e "orea( .e(i(s*la. 1ra slatio 4 t!e re%imeDs so1ter side #a(ts o*t o1 t!is mess. Seo"l8 whi&h wa ts to ease /te sio s <e.ore hosti g the 0-* s"%%it this .all8 %ade s"re to o..er the North a wa7 o"t4 8ee dema(ded t!at .9o(%9a(% Fapolo%i@e a(d p*(is! t!ose respo(si<le 1or t!e attac+:F la9i(% do#( relati&el9 eas9 terms 1or t!e Nort! to resol&e t!e co(1lict. .9o(%9a(% ma9 <e prepari(% to compl9. Eve <e.ore the i vestigatio &o &l"ded8
the Natio al )e.e se +o%%issio dis%issed Ki% Il/+hol8 its highest/ra #i g aval o..i&er8 &iti g his Iold age.I 1he aval &hie. is said to <e i his late !*s8 <"t so are %a 7 other &o%%issio %e%<ers. C<servers spe&"late that (7o g7a g %a7 "se the dis%issal to &lai% it has alread7 p" ished the %a respo si<le8 perhaps setti g the stage .or a apolog7. Ke eth J"i o es8 a .or%er State )epart%e t egotiator a d Korea e,pert8 sa7s a Isi%ilar d7 a%i&I g"ided North KoreaVs respo se whe o e o. its s"<%ari es i .iltrated So"th Korea territorial waters i 1556. Ulti%atel78 %oderate ele%e ts i (7o g7a g pers"aded the %ilitar7 hardli ers to %a#e a o..i&ial apolog7. So .ar8 histor7 loo#s set to repeat itsel..

SDI 2010 AT: Hot Spots

Impacts

Nort! "orea Not A%%ressi&e'Irratio(al

Nort! "orea (ot a%%ressi&e or irratio(al 2 Ca(do# 10 M)o"g8 se ior .ellow at the +ato I stit"te. A .or%er spe&ial assista t to (reside t 3o ald 3eaga 8
B1he U.S./So"th Korea Allia &e4 C"tdated8 U e&essar78 a d )a gero"sD8 http4//www.&ato.org/p"<?displa7.phpF p"<?idG115628 a&&essed ="l7 158 -*1*N E&e( t!e Nort!As em<r9o(ic (*clear pro%ram does (ot directl9 t!reate( t!e U(ited States. Not!i(% s*%%ests t!at "im is s*icidal4 he wa ts to live well i this li.e. It is *(li+el9 !e #o*ld stri+e at t!e U(ited States: e&e( i1 !e !ad t!e mea(s: <eca*se t!e U.S. arse(al &irt*all9 ass*res retaliator9 a((i!ilatio( . T!e prospect o1 proli1eratio( is #orrisome: <*t a%ai(: "im li+el9 *(dersta(ds8 or &o"ld <e %ade to " dersta d8 t!e e(ormo*s ris+s !e #o*ld ta+e selli(% materials to (o(state actors t!at mi%!t tar%et t!e U(ited States. 14 Washi gto still has a i terest i
de "&leari9i g the Korea pe i s"la8 o. &o"rse. ;"t the prese &e o. U.S. &o ve tio al .or&es o l7 &o%pli&ates a e..ort alread7 .a&i g e,traordi ar7 o<sta&les. 1he deplo7%e t provides Ki% =o g/il with tho"sa ds o. &o ve ie t A%eri&a "&lear hostages. It is .ar <etter .or Washi gto to pro%ote o proli.eratio i the regio .ro% a dista &e a d with greater e%phasis o the roles o. So"th Korea8 =apa 8 a d espe&iall7 +hi a. 12 I( s!ort: a(9 re(e#ed "orea( co(1lict #o*ld <e a( e(ormo*s !*ma( tra%ed9 <*t #o*ld !a&e

o(l9 limited impact o( 1*(dame(tal America( sec*rit9 i(terests. Was!i(%to( (e&ert!eless is st*c+ i( t!e ce(ter o1 "orea( a11airs toda9 <eca*se o1 t!e U.S.25G" allia(ce: #!ic! pro&ides a sec*rit9 %*ara(tee to So*t! "orea #it! (o correspo(di(% <e(e1it to t!e U(ited States. A<se t this relatio ship8 there wo"ld <e o U.S. troops o
the Korea pe i s"la withi ra ge o. North Korea atta&#8 a d o A%eri&a pro%ise to i terve e i a 7 war that %ight res"lt .ro% a provo&atio <7 (7o g7a g or retaliatio <7 the So"th.

Nort! "orea is ratio(al Nima( 03 MMi&hael8 (h.). i A%eri&a . St"dies QI ter&"lt"ral St"diesS8 BWh7 we wo Ht go to war with North
KoreaD8 http4//www.&oldt7pe. et/Assets/pd.s/1.Ni%.=a 16.pd.N ;"t what a<o"t these North Korea sF W!9 are t!e9 s*dde(l9 rattli(% (*clear sa<ers? /o(&e(tio(al #isdom sa9s t!e9Are (*ts: <*t t!eir actio(s are act*all9 B*ite predicta<le. ItHs <ee o e 7ear si &e 0eorge W de&lared North Korea Bevil.D D*ri(% t!at 9ear: t!e C*s! admi(istratio( a((o*(ced t!at Nort! "orea #o*ld <e eli%i<le to recei&e a Hpre2empti&e> (*clear 1irst2stri+e 1rom t!e U.S. /o*ple t!is #it! t!e C*s! admi(istratio(As I$0 <illio( Hmissile2de1e(se> pro%ram: #!ic! t!e9 ar%*e #o*ld <e *sed i( a #ar a%ai(st Nort! "orea: a(d #e <e%i( to see #!9 t!e Nort! "orea(s are (er&o*s. ;"sh also p"t the #a<osh o So"th Korea Os re" i.i&atio pla s with the orth8 th"s g"ara teei g the &o ti "ed e,iste &e o. North Korea a d the &o ti "atio o. hostilities <etwee that atio a d o"rs. I( li%!t o1 all o1 t!is: Nort! "oreaJs #eapo(s pro%ram seems li+e a predicta<le a(d e&e( ratio(al respo(se. T!e9 still claim t!at t!e9 are #illi(% to stop t!e pro%ram: <*t o(l9 i( e0c!a(%e 1or a U.S. promise (ot to la*(c! a 1irst stri+e attac+ a%ai(st t!eir co*(tr9. T!e C*s! re%ime #o(At ma+e t!at commitme(t: reser&i(% its ri%!t to attac+ a(9 (atio( at a(9 time: #it! or #it!o*t pro&ocatio(. I the &ase o. North Korea8 however8 itHs %ore a<o"t #eepi g a paper war alive8 eve at the ris# o. a real "&lear war.

SDI 2010 AT: Hot Spots

Impacts

Nort! "orea( N*+es , No Impact

Nort! "orea #o(At %et 1*(ctio(i(% (*+es a(9time soo( =a%es ;o9(er8 (h.). i atio al se&"rit7 a..airs .ro% the U iversit7 o. Ala<a%a a d ;.A. a d M.A. degrees i s&ie &e .ro% =a&#so ville State U iversit78 Atla ti& +o" &il8 Ma7 -'8 20078 B=o es4 North Korea N"#es VNot a
1hreatVD8 http4//www.a&"s.org/ ew?atla ti&ist/Ao es/ orth/#orea/ "#es/ ot/i%%i e t/threat8 goet9 politi&al I%%i e t

Natio(al Sec*rit9 Ad&isor =i% ;o(es declared i a spee&h to the Atla ti& +o" &il t!at t!e rece(t testi(% o1 a (*clear de&ice a(d 1iri(% o1 Taepodo(% missiles <9 Nort! "orea Fare (ot a( immi(e(t t!reatF to t!e U(ited States or t!e re%io(s <eca*se Ft!e9 !a&e a lo(% #a9 to %oF i( per1ecti(% t!e tec!(olo%9 to #eapo(i@e t!eir (*+es. He
added8 however that I1he i%%i e t threat is the proli.eratio o. that t7pe o. te&h olog7 to other &o" tries a d pote tiall7 terrorist orga i9atio s a d o / state a&tors.I Nat"rall78 this <old state%e t8 espe&iall7 &o%i g a.ter several da7s o. ha d/wri gi g i the %edia8 was ot goi g to go " &halle ged. ;logger 3i&# Mora 8 writi g at A%eri&a 1hi #er8 de&lares this IMore Ke7sto e Kops .oreig poli&7 .ro% C<a%a.I While oti g that the ad%i istratio has raised o"r %ilitar7 alert level8 whi&h I%a#es it &lear that the North Korea threat is <ei g ta#e ver7 serio"sl7 <7 the White Ho"se8I Mora wo ders8 Iwh7 go o"t o. 7o"r wa7 to dow pla7 the threat <7 trotti g o"t 7o"r atio al se&"rit7 advisor to state the o<vio"sFI Si%ilarl78 Hot AirVs Ed Morrisse7 wo ders8 IHas

t!e G<ama admi(istratio( settled o( a strate%9 o1 apat!9? )oes he thi

# ig ori g Ki% will %a#e hi% go awa7F I have to ad%it that o o e has tried that strateg7 with North Korea8 perhaps <e&a"se o o e has <ee &ra97 e o"gh to thi # it will wor#.I I teresti g8 Har&ard I5 sc!olar Stephe Walt s*%%ests doi(% =*st t!at: North KoreaVs "&lear a d %issile tests are hardl7 good ews8 <"t the7 do Ht A"sti.7 goi g i to ."ll pa i& %ode. We alread7 # ew that North Korea had a "&lear weapo s &apa<ilit78 a d tho"gh this latest test see%s to have <ee slightl7 %ore power."l tha the i itial o e8 it does Ht i%pl7 a >"alitative shi.t i the strategi& e viro %e t. Nort!

