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!:¡".1.

I DonaldE.J.Kilmer,Jr.,(SBN:179986)
LAW OFFICESOF DONALD KILMER
2 A Professional
Corporation
126l Lncoln Avenue,Suite I I I
3 SanJose,California95125-3030
Telephone: 408/998-8489
FIIHM
4 Facsimile: 408/998-8487 JAN $ 2005
E-Mail: DKlawOfc@aol.com
5
6
Attorney for Plaintiffs
^,,#imiìiî#+å
7
8
Ui\IITED STATES DISTRICT COT]RT
9
FOR THE NORTMRN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
,{_ ì l0
tl
t2
RUSSELLALLEN NORDYKE andSALLIE CaseNo.: C 99 04389 MJJ
13 ANN NORDYKE, dbaTS TRADE SHOV/S,
JESSB. GUY, DUANE DAR& WLLIAM REQTIESTFOR JT]DICTALNOTICE
t4 J. JONES,DARYL N. DAVIS,,TASIANA AND MEMORAI\IDTJM IN ST]PPORT
WERTYSCTTYNI, JEAN LEE, TODD PLATNTIFFS' REQUESTFOR
l5 JT]DICIAL NOTICE
BALTES,DENNIS BLAIR, R. L. @ob)
t 6 ADAMS, ROGERBAKER, MIKE
FOURNIERand V{RGIL MoVICKER
t7
Plaintiffs,
18 Hearing Date: Feb.15.2005
j\

t9 vs.
Hearing Time: 9:30A.M.
20 GAIL STEELE,SCOTTTIAGGERTY, Judge: Martin J. Jenkins
KEITH CARSON,NATE MILEY, ALICE Courthouse: U.S.Court House
2l LAI-BITKER, The COUNTY OF 450 Golden GateAve.
ALAMEDA, and The COUNTY OF SanFrancisco
22 California 94102
ALAMEDA BOARD OF SUPERVISORS,
23 Defendants.

24
25 Plaintiffs hereby ask the court to takejudicial notice of facts, as authorizedby Federal

26 Rule of Evidence201.
27 l. Plaintifß are set forth in the caption.
Don¡¡d K¡lær
.A,ttoæy at Iåw 28 2. Defendantsare set forth in the caption.
126l Li¡æln Avc.
SuiteI l1
Sa JoP, CA 95125
Vq 408/9984489
Fx: 408/998-8487
Nordvke v. Steele Page
I of 4
G@PyuestrorrudNotice
I 3. Plaintifß havesueddefendantsfor violations of their civil rights, includingbut not

2 limited to infringementof their rights underthe secondAmendment.

3 4. Plaintifß' anticipatethat Defendantswill answerandassertdefensesto the Second

4 AmendmentClaimswhich includean assertionof the legal theorythat individual do not

5 havestandingto suefor violationsof the SecondAmendment.

6 5. Plaintiffasks this courtto takejudicial noticeof the following adjudicativefacts

7 [copiesÆxcerptsof the relevantdocumentsareattachedasExhibits A - c.]:


8 A. That the united statesJusticeDepartmenthasissueda MEMORANDUM
9 OPIMON FOR TIIE ATTORNEY GENERAL titled: Whetherthe Second
l0 AmendmentSecuresanIndividual Right. The conclusionof the memorandumis
ll that SecondAmendmentsecuresa personalright of individuals.The opinion was
t2 issuedon or aboutAugust24,2004. It wasauthoredby: StevenG. Bradbury,

13 PrincipalDeputyAssistantAttorney General;Howard C. Neilson,Jr., Deputy


t4 AssistantAttomey General;and C. Kevin Marshall,Acting DeputyAssistant
15 AttorneyGeneral.Thememorandum
is availableonlineat
t6 http:www.usdoj.
gov/olc/secondamendmentl
.htm.
t7 B. That the United StatesSenate,Committeeon the Judiciaryhasissueda report
18 authoredbythe Subcommitteeon the Constitution.That subcommitteearrivedat
19 the conclusionthat the SecondAmendmentprotectsan individual right of a
20 private cittzento own and carry firearmsin a peacefulmanner.The reportwas

2l issuedin February1982andis availablefrom the U.S. GovernmentPrinting


22 Ofüce,WashingtonD.C. 20402. Thedocumentnumberis 88-6180.
23 C. That the United StatesSenateandthe Houseof Representatives
enactedthe
24 FirearmsOwners'ProtectionAct on or aboutMay 19,1986. The cít¿tionis 100
25 Stat.449and/orPublicLaw 99-308.Thatthe actspecificallyfinds that"citizens"
26 havethe right to keepandbeararmsunderthe SecondAmendmentto theUnited
27 StatesConstitution.
Doo¿H Kllær
Attomey al I¡w 28
126l Lin@hArc.
SuitcI I I
Sm Joæ,CÂ 95125
Vc: 40El998-8489
Fr ¿08/998-t487
Nordvke v. Steele Page2 of 4 Requestfor JudNotice
I Arsument
2 6. Thereis a conftoversyamongthe federalcircuit asto the applicationandscopeof the
J SecondAmendment.PresentlyNinthCircuit law is suchthat individualsdo not have

4 standingto assertanyrights underSecondAmendment,U.S. SupremeCourtlaw is - at

5 best- unclearon this issue.Plaintiffs havealreadypetitionedthe SupremeCourt for

6 certiorari,thepetitionwasdeniedon October4,2004.
7 7. The denialof a petition for certiorari"importsnothingaboutthe meritsof a case."

8 tgethle]'v. Louisiana,520 U.S. 1259,ll7 S.Ct.2425(1997)(statement


by J. Stevens);
9 HawaiianTel. Co.v. Stateof HawaiiDept.of l¿bor. 614F.2d 1197.1198(9thCir.
l0 1980),cert.den.446 U.S. 984 (1980)l Consequentl¡a denialof certiorarihasno
i ' - )

1l precedentialvalue.

t2 8. Plaintiffs intendto insist on the right to makean adequaterecordof their Second

13 Amendmentclaimsiflwhen thereis anotheropportunityfor the Plaintiffs to onceagain


t4 petitionthe U.S. SupremeCourton this issue.

1 5 9. Plaintiffs alsowish to assurethe court that eventhoughthis court may be boundby the

t6 currentlaw in this circuit, that Plaintiffs aresimply making a good faith argumentfor a

t7 changeof that law andthat their goodfaith is amply supportedby the opinionsissuedby
18 the electedbranchesof the federalgovernment.

t 9 10. The court hasthe authorityto takejudicial noticeof adjudicativefacts. The court can

20 takejudicial notice of factsthat arenot subjectto reasonabledisputeif the factsareeither

2l (l) generallyknownwithin the territorialjurisdictionof the trial courtor (2) capableof

22 accurateandreadydeterminationby resortingto sourceswhoseaccuracymay not

23 reasonably
bequestioned.Fed.R. Evid.201(b);U.S.v. Boyd,289 F.3d 1254,1258(l}th
24 Cn. 2002);LaSalleNat'l Bankv. First Conn.Holding Group.L.L.C., 287F.3d 279,290

25 (3d Cir. 2002).

26 l l . The court musttakejudicial noticeof a fact if a parfi properlyrequeststhe court to take

27 judicial noticeandsuppliesthe courtwith thenecessary


information. Fed.R. Evid.
Do¡¿ld Kilmq
Attorcy at I¡w 28 201(d).
I 26 I Lin@ln Âw.
Suitc I I I
SaIoF, CA95125
1/c:408/998-8489
Fr 408/9984487
Nordvkev. Steele Page3 of 4 Requestfor JudNotice
I t2. If a parlymakesa timely request,the party is entitledto a hearingon the proprietyof

2 takingjudicial noticeandthe tenorof thematternoticed. Fed.R. Evid. 201(e).Plaintiffs

3 herebyaskthat the court hold a hearingto considerthis requestfor judicial noticeif the

4 court is not inclined to summarilygrantthe request.

6 Conclusion
7 13. For thesereasons,Plaintiffs ask the court to takejudicial notice of the requestedfacts.

9 Respectfu
lly Submitted.
10 Date:December29,2004

11

t2
13 DonaldE. J. Kilmer, Jr.
LAW OFFICESOF DONALD KILMER
l4 A ProfessionalCorporation
126l LincolnAvenue,Suite 111
15 SanJose,California95125-3030
Phone:408/998-8489 Fax 408/998-8487
t6 E-Mail: DKLawOfc@aol.com

t7 Attomey for the Plaintiffs

18
L9
20
21,
22
23
24
25
26
27
Dotr¡¡d KIloq
At(omey at [åw 28
126l Limln Ave.
suite I I I
Sa Jow, CA 95125
Vc: ¡108/9984469 Nordvkev. Steele Page4 of 4 Requestfor JudNotice
Fx: ,108/998-8487
I Re: Nordykev. Steele
U.S.District Court,CaseNo. C 99 04389MJJ
2
PROOFOF SERVICE
3
I, SamRoza,declarethatI amemployedin theCityof SanJose,CountyofSant¿Clara,State
4
of Califomia. I am overthe ageof 18yearsandnot a partyto this action;my businessaddressis:
5
126l Lncoln Avenue,Suite111;SanJose,Califomiag5l25-3030
6
On December30, 2004,I servedthe following documents:
7
1. REQTJESTFOR JI'DICIAL NOTICE A¡ID MEMORAI\DT]M IN SUPPORT OF'
I PLATNTTFT'S'REQUESTF,ORJUDTCTALNOTTCE.
9 on the following interestedparty(s)in this action:
1 0 SayreWeaver RichardWinnie
RICIIARDS, TVATSON& GERSHON CountyCounsel
ll 355 SouthGrandAvenue,406Floor Countyof Alameda
los Angeles,CA 90071-3101 l22l OakStreet,Suite463
t2 Oakland,CA946l2
l3 WA MAIL - CCP $$ 10311a).2015.5
t4 tXXl Byplacing a üue copythereofenclosedin a sealedenvelope(s),
addressed
asst¿tedabove,
and placilg each for collectionand mailing on the datèd-fo[owing ordinarybusinesé
15 practices.I amreadilyfamiliarwith my firm'sbusinesspracticeof colleõtionandþrocessing
of correspon,lgntgfor mailing with the United St¿tes?ost¿lServiceand cone.ñpondencõ
t6 placedfor collectionandmailing would be depositedwith the UnitedStatesPostälService
at SanJoqe,California, with poitage thereonfully prepaid,that sameday in the ordinary
t7 courseofbusiness.
18
19 I declareunder penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct and that this
-california.
declarationwasexecutedon Dêcembei3(i, 2004,at san Jõse,
20
2l
22
23
24
25
26
27
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EXHIBIT A
TWHETHER
THE SECOND "{ENDMENT SECURESAN INDfVf - \L RIGHT . e - - PageI of 103
- -

WHETIIER THE SECOND AMENDMENT SECTJRESAN INDTVIDUAL RIGHT

The SecondAmendment secures a right of individuals generally, not a right of Statesor


a right restrícted to persons servíng in mílítias-

August24,2004

MEMORANDUM OPIMON FOR THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

Table of Contents

Introirrc_tiou

I. The UnsettledLegal Landscape

II. TexEalatd5eçurclArclyslq

A. illhe Àiehta{thqP-e-oplf

B. lTqKeepandBearAnnsl

C. lAlvçllBesulated Mililia-heirg-ìSqc-ç.srarylq-the-Sççurity-af
a-&ee$-þte"
D. Structural
Considerations:
TheBill of RightsandtheMilitia Porvers
m. fte llrgual_t¡Ld€r$IaüdtreoftheRightto KeepandBearArms

A. TtleRrghlIqh_erited
&=o_a_EnglaÐd
B

C. T e leyqlqpmerrtof theSegondÄmcu<Lrugat

ry. TheEarlylnterpretations

O * U,rrt-Çqmmc-n-tatqrs
B. 3he-,Enst-C-as-es

C. Iteconstruction

D. BeLo¡dRqçaÉgfiuclion

-C-o"-uElusisn

lntroduction

The SecondAmendment of the Constitutionprovides: "A well regulated Militia, being


necessaryto the security of a free State,the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, snãt
not be infringed." You have asked for the opinion of this Offrce on one aspectof the right

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WHETHERTHE SECOND' {ENDMENTSECURES
AN INDTVII-- q.LRIGHT Page2of 103

securedby this Amendment.Specificall¡ you haveaskedus to addressthequestion


whetherthe right securedby the SecondAmendmentbelongsonly to the States,only to
personsservingin state-organizedmilitiaunits like theNationalGuard,or to individuals
generally.This memorandum memorializesandexpandsuponadvicethat this Office
providedto you on this questionin 2001.

As relevantto thequestionaddressed herein,courtsandcommentators havereliedon


threedifferent interpretationsof the SecondAmendment.Underthe "individual right" view,
the SecondAmendmentsecuresto individualsa personalright to keepandto beararms,
whetheror not theyaremembersof anymilitia or engaged in military serviceor training.
Accordingto this ui"*, individualsmaybring claimJoiraisechallengesbasedon a
violationof their rightsunderthe SecondAmendment just asthey do-tovindicateindividual
rightssecuredby otherprovisionsof theBill of Rights.l0 Und"t the "collectiveright"
view, the SecondAmendmentis a federalismprovisionthatprovidesto Statesa prerogative
to establishandmaintainarmedandorganizedmilitia units akin to the National Guard-,and
only Statesmay assertthis prerogatíve.IÐFinally,thereis atangeofintermediate views
accordingto which the Amendmentsecuresa right only to selectpersonsto keepandbear
armsin connectionwith their servicein an organizedstatemilitia suchasthe Nãtional
Guard.Underonetypical formulation,individualsmay keeparmsonly if they are
"membersof a functioning,organizedstatemilitia" andthe Statehasnot providedthe
necessary arms,andtheyryry beararmsonly "while andas apartof activelyparticipating
in" thatmilitia's activities.SJIn essence,
sucha view would allow a privatecauseof action
(or defense)to somepersonsto vindicatea State'spowerto establishandmaintainanarmed
andorganizedmilitia suchasthe National Guard.0 We thereforelabel this groupof
intermediate positionsthe "quasi-collective
right" view.

The SupremeCourthasnot decidedamongthesethreepotentialinterpretations, andthe


federalcircuitsaresplit. The ExecutiveBranchhastakendifferentviewJovertheyears.
Most recently,in a 2001memorandum to U.S.Attomeys,you endorsedthe view thatthe
SecondAmendmentprotectsa "'right of individuals,includingthosenot thenactuallya
rnemberof anymilitia or engagedin activemilitary serviceor training,to privatelypossess
andbeartheir own firearms"'but allowsfor "reasonable restrictions"ãesigned"to prevent
unfit personsfrom possessing firearmsor to restrictpossessionof firearmi particuiarly
suitedto criminal-irur"."-í5)

As developedin the analysisbelow,we concludethatthe SecondAmendmentsecuresa


personalright of individuals,not a collectiveright thatmayonly be invokedby a Stateor a
quasi-collectiveright restrictedto thosepersonswho servein organizedmilitiá units.Our
conclusionis basedon the Amendment's text,ascommonlyundèrstoodat the time of its
adoptionandinterpretedin light of otherprovisionsof theConstitutionandthe
Amendment's historicalantecedents. Our analysisis limitedto determiningwhetherthe
Amendmentsecuresan individual,collective,or quasi-collective right.'Wedo not consider
thesubstance of thatright, includingits contoursor thenatureor type of governmental
intereststhatwouldjustify restrictionson its exercise,andnothingin this memorandum is
intendedto addressor call into questiontheconstitutionality, undèrthe Second
Amendment,of anyparticularlimitationson owning,carrying,or usingfirearms.

This memorandum proceedsin four parts.PartI addresses


the currentunsettledstateof
the law in this area.PartII demonstratesthatthetext andstructureof the Constitution
supporttheindividual-rightview of the SecondAmendment.PartIII showswhy this view

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WHETHERTHE SECOND 'æNDMENT SECURESAN INDTVI]ì-IA.LRIGHT Page3 of 103

finds furthersupportin the history that informedthe understandingof the Second


Amendmentasit waswritten andratified. Finally, Part IV examinãsthe views of
commentators andcourtsclosestto the SecondAmendmenfsadoption,whichreflectan
individual-rightview, andthenconcludesby describinghowtheåodem altemativeviews
of the SecondAmendmenttook hold in the early twentiethcentury.

I. The UnsettledLegal Landscape

Recentinterpretationsof the SecondAmendmenthavebeen chaructenzed by


disagreementanduncertainty.The SupremeCourt hasnot decidedthe questiottthut w"
addresshere,andat leastthrêeviews prevail in the federalcourtsof appeals.TheExecutive
Branchhastaken_varying positions,andtheAmendmenthasbeenthe sudectof extensive
academicdebatefor thepasttwo decades.

The SupremeCourtlsmostimportantdecisionon themeaningof the Second


Amendment,UnitedStatesv. Mílle¿@ grew out of the enactmentof the NationalFirearms
' - Act of 1934.-Q)ThatAct wasthe first federalregulationof privatefirearms.J8)It taxed(and
I therebyregistered)transfersof sawed-offshotgrinsor riflesïapableof beingconcealed
machineguns,and silencers.It alsotaxeddealersin suchweaponsandrequìredanyonewho
possessedsucha weaponacquiredbefore1934to registerit with federaltax authorities.

A SecondAmendmentchallengeto this Act producedMiller n lg3g,the closestthatthe


SupremeCourthascometo interpretingthe substanceof the Amendment.Miller and a co-
defendantwereindicted for transportinganunregisteredsawed-offshotgunin interstate
contmercefrom Oklahomato Arkansas,andthe district court sustainediheir Second
Amendmentchallengeto the indictment.On appealby the Government,neitherdefendant
appearedor filed a brief.-€) The Court, in reversingandremanding,held that the s¿wed-off
shotgunwasnot afiIongthe uArms"protectedby the SecondAmendmentabsent"evidence
tendingto showthat" its useor possession "at this time hassomereasonable
relationshipto
thepreservation or efficiencyof a well regulatedmilitia." Citing an 1840decisionof thê
Tennessee SupremeCourt,Aymettev. State,the Court concludedthat it wasnot "within
judicialnotice"thatasawed-offshotgunwasaweaponthatwas "anypartof theordinary
r
. military equipment"or whoseuse"couldcontributeto thecoûrmonãe-fence." Absent
evidence,therefore,the Court could not "saythat the SecondAmendmentguarantees the
right to keepandbearsuchan instrumeal.il{0}

After this one-paragraph


discussion, theCourtquotedthepowersthat Article I, Section
8, Clauses15and 16of the Constitutiongrantto Congressto providefor calling forth,
organizing,arming,anddisciplining"theMilitia," andstatedthat the SecondAmendment's -
"declarationandguarantee"weremade"[w]ith obviouspulposeto assurethe continuation
andrenderpossiblethe effectiveness of' themilitia, andthatthe Amendment"mustbe
interpretedandappliedwith that endin yisw."{.Ð The Courtthenaddeda historical
discussiondemonstrating that'the termMilitia" asusedin variousprovisionsof the
Constitution,includingthe SecondAmendmen!referredto a body that "comprisedall
malesphysicallycapa6leof actingin concertfor the coÍrmondefense,"who iwere expected
to appear"for occasionaltraining"bearingarmssuppliedby themselves andof thekind in
commonuseat thetime," which in the 1700'susuallymeanta "good"musketof proper
length'fl-?)

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WHETTIERTHE SECOND '{ENDMENT SECURESAN INDIVIF.-- A,LRIGHT Page4 of 103

Miller did not resolvethe questionaddressedin this memorandum.Although the


meaningof the decisionis muchdebatedthreepointsappearevident.First,the holdingwas
limited to the meaningof "Annsu in the SecondAmendmentandwhethera sawed-off
shotgunis amongthe armsprotected.In determiningthat meaning,the Court also
interpretedthe term "Militia" asusedin the Constitution.Second,the Courtdid not
categoricallyrejectMiller's SecondAmendmentchallenge.The Court'sdecisionto address
the substanceof this challengeto his indictment,asopposedto concludingthat only States
couldbring sucha challenge,appearsto be inconsistent with a collective-rightview.

Finally, the Court did not clearly decidebetweenthe individual-rightand quasi-


collective-rightviews.Its holdingregardingthe meaningof "Arms" is consistentwith either
view: The Court'slimitationof "Arms" to thoseweaponsreasonably relatedto the
preservationor efficiency of a well-regulatedmilitia (suchasthosethat are "part of the
ordin4rymilitary equipment"or that "could contributeto the commondefense")could be
consistentwith a right to "keepandbear" sucharmsthat is resffictedto servicein an
organizedmilitary unit suchastheNational Guard;but thatholding is alsoconsistentwith
anindividualright to keepandbearwhatevernArtnctttheAmendmentprotects.Similarly,
the Court'sreferenceto the needto interpretthe SecondAmendmenfs"declarationand
guarantee" with the "endin view" of furthering"the continuationandrender[ing]possible
the effectiveness of' the militia couldbe consistentwith a quasi-collective-right
view; but it
is alsoconsistentwith the understandingof the relationshipbetweenan individual right to
keepandbeararmsand the "Militia" that prevailedat thetime of the Founding,an
understandingconfirmedby early authorities'discussionsof the SecondAmendment's
Preface.-(LÐ

Evenso, absentfrom the Court'sopinion n Miller wasany discussionof whetherthe


defendantsweremembersof the National G¡ard or any otherorganizedmllitary force,
whetherthey were transportingthe shotgunin the serviceof sucha force, or whetherthey
were"physicallycapableof'bearing armsin oneandthuseveneligiblefor service.The
natureof the weaponat issue,not of the defendantsor their activities,appearedto be the
key fact, andthis aspectof the opinion tendsto point towardthe individual-right view rather
thanthequasi-collective-right view. In addition,Miller'sbroadreadingof "Militia" is most
consistentwith the individual-rightview, aswe explainbelowin Partfl.C.z, andis in
tensionwith the quasi-collective-rightview, underwhich the militia is understoodto refer
to selectmilitary units, akin to the modernNational Guard,organizedand armedby the
States.{141

ThreeyearsafterMíller,ín Casesv. UnitedStates,the First Circuit rcadMiller to turn


solelyon thetype of weaponal issueandto suggestan individual-rightview of the Second
Amendment:"Apparently,then,underthe SecondAmendment[as interpretedin Miller],
the federalgovernment. . . cannotprohibitthepossession or useof anyweaponwhich has
anyreasonable relationshipto thepreservation or efficiencyof a well regulatedmilitia." But
the courtdoubtedthatMiller "wasattemptingto formulatea generalrule applicableto all
cases,"wamedof the consequences of sucha view, andasserted that it was "unlikely that
the framersof the Amendmentintendedany suchresult."ilÐ The court, instead,adopted
whatamountedto a quasi-collective-right view: A personhasno right underthe Second
Amendmentunlesshe is "a memberof a[ ] military organization" or useshis weapon"in
preparationfor a military career,"thus"conhibutingto theeffrciencyof the well regulated
pili¡i¿." {lCI Neitherin supportof its assertionabouttheFramers'intentnor in its paragraph
fashioningthis rule did the court cite any text or otherauthority.

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WHETHER THE SECOND -{ENDMENT SECURESAN INDIVII' dL RIGHT Page5 of 103

Also in L942,theThird Circuit in UnitedStøtesv. TotappliedMiller's definitionof


"Arms" to affirm the convictionof a defendantwho receiveda pistol in interstatecommerce
after havingbeenconvictedof a felony involving violence.fl?)Alternatively, the court
restedits affirmanceon the groundthat the Governmentmayprohibit sucha convict from
possessing ¿ ¡t *-.11E) Althougheitherof theseviewsis consistentwith an individual
right,{lÐ Tot added,inapparentdicta,a one-paragraph historicaldiscussionin supportof
the view that the Amendment"rvasnot adoptedwith individualrights in mind, bul ãs a
protectionfor the Statesin the maintenanceof theirmilitia organizationsagainstpossible
encroachments by the federalpower."I2Q)The court did not addressthe Amendment'stext
but insteadchiefly relied on the Aymettecase'saccountof theright that emergedfrom the
EnglishRevolutionof 1688-1689.

Over thepastfew decades,the ExecutiveBranchhastakendiffering views of theright


securedby the SecondAmendment.(21)In 1941,PresidentRooseveltsignedlegislation
authorizingrequisitionsofprivate properly for war usethatprohibitedrequisitiõningor new
registration"of anyfuearmspossessed by anyindividualfor his personalprotectionor
sport" and moreover,any impairing or infringing of "the right of any individual to keepand
beararms."I22) bt 1959,this Office revieweda bill thatwouldhavesecuredthe custodyand
dispositionof missiles,rockets,andearthsatellites.'We questioned its definitionof
"missile,"whichincluded"projectile"and "seemsto includeconventionalammunition,"
andwe commentedthat if the bill purported"to prohibitprívate individuals from acquiring,-
possessing,or receivingany standardammunitionfor firearms. . . . seriousconstitutional
problemswouldariseunderthe SecondAmendment .n{231Incommentingon similarbills in
1961and l962,this Office citedandreaffirmedits 1959memorandum.l2Ð In 1965,
however,the JusticeDepartmentexpresslyadoptedthe collective-rightinterpretationin
congressionaltestimonyby Attorney GeneralKaøenbach.l2-Ð

Soonafter,in 1968,C'ongress passedthe first majorfederalgunregulationsince1938,


the OmnibusCrime Control and SafeSheetsAct.@ This statuteproduceda flurry of
decisionsin the federalcourtsof appealsrejectingthe individual-rightview. Followingthe
Third Circuifs dícta tn Tot,the Fourth, Sixth, Seventh,andNinth Circuits eventually
adoptedthe collective-rightview.Ø FollowingtheFirst Circuit in Cases,theEighth,
Tenth,andEleventhCircuitsadoptedquasi-collective-right views.l2i) As in Tot andCases,
manyof thesecases,particularlythe initial ones,involvedconstitutionalchallengesby
personsconvictedof feloniesor violent crimes,-€9)andsomeinvolvedchallengesto
restrictionson carryingconcealed weapons.l3Q) Thesedecisionsdid not analyze,atleastnot
in depth,the Amendmenfstext or history. Rather,theyrelied on Tot or Cases(or their
progeny),claimedsupportftom Miller, or both. As theNinth Circuit recently recognizedin
the courseof adheringto its collective-rightposition,theseearlierdecisionsreachedtheir
conclusions"with comparativelylittle analysis,""largelyon thebasisof the rathercursory
discussionin Miller, andtouchedonly briefly on the meritsof the debate."{1I)

In contrast,theburgeoningscholarlyliteratureon the SecondAmendmentin the past


two decades hasexploredthemeaningof the SecondAmendmentin greatdetail.The
collective-rightandquasi-collective-right
positionshavemanyadherents,-(3Ð althoughthe
preponderance of modemscholarshipappearsto supportthe individual-rightview.@

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WHETHERTHE SECOND \4ENDMENT SECURESAN INDIVI -AL
RIGHT Page6 of 103

Recentdecisionsof the Fífth andNinth Circuits havebegunto remedythe relatively


sparse judicial analysisof the meaningof the SecondAmerrdment. In 20b1,theFifth Circuit
tn UnítedStatesv. Emersonadoptedtheindividual-right view, basedon an extensive
analysisof theAmendment's text andhistory.(34)The followingyear,theNinth Circuitin
Silvetrav. Locþer rejectedEmersonwith an extendedcounter-analysis andreaffirmedits
adherence to thecollective-rightview.-GÐSix membersof theNinth Circuit dissented from
denialof rehearingen bancandendorsedan individual-rightview.{16)

In sum,the questionof who possesses theright securedby the SecondAmendment


remainsopenandunsettledin the courtsandamongscholars.Accordingly, \ilo turn to the
Amendment'stext, ascommonlyunderstoodat the time of its adoption*A interpretedin
light of otherprovisionsof the Constitutionandthe AmendmenfJhistorical anteiedents.
to
discernits propermeaning.

II. Textual and Structural Analysis

The SecondAmendmentof the United StatesConstitutioû pffi of the Bill of Rights,


readsin full asfollows:

A well regulatedMilitia, beingnecessary


to the securityof a free State,the
right of the peopleto keepandbearArrns, shall not be ínfringed.

The Amendmentexpresslyprotectsa "right of thepeople,"which is "to keepandbear


Arms" andwhich hassomerelation to the prefatorydeclarationthat a "well regulated
Militia" is necessary
for the ultimateendof "the securityof a freeState."We addresseach
of thesephrasesin tum and then considerhow the structureof the Constitutionilluminates
the Amendmenfs meaning.

As explainedbelow,the text of the SecondAmendmentpoints to a personalright of


individuals:A "right of the people"is ordinarilyandmostnàturallya right of individuals,
not of a St¿teandnot merelyof thoseservingthe Stateasmilitiamen.Th" phrase"keep
arms"at the time of the Foundingusually indicatedthe private ownershipand retentionof
anls by individualsasindividuals,not the stockpilingof armsby a governmentor its
soldiers,andthe phrasecertainly had that meaningwhenusedin connectionwith a "right of
the people."While the phrase"beararms"often referredto carryingof armsin military
service,it alsosometimes denotedcarryingarmsfor privatepurposes.The Amendment's
prefatoryclause,considered underproperrulesof interpretation, couldnot negatethe
individualright recognizedin the clearlanguageof the operativeclause.I" uny event,the
prefatoryclause- particularly its referenceto the "Militia," which wasunderstoodat the
Foundingto encompass all able-bodiedmalecitizens,who wererequiredto be enrolledfor
-
service is fully consistentwith an individual-rightreadingof the oþerativelanguage.
Moreover,the SecondAmendmentappearsin theBill of Rightsamid amendmentsiecuring
numerousindividual rights, a placementthat makesit likely that the right of the peopleto
keepandbeararmslikewisebelongsto individuals.Finally,a consideiationof the pãw"rs
lhat theoriginalConstitutiongrantsor allowsoverthemilitia makesit unlikely that the
secondAmendmentwould securea collectiveor quasi-collective right.

A. 'rTheRight of the People"

The SecondAmendmenfsrecognitionof a uright"thatbelongsto "the people"indicates

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a right of individuals.The word "right," standingby itselfin the Constitution,is clear.


Although in somecontextsentitiesotherthan individualsaresaidto have "rights,"-(37)1¡"
Constitutionitself doesnotusethe word ilright"in this manner.Settingasidethe Second
Amendment,not oncedoesthe Constitutionconfera "right" on any governmentalentity,
stateor federal.Nor doesit confer any "right" restrictedto personsin governmentalservice,
suchasmembersof an organizedmilitary unit. In additionioits variousreferences to a
"right of thepeople"discussed below,the Constitutionin the SixthAmendmentsecures
"right[s]"to anaccused person,andin the Seventhsecures a person's"right" to ajury trial
in civil cases.-€€)By contrast,governments,whetherstateor federal,havein the
Constitutiorr only "powers"or "authorit¡r."$С wouldbe a markedanomalyif uright"in
the SecondAmendmentdepartedfrom suchuniform usagethroughoutthe C-onstituiion.

uright"is conjoinedwith
. . In anyevent,anypossibledoubtvanisheswhen "thepeople,"as
it is in theSecondAmendment.Sucha right belongstõ individuãls:The "people'iarenot a
"State,ulor Íuetheyidenticalwith the "Militia." Indeedthe SecondAmendmentdistinctly
usesall tbreeof theseterms,yet it securesa "right" only to the "people."Thephrase"the
right of thepeople"appearstwo othertimesin theBill of Rights,*ã both timesrefersto a
personalright, which belongsto individuals.The First Amendmentsecures"the right of the
peo-pfe peaceablyto assemble,andto petition the Govemmentfor a redressof grievances,"
andthe Fourthsafeguards'[t]he right of the peopleto be securein their p"rsoo-s,houses,
papers,andeffects,againstunreasonable searchesandseizures."In addition,the Ninth
Amendmentrefersto "rights . . . retainedby the people."We seeno reasonto readthe
phrasein the SecondAmendmentto meansomethingotherthanwhat it plainly meansin
theseneighboringandcontemporaneous amendments.

The SupremeCourt, in interpretingthe FourthAmendmen!likewise hasrecognized,that


the Constitutionuses"the people,"andespecially"theright of thepeople,"to referto
individuals:
'ltTìhgpeople"seemsto havebeen
a termof art employedin selectpartsof the
Constitution.The Preambledeclaresthat the Constitutionis ordaineãand
established by "the Peopleof the UnitedStates."The SecondAmendment
protects"the right of the peopleto keepandbearArms,,'andthe Ninth and
TenthAmendmentsprovide that certainrights andpowersareretainedby and
reservedto "the people."seealso u.S. const.,Amdt. I ('icongressshallmake
no law . . . abridging. . . theright of thepeoplepeaceably to assemble")
(emphasis added);Art. I, $ 2, cl. I ("TheHouseof Representatives shaÍlbe
composed of MemberschoseneverysecondYearby thePeopleof theseveral
states")(emphasisadded).while this textualexegesis isby no means
conclusive,it suggests that "the people" protectedby the FourthAmendment,
andby the First and SecondAmendments,andto whom rights and powersare
reservedin the Ninth andTenthAmendments,refersto a classof pèrsonswho
arepart of a nationalcommunityor who haveotherwisedevelopeäsufficient
connectionwith this countryto be consideredpart of that community.-G0)

ThomasCooley,the leadingconstitutionalscholarafterthe Civil War, took the sameview


in explaining"thepeople"in the contextof the FirstAmendment:"'Whenthe term'the
people'is madeuseof in constitutionallaw or discussions,
it is oftenthe casethatthose
only are intendedwho havea sharein the governmentthroughbeing clothedwith the
electivefranchise.. . . But in all theenumerations
andguarantíesolrights the wholepeople

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are intended,becausethe rightsof all areequal,andaremeantto be equallyprotected."$L)

TheConstitutionconfirmsthis meaningof uthepeople"asindividualsby expressly


distinguishingthe "people"from the "States,"usingeachword to referto a distinctthing.
Indeedthe SecondAmendmentitself refersseparately to "thepeople"andthe "State."And
the differenceis firmly est¿blished
by the TenthAmendment,whichdistinguishes between
thepowersreseryed"to the States"andthosereserved"to thepeople."The "people"arethe
individualswho composethe States,distinctfrom - andbearingtheir federaf"rights"apart
from - thoseentitieglÐ

Similarly,the Constitutiongivesdistinctmeaningsto "thepeople"andthe "Militia."


Again,the SecondAmendmentitself is a notableexample,referringto the "well regulated
Militia" but grantingthe "right" to "the people."The Constifution'sotherreferencesto
"rights"of "thepeople,"notedabove,cannotplausiblybe construedasreferringto the
"Militia." In addition,whengrantinggovernmentalpowerover the militia, the Õonstitution
speaksof the militia expressly,without any referenceto or suggestionof the broader
"people."l{3) And the Fifth Amendment'sGrandJury Clause,which distinguishesbetween
all "person[s]"andthoseservingin the afiny,navy,or "theMilitia, whenin actualservice,"
indicatesthat wherethe Constitutionaddresses rights that turn on servicein the militia it
doesso expressly.

_Theonly truly "collective"useof the "thepeople"at the time of the Foundingwasto


refer to the peopleasthey existedapartfrom govenrmentor any serviceto it. The
Declarationof Independence refersto "onePeople"dissolvingtheir political bondswith
anotherandforming their own nation,and "We the people"createdthe Constifutionin
ratifying conventionschosen"by the People"of eachState.(aa)Thus,evenin this context,
the "people"aredistinguished from "the government"or "the State";nor cantheterm
plausiblybe limited to the "Militia." And when"thepeople"appearsin thephrase"the right
of thepeople"in the Constitution,\ryeconcludethatit indicatesa personalright of
individuals,whetherthatbe a right to assemble andpetition,to be securein óne'sperson
andproperty,or to keepandbeararms.
(r
.,
B. "To Keepand Bear Arms'r

The "right of thepeople"that the SecondAmendmentsecuresis a right "to keepand


bearArms." As theprevioussubpartshowed,thosewho hold the right are,accordingto the
text, "the people"- individuals - not the governmentor eventhe militia. The phrase"to keep
andbear{¡¡.tt is consistentwith this conclusion:Thephrase"keep. . . Arms" reinforcesig
(4Ðilt¿ the phrase
"bearArms" is not inconsistentwitbit.

I. "To Keep... Arms.,,

In eighteenth-century
English,an individual could "keeparms,"andkeepthem for
privatepurposes,unrelatedto militia duty,just ashe couldkeepany otherprivateproperty,
andthephrasewascommonlyusedin this sense.For example,in Rexv. Gardner(K.8.
1738),a defendantchargedwith "keepinga gun" in violationof a 1706Englishstatute
(whichprohibitedcommonersfrom keepingspecifiedobjectsor "otherengines"for the
.destructionof game)arguedthat "thoughtherearemanythingsfor the barekeepingof
which a manmay be convicted;yet they areonly suchascanonly be usedfor destructionof

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the game,whereasa gun is necessaryfor defenceof a house,or for a farmerto shoot


crows."The courtagreed,reasoningthat "a gun differsfrom netsanddogs,which canonly
be keptfor an ill purpose."J4o'¡X"Courtof CommonPleassix yearslatertreatedGardner
ashaving "settledand determined"that "a man may keepa gun for the defenceof his house
andfamily,utfr) andin lT52theKing'sBenchreiteratedthat"a gunmay be kept for the
defenceof a man'shouse,andfor diversotherlawful purposes.'r 1.48)
11t. sameusage
appearedin an earlierprosecutionof a man for "keepingof a gun" confiary to a statutethat
barredall but the wealthyfrom privately owning smallhandguns.{4Ð

V/illiam Blackstone,whoseCommentaríes on theLøwsof England,first publishedin the


decadebeforethe AmericanRevolution,rtr¿rs the leadinglegal authorityin America at the
Founding,wrote, without anyreferenceto the militia, of "pérson[s]"who are "qualified to
keepa gun" andare "shootingat amarh" apparentlyon theü own property.J5-CI- Hs ¿156
notedthat certainpersonscould not "keeparmsin their houses,"pursuantto a statutethat
used"keep"to signiff privateownershipandcontroloverarms,whereverlocated.@
Colonialandearlystatestatutessimilarlyused"keep"to "describearmspossession by
individualsin all contexts,"includingrequiringthoseexemptfrom militiã service(suóhas
the over-aged)to "keep"armsin their homesfor both law enforcementand "the defenseof
theirhomesfrom criminalsor foreignenemies."(52)At theMassachusetts Ratiffing
Conventionin 1788,SamuelAdamsproposedan amendmentprohibiting Congressfrom
"prevent[ing]the peopleof theUnitedStates,who arepeaceable citizens,from keeping
their own arms,"indicatingownershipby individuals of privateams.J53)And that State's
SupremeCourt, in a libel casesoonafter the Founding,likenedthe "right to keepfire arms"
to the freedomof the press,both being individual but not unlimitedrights - the former not
protecting"him who usesthemfor annoyanceor destruc¡ion.n (54)The basicdictionary
definitionof "keep"-"[t]o retain"and"[t]o havein custody"-wasconsistentwith this
specificmeaning.-(5Ð

In short,the phrase"keeparms"was cornmonlyunderstoodto denoteownershipof arms


by private citizensfor privatepurposes.When that phraseis readtogetherwith its subject-
"the right of the people"- the evidencepoints stronglytowardan individual right. Had the
Constifutionmeantnot to protectthe right of the whole "people"to "keep" armsbut instead
to establisha "right" of the Statesor of only the membersof theirmilitias to storethem,
presumablyit would haveuseddifferentlanguage.f56)

2. "To . .. BeørArms.,'

To "bear" was,at the Foundingasnow, a word with numerousdefinitions - usedwith


great"latitude"and"in very differentsenses,"as SamuelJohnsonnotedin his dictionary.
0â Itt basicmeaningwassimplyto "carr¡r"or "wear"something, particularlycarryingor
wearingin a way that wouldbe knownto others,suchasin bearinga message, bearing
anotherperson,or bearingsomethingasa markof authorityor distinction.{58)As a result,
"bear,"whentaking"arms"asits object,could referto multiplecontextsin which onemight
carryor \ryeararïnsin this way.{59It is truethat "beararms"oftendid referto carrying
armsin military t"*i"".J6-0) But thephrasewasnot a termof art limited to this sense.Arms

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alsocouldbe "borne"for private,non-militarypurposes, principallytied to self-defense.


For
example,an early colonial statutein Massachusettsrequiredevery"freemanor other
inhabitant"to providearmsfor himself and anyoneelsein his householdableto "beare
armes,"andone in Virginia required"all men that are fittinge to bearearmes"to "bring their
pieces"to church.-@)

Therearealsoseveralexamplescloserto theFounding.In 1779,a committeeof eminent


Virginians including ThomasJeffersonand GeorgeMason,chargedwith revising the new
State'slaws,authoreda bill penalizinganypersonwho,within ayearof havingviolateda
restrictionon huntingdeer,"shallbeara gun out of his inclosedground,unlesswhilst
performingmilitary duty." This bill demonstratesthat to "beara gun" was not limited to
"performingmilitary duty."JamesMadisonsubmittedthisbill to theVirginia legislaturein
1f-95.rc4Many earlystateconstitutions,includingsomewrittenbeforethe Founding
(Pennsylvania'sandVermont's)and one written a monthafter Secreþryof StateJefferson
declaredthe Bill of Rightsratified (Kentucþ's), protectedan individual right to "beararms"
in "defenseof himselfandthe State"or in "defenseof themselves andthe State,"indicating
thatapersonmightbe saidto "beararms"in self-defense.-(631 A 1780opinionof London's
Recorder(the city's legaladviserandthe primaryjudge in its criminal court) on the legality
of aprívate self-defenseassociation acknowledged "therightsof the peopleof this realmto
beararms,andto instructthemselves in the useof then¡ collectively,"albeitwithin limits.
ffÐ ¡1 a newspapercommentarypublishedin major cities after Madisonintroducedthe Bill
of Rights in Congress,a friend of his wrote that the proposedSecondAmendmentwould
"confirm[]" the people's"right to keepandbeartheirprivatearms.u(65)SupremeCourt
JusticeJosephStory,in his 1833Commentaríçson the Constitutíonof the UnitedStates,
paraphrasedasa *right to beararms"the right of English"subjects. . . [to] havearmsfor
their defence,"an individualright not tied to servicein the militia.l6-6fFinally, other
examplesof contemporaneous usesof "beararms"to denoteactionsof individualsappearin
casesfrom the early 1800'sup to the Civil IVar,discussed belowin PartIV.B.

T\e Mínority Reportissuedby twenty-onedelegatesof the PennsylvaniaConvention


that ratifiedthe FederalConstitutionin late 1787illustratesthe varioususesof thephraseat
the time, including both the ríght of pnvate "bearing"and theduty of "bearing" for the
governmentin the militia. The report recommendedamendingthe Constitutionto recognize
"[t]hat the peoplehavea right to beararmsfor the defenceof themselvesand their own
Stateor the UnitedStates,or for thepurposeof killing game"andalsourgedexemption
from militia servicefor those"conscientiously scrupulousof bearingarms."Althoughthe
Mínoríty Reportwasa productof Anti-Federalists,who had lost at that conventionandwho
lost the battle over ratiffing the Constitution,we areunawareof any contemporaneous
criticismsthatthis widely circulateddocumentmisusedlanguagein giving suchsensesto
the phrase"beararms.rr (67)

In sum,although"beararms"often referredto carryingor wearingarms in connection


with military duty, it wasnot limited to sucha meaning.When,asin the Second
Amendment,thosewordsareusedin conjunctionwith "keeparms,"which commonlydid
refer to privateaction,andthewholephrase"to keepandbearArms" is usedin the context
of a "right of thepeople,"fé8)we concludethat thecore,operativetext of the Amendment
securesa personalright,whichbelongsto individuals.We next considerwhetherthe
Amendment'sprefatorylanguagerequiresa differentconclusion.

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C. "A Well RegulatedMilitia, being Necessaryto the Security of a Free State"

A featureof the SecondAmendmentthat distinguishesit from the otherrights that the


Bill of Rightssecuresis its prefatorysubordinate clause,declaring:uA well règulated
Militia, beingnecessary to the securityof a freeState,. . . ." Advocatesof theðollective-
right andquasi-collective-rightinterpretationsrely on this declaration,particularly its
referenceto a well-regulatedmilitia. On their interpretation,the "peoplè"to which the
SecondAmendmentrefersis only the "people"in a collective,organizedcapacityasthe
stategovernments, or a smallsubsetof the "people"activelyorganizedby those
governments into military bodies."People"becomesinterchangeable with the "State"or its
"organizedmilitia."

This argumentmisunderstands the properrole of suchprefatorydeclarationsin


interpretingthe operativelanguageof a provision.A prefacecanilluminate operative
languagebut is ultimately subordinateto it andcannotrestrictit.

Wholly apartfrom this interpretiveprinciple, this argumentalsorestson an incomplete


understandingof the preface'slanguage.Although the Amendment'sprefatoryclause,
standingalone,might suggesta collectiveor possiblyquasi-collective right-toa modern
reader,whenits wordsarereadasthey wereunderstoodat the Founding,the prefaceis fully
consistentwith the individual right that the Amendment'soperativelanguageietsout. The
"Militia" asunderstoodat the Foundingwasnot a selectgroupsuchasihe Ñational Guard
of today.It consistedof all able-bodiedmale citizens.The SecondAmendment'spreface
identifies asajustification for the individual right that anecessarycondition for an effective
cittzenmilitia, andfor the "free Stateuthat it helpsto secure,is a citizenry that is privately
armedand ableto useits private aûns.

l. TheLímíts of PreføtoryLønguage.

