T 4 From the Editor
of the revamped Defense Intelligence Journal concentrates on
I&W. It presents articles by a diversity of well-qualified authors
on a variety of pertinent topics. Defense intelligence
professionals, whatever the relationship of their duties to I&W,
will find some ideas and information that will be of assistance
in their daily work and of relevance to their professional
development.
We are especially fortunate to have the newly-appointed
National Intelligence Officer (NIO) for Warning, Mary
McCarthy, as the author of our lead article, which provides an
excellent background and overview of the challenges of I&W.
Next, Daniel Landers of the Defense Intelligence Agency (J2)
describes the continuing evolution of the Defense Warning
System. The very timely article by Leonard Spector of the
Carnegie Foundation for World Peace should not be.missed by
any analyst concerned with the development a'nd proliferation
of nuclear weapons. Professor Russell Swenson of the Joint
Military Intelligence College (JMIC) suggests steps that
managers can take to improve I&W. Professor Jonathan
Lockwood cautions analysts about some of the pitfalls of I&W.
Two DIA analysts, CPT Thomas Indelicarto and LT Donald
Carney describe the difficulties of using traditional I&W
concepts in the new world environment. Finally, as a change of
pace, CPT Bryan DeCoster provides an interesting and readable
piece of historical research.
No publication on I&W would be complete without a
mention of Cynthia Grabo; a legendary analyst, leader and
teacher of I&W. Anyone interested in the history and practice
of I&W should search out her writings and those on her
recommended reading list, which is.provided in the back of this
issue. Finally, supporters and other alumni of the JMIC will
want to get up to date on developments and activities at the
College through the columns of the Commandant, LtGen
Charles Cunningham, USAF (Ret.), and Thomas Van Wagner.
Defense Intelligence Journal 3 (1994), 5-19
The National Warning System:
Striving for an Elusive Goal
Mary McCarthy
In 1992, then-Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) Robert"]
Gates established a Task Force on Improving Intelligence I
Warning and charged the group with reviewing the Intelligence I
Community's capability to warn in light of the enormous J
changes occurring in the world. According to that ten-member
panel of highly respected intelligence and policy veterans,
providing policymakers with persuasive and timely intelligence
warning is the most important service the Intelligence
Community can perform for the security of the United States.
Earlier, in its 1992 Intelligence Authorization Act, Congress had
been even less equivocal about what is expected of the
Community. In 'the language of the Act: "the Intelligence]
Community's highest priority is warning of threats to US
interests worldwide."1 ^
Warning is a process of communicating judgments about
threats to US security or policy interests to decisionmakers.
Such communications must be received and understood in order
for leaders to take action that can deter, defuse, or otherwise
address the threat and, thereby, minimize the damage to US
interests. Effective warning, -therefore, involves both
communication and timeliness.
WARNING OF TERRORIST ATTACK Page 1 of 3

WARNING OF TERRORIST ATTACK

THE CASE OF 9-11 AND THE FUTURE

A Statement Submitted for the Record Prior to Informal Testimony to

The 9-11 Commission

By
Fritz W. Ermarth

12 August 2003

It is a privilege to give testimony to this Commission on its grave subject matter, which involves
understanding the causes of the tragedy of 11 September 2001 and the ways our nation can avert such
attacks in the future.

I understand my testimony has been prompted by an article I published about a year ago in the internet
journal In the National Interest. It has been submitted separately. My resume, supplied to Commission
staff, describes my background, mostly as an intelligence officer, for offering this testimony.

In this written statement, I wish merely to summarize a few points that are most vital to the issue of
warning of terrorist attack.

First, warning is only part of the larger task of combating and defending against terrorism. That battle
requires active, offensive overt and covert measures on many fronts to disrupt, suppress, and eliminate
threatening entities, such as Al Qaeda, but by no means only Al Qaeda. Prior to 9-11 such measures
were modest, episodic, and clearly ineffective. Since then, they have been much more vigorous. The
more effective offensive measures are against terrorist entities, the less burden must a warning system
bear, or the less risk that it will be breached. But because the threat of terrorist attack cannot be provably
eliminated, the requirement for a robust warning system will continue to exist however successful we
are in the war against terrorism. Moreover, any hostile entity with resources and access to operational
capability can use terroristic tactics or covert attack to hurt, weaken, or disrupt the United States.