"oreaDs de1ia(ce is a((o9i(%: per!aps: <*t itAs (ot li+e t!e act o1 testi(% a (*clear #eapo( tells *s somet!i(% (e# a<o*t t!eir re%ime. A(d letDs (ot 1or%et t!at t!e U(ited States !as tested a (*clear #eapo(s 1030 times Qpl"s a other -4 Aoi t tests with 0reat ;ritai S8 #!ile .9o(%9a(% !as tested e0actl9 t#ice. A.ter oti g that <oth ;ill +li to a d
0eorge W. ;"sh .ailed to stop the )(3KVs "&lear progra% <e&a"se Io"r ha ds are largel7 tied8I Walt &o &l"des8 So the <est respo se is to re%ai &al%8 a d stop tal#i g as i. this eve t is a test o. C<a%aVs resolve or a ." da%e tal &halle ge to U.S. poli&7. I .a&t8 the tests are A"st I<"si ess as "s"alI .or North Korea8 a d it wo"ld <etter i. the U ited States I" der/rea&tsI rather tha overrea&ts. I stead o. givi g (7o g7a g the atte tio it wa ts8 the U ited States sho"ld "se this i &ide t as a opport" it7 to <"ild &o se s"s a%o g the %ai i terested parties Q+hi a8 3"ssia8 So"th Korea8 =apa S a d let +hi a ta#e the lead i addressi g it. A<ove all8 the C<a%a ad%i istratio sho"ld avoid %a#i g a lot o. sweepi g state%e ts a<o"t how it will ot ItolerateI a North Korea "&lear &apa<ilit7. 1he .a&t is that weVve tolerated it .or so%e ti%e ow8 a d si &e we do Vt have good optio s .or deali g with it8 thatVs pre&isel7 what we will &o ti "e to do.

Deterre(ce does(At depe(d i( Nort! "oreaAs ratio(alit9 (A13I+K M. MG53AN8 +o .li&t Ma age%e t a d (ea&e S&ie &e vol. -3 o. - 1-1/13'8 April 200$8
B)eterre &e a d S7ste% Ma age%e t41he +ase o. North Korea8D A&&esses http4//&%p.sagep"<.&o%/&o te t/-3/-/1-1.."ll.pd.Wht%l8 goet9 T!ere are co(cer(s t!at t!e Nort! ma9 attac+ <eca*se its leaders co*ld <e irratio(al, not taking deterrence
seriously and miscalculating the consequences of an attack. Cited is the way the North often seems cavalier about a war, threatening one over all sorts of provocations, such as N sanctions. !oes this call .".#$O% deterrence into question& 'irst, it is possible the regime could be irrational. (t has a history of serious miscalculations and irrationality cannot be ruled out. )owever, co(trar9 to t!e sta(dard &ie#: t!e tar%etAs ratio(alit9 is (ot a prereB*isite 1or s*ccess1*l deterre(ce. !eterrence theory was initially constructed by assuming actor rationality, but deterrence in practice does not require rationality in either party. All t!at is reB*ired is s*11icie(t 1ear o1 t!e

co(seB*e(ces 1rom t!e t!reate(ed retaliatio( to lead t!e tar%et to 1or%o #!at t!e t!reat see+s to pre&e(t. T!at 1ear ca( !a&e ratio(al or irratio(al rootsK the per&eptio s and judgments behind it may be rational, irrational, or
some combination of the two. *he same is true for judgments that deterrence threats can be ignored. +laborate cost-benefit calculations are not needed to be afraid of being hurt and to seek to avoid it. Officials can be irrationally ,e-cessively or for the wrong reasons. frightened or nonrationally frightened ,fro/en by stress, uncertainty, surprise, an-iety, or premonitions of disaster.. 0gainst such decision makers deterrence and compellence threats may work well. 1oreover, some &aria(ts o1 irratio(alit9 ca( ma+e a leader or %o&er(me(t

easier: (ot !arder: to deter. (n fact, since it is usually impossible to determine how rational leaders and governments

are, even in retrospect, there is no uncontested evidence that rationality is crucial in deterrence success. *he most sophisticated e-planation of how mutual nuclear deterrence works relies on the parties being aware that they may not be consistently rational, so threats it would be foolish to carry out nevertheless work because governments are not guaranteed to act rationally2deterrers can benefit from being irrational or the possibility they might be, or be crippled by this in trying to deliver highly credible threats. (n short, there is no fi-ed relationship between rationality and deterrence success or failure ,1organ, 3445, pp. 63#78.. T!e cr*cial &aria<le i( deterre(ce sit*atio(s is t!e #ill o1 t!e tar%et

%o&er(me(t to attac+ a(d o1 t!e deterrer to respo(d militaril9. !eterrence is meant to shrink the target9s will to
attack, and though deterrence threats can have some effect, that will is shaped by other factors as well. 0s a result, deterrence may succeed, or fail, when it :shouldn9t;< that is, the other elements, rational and irrational, shaping the challenger9s decision may be compatible with or reinforce deterrence threats, or may serve to override them ,1organ 3445, pp. =>6#=>?.. (n a serious crisis, how strong will the North9s determination to attack be&8 (n fact, it is unlikely to be high. I1 it !as (*clear #eapo(s t!is #ill <e partic*larl9 tr*eK t!e9 #ill lead it to <e more ca*tio*s: less

pro&ocati&e. Its militar9 i(1eriorit9 #o*ld <e a( importa(t 1actor: as #o*ld t!e #ea+(ess o1 its eco(om9 a(d '

SDI 2010 AT: Hot Spots

Impacts

its depe(de(ce o( o*tsiders. So #o*ld its lac+ o1 tr*e allies that share its worldview or have a huge stake in the regime9s survival after it started a war. 1ost importantly, a( attac+ o the 3CK8 =apa 8 or U.S. .or&es #o*ld p*t t!e re%imeAs s*r&i&al at ris+: a(d t!is is a re%ime lo(% dedicated: a<o&e all: to s*r&i&al. 0ttacking with weapons of
mass destruction ,@1!.would replay Aapan9s mistake of =86=B seeking to get the that make it implaccable. " to settle for peace by using means

SDI 2010 AT: Hot Spots

Impacts

No I(dia'.a+ista( War , Deterre(ce

Deterre(ce pre&e(ts I(dia'.a+ista( co(1lict. =o atha Tepperma(8 )ep"t7 Editor at Newswee# Maga9i e a d .or%er )ep"t7 Ma agi g Editor o. :oreig A..airs8 Septe%<er 148 20078 Newswee#8 Septe%<er 148 -**58 6e,is A&ade%i&
1he re&ord si &e the shows the sa%e patter repeati g4 (*clear2armed e(emies slide to#ard #ar: t!e( p*ll <ac+8 alwa7s .or the sa%e reaso s. T!e <est rece(t e0ample is I(dia a(d .a+ista(: #!ic! 1o*%!t t!ree <lood9 #ars a1ter i(depe(de(ce <e1ore acB*iri(% t!eir o#( (*+es i 155'. 3etti(% t!eir !a(ds o( #eapo(s o1 mass destr*ctio( did(Dt do a(9t!i(% to lesse( t!eir a(imosit9. C*t it did dramaticall9 mello# t!eir <e!a&ior . Si(ce acB*iri(% atomic #eapo(s: t!e t#o sides !a&e (e&er 1o*%!t a(ot!er #ar: despite se&ere pro&ocatio(s Qli#e (a#ista i/<ased terrorist atta&#s o I dia i -**1 a d -**'S. T!e9 !a&e s+irmis!ed o(ce. C*t d*ri(% t!at 1lare2*p8 i Kash%ir i 15558 <ot! co*(tries #ere care1*l to +eep t!e 1i%!ti(% limited a d to avoid threate i g the otherVs vital i terests. S"%it 0a g"l78 a I dia a U iversit7 pro.essor a d &o/a"thor o. the .orth&o%i g I dia8 (a#ista 8 a d the ;o%<8 has .o" d that o <oth sides8 o..i&ialsV thi #i g was stri#i gl7 si%ilar to that o. the 3"ssia s a d A%eri&a s i 156-. T!e prospect o1 #ar <ro*%!t Del!i a(d Islama<ad 1ace to 1ace #it! a (*clear !oloca*st: a(d leaders o( eac! side did #!at t!e9 !ad to do to a&oid it.

N*clear deterre(ce #ill pre&e(t a( I(do2.a+ #ar Stephe 3lo&er8 &ol"% ist .or the dail7 %ail8 April --8 20108 )ail7 Mail8
http4//www.dail7%ail.&o."#/de<ate/&ol"% ists/arti&le/1-6!5-6/Kill/1ride t/rate/ atio /de.e d/itsel..ht%l T!e /old War #as #o( <9 t!e West as a res*lt o1 (*clear deterre(ce . Witho"t it8 the %"&h %ore power."l red Ar%7 wo"ld pro<a<l7 have i vaded Wester E"rope de&ades ago a d we %ight all <e drivi g aro" d i 6adas a d getti g dr" # o &heap vod#a. No properl9 1*(ctio(i(% (*clear State !as e&er <ee( i(&aded. I(dia a(d .a+ista( are (o# *(li+el9 to %o to #ar a%ai(st eac! ot!er 1or t!e simple reaso( t!at <ot! possess (*clear #eapo(s. Deterre(ce !as #or+ed <et#ee( states8 tho"gh all <ets are o.. i. a gro"p o. dera ged terrorists sho"ld get hold o. a Vdirt7 <o%<V. 1he Soviet U io %a7 o lo ger pose %"&h o. a
threat8 <"t there %a7 <e other "&lear states that will threate "s i 3* 7earsV ti%e. +hi aF Ira F North KoreaF No o e # ows. We &a o l7 # ow that "&lear weapo s provide the "lti%ate i s"ra &e.