In the eighteenthcentury,the properapproachto interpretinga substantiveor "operative"


legalprovisionto which a lawmakerhadjoined a declaration(whethera "Whereas'iclause
or analogouslanguage)was(l) to seekto interprettheoperativeprovisionon its own, and
(2) thento look to the declarationonly to clariff any ambiguityremainingin the operative
provision.{6ÐIt wasdesirable,if consistentwith theoperativetext, to interpretthe
operativeprovisionso that it generallyfulfilled thejustificationthat the prefacedeclared,
but a narrowdeclarationprovidedno warrantfor restrictingthe operativetext, andthe
prefacecouldnot itself createan ambiguity.This rule appliedequallyto declarations
locatedin any'We
part of a law, not simply at the beginningof it, andto both statutesand
constitutions. thereforeconsiderthis rule applicableto the SecondAmendment

EnglishParliaments of the 1700'sandlate 1600'sregularlyincludedprefacesthroughout


statutes- not only at the beginning(constitutingthe first section)but alsoin particular
sections.'@Thesamerule of interpretationappliedto bothusesof prefaces.As an
exampleof thelatter,a sectionof a bankruptcystatuterecitedtheproblemof personswho
"conveytheír goodsto othermenupongoodconsideration" beforebecomingbankrupt,yet
continueto actasownersof the goods;the immediatelyfollowing clauseof the statute
providedthat if a bankruptdebtorpossessed "any goodsor chattels"with "the consentand
permissionof thetrueowner,"wastheir reputedowner,anddisposedof themasan owner,
suchpropertyshouldrepaythe debtor'sdebtsratherthanreturn to the true owner.The
difficulty arosewhenthe bankruptdebtorpossessed propertythat neverhadbeenhis, such

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aspropertyin trust.A leadingcasein 1716rcadtheenactinglanguageto applyevenin such


casesandrejectedthe argument"that the preambleshall restrainthe operationof the
enactingclause;andthat, becausethe preambleis too narrowor defective,thereforethe
enactingclause,which hasgeneralwords,shallbe restrainedfrom its full latitude,andfrom
doingthatgoodwhich the wordswould otherwise,andof themselves, import."{ZÐThe
King'sBenchreiteratedthe rule in lT23,rejectingin a criminalcasean argumentbasedon
declaratorylanguageintroducingpart of a stafute:"Now thosegeneralwoids in the enacting
pa$ shallneverbe restrainedby any words inûoducingthat part; for it is no rule in the
expositionof statutesto confinethe generalwordsof the enactingpart to any particular
wordseitherinhoducingit, or to any suchwords evenin the preambleitself." The court
acknowledged that "a constructionwhich agreeswith thepreamble"wasdesirable,"but not
suchasmay confinethe enactingpart to i¡;' (ü2\

Blackstonesummedup thís understandingin explainingthat, althoughthe wordsof an


enactingclausewere "generallyto be understoodin their usualandmost known
signification,"yet if its words,after dueanalysis,were"still dubious"or "ambiguous,
equivocal,or intricate," onemight look to the context,which included"the proème,or
preamble,[which] is often calledin to help the constructionof an act of parliament.u@
ChancellorKent, a leadingearlyAmericancommentator, likewisereasonedthatapreamble,
althoughnot technicallypart of the law, "may,at times,aid in the constructionof'ã shtute
or "be resortedto in orderto ascertainthe inducementsto the making" of it, "but whenthe
wordsof the enactingclauseareclearandpositive,recoursemustnot be hadto the
Preamble."JZ4)

Prefatorylanguagealsowascommonin constitutions, andthis rule of construction


appliedin the sameway. Speakingof thepreambleof thewholefederalConstitution,
JosephStory in his Commentariesrciteratedthat statutorypreamblesare "properþ resorted
to, wheredoubtsor ambiguitiesariseupon the words of the enactingpart; for if they are
clearandunambiguous, thereseemslittle room for interpretation,"andhe couldnot see
"any reasonwhy, in a fundamentallaw or constitutionof government,"the samerule should
not apply.-@ Similarl¡ the SupremeCourthasheld thatthe Constitution'spreamblelacks
anyoperativelegal effect andthat eventhoughit statesthe Constitution's"general
pu4)oses," it cannotbe usedto conjurea "spirit" of the documentto confoundclear
operativelanguage;@ the Courthas,however,alsosoughtsomeguidancefrom the
preamblewhenthe operativetext did not resolvea euesti6¡.{72)

The samereasoningappliedto declaratoryphrasesin the languageof individual


constitutionalprovisions,-theclosestanalogiesto the SecondAmendment.The 1784New
HampshireConstitutionprovided:"In criminalprosecutions, the trial of factsin thevicinity
wherethey happen,is so essentialto the securityof the life, libefy and estateof the cítizen,
that no crime or offenceoughtto be tried in anyother countythan that in which it is
committed.'{28}pven thoughin somecasesa trial outsideof the countywherea crimewas
committedmight bring it closerto the crimescene,or ajudge might think a trial in the
countywherethecrime occurrednot "essentialto" (or evenin conflict with) "the securityof
the life, liberty andestateof the citizen,"neitherfact wouldjustify disregardingthe clear
operativelanguageof this constitutionalprovision.lTÐLik"wise, the pre-1787constitutions
of Massachusetts, New Hampshire,andVermontdeclaredthat freedomof speechin the
legislaturelvas"so essentialto therightsof thepeople"that wordsspokentherecouldnot
thebasisof "any" suit.JSQOnecouldnot usethis declarationto avoid the clearimmunity

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conferredby the operativelanguage,evenwhereparticularstatements madein the


legislature- suchasan egregiousslanderunrelatedto a pendingbill - werenot thought
to" the people'srights.-@O
"essential In addition,Madison'sdraftof whatbecametheFirst
AmendmenfsFreePressClauseread:"the freedomof thepress,as oneof thegreat
bulwarlrsof liberty, shallbe inviolable."fE-2)
The emphasized declaratorylanguage
presumablycouldnot havequalifiedor limited the freedomclearlyconferredsuchasby
exemptingfrom protection,ashostileto "liberty," publicationsadvocatingabsolute
monarchy.

A discussionat the ConstitutionalConventiondemonstrates the sameunderstanding,


includingthat prefacesin a particularconstitutionalprovisionmight merelystatepolicy.
Whatwould becomeArticle I, Section8, Clause16of theConstitutíon,empowering
Congress to "providefor organizing,arming,anddiscipliningtheMilitia"" hadreachedits
final form. But GeorgeMasonproposed"to preface"it r¡r/iththephrase,"And thatthe
libertiesof the peoplemay be bettersecuredagainstthe dangerof standingarmiesin time of
peace."He wished"to insertsomethingpointingout andguardingagainstthe dangerof'
standingarmies.Madisonspokein favor,becausetheprefacewould "discountenance" a
peacetimestandingarmywhile "not restrain[ing]Congressfrom establishing" one.JÐNo
doubtan organized,armed"anddisciplinedmilitia would generally"bettersecure"liberties
againstpeace-timestandingarmies(by reducingthe needfor sucharmiesandthethreat
from any that were cr,eated),
andthusthe operativegrant of power "agree[d]with" the
declaratorypreface;{84 but the prefacedid not restrainor confinethe power.

We seeno reasonto exceptthe SecondAmendmentfrom this broadlyapplicable


interpretiverule.@ Thus,the Amendment'sdeclaratoryprefacecould not overcomethe
unambiguouslyindividual "right of the peopleto keepandbearArms" conferredby the
operativetext - evenif the collective-rightandquasi-collective-right schools'understanding
ofthe preface'smeaningwerecorrect,and eventhoughthe prefacemight help resolveany
ambiguitiesconcerningthe scopeof that individual right remainingafter onehas analyzed
the operativetext. At the sametime, any interpretationof the right ought,if possible
consistentwith its text, to furtherthedeclaredjustificationin general,asthe CourttnMiller
recognizedwhen it statedthat interpretationof the Amendmentshouldkeepthe "end in
view" of assuringthe continuationandrenderingpossiblethe effectiveness of themilitia.
(86)As we explain in the remainder
of this subpart- consideringin turn the meaningof
I'Militia," what a "well regulatedMilitia" was,andthe ultimateendof "the securityof a free
Stateu- the individual-right view doesfurther the endssetforth in the prefatorylanguage,
andthereforethe preface,properlyunderstoodis fully consistentwith the individual-right
interpretationof the operativetext.

2. The "Mílitìut'

A key claim of the collective-rightandquasi-collective-right


schoolswith regardto the
SecondAmendment'sprefaceis thata "well regulatedMilitia" is a standingmilitary
orgarizationor body of troops,of limited size,organizedandgoverned by state
governments, albeitconcurrentlywith the federalGovemment(akin to voluntaryselect
forcessuchasthe NationalGuardthatwereestablished overa hundredyearsafterthe
Amendmentwas adopted).As a result,the argumentgoes,theAmendmentmerelyprotects
the Statesagainstfederaleffortsto underminesuchforces,eitherby protectingthe States
directlyor by protectingonly personsservingin thoseforces.{8?

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This argumentdisregardsthe understandingof the "Militia" at the time of the Founding.


As usedin the SecondAmendment,andelsewherein theConstitution,"Militia" referredto
a body consistingof all adult malecitizensup to a certainage(anywherefrom forty-five to
sixty),the goal beingto includeall who werephysicallycapableof service.It wasnot
limitedto a selectforceof personsin activemilitary duty.This entirepopulationof able-
bodiedmalecitizenswasinvoluntarily"enrolled"by localmilitia offrcials,somewhatas
mennow registerfor the selectiveservice(exceptthat enrollmentrequiredno actionby the
citizen),andall enrolledcitizenswererequiredby law to join occasional "exercise"- to
-
which they were expectedto bring their own, private atms but they otherwiseremainedin
civilian life. The militia "rest[ed]uponthe shouldersof thepeople,"lÐ because, asthen
understood" it consistedof a largenumberof the "people"at anyonetime andof all of the
able-bodiedwhite menfor a substantial portionof their lives.It wasthepeopleembodiedas
an armedforce.Thus,a key aspectof the term "Militia" wasthe compositionof the forceto
which it referred.As a result,the referenceto the "Militia" in the SecondAmendment's
preface"agreeswith" the individual right that the Amendmenfsoperativetext setsout,@
becausesecuringto "the people"a right to keepandto beartheir owïr armsmadesucha
broad-based, privatelyarmedforcemorelikely to existandto be effective.J90)

The term "Militia" wasusedin contrastboth to a regular,standingarmy and,more


importantly,to a "selectmilitia" or "corps."$U the latterdistinctionis evidentthroughout
contemporaneous usage,"selectmilitia" denotinga significantlysmallerbody,consisting
eitherof bettertrainedmilitary professionalswho couldremainactivefor extendedperiods,
or of thosechosenselectively,perhapsbecauseof political or otherdiscriminatisn.fg2) pst
example,at the ConstitutionalConvention,GeorgeMasonmentionedtheneedfor federal
regulationof the militia to ensurethat they were adequatelytrained.He suspectedthat the
Stateswould not relinquish"thepoweroverthewhole"but would "over rpñtas a select
militia." He addedthat"a selectmilitia" wouldbe "asmuchasthe Gen[eral]Gov[emment]
couldadvantageously be chargedwith," andthussuggested that it receivepo\ryeronly over
"onetenthþart'rof the militia per year.Oliver Ellsworth,laterto be a SenatorandChief
Justice,objectedbecausea "selectmilitia" eitherwouldbe impracticalor wouldcaì¡se"a
ruinousdeclensionof the greatbody of theMilitia." (93)EdmundRandolph,leaderof the
Virginia delegation,similarlyequatedthe militia with "the wholemass"of thepeople.@

In the debateoverratification,both sidessharedthis broadunderstanding of "Militia."


Among the Federalists, Madisonin TheFederalistpredictedthat a federalarmybenton
oppressionwould be opposedby "a militia amountingto nearhalf a million of citizenswith
armsin their hands"- a groupthat he likenedto the citizenbandsthat had fought in the
Revolutiofi-and linked to "the advantageof being armed,which the Americanspossessover
thepeopleof almosteveryothernation."-(9--5] AlexanderHamiltondescribedthemilitia as
"the greatbody of the yeomanryandof the otherclassesof the citizens,""the greatbody of
thepeople,"and "the wholenation,"whichhe contrasted with a "selectcorps."{9é)4
ConnecticutFederalistwriting as"TheRepublican"praisedas "a capitalcircumstance in
favourof our liberty" that "thepeopleof this countryhavearmsin their hands;they arenot
destituteof military knowledge;everycitizenis requiredby Law to be a soldier;we areall
martialedinto companies, regiments,andbrigades,for the defenceof our country.'19-11nu
speech,laterpublished,in response to SouthCarolina'svoteto ratiff, DavidRamsay,a state
legislatoranddelegateto theratifing convention,praisedthe Constitution's militia powers
andasked,"What Europeanpowerwill dareto attackus,whenit is knownthatthe
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out to our defence.. . ?'{9-ÐMaryland's"Aristides,"in a fairþ widetycirculatedpamphlet,


wrotesimplythat "themilitia . . . is ourse1u"r.uf99)

AmongtheAnti-Federalists, Mason,in theVirginia Rati$ing Convention,asked:"Who


arethe Militia? Theyconsistnow of thewholepeople,"while warningthatthenew
Congressmight exemptthe rich from service.(100)TheFederalFarmer,a leadingAnti-
Federalistessayist,explainedthatthe "militia, whenproperlyformed,arein factthepeople
themselves,u andcounseled"thatregulartroops,andselectcorps,oughtnot to be keptup
without evidentnecessity."If the federalGovernmentproperly organized,armed,and
disciplinedthe militia - includingin it, "accordingto thepastandgeneralusageof the
states,all mencapableof bearingarms"- thecounürywouldhavea "genuine"ratherthan
"selectmilitia." Undersuchwiseregulation,"themilitia arethepeople."Jl0Ð

This commonsenseof "Militia" alsoappeared in theHouseof Representatives'debates


on the SecondAmendment,discussed belowin PartIII.C.z,andthe SecondCongress
appliedit in the first Militia Act, enacted,in1792,two monthsafterthe SecondAmendment
wasofficially ratiñed.The Act required"eachandeveryable-bodied white malecitizenof
the respectivestates,residenttherein,who is or shallbe of the ageof eighteenyears,and
underthe ageof forty-fiveyears,"to be "enrolledin themilitia" by the local commanding
officer.Eachenrolledcitizenwasrequiredto providehis own arms- "a goodmusketor
firelock" or "a goodrifle" - plus ammunitionandaccouterments. Theseprivate affnswere
exemptedfrom "all suits,distresses, executionsor sales,for debtor for thepaymentof
taxes."The enrolleeswererequiredto appear,armed,"whencalledout to exercise,or into
service,"althoughCongressleft the detailsof exerciseto each5gu6.(102)(Since1792,
Congresshasonly expandedthis definition, suchasby eliminatingthe racial restrictionand
includingsomewomen.lloÐ)Finally,Noah'Webster in his 1828Americandictionary
defined"militia" in accordwith this Act andthe aboveunderstanding: "The militia of a
country arethe able bodiedmen organizedinto companies,regimentsandbrigades,with
officers of all grades,andrequiredby law to attendmilitary exerciseson certaindaysonly,
but at othertimesleft to pursuetheir usualoccupations." Theywere"enrolledfor discipline,
but not engagedin actualserviceexceptin emergencies."-(I-04)

The analogyof the "Militia" to a select(andvoluntary)corpssuchastheNationalGuard


is further sfrainedby the common-lawprohibition againstthe King's deployingthe militia
outsidethe country- a rule thatBlackstonecelebrated aspart of the individual's"absolute
righf' of "personalliberty."{1qÐThe Constitutionappearsto incorporatethis rule, by
speciffing domesticreasonsfor the federalGovernment ûocall out the militia: "to execute
the Lawsof theUnion,suppressInsurrections andrepelInvasionr.rr (106)Implicit in the
common-lawrule is that the militia wasso composed thatits membersoughtto be treated
as ordinarycitizensdoing their duty, ratherthan assoldiers.PresidentTaffs Attomey
Generalreaffirmedthis ancientrule in l9t2 asCongress wasdevelopingthe modern
NationalGuard,which, partlyto avoidthis rule,wasmadea componentof the regular
military fe¡sss.0!Z)

The SupremeCourtin Miller,relying on a brief historicalsurvey,summarizedasfollows


the definitionof "Militia" thatwe havesetout andexplainedabove:

The significationattributedto the termMilitia appearsfrom the debatesin the

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Convention,thehistoryandlegislationof ColoniesandStates,andthe writings


of approvedcommentators. Theseshowplainly enoughthattheMilitia
comprisedall malesphysicallycapableof actingin concertforthe common
defense."A body of citizensenrolledfor military discipline."And further,that
ordinarilywhencalled for servicethesemenwereexpectedto appearbearing
armssupplíedby themselves andof thekind in commonuseat the time.-(108)

If, asthe Courtrecognizedandhistoricalusageconfrms,the "Militia" wascomposedof the


generalpopulationof able-bodiedmen,an individual right of the whole peopleto keepand
beararmswould makeeminentsense.A largeportion of the "people"would be requiredto
appearoccasionally for serviceor simplytraining,andtheywereexpectedto bring their
privatearms.If thepeoplecouldbe disarmed,it wouldthen,amongotherthings,be
impossiblefor militiamento makethe requiredprovisionof their privatelyprovidedarms
whencalledup, andthe citizenmilitia wouldbeundermined.

3. The'tllell Regaløted"Mílítía

Advocatesof the collective-rightand quasi-collective-rightviews arguethat the


Amendmenfsreferencein its prefaceto a "well regulated"militia indicatesthat the preface
refersto a select,organízedbodyakin to today'sNationalGuard.They claim additional
supportfor this argumentfrom usageof the term'lMilitia" elserryhere in the Constitution,in
the contextof governmental poweroverthe Militia.ÉOÐNo doubtthe "Militia" was,
throughenrollment,exercise,and commandwhenactivatedby a governoror president,a
creatureof the government.But it doesnot follow that the meaningof "Militia" asusedin
the SecondAmendmentdependedon congressional (or state)legislationorganizingor
regulatingthe Militia. The word's useelsewherein the Constitutionandthe Amendment's
prefatoryreferenceto a "well regulatedMilitia," properþ understood,in fact suggestthe
opposite.

The Constitutiondistinguishes not only betweenthe "Militia" andthe regulararmed


forcesbut alsobetweendifferentpartsandconditionsof themilitia. The latterdistinctions
appearin (l) Article I, Section8, Clause15,authorizingCongressto "providefor calling
þrth theMilitia"; (2) the immediatelyfollowing clauseauthorizingCongressto "provide
for organizing,armrng, anddiscipliningtheMilitia, andfor governingsuchPart of themas
may be employedin the Serviceof the UnitedStates";(3) Article II, Section2, Clausel,
makingthePresidentcommander-in-chief of "theMilitia of the severalStates"when"called
into the actualServíceof the United States";and(a) the Fifth Amendment,which wittrholds
the protectionof the GrandJury Clausefrom personswhosecasesarisein the militia, but
'War
only when "in actualservicein time of or public danger"(casesin the army andnavy,
by contrast,arealwaysexempted).

Theseprovisionsindicatethat the militia is of a sizethatwill makecomplete


mobilizationusuallyunnecessary, that membersof themilitia will oftennot be in service
(or that not all partsof the militia will alwaysbe in service),andthat when any membersare
not employedin "actualservice,"they oughtto be treatedasordinarycitizens.The "Militia"
is both largeandlargelylatent.In addition,thereferenceto "organizing.. . the Militia"
suggestsanentitythat in somesenseexistsandis definableapartfrom congressional
regulation,in contrastto "Armies,"which Congress must"raise,"pursuantto anotherpower
in Article I, Section8. Congressmight not "organizfel"all of the "Militia"; it might
organizesomepartsdifferentlyfrom others;andit wouldbe expectedto give necessary

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precisionto the definition of the body'smembershipby laying down a specificagerangefor


service(asCongressdid in the first Militia Act). But thebackgroundmeaningof the word
wouldremain.As an Anti-Federalistwriter recognized:"[T]he militia is dividedinto two
classes,viz. activeandinactive,"theformer,he expected,likely to "consistof youngmen
chiefly."-(110J
Thus,the useof "Militia" throughoutthe Constitutionis consistent
with the
commonunderstandingof the word at the Founding.

Nor doesthepreface'sphrase"well regulated'lalterthis senseof "Militia"; rather,it


presupposes it. Having an armedcitizenry,which the operativetext protectsby establishing
a right of individuals,becomesa necessary (albeitnot suffrcient)conditionfor a well-
regulatedmilitia onceoneproperlydefines"Militia." As oneacademiccommentator hasput
it: "TheSecondAmendmentsimplyforbidsoneform of inappropriate regulation,"which
would ensurea militia that wasnot wellregulated,namely'tisarming thepeoplefrom
whomthemilitia mustnecessarily be drawn.. . . [T]he onething thegovemmentis
forbiddento do is infringe the right of thepeople,who arethe sourceof the militia's
members, to keepandbearu*tr.rr (I I l) A militia composedof thewholebody of able-
bodiedmale cittzensand only infrequentlymeetingfor state-sponsored exerciseis more
likely to be "well regulated"in thebearingof arms,andcanmorereadily be trainedand
disciplined if its memberspossesstheir privatearmsandare accustomedto them from
usagefor privatepu4)osesbetweenexercises.{flÐeo¿ an individualright of thepeopleto
havearmshasthe indirect effect of securingthe ability of St¿tesat leastto havetheir
militiast-"¿. (ll3) As the Courtst¿tedtnMiller,the SecondAmendmentseeks"to assure
thecontinuationandrenderpossibletheeffectiveness of' the militia of "all males
physicallycapableof actingin concertfor thecommon¿e¡s6"."!J4) It protectsthe
minimumfor a well-regulatedcitizenmilitia.

In addition,the standardfor a "well regulatedMilitia," asopposedto a well-regulated


selectmilitia, or well-regulatedarmy,presupposes the backgroundmeaningof "Militia* by
takinginto accountthe body'slargesizeandvariedsource.As the Militia Actof 1792
contemplated,it might be enoughto havea countyofficer enroll personsand ensurethat
theypossessed armsandknewhow to usethemthroughbasictrainingonceor twice ayeaL
Similarly,theVirginia Declarationof Rightsof 1776defined"a well-regulatedmilitia" as
simplybeing"composedof thebodyof thepeople,trainedto arms."úþ) eo¿ the frst New
York Constitutiondeclaredthat uthemilitia" shouldalways"be armedanddisciplined,and
in readiness for service"because"it is theduty of everymanwho enjoystheprotectionof
societyto be preparedandwilling to defend¡1.rr (l16)

EventhoseFoundersskepticalof the benefitsof the citizenmilitia, andwho advocateda


morehighly regulatedselectco{ps,still recognizedthedistinctionbetweentheproper
regulationof the two. AlexanderHamiltontnTheFederalístarguedthat it wouldbe both
"futile" and"injurious"for Congressto attemptto "disciplin[e]all the militia of theUnited
States."Most enrolledcitizenswouldneedextensive"time andpractice. . . underarmsfor
thepurposeof goingthroughmilitary exercises andevolutionsasoftenasmight be
necessary to acquirethe degreeof perfectionwhichwould intitle themto the characterof a
well-regulated militia." But sucha burdenon so manycitizens"would be a real grievanceto
thepeopleanda seriouspublic inconvenience andloss."Thus,asto "thepeopleøt large,"
he expectedthat "[]ittle morecanreasonably be aimedat . . . thanto havethemproperly
armedandequipped"and,for this purpose,"assemble themonceor twice" a year.He
thereforerecommended that Congressuseits constitutionalpowerto providefor organizing

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themilitia alsoto form a selectmilitia - "a selectcorpsof moderater¡r".'1.117)Hamilton


wasreiteratingGeorgeV/ashington's well-knownrecoÍrmendations to Congressfor a two-
tieredmilitia, consistingof (l) "the Citizensof America. . . from 18to 50 yearsof age,"
whowouldbe put "on theMilitia Rolls"andgivenminimaltraining,and(2) ',a corps rn
everyState"consistingof thoseagedl8-25.-GlÐFrom the oppositepoliticalpole,the
FederalFarmerlikewiserecognized thatCongressmight makejust suchdistinctionsin
"modellingthe militia" andwarnedthatcreationof a"selectcorpsof militia" would leadto
"inattentionto thegeneralmilitia.n{1rg)

Thisunderst¿nding of the "well regulatedMilitia," andof thepossibilitiesfor


congressional organizationof it (or not),leadsto a view of theprefacethatnot only fits the
meaningof "Militia" in commoncontemporaneous usage,includingthroughoqtthe
Constitution,but also most agreeswith the meaningof the SecondAmendmenfsoperative
text settingout a "right of thepeople."The "well regulatedMilitia" andthe "people"were
not identical,but becauseof their closerelationship,a right of the latter- of individuals- to
keepandbeararmswould facilitatethe former.By contrast,a view rejectingthe individual
right on the basisof the preface'sreferenceto the "well regulatedMilitia" stugglesto
harmonizethe operativelanguageesbblishinga seeminglygeneralandindividual right with
thatprefatorylanguage.As JusticeScaliahaswritten,a narròwdefinitionof "Militian
"producesa guaranteethat goesfar beyondits statedpurpose- ratherlike sayingþolice
officersbeing necessaryto law andorder,the right of the peopleto carryhandgunsshall not
be infringed.r"(120)The "Militia" on this erïoneousview consistsonly of thosefewcitizens
whom a Statechoosesto speciallyorganize,arm, and frain into professionalunits, which i
requiresone to reject the normal,unambiguousmeaningof the operativetext asoverbroad,
rewriting"the people"to meaneither"the selectmilitia" or "the State."If that werethetrue
meaning,the Amendment'sauthorschosesingularlyinartful language.

4. The "Securítyof a Free Støte.,,

Thepreface'sexpresslinking of the "well regulatedMilitia" to theultimatenecessityof "the


securityof a free State"is alsofully consistent
with the conclusionthatthe "right of the
peopleto keepand bearArms" is a personalone.The securityof a free stateat the Founding
no doubtwas understoodto includethosethingsnecessaryto the securityof any state,such
as"to executethe Laws . . . , suppressInsurrectionsandrepel Invasiel¡s."{-12-Ð
But the
securityof afree St¿tewasnotjust thesethings.It alsowasunderstoodto includethe
securityof freedomin a state.Thus,while Blackstonerecognizedthe individual libefy of
thepressas "essentialto thenafureof a freestate,"pre-1787stateconstitutionsdescribed
the sameright as "essentialto thesecurityof freedomin a state.'LlJ-ZÐ
a6" Preambleof the
Constitutionstatesthe goalof makin[ "securethe Blessingsof Liberly," andthe Fourth
Amendmenthighlightsthe importanceof the individual"right of thepeopleto be securein
theirpersons,houses,papers,andeffects."A secure free Statewasonein which liberties
andrightsweresecure.

This clauseof the SecondAmendment's prefacereinforcesthe individualright to keep


andbeararmsin two relatedways- by supportingthe broadmeaningof "Militia" setout
above,andby identiffing a benefitfor individualsof the right thatthe operativetext
secures.First, to sayat thetime of theFoundingthat themilitia wasnecessary to the
securityof a "free State"wasto referto the citizenmilitia, composedof thepeople,who
retainedthe right to keepandusetheirprivateweapons.A selectmilitia, particularlyif it

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existedto the exclusionof the citizenmilitia,might underminethe freestate,if citizens


excludedfrom it wereleft defenseless, or if it disarmedthecitizensandinfringedtheir other
rights (or both). As we showin part III.A, that is what hadhappenedin Enghãd duringthe
strifethatproducedin 1689theexpressright of individualsubþctsto havJandusearmsfor
theirdefense,the ancestorof,theright in the SecondAmendment. (123)
ThustheVirginia
Declarationof Rights,the only statebill of rightsbeforetheadoptionof the Second
Amendmentthat expresslytiedthe militia to the security"of a free State,"alsoemphasized
thatthe "militia" was "composedof thebody of the peoplç.,'424)

Contemporaneous writersacrossthepolitical spectrumacknowledged the link between


thecitizenmilitia andsecuringthe freedomof a state."TheRepublicñ" praised"a militia
of freemen"as amongthe "principal circumstanceswhich rendèrliberty s'ecure,"and
singledout as "a capitalcircumstance in favourof our liberty"that "thópeopleihemselves
arethe military_powerof our counüy," having "armsin their hands"attd "militury
ull2Ð The FederalFarmer
þoyt9{qe listed amongthe "military forcesof a free countlr,,
t!9 "militia," by whig! he meant"thepeoplethemselves . . . whénproperlyformed."A
citizenmilitia wascritical to uthedurationof a free andmild governmènt.ñAbsentit andin
the faceof an "anti-republican"selectmiliti4 "the subsüantial-men, having families and
Plopt¡y, will generallybe without arms,without knowing the useof therã,and defenceless;
whereas,to preserveliberty,it is essentialthatthewholebodyof the peoplealwayspossess
arms,andbe taughtaþ, gspeciallywhenyomg, how to usethem.r'(126)JamesBurgh,a
Scotsman whose1774PolitícalDisquisitiooswérewell-knownin America,includin! being
citedin TheFederalíst,wrotethata 'tgoodmilitia" formed"thechief part oithe constitution
of everyfreegovemment"andwould "preservethe publicliberty." Hè addedthat "[t]he
possossion of armsis the distinctionbetweena freemananda slãve.. . . [H]e who thinls he
is his own master,andhasanythinghe may call his own, oughtto havearmsto defend
himselfandwhathe possesses, or elsehe livesprecariouslyandat discretion.nfi27) Thus,
"everymale"shouldbe trainedin theuseof arms,or at least"all menofproperty.n(128)

Second,andrelated,the freedomof a statewasunderstoodat the time of the Foundingto


includea citizen'sindividualright of self-defence (thatis, defenseof his right to life and
personalsecurity)whenthe statecannotassisthim. An individual right to ãrmssuchasthat
sgcuredby the SecondAme,ndmenfsoperativetext helpsto preservethis basicright and
thusa freestate.Asthe prefaceindicates,the existenceof a well-regulatedcitizenmilitia
further securesthe link betweensuchan individual right andthis asþectof a free state(by
increasingthe numbtr of personsequþed andhaineãto exerciset^n"rignt well), but, àsthe
discussionof the militia in thepreviousparagraphsuggests, this link wasnot understoodto
be confinedto one'sactionswhile participatingin evensucha broad-based entity.Jl2Ð
Blackstone's summaryof key Englishrightsexplainsthis point.With no mentionof the
militia, he describedthe "right of havingandusingarmsfõr self-preservation anddefence"
ry the last securityof individualEnglish subjects
for keeping theìtate, including
themselves, free:

[T]he rights,or, astheyarefrequentlytermed,thelibertiesof Englishmen. . .


consistprimaril¡ in the freeenjoymentof personalsecurity,of personalliberty,
andof privateproperty.Solong astheseremaininviolate,the subjectis
perfectlyfree;for everyspeciesof compulsivetyrannyandoppreisionmustact
in oppositionto oneor otherof theserights,havingno otherõ6jectupon which
it canpossiblybe employed.To preservethesefrom violation,it is nècessary,

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thatthe constitutionof parliamentbe supportedin its full vigour;andlimits,


certainlyknown,be setto the royal prerogative.And lastly,to vindicate these
rights,when actuallyviolated or attacked,the subjectsof Englandare entitled,
in the fnst place,to the regularadministrationandfreecourseofjustice in the
courtsof law; next, to the right of petitioning theking andparliamentfor
redressof grievances; and,lastly,to thç right of havingandusingarmsfor self-
preservation anddefence.

This right to arms,Blackstoneadded,facilit¿tesselÊdefense"whenthe sanctionsof society


(130)JohnLocke,
andlawsarefoundinsufficientto restrainthe violenceof oppresrion.rr
althoughnot explicitlydiscussingarms,similarlyexplainedtheindividualright of self-
defensethata freesocietyallows.Discussingtheright of self-defense
againsta robber,he
wrote:"I haveno reasonto supposethat he who wouldtakeawaymy líberty,wouldno!
whenhe hadme in his power,take away everythingelse."Therefore"the law, which was
madefor my preservation,whereit cannotinterposeto securemy life from presentforce,
which if lost,is capableof no reparation,permitsme my own defenca.,'llJ!)

It is thereforereasonableto concludethat the ability of a "right of the peopleto keepand


bearArms" to further the SecondAmendmentprefaceisultimateendof the "iecurity oîa
free State"consistednot merelyin the existenceof a trainedbandreadyto act assoldiers
shouldthe State'sgovernment call uponthem,but alsoin theability of the citizens(manyof
thempartof theprivatelyarmedcitizenmilitia),by individuallykeepingandbearingarms,
to help securethe freedomsof the Stateand its citizens.$34 Thrrs,the "people" in the
SecondAmendmentweredistinctfrom the "Militia" anda "State,"but a right of thepeople
to keepandbeararmswasunderstoodboth to facilit¿tea well-regulatedmilitia andto help
maintaina Statethatwasfree.By contrast,thecollective-rightandquasi-collective-right
views would sanctionnot only the creationof a selectmilitia (to the exclusionof the cittzen
militia) but alsothe disarmingof the rest of the citizenry,a resultantitheticalto the true
"Militia" asunderstoodat the Foundingand to the "free State"that the FoundingGeneration
understood it to secure.

l r I). Structural Considerations

Our conclusionthat the text of the SecondAmendmentprotectsan individual right is


further confirmedby the süuctureof the Constitution,in particularthe Amendment's
placementandits inter-relationwith the powersthat the Constitutiongrantsover the militia.

1. The BiIl of Rights.

The Secondern"n¿rnrntis embedded within theBill of Rights.Every one of theother


rights and freedomssetforth in the first nine amendments of the Bill - whetherornot
phrasedasa "right of the people"- protectsindividuals,not governments; noneof its
provisionsprotectspersonsonly in connectionwith serviceto thegovernment.(133)4t
ThomasCooleysummarized, writing of the Bill's first eightamendments, "[I]t is declared
that certainenumerated libertiesof the peopleshallnot be t¿kenawayor abridged.'{l3i) It
is thereforereasonableto interpretthe SecondAmendmentto protecfindividuils just asthe
restof thesenineamendments do.

More particularly,the SecondAmendmentis locatedwithin a subsetof the Bill of Rights

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amendgnent:, th" First throughFourth,that relatesmostdirectly to personalfreedoms(as


opposedto judicial procedureregulatingdeprivationby thegovernmentof one'slife,
liberty, or properly) - the amendments that, in Storyiswordsin his Commentaries,
"princþally regardsubjectsproperlybelongingto a bill of rights."Íl3Ð Thesefour
amendments concernlibertiesthat aretied to the right of individualsto possessanduse
certainproperly(theprinting "press"in theFirst Amendmenf{@ "house[s]"in the Third's
reshictionon quarteringsoldiers,and"houses,papers,andeffects"in the Fourth's
restrictionon searchesandseizures),or otherwiseto actwithout unduegovernmental
interference (worship,speech,assemblyandpetition).Again,it seemsréasonable to
interpretthe SecondAmendment,consistentlywith this context,to setout anotherpersonal
liberty (keepingandbearing)andprivileged form of individualproperty(arms),,rsãfuIfo.
protectingnot only the citizen'spersonbut alsothe "houses'that the fnir¿ andFourth
Amendmentsguard.ll37ì

Finall¡ the right in the SecondAmendmentimmediatelyfollows the right to assemble


andpetitior¡ which concludesthe First Amendment.The latterright is undéniablypersonal
andindividual, not dependingon governmentalorganizatronregulation,or serviðe.And the
two arealigned not only in their placementbut alsoin their origin, pulpose,andlimitations.
Antecedents of both appeared in proxímityin the EnglishBill of Rightsof 1689.(138)
Blackstone,in thepassage block-quotedin tlie previoussubpart,discussed in immediate
succession their dual utility asguardsof the greatindividua[rights of life, libefy, and
property,ll3Ðandhe did likewisein discussingthe criminallaw'slimitationson abusesof
thoserights.@ St. GeorgeTucker,the first leadingAmericancommentatoron Blackstone
andthe Constitution(discussedmore in Part[V.4, below),notedthat both rights hadbeen
tansplantedto the United St¿tesfrom England,both strippedof manyEnglish restrictions.
Oal) It follows that the former right - that securedby the SecondAmendment- also
would
be individual.

2. TheMilítía Powers.

Interpretingthe SecondAmendmentin light of the militia powersgrantedto the federal


Governmentandthe Statesin the original Constitutionlikewiie suggestsan individual right
to keepandbeararmsratherthana "right" of States,againstthe feãèralGovernment,to
maintainselectmilitias or a quasi-collective
right to be exercisedonly by personswho serve
in suchentities.Clausesl5 and 16of Article I, Section8, respectivelygrantpowerto
Congress:

To providefor calling fofth theMilitia to executetheLawsof the Union.


suppressInsurrectionsandrepelInvasions;[and]

To provide for orgamzing,arming,anddisciplining,the Militia, and for


governingsuchPartof themasmay be employedin the Serviceof the United
States,reservingto the Statesrespectively,theAppointmentof the Officers,
andtheAuthority of trainingtheMilitia accordingto the disciplineprescribed
by Congress.

In addition,Article II, Section2, makesthe President"Commander-in-Chief . . . of the


Militia of the severalStates,whencalledinto the actualServiceof the United States."

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Theseclauses,independently of the SecondAmendment,presuppose theexistenceof


firnctioningsøte militias andleavesignificantpowersoverthemto tne Sbtes.TheSøtes
expresslyretainthe powersto appointall ofücersandto train themilitia accordingto
federallyspecifiedrules.They implicitly retainthepowerof "governing"anyparti of the
militias not in actualserviceto the federalGovernment,and of having thosestate-appointed
officersgovernthe militias evenwhenin suchservice,subjectto theÞresidenfssupreme
authority.Theprovisionregardingofficersis why Hamiltoncould arguecrediblynThe
Federalístthat the Statesalwayswould retain"a preponderatinginfluenceoverihe
*i1¡¡iu.n(la2)The Constitution,in elsewhere prohibitingStatesfrom "keep[ing]Troops,or
Shipsof War in time of peace,"while still allowingthemto "engagein Wìr" if "actuilly
invaded"or underan imminentthreat,contemplates that the Stateswill have,andhave
powerto employ,usablemilitiasto providenecessary defenseandemergency war-making
ability.{raÐMore broadly,the Statesimplicitly retainthepowerto call ãut the militia on
theirown for domesticpurposes .çM)

The original Constitutionalsoleavesto the Statesconcurrentpower to providefor


. .\ organizing,arming,anddiscipliningtheir militias, so long in so doing they do not interfere
I with the federalpower. This interpretationhasbeenrecognizedfrom the beginning:At the
critical Virginia Ratiffing Convention,Henry Lee (future governorof Virginia anã
congressman), EdmundRandolph(a Framerwho becamethe fïrst Attorney General),
Madison,andJohnMarshall all madethis textualargumentin responseto attacls on the
federalpowerto makesuchprovision.{EÐ Storyfound the argumentsfor sucha concurrent
po\Mer"in their structureandreasoningsatisfactoryandconclusive.w (146)The Supreme
Court approvedthis readingin 1820in Houstonv. Moore,M andhasrecentlyreiterated
it. Lookingto the "generalplan" of the Constitution,the Courtnotedin 1990that,"Wereit
not for the Militia Clauses,it mightbepossibleto argue,"muchasonecouldregarding
federalpowerover foreignpolicy andthe armedforces,"thatthe constitutionalãllocationof
powersprecludedthe formationof organizedstate mititia. The Militia Clauses,however,
subordinate any suchstructuralinferences to an expresspermissionwhile alsosubjecting
statemilitia to expressfederallimit¿tions.'í48) Eventhe Ninth Circuit in Silveíraso
interpretedArticle I, Section8, Clause16: "Thelanguageindicatesthat the grantof power
[to Congress]is permissive.. . . Nothingin theArticle or elsewherein the Constitution
appearsto bar the statesfrom choosingto armtheir respectivemilitias astheywish."(149)

In at leasttwo respects,the abovemilitia po\ryers in the Constitutionsuggestan


individual-rightview of the SecondAmendment.First, any constitutionalamendment
securingto the Statespower to maintainmilitias would havebeenlargely redundant,
whetherthe amendmentprotectedthepowerthrougha "righttt of Statesor a right restricted
to personsservingin militia unitsthata Statehadorganized.Aprovisionshouldnot be read
to be redundantif anotherreasonableinterpretationexists,andthe individual-right view of
the Amendmentis suchan interpretation. Second,onealsowould expecta protectionof the
States'militiapowersto uselanguageanalogous to that of Clause16,which concludesby
"reservingto the Statesrespectively,the Appointmentof the Officers, andtheAuthority of
ûainingthe Militia accordingto the disciplineprescribedby Congre.r.rrllS0)Clause16's
parallelto theprotectionof statepowerin the TenthAmendmen!which providesthat
certainpowersare"reservedto theStatesrespectívely" (while mentioning"thepeople"
separately), is unmistakable, asis thecontrastbetweensuchlanguageandthe Second
Amendment's protectionof a "right of the people."Giventhe readyavailabilityof such
language,it would be both surprisingandinartful for a protectionof stateauthorityto create

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andmaintainorganizedmilitias to be phrasedasthe SecondAmendmentis, whetherone


conceives
of theprotectionasbelongingto the Statesdirectlyor to thoseservingit.

The Militia Clausesthereforesuggestthat the SecondAmendment,to the extentthat it


furthersthe States'aufhorityto maintainorganizedmilitias, doesso indirectly, aswe
discussed in theprevioussubpart(n.C.z&3),by ensuringtl" -ioi*um of a;'well regulated
-
Militia" thatthe States' people,thepoolfor thecitizen-ititia, would continueto bJable to
keepandto beartheir private arms,havingthemreadyandbeingfamiliar with them.Thus
theMilitia Clauses,alongwith the structureof theniil of RightJandtheprefaceof the
SecondAmendment,. all supportthe personal,individual right to keepandbeararmsthat the
Amendment'soperativetext setsout.

rrr. The original understanding of the Right to Keep and Bear Arms

- In thepreviouspart, we focusedon the text and strucfureof the Constitution,considering


'
lhe mganingof the SecondAmendmenfswordsandphraseswhenthey were adoptedand
how the Amendmenfsmeaningis informedby its intìr-relation with tLe rest of the
Constitution.In this part, we take abroadervlew and considerthe Anglo-Americanright to
rirmsasit existedat the time of the Foundingandinformedthe adoptiõnof the Second
Amendment.This history, like the text, indiðatesthat the Amendmèntsecuresan individual
right.

We frst considerthe historicalcontextof the right to axms,both (A) in England


þegtnningwith the Revolutionof 1688-1689and(Bl i" AmeácatnròugntheÃmerican
Revolutionandthe first stateconstitutions. Theright wasconsistentlyãp"rrooul one.
Beginningwith the right of individual Englishsubjectsto havearmsfor their defense,it
wassupplemented inrevolutionary Americawith ihe notion that a citizenmilitia,
comprisingthe armedcitløewy,wasa particularlyimportantmeansof securingfree
govemment.As onejudge recentlyput it, the Americansof the FoundingGenðration"were
theheirsof two revolutions,'!bothof whichhadimpressed uponthemthã importanceof an
individual right to haveandusearms.f-ll1)this backgroundunderstandingof the right is
inconsistent with eitherthe collective-righlor quasi-cóilective-right
víewslNext,in-Subpart
[r9,*9 tum to (l) theframingandratificatioñof the ConstitutiãnarrrdQ)theframingand
ratification of the SecondAmendment.This history demonstrates that thè Lackground-
understanding,far from beingtransformedor curtailed,was incorporatedin tha:t
Amendment,just asthe Bill of Rightsincorporatedmany othertrâditional rights of
in<lividuals. By contrast,separate proposalsto amendthe Constitutionto safãguard po\ryers
of the statesto est¿blishandmaintainorganizedmilitias failed.

A. The Right Inherited from England

As the SupremeCourthasrecognized,"Thehistoricalnecessities andeventsof the


English constitutionalexperience. . . were familiar to" the Framersand should"inform our
understanding of thepurposeandmeaningof constitutionalprovisions."(152)This rule is
particularlyapplicableto provisionssuchasthe SecondAmèndment,because"[t]he law is
perfectlywell settledthatthe first ten amendments to the Constitutiorr,.o**orrìy kto*tr ut
the Bill of Rights,werenot intendedto lay downanynovelprinciplesof govemment,but
simplyto embodycertainguaranties andimmunitieÁwhichwe haãinheritedfrom our
Englishancestors. (1-53)
"

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The right to armsthat colonial Americansinheritedfrom Englandhadbeensetout first


in the EnglishDeclarationof Rightsof 1689,andthenhadbeenexpounded by TVilliam
Blackstonein his authoritativeCommentaríeson theLaws of Englandin the decadebefore
theAmericanRevolution.Both the DeclarationandBlaclatonemadeclearthat the English
right was a personal,individual one,not a "rightubelongingto anygovemmentor restricted
to personsin governmental service.The Englishright couldnot havebeena federalism
provision,because Englandlackeda federalstructure;andneithertheDeclarationnor the
law asexpounded by Blackstoneconditionedthe right on a subjecfsservicein anymilitia.

The Declarationof Rightswasa productof theEnglishRevolutionof 1688-1689


(commonlyknownasthe GloriousRevolution).In 1660,a special"Convention"Parliament
had restoredthe Englishmonarchyby crowning Charles[I,{154)andtwo statutesenacted
underhim providedbackgroundfor the Declaration'sprovisionson arms.First was the
Militia Act, enactedby theroyalistParliament^ 1662.(.1ss) It authorizedmilitia officerson
their own warrants"to searchfor and seizeall arms"of anyonetheyjudged "dangerousto
the peaceof the kingdom,"including throughenteringhousesby fóróeilnecessary,the
armsto be handedoverto the militia andno judicial recoursebeingavailable.{@ Charles
II repeatedlyusedthispower,{UOaidednot only by theregularmilitia but alsoby a
volunteerarmy that he hadorganizedunilaterally,J+8) andby a selectmilitia of about
15,000thathe formedin 1666.(159)The secondstatutewasthe GameAct of 167l,which,
in the nameof protectingwildlife, was "the first law in Englishhistory that took from the
majority of Englishmentheprivilegeof having¡t"*-r.n (160)It outlawedpossession of
guns(no! just their usein hunting)by anyonenot amongthe few rich qualified to hunt
game'-flé11

Concernsescalated afterthe accession in 1685of Charles's


brother,King JamesII. He
wasopenlyRomanCatholic,at a time of sharppoliticaldistrustbetweenEngland's
Protestants andCatholi"..f162)He disarmedtheProtestant militia of lrelandby seizingtheir
armsandplacingthemin governmentmagazines,while returningthe armsof lreland's
RomanCatholics.In England,he continuedto usethemilitia to disarmpersonsof
questionedloyalties,includingthroughstrictly enforcingthe GameAct, althoughhe
ultimately preferredto underminethe militia (whoseloyaþ he questioned),by restricting
musters.He alsoaccelerated andexpandedhis brother'spolicy of purgingopponents,and
Protestants in general,from themilitia's andarmy'sofficerco{ps,andgeometrically
enlargedthe standingarmy.{lé3)

Jamestr fled soonafterWilliam of Orangelandedin Englandin late 1688at the


invitationof leadingEnglishmen.A ConventioñParliamentin early 1689adoptedthe
Declarationof Rights,which William andhis wife Mary (James'sdaughter)acceptedbefore
ParliamentproclaimedthemKing and Queen,andwhich the ensuingregular Parliament
enactedasthe Bill of Rights.'(164)
A hundredyearslater,AlexanderHamiltonin The
Federalistcelebrated "therevolutionin 1688,uwhenat last"Englishliberly wascompletely
triumPhant.'J1-6Ð

The Declarationfirst listedtwelveindictmentsof JamesII for havingattemptedto


subvert"the lawsandlibertiesof this kingdom,"including:

E. By raisingandkeepinga standingarmywithin this kingdomin time of

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peace,withoutconsentof parliament,andquarteringsoldierscontraryto law.

F. By causingseveralgoodsubjects,beingprotestants,
to be disarmed,at the
sametime whenpapistswere both armedandemployed,contraryto law.

Then,in a roughlyparallellist of thirteen"ancientrightsandliberties,"the Declaration


stated:

6. That the raisingor keepinga standingarmy within the kingdom in time of


peace,unlessit be with consentof parliament,is againstlaw.

7.T\atthe subjectswhich areProtestants


mayhaveArms for their

Defencesuitableto their Conditionsand asallowedby Law.

This seventharticle is mostrelevanthere,andit setout a personalright. Neitherthis


articlenor theparallelsixth indictmenttiespossession of armsto servicèin themilitia,
which the Declarationnevermentions.The sixth indictmentinsteadindicatesthatbeing
"armed"andbeing "employed"by the govemmentaredistinct - a distinction confirmeãby
the historicalcontex! which, aswe haveexplained,includedsubjectsbeing disarmedby ihe
militia. Furthermore,the right belongedto '\Subjecis,"not to any goverïrment,andthesè
subjectswereallowedarms"for their Defence."(166)

Critics of the individual-right view contendthat the two concludingclausesof the


seventharticle - "suitableto their Conditions,andas allowedby Law" - so restrictedthe
right that it was a deadletter.Among the restrictionsto which theseclausesreferredwasthe
GameAct, which literally,albeitlikely not in practice,barredmostsubjectsfrom owning
firearms.-0ØAt Lois G. Schwoererhasargued:"English-mendid not secureto 'ordinary
citizens'theright to possess weapons.. . . Draftedby upper-class Protestants
who hadtheir
own interestsat heart,Article VII wasa gun conffolmeasure."lléÐThe Declaration,
therefore,the argumentgoes,could havehad little relevanceto the right in the Second
¡ Amendment.

But this argumentregardingthescopeoftheright doesnot speakto the questionthatwe


considerhere,which is whetherthe Englishright wasa right of individuals,a right of
government,or a right specificallyconnectedwith military serviceto the government.On
that question,theansweris clear.Schwoererherselfrecognizes that manyarticlesof the
Declaration"guaranteedrights to the individual," including the right "to bear arms(under
certainrestrictions).'ll6ÐClass-andreligion-based restrictionsdid not destroythe personal
natureof the right, whateverits scope.The precedentfor AmericanswÍrsan individual right.

In addition,thatArticle 7 of the Declaration(andtheBill) only recognizeda right to


possessarms"asallowedby Law" doesnot meanthatit did not securea true right. In
England'sconstitutionaltradition,particularlyevidentin theeventssurroundingthe
Declarationof Rightsdescribedabove,formalEnglishrightsrestrictedonly the Crown's
prerogatíve,not the legislature'spower,whichwasunrestricted. Thus,althoughBlackstone
was ableto explainmanyyearsafterthe EnglishRevolutionthata royal proclamation"for
disarminganyprotestantsubjects,will not bin4"I-llÐ theright to arms,like all other
Englishrights,remainedsubjectto revisionor abolitionby Parliam.nl.(lZL)1¡u¡

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characteristicof English rights hardly preventedAmericansfrom borrowingandadapting


themto a differentconstitutionalstructure.