Second, prior to 9-11 the United States could have had and should have had a real warning system
against terrorist attack. But, while having many of the elements of such a system, it did not have a real
warning system. By that I mean we did not have a structured, tested, routinely exercised system for
integrating the elements of real warning. These elements embrace the following:

Strategic intelligence, i.e., information about the existence, hostility, and capabilities of an
enemy, in this case Al Qaeda. According to the findings of the Joint Inquiry of the intelligence
oversight committees of Congress, we had plenty of strategic warning intelligence but there was
inadequate strategic analysis of its meaning and implications.

Operational intelligence, i.e., warning-applicable information about how the enemy is

contemplating and then planning to attack. Again, according to the Joint Inquiry, we had
numerous indicators that the enemy was contemplating and indeed preparing (via flight training)
for an attack using planes as bombs.

Tactical intelligence, i.e., actionable warning information about the timing, targets, perpetrators,
and method of attack. Despite a preoccupation with exactly this kind of warning, our intelligence
and law enforcement entities failed to "crack the plot" of the 9-11 attack. But there were leads of

http://kinesis.swishmail.com./webrnail/imp/view.php?thismailbox=INBOX&index=1381&id... 8/13/03
 THE I&W PARADIGM AS APPLIED TO 9/11

Fritz W. Ermarth
25 September 2002

The revelations of recent months as to who knew and reported what and when, or did not, allow
for the hypothesis that the attacks of 9/11 could have been prevented with the information we
had. The public testimony of the Joint Inquiry Staff of the House and Senate intelligence
committees released on 18 September fortifies this hypothesis considerably. Defining and testing
this hypothesis should form a part of the agenda of inquiry as to whether there was an
intelligence failure, where and when it occurred, and how to correct it for the future. The issue
turns, first of all, on how the warning problem should have been and should be conceptualized to
address the threat of terrorist attack.

During the Cold War, with Pearl Harbor in recent memory, we worked massively on the
"indications and warning" (I&W) problem, and very successfully. We erected an "industrial age"
system for collecting strategic warning (there is an enemy who prepares energetically for war),
operational warning (here is how he mounts up for war and how we can tell), and tactical warning
or warning of attack (he is executing his attack plans). Moreover, and most importantly, this I&W
system was tightly linked to military and other response options and action plans, such as alerting
and dispersing forces, and, ultimately, war plans. Happily, this system worked well, not by
averting a Pearl Harbor, which never came (even Cuba 62 did not involve intent to begin war), but
by giving us confidence day by day that a Pearl Harbor was not in the offing, a confidence that
allowed us to act calmly even in periods of tension, and not bring about war by overreaction and
inadvertence. And the fact that our I&W system was very effective probably helped deter the
enemy from gambling on surprise, to which his military doctrine assigned a very high value.

The problem of terrorism and warning of it is vastly different from and far more difficult for
intelligence to deal with by its very nature than warning of massive military attack. The whole
point of the terrorist is to avoid giving warning by chosing operations and targets for which
elaborate military-style preparations are not necessary. Yet he must make preparations that do
or can give some warning. He must mobilize, motivate, organize, prepare, and execute...all the
while feeding, fueling, funding, and cajoling his operation. So in very rough terms, the Cold War
paradigm of strategic-operational-tactical warning, and connection to vulnerability and response,
has some utility.

Prior to 911, we definitely had strategic warning. We saw the enemy, Al Qaeda, forming up and
growing in strength. We knew his hostile intent. We saw him preparing capabilities, especially in
Afghanistan. We experienced his attacks on our overseas perimeter. We heard him proclaim
determination to hit us at home, and saw him try it in 1993. Three DCIs and other authorities
repeated that it was only a matter of time before major attacks were launched inside the US.