1*

SDI 2010 AT: Hot Spots

Impacts

No I(dia'.a+ista( War , Dialo%*e No#

No I(do2.a+ #arLpeace tal+s !a&e resol&ed t!eir di11ere(ces a(d di11*sed t!e terrorist sit*atio( Eli9a<eth 5oc!e *6/16/2010 QM&+lat&h7 / 1ri<" e ;"si ess News8 BI dia8 (a#ista .oreig %i istersV tal#s e d
positivel78 set to &o ti "eD8 6e,isNe,is8 a&&essed !/-*/1* S T!e 1orei%( mi(isters o1 I(dia a(d .a+ista( e(ded da7/lo g tal+s i Isla%a<ad o 1h"rsda7 o( a positi&e (ote: prepari(% t!e %ro*(d 1or t!e res*mptio( o1 peace tal+s t!at #ere derailed <9 t!e -**' M*m<ai attac+s. T!e tal+s <etwee (a#ista Vs .oreig %i ister Shah Mah%ood J"reshi a d his I dia &o" terpart S.M. Krish a #ere t!e t!ird !i%!2le&el co(tact <et#ee( t!e t#o So*t! Asia( (atio(s si(ce April. IWe agreed t!is process is &al*a<le a(d #e #ill co(ti(*e to meet i( t!e 1*t*re as #ell. It was a "se."l %eeti g a d we agreed to &o ti "e this e gage%e t i the da7s to &o%e8I M*res!i told reporters i Isla%a<ad at a Aoi t press &o .ere &e at the e d o. the tal#s8 late o 1h"rsda7. IWe were ver7 .ra # a d we had a dis&"ssio o all iss"es.I Cot! sides ide(ti1ied terrorism as a( iss*e o1 m*t*al co(cer( 8 he added. Krish a said that he has i vited J"reshi to visit I dia to &o ti "e tal#s. .a+ista( told I(dia t!at it #ill do e&er9t!i(% i( its po#er to e(s*re t!at its soil #o*ld (ot <e *sed 1or terrorist acti&ities8 Krish a said. (a#ista will p"rs"e Ivigoro"sl7I the evide &e that has <ee give to it
<7 I dia o the M"%<ai atta&#s a d the trial o. the seve a&&"sed i the &o spira&7 will <e &o &l"ded speedil78 Krish a said. I1he <otto% li e is that it was a good a d &o str"&tive dis&"ssio a d I loo# .orward to %7 &o ti "ed dis&"ssio o these iss"esI with the (a#ista i .oreig %i ister8 he said. II thi # o"r tal#s have e a<led "s to gai a <etter " dersta di g.I *he talks bode well for a thaw in ties 8 said Uda7 ;has#ar8 strategi& a al7st a d head o. the Natio al Mariti%e :o" datio thi #/ta #. I1he .a&t that the7 have de&ided to sta7 i to"&h is reaso a<l7 positive8I ;has#ar said. II. the7 had &alled o.. the tal#s it wo"ld have <ee di..ere t.I T!*rsda9Ds tal+s 1ollo# a directi&e 1rom t!e prime mi(isters o1 I(dia a(d .a+ista( who %et i April o the sideli es o. a regio al s"%%it i ;h"ta . It #as <illed as a( attempt to <rid%e t!e tr*st de1icit <etwee the two sides a.ter the -**' M"%<ai atta&#s d"ri g whi&h 1* Isla%ist g" %e shot dead 166 people. "ris!(a said o( !is arri&al i( .a+ista( o( Wed(esda9 t!at !e !ad come #it! a messa%e o1 Fpeace a(d 1rie(ds!ipI8 while &alli g o Isla%a<ad to a&t de&isivel7 agai st terroris%. I(a#ista %"st realise that I dia har<o"rs o ill/will agai st it a d the &a &er o. terroris% eeds to <e rooted o"t &o%pletel78I Krish a had said. I1here &a <e o sele&tive e..orts agai st this s&o"rge.I A (a#ista i &o"rt has &harged seve s"spe&ts i &o e&tio with the M"%<ai assa"lt8 i &l"di g alleged %aster%i d Ra#i"r 3eh%a 6a#hvi a d alleged 6ash#ar/e/1ai<a Q6e1S operative Rarar Shah. Isla%a<ad sa7s it eeds %ore evide &e to <oo# 6e1 &hie. Ha.i9 Saeed who New )elhi sa7s is the %ai plotter o. the atta&#s.

War is *(li+el9 <et#ee( .a+ista( a(d I(diaLt!e9 pre1er peace a(d are e(%a%ed i( diplomac9: i(cl*di(% a resol*tio( o1 t!e #ater co(1lict T!e Statesma( *-/1-/2010 QB(a# shows readi ess .or tal#s o -2 :e<D8 6e,isNe,is8 a&&essed !/-*/1*S
.a+ista( !as i(dicated its readi(ess 1or the .oreig se&retar7/level tal+s o -2 :e<r"ar78 sa7i g the two sides eeded to %ove .orward <*t i(sisted o( res*mptio( o1 composite dialo%*e co&eri(% "as!mir a(d ot!er o*tsta(di(% iss*es that is
%ea i g."l a d res"lt/orie ted. 3espo di g to the two sets o. dates proposed <7 I dia .or the tal#s8 (a#ista .oreig %i ister Shah Mah%ood J"reshi said that -2 :e<r"ar7 was ot a <ad date .or the tal#s.Mr J"reshiVs words .ollow (ri%e Mi ister Mr @o"s". 3a9a 0ila iVs state%e t that

.a+ista( !ad al#a9s 1a&ored dialo%*e #it! I(dia to a #ar #!o appreciated I(diaDs Fi(te(tio(F to res*me tal+s. 3eiterati g (a#ista Vs sta &e o res"%ptio o. dialog"e8 Mr 0ila i said Ipoliti&ia s %a#e <ridges ot wallsI8 A(( ews age &7 reported.
II appre&iate I diaVs i te tio to res"%e tal#s8I he said. I1here is a i te tio that we sa7 that there will <e o war. ;"t i te tio s &a &ha ge a 7ti%e. 1here is a threat per&eptio 8 thatVs wh7 we wa t dialog"e8I Mr 0ila i said i i terview with a private televisio &ha el tele&ast last ight.:oreig se&retar7 Mrs Nir"pa%a 3ao had proposed 1' a d -2 :e<r"ar7 as dates .or tal#s with her (a#ista i &o" terpart Mr Sal%a ;ashir. 1he &o%posite dialog"e <etwee the two sides was s"spe ded i the wa#e o. the -6/11 M"%<ai terror atta&#s. I <elieve we sho"ld %ove .orward. +o%%o se se states that tal#s sho"ld <e held as soo as possi<le8 Mr J"reshi said.W!at is importa(t is t!at #e start tal+i(%. C. &o"rse we .eel that these tal#s sho"ld <e the re/start o. the &o%posite dialog"e a d ta#e it "p .ro% where we le.t o... A.ter all8 all the iss"es that <oth sides wa t to raise are i &l"ded i the &o%posite dialog"e8 he said i separate i terviews to 0eo ews &ha el a d the News dail7. We have %a 7 o"tsta di g iss"es o o"r age da8 li#e the Kash%ir iss"e that I dia re&og ises. 1here is the waters iss"e o whi&h there sho"ld <e tal#s8 he said. I. 7o" do ot hold tal#s o these iss"es8 the tal#s will ot <e <e e.i&ial. )o 7o" wa t progress or A"st tal#sF We #a(t pro%ress a(d (ot tal+s 1or t!e sa+e o1 tal+s. We #a(t mea(i(%1*l a(d res*lt2orie(ted tal+s: !e said . Mr J"reshi was repl7i g to a >"estio o whether I dia wo"ld <e willi g to i &l"de iss"es li#e Kash%ir i the "p&o%i g parle7s. It was reall7 ot that i%porta t where the parle7s are held8 he said8 addi g (a#ista wo"ld approa&h the tal#s with a ope %i d. 5e1erri(% to t!e "as!mir: M*res!i poi(ted o*t t!at e&e( I(dia !ad started B*iet diplomac9 #it! t!e "as!miris . At the sa%e ti%e8 he said8 the shari g o. river waters was i%porta t <e&a"se (a#ista is a agri&"lt"re/<ased &o" tr7 a d 5* per &e t o. o"r water is eeded .or agri&"lt"re. Water tal#s I(dia a(d .a+ista( !a&e a%reed o( a roadmap 1or resol&i(% di11ere(ces o&er t!e s!ari(% o1 ri&er #aters i the e,t si, %o ths8 a se ior (a#ista i o..i&ial has said. (a#ista Vs I d"s Waters &o%%issio er Mr =a%aat Ali Shah i .or%ed the %edia a<o"t the road%ap a d said <oth sides had de&ided to hold two additio al %eeti gs o e at the e d o. Mar&h a d a other i =" e .or disp"te resol"tio . ;oth %eeti gs will <e i additio to the %a dator7 o e s&hed"led .or Ma78 he said. ;rie.i g Ao"r alists at the &o &l"sio o. a .ive/da7 visit <7 a tea% led <7 his I dia &o" terpart Mr 0 3a ga atha 8 Mr Shah &lai%ed the I dia side had agreed to (a#ista Vs de%a d that all water disp"tes sho"ld <e settled withi a agreed ti%e.ra%e.

