From:

Sent: To:

RST01 Hoc Wednesday, April 20, 2011 2:34 PM

(b)(6)

Cc: Subject: Attachments:

Nichols, Paul A (GE Power & Water) FW: Excitement group meeting 110419-JNES-1F4SFP.pdf

Here is another copy of the "Assessment of the Spent Fuel Pool of Fukushima Daiichi Unit 4" I believe this was sent out yesterday. Feel free to delete it if you already have a copy. Mike Mike Brown Reactor Safety Team ---- Original Message ----From: Garchow, Steve
Sent: Wednesday, April 20, 2011 12:45 AM To: RST01 Hoc Subject: FW: Excitement group meeting Find attached an analysis performed by the Japanese government on spent fuel pool #4. They have requested some "experts" review it and provide any recommendations. It was prepared by the Japanese version of the Sandia guys. We, the NRC and Sandia, attended a meeting last night and went through the analysis with them. This document is as they told us, somewhat primitive. Again, they would like any thoughts on the analysis or any other accident progressions that may be possible other than those analyzed. The documents are marked confidential but they requested that it be forwarded to the consortium for review and comment. Thanks, Steve --- Original Message---[mailto:oshima-toshiyuki@meti.go.jp] A .L,_ From: Sent: Wednesday, April 20, 2011 12:26 AM To: Reynolds, Steven; Garchow, Steve

cc:R

DK 175 of 1892

Subject: Excitement group meeting Dear Garchow Thank you for your support for our challenges of Fukushima events. Attached please find the electric file for 1F4 SFP analysis conducted by JNES. Best regards, Toshi Toshiyuki OSHIMA NISA, Japan

DK 176 of 1892

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Japan Nulear /ir'J~ Energy Saet rgnzto

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Assessment of the Spent Fuel Pool of Fukushima Daiichi Unit 4

April 19, 201.1 "Excite Meeting"

at Room 1042 of Annex Bldg of METI/NISA Japan Nuclear Energy Safety Organization (JNES) Nuclear Energy System Safety Division

DK 177 of 1892

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Organizato

Contents
1. Possible scenarios 2. Assessment of scenarios 3. Conclusion

IJNES

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Measured data and assessment approach

* Aerial photographs
Asesmn of caus

Water observed on March 15

of

explosio

Mass of feed water

From pump trucks to SFP

Water level
Skimmer surge tank level NWL - 5 m (sipping on April 12)
Asssmn
of mass

an

hea

balance

Temperature
Existent thermometer: near the surface of NWL 900C (sipping on April 12)
Asssmn of dose

Radioactive dose
-

87mSv/h (sipping on April 12)

134 Cs:

consequnc

88Bq/cm 3,

137 Cs:

93Bq/cm 3 , 1311: 200Bq/cm 3

S.JNES

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Chronology
Date 3/11 15:42 Description The earthquake occurred Loss of all alternating current power
Loss of ultimate heat sink SFP temperature I 84 0C

Injected mass

Water type

3/14 04:08 (2.52d)

3/15 06:14 (3.61d)

3/15 06:50 3/16 05:45 (4.59d) 3/16 14:00 (4.93d)

Huge crash bang

R/B was broken 583.7pSv/h at main gate Fire at R/B Taking photos of water at SFP from helicopter

3/20 3/20 3/21 3/21 3/22 3/23

08:21-09:40 18:30-19:46 06:37-08:41 06:38-08:41 17:17-20:32 10:00-13:02

Water truck of SDF Water truck of SDF Water truck of SDF Water truck of TEPCO Concrete pump truck (spray) Concrete pump truck (spray)
SFP temperature : 100 C

ca. 90 ton ca. 80 ton ca. 90 ton ca. 2.2 ton ca. 150 ton ca. 125 ton ca. 150 ton ca. 150 ton ca. 21 ton ca. 125 ton ca. 140 ton ca. 160 ton ca. 180 ton ca. 20 ton ca. 38 ton ca. 90 ton ca. 195 ton