We had a kind of operational warning in the summer of 2001. By then we knew something about
the enemy's operational repertoire and knew or had strong reason to suspect that suicidal use of
airplanes as bombs was in it. And we were hearing enough about something major in the works
to conclude that the threat was mounting in the period immediately ahead. The recent Joint Staff
testimony is eloquent on both counts

Our challenge was to move beyond strategic and operational to tactical warning. Or, at the very
least, to turn what we had in strategic and operational warning into a threat assessment on which
preventive action could be taken. Most public commentary about intelligence failure before 9/11
focuses on the first construction of the challenge, and concludes that we were just not lucky
enough or energetic enough to penetrate the enemy's immediate plans, to "uncover the plof as
FBI Director Mueller puts it. Or, put another way, there were not quite enough of the right dots to
connect to make a precise threat picture.
^- '
 WITH DRAWAL NOTICE

RG: 148
Box: 00008 Folder: 0024 Document: 3
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Copies: 1 Pages: 6

ACCESS RESTRICTED

The item identified below has been withdrawn from this file:

Folder Title: Working Papers re: Warning [1 of 2]

Document Date: 08-14-2003
Document Type: Memo of Conversation
Special Media:
From:
To:

Subject: Sumary of interview with Fritz Ermath, Charlie All

en, and Mary McCarthy

In the review of this file this item was removed because access to it is
restricted. Restrictions on records in the National Archives are stated in
general and specific record group restriction statements which are available
for examination.

NND: 361
Withdrawn: 11-12-2008 by:

RETRIEVAL #: 361 00008 0024 3

System DocID: 5714
 WITH DRAWAL NOTICE

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Box: 00008 Folder: 0024 Document: 4
Series: Team 2 Files

Copies: 1 Pages: 2

ACCESS RESTRICTED

The item identified below has been withdrawn from this file:

Folder Title: Working Papers re: Warning [1 of 2]

Document Date: 10-13-1982
Document Type: Directives
Special Media:
From:
To:

Subject: DCI Directive 6/1P, National Intelligence Warning

In the review of this file this item was removed because access to it is
restricted. Restrictions on records in the National Archives are stated in
general and specific record group restriction statements which are available
for examination.

NND: 361
Withdrawn: 11-12-2008 by:

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 WITH DRAWAL NOTICE

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Box: 00008 Folder: 0024 Document: 5
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Copies: 1 Pages: 29

ACCESS RESTRICTED

The item identified below has been withdrawn from this file:

Folder Title: Working Papers re: Warning [1 of 2]

Document Date:
Document Type: Intelligence Synopsis/Summary
Special Media:
From:
To:

Subject: Various CIA threat assessments and advisories date

d 1998-2001

In the review of this file this item was removed because access to it is
restricted. Restrictions on records in the National Archives are stated in
general and specific record group restriction statements which are available
for examination.

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For Immediate Release Page 1 of 2

For Immediate Release

Office of the Press Secretary
March 26, 2003

Text of a Letter from the President to the Chairmen of the House and Senate
Committees on the Judiciary, the House Permanent Select Committee on
Intelligence, the House Committee on International Relations, the Senate Select
Committee on Intelligence, and the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations

March 25, 2003

Dear Mr. Chairman:

Enclosed is the report to the Congress, prepared by my Administration, identifying Federal law enforcement and
intelligence community information identified as necessary by the Department of State (DOS) to screen visa
applicants and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to screen applicants for admission to the United
States, and to identify those aliens inadmissible or deportable under the Immigration and Nationality Act. I am
forwarding this report to fulfill the requirement under section 201 (b) of the Enhanced Border Security and Visa
Entry Reform Act of 2002 (Public Law 107-173).