11

SDI 2010 AT: Hot Spots

Impacts

I(dia'.a+ista( War Not /a*se E0ti(ctio(

I(dia'.a+ista( (*clear #ar does(At ca*se e0ti(ctio(. ;r"&e 8ie<erma(8 +ople7 News Servi&e8 =" e 1*8 20028 B:allo"t .ro% "&lear war i So"th Asia see as
" li#el7 to rea&h U.S8D http4//www.glo<alse&"rit7.org/org/ ews/-**-/*-*61*/i dopa#1.ht% T!e !orror o1 a (*clear #ar <et#ee( I(dia a(d .a+ista( co*ld decimate So*t! AsiaDs lar%est cities 8 #illi g "p to 1- %illio people a d <ri gi g %iser7 to &o" tless others. C*t a #ar: i1 limited to t!ose t#o (atio(s a d the "&lear arse als the7 are tho"ght to possess8 poses little danger of radioactive fallout reaching North 0merica : p!9sicists a(d atmosp!eric scie(tists sa9. 1here are ." da%e tal reaso s. :irst8 I(dia a(d .a+ista( are <elie&ed armed #it! less pote(t #eapo(s8 pro<a<l7 o larger tha the e>"ivale t o. 128*** to s o. 1N18 a<o"t the sa%e si9e as the <o%<s the U ited States dropped o Hiroshi%a a d Nagasa#i i 1542. I &o trast8 t!e t9pical (*clear #eapo( i( t!e U.S. stoc+pile toda9 is 10 to 20 times more po#er1*l t!a( t!e #eapo(s !eld <9 I(dia a(d .a+ista(: a&&ordi g to 0lo<alSe&"rit7.org. Se&o d8 t!e t#o co*(tries are t!o*%!t to !a&e (o more t!a( 200 #ar!eads <et#ee( t!em 2 not enough8 s&ie tists <elieve8 to endanger populations far beyond "outh 0sia. More tha 318*** "&lear weapo s8 <7 &o trast8 are %ai tai ed <7 eight
# ow "&lear powers8 a d 52 per&e t are i the U ited States a d 3"ssia8 a&&ordi g to the ;"lleti o. Ato%i& S&ie tists8 whi&h %o itors "&lear proli.eratio . 1hird8 t!e approac!i(% s*mmer i( t!e Nort!er( Hemisp!ere #ill mea( a( a<se(ce o1 1ast2mo&i(% #i(ter storms t!at co*ld carr9 (*clear 1allo*t B*ic+l9 across t!e %lo<e. :"rther8 So*t! AsiaDs mo(soo( seaso(8 whi&h <egi s this %o th a d e,te ds i to C&to<er8 co*ld #as! (*clear 1allo*t <ac+ to Eart!: co(1i(i(% t!e #orst e(&iro(me(tal dama%e to t!at part o1 t!e #orld. IC. &o"rse8 t!ere #ill <e some radiatio( reac!i(% %lo<all9: <*t t!e amo*(ts #ill <e small compared to t!e le&els t!at #o*ld prod*ce !ealt! e11ects:F said +harles S!apiro8 a ph7si&ist at Sa :ra &is&o State U iversit78 who &o/a"thored a 15'2 st"d7 o the e viro %e tal e..e&ts o. "&lear war. Irradiated parti&les <lasted i to the at%osphere .ro% a "&lear war <etwee I dia a d (a#ista 8 &arried alo.t <7 the Aet strea%8 wo"ld eve t"all7 rea&h ever7 part o. the glo<e a d rai <a&# dow to Earth as .allo"t8 s&ie tists sa7. At%ospheri& st"dies &o d"&ted <7 s&ie tists at the S&ripps I stit"tio o. C&ea ograph7 i 6a =olla8 +ali..8 have .o" d that parti&"late .ro% poll"tio i So"th Asia &a rea&h the West +oast o. the U ited States i as .ew as si, da7s. However8 those st"dies .o&"sed o the %igratio o. ha9e i So"th Asia that &overs tho"sa ds o. s>"are #ilo%eters / a %"&h greater area tha that a..e&ted <7 a "&lear e,plosio 8 said U. 3a%a atha 8 a at%ospheri& s&ie tist at S&ripps. IItVs ver7 ris#7 to e,trapolateI data .ro% the poll"tio st"d78 he said. 3a%a atha Vs st"d7 .o" d that parti&"lates larger tha 1* %i&ro s i dia%eter .ell to Earth <e.ore rea&hi g North A%eri&a8 so itVs " &lear how %"&h radioa&tive .allo"t %ight rea&h the West +oast8 or how dispersed it wo"ld <e8 he said. II thi # East Asia has %ore to worr7 a<o"t8 as well as E"rope8I 3a%a atha said. 6arr7 5iddle: a climatolo%ist at S&ripps8 said t!e le&els o1 radiatio( reac!i(% t!e U(ited States pro<a<l9 #o*ld (ot <e a(9 !i%!er t!a( <ac+%ro*(d radiatio( . H"%a s are e,posed ever7 da7 to radiatio .ro% spa&e8 .ro% deep i the Earth8 a d .ro% %a /%ade so"r&es s"&h as %edi&al X/ra7s a d other &o s"%er prod"&ts. IEsse(tiall9: it #o*ld !a&e (o e11ect:F 5iddle said. How %"&h radiatio %ight disperse aro" d the glo<e depe ds o several .a&tors8 s&ie tists sa7. A ato%i& <o%< deto ated a<ove gro" d &reates a large .ire<all <"t ver7 little .allo"t <e&a"se it does ot hit the gro" d a d <last irradiated parti&les a d other de<ris i to the air. A <o%< that e,plodes o the gro" d or ear the gro" d8 however8 wo"ld go"ge a %assive &rater a d h"rl d"st a d de<ris high i to the at%osphere. Air<or e parti&les irradiated <7 the <last wo"ld rai dow to Earth as .allo"t over a wide area. 3adioa&tive de<ris risi g o %ore tha a<o"t 2*8*** .eet8 the "pper rea&hes o. the troposphere8 wo"ld ret"r to Earth %"&h %ore rapidl7 tha i. it rises i to the stratosphere8 a<ove that altit"de. I:allo"t .ro% a weapo ... de&a7s e,tre%el7 rapidl78 so i. it &o%es dow to Earth >"i&#l78 itVs %"&h %ore pote t a d pote tiall7 da%agi g tha i. it sta7s "p .or a lo g while8I Shapiro said. N"&lear <o%<s deto ated <7 I dia or (a#ista 8 i. the7 are the si9e o. the <o%< the U ited States dropped o Hiroshi%a8 %ight se d a %"shroo% &lo"d -*8*** .eet i to the at%osphere. I that &ase8 So"th AsiaVs torre tial %o soo seaso &o"ld %a#e a horri.i& sit"atio worse .or those who live there. I the -**1 <oo# IC"t o. the N"&lear Shadow8I a gro"p o. ph7si&ists a d e viro %e tal e,perts spe&"lated a<o"t the res"lts o. a si gle Hiroshi%a/si9ed "&lear <o%< deto ated earl7 -8*** .eet over ;o%<a78 I dia. 1he7 gave the .ollowi g s&e ario8 <ased o the da%age do&"%e ted at Hiroshi%a a d &"rre t &o ditio s i ;o%<a74 1he i itial <last8 <righter tha 18*** s" s a d s".."sed with i te se "&lear radiatio 8 wo"ld set .ire to ever7thi g &o%<"sti<le .or o e to two %iles aro" d gro" d 9ero. 1he <last wo"ld <e .ollowed <7 a sho&# wave &reati g wi ds !* %iles per ho"r or %ore8 destro7i g ever7thi g withi a radi"s o. earl7 a %ile. Ma 7 o. the <"ildi gs i ;o%<a78 %ade .ro% raw %aterials a d poorl7 &o str"&ted8 wo"ld ot s"rvive. :irestor%s8 &overi g "p to 1.- %iles .ro% gro" d 9ero8 wo"ld &reate wi ds 3* to 2* %iles per ho"r. 1e%perat"res i the .ire 9o e8 ."eled <7 li>"id gas &7li ders i %a 7 ;o%<a7 ho%es a d a high &o &e tratio o. &ars8 s&ooters a d <"ses8 wo"ld rea&h several h" dred degrees. 3adioa&tive .allo"t8 i te si.ied <7 ;o%<a7Vs high h"%idit78 pro<a<l7 wo"ld <e .atal .or 12 to 6- s>"are %iles aro" d gro" d 9ero. I all8 earl7 4!'8*** people i ;o%<a7 wo"ld <e #illed a.ter a si gle "&lear e,plosio 8 a d a additio al --58*** wo"ld <e severel7 i A"red8 the a"thors esti%ated. T!e U.S. De1e(se Departme(t <ased its estimate o1 12 millio( dead i( a( I(dia2.a+ista( (*clear #ar .ro% the %ost re&e t assess%e ts o. the "&lear &apa<ilities o. <oth &o" tries.

1-

SDI 2010 AT: Hot Spots

Impacts

No /e(tral Asia /o(1lict , No Escalatio(

No escalatio( , US'5*ssia'/!i(a do(At #a(t co(1lict i( /e(tral Asia. Eli9a<eth Wis!(ic+8 Assista t (ro.essor o. (oliti&al S&ie &e at Mo t&lair State U iversit7 a d a 3esear&h Asso&iate at the Weatherhead East Asia I stit"te at +ol"%<ia U iversit78 :e<r"ar7 20078 3USSIA8 +HINA8 AN)
1HE UNI1E) S1A1ES IN +EN13A6 ASIA4 (3CS(E+1S :C3 03EA1 (CWE3 +CM(E1I1ICN AN) +CC(E3A1ICN IN 1HE SHA)CW C: 1HE 0EC30IAN +3ISIS8 http4//www.strategi&st"diesi stit"te.ar%7.%il/p"<s/displa7.&.%Fp"<idG5*! No etheless8 the 5*ssia2/!i(a part(ers!ip s!o*ld (ot <e see( as a( a(ti2U.S. <loc: (or s!o*ld t!e S/G <e &ie#ed as e tirel7 co!esi&e. 1h"s i( assessi(% U.S.25*ssia2/!i(a competitio(: it is importa(t to (ote t!at t!e U(ited States is (ot (ecessaril9 sB*ari(% o11 a%ai(st 5*ssia a(d /!i(a to%et!er . 1o the &o trar78 there are areas where 3"ssia a d +hi a are i &o%petitio with o e a other8 parti&"larl7 i the e&o o%i& real%8 whi&h provide opport" ities .or U.S. poli&ies. Moreover8 t!e lac+ o1 co(se(s*s <et#ee( Cei=i(% a(d Mosco# o&er eco(omic i(te%ratio( #it!i( t!e S/G !as #ea+e(ed t!e or%a(i@atio(As co!esi&e(ess: #!ile lea&i(% room 1or pro=ects to i(te%rate /e(tral Asia eco(omicall9 #it! So*t! Asia: East Asia: a(d E*rope: as #ell as 1or ot!er diplomatic i(itiati&es to e(%a%e /e(tral Asia( states o tra s atio al iss"es o. &o%%o &o &er . T!e te(de(c9 to &ie# U.S.25*ssia2/!i(a competitio( i( t!e re%io( with 15th &e t"r7 le ses: as some sort o1 H(e# %reat %ame> obscures the impact of globali/ation and the common interests the great powers share in addressing transnational problems. T!e U(ited States: 5*ssia: a(d /!i(a all !a&e a( i(terest i( ad2dressi(% (arcotics tra11ic+i(%: !*ma( tra11ic+i(%: a(d ille%al arms trade i( t!e re%io(. *hey also have a common stake in achieving stability i A.gha ista a d ro"ti g Al/Jaeda .ro% the regio . 1o the e,te t that 3"ssia8 +hi a8 a d the S+C as a orga i9atio share these goals8 t!e U(ited States #ill 1ace opport*(ities to e0pa(d re%io(2#ide as #ell as 1or <ilateral cooperatio( #it! 5*ssia a(d /!i(a o tra s atio al
pro<le%s.