Finally, whateverthe actualability of ordinaryEnglishsubjectsto havearmsfor their


defensein 1689,by the Founding,a hundredyearslater,the right to do so extended to most
of thecountry.As JudgeKleinfeld of theNinth Ci¡cuitrecentlyobserved,"Thehistorical
contextof the SecondAmendmentis a long struggleby the English citizewy to enable
commonpeopleto possess¡rr.unît.'117â In newgamelaws,particularlythatof 1706,
Parliamentdeletedgunsfrom the list of implementsthat thosenot qualifiedto hunt game
wereprohibitedfrom owning.@ The courtsdeterminedthat Parliamenthadmadethis
deletion"purposely."{-1?4) 1aus,notwithstanding the list'scatch-allprohibitionof "any
otherengines,"they interpretedthe deletion- togetherwith the existènceof "divers. . .
lawful purposes"for which one might keepa gun, suchas "for the defenceof his houseand
family" ' asprotectingthe right of individualsto keepgunsevenif they werenot qualified
to hunt game,so long asthey did not huntwith them.ûä This interpretationof the 1706
gameactwasconsidered"settledanddetermined"by 1744,andin l752the ChiefJusticeof
the King's Benchreaffrmed that it was "not to be imagined"that Parliamentin that acthad
intended"to disarmall the peopleof England.n f176)By 1780,London'sRecorder- thecity's
legal adviserandthe primary judge of its criminal court - in an opinion supportingthe
legality of the city's private armedassociationsformedfor seFdèfenseagainstriõts, could
announce as"mostclearandundeniable"the "right of his majesty'sProtestant subjects,to
havearmsfor their own defence,andto usethemfor lawful purposes,"addingthat "this
righÇwhicheveryProtestantmostunquestionably possessesìndividually" also"*uy, andin
manycasesmust,be exercisedcollectivel¡" subjectto certainrestrictions .(177)Similarly,
an Englishcommentatorin the early 1790'swrote that "every one is at liberty to keepor
carryagun,if he doesnot useit for the destructionof gams."í?8)

Blackstone'sCommentaries, ñrst publishedin 1765-l769,werefor the colonistsandthe


FoundingGenerationthe leadingexpositionof England'slaws andconstitution.Inthem,he
confirmedthat the English right to armswÍrsan individual one and explainedthat it had
groundsbroaderanddeeperthanthe right thathadbeendeclaredin the Revolutionof 1688-
1689.

In the first chapterof the first book, Blackstonedetailedthe "absoluterights of


individuals¡ (179)that is, "suchasappertainandbelongto particularmen,merelyas
individualsor singlepersons"andwhich "everymanis entitledto enjoy,whetherout of
societyor in it."ll-8-0)It wasthe purposeof law "to maintainandregulate"theserightsin
society,but "wantonandcauseléSs restraint"was"a degreeof tyranny."-(l-8-llHe
delineated
three"principalor primary . . . rightsof thepeopleof England":'the right of personal
security,the right of personalliberty, andthe right of private property.'-Gl2i

But Blackstonerecognizedthatdeclaring thesethreeprimary rightswouldbe "in vain"


anda "deadletter of the laws, if the constitutionhadprovidedno other methodto secure
their actualenjoyment."He thereforeidentifiedfive "auxiliarysubordinaterightsof the
subject"- "outworksor barriersto protectandmaintain"theprincipalrights.{l$ÐThe first
two weremaintainingthe constitutionof Parliamentandclearlimits on the King's
prerogative.Becausetheseweremoreproperlyissuesof governmentalstructure,he
posþonedtheir discussionto laterchapterr.@ The otherthree,however,wereplainly

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individualrights: (a) the "right of everyEnglishman. . . of appþing to the courtsofjustice


for redressof injuries";(b) the "right, appertaining
to everyindividual. . . of petitioningthe
king,or eitherhouseof parliament,for theredressof grievances," so long asno "riot oi
tumult"resulted;and(c) the "right of thesubject. . . of havingannsfor their defence
suitableto their conditionanddegree,andsuch¿rsareallowedby law." He notedthatthe
lattertwo rightsboth hadbeenrecognize;dinthe1689Bill of Rights.(185)

Blackstoneexplainedthe subject'sright of havingarmsas"a public allowance,under


duerestrictions,of the naturalright of resistance
andself-preservation, whenthe sanctions
of societyandlawsarefoundinsufficientto restraintheviolenceof oppresrioo.r' (1861
gt
-
tying the right to the natural andthus individual andpre-political- rignt of self-defense,he
recognized a deeperfoundationthanits declarationandenactment in 1689andconfirmed
that theright existedindependentlyof anybearingof armsin serviceto the militia, a subject
that he did not mentionin connectionwith the right.484

He returnedto the right in concludingthe first chapter.Again groupingtogetherthe last


threeauxiliary rights (suing,petitioning,andhaving arms),he explainedthat all weremeans
for "the subjectsof England"to "vindicate"the threeprimary rights "when actuallyviolated
or attacked."Thus,subjectswere"entitled. . . to the right of havingandusingarmsfor selÊ
preservation anddefence.u (188)By his repeatedreference
to "self-preseryation"andhis
descriptionof the right as including both "havingand using" arms,Blackstonereiterated
that the right had a personalaspectandwas linked to self-defense- to the right to useone's
"limbs . . . to protecthimselffrom externalinjuries,"which waspart of the individualright
of personalsecurity.$3Ð

Finally,Blacftstone'sview of the right asbelongingto individualsre-appears in his


repeateddisparagement of gamelaws asa pretextto underminecommoners'ability to use
or havearms.He tracedthemto "slavery"imposedafterthe fall of the RomanEmpireby
invadinggenerals,who soughtto "keep therusticí or natives. . . in aslow a conditionas
. possible, andespeciallyto prohibitthemtheuseof arms."Thus,"rilefind, in the feudal
constitutions,one andthe samelaw prohibiting the rustici in generalûom carryingarms,
andalsoproscribingtheuseof nets,snares,or otherenginesfor destroyingthe game.'r-ßlq)
He denouncedthosearisingin Englandafter the NormanConquestof 1066asa "[nanny to
the commons,"Í9Ð andthoughttheir real rationale\ilas an aristocraticdesireto "disarm[ ]
thebulk of thepeople."{I94 He briefly describedEngland'sexistingcriminalgamelawsas
confusedandhavinga "questionable" nature,their "rationalfooting"beingelusive.í9Ð But
he approvedhunting restrictionsagainsttrespassingfl9Ð*¿ did not cnticizeseveralother
restrictionson the useandcarryingof arms,involvingbreaches of the peace.flgÐ-

Thus,the right to armsthat America inheritedfrom Englandwas a right of individuals,


andhaddeeprootsby the time of the Framing.It did not dependon servicein the
govemment'smilitia, nor was it a federalism-related"rightu of any government.It therefore
providesno warrantfor a quasi-collective-rightor collective-rightview of the Second
Amendment.And, absentanyevidencethatAmericanswishedto abridgethis individual
right or transformit substantially,aquestionthatwe considernext,the Englishprecedent
supportsan individual-right view of that Amendment.

B. The Right in America before the Framing

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TheEnglishcolonistsin Americarecognizedthis right of individualsubjectsto haveand


usearms,andthey retainedit asthey broke from the mothercountry.They alsorecognized
that it furtheredthe citizen militia to which they lookedasa securityfor their freedom.
Theserelatedideasof an individual right to armsandregardfor the citizen militia formed
the backdropfor the SecondAmendment.We first considerthe history of the American
Revolutionandthen review the States'fnst constitutions,written during that war.

1..TheExperienceof the Revolutíon.

As theRevolutionapproached andconflictswith royal authoritiesrose,colonialleaders


both reaffirmedthe individual right to armsinheritedfrom Englandandpraisedthe shared
duty of beingarmedimposedby local law. The colonialmilitiaswerebroad-based,
composedof all able-bodiedwhitemen,who wereexpectedto be armedwith theprivate
weaponsthat all householdswererequiredto keep(regardlessof eligibility for militia dufy),
therebeing a "generalobligationof all adult male inhabitantsto possessarms,and,with
certainexceptions, to cooperate in the work of defsn5e.'r{196)
Citizenssometimeswere
requirednot only to own weaponsbut alsoto carry them,andthe class-baseddistinctionsof
Englandgenerallydid not apply.@ Americahadits own setof distinctions,basedon
race,but evenfreeblackswereoftenallowedto possess atmsasindividuals,eventhough
usuallybarredfrom militia service.lÞ-!)

Bostonwasthe focusof early oppositionto Britain, andits leadersinvoked both the


individual right to arms(as securedby the 1689Bill of Rightsandalsoas expoundedby
Blackstone)andthe localduty of beingarmed.A 1768townmeetingled by SamuelAdams,
JohnHancocþ and othersresolvedthat the right enactedin the EnglishBill of Rightswas
"foundedin Nature,ReasonandsoundPolicy, andis well adaptedfor the necessary
Defenceof the Community,"while alsopraisingthe colony'slaw requiring"everylisted
SoldierandotherHouseholder" to be armed.The resolutionthusrequestedthat any
Bostonianlackingarms"duly. . . observethe said¡¿ry."-LFÐBostonnewspapers defended
the meeting'sactions:

tl]t is certainlybeyondhumanart and sophistry,to provethe British subjects,


to whom theprivilege of possessing armsis expresslyrecognizedby the Bill of
Rights,and,who live in a provincewherethe law requiresthem to be equip'd
with arms,&c. areguilty of anillegal act, incalling upononeanotherto be
providedwith them,asthe law directs.lzoQ

A subsequent articleby Adamsrecountedthe EnglishRevolutionandthenquotedboth of


Blackstone's primarydiscussionsof the right to arms.Adamsattackedcritics of the "late
voteof this town, callinguponthe inhabitantsto providethemselves with armsþr theír
(201)Thel{ew York
defence,"asinsufficiently"attend[ing]to therightsof theconstitution.rr
Journal Supplemenlreiteratedthis argument:

It is a naturalright which thepeoplehavereservedto themselves,


confirmedby
the Bill of Rights,to keeparmsfor their own defence;andasMr. Blackstone
observes,it is to be madeuseof whenthe sanctionsof societyand law are
foundinsufficientto restrainthe violenceof oppression.f&

The individual'sright to haveandusearmsfor self-defense


wasreaffirmedin the

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celebrated"BostonMassacre"murdertrial, in 1770,of Britishsoldiersfor firing on a


harassingcrowd.(Soldiershadbeengarrisonedin Bostonsincelate 1763.)JohnAdams,
counselfor the soldiers,arguedthat they had actedin self-defense. In his closingargument,
he quotedWilliam Hawkins'sTreatiseon the Pleqsof the Croywtto establishthat "'every
private personseernsto be authorizedby the law, to armhimself" to defendagainst
dangerousrioters.Adamsadded:"Here everyprivatepersonis authorizedto arm himself,
andon the strengthof this authority,I do not denythe inhabitantshad a right to arm
themselves at thattime,for their defenc"."-(20ÐAdamsreiteratedthatview in his 1787
Defenceof the Constitutions of Government of the UnitedStatesof America,recognizing
(204)
the propriet¡lof "armsin thehandsof citizens,to be used. . . in privateself-defenc".rr

British authorities,much like Charlestr andJamesII a centurybefore,movedto disarm


the colonistsashostilitiesmountedinlTT4. Britainbannedtheexportof armsand
ammunitionto anyof the coloniesandorderedGeneralGageto considerhow to disarm
residentsof rebelliousareas.At leastin Massachusetts, somedisarmament occurred,andin
the "PowderAlarm" of September l, 1774,British soldiersseizedammunitionbelongingto
the colonial-¡1¡1iu.120Ð Theseactionsstiffenedresistance throughoutthe coloniesÊ@ and
led the coloniststo form independent local militiaswith broadmembership, the
(207)
"Minutemen." Gage'sattemptsin late 1774and,early1775to seizethesegroups'arms
acrossMassachusetts provokedconfrontationswith largeforcesof armedcolonists,andthe
Revolutionwasfamouslyignited by his efforts to do so at Concordand Lexington in April
n75.Q08j Virginia GovemorDunmore'sraid on an ammunitions storein Williamsburg
soonthereafterprompteda similar response,asmilitiamen surroundedhis home.@
British authorities'continuing effortsto disarmcoloniststvereamongthe actionsthat the
ContinentalCongresscitedwhen,in July 1775,it declaredthecolonies'reasonsfor taking
uP arm5'f210)

As the colonistsarmedand organizedthemselves,their leaderscontinuedto tum to their


rightsasBritish subjectsandpraisedthe citizenmilitiasthattheserightsmadepossible.
GeorgeMason'sactionsin Virginia (in conjunctionwith GeorgeWashingtonandothers)
providean example.In September1774,he chaireda meetingof FairfaxCountycitizensto
t )
form a private militia associationknown asthe FairfaxIndependentCompany.Being
"threat'nedwith the Destructionof our Civil-rights,& Liberty,andall that is dearto British
Subjects& Freemen,"memberspromisedto keepthemselves well armedandto train
togetherunderelectedoffrcers.l2D The following January,in a documentattributedto
Mason,the county'sCommitteeof Safetyrecommended a tax to purchaseammunition,
resolvedthat "a well regulatedMilitia, composedof gentlemenfreeholders,andother
freemen,is the nafuralstength andonly stablesecurityof a freeGovemmen!"andurged
residents"from sixteento fifty years,ofage"to chooseofficers,"providethemselves with
goodFirelocks,"and¡u .íz-lzlln April lT7s,Masonaddressed the Companyandpraised
it asformed"for the greatandusefulpurposesof defendingour counûy,andpreserving
thoseinestimablerightswhich we inherit from our ancestors." In a time of "threatened.. .
ruin of thatconstitutionunderwhich we wereborn,"it wasa security"that in caseof
absolutenecessity,thepeoplemight be the betterenabledto act in defenceof their invaded
libertY."-€-13)

Similarsentiments
appearedin North Carolina.SoonafterLexingtonandConcord,the
royal governordenouncedthoseurging people"to be preparedwith Arms" and train under

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committees of safety.{zl4 gut in July 1775,North Carolina'sdelegatesto theContinental


Congress urgedthe committeesto "form yourselvesinto a Militia" in theexerciseof "the
Rightof everyEnglßh Subjectto be preparedwith'Weaponsfor his Defense."(215)

In Octoberl775,Bntain declaredthe coloniesin rebellion,f2-lé)but organizational


effortscontinued.JohnAdams,in his Thoughtson Government wnttenin early 1776n
response to requestsfor advice,recommended a "Militia Law requiringall men,or with
very few exceptions, besidescasesof conscience,
to beprovidedwith armsand
ammunition,to be trainedat certainseasons." Sucha law wouldbe !'alwaysa wise
institution"but was "in the presentcircumstances
of our countryindispensible."l2lT-i

Many laudedthe citizenmilitias that fought in the Revolution.AmericanGeneral


NathanaelGreene,writing to ThomasJefferson,rernarkedon the "Enterprizeand Spirit" of
"this GreatBulwark of Civil Liberly [that] promisesSecurityandIndependence to this
Country.rrJ2-18)
Americanscreditedcrucial early victoriesto the citízenmilitias,evenwhile
\
recognizingtheir limitations.lzÆ)Well afterthewar, JamesMadisoncouldargueinThe
t' Federalistthatan oppressivearmywould be no matchfor citizenmilitias,as"[t]hosewho
arebestacquaintedwith the late successfulresistanceof this countryagainstthe British
arms"would recognize.He alsopointedto "the advantageof beingarmed,which the
Americanspossess overthe peopleof almosteveryothernation,"governments in mostof
the world being"afraidto trustthepeoplewith arms.'t{220\

2. Eørly ConstítutíonølRecognítíonof the Ríghf

Oneproductof this experienceof the AmericanRevolutionwasthat severalStatesincluded


explicit rightto-bear-armsprovisionsin declarationsof rights that they adoptedduring the
war. Theseappeared in Pennsylvania,North Carolina,Vermont,andMassachusetts. In the
identicalprovisionsof Pennsylvania andVermont,the languageplainly reaffirmedthe
established right of individualsto armthemselves for self-defense.
In theprovisionsof
North CarolinaandMassachusetts, althoughthe expressscopeof the right may havebeen
narrower,the right still belongedto individuals- thesestateprovisionscouldnot havebeen
i , ' )
intendedto protectthe States'prerogatives,nor did theyrestrictthe right to participantsin
militia units.OtherStates,mostnotablyVirginia, did not includeanyprovisionregarding
the right to beararmsin their declarations but did praise"a well regulated¡4i1i1iu."-.(2ã)

Virginía.Virginia'sDeclarationof Rights,adopteda monthbeforethe Declarationof


Independence, wasthe country'sfirst. Section13provided:

Thata well regulatedmilitia, composedof theUoayof tn" people,trainedto


afins,is the proper,natural,andsafedefenceof a free State:that standing
armies,in time of peace,shouldbe avoided,asdangerous to liberty; andthat in
all casesthemilitary shouldbe understrictsubordination to, andgovemedby,
the civil po*"r.@

This provisionexpresslyrecognizes thebackgrounddefinitionof "militia" explainedin Part


II.C: It wasnot a specializedor selectforce,but rathera forceof the people.Suchan
understanding of the militia is consistentwith theright of individualsto havearms-
particularlygiventhat,aswe haveexplained,the citizenmilitia wassupposedto be "trained

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to" its members'private arms.€zil Significantly,the provision'sprimary authorwasGeorge


Mason,l2?4)whosepublic views havealreadybeennotedandwho would play aleading
role twelveyearslater,explainedbelow,in authoringtheproposalof Virginiis ratiffin!
conventionthat p_lacedtogetherin a singlearticletnð in¿ivi¿ualright and-thispraiseofíre
cittzen*i1¡¿¡u._€2Ð

Pennsylvania
Pennsylvanía. adoptedits Declarationof Rightsin Septemb er 1776.
Article 13,immediatelyfollowing an articleproviding"[t]hatthep.opi. havea right to
freedomof speech,"read:

That the peoplehavea right to beararmsfor the defenceof themselvesandthe


state;and as¡tanding armiesin the time of peacearedangerousto liberty, they
oughtnot to be kept up; And that the military shouldbe kept undershict
subordinationto, andgovernedby, thecivil pow"r.l2Ð

While following the samestructureasVirginia's (of which the conventionmemberswere


well awareW),this articlereplacedthepraiseof the well-regulatedcitizenmilitia with a
lgh. a right of "thepeople,l'who,just astneyhadan individial right to speak,alsohadan
individual right to "beararms,"for eitherof the dualpurposesof delending"thémselvesand
the state."The articledoesnot restricttheright to thole ii militia sewice,lnirn it doesnot
mentionand which Pennsylvaniaaddressed separately:Article 8 broadlyprovidedthat
"ev€rymemberof society,"receivingprotectionfrom it, wasboundto contributemoney
and"his personalservicewhennecessary"while allowingan exceptionfor anyone
"conscientiously (228)¡r¿
scrupulousof bearinganns,. . . if he will pay [an] equiva1.o1.'r
theplan of government,adoptedconcurrently,provide¿fof a mìtitíaof "[t]he freemenof
this commonwealthandtheir ssn5.,'{22Ð

Theplan of govemmentalsoprovidedthatpersonscouldusetheir armsto hunt (without


hespassing):"The inhabitantsof this stateshallhaveliberty to fowl andhunt in seaionable
timeson the landsthey hold,andon all otherlandsthereinnot ¡"1or"¿."f230)Regardless of
the relevanceof this provisionto the contoursof the right to beararms(a questioñbeyond
the scopeof this memorandum), theprovisiondoesseemto havebeenviewedasa practical
securityfor, and thus a way of emphasizingthe importanceof, the right of individuãh that
Pennsylvania had elsewheresecured.Theview tha-ttheEnglishgumãlaws- whichhad
providedfor disarmingmanyin thenameof the huntingprivilegis of a few - hadbeena
pretextfor underminingthe right in practicewasprevalentat thé time. Thomaspainehad
cnticizedthe gamelaws in thePennsylvaníaMagazínethe yearbeforePennsylvania
adoptedits constitution,andonenewipuperartiJle;althougl recognizingthat the newer
gameactsdid not prohibitmerelykeepingâ gun,arguedthat Englisharistocratsstill used
themto disarmcommoners, by procuringwitnesses-to claim thaidefendantshadusedtheir
armsfor hunting.-(-2-3Ð

Pennsylvania held anotherconventionfrom November1789tbroughSeptember1790,as


the SecondAmendmentwasbeforethe St¿tesfor ratification.The t"*tting constitution
retainedessentiallythe sameindividualright. Section2l of the declarationof rights,
immediatelyfollowing a sectionproviding'[t]hat thecitizenshavea right" to aJsembleand
petition,provided:

Thatthe right of the citizensto beararrns,in defenceof themselves


andthe

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State,shallnot be questione¿.Ie)

Separatel¡in thebody of theconstitution,theprotectionof conscientious


objectorswas
combinedwith theprovisionrelatingto the cittzenmilitia:

The freemenof this coûrmonwealth shallbe armedanddisciplinedfor its


defence.Thosewho conscientiously scrupleto beararmsshallnot be
compelledto do so,but shallpay anequivalentfor personalservice.Themilitia
ofücersshallbe appointedin suchmannerandfor suchtime æ shallbe
directedbY law.J23Ð

Thus,the right to "beararms"remainedwith individual people,now "the citizens,,'and


existedfor the dual purposeof facilitating the defenseof io¿-iui¿,rals
andthe State.Neither
purposewasexpresslytiedto, let alonelimited to, servicein the militia. And theduty of
"freemen"to "bear_arms," includingpossibleexemptionfrom thatduty,wasdistinctand
wastied to the militia. In both the 1776and1790Pennsylvania constitutions,"beararms"
couldanddid bearbothmeanings.

North Caroltna.North Carolinaadoptedits constitutionanddeclarationof rights in


December1776.Arttcle17of thedeclarationprovided:

That the peoplehavea right to beararms,for the defenceof the State;and,as


standingan-ni9s,in time of peace,aredangerousto liberty, they oughtnot to be
kept up; andthat the military shouldbe kept understrict iuborãinat-ionto, and
governedb¡ the civil power.Iæ4)

This articlementionsonly theright of thepeopleto beararmsfor "thedefenceof the State."


Regardless of the^p_rovision's scope,however,theright still belongedto individuals,just as
the immediatelyfollowing Article 18setout a rightãf individuals-inproviding.[t]hät the
peoplehavea ri_ghtto assemble together,"andincontrastwith Article 25'sdec-larïtion, in
delineatingthe State'sboundaries, ofljthe essentialrightsof the collectivebody of the
people"in the "propertyof thetoil.rr(235)It would not havemadesense,in the contextof a
stateconstitution,for a "right" of "the people"to protectonly the prerogativesof the St¿te.
And the provision'stext indicatesthatall of the pèople(notjust tnor" oig*izedby the State
into militia units) had a right to beararms,at leaìt in defensãof the State]As an early North
Ça_roli,na SupremeCourtdecisionrecognized,the right in Article 17belonged"to erreryman
indeed"and "secur[ed]to him a right of whichhe cannotbe deprived,"to õe exercisedufor
th9¡afety andprotectionof his country."fiQ Moreover,by expresslyprotectingthe right
of the peopleto beararms"for the defenceof the Ståte"(somoilingtlát Nortl Carolinians
werethen doing againstthe British), the draftersof the North CaroÍna Constitutiondo not
appearto haveintendedto abrogatethe arguablymore modestindividual English rigft.lU)
Indeed,the presidentof the constitutionalconvention,who servedon the committeJthat
wrotethe declaration,hadbeenoneof the threecongressional delegates who the year
before,asdiscussedabove,hadurgedNorth Caroliniansto exercisð,theRight of
Englßh Subjectto be preparedwith V/eaponsfor his Defense."€3i) "rr"ry

Vermont.The Vermontconstitutionapprovedin July 1777 provídedthat ,,thepeople


havea right to beararmsfor thedefenceof themselvesandthe State,"in an articlèidientical
to Article 13of Pennsylvania's
Declaration.JzS9)As
in Pennsylvania,
this individualright

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immediatelyfollowedthe individualright of "thepeople. . . to freedomof speech,"andthe


constitutionseparately
includeda huntingguarantee, citizen-militiaprovisions,andan
exceptionfor conscientiousobjec¡s¡s.'-(240-
All of theseremainedin Vermonfs1786and
P4-1)
I 793const¡¡u1isns.

Massachusetts.
Article 17of theMassachusetts
Declarationof Rightsof 1780provided:

The peoplehavea right to keepandto beararmsfor the commondefence.And


as,in time of peace,armiesare dangerousto liberty, they oughtnot to be
maintainedwithout the consentof the legislature;andthe military power shall
alwaysbe held in an exactsubordinationto the civil authority,andbe governed
bY it'QA)

In addition,Article I announcedas amongthe "natural,essential,andunalienablerights',of


all men "the right of enjoyingand defendingtheir lives andliberties" and "of acquirittg,
possessing, andp-rolegting property."ta4ÐMassachusetts wasthe first Stateto add"keep"to
"bear."But this doubleright wassaidto be "for the commondefence,"a phrasethat
arguablylimis thepurposesfor which onemight exerciseit. Two townshadunsuccessfully
proposedadding"their o\rynand" beforethat phrase,onearguingthat this changewould
makeArticle 17"harmonizemuchbetterwith,' Article 1.Qaa\

Even assumingthat the phrase"for the commondefence"limited the purposesfor which


armscould be kept andborne,the "right" remainedanindividual one - residingin "the
people,"just asArticle 19setout an individualright in providingthat '[t]he pðoplehavea
righ! in an orderlyandpeaceable manner,to assemble to consuliuponinL common
good.r'f24ã) Nothingin Article 17or anyotherprovisionconnectedtheright to servicein
themílitia, muchlessindicatedthatthis "right" of the "people"belongedio the Stateor was
intgndedtoprotectits prerogatives.€40 Moreover,the addition of the word "keep',to the
right of thepeoplereinforcedthe individualnatureof theright, because,asexplainedabove
in PartII.B.1, thephrase"keeparms"commonlyreferredto individualsprivatèlypossessing
their private arms.

Thc history of the provisionreinforcesthis understandingof its text as securingan


individualright. TheprincipaldraftsmanwasJohnAdams,joined by his cousinSãmuel
Adamsandanotherindividual (247)As explainedabove,JohnAdamspublicly
acknowledgedthe individual right inheritedfrom Englandboth beforeandafter he wrote
the Declaration,andSamuelAdamsboth helpedleadtheBostontown-meetingthathad
urgedBostoniansto exercisethat indivídualright andpublicly defendedits resolutionon -
the authorityof theEnglishBill of RightsandBlackslsr.. (248)Much like Mason,Samuel
Adamsalsowould, during the ratification debate,urge that the Constitutionprotectthat
right, aswe explainbelow.

Thus,theright of individualEnglishsubjectswastransplanted to America.Americans


also,from their experience in theAmericanRevolution,cameto emphasizethecittzen
militia, whichtheyrecognizedwasfurtheredby the individualrightìo privatearms.But the
Englishright asAmericanscameto underst¿nd it wasnot, asa result,somehownewly
restrictedto a person'sservicein that militia, muchlessto servicein a selectmilitia. Nor did
earlyAmericansseethe right asa federalismprotection(which would not havemadesense
in the contextof stateconstitutions)or otherwisethe propertyof the stateratherthan its

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citizens.

C. The Developmentof the SecondAmendment

TheproposedConstitutionthat emergedfrom the ConstitutionalConventionin 1787did


not havea bill of rights,notwithstandinga lateeffortby Mason,joined by ElbridgeGerry,
to haveonedrawnup "rryiththe aid of the Statedeclarations.'(249) It did containa careful
compromise regardingthe militia. The federalGovernmentreceived,in Article I, Section8,
thepowersto call out the militia "to executethe Laws of the Union, suppressInsurrections,
andrepelInvasions,"to providefor "organizing,arming,anddisciplining"it, andto govern
anypart of it in the serviceof the federalGovernment(duringwhich the Presidentwould be
its commander-in-chief); Statesexpresslyretainedthe authorityto appointofficers andto
train the militia.{25Q

Proposedbills of rights emergedfrom the ratifiing conventionsof severalof the States.


Many of theseincludedprotectionfor the right to arms- usually in languageborrowedor
adaptedfrom the individual right to armsin the States'declarations of ãghts, and in any
gventalwaysin languageindicating an individual right. In thoseproposals,severalStaies
for the first time in a singleconstitutionalprovisionboth setout an in¿ivi¿ualright to arms
andpraisedthe citizen militia, uniting languagefrom the different statedeclaræions
discussed above.In addition,someAnti-Federalists, concernedaboutthe Constitution's
allocationof powersover the militia, soughtto protectthe ability of the Statesto maintain
effectivemilitias. They proposedto do so expressly,in amendments using languagesimilar
to that of Article I, Section8, andto be placedin thebodyof the Constitution,noiin a bill
of rights.l25lì

Yet it wasthe former proposalsthat laid the foundationfor the SecondAmendment.And


the latterproposalsfailed in the Federalist-controlledFirst Congress,which was,asmany
recognizedat thetime, willing to protectindividualrightsbut not to alterthe balanceof
power struckby the new Constitutionbetweenthe Statesandthe nascentfederal
GovernmentThus,the evidencepoints to anunderstanding of the Amendmentassecuring
the individual right to armsalreadywell establishedin America,ratherthan safeguarding
the ability of Statesto establishwell-regulatedmilitias,whetherthrougha "colleótiverignt"
of Statesor a quasi-collectiveright of militiamen.Ratherthan "lay down any novel
principlesof government,"the SecondAmendmentembodiedthe individual "guarant[ee]
and immunit[y]" to which Americanswere accustomed.{ZÐ

1. Recommendatíonsfromthe RøtíJicatíonof the Orígínøl

Although the right of individuals to havearmswasnot a subjectof much direct


discussionin the ratificationdebates,two majortopicsarerelevant.First,Anti-Federalists
objectedto theabsence of a bill of rights,oftenpointingto theEnglishBill of Rights(as
well asthe declarations of the States)asmodels.JZ5å TheFederalists'response likewise
recognizedtheEnglishprecedent,but soughtto distinguishit on variousgroundsor to argue
that manyrights,suchasthe EnglishBill of Rights'banon "cruel andunusual
punishments," or "the liberty of the press"(whichdevelopedafterthe Bill), weretoo
indefrniteto providedependable legalprotections.(254)

Second,Anti-Federalists
denounced
the militia powersto be grantedto the federal

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Governmentwarning that it would destroythe militia throughany numberof means- by


neglectingit, by creatinga selectmilitia andthenneglecting-thegeneralmiliti4 or
(somewhat inconsistenr!{Ðl by destroyingthemilitia throughonerousdisciplineand
excessivedeplo¡rmenlThe argumgltsfrom neglectrestedon tã" premisethat òongress's
powerof organizing,,arming, anddiscipliningthe militia wouldfôrecloseanysuch-State
power.If true, the militia might be left without any govemmentensuringits ärmingand
tai{ng, The argumentsalsowerepremisedon the ðommonunderstandingof the 'imilitia',
asthe citaenmilitia: The FederalFarmer,the leadingAnti-Federalistessalst, admonished
that "to preserveliberty,it is essentialthat thewholebody of thepeoplealiays possess
arms,andbe taughtalike, especiallywhenyoüg, how to usetheir,"ãnd patricli Henry,
leaderin the Virginia Ratiffing Convention,warned "The greatobjectis, that everymanbe
armed.. . . Whenthis po_w_er is givenup to Congresswithorit limita:tionoibounds, úow will
your militia be armed?'t (256) Anti-Federalists alsowarnedthat Congresswoulduseits
powerto establisha standingarmyto trampletaditional liberties,pãrticularlyafter it had
destroyedthe militia.J2f-) 1¡t Federalists'responseemphasizedthe sameunderstandingof
the citizenmilitia, askinghow the federalGovèrnmentcould tyrannizeovera populace
armedasAmerica'swas.Ø8) As alreadynotedin Part tl.D.2above,they alsoarguedthat,
in atty event,the Stateswould retaina concurrentpower over their militias, inchãing a
powerto arm16"-. (259)

Two separatecategoriesof proposedamendments resultedfrom thesefwo setsof


arguments.Proposedamendments to protectthe right to keepandbeararmsnot only were
phrasedasindividual rights (evenwhenaccompaniedby lanþage concerningthe *ititiu
andcivilian controlof themilitary) but alsoweredistinóttoñt pioposalsthafwould
safeguardstatepowersover the militia or restrainfederalpo*"i toireate a standingarmy.
(Resfüctionon standingarmieswould help ensurethat the new governmentmaintainedthe
militia, by ensuringthe govemment'sdependence on it.)

Pennsylvania's
Convention,the secondto meet,ratifiedthe Constitutionby a2to I
marginin December 1787, withoutproposingamendmenls.{2óQ A week latet,2l of the 23
9it:TFg delegates
published thetr
Addressând Reasons of Dissent("MinorítyReport',),
includingamendmentsthat they hadproposedbut the convêntionhadrefusedio coìsider. It
drewheavilyfroatle 1776Pennsylvania Declarationof Rights.The proposalregarding
armswasArticleT,.immediatelyfollorvingonestatingthat'the peoplèhâvea rigãt to tñe
freedomof speech,"andit readasfollows:

That the peoplehavea right to beararmsfor the defenceof themselvesand


their own Stateor the UnitedStates,or for thepurposeof killing game;andno
law shallbe pàSsed for disarrningthepeopleoiany of themuntãsi forôrimes
committed,orreal dangerof public injury from individuals;andasstanding
armiesin thetime of peacearedangerous to liberty,they oughtnot to be kãpt
up; andthat the military shallbe kept understrictsubordinationto, andbe
governedby the civil powers.J2éÐ

Article 8, immediatelyfollowing, protectedthe right to hunt on one'sprivatepropertyand


certainotherlands.12.62)

, SeparaÛely,the Minority sough!in Article I l, bothto restrictCongress's


Article I,
Section8, Clause16powersoverthemilitia andto protectstateauthúity over it, by

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providing'[t]hal thepowerof organizing,arminganddiscipliningthemilitia (themanner


of discipli-ringthe militia to be prescribedby Congress),remain,iitn tL individual
51¿¡e5.rr{2éÐ Theywamedthat,withoutthis resffiction,Congress's poweroverthe militia
couldplace"everyman,probablyfrom sixteento sixty years=of age'"underCongress's
powerandmilitary dis_cipline - particularly"our youngmen,. . . asa selectmilitia,
composed of them,will bestanswerthepurposesof góvemment"- andalsocouldleave
conscientious objectorscompelledto beararmsin the militia.l2@)As in pennsylvania's
1776declarationand constitution,a right to bear arïnswas distinctfrom bearingarmsin
service!o the government.Therewasno suggestionthat the individualright somehow
youl{ directly guardthe States'power, andthis separateproposalandcoãrmentindicate
thattheMinority believedthatit wouldnot.

The Massachusetts Conventionwasthe first to include with its ratification,in February


1788,a list of recommended amendments. The FederalistspreparedandhadJohnHancoõk
introducethe nine proposalsto woo marginalAnti-Federaüìts.SamuelAdams,while
rupportingHancock'slist, alsoled an effort to add severalrightsthatwould aryearin the
First, Second,and FourthAmendments,plus a ban on standiig armies"unlesi when
necessaryfor the defenceof theUnited States,or of someoneor moreof them." Regarding
arms,he proposedthat the Constitution"be neverconsfued to authorizeCongress. . . to
preventthe peopleof the United States,who arepeaceablecitizens,from keefing their own
arms."This languageindicatedthatthe "people"ionsistedof the "citizens,"who would so
long asthey were peaceable,individually keepprivate arms.Adams'sproposedadditions
werevoted down, andthe conventionthennarowly votedto rati$r *à to recommendthe
Federalists' 1¡s¡.f26Ð

Four monthslatel
-\.ew Hampshire'sConvention,alsocloselydivide{ adaptedsomeof
Adams'sproposals.f266)It recommended the nine amendments that Massachusetts had,but
addedthree:one calling for a supermajoritybeforeCongresscouldkeepup a standingarmy
in peacetime;the next 6a¡ringCãngressfróm making lavysregardingreligion or infrñging'
therightsof conscience; andthefinal oneprovidingthat "Coñgress-shall-never disarm-an!
Citizenunlesssuchasareor havebeenin Actual Rebellion."l2Ø\New Hampshirethus
becamethe first Statewhoseratising conventionas a body recommended that the
Constitutionprotecta right to arms.Again, the right belongedto the individual citizen.

Although New Hampshirehadprovidedthe crucial ninth Statefor the Constitutionto


takeeffect,-ێE)6" conventionof Virginia, occurringsimultaneouslyandconcludingfour
dayslater (on June-25,1788),hadparticularimportancgnot only beóause of the porJiUitity
thatVirginia would be the ninthStateto ratiff 6ut alsobecauseóf tn" Sbte'ssignìficance,'
the^prominencè of its leaders,andthe strengthof the Anti-Federalists,
led by patrick Henry.
GéÐTht conventiondid vote to ntify,but also recommendednumerous
amendments.
Writtenby a committeeof Mason,Henry,Madison,GeorgeWythe,andJohnMarshall,
twentywereproposedfor a separate bill of rights andtwentyfor the body of the
Constitution.Thosein the formercategoryamountedto the first full biil;f rightsproposed
by a stateconvention,andmostmadetheir way into the federalBill of Rig¡6.1220)

Theproposalregardingatmsappeared in the bill, immediatelyafterthe "right[s]" of "the


people"to assembleandpetitionandto speak,write, andpublish.It wasu synitr"iii ftom
the leadingstatedeclarations,
providing:

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That the peoplehlve a right to keepand beararms;that awell-regulated


militia, composedof thebodyof thepeoplefrainedto arms,is thJproper,
natural,and safedefenceof a f¡ee state;that standingarmies,in time ôf p"ur",
aredangerousto liberty, andthereforeoughtto be avoided,asfar asthe
circumstancesandprotectionof the communþ will admitj andtha! in all
' cases,the miliþpr shouldbe understrict subordinationto, andgovernedby, the
civil Power.(2'11)

Thetwo strandsevidentin the RevolutionaryEra - an individual right to armsandhigh


regardfor the citizenmilitia - werebroughttogether:Theproposal-combined an individual
lgh!-to-?rms provision suchasthosefrom the Pennsylvanìuan¿Massachusetts
Declarationswith the praiseof the militia from Virginia's.The "people,'would havea right
to keepandbeararms,anda well-regulated militiaõomposed"of tlè bodyof tbepeople;-
lhe people as an organized whole - would protect "a freôstate."This languagebeôamèthe
foundationfor the SecondAmendment.kr-addition,the combinationof ihe two clauses
indicat:s (a: tle differing first clausesof the analogousarticlesin the Virginia and
PennsylvaniaDeclarationshad doneseparately)thãt the individual right ind the well-
regulatedmilitia both wouldcontributeto the avoidanceof standingá-i.r andto civilian
rule.

Only in its separatelist of amendments for the body of the Constitutiondid the Virginia
conventiondirectly protectthepower of Statesto maintainmilitias andrestrict the fedãral
powerto raisestandingarmies.It recommendeda supermajorityvote for Congressto
qøintain a peacetimearmy (in the spirit of SamuelAdamsândihe New Hamf,shire
Convention),andit soughtto protectstatepower over the militia (much asthe pennsylvania
Minority had) with the following provision:

That eachsJalergsgectivelyshall havethe powerto providefor organizing,


arming,anddiscipliningits own militia, whensoeveiCongress shallomitór
neglectto providefor the same.(272)

Thesedistinct proposalsconfirm what is evidentfrom the declarationsincludedwith the


r ' proposalfor the
bill of rights:Theindividualright of thepeopleto keepandbeararmsdoes
not directly guardany polver of Statesto maintainmilitias. (Much lessdoesit guarantee
againstslandingarmies.)But it doesindírectly fi,rther thepòticy of having a wãil-regulated
militia of the body of the people,aswell asthat of rnitigatingthe needfor-an¿risk frãm a
standingarmy.

Th,çNew York Convention,votitig just over a monthafter Virginia's (andratiffing by


gnll ?9-n, foflowedVirginia'smodel.The separate declaration óf rignù includedUõtnan
individualright to keepandbeararms(immediatelyafterthe "right" oÌ,'th, people"to free
exerciseof religion)anddeclarations
regardingthemilitia andsándingarmies:

That the Pegnfehavea right to keepandbearArms; that awell regulated


Militia, includingthebodyof thePeoplecapableof bearingar*s, is the proper,
natural,andsafedefenceof a freeState.

That standingArmies in time of Peaceare dangerousto Liberty, and ought not

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to bekeptup, exceptin Casesof necessity;andthatat all times,the Military


to thecivil power.lU3)
shouldbe understrict Subordination

For thebodyof the Constitution,New York proposedlike New HampshireandVirginia,an


amendmentrequiringa supermajorityfor Congressto maintainu p"u""ti*e standinfarmy.
It did not proposeexpressprotectionof statepoweroverthe milítia.l4A

The forceof Virginia'sproposalsis evidentnot onþ in New Yorks borrowingbut alsoin


the first North CarolinaConvention.On Augustl, l7ti8, North CarolinabecamJtheonly
Stateto declineto ratiff intil the Constituúõnhadbeenamendedto include a bill of rights
(RhodeIslandhaddeclinedevento call a convention),andit proposedverbatimthe
amendments that Virginia had proposed- includingthe individuáttignt to keepandbear
armsandtheseparateproposals,for the body of the Constitution,griardingstite power ovbr
the militias andmandatingsupermajoritiesfor standingarmies.Nortn Caròlina'sactions
madethe momentumfor a bill of rights "virtually irresistible,"and,two monthsafter
Congressapprovedone,a new conventionratífied.(275)

Everyrecommendation in thesestateconventionsregardingthe right to armssoughtto


protectan individual right - not a "rightuto maintainwell-regulatedstatemilitias, wñether
belongingto the Statesor to thoseservingin suchentities(muchlessbelongingjust to those
servingin well-regulated selectmilitias).Virginia,New Yorþ andNorth Carolinaalso
appendeddeclaratoryclausesto the right suggestingthat it would benefit the citizenmilitia,
preservethe freedomof the state,andreducethe needfor or risk from a standingarmy.Buf
thoseStatesthat wantedto protect stateauthorityto maintainmilitias (Virginia ãn¿Närtn
Carolina)followed the lead of the PennsylvaniaMinority by proposing
-but sefarate
amendments doing so directly, intendednot for thebill of rights foi tnã UoAyof the
Constitution.Thus,regardingthe right to arms,thosewho tutin"¿ the Constitutiondid
nothingnovel,but ratherfollowed the path markedby the statedeclarationsandthe earlier
righ! from Englld. They proposedan individual right, not a "right" of St¿tesandnot a right
restrictedto their militiasor militiamen.As theFirsi Congress met, it had beforeit
numerousproposalsfor an individual right to armsanda few proposalsfor safeguarding
st¿temilitias by directly protectingstateauthority,but nonefor piotecting that a:uthoriÇ
througha collectiveor quasi-collective "rightuto arms.

2. TheDraftíng ønd Ratílìcatíon of the SecondAmendment.


'When
the First Congressconvenedin 1789,FederalistCongressman JamesMadison
movedquickly to win over marginalAnti-Federalistsby respondingto the calls for a bill of
rights. The Housesoonapprovedseventeenamendments. th. SenJtereducedtheseto
twelve, of which the statesratified the ten that form the Bill of Rights.

TheFederalists, victoriousin ratificationanddominantin Congress,openlyavoidedany


amendment thatwould materiallyalterthebalanceof powerwithlhe Statis oi otherwise
threatenlegitimatefederalpowers.Thus,the amendmènts that Congressapprovedwere
devotedalmostexclusivelyto protectingindividualrights.Of the cãtegoriãsof proposals
^to
discussed in theprevioussubpart,only the frst - the individualright oÍthe p"opl" keep
andbeararms- receivedapproval.The separate proposalsfor protectingstatepowerto
otgaize, discipline,andarm the militia andfor restrictingfedèralpowãr to mãintain
standingarmiesfailed.

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PresidentWashingtonsetthe stagein his inauguraladdress,urgrngCongressto consider


amendments out of "a reverencefor the characteristicrights of t.ã-ãn" bui "carefully
avoideveryalterationwhich might endangerthe benefitsof an united andeffective
(2161Madison
goverïrment.n reiteratedthis view in introducinghis proposalsin June17g9:

It will be a desirablething to extinguishfrom the bosomof everymemberof


the community,anyapprehensions that therearethoseamonghís countrymen
who wish to deprivethemof the liberty for which they valiañtly fought and
honorablybled.

I shouldbe unwilling to seea door openedfor a re-consideration of the whole


structureof the govemmen! for a re-considerationof the principlesandthe
substanceof
lhe powgrsgiven . . . . But I do wish to seea door õpenedto
consider,so far asto incorporatethoseprovisionsfor the securiÇof rights . . . .

I believethatthe greatmassof thepeoplewho opposed[the Constitution],


disliked it becauseit did not containeffectualprõvisiott ägainstencroachments
on particularrights, andthosesafeguardswhich they havãbeenlong
accustomedto haveinterposedbetweenthemandthe magistratewÈo exercised
the sovereignpower.l27Z)

M¿disonalsourgedp.gngre-ss to "expresslydeclarethe greatrights of mankind"andprovide


"thosesecuritiesfor liberty" demandedby North Caroliãaand RhodeIsland.In conftãst,he
wasconfidentthatthosewho opposedthe Constifution's"structure,"powers,or restrictions
on statepowerswerea muchsmallergroup.{zÐ Othercongressmen similarly hopedthat
suchan approachwouldwin overmanyof the disaffectedin variousg1¿1ss..(279)

Anti-Federalistleadersrecognizedthis focuson individual rights. RichardHenry Lee,


one of Virginia's first senators,reportedto PatrickHenry aboutã weekbeforeMadison's
speech"that manyof our amendments will not succeed,Uutmy hopesare strongthat such
(280)
T_'mll effectuallysecurecivil liberfy will notbe refused.rr SoonafterMadisonspoke,
Virginia's othersenator,IVilliam Grayson,wrote to Henry that Madíson'sproposals
"altogetherrespected personalliberty."128Ð

AmongMadison'sproposalswasthe foUowing,whichbecamethe SecondAmendment:

The right of thepeopleto keepandbeararmsshallnot be infringed;a well


armed,andwell regulatedmilitia beingthebestsecurityof a freã country:but
no personreligiouslyscrupulousof bearingarms,shallbe compelledto iender
military servicein perso¡.-(ZE?)

The first andsecondclausesresembledtheproposalsof the Virginia, New york, andNorth


Carolinaconventions,_including by makingthe connectionbetweenthe individualright and
the militia. The fi¡st clausestatedasthey had a right bothto keepandto beararms,which
belongedto "thepeople."Havingmadethis into a full sentence, Madisonmadethe second

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clause,which hadbeenfree-standingin the Virginia, New Yorþ andNorth Carolina


proposals,subordinateto the first. In shorteningthe secondclause,he omittedthe definition
of the militia, just asDelaware,Maryland,andNew Hampshirehaddonein their
declarations of rights.ÍZ8ÐHe alsoomittedthe conventions'disparagement of standing
armiesandadmonitionto civilian rule, andappended protectionfor õonscientiousobjðctors,
which the PennsylvaniaMinority, Virginia, uni Nottn Carolinahadseparatelyrequeited.
As the PennsylvaniaandVermontDeclarationshad shownevenbeforeratifiõation,there
\ryasno inconsistency in recognizingboth an individualright to "beararms"andan
individualexemptionfrom beingcompelledto "beararms"in military service.