The Federal Government is working to improve data-sharing capabilities between agencies. To support this effort,
the Department of Homeland Security will create an inventory of essential information needed to secure our
Nation; determine horizontal and vertical integration requirements; define target architecture for information
integration; and, determine the resources necessary to integrate information. In the short term, DHS will work to
virtually consolidate or link watch lists from multiple agencies and create a homeland security portal for users at
all levels of government. Additionally, consular officers and immigration inspectors have access to more complete
intelligence and criminal history information through the Interagency Border Inspection System (IBIS) and the
Consular Lookout and Support System (CLASS). Since September 11, more than seven million names of persons
with Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) records were added to CLASS so that now it contains approximately 13
million name records from DOS, DHS, the Drug Enforcement Administration, and intelligence resources. The U.S.
Customs Service has also provided 20,000 name records of serious violators to CLASS. The CLASS now has
over 78,000 records of suspected terrorists, up 40 percent in the past year. Since September 11, 2001,
approximately 20,000 new terrorist lookouts have been entered into the DOS's TIPOFF system.

Furthermore, an Entry-Exit System (EES) project team is building an integrated, automated information EES to
enable existing/ emerging entry exit processes. This core EES will integrate electronic arrival and departure
manifests, electronic visa data, Federal agency lookouts, traveler information, Student and Exchange Visitor
Information System (SEVIS) data, Immigration Benefit information, overstay information as well as perform risk
assessment analysis and lookout queries, and incorporate biometric technology.

(OVER)

Additionally, the newly established Terrorist Threat Integration Center (TTIC) will analyze terrorist-related infor-
mation collected domestically and abroad in order to form the most comprehensive picture of the terrorist threats
we face. The TTIC will also play a lead role in overseeing a national counter-terrorism tasking and requirements
system and in maintaining an up-to-date database of known and suspected terrorists that will be accessible to
appropriate officials at all levels of government. The TTIC represents an important milestone in our effort to
improve collaboration between and among the intelligence and law enforcement communities.

http://www.insidedefense.com/secure/specials2/Bush%20Letter.htm 5/26/2003
 Institute for the Study of Diplomacy
Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service
Georgetown University

1316-36th Street, NW
Washington, DC 20007
Phone (202) 965-5735 ext. 203 Fax: (202) 965-5811

November 4, 2003

To: See Distribution Below From: Jim Steiner

Number of Pages Including Cover Page: 8

The pages contained in this facsimile transmission are confidential and intended only for the use of the individual or entity named on this
sheet. If you are not the intended recipient, you are hereby notified that any disclosure, copying, distribution or talcing of any action in
reliance on these contents is strictly prohibited. If you receive this in error, please notify us by telephone immediately.

Message
Please see the attached regarding the November 10 conference.

Distribution:

Bax, Frans MacGaffin, John

Binnendijk, Hans (Attn Gina Cordell) McLaughlin, John
Blair, Dennis (Attn: Joanne) Nolte, William
Crocker, Chester Oakley, Phyllis E.
Dobbins, James Odom, William
Ford, Carl Peterson, Martin
Gannon, John Pickering, Thomas
Hutchings, Robert Simms, Jennifer
Johnson, Paul Yost, Casimir
Kerr, Richard
Kuhn, Woody
MacEachin, Douglas
 Studies in Intelligence Page 1 of 17
•*

UNCLASSIFIED

Previous Next Contents

UK Indications and Warning

Gauging the Iraqi Threat to Kuwait in the

1960s
RichardJk, Mobley

Between 1958, when Abdul Karim Qasim seized power in Iraq, and the expiration of the United
Kingdom's formal defense commitment to Kuwait in 1971, Britain's Joint Intelligence Committee
(JIC) was charged with providing warning of potential hostile action by Iraq. The JIC possessed
relatively few collection assets, a fact that increased the challenge of keeping the Foreign Office
and the War Office well informed about the persistently volatile situation in the Persian Gulf.
Britain moved forces into Kuwait in June 1961 (Operation Vantage) in response to Iraqi threats,
and tensions continued to ebb and flow in succeeding years.