Empiricall9 de(ied2i(sta<ilit9 does (ot lead to escalatio( Martha ;rill Glcott has a ;.A.8 SUN@/;"..aloL M.A.8 (h.).8 U iversit7 o. +hi&ago. !/1-/0- B1"r%oil i
http4//www.&ar egiee dow%e t.org/p"<li&atio s/F.aGviewYidG-*3!6 a&&essed4 !/--/1*

+e tral AsiaD Wall Street =o"r al

T!e re%io( is also s*11eri(% t!ro*%! a c9clical dro*%!t. Water le&els i( /e(tral AsiaDs reser&oirs are at record lo#s: #it! *pstream pro&iders Q1aAi#ista a d K7rg79sta S holdi g <a&# s"pplies to dow strea% "sers QU9<e#ista a d Ka9a#hsta S.
Ele&tri&it7 &"t<a&#s .or .all a d wi ter have alread7 <ee a o" &ed. Hard/hit .ar%ers8 %a 7 o. who% lost their .ood a d seed stores d"ri g the wi ter8 %"st ow pa7 re&ord pri&es .or ."el a d .or seed. Ma 7 si%pl7 re."sed to pla t a d this s"%%erVs hot a d dr7 s"%%er %ea s lower 7ields .or those who did. All o1 t!is carries re%io(al implicatio(s. I( 17-7 a(d 1770: disp*tes o&er #ater a(d la(d led to

1i%!ti(% <et#ee( U@<e+s a(d "9r%9@ i( so*t!er( "9r%9@sta(: a(d <et#ee( Ta=i+s a(d "9r%9@ alo(% t!eir <order d*ri(% t!e #a(i(% da9s o1 t!e So&iet U(io(. T!e "a@a+!s a(d U@<e+s are lo(%2sta(di(% ri&als: as are t!e U@<e+s a(d Ta=i+s. Te(sio(s <et#ee( t!e latter came close to <oili(% o&er d*ri(% t!e Ta=i+ ci&il #ar: #!e( 1li%!ts <et#ee( t!e t#o (atio(al capitals: a(d t!e <order <et#ee( t!e t#o co*(tries is still lar%el9 closed <9 U@<e+ista(.

13

SDI 2010 AT: Hot Spots

Impacts

No /!i(a War 2 3e(eral

No /!i(a #ar , domestic eco(omic 1oc*s. 8i( +ho g/(i 8 pro.essor i the 0rad"ate I stit"te o. I ter atio al A..airs a d Strategi& St"dies at 1a%#a g U iversit78 1aiwa 8 =a "ar7 -28 200)8 I terview p"<lished i Newswee# o li e8
http4//www.%s <&.%s .&o%/id/16'*53!5/site/ ewswee#/ +o"ld +hi a <e &al&"lati g that the U ited States %ight sta7 o"t o. a 1aiwa &o .li&tF 1hat does Ht see% to <e the &ase. /!i(aAs (e# %ra(d strate%9 is to sB*ee@e o*t t!e leadi(% i(1l*e(ce o1 t!e U(ited States i( East Asia #it!o*t #ar: <*t #it! eco(om9 a(d c*lt*re. 1he rapidl7 %oder i9i g %ilitar7 &apa<ilities o. M+hi aHs (eopleHs 6i<eratio Ar%7N will serve as a <a&#<o e o. ;eiAi gHs e,tra/%ilitar7 i str"%e ts8 li#e diplo%a&7. T!ereAs a &er9 stro(% co(se(s*s amo(% t!e leaders i( Cei=i(% Nt!atO t!e most importa(t t!i(% 1or /!i(a (o# is to sei@e t!is #i(do# o1 opport*(it9: #!ic! !as (ot occ*rred i( ce(t*ries: HT!ereAs (o serio*s t!reat o*tside /!i(a: t!is is t!e time #!e( #e ca( ma+e eco(omic %ro#t!.> So they want to have a peaceful environment and achieve economic growth first.

No s!ot o1 US2/!i(a co(1lict or (*clear escalatio(. S&ott Moore8 U dergrad"ate 3esear&h Assista t8 East Asia No proli.eratio (rogra%8 +NS8 C&to<er 1'8 200$8
N"&lear +o .li&t i the -1st +e t"r74 3eviewi g the +hi ese N"&lear 1hreat8 http4//www. ti.org/e?resear&h/e3?'*.ht%l T!e last 1e# 9ears !a&e #it(essed %ro#i(% co(cer( o&er /!i(aDs (*clear #eapo(s post*re . A s"&&essio
o. U ited States gover %e t reportsM1N have e,pressed alar% over the evolvi g +hi ese "&lear do&tri e8 as well as the %oder i9atio o. "&lear .or&es. 1his i terest has <ee paralleled <7 a vi<ra t dis&"ssio i the %edia8 parti&"larl7 withi the U ited States. (ro%i e t i this dis&"ssio have <ee &o &er s over the i &reasi g &apa<ilities o. +hi aVs "&lear weapo s8 a d possi<le revisio s to +hi aVs lo g/sta di g pledge ot &o d"&t a .irst stri#e "si g "&lear weapo sM-N Qthe so/&alled INo :irst UseI do&tri e or <" sho",ia shi7o gS. Despite t!e t*m*lt: t!ere is broad consensus amo(% e0perts t!at t!e co(cer(s %e(erated i( t!is disc*ssio( are e-aggerated. T!e si@e o1 t!e /!i(ese (*clear arse(al is small8 esti%ated at aro" d -** warheadsLM3N =e..re7 6ewis8 a pro%i e t ar%s &o trol e,pert8 &lai%s that '* is a realisti& "%<er o. deplo7ed warheads.M4N I &o trast8 the U ited States has "pwards o. 1*8*** warheads8 so%e 28!** o. whi&h are operatio all7 deplo7ed.M2N Eve with proAe&ted i%prove%e ts a d the i trod"&tio o. a ew lo g/ra ge I ter&o ti e tal ;allisti& Missile8 the ):/31A /!i(aDs (*clear post*re is li+el9 to remai( o(e o1 Fmi(im*m deterre(ce .IM6N Si%ilarl78 despite &o &er to the &o trar7: t!ere is e&er9 i(dicatio( t!at /!i(a is e0tremel9 *(li+el9 to a<a(do( its No Eirst Use QN:US pled%e.M!N 1he +hi ese gover %e t has &o ti "ed to de 7 a 7 &ha ge to the N:U poli&78 a &lai% s"<sta tiated <7 %a 7 +hi ese a&ade%i& o<servers.M'N I s"%8 the 8 .ears over +hi aVs &"rre t "&lear post"re see% so%ewhat e,aggerated. 1his do&"%e t8 there.ore8 does ot atte%pt to dis&"ss whether +hi aVs "&lear post"re poses a pro<a<le8 ge eral threat to the U ited StatesL %ost sig s i di&ate that eve i the lo ger ter%8 it does ot. 3ather8 it see#s to a al79e the %ost li#el7 s&e arios .or "&lear &o .li&t. 1wo s"&h possi<le s&e arios are ide ti.ied i parti&"lar4 a de&laratio o. i depe de &e <7 1aiwa that is s"pported <7 the U ited States8 a d the a&>"isitio <7 =apa o. a "&lear weapo s &apa<ilit7. Use o1 (*clear #eapo(s <9 /!i(a #o*ld reB*ire a dramatic polic9 re&ersal #it!i( t!e polic9ma+i(% apparat*s: a d it is with a a al7sis o. this pote tial that this <rie. <egi s. S"&h a reversal wo"ld also li#el7 re>"ire &rises as &atal7sts8 a d it is to s"&h s&e arios8 i volvi g 1aiwa a d =apa 8 that this <rie. progresses. It &loses with a dis&"ssio o. the ."t"re o. Si o/A%eri&a "&lear relatio s. 1he +hi ese (oli&7%a#i g Apparat"s a d the N"&lear Cptio /!i(aDs leaders!ip !as toda9 ac!ie&ed <road co(se(s*s t!at t!e (atio(Ds i(terests are <est ser&ed <9 a sta<le a(d peace1*l i(ter(atio(al e(&iro(me(t.M5N 1his has give rise to the strateg7 o. Ipea&e."l develop%e tI Qhepi g .a9ha S o.te e%phasi9ed <7 +hi ese o..i&ials. 3i&e( t!e co(se(s*s to#ards moderatio( i(

1orei%( a(d sec*rit9 polic9: a(d its em<odime(t i( o&erarc!i(% (atio(al polic9: t!ere is m*c! to s*%%est t!at t!e *se o1 (*clear #eapo(s a%ai(st t!e U(ited States: in whatever situation: #o*ld <e a(at!ema to /!i(aDs decisio( ma+ers. T!e (e# %e(eratio( o1 /!i(ese leaders8 whi&h has rise to power i the a.ter%ath o. the 15'5 1ia a %e S>"are i &ide t Qli" siP: !as te(ded to co(sist o1 moderate tec!(ocrats8M1*N #!o are *(li+el9 to s*pport radical polic9 re&ersals: s*c! as t!e *se o1 (*clear #eapo(s. /!i(ese politics i( %e(eral !a&e also e&ol&ed i(to a Fmore pra%matic: ris+2ad&erseF 1orm.M11N 1his pro&ess was i itiated <7 the rise o. Ii terest gro"p politi&sI d"ri g the te "re o.
(reside t =ia g Re%i .M1-N

14

SDI 2010 AT: Hot Spots

Impacts

No /!i(a War , Tai#a( Speci1ic

/!i(a does(At #a(t a #ar o&er Tai#a( , attempti(% (o(2&iole(t i(te%ratio(. 8i( +ho g/(i 8 pro.essor i the 0rad"ate I stit"te o. I ter atio al A..airs a d Strategi& St"dies at 1a%#a g U iversit78 1aiwa 8 =a "ar7 -28 200)8 I terview p"<lished i Newswee# o li e8
http4//www.%s <&.%s .&o%/id/16'*53!5/site/ ewswee#/ 6ess a d less li#el7. Cei=i(%As !i%!est priorit9 o( Tai#a( is what I wo"ld &all a<sorptio( #it!o*t #ar. Cei=i(% !as a( i(creasi(% (*m<er o1 i(str*me(ts to do t!at: i(cl*di(% eco(om9: c*lt*ral e0c!a(%es: ma(ip*latio( o1 media: stra(%*latio( o1 Tai#a(As i(ter(atio(al space a(d ps9c!olo%ical #ar1are . Additio all78 i1 t!ere #as a #ar: Cei=i(% #o*ld 1ace t!e res*lt o1 <loods!ed i 1aiwa a(d t!e dama%e to t!e eco(omic i(1rastr*ct*re. A1ter a co(B*est: Cei=i(% #o*ld !a&e to 1ace a re<ellio*s pop*latio( Z 1he %ilitar7 optio is the last optio . A(d e&e( t!e militar9 optio( !as (e&er <ee( to stri+e t!e U.S. a d destro7 1aiwa . 3ather8 itAs to deter t!e U.S. 1rom comi(% i(: a d
to sei9e 1aiwa Pli#e gra<<i g a <ea"ti."l8 s%ili g <ride i to 7o"r e%<ra&e. 1hatHs the idea.