ThatMadisonenvisionedthis proposed"right of thepeople"to securean individualright


is confirmedby thenotesfor his speech,in which he wrotethatthoseprovisions"relat[ing]
to whatmay be calleda bill of rights,"includingthis one,"relate. . . to private rights,'.12ß!)
by his usingin his speechthe samelanguageto discussboththerightsof Englishsubjects
andthosein his proposedbill;i¿-8-Ð andby the locationin thebodyof the Constitutionin
which he proposedto placetheseamendments. He recommended that the right to arms,
alongwith antecedents of the First, Third, Fourth,Eighth,Ninth, andportioñsof the Fifth
andSixthAmendments, be addedin Article I, Section9, immediatelyafterclauses-
protectingthreeotherindividual rights: the writ of habeasco{pusandthe prohibitions
againstexpostfoclo lawsandbills of attainder.{-23Q It is reasonableto assumethat
Madisonviewedthe additionalrightsaslikçwisebelongingto the individual.-0-8ä gu¿ 6"
insteadintendedto protectstatemilitias (whetherdirectly througha collectiveright or
indirectlythrougha quasi-collective right), a morereasonable lõcationwould havebeenin
or nearthe two clausesin Article I, SectionS,thatgrantedcongressional poweroverthe
militia, oneof which already"reserv[ed]to the States"certainpowersovèrthe militia. And
Madisonlikely would havedrawnfrom the separatelanguagethat Virginia andothershad
proposedfor just this purpose- but thoseproposalshadthepotentialto threatenthebalance
of powers,at leastby invitingdisputesoverwhetherthefederalGovemmenthad "neglect
[ed]" the militia.

Othersalsounderstood Madison'sproposalto securean individualright to keepandbear


arms.LeadingFederalistCongressman FisherAmeswrote:"Mr. Madisonhasintroduced
hislongexpectedAmendments....ItcontainsaBillofRights...[including]therightof
the peopleto bearur*r.rr (288)Ekewherehe wrote:"Therightsof conscience, of bearing
alms,of changingthegovernment, aredeclaredto be inherentin thepeopls."{239) Tench
Coxetook the sameview in hisRemarkson the FirstPart of theAmendments to the
FederalConstitution,publishedin the majorcities.Writing as"A Pennsylvanian" (a
pseudonymthat he hadusedduring the ratification debates),he explainedthe right that
Madison'sproposalprotectedasfollows:

Aq civil rulers,not havingtheir duty to thepeopleduly beforethem,may


attempttotyranrúze,andasthemilitary forceswhichmustbe occasionally
raisedto defendour country,might perverttheir powerto the injury of their
fellow citizens,thepeopleareconfirmedby the . . . articlein their right to keep
andbeartheir privatearms.l290l

Coxerecognuedthatthe "right" of "thepeople"belongedto the "citizens,"who couldboth


keepandbear"private"arms.He senthis Remarksto Madisonthe daythat theywere
published,andMadisonsix dayslaterreturnedthanksfor his "explanatorystrictures"and

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. ' .
the "co-operationof your pen,"notingfromNew York City thattheRemarþs"arealreadyI
find in the Gazettesþe¡s."-(29-Ð
NeitherMadisonnor, it appears,anyoneelsedisputed
Coxe'sinterpretaticlî.('292)
SamuelNasson,whohadbeenan Anti-Federalistdelegateto the
MassachusettsRati$ing Convention,describedtheright similarly in a lefterto a Federalist
Congressman from the Statea monthafterMadisonintroducedhis proposals:

I find that Ammendments¿Ireonceagainon the Carpet.I hopethat suchmay


takeplaceaswill be for theBestInterestof thewhoie[.]n din of rightsweti
securedthat_rye the peoplemay knowhow far we mayÞroceadein Èvery
Department[,] thentheir will beno DisputeBetweenthepeopleandrulersf.][] '
n thatmaybesecuredtheright to keeþarmsfor Commonan¿Exhaordin*y-
Occationssuchasto secureourselvesagainstthe wild Beastandalsoto amuse
us by fowling andfor our Defenceagainsta CommonEnemy[.][Y]ou knowto
learnthe Useof armsis all that canSaveus from a forighn foèinut touy
attemptto subdueus[,] for if we keepup theuse of armsandbecome
acquaintedwith themwe Shall allway be ableto look them in the facethat arise
uPagainstus[.]12L3)

Like Coxeandothers,Nassonunderstood"thepeople"asdistinctfrom thegovernment,


and
includedin "theright" of thepeopleprivateownershipandprivateusesof arms.

In lateJuly 1789,a committee,to whichhadbeenreferredboth Madison,sproposalsand


all amendments thatratiûing conventions
hadproposedissueda reviseddraft.It provided:

A well regulatedmilitia, composedof thebodyof thepeople,beingthebest


sepurityof a free state,the right of thepeopleto keepàndbeararmsshallnot
be infringed,but no personreligiouslyscrupulousshallbe compelledto bear
arms.-Q'9A\

TheCommitteehadleftunchangedthe text of Madison'sindependent clausestatingthe


right. But it hadinvertedthe first two clauses,
modifiedthe languageregardingtnJmititia to
returnit somewhatto whathadbeenproposedby someof the sâte conventions(including
by definingthemititia), andrevisedtheõonscientious-objector clause.

Thereis no reasonto supposethat the merereversalof order, or any of the other


changes,hadalteredthe right that Madison,andtheratiffing beforehim, had
se!9u!:Theoperativetext of the independent "oov"rtions
clausewasunóhanged from Madison'sdraft,
with themilitia clauseretainingits subordinaterelationship;Madisonhadservedon the
committee,whichdoesnot seemto havehadanyseriousdisagreements overcontent;f29-5)
andthe committeehadretainedMadison'sproposalthat this amendment,alongwith ihe rest
of the "Bill of Rights,"be placedamongthethreepre-existingindividuairighti in Article I,
Section9, albeitmovedforwardoneclause.{296\krtheensuingdebates,no memberof the
Housesuggestedthat any changein the right hadoccurred.Thõ Speakerof the House,from
Pennsylvania,wrote to a leadingfellow Federalistin the Statethai the committee's
proposals"takel ] in theprincipalAmendments which our Minorityhadso muchat heart";
theMinority had,asdiscussed above,proposedanindividualright to bearr-r..G9Ð ¡1¿
an articlein Boston,reprintedin Philadelphia,describedthe committe"'sproposalas
containing"[e]veryoneof' the amendments "introducedto the conventionof this
commonwealth by . . . SamuelAdams"(excepttherestrictionagainsta standingarmy),

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includingthat"the saidconstitutionbe neverconstrued. . . to preventthepeopleof the


UnitedStateswho arepeaceable citizens,from keepingtheir own arms.'t("298\
Clearly,the
committee'sproposedamendmenton arms,like Madison'sandlike Adams's,\üas
understoodto protectan individual right.

In floor debatethatbeganin mid-August,the focuswason the concludingexemptionfor


conscientious objectorsandthuson militia serviceratherthan"theright of thepeople"that
thecommittee's draft secured.Representative
Gerryof Massachuseffõ, who hadrefusedto
signthe Constitutionandwas a leadingAnti-Federalist,@ objectedthat this final clause
would enablethe federalGovernmentto "declarewho arethosereligiouslyscrupulous, and
preventthemfrom bearingarms."This,he warned,"togetherwith tÕongróss's] õther
powers,"woulde¡1þleCongressto "desftoythemilitia" andestablish"a'standingarmy,the
baneof liberty.rr(300)He movedto narrowtheclause,but aftera debate,including an effort
to deleteit, theHouseapprovedthe comrnittee's draft.Immediatelyafter,itresouãdingty
defeatedanotherAnti-Federalist'smotionto requirea supermajorityto authorizea standing
armYin Peacetime.-ß0-! )

It doesnot appearfrom the debatesthat anycongressman sharedGerry'sconcern,but, in


anyevent,his concernseemsmoreconsistent with a view thatthe amendment securedan
individual right thanwith the altemativeviews.Gerrypresumedthat the first two clauses-
praisingthewell-regulated militia andsettingout theright of the people- wouldnot suffice
to protectthe militia in the faceof affirmativefederalefforts to undermineit. The individual
right wasinadequateto do so.That understandingis consistentwith the individual-right
Yi"*, ?s$reexplainedabovein PartII.C. It alsowastheunderstanding, andconcern,
implicit in thedual recommendations of Virginia, North Carolina,andthe Pennsylvania
Minorrty, which soughtseparatelyto protectboth statemilitia powersandthe individual
right to arms.In addition,if the "right of thepeople. . . to beararms!'meantsomeright
restrictedto servingin an organizedmilitia, ratherthan a personalright, Gerry'sconõern
wouldnot havemadesense:PersonswhomCongressdeclaredreligiouslyscrupulous
pursuantto the proposedamendment, althoughthereforenot"competledto beararms"in
themilitia, still would,undera quasi-collective-right view of the otherclausesof the
amendment, have someright to do so,andthusCõngresscouldnot, asGerr)'charged,
"preventthem"from serving.

After moredebateoverthe conscientious-objector clauseon August 20,theHouseadded


back "in person"at the end andapprovedthe draft.l3O2)It att¿chedall of the amendmentsto
the endof the Constitutionratherthan incorporatingthem,but no substantivechangewas
intended.-003)the right of the peopleto keepandbearanns was the fifth of the seventeen
proposedamendments thatthe Housethénsentto the Senate.-ßOÐ

An Anti-Federalistwho during the ratificationdebateshad wriuen widely published


essaysas"Centinel"wasenragedenoughby theHouse'sfailureto restrictfedãral,and
protectstate,powerthat he took up his pen again,asCentinelRevived.@ He denounced
"the partial amendments makingby Congress"andlamentedthat, although"manyof these
amendments arevery properandnecessarl,yet.. . the constitutionis sufferedto retain
powersthat may not only defeattheir salutaryoperation,but may, and incontrovertiblywill
be so decisivelyinjuriousasto sweepawayeveryvestigeof liberty." He highlightedthe
SecondAmendmentfor criticism:

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It is remarkablethat this article only makesthe observation,"that a well


regulatedmilitia, composedof the bodyof thepeople,is thebestsecurityof a
free state;"it doesnot ordain,or constitutionallyprovidefor, the establiihment
of sucha one.The absolutecommandvestedby othersectionsin Congressover
the militia, arenot in the leastabridgedby this amendment.-Cai6)

Centinelunderstood the SecondAmendmentnot to constrainCongress's Article I, Section8


"absolutecommand"overthe militia or otherwisesecureanypowerof the Statesto
maintainone(whetherbycreatinga "right" of St¿tesor of the membersof their organized
militia units),andunderstoodthe Amendment'sprefaüorypraiseof the militia - a mere
"observation"- not to haveanyoperativeeffect.Thereasonable inferenceis thatheviewed
the "right of thepeopleto keepandbeararms"¿rsonebelongingto individuals.

The Senatereducedthe House'sproposedamendments to twelve in early September.


(30Сt so doing,it made
threechangesin what would becomethe SecondAmendment(1)'
deleting"composed of thebody of the people,"(2) replacing"thebest"with 'lnecessary to
the," and(3) deletingthe conscientious-objector clause.It alsovoteddown a motionto
insert "for the commondefense"immediatelyafter "to keepandbearAr-r."f3QÐ 1a.
Senated.eliberated in secre! and its minutesareconclusory,so it is difficult to discernthe
reasonsfor thesechanges. Onecouldarguethat someof them(deletionof the
conscientious-objector clauseandrejectionof the "commondefense"clause)tendto
supporttheindivjdual-rightview of the Amendment,althoughcontraryargumentsareno
doubtpossible.-C3oÐ Onealsocouldarguethatdeletionof thedefuritionof themilitia cuts
againstthe individual-rightview's readingof the prefatorylanguage,althoughthere,too, a
counter-argument is possib¡..-(3-L0i
Becauseof thelack of historicalrecordsandthemultþle
possibleexplanations,we arereluctantto attributeanymatedalsignificanceto these
actions.
'We
do,however,find it significantthatthe Senaterejecteda motionto adda separate
amendmentsecuringstatepower to organize,aÍm,anddisciplinethe militias if Congress
should"omit or neglect"to do so.-(3-l-ÐNotrvithstanding
thelack of historicalrecordsof the
r i deliberationson this motion,the broaderhistoricalcontextsuggeststhat, had Congress
soughtto securethe States'ability to maintainorganizedmilitia units, adoptingthis
provisionis how it wouldhavedoneso.It is hardto ascribethis voteto a view thatthe
proposedamendment wasredundantwith the right of thepeopleto keepandbeararms:Not
only arethetextsof thetwo provisionsmarkedlydifferent,but also,asèxplainedin the
previoussubpart,the Virginia andNorth CarolinaRatiffing Conventions(from which the
rejectedfanguage wasdirectlytaken)hadmadedistinctproposals,onecoveringthe right to
armsandthe othercoveringstatepower over the militia (the PennsylvaniaMinority also
had donethis). In addition,the Senatewas evenmoreFederalistthanthe House(Lee and
Graysonof Virginiabeingthe only Anti-Federalists amongthe22 senators).-(3-L2i.As
alreadynoted,the Federalístswere determinedto avoid amendments affecting the federal-
statebalanceof powerandinsteadto focuson individualrights.If senatorshadthoughtthat
what becamethe SecondAmendmenthadthe effectof thisrejectedprovision,onewould
haveexpectedthemto haverefusedto approveit aswell. Finally,the two Anti-Federalist
senatorsacknowledgedthat their efforts to obtainamendments áffectingthe federal-state
balancehadfailed.SenatorLee, like Centinel,complained,in a letterto PatrickHenry,that
the amendments wereinadequate for "securingthedueAuthorityof the g1¿1ss."(313J
SenatorsLee andGraysonjointly informedtheVirginia legislatureof their failure to secure

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the "RadicalAmendmentsproposedby the Convention .'-QLÐThus,the Senatecontinued


the House'sapproach- attempts to resffict congressional
powersor augmentstate
ryj:gturg
powers,while securingindividual rights in the hopeof creatinga nationalconsðnsusin
favor of the new Govemment.
i

On September24,l78g,a conference committeeagreedto somechangesin the Senate's


proposedamendments, but therewasno changein (or effort to change)th=eSenate'sversion
of whatbecamethe SecondAmendment.Congress,throughthe Pres-ident, thensentthe
twelveproposedamendmentsto the then-elevenStatesfoiratificatior, *d to North Carolina
andRhodeIsland (which still hadnot ratified the constitution).J3JÐThe recordsof the
stateratiSringconventionsaresparseanddo not appearto provideany significantmaterial
concerningthe meaningof the SecondAmendmentright.J3l0 The Statesapprovedten of
thetwelveproposedamendments, and,inMarch lTgz,Secretaryof StateJeäersonofficially
declaredthe Bill of Rightsratified.€Ð

The history in this subpartof the immediatedevelopmentof the SecondAmendment


levealsa right consistentwith, anddevelopedfrom, the individual right to armsthat had
beeninheritedfrom England,recognizedand invokedin revolutionaú America,and
codifiedto variousextgnlsin early statedeclarationsof rights. In addition,the early States
pnzeda well-regulatedcitizen militia, assomeof their deólarationsrecognized,and
understoodthe individual right to armsto facilit¿tesucha militia. The SðcondAmendment,
followingthe leadof severalof theratiffing conventions, reflectsthe contemporaneous
y9.gltun9ing of this relationship;in so doing,it grantstheright to "thepeopÎe,,'notto the
"Militia'l (muchlessto membersof selectmiiitia units¡,or toihe "State.,ìNor doesthe
F low supportfimiting the right securedby the Amendmentto any of theseentities.
Indeed,thosewho wantedto ensurethat the Statescouldhavefully ñrnctioningmilitias
p-roposed a separateamendment, expresslyprotectingstatepower.Theirproposalsfailed.
GlÐ Thus,the history of the Amendment,like its text, indicates
that the Second
Amendment's "right 9f thepeopleto keepandbearArms" is not collectiveor quasi-
collectivebut ratheris a personalright thatbelongsto individuals.

IV. The Early Interpretations

- Our analysisof the SecondAmendment'stext andhistory in the two precedingpartsof


this memorandumis supportedby the views of thosewho first interpretðdthe Amendment.
In the generationsimmediatelyfollowing its ratification,the threelêadingcommentatorsto
considerthe SecondAmendmenteachrecognizedthat its right of the peopteto keepand
beararmsbelongedto individuals,not to St¿tesandnotjust to membetsôf -ilitiuj
(yhethgrof organized,selectmilitia unitsor evenof thJ citizenmilitia).Nearlyall of the
discussionsof the antebellumcourts,includingin the leadingcases,understooâ theright in
the sameway, whethertheywereconsideringthe SecondAmendmentor similarprovìsions
in stateconstitutions.This early understanding
of a personalright continuedat leastthrough
Reconstruction. The modernaltemativeviewsof the SecondAmendmentdid not takeholã
until 1905,well over a centuryaftertheAmendmenthadbeenratified.

A. The First Commentators

In the first few decadesafter the SecondAmendmentwas draftedandratified, eachof


the threeleadingcommentators on the Constitutionaddressed
it St. GeorgeTucker,

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William Rawle,andJosephStory.Eachagreedthat it protectsan individualright. Less


prominentearly commentatorsalsoconcurredwith this interpretation.

Tucker,ajudge andlaw professorfrom Virginia,publishedin 1803an editionof


Blackstone'sCommentariesto which he had addedannotationsandessaysexplainingthe
relationof Americanlaw, including the new Constitution,to England's.Tucker'sBtickstone
quickly becamethe leadingAmericanauthorityon both BlackstoneandAmericanlaw.{Ð

Tuckbraddressedthe SecondAmendmentat severalpoints.He first did so,repeatedly,


in his intoductory lriew of the Constitutionof the Uníteã States.He tied tne fó¿eiatrighi'as
Blackstonehadthe English one,to the individual, naturalright of self-defenseandto ihe
freedomof the state.After quotingthe Amendment,he wrote:

This maybe considered asthefruepalladiumof liberty . . . . Theright of self


defenceis the first law of nature:in mostgovernmentsit hasbeenthe studyof
rulersto confine this right within thenarrowestlimits possible.Wherever
standingarmiesarekept up, andthe right of the peopleto keepandbeararms
is, underany colour or pretextwhatsoever,prohibited,liberty,if not already
annihilated,is on theb¡ink of destruction.l3Ð

He condemnedthe use of the gamelawsin Englandasa pretextto disarmordinarypeople-


the "farmer,or inferior ffadesman,
or otherpersonnot qualifiedto kill game."l3.2ÐAnd he
grolped the SecondAmendmentright with thoseof the First, confirmingthat all belonged
to individuals:

If, for example,a law be passedby congress,prohibiting the free exerciseof


religion,accordingto the dictates,or persuasiõns of a man'sown conscience; or
aþridgtngthe freedomof speech,or of the press;or the right of thepeopleto
assemble peaceably,or to keepandbearanns;it would, iã anyofthesecases,
be theprovinceof thejudiciaryto pronouncewhetherany suchactwere
constitutional,or not; andif no! to acquitthe accused. . . .ß22)

Second,in arurotating Blackstone'sdescription,in Book I, Chapter1,of the individual


Englishsubject'sright to haveanduseaüru¡for self-defense (discussed abovein PartIII.A),
Tuckerpraisedthe SecondAmendment"right of thepeople"for being"withoutany
qualificationasto their conditionor degree,asis the casein the British government"(under
England'sBill of Rights)andagaindenounced the gamelaws,by which "theright of
keepingarmsis effectuallytakenawayfrom thepeopleof England.'(323) Finally,in a note
to oneof Blackstone's (critical)discussions
of thegamelaws,Tuckeroncemoreattacked
thern,because"it seemsto be held"thatno onebut thevery rich has"anyright to keepa
gun in his house"or "keepa gunfor their defence,"theresultbeingthati'thewholenãtion
arecompletelydisarmed,andleft at themercyof the government,"and "the massof the
people"arekept "in a stateof themostabjectsubjection."By contrast,"üt Americawe may
reasonably hopethat the peoplewill neverceaseto regardthe right of keepingandbearing
armsasthe surestpledgeof their libety.""ßZL)

In all of thesediscussions,theright belongedto individuals- to personsavailing


themselves of thenafural,individu¿l"right of self defence,"to the'Lccused"r"rkiãg
judicial reviewof a violationof the SecondAmendment,andto "themass"of ordinãry

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peopleableto defendthemselves because protectedby the SecondAmendmentfrom class-


basedpretextsfor disarmament.Tuckerun-derstood Uótntne EnglishandAmericanrights to
armsto belongto individuals,andhe thoughtthe latter moresec-ure
andbroad-based.
Nowheredid Tuckersuggestthlt the of the peopleto keeBandbeararmsdepended
on a person'senrollmentandexercisein lght the citizenmilitia (muchiesshis mernbershþin an
organized,selectmilitia unit) or tha! it was a "rightu that beìongedto stategovernments.He
did elsewhere, in discussingthe Militia Clauses,-point out thatthe SecondAmendment
eliminated"all room for doubt,or uneasiness"on whetherthe federalGovemmentcould
prohibit States.fromsimgly providing armsfor their militias (doubthe rightly found
questionablegiven that the original Constitutionleft a concruïentarming-powerin the
States¡.J3-2J)
Tuckerdid not.suggestherethat he thoughttheAmendmenthad only this
effect,updhis otherdiscussionsconfirm that he díd nõt so understandit.

William Rawle.ofPennsylvania publishedhis Viewof the Constitutíonof the United


Statesof Americain 1825,with a secondeditionapp.*ing in 1829.After havingturned
downPresidentWashington'soffer to be the fust áttorneygeneral,he had servedin the
PennsylvaniaAssemblywhen it ratified the Bill of Rights.His commentary,like Tucker's,
gainedwide prom¡rn6. f3-2f)

_ Rawle¿nalyzed the SecondAmendmentin a chapterentitled"Of the Restrictionson the


loyerg o[Congregs . . . [,] Restrictionson the Powersof StatesandSecurityto the Rightsof
Indíviduals,"by whichhe meant,respectively,Article I, Section9; Article SectionI0;
ú
andthe first eight amendments of the Bill of Rig6r.l3Z) He startedlvith the Second
Amendmenfspreface,givrn-gto it, including the word "Militia," preciselythe senseand
significancethat emergesfrom our analysisabove,andmakingciearthaíthe substantive
right belongedto the ordinary citizen:

In the secondarticle,it is declared,that a well regulatedmilitia is necessqryto


thesecurityof
?free state;apropositionfrom which few will dissent.Although
in actualwar, the servicesof regulartroopsareconfessedly morevaluable;ye-t,
while peaceprevails,andin the commencement of a war beforea regularforce
t ) canbe raised,the militia form the palladiumof the counûy. . . . That they
shouldbe well regulated is judicióusþ added.. . . The duþ of the srate
governmentis, to adoptsuchregulationsaswill tendto makegood soldiers
with the leastintemrptionsof the ordinaryandusefulo.ropudãnsof civil life. .

The corollary,
-þm the fnst position,is, thattheright of thepeopleto keepand
bear armsshall not be infringed.

Theprohibitionis general.No clausein the Constitutioncouldby anyrule of


constructionbe conceivedto give to congressa powerto disarmihepeople.
Sucha flagitiousattemptcouldonly be madeunãersomegeneralpr"t"*" by u
statelegislature.But if in anyblind pursuitof inordinatepõwer, should
"ith"r
attemptit, this amendmentmay be appealedto asa restrainton 6oçr.13-2Ð

Both Rawle'slanguage- theAmendment's prohibition"is general"andprotectsthe armsof


"thepeople"- andhis view of the SecondAmendmentasapplyingto the Statesand
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collective.

Two additionalpoints furthershowthat Rawleviewedthe right asbelongingto


individuals.Like Tucker,he favorablycontrastedthe right ofthã peoplethat the Second
Amendmentsecuredwith the moreselectiveindividualïght in Unglandunderthe
aqllocraticgamelaws,includinga swnmaryof Blackstone's critiqùeof thoselaws.In
addition,he expresslyrecognized,ashadBlackstone,Tucker,anAlin varying degrees,the
PennsylvaniaMinority, SamuelAdams,andthe New HampshireRatiffing Convãntion,that
therightprovidedno warrantto breachthepeace,includingby incitingreãsonable fearof a
breach.J32Ð This recognitionindicatesan individual-rightview becausethereis no needfor
ordinarycriminal law to overseeeitherthe actionsof Sátesin regulatingtheir militias or
the bearingof armsby membersof a State'smilitia in connectionwith their serviceand
understateregulation.

Rawlefurther explainedthe individual-rightview's understandingof the Second


{lendment prefacewhen discussingthePresident'slimited powerto commandthe militia.
Althoughnot mentioningthe Amendmentexpressl¡ he noteà:"In a peoplepermittedand
accusúomed to beararms,we havethe rudimentsof a militia, which ptoprrti consistsof
armedcitizens,divided into military bands,andinstructedat leastin part in the useof arms
for the purposessf v¿¡.n (330)Thus,the "people"of the country,asindividuals,keepand
beararmsfor private purposes;they alsoform the militia; andihe former facilitatesthe
l_atter,
but only asa rudiment.That is why the individual right is a "corollary" from the need
for a militia.

The sameview appearsin the influential 1833Commentaríes on the Constitutionof the


UnitedStatesof SupremeCourtJusticeandlaw professorJosephStory,aswell asin his
latet Familiar Expositíonof theConstitution.Thè Commentarl"t upp"uredfirst in a three-
volumesetandthen, a few monthslater,in a one-volumeabridgementbyStory (the
"Abr idgementr').{3-3Ð

Storydevoteda chapterof hisAbridgementto the Bill of Rights.Beforeturningto its


provisions,he recountedthe debateover whetherto addoneanã identified ,"u.rufp.,rpor"r,
-
all relatedto individ¡al rights: (l) to preventpowersgrantedto the governmentaom Ueing
exercisedin a wfY "dangerousto the people";(2) aspartof "the munimentsof freemen,
showingtheir title to protection,"to ensureagainstan "extravagantor undueextentionof'
powersgranted;and (3) to protectminorities.lËÐ He then singledout thoseamendments
that did not relateto judicial procedure(the First, Second,Thirã, Fourth,Eightb, Ninth, and
Tenth)asthoseaddressing"subjectsproperlybelongingto a bill of rights."133Ð

lvith regardto the SecondAmendment,he first explainedthe importanceof the militia


for "a freecount¡r," includingasa checkon "domestiõusurpations of power,"andthe
hazards"for a fre_e people"of keepingup "largemilitary estãbfishmentìand itunait g armies
in lime of peace."He nTheright of the citizensto kleep,
linkedthesepoliciesto theright:
andbeararmshasjustly beenconsidered, asthepalladiumof the libertiesof a republic;
sinceit offersa strongmoralcheckagainstthe usurpationandarbitrarypowerof rulers;and
will generally,evenif thesearesuccessful in the fnst instance,enableihepeopleto resíst
andtriumphoverth"-.rr (334)In theunabridgedversion,he citedTucker,Rawle,andthe
Ï9yt" of Representatives' first dayof debateon theAmendmentin supportof this sentence.
É35)

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By paraphrasingthe 'right of thepeople"asthe "right of the citizens"- not of St¿tesor


membersof their militias - aswell asby citing Tucker-andRawle'sdiscussions(including
borrowingfrom Tucker's"palladium"language),Story left no doubtthat he consideredthe
right to belongto individuals.He reinforcedthi¡ poini in an additionalparagraphin the
unabridged version,citing bothBlackstone's discussionof the "similarþrovisiõn"in
England- clearlyan individualright, asexplainedabove- andTucker'Jdiscussion of what
Storycalledthe
]'{efelsive privilegr" 1¡"r".{33é)In his Familiar Exposítion,Storybegan
his discussionof the Amendmentwith anevenmoreexplicit statemãnt: "Oneof the
9{inary modes,by which tyrantsaccomplishtheir purposeswithoutresistance, is, by
disarmingthe people,andmakingit an ohenceto kèeparms,andby substitutingu t lu,
armyin the steadof a resortto ther¡iti1i¿.n(337)

Thu-.Story,like Tucker,Rawle,andothers,recognizedthat the right that the Second


Amendmentsecuredwas an individual one.He also saw,asthey hadlthat this personal
right wasnecessary for ensuringa well-regulated militia of thepeoplã.But he úkewise
recognized,consistentwith the individual-rightview, that suchä riþt wasnot sufficient for
ensuringsuchan entity,wonderinghow it would be "practicableto-keepthe peopleduly
armedwithout someorganization,"andlamentingthe declineof mititia discipline.$3Ð

LessprominentcommentatorssharedTucker,Rawle,and Story'sview of the Second


Amendmentassecuringan individual right. Most significant ofthese wasprobablyHenry
Tucker(sonof St. George).In an l83l commentary, he explained:

The right of bearingatms- which with us is not limited andrestrainedby an


arbitrarysystemof gamelaws asin England;but is practically enjoyedby
every citizen,and is amonghis mostvaluableprivilèges,sinceit fumishesthe
meansof resistingasa freemanought,the inroadsof usurpation.{33Ð

He alsonotedthatthe right inheritedfrom Englandandexpounded by Blackstone"is


securedwith us by" the SecondAmendment.(34o)And JonathanElliot, in his recordof the
ratificationdebatesfirst publishedin the 1830's,providedan indexof the Constitutionthat,
underthe heading"Rightsof the citizendeclaredto be," listed eachof the rights of the first
nine amendmentsof the Bill of Rights,including "To keepandbeararms.uð4ÐHe grouped
the right securedby the SecondAmendmentwiih tne unquestionablyindividual rignJts
securedby its neighbors.Therewasno entry in the inderfor the miiitia or its members,
asidefrom referenceto the congressional powersin Article I, SectionB,andnoneof his
entriesregardingthe Statesincludedreferenceto the militia or the SecondAmendment.
ß42) theseearlycommentators wereall consistent'inrecognizingthattheSecond
Amendmentsecuresan individual right. They did not evenm"nliott põssiblealternative
views,whetherinvolving a collectiveor a quasi-collective"right."

B. The First Cases

Like the commentators,the early caselaw alsotreatedthe SecondAmendmentas


securinga right of individuals,not a right of govenrments or thosein its service.Without
takinganypositionon the correcüress of the courts'holdingsor the constitutionality,
- under
the SecondAmendment, anyparticularlimitationson owning, carrying,orusing
_of
firearms,we find it significantthatthesedecisionsconsistentlyînAeritoõáthe rigÈ'tto be an
individualone-The earliestcases,althoughnot numerous,consistentlyrecognizJdthat the

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right to "bear"armsbelongedto individuals,just asthe right to "keep"them did. Judicial


treatmentbecamemorecommonbeginningin the 1840's,mostlybecauseof new
prohibitionson carryingweaponsconcealed.The courtsupheldtheseprohibitions(some
courtsappþing the SecondAmendmentand someapplylngsimilar stateprovisions),but in
godoingtheyall recognizedan individualright to arms:All of thedecisionsrecognizedan
individual right to keepprivate arrns;nearly all, includingthe leadingcases,recognizeda
right of individualsto "bear"thosearmsfor privatepurposes; andalf recognizediome
mannerof individual right to bearthem.Most notably,the SupremeCourLof Georgiatwice
unanimouslyruled in favor of individuals on the basisof the SecondAmendment.

l. CøsesBeþre 1840.

The first of theearlycasesís Houstonv. Moore,in 1820.The SupremeCourt,in


upholdingPennsylvania's power to try a militiaman for failing to reportfor federalservice
in the War of 1812,recognizedthatStateshadconcurrentpowerto regulatetheir militiasat
leastwhenthe militiaswerein the serviceof their Stateor in the absenceof congressional
regulation.Yet it did not mentionthe SecondAmendment.JusticeStory,in dissènt,also
recognizedthe concurrentpower,andhe notedthat the SecondAmendmentwasprobably
irrelevantto thequestion.J34Ð As we explainedabovein ParttrI.C.l, the Anti-Federalists
who claimedto fear that the federalmilitia powerswould not allow a concurrentstate
jurisdiction did not rely on the proposalsfor a right to armsto resolvetheir concern,but
ratherproposedseparateamendments(which failed to pass).It appearsthat the Court in
Houslonsimilarly recognizedthat the SecondAmendmentdid not guardstatepower to
maintainmilitias,whetherby creatinga collectiveright of Statesoia quasi-coilective right
of militiamen to vindicatestatepower. Otherwise,onewould expectthe Court to have
discussedit. Thus,Houston,althoughfar from conclusive,lendssomesupportto an
individual-rightview.

Secondin Blíssv. Commonwealth (1822),in what appearsto be the flrstjudicial


interpretationof the right to beararmsin America, a dividedhighestcourt of Kentucky
appliedthat State'sconstitutionalprotectionof "theright of the citizensto beararmsin
defenseof themselves andthe state,"first adopted:rr,
l792,to void a banon wearingcertain
weaponsconcealed.l34 The St¿tehad arguedthat the banmerelyrestrictedthe mannerof
exercisingthe right. The court, althoughnot citing authority,gavetwo primary reasonsfor
rejectingthis argument:(l) theright in 1792includedcarryingweaponsconcealed,and(2)
to recognizethis oneexceptionwould leaveno principledbasisto rejectothers,eviscerating
the right.(345)Thecourt'sspecificholdingwasrejectedthereafter- by courts-OlOandby
the peopleof Kentucþ, who in their 1850constitutionaddeda clauseallowinglawsto
preventcarryingconcealedarms.f3iz) But the holding wasrejectednot on the groundthat it
improperlyrecognizeda right of individuals to "beararms"(Kentucþ's provision remained
otherwiseunchanged),but ratheron the groundthat .Bft'sserredin determiningthe right's
scope.ThusB/rs confirmsthe individual natureof the right.

Third, severalearly referencesto the right or to "bearingarrns"indicatethat courts


viewed the right asan individual one,or at leastthat an individual carrying \ileaponsandnot
in militia servicecouldbe saidto "beararms."A Virginia appellatecourt in 1,824,
discussingthat State'srestrictionson the rightsof freeblacks- "manyof which are
inconsistentwith the letterandspirit of the Constitution,bothof this Stateand of the United
States"- citedtherestriction"upontheir right to bears¡5.u134QThutthe restriction

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involvedtheir rights asindividuals is evidentfrom Tucker'ssunmary of the Virginia laws.


Ga9)¡o an 1829libel cas-e, the SupremeCourt of Michigan(thena territory) drew a parallel
betweenthe freedoms-of speechandpressandtherigniof tÈepeoplelrcbi¿ararms to
explainthat individual rights arenot unlimited: "The-constitutiãnäf tn. United Statesalso
grantsto the citizenthe right to keepandbeararms.But the grantof this privilege
cannotbe
construedinto theright in him who keepsa gunto destroyhis neighbor."(350)And in ajury
instructionwhile riding circuit in 1833,in uõ*. unrelateäto the ñrilitiu, U.S. Supreme
CourtJusticeBaldwinincludedthe Amendmentin a list of potentiallyrétevantindividual
right5.(35t1

Lastof theearliestcasesis the 1833decisionof the SupremeCourtof Tennessee in


simpsonv. $¡a¡s.ß52)The-question wasthr validity of a boilerplateindictmentallegingthat
the defendanthadappearedin a "public streetandúighway. . .-anayedin a warlike
manner"andthen "üothe greatteåor and disturbance"of díversgood citizens. . . an aftay
. . . against the peaceand dignity of the ,¡u1..n(353)
9id **. The court held the indictment
invalidbecause it allegedneitherfighting(anelementof "affray")nor urryoth., actlikely to
havecausedpublic terror and indictableat commonlaw. The cóurt reachÉdthis conclusion
F , UVconsideringthecommon law, particularlyassetout by Blaclcstone.But because
therewas someuncertaintyregardingthe commonlaw, the court alsorelied on the 1796
Tennessee Constitution,which provided uthatthe freemenof this statehavea right to keep
andto beararmsfor their commondefs¡çe.u(354)This right eliminatedany doubtwhether
melely appgaringin public armedcould create"terror" uridthr'rsbe criminãl:
"By this clause
of lhe constitution,an expresspower is given andsecuredto all the free citizensof the state
to keepandbearannsfor their defence,without anyqualificationwhateverasto their kind
o. nu1ut".u(355)Thecourt,recognuedthatindividualscould,'beararms,,for private
purposes,just astheycould "keeo"them,andincludedselÊdefense within "theircommon
defence'"Thus,in the fnst four decadesafter the Founding,the courtswere consistentin
recognizingthat the right to keep andbear arms\ryasa rigÈi of individuals, allowing both
the keepingof privatearmsand the bearingof themfor
frivate purposes.
2. Casesfrom 1840to the Cívíl lllar.

The leadingcasefrom the antebellumperiodon theright to beararms,andthe fnst


majordecision,wasStatev. Reídin 1840.TheSupremrðourt of Alabamaunanimously
upheldthe State's on carrying gunsor knivessecretly,finding no violation of íne
""* !T
provisionin the State's 1819constitutionthat "[e]verycitizenúasa rig'ntto beararms,in
defenceof himselfandthe State."f3å6) In so doing,thecourtrecognizedthattheprovisions
right to "beararms"wasa right of an individual,who couldbeartúemto facilitatehis self-
defense.The court first lookedto the origins of the right in the "provisionsin favor of the
fibery of tlt subject"in the EnglishDeclarationof Rìghts.Quoiingthe right of subjectsro
havearmsfor their defense,the court explained:"Theãvil *Èi"h ùas inteädedto be
remediedby theprovisionquoted was a denialof theright of Protestants to havearmsfor
their defence,andnot an inhibition to wea¡themsecretly."-13tt,

The courtthenadoptedthe State'sfactualargumentthatcarryingweaponsconcealeddid


not facilitateself-defense
but ratherservedthepurposeof aggressiõnunábreachingthe
peace.The courtelaborated in explainingthe limits of the Siãte'spower to enad lafs
regulating"themannerin which armsshallbebome',:

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A statutewhich"underthe pretenceof regulating,amountsto a destructionof


theright, or which requiresarmsto be so borneasto renderthem wholly
uselessfor thepurposeof defence,wouldbe clearlyunconstitutional. But a law
which is intendedmerely to promotepersonalsecurity,andto put down lawless
aggression andviolence,andto that endinhibitsthewearingof certain
weapons,in sucha mannerasis calculatedto exertan unhappyinfluenceupon
the moral feelingsof the wearer,by makinghim lessregardful of the personal
securityof others,doesnot comein collisionwith the constitution.JSSÐ-

The court thusrejected^B/¿ss's holding: "[The constitution]authorizeshim to bearthemfor


the purposesof defendinghimself andthe State,andit is only when carriedopenly,that
theycanbe efficientþ usedfor defence.u (359)
If theneedfor defensewereimmediate,
"therecanbe no necessityfor concealin!theweapon,"andif it werenot immediate,there
werelegalprocessesfor securingprotection.If a defendantcould prove that it was
"indispensableto the right of defence"for him to concealhis weapon,the court might
construethe statutenot to apply, but Mr. Reid hadnot doneso.{@

Eighteenyearslater, the samecourt in Owenv. StatereaffirmedRetd nrecognizingthe


constitutionality
of a similar statute(the legislature,
perhapspromptedby Reid,hadadde¿
an exceptionfor thosethreatenedwith or reasonablyfearingattack).In so doing,the court
madeexplicit what hadbeenimplicittn Reid - that "carries"in the statute"tryasusedasthe
synonymo¡'6"*r."'-(3éÐ

SoonafterReid,theSupremeCourtof Georgia, in Nunnv. State,reliedon Reid,aswell


as Bliss,in unanimouslyreversinga conviction for openlycarrying a pistol. The court
appliedthe SecondAmendmen! holding "that so far asthe act . . . seeksto suppressthe
practiceof carryingcertainweaponssecretly,.. . it is valid, inasmuchasit doesnot deprive
the citizenof his natural right of self-defence,or of his constitutionalright to keepanôbear
arms.But that so much of it, ascontainsa prohibitionagainstbearing armsopenly,is in
conflict with the Constitution,and ,o¡¿."(3ÉAAs hadReid,Nunn looked for guidanceto the
right to haveandusearmsin England.The court viewedthat right, the right of the Second
( l
Amendment,andthe rights protectedby the States'constitutionsas all securinga personal
right of individuals: "When, I would aslqdid any legislativebody in the Union havethe
right to denyto its citizensthe privilege of keepingandbearingarmsin defenceof
themselvesandtheir country?"Likewise, "the Constitutionof the United States,in
declaringthat the right of the peopleto keepandbeararms,shouldnot be infringed,only
reiterateda truth announceda centurybefore,in theactof 1689."(363)This "right of the
people"wasjust as"comprehens_iy.e" and"valuable"asthosein the First, Fourth,Fifth, and
Sixth Amend¡¡en1s. f3f 4)

Like RawleandStory,theNunncourtrecognizedtheharmony betweenthe Second


Amendment's individualright andits preface:"[O]ur Constitutionassignsasa reasonwhy
this right shall not be interferedwith or in anymannerabridged,that the free enjoymentof
it will prepareandqualiSra well-regulatedmilitia, which arenecessaryto the securityof a
freeState-"More broadly:

Theright of the wholepeople,old andyomg, men,womenandboys,andnot


militia only, to keepandbeararmsof everydescription,andnot suchmerelyas
areusedby the militia, shallnot be infringed,curtailed,or brokenin upon,in

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the smallestdegree;andall this for the importantendto be att¿ined:therearing


up andqualifigg a well-regulated militia, so vitally necessary
to the securityõf
a free51¿¡s.-(-3-6-Ð'

Thepreface's referenceto the militia as"necessaryto the securityof a freeState"reinforced


this understanding and helpedconvincethe court that the Amendmentalsorestrictedthe
States:"If a well-regulatedmilitia is necessary
to thesecurifitof the Stateof Georgiaandof
the United States,is it competentfor the GeneralAssemblyio take awaythis rc,ráty, Uy
disarmingt_he people?"The right lay"atthe bottomof everyfree government," stateor
federal.(366)As hadRawle,the courtin Nunn,by concludingthat theAmendment
restrìctedthepoïversof the States,confimredits view that the Amendmentdid not protect
the powersof the Statesbut ratherprotectedthe rights of their individual citizens.

Fifteenyearslater,the samecourtreportedthatNunnhad "beenconstantlyadheredto,"


andunanimouslyappliedit to reverseajury instructionthat, for a weaponto-becarried
openly,it had tobe entíreþ uncovered.Because suchcarryingwas "impossible,"suchan
interpretation"would . . . prohibit the bearingof thosearmsaltogel¡.t.,f3fz)

The LouisianaSupremeCourt took the sameview of the SecondAmendmenrasan


individual right in a seriesof casesin the 1850's.In Statev. Chandler,a murderdefendant
had soughtan ínstructionthat carryingweapons"either concealedor openly" couldnot be a
crime consistentwith the Constitr¡tion.The court affirmed the denial oithiinstruction. Like
ReidandNunn,the court sawno facinllink betweencarryingweaponsconcealed andselÊ
defense.But alsolike them,it viewedopencarryingof armsãifferènUy:"This is theríght
guaranteed by the Constitutionof the United States,andwhich is calcuiatedto incite ménto
a manlyandnobledefenceof themselves, if necessary,andof their counûl¡."{16Å)Six years
later,the court uphelda conviction for carryíngaconcealedweapon,finding no Second
Amendmentviolation because"[t]he armstherespokenof are suchasarebómeby a people
in war, or at leastcarriedopenly."J3éÐAnd two yearsafter that, the samecourt cited these
decisionsin upholdinganothersuchconviction,againtreatingthe right asbelongingto
individualsandunderstanding"carqf" to be synonymouswith "bearl "The statutein
question. . . . is a measureof policeprohibiting only a particular modeof bearingarms
l r
which is founddangerous to thepeaceof society.n(370)

Two otherstate-courtcasesof this later antebellumperiod merit specialmention.The


fnst andmoresignificant is Aymettev. State,lSlÐthe second, Statev. Buzzard.-ß7z)kr
both, the court'sholding wasunrema¡kable- that banson carrying weaponsconcealedwere
constitutional.But the courtsirationales
werenovel.While stiil reiognizngaright to keep
andto beararmsthatbelongedto individuals,thesedecisionssharplyrestrictedthe
purposesfor which armscouldbeborne.UnlikeReid andNunn,neithercasewasciteduntil
severalyearsafter the Civil IVar (andthenusuallyjust for their holdings),batAynette
acquiredsomeprominencethereafter,and,Buzzardis notablefor onejudge'sseparate
opinionsomewhatforeshadowing thecollective-andquasi-collective-right views.

In Aymette,the Tennessee SupremeCourtappliedthat State's1834Constitution,which


provided"that the free white menof this Statehavea right to keep andbeararmsfor their
coÍrmondefence."(The only differencefrom theprovisiondiscussedin Simpsonwasthe
changeof "freemen"to "freewhite-"o."13JС In upholdingthe defendant's convictionfor
carryinga concealedbowieknife, thecourtlimitedthe stateright to "beararms"to actions

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done"by thepeoplein a bodyfor their commondefense.uۧ)So*. havereliedon


Aymette'sreasoningin arguingagainstthe individual-right view of the SecondAmendment.
TheNinth Circuit tn Silveira,for example,overlookingã[ of the antebellumcases
discussed above,describedAynetteas"themostsignificantjudicialdecisionto consfuethe
term'beararms"'a{_T concludingthatthephrase"referredtothe performance of a
milítâryfr¡1ç1isn.rr-ßZÐ
Sifueiraparticularlyreliedon Aynette'sstatement that "'[a] manin
pursuitof deer,elk andbuffaloesmight carryhis rifle everyday for forty years,andyet it
wouldneverbe saidof him thathe hadborner-r.rrr (376)Fairly read,however,Aymette
doesnot contravenean individual-rightview of the secondAmendment.

First evenassumingfor the sakeof argumentthatAymettereadthe Tennessee


Constitutionnot to secureany individual right to bear Írms, the decisionhastwo distinctive
feafuresthatundermineits relevanceto the SecondAmendment.Aymette,sanalysis rested
heavilyon the phrase"for their commondefence"in theTennesseé provision,which is
absentfrom the SecondAmendment.Thephrasepervadesthe courtL brief analysis.The
courtdefined"common" andevendescribedthe right to armsin the Englishniíl of Rights
asif it included16"*ot¿. (377)Thecourtalsoreliedon a conscientious-objector clausethat
appearedelsewherein the stateconstitution,citing it at the endof its opinion, in criticizing
Bliss,tomake"the casestill moret1.ut.w(378)Yct no conscientious-objector clauseappears
in the SecondAmendmentor eventhe Constitut¡on.J3?Ð

Second,andmore rmportantþ,Aymettedoesnot rejectan individual right eitherto keep


^
orto beararms,eventhoughit rnayexcludeindividuai self-defensefrom ihe meaningof
"bear."The courtwasunequivocalon "keep":"The citizenshavethe unqualifredrigÈtto
keeptheweapon,"so long asit is a protectedn"r-.rr (.380) It did describe"bear,,aslimited to
"military use,"J38l)but by that appearsstill to havecontemplateda right that belongedto
individualsratherthan to the St¿teor thoseengagedin its service.{38z)The court did not
mentionthe militia. Rather,the "military" bearingthat it appearsto havehad in mind was
thepeople,in an extremecaseof govemmentaltyranny,independentlybearingarmsaf¡a
body to checkthe government.The court confinedubearuto the mostiadical ol
emergencies. Thus,it providedthe following accountof the EnglishRevolutionof 1688-
1689:

[I]f the peoplehadretainedtheirarms,theywould havebeenable,by a just and


properresistanceto thoseoppressivemeasures,eitherto havecausedthe king
to respecttheir rights, or sutrender(ashe was eventuallycompelledto do) the
governmentinto otherhands.No private defencewascontemplated,or would
haveavailedanything.. . . [The right in the English Declaratiõnme-arns]
that
they may as a body rise up to defendtheirjust rights, andcompeltheir rulers to
respectthe laws. . . . The complaintwas againstthe government.The
gnevancesto which they werethusforcedto submit were for the mostpart of a
public character,andcouldhavebeenredressed only by thepeoplerising up for
their commondefence,to vindicatetheir rights.l383)

The court also wrote that the people"may keeparmsto protectthe public liberty, to keepin
awethosein power,andto mainøinthesupremacyof the lawsandthe constitution."
Citizensneedto be prepared"to repelany encroachments upon their rights by thosein
authority,"and the right "ís a greatpoliticalright. It respectithe citizens,ott ihe onehand

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andtherulerson the s1¡e¡.u{384)

Subsequent treatmentby the samecourt confirms thatAymette,despiteits narrow


readingof "bear,"still recognizedan individualnght.In Andrewsv. Siate,a prominentcase
afterthe Civil War, the Tennessee SupremeCourt interpretedthe right of the "citizensof
this State. . . to keepandbeararmsfor their commondèfense"undérthe State's1870
constitution.It was not until afterAndrewsthat Aymette,previouslyuncited,acquiredany
prominence.(385)The new constitutionhad addedan exceptiongrantingto "the
Legislature..-. .-Powerby law, to regulatethe wearingof arms,with a view to prevent
crime," *F:lt had beenpromptedby an enduringdisputebetweenpartisansoî Aynette and
Simpson.ffi) The statuteat issueprohibitedany publicor privatecarryingof ,,adirk,
swordcane, Spanishstiletto,belt or pocketpistol or revolver.rr(387)Noffiithstandingthe
addedconstitutionalclauseandthe arguableimplicationsof Aymette,the court held it
unconstitutíonalasappliedto certain¡sy6lye¡s.J38Ð

In reachingthis holding, the courtwent far to assimilateAymetteto thereasoningof Reíd


andNunn,evenwhile technicallyretainingAymette'sview of "be*."{38Ð It did so in three

\ryays. First,it expresslyreaffrmed thatatleasttheright to "keep"belongedto individuals:
The 'right to beararmsfor the commondefense. . . may well bè held to be a political right,
or for protectionandmaintenanceof suchrights, intendedto be guaranteed; bit the righlto
keepthem,with all that is implied fairly asan incident to this right, is aprívate índiviãuat
right, guaranteedto the cìtizen,not thesoldier." (.390)
The court added,relying on Story,
that it is "to be exercisedandenjoyedby the citizenassuch,andnot by ntm ai a soldier,or
in defensesolelyof his politicalrights..-ê9Ð

SecondAndrewsread"keep"expansivelyto includebroad"incidentaluse,"
emphasizingthat the goal of the right wasto ensurethat "the citizensmakingup the
yeomanryof the land,thebody of themilitia," wouldbe preparedwhenneeded.Thus:

The right to keeparms,necessarilyinvolvesthe right to purchasethem,to keep


. them in a stateof effrciencyfor use,and to purchaseandprovide ammunition
suitablefor sucharms,andto keepthem in repair.And clearly for this purpose,
a manwould havethe right to carry them to andfrom his home,andno one
could claim that the Legislaturehadthe right to punishhim for it, without
violatingthis clauseofihe Constitution.