The UK's defense of Kuwait is chronicled in an extensive collection of documents, many only
recently declassified. These papers portray a responsive intelligence system, despite collection
limitations and the amount of time it took to redirect assets. The documents illustrate the difficulty
of monitoring idiosyncratic leaders and UK frustration with human source intelligence and "bazaar
rumors" that could not be corroborated by technical means. Despite these problems, the record
shows JIC Assessments to be well crafted and credible. They appear to have had a compelling
effect on UK contingency planning and force readiness posture against Iraq throughout the 1960s.
[1]

Setting the Scene

The Anglo-Kuwait Treaty of 1899 governed relations between London and Kuwait until 1961.
This treaty forbade the introduction of other foreign diplomats into Kuwait or Kuwaiti territorial
concessions without British concurrence. The agreement implied military protection in return for
Kuwait's allowing the UK to conduct Kuwaiti foreign relations.

An exchange of letters in June 1961 between Shaikh Abdullah III and Sir William Luce, the
United Kingdom's Political Resident, redefined the international relationship. At that time, the UK
explicitly agreed to provide military assistance to Kuwait should the ruling family request it. This
defense agreement remained the driver for UK contingency planning until it lapsed in May 1971,
although in the interim Britain persuaded the Kuwaiti Government to accept modifications to the
form of its military response.[2]

Iraq was unstable between 1958 and 1971. Ruling uneasily since seizing power in 1958, Qasim
reacted quickly and with vitriol to the Anglo-Kuwaiti exchange of letters in 1961. Until Qasim
was killed during a coup in 1963, strident Iraqi rhetoric convinced Whitehall that it did not dare

http://www.cia.gov/csi/studies/fall_winter_2001/article03.html 8/4/03
Predicting the Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan: The Intelligence Community's Record (U) Page 1 of 57

UNCLASSIFIED

CENTER for the STUDY of INTELLIGENCE

Predicting the Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan:

The Intelligence Community's Record
Douglas MacEachin served as CIA's Deputy Director for Intelligence from 1993 to 1995 during his
thirty-two year career at CIA. Mr. MacEachin was an officer-in-residence at Harvard University's John
F. Kennedy School of Government, from 1995 to 1997, subsequently becoming a senior at the Kennedy
School.

Contents
Introduction
Shaping the Politico-Military Topography
International Reactions
Daoud Moves Away From Moscow
The Communist Coup
Washington Perspectives
Party Purge—Stage Two
The Tribes Revolt
The Conflict Escalates
Moscow Looks for a New Team
The Confrontation Intensifies
Soviet ReactionsiznUS Interpretations
Another Duel in the Palace
Intelligence Community Views of Soviet Military Options
Approaching the Boiling Point
The Advance Echelon Deploys
The Main Forces Deploy
Soviet Documents on the Invasion Plan
Targeting Amin
The Military Decisions
Intelligence Expectations versus Realities
Postscript
Source Notes, Books, Articles, Documents

http://www.cia.gov/csi/monograph/afghanistan/index.html 8/4/03
 COMMISSION SENSITIVE

WARNING - THOUGHTS (4 Aug 03)

"Warning is THE mission of intelligence."

Rice has commented that she/NSC/President/policy makers got "no warning" before
9/11. She continues they had no specific information as to date, time, place, method of
the attacks. The DCI and Armitage have said the DCI declared war on Al Queda in 1998
and went all around town constantly and especially in the spring/summer of 2001
"warning" an attack was imminent.

These comments reflect a misunderstanding of "warning" that was fatal. The intelligence
community will not be able to provide unambiguous warning and will seldom have
specifics as Rice desired. And, strategic and operational "warning" of the kind the DCI
promulgated was probably seen by OMB (he claims OMB stymied his attempts to get
resources in the President's budget or through Congressional appropriations) and others
as simply a play for resources for intelligence and CA. There appears to have been no
concerted effort to connect this to the NIO for warning or any organizational change,
system, process, or product (NIE, Threat Analysis, vulnerability assessment, etc) to his
efforts. His one effort "The Plan" was not comprehensive or "warning" oriented.