No s!ot t!at Tai#a( #ar #o*ld %o (*clear. =oh .i+e8 )ire&tor o. 0lo<alSe&"rit7.org8 *-/*1/200$ 8 B+hi aVs Cptio s i the 1aiwa +o .ro tatio 8D
http4//www.glo<alse&"rit7.org/%ilitar7/ops/taiwa /pr&.ht% /!i(a #o*ld almost certai(l9 (ot co(template a (*clear stri+e a%ai(st Tai#a(: (or #o*ld Cei=i(% em<ar+ o( a co*rse o1 actio( t!at posed si%(i1ica(t ris+s o1 t!e *se o1 (*clear #eapo(s. T!e mai(la(dDs lo(% term %oal is to li<erate Tai#a(: (ot to o<literate it8 a d a 7 "se o. "&lear weapo s <7 +hi a wo"ld r" a s"<sta tial ris# o. the "se o. "&lear weapo s <7 the U ited States. A( i(a<ilit9 to co(trol escalatio( <e7o d Ide%o strativeI deto atio s #o*ld ca*se "tterl7 disproportio(ate destr*ctio(.

Eco(omic 1oc*s pre&e(ts co(1lict. Iva Ela(d8 dire&tor o. de.e se poli&7 st"dies at the +ato I stit"te8 =a "ar7 -38 20038 BIs +hi ese Militar7
Moder i9atio a 1hreat to the U ited StatesFD http4//www.&ato.org/p"<s/pas/pa462.pd. Hostile <e!a&ior to#ard Tai#a( co*ld dist*r< /!i(aAs i(creasi(% eco(omic li(+a%e #it! t!e rest o1 t!e #orld Lespeciall9 growi g &o%%er&ial li(+s #it! Tai#a(. Ceca*se /!i(aAs !i%!est priorit9 is eco(omic %ro#t!: t!e disr*ptio( o1 s*c! eco(omic relatio(s!ips is a disi(ce(ti&e 1or a%%ressi&e /!i(ese actio(s &is2Q2&is Tai#a( . A(9 attac+ s!ort o1 i(&asio( Q"si g %issiles or i stit"ti g a aval <lo&#adeS #o*ld li+el9 !arm t!e Tai#a(ese eco(om9 a(d disr*pt /!i(ese trade a(d 1i(a(cial co(tacts with 1aiwa a d other developed atio s #it!o*t %etti(% /!i(a #!at it most #a(tsLco(trol o1 Tai#a(. A( a%phi<io"s i(&asio(Li( t!e *(li+el9 e&e(t t!at it s*cceededL#o*ld pro&ide s*c! co(trol <*t #o*ld ca*se e&e( %reater disr*ptio( i( /!i(aAs commercial li(+s to de&eloped (atio(s.

12

SDI 2010 AT: Hot Spots

Impacts

No 5*ssia War , 3e(eral

No s!ot o1 US25*ssia #ar , 1o*r reaso(s. 6eo Aro(8 )ire&tor o. 3"ssia st"dies at the A%eri&a E terprise I stit"te8 Septe%<er 200$8 3"ssia i 0lo<al
A..airs8 http4//e g.glo<ala..airs.r"/pri t/ "%<er/ ?6'66 @et8 a !ead2o( co(1ro(tatio( a(d a (e# /old War are highly unlikely8 at least 1or 1o*r reaso(s. Eirst: despite their erosio 8 the a.ore%e tio ed %eo2strate%ic Hassets> are 1ar 1rom <ei(% depleted a(d co(ti(*e to ser&e as a +i(d o1 1rame o*tli(i(% t!e <asic relatio(s <et#ee( t!e t#o co*(tries. Seco(d: t!e o<=ecti&es o1 5*ssiaAs 1orei%( a(d de1e(se policies8 set i 155-/15538 remai( *(c!a(%ed. 1he7 are4 3"ssia as a regio al s"perpowerL 3"ssia as a glo<al "&lear
s"perpowerL a d8 %ost i%porta tl7 .or A%eri&a8 3"ssia as o e o. great powers Q<"t ot a s"perpower that wo"ld politi&all7 &o%pete with the U ited States worldwideS. Altho"gh t!ese o<=ecti&es %a7 irritate Washi gto ow a d agai 8 the7 #ill !ardl9 e&o+e its deep

a(0iet9 a<o*t AmericaAs &ital i(terests. T!ird: despite t!e "remli(As i(cli(atio( to 1le0 its m*scles: 5*ssia 8 " li#e the Soviet U io a d &o te%porar7 +hi a8 is (ot a Hre&isio(ist> po#er t!at co(sta(tl9 see+s to c!a(%e t!e %lo<al <ala(ce o1 1orces i its ow .avor. S*c! e11orts reB*ire a( ideolo%9 a(d8 as a res"lt8 a s9stem o1 priorities: #!ic! Mosco# does (ot !a&e toda9 a d will hardl7 have i the ."t"re. What ideolog7 &a we spea# o. whe 3"ssia8 while passio atel7
de.e di g Ira Hs right to the Bpea&e."l develop%e t o. "&lear e erg7D a d a resista &e to Bpress"re thro"gh .or&e8D si%"lta eo"sl7 la" &hes a ro&#et .ro% its :ar Easter spa&e la" &h site Svo<od 7 that is &arr7i g a Israeli sp7 satellite i te ded to %o itor Ira Hs e..orts to develop a "&lear <o%<[ T!e s!are o1 t!e 3D. spe(t <9 5*ssia8 ow rolli g i petrodollars8 o( de1e(se Q3 per&e tS is e&e( less t!a( it did i 155-/155!8 a1ter t!e 5*ssia( Eederatio( !ad i(!erited a( a<sol*tel9 empt9 treas*r9 1rom t!e So&iet U(io(8 a d at least te ti%es less tha the Soviet U io did i 15'2. C the <asis o. its p"r&hasi g power parit7 Qi a<sol"te .ig"res esti%ated .or -**2S8 5*ssiaAs de1e(se spe(di(% QT4!.!! <illio S is more t!a( ele&e( times less t!a( t!e o*tla9s o( de1e(se i( t!e U.S. QT2-- <illio S. 6et: t!e most importa(t 1actor o1 co*(teractio( to a (e# /old War is t!e o(e t!at t!e "remli( strate%ists !a&e lo(% dismissed #it! co(tempt $ a%el78 p*<lic opi(io(. Neit!er America(s (or 5*ssia(s #ill s*pport a(9 co(1ro(tatio( pla(s o1 t!eir elites: as t!e9 #ill (ot &ie# t!em as (ecessar9 .

16

SDI 2010 AT: Hot Spots

Impacts

No N*clear Escalatio( 2 3e(eral

De2escalatio( sol&e t!eir (*clear #ar impact , (eit!er side #ill retaliate. Mi&hael M*i(la(8 .or%er )ire&tor o. the )it&hle7 :o" datio a d (er%a e t U der/Se&retar7 o. State i the UK8 20078 B1hi #i g a<o"t "&lear weapo s4 pri &iples8 pro<le%s8 prospe&ts8D pp.63/4
E&e( i1 i(itial (*clear *se did (ot B*ic+l9 e(d t!e 1i%!ti(%: t!e s*ppositio( o1 i(e0ora<le mome(t*m i( a de&elopi(% e0c!a(%e: #it! eac! side r*s!i(% to o&erreactio( a%id &o ."sio a d " &ertai t78 is impla*si<le. It .ails to &o sider what the sit"atio o. the de&isio /%a#ers wo"ld reall7 <e. Neither side could want escalation. Cot! #o*ld <e appalled at #!at #as %oi(% o(. Cot! #o*ld <e desperatel9 loo+i(% 1or si%(s t!at t!e ot!er #as read9 to call a !alt. Cot!: %i&e( t!e capacit9 1or e&asio( or co(cealme(t #!ic! moder( deli&er9 plat1orms a(d &e!icles ca( possess: co*ld !a&e i( reser&e si%(i1ica(t 1orces i(&*l(era<le e(o*%! (ot to e(tail *se2or2lose press*res . QIt %a7
<e %ore ope to >"estio 8 as oted earlier8 whether ewer "&lear/weapo possessors &a <e i%%ediatel7 i that positio L <"t it is withi rea&h o. a 7 s"<sta tial state with adva &ed te&h ologi&al &apa<ilities8 a d attai i g it is &ertai to <e a high priorit7 i the develop%e t o. .or&es.S As a res*lt: (eit!er side ca( !a&e a(9 predispositio( to s*ppose8 i a a%<ig"o"s sit"atio o. .ear."l ris#: t!at t!e ri%!t co*rse #!e( i( do*<t is to %o o( copio*sl9 la*(c!i(% #eapo(s. A(d (o(e o1 t!is a(al9sis rests o( a(9 pres*mptio( o1 !i%!l9 s*<tle or pre/&o &erted ratio(alit9. 1he ratio alit7 re>"ired is plai .

1!