But fartherthan this, it must be held,that the right to keeparmsinvolves,necessaril¡ the


right to use'sucharmsfor all the ordinarypurposes,andin all the ordinarymodesuiual in
the country,and to which armsareadapted,limited by the dutiesof a good cítaenin times
ofpeace.

Becausecitizensneededto be ableto "becomefamiliarwith" theuseof arms"in timesof


peace,that they may the moreeffrcientlyusethem in timesof war, . . . the right to keep
armsfor this purposeinvolvestheright to practicetheir use."(392)Usefor "ordinary
purposes"includeda mantakinghis gun "from his roominto the sheetto shoota rabid dog
that threatenedhis child"-(39Ðandusingthemon one'spropertyin lawful self-defense.-ß94).
Suchreasoningis in largemeasurethe sameasthat takenby the traditionalindividual-right
view in explainingthe relationbetweenthe SecondAmendmenfsprefaceand operative

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text.

Third,consistentlywith its readingof "keep,"thecourtalsobroadened ,,arms."Aymette


haddefrnedthe word to includeonly sucharms"asareusuallyemployedin civilized
warfare,andthat constitutethe ordinarymilitary equipment.rr(395)Andrewsexplainedit as
follows:"[T]he ideaof the Constitutionis, theteepin! anduseof sucharmsaJareuseful
eitherin warfare,or in preparingthe citaenfor their usein warfare,by training him asa
cltizen,totheir usein timesof per..."f3i6) Thecourttookjudicial notice"thattherifle of
all descriptions,the shotgun,the musket,andrepeater,aresoch¿¡6s.r{397)

Thus,settingasideanydistinctionsbasedon thespecificlanguageof Tennessee,s


Constitution,the consequence of Aymette,takentogeiher withAndlews,is that "beararms"
wasdefinedmorenarrowlyin thosecases,and"keeparms"morebroadiy,thanwasusual.
The net resultseemsto be not far ftom the traditionàlindividual-rightview held at the
Foundingandreflectedin the greatweight of early authority.

The divided 1842decisionof the ArkansasSupremeCourt in Buzzarddid not, evenafter


the Civil War, everacquirethe prominenceof Aymette,andwhencited it was simply for its
limited"uncontoversial holding,upholdinga ban on carryingweaponsconcealed.€98)
Nevertheless, comingfour yearsbeforeNunn,it appearsio hãvebãenthe first judicial
holding involving the SecondAmendment,andonejudge'sconcurringopinion wasthe first
appearance of somethingsuggesting a collective-rightor quasi-coltective-right
view.

ThereasonTgof th" leadingopinionfor the 2-1 courtwassimilarto that of Aymette.The


courtaddressed both the SecondAmendmentandthe 1836fukansasConstitutioi,which,
like Tennessee's,providedthat "the free white menof this St¿teshall havea right io keep
andbeararmsfor their commondefense.'r (399)Despitethe textual
differencesbetween
thesetwo provisions(in particulartheArkansasprwision's "for their coÍrmon defense"
language),the court treatedthemasthe same.f400)Múch hkeAymette,albeit without
distinguishingbetween"keepuand "bear,"the court apparentlyrecognizeda right of
individualsbut gaveit a limited scope.@il Th. Ark*sas court'spost-wardecisions
confürmedthat the right securedby the ArkansasConstitutionbelongedto individuals and
includedthe right to beararmsfor at leastsomeprivat. p,rpor"s.@

The concurringopinion citedno history or authorityand asfar aswe are aware,no court
or evenjudge hasevercited it in interpretinga right to beararms,whethersecuredby the
SecondAmendmentor by any of the analogousprovisionsin stateconstitutions.-ßOÐ It did
nolþresentwhatwould now be considereda standardcollëdtive-rightor quasi-collective-
'Whereas
right view. thoseviews addressthe limits of federalpow"i to intãrferewith state
law, JudgeDickinson addressed the casefrom the oppositevantagepoint, statingthe
questionaswhetherthe State'sbanon carryingweaponsconcealeduinterfere[slfuittrany
regulationsmadeby Congress, asto the organizing,arming,or discipliningthe militia, ór in
the mannerin which that militia areeitherto keepor beartheir arms."tLD-!)In modern
terminology,thejudge seemedto recastthe caseasturring on possiblefederalpre-emption
of the st¿telaw. The SecondAmendment,in settingout what he describedas "dhepo*ìt
glventhe militia to keepandbeararms,"merelyrephrased the expressfederalpowersin
Article I, Section8, Clause16of the Constitution,ihe Amendmentbeing "but an assertion
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military ¡ot t."J4oÐ The Amendmentthusdid not addanyprotectionof statepowers. That


protectionwasimplicit in Clause16: "[T]he Statesretainthepower to legishtèin relation
to armsandthe modeof carrying andkeepingthem,providedits exerciseis not repugnant
to the previousgrantto the FederalGovemment.. . . Could Congressauthorizeuw *¿
everypersonby expresslaw, to ca¡ry deadlyweaponsconcealedabouthis person,whennot
composingoneof the militia, andnot a part of the regulationsordainedfor their
govemmentrul4Q6)

Th9 dissentingopinion employedthe generalrule for interpretingprefaces(discussedabove


in PartII.C.I), andthe samereasoningasRawle,Story,andNuin, to explaintherelationof
the Amendment's_ prefaceto the right: "Now, I takethe expressions'a well regulatedmilitia
beingnecessary for the securityof a freeState,'andtheterms'commondefense,'tobe the
rgalonsassignedfor the grantingof the right, andnot a restrictionor limitation uponthe
right itself . . . . fW]hen wasit contendedbeforethat the reasongiven for the establishment
of a right or its unintemrptedenjoymentnot only limited the right itself, but restrainedit to
asinglespecificobjecl!"{4QZ)JudgeLacy alsopointedto the SecondAmendment's
referenceto a ufreeState":"To supposethat liberty cannotbe in danger,exceptfrom a
foreign foe or internaldisorder,ís virtually to denythe importancean¿n"cesJityof wrítten
constitutions.. . . I cannofseparatethe political freedomof the Statefrom the pêrsonal
rights of its citizen".u{408)He singledout the concurringopinion for grantingthe right to
"the militia alone,"and only at "the discretionof the Legisiature"- a right "vãluelesiand
not wortå preserving;for the Stateunquestionablypossesses the power,without the grant,
to armthe militia anddirecthow they shallbe employedin casesof invasionor doméstic
insurrection.. . . [W]hV give that which is no right in itself andguaranteesa privilege that is
uselessru (409)Finally,the dissent
explainedtheright muchasBlaclstonehad,tying it to
selÊdefenseandpointing out that it wasno moreunlimited thanthe freedomsof spéechand
Press.-({l-oj

In sum,the activity of courtsclosestto the Foundingtendsto reinforcewhat the text and


history establish- that the right securedby the SecondAmendmentbelongsto individuals.
No court questio:redthe private right to keeparms,andmostrecognizedthe traditional
individual right to bearthem.Two of the threest¿tesupremecourtsto apply the Second
Amendment(GeorgiaandLouisiana)repeatedlyrecognizeda private right to beararmsfor
selÊdefense. Thetwo casestakingthenarowestview qf the right (bothln St¿teswhose
constitutionshad "commondefense"clausesin their righÐ were ignored,andeventhey
recognizedsomemannerof individual right. Only in an opinion of a singlejudge, whiôh
was andhascontinuedto be ignored,did somethinglike a quasi-collective-or õoilective-
right understandingappear,but eventhat opinion did not view the SecondAmendmentas
securinganyright of Statesor of state(asopposedto federal)militias. On balance,then,the
casesbeforethe Civil War, like the first commentators, confrm that the text andhistory of
the SecondAmendmentsupportthe individual-rightview, not the collective-rightor qúasi-
collective-rightviews.

C. Reconstruction

As the Civil War endedin 1865,southerngovemments enacted"black codes,"which,


lmong other things,either directly prohibitedthe newly freed slavesfrom keepingand
bearingaffnsor imposedstringentpermit systems.In addition,armedwhite mobJ,
sometimesincludingthe militias, frequentlydisarmedthe freedblacks.(411)Suchpractices,

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coupledwith blacks'lack of citizenship,promptedthe Thirty-Ninth Congressto takeseveral


actionssecuringthe rights of the newly freedilaves andrealfirming the understanding
that
the right to keepandbeararmswas a personalright.

The first actionwasenactmentof theCivil RightsAct of 1866.Onegoalof manywho


soughtits passage, notedby them and lamentedby their opponents,appéarsto havsbeento
secureto freedmenthe SecondAmendmenfsright to keepandbeararms.Both
representatives and senatorshighlighteddisarmamentof blacksand arguedthat the Act, by
makingblacla citizens,would secureto themthatright. SenatorTrumbull, Chairmanof túe
JudiciaryCommitteeand a sponsorof the Act, explainedthat it would counteractthose
portionsof the-blackcodesthat "prohibit anynegroor mulattofrom having fire-arms.n$1Ð
In the House,Representative Clarke quotedthe SecondAmendmentand dãchred,,'I shall
insistthatthereconstructed rebelsof Mississippirespectthe Constitutionin their local
laws";he alsodecriedthat newly formedsouthemgõvemments hadbeen"allowedto rob
anddisarmour þlack] veteransoldiers."Representative Raymondargued,in favor of the
Act, that makingblackscitizenswould give to them"everyright whiãh you or I have,"
including"a right to bear*-r.n (413)

The secondcongressionalaction waspassageof the FourteenthAmendmentin June


1866.SenatorPomero¡ in addressing anearlydraft,listedasamongthe "safeguards of
liberty . . . underour Constitutíon"the right of 'the freedman"to "bãararmsfor the defense
of himself andfamily andhis homestead,"evensuggestingthat Congress'spower to enforce
the ThirteenthAmendment'sban on slaverymightjustiff il in protectingthis right in the
South.l&) On" of the FourteenthAmendment'ssponsors,in listing the rights of citizenship
that its Privilegesor Immunities Clausewould extendto blacks,pointed to "the personal
rights guaranteedand securedby the first eight amendments of the Constitution;suchasthe
freedomof speechandof the press;. . . [and] thr right to keepand to beararms."JflÐ 1a,
New York Timesandother leadingnewspapers reprintedthesecomments,including the
referenceto the SecondAmendment,andpraisedthem.J4lé)

. This history indicatesthat it was widely recognizedthat the right to keepandbeararms


Yas to be protectedby the Civíl RightsAct andthe FourteenthAmendment,andthat that
right wasunderstoodto belong to individuals.For example,Raoul Bergeq evenwhile
arguingagainstthe view that the FourteenthAmendment"incorporated'the Bill of Rights
to apply to the States,explainsthat "all areagreed"that the FourteenthAmendmentaimed
at least"to embodyandprotect"the Civil RightsAct of 1866;he contendsthat theAct, in
turn, "intendedto conferon the freedmenthe auxiliary rights that would protecttheir'life,
liberly, andproperty'- no more."He quotesBlackstone'slisting of theseihreeprincipal
rights anddemonsüates Blackstone'spromiñèncein the debateiand in the denunciaúonsof
theblackçsdç5.-É14Aq explainedabovein PartIII.A, Blackstonedescribedfive "auxiliary
rights," andthe right of individuals to haveandusearmsfor their defensewas one of them.
Giventhelanguageof SectionI of the Civil RightsAct, it may be that Statessimplycould
not discriminateagainstblacla in the right to keepandbeararms,not that the Second
Amendmentappliedper se,but the point remainsthat therewas a consensusthat the right in
questionbelongedto individualsandwasa nghtagainsfthe s1¿1e. (418)

Werethereanyremainingdoubt on this question,Congresseliminatedit a month after


approvingthe FourteenthAmendment,whenit renewedthe Freedmen'sBureauover
PresidentAndrew Johnson'sveto. The actprovidedthat whereverthe courtswere not open,

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9r in any Statethat had not beenrestoredto the Union, variousrights, largely paralleling
thosein the Civil RightsAct, should"be securedto andenjoyedty uit Aã citiiens
withoutrespectto raceor color,or previousconditionof slavery."Amongthesewere"the
right . . . to havefull andequalbenefitof all lawsandproceedings ron""ãting personal
liberty, personalsecurity,andthe acquisition,enjoyment,and diõpositionof esàte,real and
personal,íncludíngthe constitutionalright to bear arms.u{419) The Congressthusnot only
enactedthe understandingthat the SecondAmendmentprotectedan individual right,
includingtheright to "bear"arms,but alsodid soin a way thatrestedon Blacftstone's
expositionof the individual right to armsasa critical auxiliary to the threeprimary
individual rigtts of life, liberty, andproperty.

Congress tookthe sameview earlyin thefollowin gyeatdemonstratingnot only its


u1{erstãndingthlt lhe right belongedto individualsbut alsothe limited, indirecrwây in
whlch it protectedthe States'militias. Respondingto the southernmilitias' depredatiôns
againstthe freedblacks,Congressincludedin a bill, which the Presidentsignèd a provision
*[t]hat all militia forcesnow organizedor
in service"in the Statesof the former
Confederacy"be forthwith disbandedandthat the furtherorganization,arming,or calling
into serviceof the saidmilitia forces,or anypart thereof,is herebyprohibited."-(4201.
Significantly,the bill's sponsorhadagreedto strike"disarmed"after "disbanded,"in the
faceof oppositionfrom several'(northem)senatorsthat to disarmthe citizens from whom
the militia wasdrawn,ratherthanmerelydisbandingthe militias, would violate the Second
Amendment .lÆlCongress's actionsboth in disbandingthe southernStates'militiasandin
not disarmingtheir citizensshowthat it understoodthe SecondAmendmentright to protect
individuals,not Statesor their militias.@) Thus,from the Foundingthroughthe Civil
War, the overwhelmingunderstandingof the right of thepeopleto kéep andbeararmswas
that it wasa right that belongedto individuals.

D. BeyondReconstruction

As alreadysuggested by our discussions aboveof Andrewsandcasesciting Buzzard,the


understandingof the right to keepandbeararmsasan individual right continuedbeyondthe
Civil War andReconstruction.Although we do not provide an exhiustive surveyof the
post-warperiod,we find it significantthat the modemalternativeviews of the right did not
takehold until the twentiethcentury,well over a centuryafter the SecondAmendmentwas
ratified.Beforethat,the viewsof the leadingconstitutional-law scholarof theperiod-
Thoma¡cooley, were in accordwith his prJd.rrrrors Tucker,Rawle, and story in
recognizingan individual right. And the SupremeCourt,althoughmaking no holding
regardingthe substanceof the Amendment,suggestedin dicta that it protectedan inãividual
right.

Cooley'sGeneralPrincíplesof Constítutional Law, first publishedin 1880,gaineda


prominenceon the level of the worksof his predecessors.l4LS)As hadthe antebellum
commentators, he espoused the individual-rightview Òfthe SecondAmendment.After
quotingthe Amendment,noting that it wasa "modificationand enlargementfrom the
EnglishBill of Rights,"andciting Tucker,cooley addedthe following:

TheRightis GeneraL- It might be supposed from the phraseologyof this


provisionthat the right to keepandbeararmswasonly guaranteédto the
militia; but this would be an interpretation
not warantedby the intent.. . . tl]f
the right were limited to thoseenrolled[in the militia, a numberthat the

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govemmentcould constrict],thepurposeof this guarantymight be defeated


{together by the actionor neglecttoact of the gõvernmêntiiwas meantto
hold in chec\. The-meaning of theprovisionunãoubtedlyis, thatthepeople,
from whom the militia mustbe takèn,shall havethe right tokeep andb"ã.
anns,andtheyneedno permissionor regulationof law for thep*por". But this
enablesthe governmentto havea well-règdatedmilitia; for to ã.* ur-t
implies somethingmorethanthe merekeeping;it impliósthe learningto handle
andusetþ.* i" a way that makesthosewho Èeepthémreadyfor their efficient
use;in otherwords,it implies the right to meetfor voluntarydisciplinein anns,
observingin doing so the lawsofpublic order.(424)

Cooley'srejectionof any collective-rightandquasi-collective-right view is consistentwith


the understandingof the Amendment's_prefatory clausethat is eiident from the Founding
andhadbeenreiteratedbeforethe Civil War by Rawle,Story, and, Nunn.EvenCooley's
headingechoedRawle'sstatementover fifty yearsearlier: "The prohibition is general.'t(425)
Cooleylikewisetrealgqothkeepingandbearingasprivaterightsof citizens,and
recognizedthat the right haslimitations ("the laws of public orãer"),just asany other
individualright does.g4 Conversel¡in discussiigthe Militia ClausesofArticle I,
Section8, in a separatepart of his treatise,he madeno mentionof the SecondAmendment.
(427)

Cooleyreiteratedthis individual-right interpretationin his evenmorecelebrated


Treatiseon the ConstitutionalLimitations,first published¡¡ 1g69.{42&Amongthe clauses
coûlmonin statgconstitutions,he explained were "[t]hosedeclaratoryof the fundamental
rights of the citrzeî," amongwhich werefreedo* oirpe"ch andof the pressand "that every
Tal may beararmsfor the defence of himself andthe State.n(429)In a later chapterhe
includedþright amongthe uthe constitutionalprotectionsto personalliberty": "Among
the otherdefencesto personalliberty shouldbe mentionedthe right of the peópleto keef
andbeararms-uHe explainedthe right'sEnglishorigins,notedtñ" i*pott^ce for a "weil-
regulatedmilitia' o_f"thepeople"being"frainedto biaring arms,"praisedthelack of
legislation"regulat[ing]this right," andcited Bliss,Nunn,-and"r*e concerningtheright of
self-defens"-l€l FT?!IV,in else¡vhere explainingthe scopeof a State'sconcurrentpower
to organizeanddisciplinethe militia, Cooleysimply cited.-Houston v. Moore,not
mentioningthe SecondAmendment.Ø3r) Like the Court,he apparentlydid not seethe
Amendmentasrelevantto the scopeof the State'spower to màinøin a militia.

The SupremeCourt did not addressthe substanceof the SecondAmendmentduring this


period becauseof its view thattheBill of Rights,includingthe SecondAmendment;-ðid
not apply to the States.l432)In Robertsonv. Baldwin, however,the Court invokedthe
historyof, andlimitationson, thevariousrightsin the Bill of Rights,includingthe Second
Amendment,to illustrate anddefenda holding regardingthe limitations on the Thirteenth
Amendment's banon slavery:

The law is perfectly well settledthat the first ten amendmentsto the
Constitution,coÍtmonly knownasthe Bill of Rights,werenot intendedto lay
downanynovgfprinciplesof government, but simplyto embodycertain
guarantiesandimmunitieswhich we had inheriteðfromour en4istr ancestors,
andwhich hadfrom time immemorialbeensubjectto certainwéil-recognized-
exceptionsarisingfrom the necessities of the case.In incorporatingthese

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,

principlesinto the fundamentallaw therewas no intentionof disregardingthe


exceptions, which continuedto berecognizedasif they hadbeenformalfy
expressed. Thus,the freedomof speechandof thepreis (art. 1) doesnot permit
the publicationof libels,blasphemous or indecentàrticlei, or otherpubliôations
injuriousto public moralsor privatereputation;[and] the right of the peopleto
keepandbeararms(utt. 2) not infringedby lawsprohibitlng the carryingof
il
concealed weapons. . . . (433)
' TheCourt addedsimilar illustrationsfrom the Fifth and Sixth Amendments.The Courtthus
suggested that the SecondAmendmentprotectedan individual right, both by treatingit in
parallelwith the individual rights in the restof the Bill of Rightr *á Uypoittting to îhe
righfs Englishorigins.

Not until 1905was a view rejectingthe individual.right view truly born, andthenin a
decisioninterpretingnot the SecondAmendmentbut ratler a provisiãn in a state
constitution.InCity of Salinav. Bløkslqt,theKansasSupremêCourthetdthat a clausein
theKansasBill of.Rights,providingthat "'[t]hepeoplehãvetheright to beararmsfor their
defenceandsecurity,"'referredonly "to thepeopleãsa collective-body"anddealt
"exclusively-*i|h the military. Individual rights arenot consideredin ihis section."Rather,
þ "Peopleshall exercisethis right" throughthepower of their legislature,setout in the
body of the stateconstitution,to organize,equip,andOistiptinetÈemilitia. The right
extended"only to the right to beararmsasa memberof thê statemilitia, or someother
militaryorganizationprovidedfor by 1u*.rr(434)The courtseemsto havebeeninfluenced
by aprovisionin the stateconstitutionadmonishingagainststandingarmiesin time of
peace,.andpraisingcivilian control of the military, thàt immediatelyfollowed thetext of the
right.{43ÐThe court also,without citing historicalauthorityandwith little explanation,
pointedto the SecondAmendmentasanalogousandreinforcing its reading.{43QSahna,s
Tltlq w?slot missed.Onestatesupremecourt soonafter, inã surveyreãchingbackto
Bliss,Reid,Nunn, and.Aymette,descnbedSalínaashavinggone"fuftder than añy other
case"by holdingthat the right to beararmsin the KansasÓõnstitutionimposedno limit on
the legislature'spower to prohibit private individualsfrom carrying arms.1437)

Conclusion

For the foregoingreasons,we concludethatthe SecondAmendmentsecuresan


individual right to keep andto beararms.Currentcaselaw leavesopenandunsettledthe
questionof whoseright is securedby the Amendment.Although *é do not addressthe
scopeof the right, our examinationof the original meaningofihe Amendmentprovides
extensivereasonsto õõncludethat the SecondAmendmentsecuresan individual righ! and
no persuasive basisfor eitherthe collective-rightor quasi-collective-right
views.Thetext of
the Amendmenfsoperativeclause,settingouia "right of the peopleto-L."p andbear
Arms,"is clearandis reinforcedby the Constitution's stucfure.The Amendmenfsprefatory
clause,properlyun$ersto.o{,is frrlly consistentwith this interpretation.Thebroadeihistory'
of theAnglo-Americanright of individualsto haveandusearms,from England,s
Revolutionof 1688-1689to theratificationof the SecondAmendmenta hùndredyears
later,leadsto the sameconclusion.Finally, the first hundredyearsof interpretationsof the
Amendment,andespeciallythe comment¿ries andcaselaw in the pre-Civil War period
closestto theAmendment'sratification,confrrmwhatthe text andhistoryof the Second
Amendmentrequire.

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WHBTHERTIIE SECOND ^ MENDMENT SECURESAN INDI\rII"'-.AL RIGHT Page61 of 103

Pleaselet us know if we may providefurtherassistance.

StevenG. Bradbury
PrincipalDeputyAssistant
Attorney General

HowardC. Nielson,Jr.
DeputyAssistantAttorney
General

C. Kevin Marshall
Acting DeputyAssistant
Attorney General

Ls"r, e.g.,(Jnitedstatesv. Emerson,270


F.3d,203,220,260
(5thcir. 2001).
2 5"",e.g.,*ílveirav.Locþer,312F.3d1052,
1060-61, (gthCt.2002),cert.
1086-87
denied,124S. Ct. 803(2003)

3 Emerson,27}F.3dat2l9 (describing
view); seealso,e.g.,Casesv. (Jnited
intermediate
States,l3l F.2d916,923(tsr Cir. lg42).

4 s"", e.g.,(Jnitedstatesv. parker,362Fsa,1279,l2g3


(l0th cir. z0o4).

5 Memorandumfor United StatesAttorneys


from the Attomey General, Re:(JnitedStatesv.
Emerson(Nov.9,2001)(quotingEmerson,27}F.3d.at260),reprintediz Brief forthe
: UnitedSøtesin Opposition,app.,Emersonv. UnitedStates,536U.S. 907 Q0O2)(denying
1 I certiorari).you a¿¿e¿that the Départmentof Justice"can andwill continueto defend
vigorouslythe constitutionality,underthe SecondAmendment,of all existing federal
firearmslaws."

6 3ot u.s. 174(1939).

7 ch.757,4g stat. 1236.

8 SeeNationalFirearmsAct: Hearings
on H-R.9066Beþre theHouseComm.on Waysand
Means,73dCong.90 (1934)(statement of Ass'tAtty. Gen.Keenan);(JnítedStatesv.
Lopez,2F.3d1342,1348 (5rhCir. 1993),afrfd,5t4U.S.549(1995).

e¡ozu.s.at t75-77.

L0Id. ut 178(citingAymette
v. State,2l Tenn.(2 Hum.) 154,158(1840)).We discuss
Aymettebelowin ParttV.B.2.

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WHETHERTTIESECONÎ ' MENDMENT SECURESAN INDMI- -IAL RIGHT PAgE
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rr Id.

12Id. at 179;seeid. at
179-82(describingmilitia regulations,
includingarmsrequirements).
'j tubelow, Partq
tr.C (discussing SecondAmendment's preface),III.B-C (discussing
Founders'recognitionthat the individual right to armsfurtheredtbe citizen-ititiu¡, rvlA
(discussingearlycomment{otÐ,IV.B.2 (dìscussingearlycases),tV.D (discussingviewsof
ThomasCooleysoonafterCivil War).

la f-9te,opinionsof the SupremeCourtappearto accepttheindividual-rightview, at least


in dicta, althoughnone dispositive.Iniòhnsonv. Eisentrager,33gU.Slzo¡
is lpso¡, tne
Court rejecteda claim that the Fifth Amendmenfscriminal-froóedurèprotectiois
ffii"a to
nonresidentenemyaliensby pointing out, amongotherthings,that a cäntraryview would
ryqyir9 alsoapplyingthe "companioncivil-rights Amendmeãts"in the niil of nights,
includingthe SecondAmendment.Id. at7841"p1uring military occupationirreõoncilable
enemyelements,guerrillafighters,and'werewolves'couldrequirethe nme¡can Judiciary
to assurethem freedomsof speech,press,and assemblyasin fhe nirst Amendmenfrightio
beararmsasin the Second,securityagainst'unreasonable' searches andseizuresasin the
Fourth,aswell rights to jury trial asin the Fifth andSixth Amendments.,).ln Konigsberg
T
v: StateBar of C-al.,l_66 U.S. 36 (1961),theCourt,citingMiller,again equatedthe Se-cond-
Amendmentright with therightssecuredby the First Amendment.-Id. at +9 n.tO.More
recentcaseshaveassumed an individualright n dictaby listingthe SecondAmendment
right amongthepersonalrightscomposingthe"liberty' thatthã Constitution'sdue-process
provisionsprotect.SeePlannedParenthoodv. Casey,SOSU.S. 833,847(1992);Mborev.
City of East Cleveland,43lU.S. 494,502(1977)lpiurafity opinionj
lquoìingpoe v.
ulman,367 u.s. 497,542-43(196r)(Harlan,J, dissentin Ð); id. ít i+z çwñit", J.,
dissenting)(sameasplurality).But seeAdamsv. Wílliams,Zó7u.s. 143,150(l'g7z)
(Douglas_, J., díssenting)('A powerful lobby dins into the Larsof o-urcinzewy'thattLese
gun purchases areconstitutionl!rightsprotectedby the SecondAmendment,;but "[t]hereis
no reasonwhy all pistolsshouldnot be barredto everyoneexceptthepolicei'). fhe öourt in
Lewisv- UnitedStates,445U.S.65 (1980),rejectedanequal-protectiôn challãngeto a
prohibitionagainstfelonspossessing firearms.In a one-sentenìe footnoteexplainingwhy it
was applyingrational-basisreview,the Court st¿tedthat sucha prohibition ii not "bãsed-
upon constitutionallysuspectcriteria"anddoesnot "trench.rponunyconstitutionally
protectedliberties."Id. at 65 n.8.Althoughthis languageis cõnsistentwith the view thatthe
SecondAmendmentdoesnot securea right of individuãls,it is alsoconsistentwith the
traditional understandingof the individual-right view that the libertyprotectedby the
SecondAmendmentdoesnot extendto convictedfelons.Seeinfranoær tq &,Zi,and the
discussions referencedtherein.

ls 13I F.2d,gt6, 922(tst


cir. t942).

16Id. atg23.

17l3l F.2d,261,266
(3d,cir. 1942),
rev'don othergrounds,3l9u.s.463(1943).
18Id- T]nesameground
appearsto havebeenavaílable in Cases.SeeCases,l3l F.2d at9l9
n.l.

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l

Regardingviolent felons,althoughthe caseinvolvedpossession, thecourtreliedon


authorityfor regulatingthe bearing ofanns (banningcarryingweaponsconcealedor to the
terrorof the people).For moreon-pointauthority,seeproposahmãdedtring the rati$ing
conventions, discussedbelowinPartm.C.l, andEmerson,2T}F.3dat 226n.Zt;cf,iewis,
445 U.S. at 65 n.8 (rejectingequal-protection
challengeto prohibitionof felon posiessinga
firearm);Richardsonv. Ramirez,4l8U.S. 24,53-55 OglÐ (holdingconstitutiõnalthe
disenfranchisement of convictedfelonswho hadcompletedtheirsentences andparoles).
20 l3lE.2dat266.Thecourt cited
somehistoryfrom theFoundingEra,which we address
in Partltr.C.l.

21W. havenot conducteda review


of the Government'slitigating positionsin the numerous
firearmscasessinceMiller.In its brief in Miller,the Govemment madetwo alternative
arguments.The frst wasconsistentwith a quasi-collective-rightview. ^See Brief for United
Statesat 9-18, UnitedStatesv. Miller,307 U.S. 174(1939)(No. 696).The second(which
lhe Cgurt adopted)wasconsistentwith either a quasi.collective-or individual-right view.
Seeíd. at l8'20.Its presentlitigatingpositionappearsto be consistent with your100l
memorandumto U.S, Attomeysendorsingthe individual-rightview. See,e.g., UnitedStates
v. Lippman,369 F.3d 1039,1045(SthCir. 2004)(Colloton,J.,concurringin part and
concurringin thejudgment).

22PrcpertyRequisitionAct, ch.445,
$ l, 55 Stat. 742,742.
23Memorandumfor LawrenceE.
Walsh,Deputy Attorney General,from Paul A. Sweeney,
Acting AssistantAttorneyGeneral,Office of LegalCounsel,Re:H.R. 232, 86th Cong., Iit
,Sess.,
a bill "Toprovideþr thesecuringof custodyand dßpositionby the (Inited Støes of
missiles,rockets,earthsatellites,and símilar devícesadaptøbleto military uses,andþr
otherpurposes,"at l-2 (Apr. 9, 1959)(emphasisadded).

245"" Memorandumfor Byron


R. White, Deputy Attomey General,from NicholasdeB.
Katzenbach,AssistantAttomeyGeneral,Office of LegalCounsel,Re:H.R. 2057,a bitt to
providefor the securingof custodyand dispositionby the (lnited Statesof míssiles,rockets,
earthsatellites,andsimilar devicesadaptableto mílitary use(May 8, l96t); Memorandum
for'White, from Katzenbach,Re Proposedreport of theDeparmàn¡of Deþnse on H.R.
2057 "Toprovideþr thesecuringof custodyand díspositionby the UnitedStatesof
missiles,roclæts,earthsatellitesand similar devicesadaptableto Mititary uses,andþr
otherpurposes,"at I (Mar.22, 1962).
-'25
5"" Federal FirearmsAct: HearingsBeþre the Subcomm.to InvestigativeJuvenile
Delinquencyof theSenateComm.on theJudicíary,89thCong.40-41lileS¡ (statementof
Attorney GeneralKatzenbach).For subsequenttreatrnentof the SecondAmendment,see,
e'g., Memorandumfor RichardG. Kleindienst,DeputyAttorneyGeneral,from lVilliam H.
Rehnquist,AssistantAttomeyGeneral,Office of LegalCounsel,Re:Proposed"Federal
GunRegístrationandLtcensingAct of 1969"(Feb.19, 1969)(in one-senience discussion,
citing Miller andTot to find no "seriouslegal obstacle"underAmendmentto proposalfor
federalregistrationof firearmsandlimited federallicensing);Memorandumfõr D. Lowell
Jensen,AssistantAttorneyGeneral,Criminal Division,from TheodoreB. Olson,Assistant
Attorney General,Office of Legal Counsel,Re: ProposedLegislatíonRelating to Firearms
and to MandatorySentencing, at2 (May 27,l98l) (citingMitter asbasisfor ñperceiv[ing]

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no basisfor suggestingthat the [1963 Gun Control] Act so interfereswith the powersof the
Statesto raisen-uli_tias
asto transgressthe SecondAmendment");FirearmOwners'
Prorection Acr,pub.L. No. gg-30g,$ l(b), 100st¿t. 449,Mg lilae;, lg u.s.c. g g2l note
(2000)(law signedby PresidentReaganthatrecognízed ithe ¡ì+q
1'óf citizens. . . to k".p
andbeararmsunderthesecondamendment.").

26pub.L. No. 90-351,g2


srar.197.

T^{r:,^e.g.,Lovev. Pepersack, 47 F.3d 120,122-24(4rhCir. 1995);(JnitedStatesv. Warín,


530 F.2d 103,105-07,108(6th Cr. 1976)(dismissing"theerroneó,srrpporition thatthe
SecondAmendmentis concemedwith the rights of individualsratherthanthoseof the
States"andrejectingclaim involving gt tr bearingreasonablerelationshipto
preservationor_efficiency "dirittedly
of the army);Gíllespíe v. City of indianapol¿s,I 85 FSd 6n , 7rc-
ll(7thCir.|999);Hichnanv.BIock,8lF.3d98,gg-|02-(gthC|r..|gg6).TheThird
Circuifs presentpositionis at leastthequasi-collective-rigLt vi"*, if noí the collective-right
view.seeunitedstøtesv. Rybar,l03 F.3dz7i,zg6 (3dcir. 1996).

'lt:",":g.;!!i!1dStatesv.Hale,g7lt.2dl016,
l0l9-20(SrhCr..l99Z);Unitedstatesv.
Oa4res,564F.2d384,387 (lOth Cr. 1977);UnitedStates v. Wright,nl f Sa 1265,lZ72-
74 (1lth Cir- 199,7),
yacatedin part on othergrounds,133r.ldlqiz (1998).Thesécourrs
makeclearthat the right underthe quasi-collective-rightview protectsonly membersof
organizedmilitia units suchasthe NationalGuard,nõt membersof the "m-ilitia,'defined
morebroadly.
!1kes,-for example,reþcted a claim basedon the defendanfsmembershipin
the Kansasmilitia, which consistedof all able-bodiedmenbetweentwenty-oneandfofti-
fwe.564F-2dat387;seealsoWright,llTF.3d atl27l-74(simitar); HatL,978F.2dat
1020(similar);Warin,530F.2dar 105,106,l0g (similar).

'n (Inited States


!?", !.8., v. Baer,235F.3d 561,564(10th Cir. 2000);Gillespie,lgsF.3d
at7t0-ll; Margle1ev. Caliþrnía,545F.2d645,646(gthcr. tg76i;-(IniteilStates v.
Johnson,497F2_d548,550 (4th Cir. 1974) Qtercurìam);Codyu. Uo'¡t"dStotes,460F.2d,
34,35-37(8thCir. 1972);Stevens v. LlnitedStates,440F.zd iu,l4g (6thCir. l97l);
UnitedStatesv. Synnes,438F.2d764,766(8th Cir. lgTl), vøcaiedon-othergroun¿|, qOq
U.S. 1009(1972).Courtshaverecognized,thatsuch holdingscouldbe consislentwith an
individual-rightview. SeeUnítedStatesv. Price,328F.3dé58,961 (7rh Cir. 2003);supra
note 19 (discussingTot);cf. Emerson,270F.3d,at 261(upholdingp.òhibitionon posseìsion
9f fireqm by personsubjectto domestic-violence restrainingo.aãity concludingthat
Ame¡dmentprotectedan individualright but findingno violation);itppman,369 F.3dat
l0M-45 (Colloton,J.) (similar)

305"" Hichnan,-8lF.3d at99-103;


Thomasv. Membersof City Councilof portland,l3l
F.2d41,42 (lstcir. 1984)Qtercuriam).Courtshaverecogntzedthatrurhholdiográlro
couldbe consistentwith an individual-rightview.SeeParker,36}F.3dat 1285-gõ(Kelly,
J., concurring)(arguingfor upholdingconvictionon naffowergroundthat caseinvoived-
reasonablerestrictionon concealedweapons,and cnticangcircuit courts,in interpreting
SecondAmendmen!for ignoring"theuniversaladmonitionto decideconstitutionãlirr,rés
narrowly");PartIV.B.2, below(discussingcasesrecognizingindividualright but rejecting
right to carryconcealedweapons).

3r Sílveira,312F.3dat 1063-64
& n.I I .

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. j

32.Fora symposiumof articles


spanningtheviews,seeTheSecondAmendmentToday:
Historical and ContemporaryPerspectiveson the Constitutionalityof FirearmsRegulation,
29 N. Ky. L. Rev.643(2002),andfor articlescriticalof the individual-ightvíew,iee
Symposium on theSecondAmendment: FreshLoolcs,76Chi.-KentL. Rei. 3 (2000).See
qlso,e.g.,GarryWills, A Necessary Evil: A Hîstoryof AmericanDistrust of Government
207-21,256-60(1999);AndrewD.Herz, GunCrazy:ConstitutionatFatsàConsciousness
andDerelictíonof DíalogicResponsibility, T5B.U. L. Rev.57 (1995);RichardM. Aborn,
Essay,TheBattleOvertheBradyBill øndtheFutureof Gun ControlAdvocøcy,22
FordhamUrb. L.J. 417(1995);Carl T. Bogus,Essay,ilo"", Riots,and Guns,éOS. Cut.I,.
Rev.1365(1993);DennisA. Henigan,Arms,AnarchyandtheSecondAmendment,26Yal.
U. L. Rev. 107(1991);WendyBrown,Comment,Guns,Cowboys,Philadetphialtiayors,
and CivicRepublicanísm: On SanfordLevinson'sTheEmbarrassíngSeconãAmeniment,
99 Yale L.J. 661(1989);Keith A. Ehrman& DennisA. Henigan,TheSecondAmendment
in the TwentiethCentury:Have YouSeenYourMilitia Lately?,15U. Da¡on L. Rev.5
(1989);SamuelFields,Guns,Crímeand theNegligentGunOwnea l0 Ñ. Ky. L.Rev. 141
'Warren
(1982); Spannaus,StateFirearmsRegulationand theSecondAmenilment,6
HamlíneL. Rev.?_83 (1983);cf.DavidYassþ TheSecond Amendment: Structure,
History,
and ConstítutionalChange,99Mich. L. Rev.588(2000);David C. Williams, Cívic
Republícanism andthe CítizenMilitia: TheTerrifyíngSecondAmendment,l0l YaleL.J.
551,554-55(1991).

lt 1"", e.g.,LawenceH. Tribe, I AmericanConstitutional Law 900 & 902n.221(3ded.


2000);NelsonLund, TheEndsof SecondAmendment Jurisprudence:FirearmsDisabílities
andDomesticllíolenceRestrainingOrders,4Tex.Rev.L. & Pol. 157(1999);LeonardIV.
LeW, Originsof theBíll of Ríghts134(1999);RonaldS. Resnick,PrivateArmsas the
Palladiumof Liberty: TheMeaningof theSecondAmendment,TT V. Det.MercyL. Rev. I
(1999);BrannonP. Denning,GunShy: TheSecondAmendmentc¿s an "(Jndereiþrced
ConstitutionalNorm,"2l Hanr.I.L. &Pub. Pol'y719(1998);L.A. Powe,h., duns,Words,
and Constítutional Interpretation,38Wm. & Mary L. Rev. l3ll (1997);NelsonL.crrrdThe
PastandFutureof theIndivídual'sRight to Arms,3t Ga.L. Rev. I (1996);RandyE.
Barnett& Don B. Kates,UnderFire: TheNewConsensus on the SecondAmendment,45
EmoryL.J. I139 (1996);GlennHarlanReynolds& Don B, Kates,TheSecondAmendment
gnd States'Ríghts: A ThoughtExperimenf,36'Wm.& Mary L. Rev. 1737(lgg5); David B.
Kopel,It Isn't AboutDuck Hunting: TheBritíshOrigínof theRíght to Arm,s,93Mich. L.
Rev.1333,1355(1995);William Van Alstyne,Essay,TheSecondAmendment andthe
PersonalRightto Arms,43 Duke L.I.1236; JoyceLeeMalcolm, To KeepandBearArms:
le Oríginsof qnAnglo-Amerìcan Right Q99$;ClaytonE. Cramer,For theDefenseof
Themselves and the State:TheOriginal Intent andJudicial Interpretation of the-Right io
KeepandBearArms(1994);Attril Reed-Amar, TheBíll of Righitts
as a Constítutioi,100
YaleL.J. 1131,I 162-68(1991);RobertJ. Cottrol& RaymondT. Diamond,TheSecond
Amendment: TowardanAfro-Americanist Reconsíderaiion,80 Geo.L.J. 3d9(1991);
SanfordLevinson,Comment,TheEmbarrassing SecondAmendrnent,99YaleL.I.637
(1989);NelsonLund, TheSecondAmendment, PoliticalLiberty, and theRightto Self-
Preservation,39Ala.L. Rev. 103(1987);DavidT. Hardy,Armed Citizens,CitizenArmies:
Towarda Jurísprudence of theSecondAmendment, g Harv.J.L. & Pub.Pol'y 559(1986);
Don B. Kates,Jr.,TheSecondAmendment: A Díalogue,49Law & Contemp.Probs.143
(Winter 1986);StephenP. Halbrook,ThatEveryMan BeArmed: TheEvolutíonof a
Constitutíonal Ríght(198a);Don B. Kates,Jr.,HandgunProhibítion and the Orígínal
Meaníngof theSecondAmendment,32 Mich. L. Rev.204(1983);seealsoPrintzv. (lnited
states,52l u.s. 898,938n.2 (1997)(Thomas.,J.,concurring)(noting "growingbodyof

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WHETHERTHE SECOND ^ MENDMENT SECURESAN niDn4':.-IAL RIGHT Page66 of 103

gchotarlycommentaryindicat[ing]thatthe [right¡'ris a personalone);Emerson,27}F.3dat


220(similar).

3a270F.3dat 227-60.

3s 3t2F.3dar l060-87.

36Silveirav. Locþer,328
F.3d 567,570(9thCir.) (Kleinfeld,J.,joined by Kozinski,
O'Scannlain, andT.G.Nelson,JJ.,dissentingfrom denialof rehearingen tanc), cert.'
denied,124s. cr. 803(2003);see328r'.3dãt 56g(pregerson, J., ruti"¡; íd. ad56g
(Kozinski,J., same)¡íd. at 592(Gould,J.,joined by Koiinski, J., samej.For otherrecent
opinionsof Ninth Circuit judgesendorsingthe individual-rightvíew andcriticizing Silveira,
seeNordyke,3l?r'.3d at ll95 (Gould J.,concurring); Nordykev.King,364E3d102s,
1025(9thCh.2004) (Kleinfeld"J., dissentingfrom ãenialof rehearingâ banc);id. at 1026
(Gould,J.,joined by o'scannlain,Kleinfeld,Tallmar¡ andBea,JJ.,same).

37Fot example,Article tr of
the Articles of Confederation,drafteda decadebeforethe
Constitution,reservedto eachState"everypower,jurisdiction, andright" not expressly
delegatedto the federalGovenrment.

,,exclusive
18.tn uOaition,the CopyrightandPatentClauseauthorizesCongressto grantan
Righf' to authorsandinventorsfor a limitedtime. u.s. const. utt. r, $ s, cl. g.

395""., e.g.,U.S.Const.art.
I, $ l; art.I, $ 8; art.n,$ l; art.III, $ l; amend.X.

40(Init"d Stotesv. Verdugo-(Irquidez,494


U.S. 25g,265(1990);seealso id. at279
(Stevens,J., concurringin judgment)("alienswho aretawÀrttypresentin theUnitedStates
areamongthose'people'whoareentitledto theprotectionof the Bill of Rights,including
the FourthAmerldment");id. at 287-88(Brennan,J., dissenting)(similar;cãntendingthal
"'thepeople"'is broaderthan"'citizens,"freemen,"residents,'oi'th" Americanp"opl-"."1.
The Ninth Circuit tn Silveira did not discussthe "right of the people"in the Second
Amendment,and it disregardedVerdugo-Urquidezexceptto õite its analysisof "the people"
asan analogyin supportof its own readingof "Militia." See312F.3dat 1069,-10 U n.Zi,
l07l &' n.27.While recognizingthat "[t]he question.. . is not whetherarmsmaybe kepi,
but by whom andfor whatpurpose,"id. at l074,the courttn Silveiradid not considerthat
the "who[ ]" might be "thepeople"to whom the SecondAmendment's text - like that of the
First, Fourth, andNinth - expresslygivesthe right.

41ThomasM. Cooley,The
GeneralPrínciplesof ConstitutionalLaw in the (InitedStatesof
America26T-68
(1880;reprinr2000)(emphasisadded).
42Of the "people"might chooseto exercisethoseindividualrights in groupsrather
"ourse
thanalone, asin the First Amendmentright to assemble andpetition,but that doeJnot make
their rights "collective"or quasi-collective
in the senseof dependingon the will or actions
of a St¿teor on one'sserviceto it.

a3U.S.Const.art.I, 8, cls.15-16; g 2, cl. l.


$ d.[,

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WHETHERTHE SECOND 'VIENDMENT SECURESAN INDIVID-ÌAL RIGHT Page67 of 103

4 T\elastquotationis from the


ConstitutionalConvention's resolutiontransmittingthe
proposedConstitutionto the Congress.2 TheRecordsof theFederalConventíon of 1787,at
665 (Max Farranded.,rev. ed. 1966).This distinctionbetweenthe "people"andthe
governmentis why the Foundersinsistedthat the Constitutionbe ratified by popularly
electedspecialconventionsratherthanby the stategovernments,to ensureitl supremacy
overthosegovemmentsSeeTheFederaltstNo.39, at253-54(J.Madison)(JacobE.
Cooke,ed. 1961);JamesMadison,Notesof Debatesín theFederalConventionof I787,at
70 (1987)(remarksof Madison,June5); íd. at348:-49(remarksof GeorgeMasonand
EdmundRandolph,July 23); id. at352-53(remarksof Madison)

45Thos"who rejectthe individual-right


view tendto neglect"keep"or to treatit as
redundantwith "bear."In Silveira,the court found it "not clear"why the word "was
includedin the amendment"andconcludedby summarizingthe Amendmentasmerely
protectinga rrghtto "'beararrns"'in conjunctionwith militia service.312F.3dat 1074,
1086.,SeealsoMichaelC. Dorf, WhatDoestheSecondAmendment MeanToday?,76Chr.-
Kent L. Rev. 291, 317 Q000)(contendingwithout cit¿tionthat ukeepandbear"is "a unitary
phrase,"with "keep" addingnothingto "bear,"but admittingpossibility that "the plain
meaningof 'keep'would havebeensuffrcientto connotean individual right"); H. Richard
Uviller & V/illiam G. Merkel,TheSecondAmendmentin Conte:ct: TheCaseof the
VaníshingPredicate,T6 Chi.-KentL. Rev. 403,424-25,508,549-50,593(2000)(similar).