OUTLINE
Ermarth
o We need a new I&W scheme for international, non-state sponsored
terrorism (and changes in technology) like we do for the traditional Cold
War military system. It must be connected to response options and action
plans,
o We needed an NIE and an active NIO
- McCarthy
o Need for Analytical rigor and proper communication of the warning
(proper analytical training)
- Holl
o Need for Warning-Response Framework (Why warning is a problem and
how to fix it).
- All emphasize accountability of the analysts and 1C as well as policy makers

Other - Lani Kass, NWC, Surprise and Denial and Deception

Bard O'Neill, NWC, Terrorism/Terrorists and a framework for analysis
Ernest May, Historical Failures

Note: Phillip and members of Commission mentioned in last meeting something that is
important to this discussion. Intelligence officers and avoided policy (they think it taints
their analysis) and "recommendations" and policy makers have typically received their
briefings and wait until the analysts leave the room to discuss policy options. As in Holl
above, the intelligence officers/analysts should be part of the policy response discussion
Studies in Intelligence Page 1 of 12

UNCLASSIFIED

Previous Next Contents

Perceptions and Reality

Two Strategic Intelligence Mistakes in Korea,

1950
P. K. Rose

On 25 June 1950, the North Korean People's Army of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea
(DPRK) swept across the 38th parallel and came close to uniting the Korean peninsula under the
Communist regime of Kim Il-sung. American military and civilian leaders were caught by
surprise, and only the intercession of poorly trained and equipped US garrison troops from Japan
managed to halt the North Korean advance at a high price in American dead and wounded. Four
months later, the Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA) intervened in massive numbers as
American and UN forces pushed the North Koreans back across the 38th parallel. US military and
civilian leaders were again caught by surprise, and another costly price was paid in American
casualties.

Two strategic intelligence blunders within six months: yet the civilian and military leaders
involved were all products of World War II, when the attack on Pearl Harbor had clearly
demonstrated the requirement for intelligence collection and analysis. The answers to why it
happened are simple, and they hold lessons that are relevant today.

The role of intelligence in America's national security is often misunderstood. Intelligence

information has to exist within the greater context of domestic US political perception. With the
defeat of Japan, our historically isolationist nation moved quickly to look inward again. The armed
forces were immediately reduced in number, defense spending was cut dramatically, and
intelligence resources met a similar fate. The looming conflict with Communism was focused on
Europe, our traditional geographic area of interest.

The war had produced a crop of larger-than-life military heroes, and perhaps the biggest was Gen.
Douglas MacArthur, Far East Commander and virtual ruler of a defeated Japan.

While many considered MacArthur brilliant, his military career also contained numerous examples
of poor military judgment. He had few doubts about his own judgment, however, and for over a
decade had surrounded himself with staff officers holding a similar opinion. MacArthur was
confident of his capabilities to reshape Japan, but he had little knowledge of Chinese Communist
forces or military doctrine. He had a well-known disregard for the Chinese as soldiers, and this
became the tenet of the Far Eastern Command (FEC).

In January 1950, Secretary of State Dean Acheson had publicly declared a defensive containment
line against the Communist menace in Asia, based upon an island defense line. The Korean

http://www.cia.go v/csi/studies/fall_winter_2001 /article06.html 8/4/03

 Page 1 of20

I Next Section ^ ' .' [

The CIA and Double Demonology*

Calling the Sino-Soviet Split

Harold P. Ford

Sino-Soviet relations are in a critical phase just short of an acknowledged and definitive split. There is
no longer much of a fundamental resolution of differences. In our view, the chances that such a split can
be avoided in 1962 are no better than even.