Fresh water Fresh water Fresh water Fresh water Sea water Sea water Sea water Sea water Sea water Sea water Fresh water Fresh water Fresh water Fresh water Fresh water Fresh water Fresh water

3/24 2:30

3/24 14:36-17:30 3/25 19:05-22:07 3/25 06:05-10:20 3/27 16:55-19:25 3/30 14:04-18:33 4/1 08:28-14:14 4/3 17:14-22:16
4/4 09:30

Concrete pump truck (spray) Concrete pump truck (spray) Fire engine to FPC piping Concrete pump truck (spray) Concrete pump truck (spray) Concrete pump truck (spray) Concrete pump truck (spray)
Water level of FPC skimmer surge-tank: 5000mm

4/5 17:35-18:22 4/7 18:23-19:40 4/9 17:07-19-24

4/12

Concrete pump truck (spray) Concrete pump truck (spray) Concrete pump truck (spray)
Sipping at 1F4/SFP

4/13 0:30-6:57

Concrete pump truck (spray)

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Orgniato

Logic tree - pyramid structure -

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Possible scenarios

" Scenario 1: Crack

- SFP was cracked due to the earthquake and resulted in leakage

* Scenario 2: Flashing
-

Depressurized boiling occurred and half of water spilled over

* Scenario 3: Hydrogen from 1 F3

-

Hydrogen came from Unit 3 to Unit 4 via piping or duct

* Scenario 4: Soot from MG-set lubricant

- Lubricant of MG-set caused explosion

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raization

Assessment of mass and heat balance

* Mass and heat balance calculation was conducted
- Decay heat: 1.88MW (TEPCO information) - Initial water level: 10.8m (NWL - 1.0m) - TAF: 4.5m Level of H2 explosion: 4.Om Initial SFP temperature: 300C Feed water temperature: 150C Leakage rate: in proportion to square root of water level difference Plant model: I&

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JapaNulea

Energy

Saft

raization

Scenario 1: Crack (1/2)

Crack at bottom, with broken pool gate
Assuming fuel exposure and hydrogen generation by fuel cladding oxidation before March 15, pool would be empty after a month
100 90 80

j0)
-o
0) 0 0) 0~ 0)

70 60 50 40 30 20 10 0

~I)

1 2 3 4

5 6 7

8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 time (day)

0 1 2

3 4 5

6 7 8 9 10111213141516171819202122232425 time (day)

Water level (m)

Temperature (C)

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Scenario 1: Crack (2/2)

Crack at mid-level, with broken pool gate
-

Even assuming fuel exposure before March 15, pool could possibly keep the water level However, if hydrogen was generated from fuel cladding at SFP of Unit 4, cesium dose would be high and iodine low compared with measured data
12 11 10 9 8
SFP

WELL TAF H2 -

7
_
.~5

4 3 2

0 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 192021 2223 24 25 time (day)

Water level (m)

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Organizatio

Scenario 2: Flashing (1/4)

* Static head of water continued to decrease with water temperature increasing * Flashing started immediately when water temperature reached the saturation temperature
Atmospheric pressure Spilled water

Flashing mechanism

Temperature increasing Water volume increasing Liquid level increasing (overflow)

Head

PIPE6 Fuel Bundle

High temperature water>1000c

Head decreasing Saturation temperature decreasing Flashing

RELAP5/MOD3.3 model

1F-4 spent fuel pool

Overflow

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Scenario 2: Flashing (2/4)

"
Flashing phenomenon caused swelling of the two-phase mixture level and accelerated the overflow As a result, the pool liquid level dropped largely for very short time of about 6 seconds " More than half water of the pool overflowed during the flashing phenomena continued
12 10 8 6
The water level dropped quickly near the top of the bundles
----

Water level (m)

:-6s
I
---------------------------------------------------------

4 2 0 0 2 4
I

10

time (day)