462 SttattgeRep.1098,1098(applying
5 Ann., c. 14(1706));see Rexv. Gardner,S7Eng.
Rep.1240,7 Mod. Rep.279K.B. 1739)(apparentlylatercase,but similar);íd. at l24l
(defendant,arguingthat "to chargeonly that he kept a gun is improper,for it includesevery
manthat keepsa gun," andthat gunsarekept "for the defenceof a man'shouse");id. (Lee,
C.J.)(wordsof statute"do not extendto prohibit a man from keepinga gun for his
necessarydefence");id. @robyn,J.) ('farmers aregenerallyobligedto keepa gun, and are
no morewithin the Act for doing so thanthey are for keepinga cabbage-net"¡.

47Mailockv.Easþ,87 Eng.Rep.
1370,1374,7Mod.Rep.4g2(C.p.l7M).

a8mogfì"ldv. Stratþrd,96Eng.Rep.787,
7B7,SayerRep.
15(K.8. l75Z).
ot Kng v. Silcot,87 Eng.Rep.186,186,
3 Mod. Rep.280 (K.8. 1690)(italicsomftred)
(interpreting33 Hen.VIII, c. 6 (1541),andquashingindictmentbecauseit did not
specificallyallegethat defendant'sincomewas insufficient whenhe kept the gun).

504 Blackstoneat *182{he qualification


to which Blackstonerefersis a wealth--
requirementtied to the gamelaws,seeid. at *174-75,whichwe discussin PartIII.A, below,
andelsewhere.RegardingBlackstone's influenceandauthority,see,e.g.,Madison,Notesof
Debatesat 547(remarksof Dickenson,Aug. 29);FederalistNo.69, at465 n.* (4.
Hamilton) & No. 84, at 577 (ttamlton); Malcolm, To Keepand Bear at 130;Schickv.
UnítedStates,l95 U.S. 65,69 (1904).EdmundBurkeinformedParliamentthat "they have
soldnearlyasmanyof Blactstone'sCommentaries in Americaasin England."Speech
concemingResolutionsfor Conciliationwith the Colonies(Mar. 22,177s),tn Edmund
Burke,Pre-RevolutionaryWrítings206,225(Ian Harrised., 1993).

514 Blackstoneat *56; seeid. (personbarred


from "keepingarmsin his house").Seel W.
& M., Sess.l, c. 15,$ 4 (1689)("nopapist. . . shallor mayhaveor keepin his house,or

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elsewhere,
or in the possession
of anyotherpersonto his use,or at his disposition,any
arms,tveapons,gunpowder,or ammunition").

52Kates,82 Mich. L. Rev.


at215,219.

53Wr discussthisproposalbelow part


in m.C.l.
54Co**orwealthv. Blandtng,20
Mass.(3 pick.) 304,33g(1g25).

55SamuelJohnson,A Dictionary
of theEnglishLanguage(I755)(unpaginated).SeeNoah
Webster,
An American,Dictionary of theEngtßhLanguãge(1828)'(unpãginateá)
(defuring
"Keep"fnst as"To hold; to retainin one'spoweror póssãssion").

tr,SeeSteph.l HalbrooþA Ríght


l. to BearArms: StateandFederatBills of Ríghtsand
ConstitutionalGuarantees 94 (1989)(contendingthat "commonlinguisticosug;of th"
,V. . . referr[e{l t9 the depositingof public armsin an arsenal,in cãntrast*iih th" læeping
of private arms-b¡rthe people,"andprovídingan exampleof the former usagen a lTBi
statestatute);c/ U,S, Const.art.I, $ 10,cl. 3 ("No Stateshall. . . keepTroõps"without
Congress's con-sent) (emphasis added).Whenmembersof a militia, asopposedto the people
in general,retainedtheir own armsfor militia service,commonusageseemsto havebèento
speakof them"providing"themselves with weapons,seeMrilitiaAcl,ch. 33, $ l, I Stat.27l
(1792);ThomasJefferson,Noteson theStateof Yirginiø8S(William peden"ä.,'teAZ¡;t
ThePapersof GeorgeMason,1725-1792,atzJz(RobertA. Rutlanded.,1970),altho;gh
we do not meanto claimthat onecouldnot speakof militiamen"keeping"armi for militia
use.

57Johttsorr,
Dictíonary(unpaginated).

58 ,'conveyor carr5/,',,,catÍytasa markof


lee \d. (defining"bear"asto "carryasa burden,,,
authorityu(suchasa sword), " caÍryrasa mark of distinctioni'(suchasto ,,bear armsin a
994t"),and"carr¡rasin show");Webster,AmericanDictionary(unpaginated) (defrning
!'bear"asto "support,""sustainr""carryr""conveyr""supportândrêmãvefrom-placetõ
place,""wea^r," and "bearasa markof authorityor distinõtion;as,to bear u r*órd" a badge,
a name;to bear armsin a coat").

59IoM^"orello v. (Jnited
States,524U.S. 125(1998),which involveda statute,the Court
wasunanimousin understanding"beararms"to refer generallyto a personcarrying arms
upon his personfof the purposeof beingarmedandreadyfor ôffensiveörlefensivi action,
the dissentciting the SecondAmendmentin supportof this view. The majority gave
"carriesa firearm"a broadermeaning.Id. at 130;id. at 139-40,143(Ginsburg,i.,
dissenting).

tn, e.g.,Kates,82Mich. L. Rev. at2l9 (explainingthat,in earlycolonialstatutes,


l''l!.-'
did generallyreferto thecarryingof armsby militiamen");St. GeorgeTuckeq2
Blaclrstone's Commentaries *408-09n.l (1803;reprint 1996)("Tucker'sBlackstone,,)
(discussingVirginia law exemptingfrom militia duty those'teligiouslyscrupulousoî
bearingarms");The Declarationof Independence para.28(1776)("Hè hasconstrainedour
fellow CitizenstakenCaptiveon thehigh Seasto bearArms againittheir countr¡r.").Militia

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servicewasnot however,limited to "military" action.The Constitutionspeaksof using - the


militia "to executetheLaws of the IJnion,"which is distinctfrom both "repel[ling]
Invasions"and"suppress[ing] Insurrections."u.s. const.art.I, $ 8, cl. l5-

6l Malcolm,ToKeepandBearat 139.
Quoted¿n

p.
!, *: Papersof rhomasJefferson4[3-M(Julian Boyded., 1950).concerningthe
Committeeof Revisors,seeid. at 305; I Tucker'sBlackstone,
NoteF, at 444-45.
63Thesearecollectedthroughthe
MichiganConstitution of 1835,in Emers;on,Z701.3dat
230n.29.T[e discussthe Pennsylvania andVermontconstitutions below in PartIII.B.2. For.
an 1822judicial interpretationconfirming the plain meaningof the Kentucþ provisionas
grantinganindividualright, seebelow,ParttV.B.l. Regardingratificationofihe Bill of
Rights,seebelow,Paftm.C.2

&
"Legalityof theLondonMilitary Foot-Association" (hu\y24,1780),reprinted¿z'William
B.liz.añ,DesultoryReflectionson Police: Wíthøn Essayon theMeansof PreventingCrímes
aryd!ryendíngCríminals59,59 (London17S5)(emphasis omitted).ReþardingthiJopinion,
which was"of wide interest,!'LeonRadzinowicz,,4 A Historyof EnglíshCriiinal Liw 107
(1968),seeid. at 107-10;Malcolm, ToKeepandBearat 133-34;andour furtherdiscussion
belowin PartIII.A. Regardingthe Recorder,seeI Blackstoneat *76;3lZ at *80-8| n.i; id.
at*334; JohnH. Langbein,ShapingtheEighteenth-Century Criminal Trial: A Viøufrom
theRyderSources,50 U. Chi.L. Rev.1,8,17-19,34-36 (1933).
65This essayby TenchCoxeis discussed
belowin part m.C.z.

66JosephStory,Commentaries on the Constítutionof the UnítedStates$ 980, at695


(RonaldD. Rotunda& JohnE. Nowak eds.,1987)(1833)("Abrídgement"). The English
right is discussed
belowin PartIII.A.

67S""BernardSchwartz, 2 TheBíUof Rights:A Documentary Hßtory 665,672(1971).We


discussthePennsylvania Convention,includingtheReportandits critics,in PartI[.C.1,
belgw.RegardingtheReport'swide circulation, seeid. at 6281'2TheDocumentaryHístory
of theRatiJìcationof the Constitution617(Merrill Jensened.,1976)("Doc. Hist.'i)(note)j
15Doc. Hist. at 7-10(JohnP. Kaminski& GaspareJ. saladinoeds.,1984)(note).

68Io uddition,the SecondAmendment's


referenceto "Arms" in the context of "keep" and
"bearurêiriforcesour view that it protectsan individual right. Thè-mereword "Armi" could
dgnoteanyweapon,including artillery. ,SeeWebster,AmericanDictionary (unpaginated)
(defining"arrns"as"Weaponsof offense,or afinorfor defenseandprotectionof thebody"
and including explanationof "Fire arms" as "suchasmay be chargedwith powder,as
cannon,muskets,mortars&c."; alsodefiningtheverb rrârrn,, asincluding,'[t]o fumishwith
meansof defense;to preparefor resistance; to fortiff"); Johnson,Dictionary (unpaginated)
(defining"arms"as "'Weapons of offence,or armourof defence").CertainlyCongrèss's
powerin Article I, Section8, Clause16to providefor "arming"the militia includessuch
weapons,particularlygiven that the Constitutioncontemplatesthat the Stateswill use
militias to defendthemselves againstsurpriseinvasions.,SeeU.S. Const.art.I, $ 10,cl. 3
("No Stateshall,withoutthe Consentof Congress,. . . keepTroops,. . . or engagein war,
unlessactuallyinvaded,or in suchimminentDangeraswill not admit of delay.");Militia

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. 1

Act $ 4, I Stat.271,272(1792)(requiringeachdivisionof State'smilitia to havea


companyof artillery andtroop of horse).If the SecondAmendmentprotecteda state
prerogative.tgþaveorganizedand effectivemilitias, onewould expeit it to protectall of the
armsessentialfor that purpose,including artillery. Yet its text suggeststhat the "Arms" that
it protectsdo not includethosethat "thepeople"couldnot both ukeep"and "bear"- those
that an individual could not storeand carry. This useof "Arms" points toward anindividual-
right view ratherthana right of Søtesto haveselect"militias,"andit alsoseemsmore
consistentwith an indiyidual-right than a quasi-collective-rightview, asthe latterrequires
that the "militia" of which the claimantis a memberbe fullyorganized,and.equipped. ,See,
e.g.,UnitedStatesv. Parker,36ZF.3dlZ7g,lZB3(l0th Cir. ZOO+¡.

69Thi, rule assumes thatthe legislatureincorporatedthedeclarationduring the ordinary -


legislativeprocess,not adoptingit separately(with little consideration)or ieavingit to
othersto insert.NormanJ. Singer,2A,Sutherlandon StatutoryConstructiong 41.0+,at220
&, 223(6th ed.2000);seeJamesKent, I Commentøries onAmericanLaw St e (etn eA.
1858)(notingthattitles andpreambles"generatly. . . arelooselyandcarelesslyinserted,
andarenot safeexpositorsof the law"); seealsoKing v. Willíams,96Eng.Rep.51, 52, I
Blackst.Rep.93 (K.8. 1758)("lle conciseness of thetitle shallnot controlthebodyof the
Act. Thetitle is no part of the law; it doesnot passwith the samesolemnity asthe dw ißelf.
Onereadingis oftensufficientfor it."); ThomasJefferson, A Manual of parliamentary
Pragticeforthe Useof the Senateof the (lnítedStates41 (1801;reprint 1993)(noting
desirabilitythatpreamble"be consistentwith' a bill but possibilitythat ítmay not be,
because of legislativeprocedures).

]0_¡lamptesof both includethe statutesdiscussed or citedbelowin PartIII.A. See,e.g.,the


MilitiaActof 1662,13&14car.II,c.3,$$1,3, 14,20;theGameActof 1671,326'.33
car.II, c.25,$$ 1,2,4,5,6,7; theActtoDisarmPapists, I w. & M., sess.l, c. 15,$$ 1,4
( 1 6 8 9 ) ;th e B i l l o fR i g h1ts,
w .& M .,Sess.2,c.2,$$1,9( 16s9) ;theGamActof e r cs 2,4
& 5 w . & M . , c . 2 3 ,$ $ 1 , 3 , 4 , 5 , 7 , 1 0 ; t h e a c t r e p e a l i n g t h e b a n o n h a i l - s h o t , 6 & , 7 w i l / . .
il, c. 13,$$ 1, 3 (1695);andtheGameAct of 1706,5Ann.,c. 14,$$ l, 3, 5.

7.rcop"*on v. Gallant,24Eng.
Rep.404, 407,|p. wms. Rep.314(ch. 17l6); id. at 405
(quotingstatute)(emphases added);seeSinger,2A SutherlønãE+l.O+, at220(,'Copeman .
. . establishedthe rule that the preamblecouldnot be usedto restrict the effect of thè words
ry9d in thepurview.").In Ryall v. Rolle,26Eng.Rep.107,1 Atk¡msRep. 165(Ch. l74g), '
althoughthe questionwasnot at issue,seeid. at 116(Lee,C.J.);id. at 178(Hardwicke,
Ch.),somejudgesvoiceddisagreement withCopeman'sinterpref¿tion of that statute
becauseof the great"inconvenience"it would causeto cornmercialarrangementssuchas
trusts,agency,andbailment,but they still recognizedthe generalrule,seeid. at ll3
(Parker,C.B.) (recogniznganothercaseholding'[t]hat thepreambleshallnot restrainthe
enactingclause"andrecognizíngthatCopeman"explodedthenotion of the preamble's
govemingthe enactingclause,"but addingthat "if thenot resfiainingthe generalityof the
enactingclausewill be attendedwith aninconvenience, thepreamblèshailrestrainít'); id.
at I l8 (Hardwicke,Ch.) (agreeingwith parker).

" King v. athos,8Mod. Rep.136,144(K.8. 1723). seeid.(Forrescue, J.) (,,[I]tmusrbe


admitted,thata preamblemay be a goodexpositorof a statute;but what wasofferedon the
othersideis not properlya preamble,but only introductiveto an enactingpart of a statute:
besides. . . preamblesareno morethanrecitalsof inconveniences, whicñ ão not exclude
anyotherto which a remedyis givenby the enactingpart.");Kinøstonv. Clark,26 Eng.

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Rep.526,527,2 Atþns Rep.204(Ch. l74l) ("Therearemanycaseswheretheenacting


part in a statuteextendsfurther thanthepreambleevenin criminal matters. . . .u).

73I Blackstone at *59-60.SeeCrespígny v. W'ittenoom,l}}Eng.Rep.1304,1305,4Term


Rep.7_91 (K.8. 1792)(Buller, J.) ("I agreethat thepreamblecannotcontoul the enacting
part of a statute,which is expressedin clearandunambiguousterms.But if any doubtarise
on thewordsof the enactingpart,thepreamblemaybe resortedto, to explanit."); id. at
1306(Grose,J.) ("Thoughthepreamblecannotcontroulthe enactingclause,we may
comp¿Ire it with the restof theAct, in orderto collectthe intentionof the Legislature.").

74 Kent,I Commentaries at516.SeeMilts v. Wilkins,STEng.Rep.822, 822-23,6Mod.


Rep.62 (Q.8. 1703)("[T]he title is not the law,but thenameor descriptiongivento it by
the makers:just asthe preambleof a statuteis no part thereof,but containsgènerallythe
motivesor inducements thereof.");seea/soSinger,2A,Sutherland$ 47.04,at22l-22; id. at
224-25('The preamblecanneitherlimit nor extendthe meaningof a statutewhich is clear.
Similarl¡ it cannotbeusedto createdoubtor uncertainty.").

75JosephStory | Commentaries
on theConstitutionof the (JnitedStates$g 459-460,at
443-M (1833;reprint1991).

76Jacobson
v. Massachusetts,lgT
U.S. 11,22(1905).

77See[1.5.TermLimits,Inc. v. Thornton,sl4
U.S.77g,821n.31,838(1995);id. at846&
n.l (Thomas,J., dissenting);seealsostenbergv. carhart,53Ou.s. 914,953(2000)
(Scalia,J.,dissenting).

78N.H. Const.art. I, t7 (1784),reprintedrnFrancis


$ NewtonThorpe,4 TheFederaland
StateConstítutions,Coloníal Charters,and Other OrganicLaws 2455(1909;reprint I9g3).

79Sr"EugeneVolokl¡ TheCommonpløce SecondAmendment,T3


N.Y.U. L. Rev.793,
798,804-05,808-09(1998);Emerson,270
F.3d,at 234n.32.

80Mass.Const.pt. I, 21 (1780),reprinted
$ ín 3 Fed.and StateConsts.at 1892;N.H:
Const.art.I, $ 30 (1784),reprintedín 4 Fed.andStateConsts.at2457; Vt. Const.ch. I, g
l6 (1786),repríntedín 6 Fed.and StateConsts.at3753..

8l S""Volokh, 73 N.Y.U. L. Rev. at794-95,799-8-Q0.


As with statutes,constitutional
prefacesandoperativelanguageoften do not matchexactly,the latter sometimesbeing
overinclusivecomparedto the declarationandsometimesunderinclusive.Seeid. at 801-07
(providingexamples).

82CreatingtheBitl of Rights:TheDocutnentary
Recordfrom the FirstFederal Congress
12(HelenE. Veit et.al. eds.,1991)(emphasis
added).
on
"' Madison, Notesof Debatesat 639(Sept l4). Mason'sproposalwasdefeated,apparently
on the groundthat it improperlyimpugnedsoldiers.Id. at63940.

84Athos,SMod. Rep.at
f44.

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"ii

85TheNinth Circuit n Silveiraprovided


only oneparagraphon the properrelationship
betweena prefaceand operativelanguage,concludingthafthe lattermuit be read"to
implementthepolicy"of theformer.See3l2F.3d,atl07S.

86UnìtedStates
v. Miller,307 U.S. 174,l7g (1939).

87Sr", e.g.,Sílveíra,312F.3dat
1069-72

ll tl9øt* v. King, 364F.3d 1025,103I (9th Cir. 2004)(Goutd,J.,joined by O'Scannlain,


Kleinfeld,Tallman,andBe4 J.r.,dissentingfrom denialof rehearingen banc).

89Athor,SMod. Rep.at 144.

nl
fu!(opel, 93 Mich. L. Rev.at 1355("[O]ne of thereasonsCongressguaranteed the
right of the peopleto keepandbeararnx¡was so that a popularmilitia could be drawn from
fu.b9¿t ofthe people.")(footrroteomitted).Thus,the Si[veiracourt's descriptionof the
and-organizedmilitary force," 3l2F.3dat 1069,is technically
militia as"the state-created
truebut critically incomplete,becauseit ignoresthe compositionof themilitia.

91on theformerdistinction,see
u.s. const. art. I, $ B,cls. lz-16;art. I, $ 10,cl. 3; art.tr, $
2, cl. l; amend.V; Articlesof Confed.art.VI (contrastinga "body of forces"with "a well
regulatedanddisciplinedmilitia, suffrcientlyarmedandaccoutered."); Authorityof
Presídentto sendMilitia Into a ForeignCountry,zg op.Att'y Gen.322,322 6g|z)
(Wickersham, A.G.) ("[T]he militia hasalwaysbeenconsiderêdandtreatedasa military
body quite distinct and different from the Regularor standingarmy.").

el Sggtvtutcolm,ToKeepandBear at 125(discussingconcernsof EnglishWhigs afterthe


EnglishRevolutionof 1688-1689 to mainøtna cittzens'militia asopposedto a ielect one);
id. at95-97, 103,105(discussing purgesandselectivedisarmamenfôfmilitia by CharlesII
andJamesII); id. at 63 (discussing
CharlesII's selectmilitia).

93Madison Notesof Debatesat 478,483-84(Aug.


, l8).
9aId. at515(Aug. 23). JohnAdamsalsopraised
a militia of thewholepeople,asopposed
to a selectband in worksthathe publishedn 1776and1787. Seebelow,PartIII.B.I.

95FederalistNo.46, at32l (J.Madison).


Thepopulationof all white malesagedl6 and
overin the 1790censuswas813,298,makingMadison'snumbera fair approximationof the
citizenmilitia.,See
U.S.Dept.of Commerce,
Bureauof the Census,I Historical Statistics
of
the UnitedStates16(1975).

96Federalist No. 29,at183-85(4. Hamilton).

97| Th" Debateon the Constítution7l}(Bernard


Bailyn ed., 1993).

982 ¡d. at 507.For Ramsey'sbiography,


seeid. at 1009.

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. l

99"Atistid"s," Remørkson theProposedPlan of a Federal


Governmenl(1788),reprinted
in 15Doc. Hist. at 522,533;seeid. at 518-20(noteregardingcirculationandresponses).

10010Doc. Hist. atl3L2(John P. Kaminski & Gaspare


J. Saladinoeds.,1993)(June16,
1788).

r0r Fed"rol Førmer No.18 (1788),repríntedin 2 The


CompleteAntiFederalist 341-42
QlerbertJ. Storinged., l98l); seealso No.3 (1787),id. at242.Publius(Hamilton)
recognizedtheFederalFarmer letters¿rsamongthe bestof the Anti-Federalists'.,See
FederalístNo. 68,at 457-58.

r02Act of May 8, l7gz,ch. 33, 1-2,1 Stat.at27l-72;


$$ see2 Tucker'sBlackstoneat*409
n.1.

10310U.S.C. 311(a)(2000)(includingin themilitia


$ malesatleast17
"all able-bodied
yearsof ageand . . . under45 yearsof age,"both citizensandthose"who havemadea
declarationof intentionto become"citizens,certainmenbetween4l and64,and"female
citizensof the United Stateswho are membersof the NationalGuard').

104W"brt"r, AmericanDictionary(unpaginated)
(emphasis
added).

los I Blackstone
at *134,138,413.

106¿¡1.I, 8, cl. 15.


$
10729 Op. Att'y Gen.at 322;seePerpichv. Department Defense,496U.S.334, 341-44
of
(ree0).
108307 U.S.at 179(emphases added);seeid. at |79-82(collectinghistoricalsupport);see
Presserv. Illínoís, 116U.S.252,265 (1886)("It is undoubtedlytruethat all citizenscapable
of bearingarmsconstitutethe reservedmilitary force or reservemilitia of the United States
aswell asof the States.");Marylandv. UnítedStates,3SlU.S.41, 46 (1965)(describing
pre-WorldWar I militia as"a citizenarmy").

109S"e,e.g.,Silveira,312F.3dat 1069-72

110Aristocrotis, TheGovernmentofNature Delineated,or An Emct Picture of theNew


FederalConstitution(1788),reprintedin 3 CompleteAntïFed. at202.

lll Luttd,3l Ga.L. Rev.at25,26.

!r2 SeeSilveírav.Locþer,328 F.3d 567,57g(9thCir.)(Kleinfeld,J.,joined by Kozinski,


O'Scannlain,andT.G. Nelson,JJ.,dissentingfrom denialof rehearingen banc)("Thepanel
seemsto imaginethat a well regulatedmilitia is a peopledisarmeduntil the government
puts gunsin their handsafter summoningthemto service."),cert. denied, 124S. Ct. 803
(2003).

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WHETHER TIIE SECOND ^MENDMENT SECURESAN INDTVIF-T.ALRIGHT Page74 of 103

113Seebelow,PartIV.A, for St. George


Tucker'sdiscussion
of a similarpoint.
rr4 307U.S.at t7}-7g (emphasisadded).

1ls Va. Decl.of Rights 13(1776),


$ repríntedin 7 Fed.andStateConsts.at3814.

I t6 N.Y. const. g 40 (1777),reprínted


in 5 Fed.andstateconsts. at2637.

lt7 F"d"rolíst No. 29,atl83-84 (4.


Hamilton)(emphases
added).
rL8Sentiments on a PeøceEstablishment(1783),repríntedin 3 TheFounders'Constitution
129(Phillip B. KurlandandRalphLemer eds.,1987)(emphases added).
ll9 F"d. Farmer No.3, reprintedin2
CompleteAntí-Fed.at242;Fed.Farmer No. 18,
reprintedín id. at342 (emphasesadded).

120Antonin Scalia,Response,ín A Matter


of Interpretation:Federal Courtsand theLaw
r37 n.l3 (1997).

121U.S. Const.art.I, 8, cl. 15;see


$ id.amendV (discussing
militia servicein "'Waror
public danger").

r22 Blackstone at *151;e.g.,Mass.const.pt. I, art. 16(1780),reprintedin 3 Fed.and


StateConsts.atl892. Similarly,the EnglishDeclarationof Rights,well known to the
FoundingGeneration,seebelow, Part trI.A, chargedKing JamesII with having soughtto
"subvertandextþate" the "liberties of this kingdom"by taking severalactionJ"uttðrþ and
directly contraryto" the "freedomof this realm."I w. & M., Sess.2, c.2, $ I (1689).

1235"" alsoMalcolm,To KeepandBear at50-53,115-16,123(militraofficers'useof


discretionarypowerto disarm);id. at 45-46(disarmamentby CharlesII prior to 1662);id. at
85 (disarmament by militia in 1678);id. at 103(useof militia by JamesII to disarm
suspiciouspersons);id. at 105(attempteduseof militia in 1686to disarmby enforcing
gameact);id. at 31 (in Civil War); seealso íd. at92-93,95 (in responseto 1683Rye House
plot; confiscatedarmsgiven to militia); id. at 100(disarmamentby CharlesII in western
Englandearly in reign, and in responseto Rye Houseplot later).Efforts to disarmand
underminethe militia alsoincludedrequiring its membersto "store" their armsin
government magazines. Seeid.at 38, 78-79,96-97; seealsoid. at3,5, l0-l I (discussing
private ownershipandstorageprior to EnglishCivil War, and failed plansto requirepublic
storage).The actionsof white militias towardfreedblacksin the Southafter the American
Civil'Warweresimilar.SeePartfV.C, below.

r24Ya. Dect.of Rights t3 (1776),reprinted


$ in 7 Fed.øndStateConsts.at3814;seealso
Md. Const.,Decl.of RightsS 25 (1776),repríntedin 3 íd. at 1688("That a well-regulated
militia is theproperandnafuraldefenceof a freegovernment.").

L25| D"bote on the Const.atTll-12.

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\ryHETIIERTHE SECONDd MENDMENT SECURESAN IND[V[I-'\AL RIGHT PAgE75Of 103

126pt¿. Farmer No. 18,reprinted


inz completeAnti-Fed. at34l-42.

127Ja*es Burgh,Political Disquísitions,


reprinted in part in 3 Founders'Const.at 126,
125;seeFederalistNo. 56 at382 n.* (J. Madison);seealso2 Tucker'sBlacftstoneat*245
n.7 (quotingBurgh'sDísquísitions).In bothpassages, BurghwaslooselyquotingAndrew
Tl"l9tqt, a prominentmember of the ScottishParliamentprior to unionwith nngtanAin
1707.SeeA Discourseof Government with relationto Milítias (1698),reprinteãlz Andrew
Fletcher,Politícøl Worlçs2l-22 (JohnRobertsoned.,1997);Speeches by-amemberof the
Pørliament,No. 7 (1703),repríntedin id. at 149-50.RegardingFletcherandBurgh,see
David ThomasKonig, Ihe SecondAmendment:A Missing TransatlanticContørtfor the
HístoricalMeaningof 'the Right of thePeopleto KeepandBearArms," 22Law &Hist.
Rev. I 19, 125-26,136-39(2004).

128Burgh,PolitícalDisquisítions,reprínted
ín 3 Founders'Const.at 124,126.As Fletcher
put it: "I cannotsee,why armsshouldbe deniedto any manwho is not a slave,sincethey
arethe only true badgesof liberly . . . neithercanI understandwhy any manthat hasarms,
shouldnot be taughtthe useof them."A Discourseof Governmeni,reprinted ínEletcher,
Polítical Worksat23.

'?'^*"duty to seryein the militia


andthe right to possess or carСweaponsfor self-
defensewererelatedbut distinct in colonialAmerica.Onemight havethe latter without the
former.,SeeCottrol& Diamond,80 Geo.L.I. at325-37(survèyingcoloniallawsand
explainingthe developmentof "the view that the securityof the statewasbestachieved
throughthe armingof all free citizens,"regardlessof eligibility for militia service);seealso
PartII.B.l, above(discussingright to "keep'larmsfor privatepurposes).

1301 Blackstone at *144. Blackstone


alsodescribedthefundamental"right of personal
security"asincludingprotectionagainst"lossof limb," so asto guarda man,sãbility "to
protecthimself from externalinjuries in a stateof nature,"and condemnedany destruction
of limbsas"a manifestbreachof civil liberty,uid. at * 129, 130;andhe setoui thebasic
common-lawrule of self-defense, "theprimarylaw of nature,"by which it is lawful for a
person"forcibly attackedin his personor property. . . to repel force by force" without being
liablefor breachof the peaceor a resultinghomicide,3 id. at *3-4. The importanceof this
righÍ of self-defensewasreinforcedby thJabsenceoi*y constitutionalduty of govenrment
to defendcitizens'lives,liberty, or property.SeeDeShaneyv. Winnebøgo CòuntySoc.
Servs. Dept.,489U.S.189,195-97(1989).

13l¡o¡n Locke,sec-ond. Treatiseof Governmenl$$ l8-19, atlz-13 (Richard-H.cox ed.,


1982)(1689);seealso t¿ $$ 204-10,at126-29(similar).BlackstoneandLockedisagreed
4 Blackstoneat *181-82;seealso I id. at
on the exactscopeof the right of self-defense.
*251. Lockewas,afterBlackstoneandMontesquieu, thewriter whom Americanpolitical
writersof the Foundingcitedmost.Malcolm,ToKeepandBear at 142&214 n.44.His
thinkingis particularlyevidentin theDeclarationof Independence.Seealso 2 Tucker's
Blackstone at *161&n.25.

1325"" Van Alstyne,43 DukeL.I. atl243 (T\esecond


Amendment"looksto anultimate
relianceon the commoncítizenwho hasa right to keepandbear arms. . . as an essential
sonrceof security[for] a free state.");seealsoLun4 3l Ga.L. Rev. at24.

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WHETHERTIIE SECOND ' MENDMENT SECURESAN INDMI--'AL RIGHT Page76of 103
. ' .
r33Cf.PlannedParenthoodv.Casey,505
U.S. 833,847(lgg2)(rejectingargumentthatthe
personal"liberlyu that the FourteenthAmendmentprotects"encompasses no morethan
thoserights alreadyguaranteedto the individual againstfederalinterferenceby the express
provisionsof theJirst eíghtAmendments")(emphasisadded)(citation omitted);Moore v.
City of EaßtCleveland,43l U.S. 494,502(1977)(pluralityopinion)(similar,quotingPoe
v. Ullman,367U.S. 497,542-43(1961)(Harlan,J.,dissenting));Johnsonv. Elseúrãger,
339U.S.763,784(1950)(describingFirst,Second,Fourth,Fifth, andSixthAmendments
asthe "civil-rightsAmendments");Robertsonv.Baldwin, 165U.S. 275,281(1897)
(describingBill of Rights as embodying"certainguarantiesandimmunitieswhich we had
inheritedfrom our English ancestors").While somemight arguethat, asan original mîtteç
the First Amendment'sEstablishmentClause(which makesno referenceto any "right" or
"freedom")was an exceptionto this rule, the SupremeCourthasheld that it too createsan
individualright, applicableevenagainstStates.SeeZelmanv. Simmons-Harrís,536 U.S.
639,678Q002)(Thomas,J.,concurring);Eversonv.Boardofùd.,330u.s. l,B(1947);
DavidCurrie,TheConstitutíonîn theSupremeCourt: TheSecondCentury339-40(1990).

134Cooley,GeneralPrincíples at}00.

135Story,Abrídgement 984,at698(commencing
$ discussionof FirstthroughFourth,and
EighthtbroughTenth Amendments).

1365""4 Blackstoneat*ll2n.a; JohnO. McGinnís,


TheOnceandFutureProperty-Based
Vísionof theFirst Amendment,63U. Chi.L. Rev; 49,92-94(1996).

137Co*por" I Blackstoneat *138 ('The


third absoluteright, inherentin everyEnglishman,
is that of properly: which consistsin the fueeuse,enjoyment,and dispos¿lof atl his
acquisitions, without any conüolor diminution,saveonly by the lawsof the land.")
(emphasis added),with id. at *144 (recognizing"the nght of havingand usingarms")
(emphasis added);see above,PartII.B.I (discussing Englishcasesin 1700'sapprovingthe
"keeping"of armsfor defenseof one'sself andhome).

138I W. & M., Sess.2, c. 2, l, paras.5


$ &,7 of thelist of rights.

1395"" also lBlackstone at*143-M(similar);


JeanL. De Lolme,2 The RkeandProgress
of theEnglßh Constitution886-87(4. J. Stephens ed., 1838)(1734)(notingthatEnglish
Bill of Rights "expresslyensuredto individualsthe right of publicly preferringcomplaints
againstthe abusesof the govemment,and,moreover,of being providedwith armsfor their
own defence,-lland thenquotingI Blackstoneat*lM regardingtheserights).

1405"" 4 id. at*145-4g(discussing the followingmisdemeanor breachesof thepeace:


aftay, riot, rout, unlawful assembly,
tumultuouspetitioning,forcibleenûryor detainer,and
goingarmedwith dangerousor unusualweaponsto the terrorof thepeople).Among
feloniesagainstthe public peace,Blackstonefirst listedviolationof the Riot Act against
"riotousassemblingof twelvepersons"andthendescribed"unlawfulhunting"in certain
parks,which involvedbeingdisguisedand"armedwith offensiveweapons."Id. at*142-44.

l4l 2 Tucker'sBlaclcstoneat*143-44m.38-41.
Seealso UnitedStatesv. Cruikshank,g2
U.5.542,551-53(1876)(analyzngthetwo rightssimilarly);Loganv. UnítedStates,144

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WHETIIER THE SECOND ^\@NDMENT SECURESAN INDIVII-'.AL RIGHT Page77of 103

U.S.263,286-87(1892)(same).

r42FederalistNo. 29,at 185(A..Hamilton);see


also id. No.46, at32l-22(J. Madison).

la3U.S.Const.art.I, 10,cl. 3. SeeHouston


$ v. Moore,lS U.S.(5 rWheat.)l,52 (1g20)
(Story,J., dissenting);Va. Ratif.Conv.,in l0 Doc. Hist.at 1307(remarksof JohnMarshall,
June16).

l$,SeeStory,Abridgement 593,at 425;Va.


$ Ratif.Conv.,in l0 Doc.Híst. atl304, l31l
(remarksof JamesMadison,June16); id. at 1306-07(remarksof JohnMarshall,same).

r4sCo*pore 9 Doc. Hist.at 1074(JohnP. Kaminski


& GaspareJ. Saladinoeds.,1990)(H.
Lee,June9), id. at ll02 (Randolph,Junel0), l0 id. at 1273(Madison,Iune l4), ìd. at
1306-08(Marshall,Junel4); wíth 9 id. at 957-58,1066(PatrickHenry,June5 &, 9), l0 id.
at 1270-71(George Mason,Junel4), id. at 1305(William Grayson,June16).HenryLee
shouldnot be confusedwith his Anti-FederalistcousinRichardHenryLee.

146Story,Commentaru'es1202,at85-86.
$
r47 l8U.S. (5 Wheat.)I (1820).Seepaftfv.B.l,below.

148Perpich,496 U.S. at 353-54 (footnotesomitted).

r4e3t2F.3dat logl n.43.

150As we explainbelowin PartIII.C, severalstate


ratiffing conventions unsuccessfully
proposedsimilar languagein suggestedamendments distinct from thosesecuringthe right
to beararms.

r5r Silveírav.Locþer,328 F.3d567,580(9th Cir.) (Kleinfeld,J.,joined Kozinski,


by
O'Scannlain, andT.G. Nelson,JJ.,dissentingfrom denialof rehearingen banc),cert.
deníed,1245.Ct. 803(2003).

rszLovingv. UnitedStates,5lTU.S.748, 766(1996).

153Rob-ertson
v. Baldwín, 165U.S.275, 281(1897),discussed
furtherbelowin PartIV.D.

1545"" I Blackstone
at * 15l.

155The Founderswere well awareof the eventsleadingup to the Declaration.


A delegateat
the Massachusetts Ratifying Convention,warningagainstoverreactingto the weaknessof
the Articlesof Confederation,pointedto the Restoration,
in whichthe people,"so vexed,
harassedandworn down . . . [had] run madwith loyalty, andwould havegiven Charlesany
thing he could haveasked." I Debateon the Const.at 897(remarts of CharlesTurner,Jan.
17, 1788).A delegateat Virginia'sconventiondrewthe oppositelesson:The new
Constitutionwould preventthe anarchythat had led Englandinto the armsof CharlesII. 2
id. at756 (remarksof ZachanahJobnston, Iune25,1788).

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l

ls6 13& 14 car.Il, c. 3, g 14.

l5TMalcolm,ToKeepønd\earat36,38,43,45-4g,50-53,85,
100,l15-16,123;seealso
id. at92-93,95;Lois G. Schwoerer,TheDeclaratíonof Ríghts,168g,at76 (1981)("Charles
II hadmadeeffectiveuseof' themilitia acts"to ûy{o snuffoutpolitical andreligious
dissent,"disarmingindividualsandtownsandconfiscatingweapons). He hadbegundoing
so assoonashe assumed thethrone.An interim actin 1661approvedhis actionsand
providedindemnityto militiamen. 12 Car. II, c. 6, $ 3 (favorablyrecognizingthat "divers
armshavebeenseizedandhousessearchedfor arms");cf. FederalßtNo.69, at 465n. (4.
Hamilton) (discussing166l act).

158Mulcolm,ToKeepandBear at36-3g.

159Id. at63.SeealsoSchwoerer,
Declaratíonat75-76(describing
CharlesII's actions,
includingdisarmament,
andnotingrise of complaintsfrom Commonsbeginningin 1663).

160Malcolm, ToKeepandBear at 12;


seeíd. at 69-76;Schwoerer,
Declaration at78
(describingit as"the moststringentand comprehensiveof the gamelaws") (intemal
quotationmarksomitted).

16122 & 23 Car lI, c. 25 3


, $ þroviding that all who did not haveestate"of the clearyearþ
value of onehundredpounds"per year were "not allowedto haveor keep for themselves,or
any otherpersonor persons,any guns,bows,greyhounds. . . or otherengines").

1625"" 4 Blaclstoneat *55 (explaining


variouslegaldisabilitieson certainRoman
Catholics,including severaldatingfrom English Revolutionor earlier,by statingthat such
persons"acknowledgea foreignpower, superiorto the sovereigntyof the kingdom"); íd. at
*58 (hopingthat "a time . . . shouldarrive" soonwhenit wouldbe safeto
"review and
softentheserigorousedicts").

1635"" Malcolm,ToKeepandBeørat 95-106;


Schwoerèr,Declarationatll-73,75-76; see
alsoFederalístNo.26, at 166(A. Hamilton);Marcus No.4 (Jameslredell) (1788),
reprtntedin I Debateon the Const.at39l; Mass.Ratif.Conv.,in id. at904 (remarftsof
ThomasDawes,Jr.,Jan.24,1788).

1641X" Bill of Rightsis at I W. & M.,


Sess.2, c.2(1689).Its firstthreesections,except
- --for the initial preamble,
consistof the Declaration,se-e^
$chwoerer, Declaration at295(App.
l, reprintingDeclaration),andit recountsthe eventsof theRevolution.Seealso I W. & M.,
Sess.1, c. l, $ 2 (1689)(notingpresentationandacceptance of crown,andproclaiming
Parliamentto beregularfrom thatdate);íd. c.6 (establishing coronationoatÐ; 1 Blackstone
at*128,152,211-16,245 (discussingevents);FederalßtNo.84,at578(4. Hamilton)
(similar).

165F"derolist No.26, at 165-66.^See


Schwoerer,Declaratíonat289(Americansgreetedthe
revolutionandDeclaration"with enthusiasm.
").
166Similarly,the sameParliamentenacted
a law providingthata "papistor reputedpapist"
could "haveor keep. . . suchnecessary
weapons,asshallbe allowedto him by orderof the

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justicesof thepeace. . .þr thedefenceof hishouseor person."I 'W.& M., Sess.1, c. 15,$
4 (1689)(emphasis added).

1675"" Malcolm, To KeepøndBear


at 86-89(noting effect of wealthqualificationbut also
dearthof prosecutions merelyfor possession).
Blaclatonecomplainedthattherewas"fifty
timesthepropertyrequiredto enablea man to kill a partridge,ãsto vote for a knight of the
shire."4 Blackstoneat*l75.In addition,theseclausesprobablyreferredto two statutes
from the 1540'srestrictingownershipanduseof shorthandguns basedon wealth,outlawing
shot,andregulatingtheuseofgunsincitiesortowns, see33Hen.VI[,c.6(1541);2&3
Edw.VI, c. 14(1548),andtheymay alsohavereferredto theMilitia Act, seeMalcolm,To
KeepandBear atl20.

168Lois G. Schwoerer,To Hold andBear


Arms: TheEnglishPerspective,'l6Chi.-Kent L.
Pteu.27,59(2000).Sheseemsto misunderstand the individual-rightview asrequiringan
unlimitednght.Seeid. at 56,60.

169Schwoere4 Declaration at283; seeMalcolm"ToKeepandBear atllg-20. Seealso


JeanL. De Lolme,2 The RßeandProgressof theEnglßh Constítutioz886(4. J. Stephens
ed.,1838)(1784)(Declaration"expresslyensuredto individualstheright of þetition andl
of beingprovidedwith armsfor their own defence").

170I Blackstone
at *271.

r7r 3"" FederalistNo. 84,at 578-79(A. Hamilton)(arguinguthat


bills of rightsarein their
origin, stþlations betweenkings andtheir subjects,abridgmentsof prerogativein favor of
privilege, reservationsof rights not surrenderedto the prince," and "[s]uch . . . wasthe
declarationof rightspresented by the lordsandcommonsto theprinceof Orangein 1688,
andafterwardsthrown into the form of an act of parliamentcalledthe bill of rights").

r72Silveira,328F.3dat 582(Kleinfeld J.).

1735 Ann.,c.l4,g 3 (1706);see4&5 w. &M.,


c.23, g 3 (1693)(similar).parliamenr
alsorepealedthe laterof the two statutesof the 1540'smentionedin note 167,notingits
desuetude. 6 &.7 Will. III, c.13, $ 3 (1695).Enforcementof the otherwas,at leastin the
1600's,lax andselective.^See Malcolm,ToKeepandBear at80-81,87. Effortsto revisethe
Militia Act failed but the right in the Bill may havesufücedto resfiainthe King from
disarmingProtestants . Seeid. at 123-25;seealso I Blackston e at *27l; Schwoerer,
-7
Declarationat 75 8, 267, 283.

174Rexv. Gardner,87 Eng.Rep.1240,1241,7


Mod. Rep. 27g(K.8. l73g).

r1s ltring1fr"ldv.
stratford,g6Eng.Rep.787,787-88, sayerRep.l5 (K.8. 1752)(Lee,c.J.,
citingRexv. Gardner,2StrangeRep.1098(K.8. 1738));Mallockv. Eastly,87Eng.Rep.
1370,1374,7 Mod. Rep.482 (c.P.l7M), respectively; seealsopartII.B.l, above
(discussing useof "keep"in theseandothercases);Malcolm,ToKeepsnd Bear at 128
(quotingcommentator of early 1800'sreaffirmingrule of thesecases).In addition,it appears
that courtsstrictly interpretedindictmentsunderthe gamelaws.,SeeKing v. Sílcot,87 Eng.
Rep.186,186n.(b),3 Mod. Rep.280 (K.8. 1690)(reporrer'snotefrom 1793).

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. l

176Mailock,87Eng.Rep.at 1374;
Wingfield,96Eng.Rep.at 7g7 (Lee,C.J.).

r77"Legalityof the LondonMilitary Foot-Association"


'William (Iuly 24,1780),reprintedin
Blizard,DesultoryReflectionson Police: Withan Essayon thìeMeansof
PreventingCrimesandAmendingCriminals59,59-60(1785)(italicsomitted).For
background, seeParttr.8.2 above.The Recorderfoundit "a matterof somedifficulty to
definethepreciselimits and extentof the rights of the peopleof this realmto beararms,and
to instructthemselves in theuseof them,collectively."Id. at 59.At the very least,he
opined,sucha groupneededto (l) havea "lawfril" "professed purposeandobject,"(2)
"demean themselves in a peaceableandorderlymanner"consistentwith that purpose,(3)
not assemblein numbersthat "manifestþ andgreatlyexceed"that purpose;and(4) not "act
without the authorityof the civil magistrate"exceptto suppress"súddên,violent, and
feloniousbreachesof the peace."Id. at62 (italicsomitted).Seealso William Hawkins,I I
Treatíseon thePleasof the Crownch. 63, at 136,g l0 (1724;reprint 1972)(notinglegality-
of person"arm[ing]himselfto suppress dangerous Rioters,Rebels,or Enemies"an¿
"gndeavour[ing] to suppressor resistsuchDisturbersof the Peaceor Quietof theRealm");
id. ch.65,at 161,$ 2 I (notingright to do so whenassistingJusticeof Þeaceagainstriot).

1785"" William Blac*stone,2Commentaries


on theLawsof England*412n.8(William
DraperLewised., 1900)(reprintingannotationof EdwardChristian).Christian's
posthumous Blackstonewaspublishedin 1793-95,see Malcolm,To KeepandBear atl34,
2l0,and availablein Americ4 seeI Tuclær'sBlackstoneat*145 n.42.Álthoughthelaw
wasclear,somequestionedhow muchasa practicalmatterthe revision of the gamelaws
hadbenefitedcommoners,Ítr¡we explainin thediscussíon
of the PennsylvaniaConstitution
belowin Partm.8.2.

179I Blackstone
at *l2l; id. at*123,124.

r80Jd. at*l23.He contrasted


"relative"individualrights,"which areincidentto þersons]
asmembersof society,and standingin variousrelationsto each other."Id.

r8r J¿. at*124-28.

182Id. at*I29.These reappearthroughout


the AmericanConstitution,in general
protectionsagainstdeprivationsof "life, liberly,or property,without dueprocessof law"
andin specificrights. See,for example,St. GeorgeTucker'sfootnotesannotating
Blackstone'sexpositionof the threeprincipal rights with parallelsin the Constitution,2
Tuclrer'sBlackstoneat * 129,133-40.

1831 Blackstone
at *140-41.

r845"" id. at*141.

18sJd. at*141,143-44.

186¡¿. at*144.

1875"" also4 id. at*55-58 (elsewhere


describingprohibitionsagainstcertainRoman

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WHETHERTHE SECONDAMENDMENT SECURESAN INDIVIDT-IALRIGHT Page81 of 103

Catholicskeepingarmsashopefully temporarysuspensions
of rights). He summarizedthe
militia in Chapter13, I id. at*4lZ-13.

1 8 8 1¿ a t*l M.

189¡¿. at *130.Seeid. at*L3l(summarizing


commonlaw'sspecialprotectionfor,'those
limbs andmembersthat may be necessaryto a man in ordertõ ¿efen¿himself or annoyhis
enemy").

r9o2 id. at*412,413.

l9r 4 id. at*416;see2 id. at*415-16(forest


lawsproduced"the mosthorrid tyranniesand
oppressions").

r922 id. at*4l2.As an example,


he citeda popularbook,by a bishop(andthuslord),that
praisedbanning"PeasantsandMechanics"from huntingg¿tme:"It wãs not at all for the
public Goodto suffer [them] . . . to run up anddownthe WoodsandForests,armed;which .
. . drawsthem on to RobberyandBrigandage:Nor to permit the populace,in Townsand
Cities,to have, and carryArms attheir pleasure;which would giveõpportunity and
encouragement to Sedition,andCommotions."rWilliam'Warburton, I TheAllianceBetween
Churchand State:Or, the NecessityandEquity of An EstablishedReligion ønda TestLaw
Demonstrated324 (London4th ed. 1766).