NIE 11-5-62, February 1962 l

[Ambassador George Kennan:] In summary, it seems to me that Chinese-Soviet relations bid fair to
receive, in the coming months, a certain easement-. An environment of continued sharp, military
bipolarity will leave the two partners little choice but to repress their differences and carry on.
[Ambassador Charles (Chip) Bohlen:] I am inclined to agree with George . . . there is not the slightest
sign that any adjustments of the basic elements of that dispute have been or are in process . . . .

Comments on NIE 11-5-62, May 1962 2

The Soviet party is opportunist and revisionist; it lacks any deep knowledge of Marxism; its ideas about
disarmament are absurd; peaceful coexistence could mean nothing, except as a tactical weapon to
deceive the enemy; the Soviet idea of a division of labor among the countries of the socialist camp is
wrong; and China must go her own way.

Deng Xiaoping, November 1960

Once it was widely believed that the USSR and Communist China were firm allies acting in concert to
spread Communist influence everywhere they could in the world. In the early 1950s, there was much to
support that image. Mao Tse-tung's regime had triumphed in China and then allied itself formally with
the Soviet Union. Communist North Korea had invaded the Republic of Korea. Communist China had
intervened massively in that war. The USSR had provided its Communist allies with military assistance,
including Soviet-piloted MiGs. The trouble was, among US policymakers such an image of Sino-Soviet
solidarity persisted long after the Moscow-Beijing relationship had in fact begun to fray badly.

Furthermore, that image persisted long after officers from various CIA units had begun to alert
consumers that a Sino-Soviet break was definitely developing. ^ Not all CIA officers were of one mind:
some remained reluctant to change their long-held view of Communist bloc solidarity. All in all,
however, the dominant voice of CIA analysis was out in front of the rest of the Intelligence Community
(1C) in trying to alert policymaking consumers that the United States might someday face a significantly
changed strategic situation.

http://www.cia.gov/csi/studies/winter98-99/art05.html 8/4/03
Paul Wolfowitz on Intelligence Policy-Relations Page 1 of 9

Contents

The Challenge of Managing Uncertainty

Paul Wolfowitz on Intelligence Policy-Relations

Jack Davis

To Paul Wolfowitz, former Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, the essential challenge for policy
officials is to make sound decisions amidst inherent uncertainty about the character of pending threats to
and opportunities for US security interests. To succeed in these circumstances, policymakers must
become, in effect, the senior analyst on their core accounts. Above all, they must become adept at the
analytic techniques for doing battle with incomplete information and contradictory assumptions.

Policymakers need support from intelligence to help deal with uncertainty. Thus, policy officials come
to respect and rely on analysts and managers who appreciate this aspect of the decision process.
Analysts and their analysis are deemed most useful when they:

• Clarify what is known by laying out the evidence and pointing to cause-and-effect patterns.

• Carefully structure assumptions and argumentation about what is unknown and unknowable.

• Bring expertise to bear for planning and action on important long-shot threats and opportunities.

By the same standard, the heavily engaged policymaker has little use for intelligence products that
emphasize prediction over explanation and opinion over evidence. The policymaking process is
particularly ill served by assessments that trivialize the challenge of uncertainty by burying honest
debate in compromise language and by ignoring high-impact contingencies.

Ambassador Wolfowitz believes effective management of uncertainty and related challenges to sound
decisionmaking requires close cooperation between policy and intelligence officers. The analyst and the
collector have to know the operational agendas of policymakers and to understand the continuous and
largely informal processes by which they come to decision. Similarly, policymakers have to get close
enough to intelligence to provide direct guidance to the collection and analytic processes.

Both the policy and the intelligence sides suffer, as does the national interest, whenever principles or
practices are allowed to interfere with close professional cooperation.

*****

This article on the views of Amb. Paul D. Wolfowitz is the second in a series by the author on what
ranking officials of the administration of President Bush believed worked well in intelligence-policy
relations, what did not, and why. The views of Amb. Robert D. Blackwill, Special Assistant to the
President and Senior Director for European and Soviet Affairs, National Security Council Staff, were

http://www.cia.gov/csi/studies/96unclass/davis.htm 8/4/03