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Organization

Scenario 2: Flashing (3/4) " Flashing phenomenon accelerated the overflow of the pool water, and
* thereby shortened the initiation time to the fuel temperature increasing The amount of the overflow due to flashing was not strongly influenced by decay heat
Decay heat at March 11th
IZ

12
10 8 6 4 2 0

Decay heat at April 11th

level (i ) -Water

10 8 6 4 2 0

0
1200 1000 800 600 400 200 0 0

Rod surface temperature__C)

-time (day)
- - - - - - - - -

10

0 1200 1000 800 600 400 200 0

10

time (day) Rod surface temperature .(0()

- --

10

10

time (day)

time (day)

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Organzatio

Scenario 2: Flashing (4/4)

* Flashing, with broken pool gate, no crack
- Consistent with mass balance - Not consistent with dose on April 12
100 90

80
j
0) 0

70 60 50

E
Q.

40 30 20 10 0

1 2 3

4 5 6 7 8 9 10111213141516171819202122232425 time (day)

1 2 3

4 5

6 7 8

9 10111213141516171819202122232425 time (day)

Water level (m)

Temperature (C)

:cJNES

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Organiatio

Scenario 3: Hydrogen from 1F3 (1/3)

Possibility of H2 transport via piping or duct
- This picture shows that the space between Unit 3 and Unit 4 was also exploded - This indicates the possibility of spreading of hydrogen generated in the core of Unit 3 In addition, result of sampling water, i.e. dose of cesium and iodine, seems not to come from fuel at 1F4/SFP --7
-'

, .............. ,..

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Scenario 3: Hydrogen from 1 F3 (2/3)

1H 2 came from Unit 3, with intact pool gate, no crack
- If this hypothesis were correct, the figure below shows the possibility that rapture of fuel cladding might occur quite recently - Another possibility is that sea water injected during March 22 to 27 might have included radioactive materials
20 mdotp mdot leak mdotvap mdot wp mdot ject 15 10

5
Mj 0,

Lt
. . . . . .

0 -5

-10 -15 -20 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1011121314151617181920212223242526272829303132333435 time (day)

. . . . . . .

0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1011121314151617181920212223242526272829303132333435 time (day)

Water level (m)

Mass flow rate (kg/s)

*JNES

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Oranzaio

Scenario 3: Hydrogen from 1F3 (3/3)

* H2 came from Unit 3, with broken pool gate, no crack
- Consistent with mass balance - If radioactive materials came from sea water or fall out from Unit 2, this is consistent with dose measured on April 12

100 90 80 70 60
E

a,

50 40 30 20 10 0

0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1011121314151617181920212223242526272829303132333435 time (day)

0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1011121314151617181920212223242526272829303132333435 time (day)

Water level (m)

Temperature (C)

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Scenario 4: MG-set lubricant State of broken panel at 1 F4

2

'1=.X-

:1,
-

,.~,

* *=;~-~~i.

*-

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Oraization

Scenario 4: MG-set lubricant

North "

Distribution of broken panel at 1 F4 shows that the floor the MG-set located in is broken widely

Li L2 L3 L4 L5 L6 South A B C D E

" Plenty of lubricant oil is included in the MG-set room

E East D C B A

The oil mist generated by the temperature increase and the cease of circulation fan operation might be the source of explosion

6 West

11
* * 0

L1-L6: Floor No. See 1-6: Panel No. (North - South: See) A-E: Panel No. (East
-

West) Distribution of Broken Panels at 1F4

Fig.1

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Japan

Nuclear

Energy.

SaeyOgnzto

Conclusion
Several assessments based on possible scenarios have been made
- Assumption will be modified as new information would be obtained

" At present, cause of explosion is not clear - A hypothesis that huge oxidation of cladding at SFP was not occurred is conceivable - Still, there is a possibility that fuel rod rapture might occur at 1F4 - Sea water injection as well as 1F2 explosion could affect the dose of the 1F4/SFP " Important thing is not to expose fuel to atmosphere - Belief in SFP being full based on skimmer surge tank level was not very good