1934 Blackstone
at *174-75.

1945""2 id. at*4ll-12(approving


as"natural"a banon unauthorized huntingon private
properly);see4 id. at *174 (beinglesscritical of the "forestlaw," which simpiypróhibited
huntingin the king's forests).

1955"" 4 id. at *144 (unlawfulhunting-


beingdisguisedand"armedwith offensive
\treapons" in breachofpeaceandto terrorof public);id. at*145 (affray (publicfighting),
includingattackwith or drawingof weaponon churchgrounds);id. at4'l4B(forciUteeãtry
or detainer,"such asis carriedon andrnaint¿inedwith force,with violence,andunusual
weapons");id. at*149 ("riding or goíngarmed,withdangerous or unusualweapons. . . by
terriffing" the people);seealso id. at*146-47(riots,routs,unlawful assemblies,and
tumultuouspetitioninÐ; id. at *168 (quasi-nuisance of "making,keeping,or cariage,of too
*lB2
targea guantityof gunpowderat onetime or in oneplaceor vehicle!);i¡ ia. at
(excusablehomicideby misadventure,suchas "wherea personqualified to keepa gun is
shootingat a mark andundesignedlykills a man:for the act is lawful, andthe etfeci is
merelyaccidental");3îd. at *4 (notinglimitationof self-defenseto "resistance"that "does
not exceedthe boundsof meredefenceandprevention").

196Uo¡t"dStotesv. Miller,307
U.S. 174, l7g-80(1939)(internalquotationmarksomitted).
^leeKates,82 Mich. L. Rev. at2l5-16 ("With slightvariations,the differentcolonies
imposeda duty to keeparmsandto musteroccasionallyfor drill upon virtually everyable-
bodiedwhite manbetweenthe ageof majorityanda dðsignated curoff age.Itioreover,the
duty to keeparmsappliedto everyhousehold, not just to thosecontainingpersonssubjectto
militia service.Thus,the over-agedandseamen, who wereexemptfrom militia servicê,

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WHETHERTHE SECOND'.\4ENDMENT SECURESAN INDIVIP'I{L RIGHT Page82 of 103

were requiredto keeparmsfor law enforcementandfor the defenseof their homesfrom


criminalsor foreignenemies.")(footnotesomitted).In Virginia,"Everyable-bodied
freeman,betweentheagesof 16and50, is enrolledin themilitia. . . . The law requires
everymilitia-manto providehimselfwith the armsusualin theregularservice."That
requirement"was alwaysindifferently compliedwith," andthemilitia's atmswere
"frequentlycalledfor to arm the regulars,"so that "in the lower partsof the counûy they are
entirelydisarmed."But "[i]n the middlecountrya fourthor fifth partof themmay have
suchfirelocls asthey hadprovidedto destroythe noxiousanimalswhich infest their farms;
andon thewestemsideof theBlue [R]idgethey aregenerallyarmedwith rifles." Thomas
Jefferson,Noteson theStateof Vírginia88 (V/illiam Pedened., 1954).For moreregarding
themilitia, seeabove,PartII.C.2-4.

r975"" Malcolm, To Keepand Bear at 139(quotingcolonial


statutesfrom RhodeIsland,
Virginia, andGeorgia);Kates,82 Mich. L. Rev.at216 (discussingGeorgialaw); id. at240
("[T]he EnglishGameActs . . . hadneverbeena part of thecoloniallaw"); 5 Tucker's
Blackstoneat*I75 n.l6 (describinggamelawsof Virginia,limitedto prohibitingtrespass
andconversionandestablishing huntingseasonfor deer).

r98SeeCottrol & Diamond,80 Geo.L.J. at323-27(notingthat


"thetraditionalEnglish
right" became"a muchbroaderAmericanone" aspart of "a moregenerallesseningof class,
religious, andethnicdistinctionsamongwhites in colonialAmerica,"but that "the law was
much more ambivalentwith respectto blacks"; surveyingvarying colonial laws regarding
right of blacksto carryweaponsor keepthem in their homes,andnoting usualexclusion
from militia duty,exceptin "timesof crisis");Malcolm,ToKeepandBear at 140-41("The
secondgroup[afterIndians]forbiddento possess weaponswereblackslaves,with
restrictionssometimesextendedto free blacks. . . . Northerncolonieswere ambivalent
aboutblackspossessing firearms";surveyingcoloniallawsanddrawingparallelto
England'sambivalenttreatmentof right of RomanCatholicsto havearrrs).

199BostonChronicleat363,col.2(Sepl lg,1768),quotedinStephen P. Halbrook,r4


Right to Bear Arms: Stateand Federal Bills of Rightsand ConstitutionølGuaranteesl-2
(1989).This resolutionwasrepublishedin the MarylandGazette. Seeíd. at6l.

200BostonGazette,andCountryJoumal at2,col.l (Jan.30,1769),quotedlnHalbrook,


Right to Bear at 6; seeBostonunderMìlitary Rule,1768-1769,asRevealedín a Journal of
the Tímes61 (OliverMortonDickersoned., 1936)(reprintingsamepÍrssage from Boston
EveningPost(Apr. 3,1769)).

201Su*rr"l Adams,BôstonGazette(Feb.27, 1769),reprintedin I TheFounderi'


Constitution90 (PhilipB. Kurland& RalphLernereds.,1987).AdamsquotedI Blackstone
at*143-44& 144.

202r'Bor¡on,March 17,"New York Joumal,Supplement at l, col. 3 (Apr. 13, 1769),


reprintedín BostonunderMilítary Rule at79; seeHalbrook, Ríghtto Bear at 7 (quoting
samepassage).

2033 L"gol Papersof JohnAdøms247-48(L. Kinvin Wroth & Hiller B. Zobeleds.,1965)


(quoting"Hawkinsp.71, $ 14').Forthe facts,seeíd-atI(note).Adamssecuredseveral
acquittals.
Id. at29.

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WHETHERTIIE SECOND \ßNDMENT SECURESAN INDIVII-'A.L RIGHT Page83 of 103

204Joht Adams,3 A Defence


of the Constitutionsof Governmentof the UnítedStatesof
America475 (1787} TheNinth Circuit selectivelyquotedthis sentênce to claimthatAãams
"ridiculed . . . an individual right to personalarms"andassertedthat "the general
availabilityof arms"would "'demolisheveryconstitution,and,laythe lawi prostrate,sothat
liberty canbe enjoyedby no man- it is a dissolutionof the government ."' Silveíra,3lZ F.3d
at 1085.In theseportions,Adamswasmerelyarguingagainstcommandof themilitiaby
privatepersonsor localities,while alsoexpresslyreiteratingthe right of armingfor privâte
selÊdefense.

'!t suHardy, 9 Harv.J.L.


&Pub. Pol'yat S9};HalbrooþRightto Bear atg,16,72.
Soldiersseizedprovincialarmoriesin CambridgeandCharlestown.In response,
"twent¡r
thousandYankeespickedup their musketsandheadedfor Boston"to confuontthe Britúh.
RobertA. Gross,TheMinutemenand Th:,eirWorld55 (1976).

2065"" First ContinentalCongress,


"Appealto the Inhabitantsof Quebec"(Oct. 1774),
reprintedín I AmericanPolitical WrítingDuríng theFoundíngEra, 1760-1805,at237
(CharlesS. Hyneman& DonaldS. Lutz eds.,1983)("Theinjuriesof Bostonhaveroused
andassociated everycolony.");Halbrooþ RíShtto Bear at 88-89(quotingwarningof South
Carolina'sgoverningbodyin 1774againstBritish "designof disarmingthepeoplJof
America" throughthe embargo).

207S""Gross,Minutemenat 59.In
Concord,"Minutementrainedtwice a weekon the
commonandcarriedtheir musketseverywhere,in the fields, in shops,evenin church."
lVhenthey weremusteredin March l775,lt "presented a revealingportraitof the
community.This tvasa citizenarmyof rural neighbors.. . . The Concordmilitia included
nearlyeveryonebetweenthe agesof sixteenandsixt¡r."Id. at69-70.

208Hardy,g Harv.J.L. &,Pub.Pol'y


at590-91;Malcolm,ToKeepandBear at145-46.

209Hardy,g Harv.J.L. &,Pub.Pol'y


atS9};HalbrooþRightto Bear at16.

2r0 | Jou*als of Congress


137(July6,1775)(1S00);seeHalbrook,Rightto Bearat 13-15;
Hardy,9Harv.I.L. &.Pub.Pol'y at59l.

zrL | 'IhePapersof GeorgeMason1725-1792,


at2l}-ll (RobertA. Rutlanded., 1970).

2r2¡¿. at2l2.

2r3Id. at229-il.

214S""Halbrook,Rightto Bear at29-30.

215RichardCaswell,William Hooper,
& JosephHewes,'To the Committeesof the Several
TownsandCountiesof theProvinceof North Carolina,"N.C. Gazette(Newburn),at2, col.
3 (July 7, 1775),excerptedin id. at29.

216See4 AdamsPapersat78n.6(note).

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WHETIIER THE SECOND \@NDMENT SECURESAN INDIVIT-:A,L RIGHT Page84 of 103

217¡o6t Adams,Thoughts
on Government (Apr.1776),reprintedin 4 id. at9t. This
pamphlet,writte¡ for political leadersin North Carolin4 Vírginia, andNew Jersey,was
widely reprintedanddiscussedfor severalyears.Seeid. at6i,68-72(note).

218Lefferfrom Greeneto
Jefferson(Nov. 20, t780), ín 4 ThePapersof ThomasJefferson
130-31(JulianP.Boyded.,l95l).

2195"",
!;E;,"ADemocratic Federalist,"Penn.Herald(Oct. 17, l7B7),reprintedin 2 Doc.
!Ißt. at 197 (arguingthat "a well-regulatedmilitia" is "sufficientfor everypurposeof
intemaldefense,"asshownby victoriesat LexingtonandBunkerHill); Va. nâtif. Conv.,ín
9 Doc.Híst.at 981(remarksof EdmundRandoþh,June6, l7S8) ("I will pay thelasttribute
of gratitudeto themilitia of my country:theypèrformedsomeofìhe mosìgallantfeats
during thelast war, and actedasnobly asmenenuredto otheravocations.o-ut¿be expected
to do: But, Sir, it is dangerous
to look to themasour soleprotectors.");Federalßt Ni. 25,at
16l-62 (4. Hamilton)þraising militias'valorbut emphasizing insufficiencyfor defense).
GeneralGreenerecognizedthat the militia should"nót þe] depended.rpon'*aprincipal
but employedasanAuxilliary." Letterto Jefferson,tn 4legercon pape-rsat l3l'.

220F"d"rolist No.46, at32l-22(J.


Madison).

221Thefust constitutions
of New Jersey,SouthCarolina,Georgi4 andNew york did not
¡ncfude separate bills of rights.Their constitutions
did protecta-fewrights,but did not
in{ude therightto armsor generalstatements regardingthe militia. SáefiemardSchwartz,
I Jhe Bill of Rights:A DocumentaryHístory256(t97tj CN.J.1776); id. at29t (Ga. 1777);
id. at 301(N.Y. 1777);id. at325 (S.C.l77S).Georgiadid providefor forming -ititiu
bftalion in uny county with "two hundredandfifty men,andupwards,liableîo"beararms,"
id. at297,andNew York declaredtheduty of all to providepeisonalserviceto protect
society,seeíd. at3l2, muchasthe Pennsylvania Declaration,discussedbelow,äid.
ConnecticutandRhodeIslanddid not adoptnewconstitutions. Id. at2B9.
222Va. Bill of Rights 13(1776),
ç reprintedin 7 Fed.and StateConsts.at3gl4.

2]3 Reg_araingthis point andthe meaningof both "militia" and "well regulatedmrlitia,,,see
above,PartsII.C.2-4, andm.8.1, at note 196(quotingJefferson's Noteson theStateof
Virginîa).

224Sr" l MasonPapers at274-75,286


(editorialnotes);id. atZ87(final draft).

Ð5 Delaware,Maryland,and
New HampshireadaptedVirginia's language,omitting
definitionof the.militiaandchanging"freestate"to "freegõvertt*ent" *hil" retainingthe
implicit connectionbetween"a well regulatedmilitia" attdth" avoidanceof standingãr-i"t
andmilitary insubordination.SeeDel.Decl.of Rights$$ 18-20(1776),reprintedii 5
Founders'Const.at 5,6; Md. Decl. of Rightsgg 25-27(1776),repríniedln 3 Fed.andState
Consts.at 1688;N.H. Const.pt. I, arts.24-26(1784),reprintedú q fed. and StateConsts.
at2456.TheDelawareConstitutionalsospeciallyprovidedthat "[t]o preventanyviolence
or forcebeingusedat . . . elections,no personshallcomearmedtó anyof them,andno
musterof themilitia shallbe madeon thatday."Del. Const.art. XXVItr (1776),reprinted
in I Fed.andStateConsts.at 567.

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TTTESECOND \4ENDMEN SECURESAN INDTVIP-'AL RIGHT
\4/HETTIER PAgE85 Of IO3

226Reprintedin 5 Fed. and State


Consts.
at 30g3.
2275"" I MasonPapers at276(note
discussing"thewidespread andalmostimmediate
influenceof the Virginia Declarationof Rightson othernaJcentstates,"including
Pennsylvania).

2285 FedandStateConsts.at
3083.Suchpersonalservicewouldbe difficult if onecould
not own privateÍilms. This duty may havebeenbroaderthanthe obligationof militia duty,
perhapsincþding the possecomit¿tus.SeegenerallyFederalístNo.ig,at 182-83(A.
Hamilton).NgwHampshire'sconstitution,while praisingthewell-reguiatedmilitia,
recognized_tr!¿uty separately, N.H. Const.pt. I, arl.;s.
12-13,reprinledîn 4 Fed.andState
Consts.at2455,althoughNew York's connected thetwo, N.Y. Const.$ 40 (1777),
reprintedin 5 id. at2637.

229Pa-Planor Frameof
Gov't $ 5 (1776),reprintedin 5 Fed.and StateConsts.at3084.
' - j 230¡¿. 43,reprintedin
$ 5 Fed.and StateConsts.at3091.

2315"" Halbrook,Right to
Bear at23-25.Somein Englandsharedthis concern.,See
Schwoere4T6 Chi.-KentL. Rev. at52-53.

232P^-Const.d. X,
$$ 20 &21, reprintedin 5 Fed.andStateConsts.at3101.Section22
addressedstandingarmiesandcivilian controlof the military. Kentucþ admitted:rr_lZgl
asthefileenth state,copiedthis languageon theright verbatim.SeeKy. Const.art.)ilI, $
23 (1792),reprintedin3 Fed.and StateConsts.at1275.

233pu.Const.ffi. H, 2, reprinted
$ in 5 Fed.andStateConsts.at3099.Kentucþ also
copiedthisprovision.SeeKy. Const.art.VI, $ 2, reprintedín 3 Fed. and StateConsts.at
t271.

¿r+Reprintedin 5 Fed. and State


^aa

Consts.at27gg.

23s¡¿.

236Stot"v. Huntly,25N.C. (3
Ired.)418, I 843WL 89I , at *2.Anotherearþ decision
recognizedthat the right of "free peopleof color" to beararmsmight be abridged- but only
because thecourtbelievedthat they "cannotbe considered-as citizens,,'or at lõastnot full
citizens,_not
becauseof any exclusionfrom themilitia (a subjectthe courtdid not mention).
Statev.Newsom,27 N.C.(5 hed.)250,IBM WL 1059,at*i,2.

2375"" infra,note239.

238ThiswasRichardCaswell,
who becamethe first govemor.Anothermemberof the
committeealsohadbeenoneof thethreedelegates. SeeHalbrook,RíShtto Bear at29-31;
seealso5 Fed.and StateConsts.at2794.

239Vt. Const.ch. I, 15,reprintedin


$ 6 Fed.andStateConsts.at374l.The constitution

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WHETIIER THE SECOND : MENDMENT SECURESAN INDIVIP"AL RIGHT page86 of 103

alsoasserted independence from New York. Id. at3738-39(preamble); seeHalbrook,Right


to Bear at 37 ("Recognitionof bearingarmsto defendthe state\ryasmoreradical than selÊ
defense,since-itjustified aclionby armedprivate citizensto defendan incipient statefrom
theconstitutedauthoritiesof bothNew York andGreatBritain.").TheFirs?Congress
admittedVermontasthe fourteenthState,see Actof Feb. lg,lTig1,l Stat.191,in time for
it to ratiff rhe Bill of Rights,seeschwarrz, 2 Bill of Ríghæui tzoz-ol.

240Vt. Const. l,
$ 14,repríntedin 6 Fed. and StateConsts.at374l (speech);id. g 9,' at
374.9-41(duty "h-.
of personalservice,andconscientious objectors);id. ch.ù, $ S, íll,iZ
(militia of "freemen. . . andtheir sons");id. ç 39, at374g
@unting).
24r5""Vt. Const.ch.I,
$$ 10,15& 18(1786),reprtntedin 6 id. at3753(dutyof personal
serviceandconscieltiougobjectors,speech,andarms,respectively); id.."È.U, $ lõ, at 3758
(militia, includingall "inhabiønts"raiherthanall freemenan¿theií sons);id.-g-37,'at3760
(hunting);Vt. Const.ch. I, arts.9,13 &, 16(1793),reprintedin id. at3763-64(¿"tí of
personalserviceandconscientious objectors,speecþ-and
atms,respectively);ld. c-n.n, ç
22, at 3768(militia); íd. g 40, ar 3720(hunting).

o"
a lla
Reprintedín 3 Fed. and StateConsts.at 1992.

243Mass.Const.pt. I, art. I (1780),


repríntedín id. at lgg9.
24 S""Halbrooþ Ríght
to Bear at4l-42.

245Murr. Consl pt.I, art. L9,


repríntedin 3 Fed. and StøteConsts.at lB9Z.An early
decisionof the.State'ssupreme court,interpretingthe Declaration'sprotectionof the-
individual's "liberty of the press"asnot protectingcommon-lawübôL drew a parallel to uthe
right to keepfire arms,which doesnot protecthim who usesthemfor annoyanceor
destruction." Commonwealthv. Blanding,20Mass.304,338(1325).Whetherthe courthad
in mind Article 17 or theright from Englandis unclear,-but in'eitheicaseit rccognized,
a
right of individuals to keeparms.

246ktaddition, the purposes


of callingout the militia seemto havebeennarrowerthan
whatever"for the commondefence"signified, asthe governorwas authorized,tocall it out
"for the specialdefenceandsafetyof the commoilileãlth," which appearsto havemeant
war, invasion,or rebellion.Mass.Const.pt. [, ch.2, $ l, art.7, repilntedin 3 Fed. and
StateConsls.at 1901.

247Schwartz,I Bill of Rights


at337.Theonly changebetweentheir draft and the final was
the deletionof "standing"before"armies."Id. at37i (draft);id. at364(deletion).

2484t with North Carolina's


emphasison the "defenceof the State,"Massachusetts,s
emphasison the "commondefence"may haverepresented the assertionof a ríght that went
beyondthetraditionalEnglishone."Common"hãdbeendeletedfrom a similai clause("for
their commondefence")in a draftof the EnglishDeclaration,perhapsat the urging of
William of Orangeor conservativeLords,who objectedto suggestiôn of a poputuirignt to
checkroyal power.SeeMalcolm,ToKeepand Bear atllg-2l.

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24eMadison,Notesof Debatesat 630(Sept.


l2).

250U.S.Const.art.I, 8, cls. 15& l6,and


$ art. II, $ 2, cl. l. TheNinth Circuit claimsthat
therewas "disagreementamongthe delegates"over whetherCongress's power to arm the
militias "shouldbe exclusiveor concurrent"with the States.Silveira,3l2F.3d at 1079.But
the courtonly citesPerpichv. Departmentof Defense,496U.S.334,340 (1990),which
doesnot supportthis claim; nor do the debatesof the Convention,wherethe focus wason
the extentof any federalauthorityto establishuniform disciplineandregulationof the
militia (including providing for arms),not on whetherthe Stateswould retain concurrent
authorityin areaswherefederalpowerwas granted.For the two chief debates,seeMadison,
Notesof Debatesat478,483-85(Aug. lS); ìd. at512-16(Aug.23). Similarly,the Thhd
Circuit hascited in supportof the collective-rightview, a statementby Roger Shermanthat
Statesshouldretainpower to usetheir militias for intemalneeds.SeeUnitedStatesv. Tot,
l3l F.2d 261, 266(1942),rev'don othergrounds,319U.S.463(1943)(citing 5 Elliot's
.Debates445Qd'ed. 1901). We fail to seehow this statement supportsthat view,
particularlygiven that no oneappearsto havedisagreedwith Sherman;that he servedon the
committeethatdraftedwhatbecamethefinal versionof Article I, Section8, Clause16,
Notesof Debatesat 480, 485 (Aug. l8); 494-95(Aug. 2l), andgenerallysupportedits
compromise, id. at 513-14;andthathe sawno needfor amendments, seeA CountrymanNo.
2 (1787), repríntedín 14Doc. Híst.at 172(JohnP.Kaminski& GaspareJ. Saladinoeds.,
1983);A CountrymanNo.3 (1787),reprintedin id. at296;A Citízenof NewHaven(1789),
reprinted in CreatingtheBill of Ríghts:TheDocumentaryRecordfrom the First Federal
Congress220(HelenE.Veit et. al. eds.,l99l) ("Veit, Creating").

25176.Ninth Circuit in Silveíradid not mention


this latter setof proposals,and the court
presentedthe commentsin theratification debatesmostrelevantto theseseparateproposals
asif theyinsteadrelatedto the SecondAmendment.See312F.3dat 1082-83;seealso id. at
1078(claimingwithout citationthat "[t]he compromisethattheconventioneventually
reached,which grantedthe federalgovernmentthe dominantcontrol over the national
defense,led ultimately to the enactmentof the counter-balancing SecondAmendmenti').
252Robertson,165 U.S.at 281(discussing Bill of Rightsin general);
seeSílveira,328F.3d
at 584 (Kleinfeld,J.) ("The SecondAmendmentwasnot novel,but rathercodified and
expandeduponlong established principles.").

2535"", e.g.,2 CompleteAnti-Fed.atZ,ll


þublic objectionsof MasonandGerry);Va.
Ratif. Conv.,in l0 Doc. Híst.at 1212(remarksof PatickHenry, June12, l78S) (invoking
EnglishBill andstatedeclarations); "Addressby Sydney"(RobertYates)(1788),reprinted
in 6 CompleteAnti-Fed.at 107,109(similãrto Henry).Oneof the leadingargumentsof this
point wasby the FederalFarmer.SeeFed. Farmer No.16 (1785),reprinted in 2 Complete
Anti-Fed.at323.

2545"", e.g.,FederalistNo. 84,at575-81(,4'.Hamilton);


Marcus No-I, Answerto Mr.
Mason'sObiections(Jameslredell)(1788),repríntedin I Debateon the Const-at363-64;
MarcusNo- 4 (1788),repríntedin id. at387-90;America,To theDßsentíngMembersof the
Iate Conventionof Pennsylvanía(NoahWebster)(1787),reprintedin I Debateon the
Const.at 555-60.

2554t oneFederalistcriticizedLutherMartin, an
Anti-Federalistwho hadbeena delegate

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to the ConstitutionalConvention:"One hour you sportedthe opinion, that Congress,afraid


of themilitia resistingtheir measures,would neitherarmnor organizethem: andthenext,as
if menrequiredno time to breathebetweensuchcontradictions,that they would harassthem
by long andunnecessary marches,till they wore down their spirit and renderedthemfit
subjectsfor despotism."TheLandholderNo.I0 (1788),reprintedin 16Doc. Híst.at265,
267(JohnP.Kaminski& GaspareJ. Saladinoeds.,1986).

2s6Fed.Farmer No.1S(1788) reprintedin2


, CompleteAnti-Fed at342;Va.Ratif, Conv.,
in l0 Doc.Hist. at 1276(remarksof Henry,June14, 1788).

257S"¿,e.g.,regardingall of theseconcerns,
"JohnDe Wítt" No.5 (1787),repríntedin 4
Complete Antí-Fed.at36-37 (warningthat federalgovernmentwould neglectto armmilitia,
not fusting thepeople,and enforceunjust laws throughstandingarrny); Pa.Ratif. Conv.,ín
2 Doc.Hist. at 509(remarksof JohnSmilie,Dec.6, 1787)("'Whena selectmilitia is
formed;thepeoplein generalmay be disarmed.");Fed.Farmer No.3 (1787),reprintedín2
Complete Anti-Fed.at242 (discountingsafeguard of armed"yoemanryof thepeople,"
whom Congresswould underminethroughcreatingselectmilitia); The Genuine
Inþrmøtion Deliveredto theLegislatureof theStateof Maryland Relativeto the
Proceedíngsof the GeneralConventíonLately Held at Phíladelphia;By Luther Mørtin,
Esquíre(1788),reprintedin 2 CompleteAntí-Fed.at 59-60(wamingthat Congresswould
useits militia andarmy poweñ¡"to subverttheliberties of the Statesandtheir citizens,since
we [allow anunlimited standingarmy and,]by placingthe militia under l'fspower,enableit
to leavethemilitia totally unorgarlized,undiscíplíned,
andevento dísarmthem"');Va.Ratif.
Conv.,in l0 Doc.Hist. at 1271(remarksof Mason,June14, 1788)(warningthat Congress
would "disarmthepeople"gradually,ratherthan"openly,"by "totally disusingand
neglectingthemilitia"). Henry repeatedlydenouncedthe allegedlyexclusivepower.,See9
Doc.Hist. at957(June5) (.Of whatservicewouldmilitia be to you, whenmostprobably
you will not havea singlemusketin the State;for asaÍns areto be providedby Congress,
theymayor maynot furnishthem.");id. at 1066(June9) ("Thepowerof armingthe militia,
andthe meansof purchasingaüns,aretakenfrom the States. . . . If Congresswill not arm
them,theywill not be armedat all.").

258Sr", e.g.,Federalist No. 46, at32l-22(J. Madison)(conhasting


the "advantage
of being
armed,which the Americanspossess,"with the circumstances in "severalkingdomsof
Europe. . . [where]the govemmentsareafraidto ftust the peoplewith arms");An American
CítizenIV: On theFederalGovernment (TenchCoxe)(1787),reprintedin 13Doc. Hist.at
433 (JohnP. Kaminski& GaspareJ. Saladinoeds.,1981)(arguingthat,if tyranny
threatened,the"friends to líberty. . . usingthoseannswhich Providencehasput into their
hands,will makea solemnappeal-|to thepowerabove"');"A citizen of Amenca,"An
ExømínationInto theLeadingPrinciples of theFederal Constitution(Noah Webster)
(1787),reprintedin I Debateon the Const.at 155("Beforea standingarmy canrule the
peoplemustbe disarmed;asthey arein almosteverykingdomin Europe.The supreme
po\ilerin Americacannotenforceunjust lawsby the sword;becausethe whole body of the
peoplearearmed").

259JohnMarshall,for example,provideda standardanalysis:


"The truth is, that when
poweris givento the GeneralLegislature,if it wasín the StateLegislaturesbefore,both
shallexerciseit; unlesstherebe an incompatibilityin the exerciseby one,to thatby the
. other;or negativewords precludingthe StateGovemmentsfrom it. But thereareno
negativewordshere.It reststhereforewith the States."Va. Ratif. Conv.,in l0 Doc.Hist. at

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WHETIIER THE SECOND VENDMENT SECURESAN INDIVI,:'r'AL RIGHT Page89 of 103

1307(June16).

260Deluwarealreadyhad ratified
unanimously.After Pennsylvania'svote,New Jersey,
Georgia,andConnecticutratifiedby largemajorities.No proposedamendments emerged
from theseconventions. SeeSchwartz,2 Bítl of Rightsat SZl,674.Marylandratifiedõn
April 26, 1788,without proposingamendments, althougha committeehadapproved
several,including a prohibition on subjectingthe militia to martial law "exceptin time of
war,invasion,or rebellion."The committeeunderstood the militia to consistãf"all men,
ableto beararms,"which would makemartial law for the militia a pretextfor applyingit to
thepopulace. Seeid. at729-30,734-35.

261Schwarø,2Bítl of Rights
at665.TenchCoxe,in a critiqueof the Minority, described
thisproposalasa "provisionagainstdisarmingthepeople.ul?hilanthropos,"Þenn.Gazette
(1788),reprintedin 15Doc. Hist.at3gl,393..

262S"h*urv',2 Bill of Rights at665.Noah'Webster


suggested that the Minority also
'[t]hat Congressshall neverrestrain
Propose any inhabitantof America from eatingand
drinking,at seasonable times."His seriouscriticismof Article 8 wasthatit wasuséless
becauseaimedat gamelaws, which hadneverexistedin America. He did not commenton
Article 7. "America,"Daily Advertiser(1787),reprintedin I Debateon the Const.at 559-
60.

263Schwat",2 Bill of Rights at665.

264Id. at67t-72.

26s¡¿. at 674-75,681.South
Carolinaratifiedin May 1788without proposinganyrelevant
amendments. Seeid. at739,756-57.

266^¡6"conventionhad adjoumed
in February1788to avoid a vote againstratification.
Whenit reconvenedin the suûrmer,it ratifiedby a vote of 57 to 47.Seeid. at758.

267Id. at76l; seeid. at 758 (notingthat


the first nineNew Hampshireamendments
"were
takenalmostverbatimfrom thoseproposedby Massachusetts").

'TrO.at758.,See
U.S.Const.arr.VII.
269S""Schwartz,
2 Bílt oin¡sho at762,764.
2705"" id. at765-66.

271Sch*utrr,2 Bill of Rights at842.Mason


draftedthis provisi on.See9 Doc.Hist. at82l
(reprintingMason'sdraft). Two articleslater,Virginia alsoproposedexemptionsfor those
"religiouslyscrupulousof bearingams," agarnborrowing from Pennsylvania's
Declaration.
Schwartz,2 Bill of Rights at842.

272Id. atB43.

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WHETHERTHE SECOND i MENDMENT SEC{JRES
AN INDIVIDTIAL RIGHT Page90 of 103

273¡¿. at9l2.New York


did not proposeanyprotectionfor conscientious
objectors.
274¡¿.at915,91g.

27sId. at932-33,968-69;Halbrooþ
Ríghtto Bear at33-j4.

276¡irst InauguralAddress(Apr.
30, l78g), reprintedín I A Compilatíonof theMessages
andPapersof thePresídents43,45 (JamesD. Richardsoned., 1897).

277speechofMadison(June
8, 1789),reprintedínyeit, creating atTg-79.

278
¡¿.

2795"" Letterfrom Rep.Fisher'Ames


to GeorgeR. Minot (July 23,ll}g)(discussing North
Carolina),inYelt, Creatingat269;Letterfrom Rep.William L. Smithto EdwardRuttedge
(Aug. 9,1789) (North Carolina;notingdispositionbfHouseto "agreeto some,which wil-l
moreeffectuallysecureprivaterights"),in id. at272-73;Letterfrõm Rep.FrederickA.
Muhlenbergto BenjaminRush(Aug. 18, 1789)(Pennsylvania Minority),in id. at2B0.
280Letterfrom Leeto Henry(May
ZB,l1gg),inyeit, Creatíngat24l.

281Letterfrom Graysonto Henry (June


12,l78g), ínYeit, Creating at249.See alsoletter
from JosephJonesto Madison(June24,1789),in íd. at253 (describingMadison'sproposed
amendments aswell "calculatedto securethepersonalrightsof thepeople"¡.

282MudisonResolution(June
8, lz89), reprintedinyeit, creating at 12.

2835"" above,PartIII.B.2, at
note225 (discussing
differencesfrom Virginia Declaration).
28412MadtsonPapers atl93 (emphasis
added);seeid. at194-95;Speech
of Madison,
reprintedinYeít, Creatíngat 80.

2 5go*pore Speechof Madison


, reprinted inYeit, Creatíngat80 (discussing"the
declarationof rights" of England),withid. at84 (concludingby describinghiJproposals"as
a declarationof the rightsof the people").In his notes,althoughapparentþnofin fus
speech,hepointedo-gtthat the Englishright to armsw¿rslimited to-Protesiants.12 Madison
Pøpersat 193-94.

2865r"Yeit, Creatingat t2 (Madison'sproposal);


id. at80,84 (Madison'sspeech).His
separate proposalof what wouldbecomethe TenthAmendmentwasto be placedbetween
Articles 6 and7, asits own article. Id. at 13-14.

N Thearguableexception,as
discussed abovein PartII.D.l regardingthe Establishment
Clause,wasa prohibitionon "any nationalreligion."Madisonproposedotheramendments
that did not relateto private rights, suchasalteringthe ratio of representationin the House
of Representatives andbanningincreases of legislatorpay without an ensuingelection,but
he proposedto placetheseelsewherein theconstitution.Id. at rz.

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288Lette, from Amesto ThomasDwight (June


I l, 1789),inYeit, Creatingat}47.
289L"tter from Amesto GeorgeR.
Minot (June 12,l78g),inYeit, Creatíngat247-4l.The
right of "changingthe govemment"to which Amesrefenedwasa provision,in a separate
sectionof Madison'sproposal,affrming the right of thepeople"to reformor changètheir
govemmenÇ wheneverit be foundadverseor inadequate to thepurposesof its institution."
Regardingsuchusageof the "thepeople,,'seepart tr.A, above.

290PhiladelphiaFed. Gazetteat (June


2 18, 1789),accerptedtnKates,S2Mich. L. Rev.at
224 & nn.81-82.TtieRemarlcs werereprintedwithin thréeweeksin newspapers in Boston
(on the front pageof a specialJuly 4 issue)andNew York. SeeStephenP. Halbrook&
David B. Kopel, TenchCoxeand theRight to KeepandBearArms-,1787-1823,7Wm. &
MaryBill Rts.J.347,367(1999).

2915""Letter from Coxeto Madison(June


18, 1789),inYeit, Creatingat252-53;Letter
from Madisonto Coxe(June24,1789),in 12MadísonPapersat257;iee alsoYeit,
Creatingat 254 (excerptingMadison'sletter).

!2 y"gSt"phenP. Halbrooþ ThatEveryMan BeArmed:TheEvolutionof a Constítutional


Right 77 (1984)(noting that author's"searchof the literatureof the time rweals that no
writer disputedor contradictedCoxe'sanaþis").

293Letterfrom Nassonto Thatcher(July


9, 1789),inYeit, Creøtingat260-61fsícf;seeíd.
at 309 (brief biographyof Nasson).

294Y€¡, Creating at30.

29s¡¿. at6,102-03;seeLetterfrom
Madisonto WilsonCaryNicholas(Aug. 2, l7B9),in íd.
at27l (refeningto !'theconcord"of thecommittee);Letterfrom RogerShermanto Henry
Gibbs(Aug. 4,1789), in id. (anothercommitteemember,predictingthatcommittee's
proposals"will probablybe harmless& Satisfactoryto thosewho arefond of Bills of
rights," althoughnoting his desireto placethem at the endof the Constitution).

296S"e id. at3}.The separate


placementof whatwouldbecomethe TenthAmendment
remainedunchanged, andMadison'sotherproposals,notedabove,alsoremainedseparate.

297LetterfromRep.FrederickA. Muhlenberg
to BenjaminRush(Aug. 18, 1789), inYeit"
Creatíng at280 (writing after the first day of debatethat involved the armsprovision, in
which no changesweremade,anddescribingproposedamendments to datqas"nearlythe
sameas" the committee"hadreportedthem").

298rrpro* the Bostonlndep.Chronicle,"


PhiladelphiaIndep. Gazetteer2
(Aug. 20, l78g),
excerpted¿nHalbrook,Ríghtto Bear at45.

299Atthe ConstitutionalConvention,
Gerryhadbitterly opposedthefederalpowersover
the militia in Article I, Section8, Clause16.Madison,Notesof Debatesat 513-16(Aug.
23). Regardinghis Anti-Federalistwritingsduringratification,seeSchwartz,1Bitl of
Rightsat 464-65,480-93.He hadattendedthe Massachusetts Conventionasan invited

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observerandhelpedleadthe opposition.Id. at465. Presumably,


therefore,he supported
SamuelAdams'sproposedamendments, eventhoughhe alsodesiredaddiiional ones.Seeid.
at 486-89.

300Remarksof Gerry(Aug. 17,


lTgg),reprinted inyeit, creatíngat lg2.

3ol SeeYeit,Creatingat183-85.

3025"" ìd. at 198-99.The


additionmay havebeenan effort to partially satisff
Representative Scott,by ensuringthat Congresscould at leastiequireconscientious
objegtorsto prwide an equivalent.Unlike Gerry,he objectedto ihe exemptionbecausehe
worried that citizens,ratherthanCongress,would abusèit, with the resultthat "you can
neverdependuponyour militia." He ãddeá,"This will leadto theviolationof another
article in the constitution,which securesto the peoplethe right of keepingatïns,asin this
caseyou must haverecourseto a standingarmy." Id. at 198.While this cr1'pticandelliptical
commentconceivablymightbe construedto suggesta quasi-collective tight, its meaningis
far from clear,andwe find little probativevaluéin it. The Fifth Circuitii Emerson
reasonablyconcludedthat Scott'scomment"doesnot plainly lendsupportto anyof the
SecondAmendmentmodels,"270F.3d at248,andtheNinth Circuifin Stlve¡radidnot cite
it, see312F.3dat 1085-86.

303SeeYeit,Creatíngat ll7-28 (debate


of Aug. 13, 1789);id. at 197-98(debateof Aug.
19,1789).

304Jd. at37-4t.

'jnt .P: mostprolific andone


of thebestknown of theAnti-Federalistessayists
wasthe
Centinel,whoseessaysappearedin the PhiladelphiaIndependentGazetteerandthe
PåiladelphiaFreeman'sJournalaridwerewideþ reprintðd."2 CompleteAnti-Fed.at 130.
He publishedtwelveessaysasCentinelRevived.Id-

306c"ntirel (Revived),No.29 (1789),quoted


in Emerson,z7}F.3dat255.
3071a" Senatecombínedprovisions(such
asin creatingwhatbecamethe First andFifth
Amendments)andrejectedHouseprovisionsregulatingappealsto the SupremeCourt;
aPplytngreligion, speech,press,and criminal-jury protectiònsto the Stateì; andprohibiting
violationsof the separation
of powers.SeeSchwartz,2Bill of Rights atll45-47
(suniñarizingchanges);compareYeit,Creatingat37-416f-ousãproposals), with íd. at47-
49 (Senate).

3085""Yeit, Creatingat39n.l3;Schwartz,
2 Bitt of Rightsat ll53-54(Sen. Journal).

3095"" Uviller & Merkel,76


Chi.-KentL. Rev. at507(theorizingthatvote on common-
defenseclausewls promptedby desireto avoid eitherredundancyor the objectionthat the
amendmentfailedto protectmilitia servicein defenseof a State,ár oppos"dto the
"common"nationaldefense).The deletionof the troublesome conscientious-objector
clause
couldhavebeensimplybecause of a desire,asvoicedin the House,to leavethã maüerto
Congress'sdiscretion,see,e.g.,Remarksof Rep.Benson(AuS. 17, l78g), reprinted inYeit,

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WHETHER TIIE SECOND ' \{ENDMENT SECURESAN INDIVID'A.L RIGHT Page93 of 103

Creatingat 184,without affecting the right oneway or the other.

310Onecould arguethat the definition was


consideredsuperfluous.^See Schwartz,2 Bíll of
Rightsat lI45 (observingthat Senatein its revisionsof the Houseproposalsgenerally
"tighten[ed]up the languageof the Houseversion,striking out surpluswording and
provisions.");Partrr.c.2-4 (discussingmeaningof "Militia" at the-time).

311S"hwart" Bill of Ríghtsat ll52(Sen.


,2 Joumal).

312SeeYeit,Creatingatxii; Letterfrom Madison


to Jefferson(Mar. 29,l78g),in id. at
' 22s.
313Letterfrom Lee to Henry (Sept.14,l78g),
in id. at2g5.TheSenatealso,like theHouse,
hadrejecteda proposalto appendto what becamethe SecondAmendmenta supermajority
requirementfor peacetimestandingarmies,a provisionto help enflre that Congresswould
dependon andthereforeprovidefor themilitia. Schwartz,2 Bill of Righæat 1149(Sen.
Journal);seeYeit,Creatíngat 38-39n.13.

314Lettetfrom Lee andGraysonto the Speaker


of the Virginia Houseof Delegates
(Sept.
28,1789),inYeít, Creatingat299.

3155"" íd. at 49-50(ConferenceCommittee


ReportandHouseResolution) ; íd. at296-9S
(variouslettersof Sept.1789,includingby Madison,detailingconcernswith certainSenate
revisionsbut not mentioningSecondAmendment);Schwartz,2Bill of Righ* at llTl-73
(regardingpresidentialtransmittal).

316SeeSchwartz,2 Bill of Rightsat llTl-72("[Wje knowpractically


nothingaboutwhat
wenton in the statelegislaturesduringtheratificationprocess"and "[e]venthe
contemporary newspapers arevirtually silent.");Emerson,27ÙF.3dat255(without
comment,omittingdiscussionof ratification);Silveíra,3l2F.3dat 1086(same).

317Srh*urt" Bitl of Rígh,.r


at 1171,1203.Oneof thetwo not thenratified wasratifiedin
,2
1992asthe Twenty-SeventhAmendment,which relatesto congressionalpay. The other
addressed
the sizeof theHouse.

318¡t¿ evenif onebelieves,contraryto thehistorical


record,that Anti-Federalists'
._._concernsaboutthe militia wereresolvedin their favqr,the Anti-Federalists' insistenceon
the superiorityof a citizenmilitia to a selectmilitia, notedat thebeginningof PartI[.C,
would leadto the understandingof the Amendment'sprefatoryclausethat we setout in Part
il.C, anunderstanding that is, aswe explained,ñrlly consistentwith the individual-right
view of the SecondAmendment.

3195"" ClydeN. 'Wilson,Forward,lz St.GeorgeTucker,


Yíewof the Constítutíonof the
UnitedStates,with SelectedWritingsat viii-ix (1999);PaulFinkelman& David Cobin,An
Introductionto St.GeorgeTucker'sBlackstone's Commentaries,in I Tucker'sBlackstoneat
v-xä; Editor'sPrefacein id. atv.

320| Tucker'sBlackstone,NoteD, at300(ellipsisin


original).

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32rJd.

322Id. at357;seeid.at 315-16(explainingtha!


whereasin England "the game-laws, as
wasbeforeobserved,havebeenconvertedinto the meansof disarmingthe body of the
people,"andst¿tuteshaverestrictedassemblies, the Constitutionwill not "permitany
prohibitionof armsto thepeople;or of peaceable assembliesby them");id. at289
(describinghypotheticallaw "prohibiting anypersonfrom bearingarms" asviolating the
SecondAmendment).

3232 td. at*143-44&m.40-41. Seealsoid. at*145


n.42(againcriticizinggamelaws).

3243 id. at*414n.3; seealso, above,PartsItr.A (discussing


right to armsin England)and
m.8.2 (discussingdoubtswhethertherelaxationof Englishgamelawsin 1700'ssucceeded
asa practicalmatterin enablingcommonersto keeparms).

3251 ¡¿. at273.Tuckerthoughtthe federalpowers


in Article I, Section8, Clause16,to
providefor "organizing"and "disciplininguthemilitia wereexclusíve,id. at 180-81,but that
Statesret¿ined"concurrent,thoughperhapssubordinate"powersto provide for "arming"
theirmilitiasand"to call themforth whennecessary for their intemaldefence,"id. at 182,
183.His only otherreferenceto the SecondAmendmentin connectionwith the militia was
in a noteto Blackstone's discussionof themilitia, in which Tuckercollectedall references
in the Constitutionto the militia, alongwith the Third Amendment,Virginia laws,andthe
federalMilitia Act.2 id. at*409 n.l.

326SeeHardy, g Harv. J.L. QLPub.Pol'y at6l3.Rawle did agreeto be United States


Attorneyfor the District of Pennsylvania.
8.g., United Statesv. Fries, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 515,
517(C.C.D.Pa. 1799)

327Williu- Rawle,A V.iewof the Constítutionof the


UnitedStatesof America 115(2d ed.
1829;reprint 1970)(font altered;emphasisadded).

328Jd.at 125-26.

329Id. at l26.RegardingBlackstoneseeParttrI.A
, above.For Tucker'sannotationsof
someof Blackstone's discussions
of improperusesof arms,see5 Tucker'sBlackstoneat
*126, 142-149,175.RegardingthePennsylvania Minority, Adams,andNew Hampshire,
seePartIII.C.]above.

330Ru*I", A Vie,wof the Const.at 153.Significantly,in


separatelydiscussingtheMilitia
Clausesof Article I, Section8, Rawlemadeno mentionof the SecondAmendment.Id. at
lrt-12.

331RonaldD. Rotunda& JohnE. Nowaþ Introduction,in


JosephStory,Commentaries on
. the Constitutionof the UnitedStatesxi-xiv (Rotunda& Nowakeds.,1833;reprint 1987)
("Abridgement").

332Story,Abridgementg 930-982, at 696-97


.
$

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333Jd.g 984, at698;seeid. 9S5-t0t


$$ I,at69g-7t4.

334Jd.g lool, at7og.

335JosephStory,3 Commentaries
on the Constitutionof the (JnitedStates$ 1890,at746
n.l (1833;reprint1991).In UnitedStatesv. Miller,307u.S. 174,l82n.t 1t939),the
SupremeCourt includedthis passage(from a later edition) in a stringcitation.

136Story,3 Commentaries $ 1891,at747.In a separatechapter,thefull Commentaries also


includedan extendeddiscussionof theAnti-FederalistchargesleveledagainsttheMilitia
Clauses,includingthe chargethatthe federalmilitiapowerswouldbe exilusive(which
Storyfound unpersuasive).Storyalludedto the failure of proposalsexplicitly to protect
statemilitia po\¡r¡ers.
/d. $$ 1198-1202,at 83-87.

337JosephStory,A Familiar Exposttion


of the Constítutionof the (InitedStatesg450,at
319(1840;reprint1986).

338StoryAbridgemenr
g 1001,at 708-09.

339H"ory St. GeorgeTucker,Commentaries


on theLawsof Virginía43(1831).

340¡¿.

341'IheDebatesin the SeveralState


Conventionson theAdoptíonof theFederal
Constítutionatxv (JonathanEllioted.,2d,ed.1836;reprint lg87).

342Foladditionalantebellumcommentato
rs, seeDavidB. Kopel,TheSecondAmendment
in theNineteenth
Century,l998BYU L. Rev.1359,1399-1403,143541; seealsoíd. at
1397-98(discussingHenryTucker).

343Houstonv. Moore,l8 U.S.(5 Wheat.)


l,16-17,21-22(1S20)þluraliry opinionof
washington,J.); seeid. at34-36(Johnson, J., concurrinÐ;id. at 50-53(Story,J.,
dissenting).Story dissentedon the groundthat the militia law grantedenforcementauthority
exclusivelyto federalcourts.Id. atTl-72.

34412Ky.(2litt.) 90, 1822wL 1085. judgedid not issuean opinion.,See


Thedissenting
id. at*4.

345Id. at*2.

346Thefust courtto departfromB/rss'sholding,


the IndianaSupremeCourtelevenyears
laterin Statev. Mitchell,3 Blackf. 229, 1833WL 2617, at * | , did not cite its neighboring
courtor otherwiseexplainitself theentireopinionbeingasfollows: "ft washetd ntbts
case,that the statuteof 1831,prohibitingall persons,excepttravelers,from wearingor
carryingconcealedweapons,is not unconstitutional." We discussthe laterantebellumcases
in the next subpart.