SDI 2010 AT: Hot Spots

Impacts

**6es Impact** AT: No 3reat .o#er /o(1lict

3reat po#er co(1lict still possi<le , co*ld %o (*clear. Harald M*ller8 dire&tor o. the (ea&e 3esear&h I stit"te :ra #."rt i 0er ia 7 a d a pro.&ssor o. i ter atio al relatio s at :ra #."rt U iversit78 Spri g 200-8 Washi gto J"arterl78 p.6'
A po#er tra(sitio( creates da(%ero*s times.H Most c!alle(%es to a !e%emo( i world histor78 whether s"&&ess."l or ot8 !a&e precipitated #ar or a series o1 #ars. Toda9As i(terdepe(de(ce #ill s"rel7 serve to ma+e %reat po#ers ca*tio*s a<o*t armed co(1lict: <*t it cannot &o%pletel7 guarantee such a conflict will not occur. Co(es o1 co(te(tio( e0ist8 ota<l7 <etwee the U ited States a d +hi a4 1aiwa 8 the So"th +hi a Sea8 a d the &o%petitio .or (ersia 0"l. a d +e tral Asia e erg7 reso"r&es. Alt!o*%! t!ere e0ists a (ai&e <elie1 t!at %reat2po#er #ar !as <ee( elimi(ated as a possi<ilit9 i( #orld politics: e0a%%erated complace(c9 co*ld <ecome e0tremel9 da(%ero*s. I(terdepe(de(ce itsel1 a(d ad&a(ced #eapo(r9: nuclear weapons included: #o*ld mea( t!at a &iole(t co(test amo(% t!e <i% po#ers #o*ld <e a( *(miti%ated catastrop!e. 1he relatio ships a%o g those powers %"st <e &are."ll7 %a aged i. a &lash is
to <e avoided8 a d "&lear weapo s red"&tio s are a esse tial &o tri<"tio to this %a age%e t.

1'

SDI 2010 AT: Hot Spots

Impacts

Middle East /o(1lict Impact

Middle East co(1lict ca*ses %lo<al (*clear co(1lict. E.M. .rima+o&8 a&ade%i&ia o. the 3"ssia A&ade%7 o. S&ie &e a d .or%er 3"ssia (ri%e Mi ister8 20078
S&ie ti.i& Sessio o. the 0e eral Meeti g o. the 3"ssia A&ade%7 o. S&ie &es8 http4//www.spri gerli #.&o%/&o te t/24!-*-1tr,*!63!4/."llte,t.pd. A1ter t!e e(d o1 t!e /old War: some researc!ers a d politi&al o<servers came to t!e co(cl*sio( t!at t!e real t!reat o1 Ara<,Israeli co(1lict escalatio( <e9o(d the re%io(al <o*(daries !ad e0pired. Ho#e&er: t!is co(cl*sio( is !ardl9 so*(d i( t!e 21st ce(t*r9. T!e US militar9 operatio( i( IraB c!a(%ed t!e <ala(ce o1 1orces i( t!e Middle East. A1ter t!e disappeara(ce o1 t!e IraBi co*(ter<ala(ce: Ira( !as <ecome a re%io(al po#er t!at is pote(tiall9 capa<le o1 direct participatio( i vario"s Middle East pro&esses. I a% ot a%o g those who <elieve that Ira has alread7
%ade a politi&al de&isio to &reate "&lear weapo s. However8 it loo#s li#e 1ehra is ai%i g to attai a te&h ologi&al level that wo"ld allow it to %a#e this de&isio >"i&#l7 i. the &ir&"%sta &es are " .avora<le QBthe %odelD o. =apa S. Israel is +(o#( to possess (*clear #eapo(s

a(d mea(s to deli&er t!em. I1 t!e Middle East co(1lict remai(s *(settled: the threat of a nuclear confrontation in the 1iddle +ast will be very high, #!ic! #ill lead to catastrop!ic consequences for the whole world.

Middle East co(1lict escalates , t!eir i(dicts do(At ass*me c!a(%i(% re%io(al d9(amics. Marti "ramer8 Se ior :ellow at the Shale% +e ter i =er"sale%8 We,ler/:ro%er :ellow at 1he Washi gto
I stit"te .or Near East (oli&78 a d Natio al Se&"rit7 St"dies (rogra% Uisiti g S&holar at Harvard U iversit78 =" e 1-8 200-8 B1he M7th o. 6i #age8D http4//<logs.law.harvard.ed"/%esh/-**'/*6/the?%7th?o.?li #age/ I still <elieve Middle East is less i tegrated tha E"rope8 <"t it does share o e .eat"re with earl7 -*th/&e t"r7 E"rope. U(til (o#: t!e Middle East !as !ad more %eo%rap!9 t!a( militar9 po#er. States !a&e <ee( *(a<le to pro=ect po#er &er9 1ar <e9o(d t!eir <orders. C*t t!e spread o1 missiles a(d: possi<l78 nuclear weapons8 co*ld c!a(%e t!at: lea&i(% states #it! too little %eo%rap!9 a(d too m*c! po#er. I( t!ese co(ditio(s: co(1licts t!at !a&e <ee( locali@ed co*ld <ecome re%io(ali@ed. I this &ase8 it wo"ld ot <e the Israeli/(alesti ia &o .li&t that wo"ld o&&"p7 the pla&e o. :ra &e a d 0er%a 7. It wo"ld <e the &o .li&t <etwee Ira a d Israel8 a d <etwee Ira a d the %oderate Ara< states. S*c! a co(1lict co*ld co(1i%*re t!e Middle East as o(e re%io( 8 &ollapse the dista &e <etwee the 6eva t a d the 0"l.8 prod*ce arms races: sp*r (*clear proli1eratio( a(d pro09 #ars: create ti%!tl92i(te%rated allia(cesLi( s!ort: ma+e t!e Middle East &er9 m*c! li+e E*rope i( its dar+est da9s . Whether the U ited States will a&t to a..ir% the pa, A%eri&a a8 <7 &he&#i g Ira Hs rise8
re%ai s to <e see . Whether or ot it does8 <"t espe&iall7 i. it does ot8 the &o%%o " dersta di g o. Bthe Middle East &o .li&tD see%s desti ed to shi.t agai . We %a7 the loo# <a&# with ostalgia to a ti%e whe the gra diose title o. Bthe Middle East &o .li&tD <elo ged to Israelis a d (alesti ia s. T!e (e0t Middle East co(1lict co*ld <e &er9 di11ere(t .

15

SDI 2010 AT: Hot Spots

Impacts

Asia( /o(1lict 8i+el9

Asia( #ar *(iB*el9 li+el9 , t!eir e&ide(ce does(At ass*me c!a(%i(% str*ct*ral co(ditio(s. H"gh W!ite8 Uisiti g :ellow at the 6ow7 I stit"te .or I ter atio al (oli&7 a d (ro.essor o. Strategi& St"dies at the A"stralia Natio al U iversit78 )e&e%<er 200-8 S"rvival8 I .or%aWorld C li e
;"t i. the prese t order i East Asia %a#es war " thi #a<le toda78 t!e B*estio( o1 #!et!er #ar i( Asia #ill remai( *(t!i(+a<le i( t!e 1*t*re depe(ds o( the a swer to a some#!at deeper B*estio(: ca( East Asia preser&e t!e order it !as e(=o9ed d"ri g the past .ew de&adesF I. it &a 8 AsiaVs ."t"re will <e ass"red a d I%%a "el Ka tVs visio o. perpet"al pea&e1 will have &o%e a lo g wa7 towards ."l.il%e t. I1 (ot: major war among great powers could again become not just thinkable, but .righte i gl7 possi<le8 or eve probable. Whether o e is opti%isti& that the order o. re&e t de&ades will <e s"stai ed8 or pessi%isti& that it %a7 &ollapse8 depe ds i part o how o e e,plai s the re&e t de&ades o. pea&e. Ma 7 <elieve that AsiaVs pea&e is the prod"&t o. i e,ora<le .or&es o. histor78 whi&h are %ovi g i ter atio al so&iet7 awa7 .ro% a world do%i ated <7 atio /states towards a s7ste% i whi&h o /state a&tors are the %ost i%porta t pla7ers8 a d pose the %ost sig i.i&a t ris#s.- I this ew world8 the threat o. traditio al8 %aAor &o .li&t see%s to <e per%a e tl7 red"&ed. 1his view has a Whiggish8 eve .ai tl7 Mar,ist .lavo"r8 with its .aith i i e,ora<le histori&al pro&esses. Its s"pporters te d to see AsiaVs pea&e."l order as a d"ra<le .a&t8 <elievi g that i divid"als a d eve %aAor states have little or o &o trol over the deep histori&al pro&esses that have prod"&ed it. 1he7 &o .ide tl7 e,pe&t that it will last .or a lo g ti%e to &o%e8 regardless o. the a&tio s o. i divid"als or the poli&ies o. atio s. T!e more pessimistic &ie# is &hara&teristi&all7 &o servative i the old/.ashio ed8 ;"r#ea se se. Its s"pporters see (o 1*(dame(tal tra(s1ormatio( o1 i(ter(atio(al societ9: a(d attri<*te t!e peace o1 rece(t decades to a 1ort*(ate: co(ti(%e(t a(d pote(tiall9 1ra%ile co(=*(ctio( o1 e&e(ts a(d circ*msta(ces . I other words8 the7 <elieve it to <e the prod"&t o. good l"&#8 helped <7 the se si<le de&isio s o. atio al leaders. T!e9 ac+(o#led%e t!e disti(ct possi<ilit9 t!at <ad l*c+ a(d *(#ise decisio(s co*ld re&erse t!is %ood 1ort*(e a(d destro9 t!e peace . 1he7 there.ore do ot ass"%e that the re&e t pea&e i Asia will lastL o the &o trar78 the7 <elieve that8 witho"t hard wor#8 wise A"dge%e t a d good l"&#8 it is as li#el7 as ot to disappear. C <ala &e8 t!e seco(d &ie# is more pers*asi&e: t!e e&ide(ce s*%%ests t!at it is

<ecomi(% more di11ic*lt to preser&e t!e order t!at !as (*rt*red t!e peace o1 rece(t decades. Eco(omic %ro#t! is erodi(% t!e 1o*(datio(s o1 t!e re%io(al order: a(d t!e #or+ o1 <*ildi(% a (e# order8 o e that <etter re.le&ts the e&o o%i& realities o. the VAsia &e t"r7V: !as (ot <e%*(. Whe it does8 it will <e&o%e &lear that <"ildi g a sta<le ew order i
Asia will re>"ire sig i.i&a t &o &essio s <7 all o. the regio Vs %aAor powers. It is .ar .ro% &lear that the7 will <e willi g a d a<le to %a#e these &o &essio s8 a d the7 &ertai l7 will ot do so " less a d " til the7 " dersta d %ore &learl7 how %"&h is at sta#e. I. the7 are ot willi g to thi # i ew wa7s a<o"t AsiaVs order a d their pla&e i it8 #ar 2 s9stemic: catastrop!ic #ar 2 #ill <ecome disti(ctl9 possi<le.

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SDI 2010 AT: Hot Spots

Impacts

Hi%! 5is+ o1 I(dia'.a+ista( N*clear /o(1lict

8ar%e ris+ o1 I(dia'.a+ista( (*clear co(1lict , deterre(ce post*res *(sta<le (o#. Uipi Nara(%8 (h.). &a didate i the )epart%e t o. 0over %e t at Harvard U iversit7 a d a resear&h .ellow at HarvardVs ;el.er +e ter .or S&ie &e a d I ter atio al A..airs8 Wi ter -**5/20108 I ter atio al Se&"rit78 6e,is
A&ade%i&
C. the three "&lear post"res adopted i So"th Asia si &e the late 15'*s8 o l7 (a#ista Vs as7%%etri& es&alatio post"re has <ee a<le to dire&tl7 deter <oth &o ve tio al aggressio a d "&lear &oer&io . 1here is little evide &e to s"ggest that I dia was deterred <7 (a#ista Vs &atal7ti& "&lear post"re8 <"t U.S. i terve tio 8 pro%pted <7 &o &er s over (a#ista i "&lear %ove%e ts8 helped to preve t es&alatio . A.ter (a#ista Vs adoptio o. a as7%%etri& es&alatio "&lear post"re i 155'8 however8 I dia leaders have <ee deterred several ti%es .ro% a"thori9i g sig i.i&a t &o ve tio al retaliator7 operatio s agai st (a#ista //eve as the U ited States i te sel7 press"red (a#ista to <a&# dow . C the .lip side8

alt!o*%! I(diaDs ass*red retaliatio( post*re ma9 deter .a+ista(i *se o1 (*clear #eapo(s a%ai(st I(diaDs ma=or cities: it !as (ot deterred .a+ista(i attac+s//<oth at the s"<&o ve tio al a d &o ve tio al levels//#!ic! ca( (o# <e ac!ie&ed #it!o*t 1ear o1 I(dia( reprisal. I deed8 t!e c*rre(t co(1i%*ratio(22a limitedl9 re&isio(ist .a+ista(: #it! a( as9mmetric escalatio( (*clear post*re that <l" ts I diaVs &o ve tio al power a d re ders I diaVs ass"red retaliatio post"re %ostl7 irreleva t//is acutely unstable. It was ot si%pl7 (a#ista Vs a&>"isitio o. "&lear &apa<ilities that &a"sed this state o.
a..airs8 give that (a#ista has had li%ited revisio ist i te tio s a d "&lear weapo s si &e 15'68 <"t its adoptio o. the as7%%etri& es&alatio "&lear post"re i 155'. 1he theoreti&al &o tri<"tio o. this arti&le is to s"ggest that the a&>"isitio o. "&lear weapo s alo e %a7 ot prod"&e a " i.or% deterre t e..e&t a&ross states. T!e selectio( o1 a partic*lar (*clear post*re//how a state operatio ali9es its "&lear &apa<ilities//does i(deed !a&e di11ere(tial e11ects o( deterre(ce a(d disp*te d9(amics . 1he e%piri&al patter i So"th Asia s"ggests that "&lear post"re %a7 there.ore <e a i%porta t o%itted varia<le i e,plai i g &o .li&t d7 a%i&s i the regio 8 a d that it %a7 set s&ope &o ditio s .or whe i tera&tio s are %ore or less sta<le at <oth the &o ve tio al a d "&lear levels. I additio 8 the ge eral patter //that di..ere t post"res &a have varia<le deterre &e e..e&ts//%a7 have s"<sta tial e,ter al validit7 .or other regio al "&lear powers8 <e&a"se the di..ere tial deterre t power o. "&lear post"res at vario"s levels a d i te sities o. &o .li&t derives .ro% a logi& that sho"ld <e valid a&ross other %idsi9e "&lear powers s"&h as +hi a8 Israel8 a d pote tiall7 Ira . C e at"ral >"estio that arises .ro% this .i di g is wh7 states sele&t the post"res the7 do. 1his is a >"estio I e,plore elsewhere i a e..ort to develop a rigoro"s theoreti&al a d e%piri&al " dersta di g o. the so"r&es a d &o se>"e &es o. regio al power "&lear post"res. 144 At the poli&7 level8 this arti&le highlights &riti&al deterre &e/%a age%e t trade/o..s ge erated <7 the as7%%etri& es&alatio post"re a d ide ti.ies a so"r&e o. deep i sta<ilit7 i the I dia/(a#ista d7ad. Alt!o*%! .a+ista(Ds

as9mmetric escalatio( post*re ma9 deter co(&e(tio(al attac+s: it also e(a<les .a+ista( to more a%%ressi&el9 p*rs*e re&isio(ist aims a%ai(st I(dia #it! little 1ear o1 retaliatio(: more 1reB*e(tl9 triggering precisely the crisis scenarios that magnify the risks of intentional or inadvertent use of nuclear weapons. T!ese c!alle(%es #ill o(l9 <e i(te(si1ied i1 I(dia//to redress its &"rre t per&eived paral7sis agai st persiste t (a#ista i provo&atio s//pro%resses to#ard a /old Start co(&e(tio(al post*re: #!ic! mi%!t t!e( p*s! t!e .a+ista( Arm9 to#ard a read9 deterre(t o( e11ecti&el9 !air2tri%%er alert. S*c! a com<i(atio( co*ld spa#( intolerable risks of accidental or unauthori/ed nuclear use . 3i&e( t!e pro0imit9 a(d d9(amic i(sta<ilit9 <et#ee( I(dia a(d .a+ista(: t!ese t#o (atio(s a(d t!e i(ter(atio(al comm*(it9 s!o*ld a#a+e( to t!e da(%er t!at t!eir co(&e(tio(al a(d (*clear post*res are <arreli(% to#ard i(creasi(% i(sta<ilit9 8 espe&iall7
whe &o"pled with (a#ista Vs growi g do%esti& politi&al volatilit78 whi&h %a7 ."rther a%pli.7 its s"pport .or s"<&o ve tio al atta&#s agai st I dia. I dia a d (a#ista sho"ld ta#e appropriate %eas"res to esta<lish &lear li es o. &o%%" i&atio 8 sig ali g pro&ed"res8 &o .ide &e/<"ildi g %eas"res8 a d te&h i&al sa.eg"ards to %itigate the ris# that s%all %isper&eptio s a d %is&al&"latio s &o"ld spiral to the i te tio al or " i te tio al "se o. "&lear weapo s. Altho"gh "&lear weapo s o the s"<&o ti e t are ow a irreversi<le realit78 "&lear post"re is a %allea<le varia<le. 1he U ited States a d the i ter atio al &o%%" it7 &a ta#e steps to help %a#e (a#ista Vs operatio ali9atio o. its as7%%etri& es&alatio post"re sa.er//%a#i g the %a age%e t o. the arse al %ore se&"re witho"t sa&ri.i&i g deterre t power//a d lea o <oth I dia a d (a#ista to wal# awa7 .ro% the d7 a%i& i sta<ilit7 i d"&ed <7 their &hoi&e o. &o ve tio al a d "&lear post"res.

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SDI 2010 AT: Hot Spots

Impacts

Hi%! 5is+ o1 I(dia'.a+ista( N*clear /o(1lict

I(dia'.a+ista( co(1lict %oes (*clear , !i%! ris+ o1 miscalc*latio( a(d escalatio(. 3i&hard Weit@8 dire&tor o. the +e ter .or (oliti&al/Militar7 A al7sis a d a Se ior :ellow at the H"dso I stit"te 8 ="l7 1-8 20108 BSo"th AsiaHs N"&lear War 3is#8D 1he )iplo%at8 http4//the/diplo%at.&o%/-*1*/*!/1-/so"th/asia
EE-E'*E55s/ "&lear/war/ris#/4/
@et eve setti g aside the >"estio o. "&lear weapo s .alli g i to terrorist ha ds8 (*clear

competitio( <et#ee( I(dia a(d .a+ista( is especiall9 da(%ero*s. Acti&e Ra(d o(%oi(%P political disp*tes <et#ee( t!e t#o co*(tries !a&e res*lted i( t!ree past #ars as #ell as (*mero*s pro09 co(1licts . (a#ista i leaders i parti&"lar have &o &l"ded that their "&lear arse al has deterred I dia .ro% agai "si g its &o ve tio al .or&es to atta&# (a#ista i territor7. As a res"lt8 .a+ista(As implicit (*clear doctri(e pres*mes t!e possi<le 1irst *se o1 (*clear #eapo(s. T!e ris+s o1 s*c! te(sio(s are compo*(ded <9 t!e p!9sical pro0imit9 o1 t!e t#o co*(tries: as #ell as t!eir relia(ce o( <allistic missiles as deliver7 vehi&les8 #!ic! mea(s t!at earl9 #ar(i(% times mi%!t <e as little as 1i&e to te( mi(*te s. Altho"gh it re%ai s
" &lear whether I dia or (a#ista have &o%<i ed its "&lear warheads with their assig ed deliver7 s7ste%s8 s"&h a pre&ario"s sta &e wo"ld i &rease the ris#s o. <oth a&&ide tal a d &atal7ti& war Qa "&lear &o .li&t <etwee <oth gover %e ts pre&ipitated <7 a third part78 s"&h as a terrorist gro"pS. T!ro# /!i(a i(to t!e mi0: #it! .a+ista( at ris+ o1 &ie#i(% its o#( (*clear pro%ramme as i(creasi(%l9 i(adeB*ate as I dia see#s to a&hieve %"t"al deterre &e with +hi a8 a d the pi&t"re <e&o%es %ore &o%pli&ated. A(d add

i( t!e ris+ o1 #idespread political disorder i( eit!er I(dia or .a+ista(: #!ic! co*ld see a da(%ero*s political ad&e(t*rism as political leaders loo+ to rall9 domestic s*pport 8 a d the pe&"liar &halle ges posed <7 the regio <e&o%e &learer. 1he .a&t is "outh 0sia is particularly prone to a destabili/ing arms race . 0nd perhaps nuclear war.

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