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WHETHERTHE SECOND " VÍENDMENTSECURESAN INDIVD--"AL RIGHT page96of 103

347SeeKy.Const.
art.)(III, $ 25 (1850),reprinted
in3 Fed.andStateConsts.atl3l4.
3aBAldrtdg"v. commonwealth, ya.
eva. cas.) 447,lgzlwL ll1z,at *3 (va. Gen.
cr.).
3495 Tucker'sBlackstoneat*175
n.l7(7)(listing asamongthe "offencesagainstthepublic
police,or [e]conomy,"therestrictionagainst"any" blackor mulatto"keepiãgor rutryiog
any gun-powder,shot,club, or otherweapon,"including a "gun"). Seeølio Waters,. Stãt",
1 Gill. 302,1843WL3024 (Md.) (explaining,vrith regardto freeblaclcs,that "lawshave
beenpassedto preventtheir migrationto this State;to makeit unlawful for them to bear
arms;to guardeventheir religiousassemblages with peculiarwatchfulness.").
350(-loit"dStatesv. Sheldon,SBlume
Sup.Ct. Trans.337, l82gWL 30Zl, at + l2(Mich.
Ten.). Seealso Commonwealthv. Blandlng,20Mass.(3 Pick.) 304,338(igzS) (iivoking
right to keeparmsto draw sameanalogy).

35rJohrronv. Tompkins,13F.
Cas.840,850(C.C.E.D.pa. lS33)(No. 7,416).

3s213Tenn.(5 Yer.) 356, 1833


WL \ZZT.

3531833v,rL1227,at*r.

35aft¿.Formoreregardingthe
relevantcommonlaw, seethe discussionin Statev. Huntly,
25 N.C. (3 hed.) 418, 1843WL 891, at*2-3 (surveyingcoÍrmonlaw andnoting "thatthe
9!"Ting of a gunper se constitutes no offence"). SeealsoStatev. Langþrd, 10Ñ.C. (3
Hawks)381,1824WL 380;4 Blackstoneat*149;William Hawkins,I A Treatíseon the
Pleasof the Crownch. 63, $ 9, at 136(1724;reprint 1972).An Englishcasethatthe court
citedin Huntly,.predating the EnglishDeclaration of Rights,hadcõnstrueda seemingly
restrictivemed!9valstatuteasonly punishing"peoplewho go armedto terriff the kin$s
subjects,"not all who go armed.SírJohnKnight'sCase,,87Eng.Rep.75, 26, 3 Vtod.-Rep.
117(K.8. 1686).The courtrecognized that "now therebe a generalõonnivanceto
gentlemento ride armedfor their securiqr,"suchthat violating the statuterequiredriding
"maloanimo."1d.,90Eng.Rep.330,330,Comberbach Rep.3g.
3s51833wL l2z7,ar*1.

356I Ala.612,lg4owL229,at*2.

3s7ß4owLz2g.atx2.

3s8Jd. at*3.

3s9Id. at*5-6.

360Id. at*6-7;seeid.at *1.

3613l Ala.3g7,lg5gwL 34o,at*1,2.

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I

362| Ga.(l Ketly) 243, l846wl- I 167,at *11. Georgia's


constitutio:rdid not expressly
protectthe right to arms.The court alludedto Barronv. Mayor & City Council of
Baltimore,32U.S.(7 Pet.)243(1833),whichheldthattheTakingsilause of thê Fifth
Amendmentdid not apply to the Statesandreasonedthat noneof the Bill of Rightsdid, but
rejectedit because of the court'sown precedent,
the SecondAmendmenfsbroad,non-
restrictivelanguage, andthe fundamentalimportanceof theright. 1846WL I 167,at *9-10.

363Id. at *8.

364Jd.at *lo.

36s¡¿.

366¡¿. at *10,9.

367Stockdalev. State,32 Ga.225,186l wL 1336,at *3. TheTexasSupremeCourtbefore


.r
I the Civil rWarappearsalsoto haveviewedthe SecondAmendmentasapplying to the States
andincluding an individual right to own armsandusethemfor selÊdefenseandperhaps
hunting.SeeChoatev. Reddíng,18Tex. 579,1857lVL 5009,at*2; Cochum v. State,24
Tex.394, 1859WL 6446,at *6-8. In the lattercase,in whichthe courtrejecteda
constitutionalchallengeto a sentencingenhancement for homicidewith a bowie-knife,the
court did not cite any authority,but the defendanthad citedNunn,Reid, Bliss,andMitchell.
1859WL 6M6,at*3.

3685 La. Ann. 489, 1850WL 3838,at *1; seeid.at *2 (discussing


selÊdefense).

369Stot"v. Smith,l l La. Ann.633, 1856WL 47g3,at*l:

370Stot"v.Jumel,13La.Ann.399,
1858WL 5151,at *1.

| 3712l T"on.(2 Hum.) 154,1840WL 1554.

3724Ark. (aPike) tB,t}4zwl,33t.

373"¡¡u¡changemay havebeenpromptedby Nat Tumet's1831slaverebellion,which


createdfearsof freeblacksarmingandinciting slaves.,SeeRobertJ. Cottol & RaymondT.
Diamond,TheSecondÀmendment:TowardønAfro-Americanist Reconsideraiíôin,80Geo.
L.J.309,337-38(1991).

374ß4owl, 1554,ar *3.

37s312F.3dar 1073.

376¡¿. (quotingAymette,l840WL 1554,at*5).

377l840WL 1554,at*3; seetd. at*Z. As notedabovein PartIII.B.2, in discussingthe

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WHETHERTHE SECOND^'{ENDMENT SECURESAN INDfVID"{L RIGHT Page98 of 103
. '

Massachusetts Declarationof Rights,the phrase"commondefense"is notnecessarily


inconsistentwith a right to beararmsfor privatepurposes.

3781840WL 1554,at *5. ThustheNinth Circuitwasincorrectin contendingthatAymette


"reachedits conclusionprimarilybecauseof' the conscientious-objector provision,rather
thanthe "commondefense"language.Sílveíra,3l2 F.3dat 1073.Furthermore, Aymette's
relianceon the conscientious-objector provisionwasnot persuasive, asour discussions of
the PennsylvaniaandVermontdeclarationsof rights (PartIII.B.2) andproposalsemerging
from thePennsylvania, Virginia, andNorth Carolinaratifyingconventions(Partltr.C.l)
showed.SeealsoParttr.8.2 (discussingmeaningof "beararms").It wascommonin a
singledocumentto refer separatelyboth to the right of individualsto "bearams" andto
exemptionof individualsfrom the duty to "bear"themin the serviceof the government.In
addition,the court'sassertionthat a huntercould neverbe saidto "bear" arms,quoted
above,is opento doubt,giventheproposedVirginia law discussed in Partf,.8.2 andthe
Pennsylvania Minority Report(seePartsII.B.2 andIII.C.l), an{ in anyevent,saysnothing
aboutpersons"bearing"armsin self-defense.The court did not cite the decisionof its
southernneighbortn Reid,which appearsto havebeendecidedaboutsix monthsbefore;it
treatedits previousdiscussionof the right in Simpsonasdicta,1840WL 1554,at*5-6.

3795r" above,PartIII.C.2 (discussingconscientious-objector


clausein draft of Second
Amendment).

3801840WL 1554,at*4. As we notedin the introductionof PartII.B, the Ninth Circuit,in


reaffirming its collective-rightview, did not attemptto reconcilethe right to "keep" arms
with its view.

38r¡¿. at *3, *5.

382Seeíd. at*4("the citizensmay bear


[arms]for thecoÍrmondefence,"but "the
Legislaturemay prohibit suchmannerof wearingaswould neverbe resortedto by persons
engagedin the commondefence")(emphasisadded).

383Id. at*Z.

384Id. at*3-4. Furthermore, evenif onemightreadthe court'srejectionof an individual


right to beararmsin "privatedefence"asforeclosingany individual right to beararms,two
aspectsof the court'sreasoning(in additionto its analysisof "bear")leaveit opento
question.First; the court'saccountof the English nght, seeid. at*2, was-eontraryto the text
of the EnglishBill of RightsandBlackstone'sexpositionof an individual right to armsfor
selÊdefense,andfailed to recognizethat the individual Englishright was transplantedto
America free of England'saristocraticrestrictions,asTucker,Rawle, Story, and othershad
recognizedandpraised.Second,facedwith thedefendant's provocativelyabsoluteclaim
regardingthe scopeof the nght,seeid. at*|, thecourtresponded with dichotomiesbetween
bearingarmsby the body of the peoplefor the commondefenseand "bearing" armsfor
hypotheticalcriminal purposes,suchasterriffing people.In thusdefining the question,the
courtdefinedawaythe well-established third possibility- bearingarmsin legitimateself-
defense- andoverlookedbackgroundlaw prohibitingbearingweaponsfor the hypothesized
purposes. Compareíd.at*3-4,wíth Simpson,1833V,lL1227,at *1; Statev.Hunþ,25
N.C. (3 lred.)418, 1843WL 891;4 Blaclcstone at*145-47;Reíd,1840\ryL 229,at *3, 5-6.

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1
385Andr"*t v. State,50Tenn.(3 Heisk.)165,l87l WL357g,at *6. Andrewswasthefrst
casein anyjurisdiction to citeAymeneregardingthe righl to bearaflns.

3865"" íd. at*8 ('The Conventionof 1870,knowingthattherehadbeendifferencesof


opinionon this question,haveconferredon the Legislaturein this addedclause,theright to
regulatethe wearingof arms,with a view to preventcrime"); id. at*13 ("Ever sincethe
opinionsïverepromulgated,it hasbeenmy deliberateconvictionthat the expositionof the
Constitution.. . in Simpson.. . w¿rsmuchmorecorrectthanthat.. . rnAymette.. . .")
(Nelson,J.,joined by Turle¡ J., dissentingin part).

387lï7lwL357g,at * 3.

388Id. at*ll.

389¡¿. at *10 (frnding"muchof interestingandablediscussionof thesequestions"tn Bliss,


Reid, andNunn; explainingthat in Reid andNunn "the generalline of argumentfound in
this opinion is maintained"andthat the court hadbeen"aided. . . greatlyby the reasoning
of theseenlightenedcourts");id. (describrngAymette as"hold[ing]the samegeneralviews"
astheAndrewscourt) (emphasisadded).

390¡¿.at *8 (emphasisadded).

39rId. at*9.

392Id. at*6-7.

393Jd. at*ll.

394Jd. at*13.

3e5rB4orvl 1554,at *3.

396ß7lWL357g,at *9. The courtelsewhere defined"arms"asthosefurtheringthe endof


"the efüciencyof the citízenasa soldier," id. at*7, andasincluding not only weapons
uadapted to the usualequipmentof the soldier"but alsothose"the useof which may render
him moreeffrcientassuch,"id. at*ll. Thetermhadto be "takenin connectionwith the
fact thaf ihe citizenis to keepthem asa citizen" andthereforeincludedsuch"as arefound to
makeup the usual armsof the countlr, andthe useof which will properþ train andrender
him effrcientin defenseof his own liberties,aswell asof the State."Id. at*7.

397¡¿.at*7;id.at*ll. Twojudgesdissentedinpart, cnticizngAymetteandtakinga


broaderview thanthe majoritybasedon Simpson,Bliss,Blackstone,andTucker.Id. at*13-
15(Nelson,J.,joined by Turney,J., dissentingin part).They arguedthat "for their coÍtmon
defense"wasequivalentto "in defenseof themselves andthe State."Id. at*13-14.
not
Similarly,"The word'bear'was usedalone the in military senseof carryinganns,but in
thepopularsenseof wearingthemin war or inpeace."Id.

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WHETHERTHE SECOND4 \4ENDMENT SECURESAN INDIVIDTT{L RIGHT Page100of 103

t'r E.f. Ftfe v. Støte,3I fuk. 455,1876 WL 1562,at *3 (summarizngholdingandthen


,
relyingonAymetteandAndrews); Statev.Wílþrth,74Mo.528, 1881WL 10279,at *l
(includingBuzzardin sfring citation wlth Nunn,Jumel,Mitchell, Owen,andReid, and
relyingon Reid).Buzzardwasfirst citedin 1872.SeeStatev. Englísh,35Tex. 473, 1872
WL7422; Carrollv. State,28Ark. 99,1872rWL1104.

399Btorord,4Ark. 18,l842WL 331,at *6.

4005"" id. at*6 (equatingthe two, andadoptinga singlerule for evaluatingrestrictions).

401St" id. at*4 (explainingthat uthemilitia, without arms. . . might be unableto resist,
successfully,the effort of thosewho shouldconspireto overthrowthe established
institutíonsof the country,or subjugatetheir coÍlmon liberties" andthat "the people
designedandexpectedto accomplishthis objectby the adoptionof the article under
consideration,which would foreverinvestthemwith a legalright to keepandbeararmsfor
that purpose");id. at *6 (*The act in questiondoesnot . . . detractanythingfrom the power
of the peopleto defendtheir free stateandthe establishedinstitutionsof the country.");see
also id. at *2 (expresslyequatingSecondAmendmentright with rights in First); íd. at*7
(noting thatReid andMitchellhadupheld similar laws notwithstandingconstitutional
provisionsexpresslyprotectingbearingarmsin self-defense).As rn Aymette,the courtwas
facedwith an absoluteclaim that the right wassubjectto no restrictions,and responded
similarly.Seeid. at *3, *5.

4025"" Carroll, l872WL 1104,at *2 (upholdingconvictionfor carryingdeadlyweapon


concealedandexplainingBuzzardasholding that "a constitutionalright to bear arms in
defenseof personandproperty doesnot prohibit the legislaturefrom making suchpolice
regulationsasmay be necessaryfor the goodof society,asto the mannerin which such
armsshallbeborne";addingthata "citizen"maynot "usehis own propertyor bearhis own
artnsin suchway asto injure the propertyor endangerthe life of his fellow citizen")
(emphases added);Fife,l876WL 1562,at*3,4 (restatingBuzzørdsholding,and
upholdingconvictionfor carryingpistol by constnringstatuteonly to apply to pistol that "is
usuallycarriedin the pocket,or of a sizeto be concealedaboutthe person,andusedin
privatequarrels,andbrawls, andnot suchasis in ordinaryuse,and effective as a weaponof
war, andusefulandnecessary for 'thecommondefence"');Wilsonv. State,33Ark. 557,
1878WL 1301,at *2 (reversingconvictionfor carryingsidearms,wheretrial courthad
refusedjury instructionto acquitif pistol lvas "army suc . .. suchÍN are commonlyusedin
warfare";citing Fife andAndrewsandexplainingthat "to prohibit the citizenfrom wearing
or carryingawar aftn, exceptuponhis own premisesor whenon a journey . . . , or when
actingasor in aid of an officer, is an unwarrantedrestríclion uponhis constitutíonalright
to keepand beararms")(emphases added).

4031842\ryL331,at *7 (Dickinson,J.,concurring).SeealsoKopel,lggS BYU L. Rev.at


1425("T\e Buzzardconcrurence'sassertionthat the right to armswas not individual
vanishedfrom Americancaselaw for the restof the nineteenthcentury.").

404l842WL 331,at *7 (Dickinson,J.);seeid. at *10 ("The act. .. doesnot, in my opinion,


conflictwith anyof the powersof the GeneralGovenrment.").

405¡¿. at*7,9. It is unclearwhat significancehe gaveto the stateconstitution'sprovision.

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WHETIIERTIIE SECOND¿'{ENDMENT SECLJRES
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Seeid. at*9.

N6 Id.at *8.

407ld.at *10 (Lacy,J.,dissenting).

N8 Id. at*14. Seealso íd. (arytngthat the right hasat times


"beenthe only meansby
which public liberty or the securityof free Stateshasbeenvindicatedandmaintained").
q9
ld.at *lo.

410Id. at*12-14.

4ll See,e.g.,Lawsof Miss. ch.23,$l, at 165(enacted


Nov. 29,1865),reprintedín
P.
Stephen Halbrooþ Freedmen,theFourteenthAmendment,and theRight to BearArms,

22-23,26-32,34-37(collectingreportsof armyandFreedmen's Bureauofficersto President


andCongress,petitionsto Congress,and otherpublic materialsdocumentingattemptsin
formerConfederacy in 1865and 1866to disarmblacks,includingthroughlegislationand
by militias).

4rz Cong.Globe,39thCong.,lst Sess.474(1866).Seealsoid. at478(Sen.Saulsbury,


lamentingthis effect of the Act). RegardingTrumbull, seeRaoulBerger,Governmentby
Ju.diciary:TheTransformationof theFourteenthAmendment32 (2d ed. 1997).

413Co'lg.Globeat 1838-39
@ep.Clarke); id. at 1266(Rep.Raymond).See alsoíd. at 1629
(Rep.Hart, explainingthat Act would guaranteeto free blacLs"[a] govemment. . . where
ho law shallbe madeprohibiting the free exerciseof religion'; where'the right of the people
to keepandbeararmsshallnot be infringed"').

i. ; ara¡¿. at llï2.

4rsJd. at2765(Sen.Howard).

4165"" HalbrooþFreedmënat 36 (collectingexcerpts).

417B"rg"r, Government by Judictary at30,30-39;53-54.Bergerdoesnot specifically


mentionthe right to keepandbear arms.See,e.g., id. at 166-69(addressingSen.Howard's
statementbut omitting his listing of rights).

418SectionI of the Civil RightsAct declaresall thoseborn in the United Statesto be


citizens,grants"the sameright, in everyStateandTerritory in the United States. . . asis
enjoyedby white citizens"with regardto certainenumeratedaspectsof properly,
contracting,and lawsuits,andguarantees "full and equalbenefit of all laws andproceedings
for the securityof personandproperty."14 Stat.27 (1866).In light of Blackstone's
understandingandthe contextof the black codes,any laws regardingthe ability to keepor
beararmswouldpresumablybe "laws. . . for the securityof personandproperty"and

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thereforewould needto be equalfor all citizensregardlessof color.

4194r1of July 16,1866, 14, 14Stat.173,176(emphasis


$ added).Thepresidenfs reasons
for his veto did not involve any disagreement
with Congressregardingthis right. ,SeeVeto
Message (July 16, 1866),reprintedín 8 A Compilatíonof theMessages øndPapersof the
Presidents 3620(IamesD. Richardsoned., 1897).

420Aúof Mar. 2, 1867, 6, 14 Stat.485,487.


$ The Presidentdid inform theHousethathe
wassigningunder"protest" becausethis provision,and anotherto which he objectedwere
includedin an essentialappropriationbill. SeeLetterto the Houseof Representatives (Mar.
2,1867),reprintedin 8 Messages andPapersat3670.Regardingthe militia provision,he
objectedthat it "deniesto ten Statesof this Union their constitutionalright to protect
themselvesin any emergencyby meansof their own militía." It may be that in his
constitutionalobjectionhe hadin mind Article I, Section10'simplicit recognitionof the
prerogativeof Statesto defendthemselveswith their militias in casesof invasionor
imminentdanger.SeePartII.D.zabove(discussingwaysin which originalConstitution
recognizesthat Stateswill haveandbe ableto usemilitias).

421Ï¡"Senatedebateis summarizedfrom the Congressional Freedmen


Globein HalbrooL,,
at 68-69.

4225"" íd. at69 ("Astonishingly,while still waivingthebloodyshírtanddepriving


Southerners of suffrage,Republicanswereunwilling to denythe right to havearmsto ex-
Confederates."); NelsonLund, Book Review,OutstderVoiceson Gunsand the
Constítution,17Const.Comm.701,713(2000)(reviewingHalbrook)("This incident
perfectlyillustrateswhy the SecondAmendmenthadbeenadoptedin the first place.").

423S""Kates,82 Mich. L. Rev. at243.AmongCooley'smanyworkswasto preparethe


fourtheditionof Story'sunabridgedCommentaries,
publishedin 1873.

424ThomasCooley, GeneralPrinciplesof ConstitutíonalLaw ín the Uníted Statesof


Ameríca271 (1880).Cooleycited I Tucker'sBlacl<stone at 300,which praisestheright in
the SecondAmendmentas "the truepalladiumof liberty" and parallelingBlackstone,tiesit
to thenatural"right of self defence."Seeabove,PartIV.A.

425Ruwle,Viewof the Const.atl}S,discussedabovein PartIV.A.

Ð6 H"added, citing Andrews(which hadnõt interpretedthe SecondAmendment),that the


Amendmentprotectedthe keepingof arms"suitablefor the generaldefenceof the
communityagainstinvasion or oppression,"whereas"the secretcarryíngof thosesuited
merelyto deadlyindividual encountersmay be prohibited." Cooley, GeneralPrínciplesat
27t-72.

427¡¿. ar 88-89.

428S""Kopel, 1998BYU L. Rev. at1462.

429T\omusCooley,A Treattseon the Constítutional


LímitationsV[/'hichRest(Jponthe

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LegislativePowerof the Statesof theAmericanUnion35-36(1868).

a3o¡¿.at 350;seeid. at29|(chapter trrle).Mitlercited this section.See 307U.S.at 182n.3


(citing "Cooley'sConstitutionalLimitations,Vol. l,p.729," likely the 8th edition,
publishedwell afterCooley'sdeath).

431Cooley,ConstitutíonalLimitatíonsat 18.

432SeePresserv. Illinois,l 16U.S. 252,264-6.5


(1836);seealso Uníted Statesv.
Cruikshank,g2U.S. 542,553(1876);Loganv. UnitedStates,144U.S.263,286-87(1892);
Maxwellv. Dow,l76 U.S. 58I,597 (1900).As notedabovein PartI, the federal
Governmentdid not regulateprivate firearmsuntil 1934.

43 r6s u.s.275, 2Bt-82(1897).

a 8l p. 619,620(Kan. 1905).

4355r" id. Asshownin Partsm.8.2 andItr.C.l, however,therewasnothingunusualin


combiningsuchdeclarationswith an individual right to arms.

4365"" 83 P. at 620.The Fifth CircuitinEmerson cnttcizedSalína,tothe extentthat it was


endorsinga quasi-collective-rightview, as"consü:u[ing]the constitutionalprovision as
sayingno morethanthat the citizen hasa right to do that which the stateordershim to do
andthusneitherSants the citizen any right nor in any way restrictsthe power of the state."
It foundsucha criticism "especiallyapplicableto the theorythat suchsrøleconstitutional
provisionsgrantrights only to the state,"noting thatSalínadid "not appearevento
recognize,muchlessattemptto justiff, the anomalyof construinga constitutional
declarationof rights as conferringrights only on the statewhich hadthem arryway."270
F.3dat 231n.30(emphasisadded).In the contextof theright to keepandbeararmsin the
federalConstitution,the quasi-collective-rightview appearsto amountto the right of a
i' militiaman,througha private causeof action(or defense),to act as an agentfor the interests

suchastheNationalGuard.See,e.g.,UnitedStatesv. Haney,264F.3dI 161,1165(10th


Cir.2001).

47 St irklondv. State,725.8.260,262(Ga.191l). For additionaldiscussion


of City of
Salina,seeKopel,1998BYU L. Rev.at l5l0-12.

htþ://www.usdoj.gov/olc/secondamendment2.htrn 12120/2004
EXHIBIT B
TheRightto KeepandBearArms
REPORT
of the
ST]BCOMIVtrTTEEON THE CONSTITUTIONI
of the
UNITED STATESSENATE
NINETY- SEVENTH CONGRESS
SecondSession
February1982
Printedfor theuseof the Committeeon the Judiciary

U.S. GOVERNMENTPRINTINGOFFICE
WASHINGTON:1982

8 8 -6 1 80

For salebythe Superintendent


of Documents,
U. S. GovernmentPrintingOffice
Washington,D.C. 20402

COMMITTEEOffi

STROM THURMOND,SouthCarolina,Chairman
CHARLES McC. MATHIAS, Jr., Maryland
JOSEPHR. BIDEN, Jr., Delaware
PAUL LAXALT, Nevada
EDWARD M. KENNEDY,Massachusetts
ORRIN G. HATCH, Utah
ROBERT C. BYRD, V/estVirginia
ROBERTDOLE,Kansas
HOV/ARD M. METZENBAUM. Ohio

t This is an excerpt and omits the


"Other Views of the
SecondAmendment" section.
ALAN K. SIMPSON,Wyoming
DENNIS DeCONCINI,Arizona
JOHN P. EAST,North Carolina
PATRICK J. LEAHY, Vermont
CHARLESE. GRASSLEY,Iowa
MAX BAUCUS,Montana
JEREMIAHDENTON,Alabama
HOWELL HEFLIN,Alabama
ARLEN SPECTER,Pennsylvania

Vinton DeVaneLide, Chief Counsel


QuentinCrommelin,Jr., Staff Director

SUBCOMMITTEEON THE CONSTITUTION

ORRIN G. HATCH, Utah,Chairman


STROMTHURMOND,SouthCarolina
DENNIS DeCONCIM, Artzoîa
CHARLESE. GRASSLEY,IOWA
PATRICK J. LEAI{Y, Vermont

StephenJ. Markman,Chief CounselandStaffDirector


RandallRader,GeneralCounsel
PeterE. Ornsby,Counsel
RobertFeidler,Minority Counsel

CONTENTS

o Preface,by SenatorOrrin G. Hatch,chairman,U.S.


SenateJudiciaryCommittee,Subcommittee on the
Constitution,from the Stateof Utah
o Prefaceby SenatorDennisDeConcini,ranking
minoritymember,U.S. SenateJudiciaryCommittee,
Subcommittee on the Constitution,from the Stateof
Anzona
o History:Secondamendment right to "keepandbear
armstt
o Appendix: Case law
O Enforcement of Federal firearms laws from the
perspectiveof the SecondAmendment
O Other views of the secondamendment:
a Does the SecondAmendment meanwhat it says?,by
David J. Steinberg,executive director, National
Council for a ResponsibleFirearmspolicy.
o National Coalition to ban handguns,statementon the
SecondAmendment, by Michael K. Beard, executive
director, and Samuel S. Fields, legal affairs
coordinator,National Coalition to Ban Handguns.
Historical Basesof the Right to Keep and Bear Arms,
by David T. Hardy, partner in the Law Firm Sando &
Hardy.
o The Fourteenth Amendment and the Right to Keep
and Bear Arms: The Intent of the Framers,by Stephen
P. Halbrook, PH. D., attorneyand counselorat law.
o The SecondAmendment to the United States
Constitution Guaranteesan Individual Right To Keep
and Bear Arms, by JamesJ. Featherstone,Esq.,
GeneralCounsel, Richard E. Gardiner,Esq., and
Robert Dowlut, Esq., Office of the General Counsel,
National Rifle Association of America.
o The Right to Bear Arms: The Developmentof the
American Experience,by John Levin, assistant
l r professor,Chicago-Kent College of Law, Illinois
Institute of Technology.
o StandingArmies and Armed Citizens: An Historical
Analysis of The SecondAmendment,by Roy G.
'Weatherup,
J.D., 1972 StandfordUniversity; member
of the California Bar.
o Gun control legislation, by the Committee on Federal
Legislation, the Association of the Bar of the City of
New York.
PREFACE

"To preserveliberty, it is essentialthatthewholebody


of the peoplealwayspossess arms,andbe taughtalike,
especiallywhenyoung,how to usethem."(Richard
HenryLee,Virginia delegateto the Continental
Congress,initiator of the Declarationof Independence,
andmemberof the first Senate,whichpassedthe Bill
of Rights.)

"Thegreatobjectis that everymanbe armed. . .


Everyonewho is ablemayhavea gun."(PatrickHenry,
in theVirginia Conventionon the ratificationof the
Constitution.)

"The advantage of beingarmed. . . theAmericans


possess overthepeopleof all othernations. . .
Notwithstandingthemilitary establishments in the
severalKingdomsof Europe,which arc cantedasfar
asthe public resources will bear,thegovernments are
afraidto trustthe peoplewith arms."(JamesMadison,
authorof the Bill of Rights,in his FederalistPaperNo.
46.)

"A well regulatedMilitia, beingnecessary to the


securityof a free State,theright of thepeopleto keep
andbearanns,shallnot be infringed."(Second
Amendmentto the Constitution.)

In my studiesas an attorneyand as a United States


Senator,I haveconstantlybeenamazed by the indifferenceor
even hostility shown the SecondAmendmentby courts,
legislatures,and commentators.JamesMadison would be
startledto hearthat his recognitionof a right to keepandbear
anns,whichpassedtheHouseby avoicevotewithoutobjection
and hardly a debate,has since been construedin but a single,
and most ambiguous Supreme Court decision, whereas his
proposals for freedom of religion, which he made reluctantly
out of fear that they would be rejectedor narrowedbeyonduse,
and those for freedom of assembly,which passedonly after a
lengfhy and bitter debate,are the subject ofscores ofdetailed
and favorabledecisions.ThomasJefferson,who kept a veritable
armoryofpistols, rifles and shotgunsat Monticello, andadvised
his nephewto forsakeother sportsin favor ofhunting, would be
astounded to hear supposed civil libertarians claim firearm
ownership should be restricted. Samuel Adams, a handgun
owner who pressed for an amendment stating that the
"Constitution shall neverbe construed. . . to preventthe people
of the United Stateswho are peaceablecitizens from keeping
their own arms," would be shockedto hear that his native state
today imposesa year'ssentence,wíthout probationor parole,for
carrying a firearm without a police permit.

This is not to imply that courts have totally ignored the


impact of the Second Amendment in the Bill of Rights. No
fewer than twenty-onedecisionsbythe courtsof our stateshave
recognized an individual right to keep and bear arms, and a
majority of these have not only recognized the right but
invalidated laws or regulationswhich abridgedit. Yet in all too
many instances, courts or coÍrmentators have sought, for
reasonsonly tangentially related to constitutional history, to
construethis right out of existence.They arguethat the Second
Amendment'swords "right of the people" mean "a right of the
state" - apparentlyoverlooking the impact of thosesamewords
when used in the First and Fourth Amendments.The "right of
the people" to assemble or to be free from unreasonable
searches and seizures is not contested as an individual
guarantee.Still they ignore consistencyand claim that the right
to "bear arms" relates only to military uses. This not only
violates a consistent constitutional reading of "right of the
people" but also ignores that the secondamendmentprotects a
right to "keep"arms.Thesecommentators contendinsteadthat
the amendment's preambleregardingthe necessityof a "well
regulatedmilitia . . . to a freestate"meansthattheright to keep
andbeararmsappliesonlyto a NationalGuard.Sucha reading
fails to notethattheFramersusedtheterm"militia" to relateto
everycitizencapableofbearingarms,andthattheCongress has
established thepresentNationalGuardunderits own power to
raisearmies,expresslystatingthatit wasnot doingsounderits
powerto organizeandarmthemilitia.

When the frrst Congressconvenedfor the purposeof


thetaskto JamesMadison.
draftingaBill of Rights,it delegated
Madisondid not write upona blanktablet.Instead,heobtained
a pamphletlisting the Stateproposalsfor a bill of rights and
soughtto producea brieferversionincorporatingall the vital
proposalsof these. His purpose was to incorporate,not
distinguishby technicalchanges, proposalssuchasthat of the
Pennsylvaniaminority, SamAdams,or the New Hampshire
delegates.Madisonproposedamongother rights that "That
right of thepeopleto keepandbeararmsshallnot beinfringed;
a well armedandwell regulatedmilitia beingthebestsecurity
of a free country;but no personreligiously scrupulousof
bearingarmsshallbe compelledto rendermilitary servicein
person."I n the House,this was initially modifiedso that the
militia clausecamebeforetheproposalrecognizingthe right.
The proposalsfor the Bill of Rightswerethentrimmedin the
interestsof brevity. The conscientiousobjectorclausewas
removed following objections by Elbridge Gerry, who
complainedthat futureCongresses might abusethe exemption
to excuseeveryonefrom military service.

The proposalfinally passedthe Housein its present


form: "A well regulatedmilitia, being necessaryfor the
preservationof a freestate,the right of thepeopleto keepand
beararmsshallnot be infringed."In this form it wassubmitted
into the Senate,which passedit the following day.The Senate
in the processindicated its intent that the right be an individual
one, for private purposes,by rejecting an amendmentwhich
would have limited the keeping and bearingof arms to bearing
"For the common defense".

The earliest American constitutional commentators


concurredin givingthis broadreadingto the amendment.When
St. George Tucker, later Chief Justiceofthe Virginia Supreme
Court, in 1803published an edition of Blackstoneannotatedto
American law, he followedBlackstone's citation of the right of
the subject "of having arms suitable to their condition and
degree,and such as are allowed by law" with a citation to the
SecondAmendment, "And this without any qualification as to
their condition or degree, as is the case in the British
'William
government." Rawle's "View of the Constitution"
published in Philadelphiain 1825noted that under the Second
Amendment: "The prohibition is general. No clause in the
Constitution could by a rule of construction be conceived to
give to Congress a power to disarm the people. Such a
flagitious attempt could only be made under some general
pretense by a state legislature. But if in blind pursuit of
inordinate power, either should attempt it, this amendmentmay
be appealedto as a restraint on both." The Jefferson papersin
the Library of Congressshow that both Tucker and Rawle were
friends of, and correspondedwith, Thomas Jefferson. Their
views are those of contemporariesof Jefferson,Madison and
I others, and are entitled to special weight. A few years later,
Joseph Story in his "Commentaries on the Constitution"
consideredthe right to keep and bear arms as "the palladium of
the liberties of the republic", which deterred tyranny and
enabled the citizenry atlarge to overthrow it should it come to
pass.

Subsequentlegislationin the secondCongresslikewise


supports the interpretation of the Second Amendment that
creates an individual right. In the Militia Act of 1792, the
second Congress defined "militia of the United States" to
include almost everyfree adult male in the United States.These
persons were obligated by law to possessa frearm and a
minimum supply of ammunition and military equipment.This
statute, incidentally, remained in effect into the early years of
the present century as alegalrequirement of gun ownership for
most of the population of the United States.There can by little
doubt from this that when the Congressandthe people spokeof
a "militia", they had referenceto the traditional concept of the
entire populacecapableof bearing arrns,and not to any formal
group such as what is today called the National Guard. The
purpose was to createan armed citizenry, which the political
theorists atthe time consideredessentialto ward off tyranny.
From this militia, appropriatemeasuresmight create a "well
regulated militia" of individuals trained in their duties and
responsibilities as citizens and owners of firearms.

If gun laws in fact worked, the sponsorsof this type of


legislation should have no difficulty drawing upon long lists of
examplesof crime ratesreducedby such legislation. That they
cannot do so after a century and a half of trylng - that they
must sweep under the rug the southern attempts at gn control
in the 1870-1910 period, the northeastem attempts in the
1920-1939period, the attemptsatboth Federaland Statelevels
in 1965-1976 - establishes the repeated, complete and
inevitable failure of gun laws to control seriouscrime.

Immediately upon assuming chairmanship of the


Subcommitteeon the Constitution,I sponsoredthe report which
follows as an effort to study, rather than ignore, the history of
the controversyover the right to keep and bear anns. Utilizing
the research capabilities of the Subcommittee on the
Constitution, the resourcesof the Lilcr:ar.yof Congress,and the
assistanceof constitutionalscholarssuchasMaryKaaren Jolly,
Steven Halbrook, and David T. Hardy, the subcommitteehas
managedto uncover information on the right to keep and bear
arms which documentsquite clearly its statusas a major
individualright of Americancitizens.We did not guessat the
purposeof theBritish 1689Declaration of Rights;we located
theJournalsof theHouseof Commonsandprivatenotesofthe
Declaration'ssponsors,no\rydeadfor two centuries.We did not
make suppositionsas to colonial interpretationsof that
Declaration'sright to keep arms; we examinedcolonial
newspapers which discussedit. We did not speculateasto the
intentof the framersof the secondamendment; we examined
James Madison's drafts for it, his handwrittenoutlines of
speeches upontheBill of Rights,anddiscussions ofthe second
amendmentby early scholarswho were personalfriends of
Madison,Jefferson,and Washingtonwhile thesestill lived.
What the Subcommitteeon the Constitutionuncoveredwas
clear- andlonglost- proofthatthesecondamendment to our
Constitution was intended as an individual right of the
Americancitizentokeepandcarryarmsin apeacefulmanner,
for protectionof himself his family, and his freedoms.The
surnmaryof our researchandfindingsform the first portionof
this report.

In the interest of fairnessand the presentationof a


completepicture,we alsoinvited groupswhich were likely to
opposethis recognitionof freedomsto submittheirviews.The
statements oftwo associations whorepliedarereproducedhere
following the reportof the Subcommittee. The Subcommittee
alsoinvitedstatements by Messrs.HalbrookandHardy,andby
the National Rifle Association,whose statementslikewise
follow our report.
When I became chairman of the Subcommitteeon the
Constitution,I hoped that I would be able to assistin the
protectionof the constitutionalrights of American citizens,
rights which have too often been erodedin the belief that
government couldberelieduponfor quicksolutionsto difficult
problems.
Both as an American citizenand as a United States
SenatorI repudiatethisview. I likewiserepudiatetheapproach
of thosewho believeto solveAmericanproblemsyou simply
becomesomethingother than American.To my mind, the
uniquenessof our free institutions,the fact that an American
citizencanboastfreedomsunknownin anyotherland,is all the
morereasonto resistanyerosionof ourindividualrights.V/hen
our ancestorsforgeda land "conceivedin liberly", theydid so
with musketandrifle. Whentheyreactedto attemptsto dissolve
their free institutions,and establishedtheir identity as a free
nation,they did so as a nationof armedfreemen.Whenthey
soughtto recordforever a gaaruntee of theirrights,theydevoted
onefulI amendment out of tento nothingbut theprotectionof
their right to keep and bear arms against governmental
interference. Undermy chairmanship theSubcommittee on the
Constitutionwill concemitself with a properrecognitionof,
andrespectfor, this right mostvaluedby freemen.

Orrin G. Hatch,Chairman
Subcommittee on the Constitution
January20,1982
The right to beararmsis a traditionwith deeprootsm
Americansociety.ThomasJeffersonproposedthat"nofreeman
shall everbe debarredthe useof arms,"and SamuelAdams
called for an amendmentbanning any law "to preventthe
peopleof the United Stateswho are peaceable citizensfrom
keepingtheir own arms." The Constitutionof the Stateof
Arizona,for example,rccognizesthe "right of an individual
citizento beararmsin defenseof himselfor the State."

Eventhoughthetraditionhasdeeproots,its application
to modern America is the subject of intensecontroversy.
Indeed,it is a controversy intowhichtheCongress is beginning,
once again, to immerse itself. I have personally been
disappointedthat so importantan issueshouldhavegenerally
been so thinly researched and so minimally debatedboth in
Congressand the courts.Our SupremeCourt has but once
touchedon its meaningat the Federallevel andthat decision,
now nearlya half-centuryold, is so ambiguousthatanyschool
of thought can find somesupportin it. All SupremeCourt
decisionson the secondamendment's applicationto the States
came in the last cenftiry,when constitutionallaw was far
differentthan it is today.As rankingminority memberof the
Subcommittee on the Constitution,I, therefore,welcomethe
effort which led to this report- a reportbasednot only upon
the independent researchof the subcommitteestaft but also
upon full and fair presentationof the casesby all interested
groupsandindividualscholars.

I personallybelieve
thatit is necessary
for the Congress
to amend the Gun Control Act of 1968. I welcome the
opportunityto introducethis discussionof how best these
amendments mightbe made.

staff haspreparedthis
The Constitutionsubcommittee
monographbringingtogetherproponentsof both sidesof the
debate over the 1968 Act. I believe that the statements
contained herein present the arguments fairly and thoroughly.
I commend SenatorHatch, chairman of the subcommittee,for
having this excellent referencework prepared.I am surethat it
will be of great assistanceto the Congressas it debatesthe
secondamendmentand considersleeislationto amendthe Gun
Control Act.

Dennis DeConcini,
Ranking Minority Member,
Subcommitteeon the Constitution
January20,1982
History:
SecondAmendmentRightto "KeepandBearArms"

Theright to keepandbeararmsasapartof Englishand


Americanlaw antedates not only theConstitution,but alsothe
discoveryof firearms.Under the laws of Alfred the Great,
whosereign beganin 872 4.D., all Englishcitizensfrom the
nobility to the peasantswere obliged to privately purchase
weaponsandbeavailablefor militarydoty._LThiswasin sharp
contrastto the feudal systemas it evolvedin Europe,under
which armamentandmilitary dutieswereconcentrated in the
nobility. Thebodyof armedcitizenswereknownasthe "t¿rd".

While a greatmarryof the Saxonrightswere abridged


following the Norman conquest,the right and duty of arms
possession wasretained.Underthe Assizeof Arms of ll8l,
"thewholecommunityof freemen"betweentheagesof 15and
40 wererequiredby law to possesscertainarms,which were
arrangedin proportion to their possessions. 2 They were
requiredtwice ayearto demonstrate to Royalofficialsthatthey
were appropriatelyarmed.In 1253,anotherAssize of Arms
expanded thedutyof armament to includenotonly freemen,but
alsovilleins,who weretheEnglishequivalentof serfs.Now all
"citizens,burgesses,freetenants,villeinsandothersfrom l5 to
60 yearsof age"were obligatedto be armed.3 V/hile on the
Continentthevilleinswereregarded aslittle morethananimals
hungeringfor rebellion, the English legal systemnot only
permitted,but affirmativelyrequiredthem,to be armed.

The thirteenth centurysaw further definítions of this


right as the long bow, a formidablearmor-piercingweapon,
becameincreasinglythemainstayof Britishnationalpolicy. In
1285,EdwardI commanded that all personscomply with the
earlierAssizesand addedthat "anyoneelsewho can afford
them shall keepbows and arrows."4 The right of armament
wassubjectonlyto narrowlimitations.1n1279,it wasordered
that thoseappearingin Parliamentor otherpublic assemblies
"shall comewithout all forceandarmor,well andpeaceably".
5 In 1328,the statuteof Northamptonorderedthatno oneuse
their armsin "affrayof the peace,nor to go nor ride armedby
day or by night in fairs, markets,nor in the presenceof the
justicesor otherministers."6 Englishcourtsconstrued thisban
consistentlywith the generalright of private armamentas
applyng only to wearingof arms "accompanied with such
circumstances asareapt to terri$r the people.u7 In 1369,the
King orderedthatthesheriffsof Londonrequireall citizens"at
leisuretime on holidays"to "usein their recreationbowesand
arrows"andto stopall othergameswhich might distractthem
from this practice.I

The Tudor kings experimentedwith limits upon


specializedweapons- mainly crossbowsand the then-new
firearms.Thesemeasureswere not intendedto disarm the
citizenry, but on the contrary,to preventtheir being diverted
from longbowpracticeby sportwith otherweaponswhichwere
consideredlesseffective.Even thesenarrowmeasureswere
shortlived. In 1503, Henry VII limited shooting (but not
possession) of crossbowsto thosewith landworth 200 marks
annualrental,but providedan exceptionfor thosewho "shote
owt of a howsefor thelawefulldefensof thesame".9 In 151l,
HenryVItr increased thepropefy requirement to 300 marks.He
alsoexpanded therequirementoflongbowownership, requiring
all citizensto "usoandexercyseshootyngin longbowes,and
also havea bowe and arrowescontynually"in the house.10
Fatherswererequiredby law to purchasebowsandarrowsfor
their sonsbetweenthe ageof 7 and 14 andto train them in
longbowuse.

kr 1514thebanon crossbowswasextendedto include


firearms. 11 But in 1533, Henry reduced the property
qualificationto 100poundsper year; in l54l he limited it to
possession of smallfirearms("of the lengthof onehole yard"
for some firearms and "thre quarters of a yarde" for
others)l2and eventuallyhe repealedthe entire statute by
proclamation.l3 The later Tudor monarchscontinuedthe
systemandBlizabethaddedto it by creatingwhat cameto be
known as "train bands", selectedportions of the citizenry
chosen for special training. These trained bands \ryere
distinguishedfrom the "militia", which term was first used
duringthe SpanishArmadacrisisto designate the entireof the
armedcitizenry.14

Themilitia continuedtobeapivotalforceinthe English


political system.TheBritishhistorianCharlesOmanconsiders
the existenceofthe armedcitizewyto beamajorreasonforthe
moderationof monarchicalrule in GreatBritain; "More than
once he lHenry VItr] had to restrain himself, when he
discoveredthatthe generalfeelingof his subjectswasagainst
him...His'gentlemen pensioners'
andyeomenof theguardwere
but a handful, and bills or bows were in every farm and
cottage".15

Whencivil warbrokeout in 1642,thecriticalissuewas


whether the King or Parliamenthad the right to control the
militia. 16 The aftermathof the civil war saw England in
temporarycontrol of a military governmentwhich repeated
dissolvedParliamentandauthorizedits officersto "searchfor,
and seize all arms" owned by Catholics,opponentsof the
government, "or anyotherpersonwhomthecommissioners had
judgeddangerous to thepeaceof this Commonwealth".17

The military governmentendedwith the restorationof


Charlestr. Charlesin tum openedhis reign with a variety of
repressivelegislation,expandingthe definition of treason,
establishingpresscensorshipand orderinghis supportersto
form theirowntroops,"theofficersto benumerous, disaffected
personswatchedandnot allowedto assemble, andtheir arms
seized".18 In 1662,a Militia Act was enactedempowering
officials " to searchfor and seizeall armsin the custodyor
possession of anypersonor personswhomthe saidlieutenants
or any two or moreof their deputiesshalljudge dangerousto
the peaceof the kingdom". 19 Gunsmithswere orderedto
deliver to the governmentlists of all purchasers.20 These
confiscations werecontinued underJamesII, whodirectedthem
particularlyagainsttheIrishpopulation: "Althoughthe country
wasinfestedby predatorybands,a Protestant gentlemancould
scarcelyobtainpermission to keepa braceof pistols."21

In 1668,the governmentof Jameswasoverturnedin a


peacefuluprising which cameto be know as "The Glorious
Revolution".ParliamentresolvedthatJameshadabdicatedand
promulgateda Declarationof Rights,laterenactedastheBill of
Rights.Before coronation,his successor V/illiam of Orange,
wasrequiredto swearto respecttheserights.Thedebatesin the
Houseof Commonsover this Declarationof Rights focused
largelyuponthe disarmament underthe 1662Militia Act. One
membercomplainedthat "an act of Parliamentwas madeto
disarmall Englishmen,who the lieutenantshouldsuspect,by
day or night, by forceor otherwise- this wasdonein keland
for the sakeof putting armsinto Irish hands."The speechof
anotheris summarizedas "militia bill - powor to disarm all
England- nowdonein keland." A third complained"Arbitrary
power exercisedby the ministry. . . . Militia - imprisoning
i ) without reason;disarming- himself disarmed."Yet another
summarized hiscomplaints"Militia Act - anabominablething
to disarmthenation...."22

TheBill of Rights,asdraftedin theHouseof Commons,


simply provided that "the acts concemingthe militia are
for the public
grievousto the subject"andthat "it is necessary
Safetythatthe Subjects,which areProtestants,shouldprovide
and keep arms for the common defense;And that the Arms
which havebeenseized,andtakenfrom them,be restored."23
The Houseof Lords changedthis to makeit a morepositive
declarationof anindividualright underEnglishlaw: "Thatthe
subjectswhich areProtestantmayhavearmsfor their defense
suitableto theirconditionsandasallowedby law." 24 The only
limitation was on ownershipby Catholics,who at that time
composed onlya few percentof theBritishpopulationandwere
subjectto a widevarietyofpunitivelegislation.TheParliament
subsequently madeclear what it meantby "suitableto their
conditionsandasallowedby law".Thepoorercitizenshadbeen
restrictedfrom owning firearms,as well as traps and other
commoditiesuseful for hunting, by the 167l Game Act.
FollowingtheBill of Rights,Parliamentreenacted that statute,
leavingits operativeparts unchangedwith one exception-
whichremovedtheword "guns"fromthelist of itemsforbidden
to thepoorercitizens.25 Theright to keepandbeararmswould
henceforthbelongto all Englishsubjects,rich andpoor alike.

In the colonies,availability of hunting and need for


defenseled to armamentstatutescomparableto thoseof the
early Saxontimes.In 1623,Virginia forbadeits coloniststo
travel unlessthe were "well armed"; in 1631 it required
coloniststo engagein targetpracticeon Sundayand "to bring
their peecesto church." 26 In 1658 it required every
householderto havea firnctioningfirearmwithin his houseand
in 1673its lawsprovidedthata citizenwhoclaimedhewastoo
poor to purchaseaftrearmwould haveonepurchasedfor him
by the govemment,which would then require him to pay a
reasonable pricewhen ableto do so.27 In Massachusetts, the
first sessionofthe legislatureorderedthatnotonlyfreemen,but
alsoindenturedservantsown firearmsandin 1644it imposed
a stem6 shillingfine upon anycitizenwhowasnot armed.28

When the British governmentbeganto increaseits


militarypresencein thecoloniesin themid-eighteenthcentury
Massachusetts respondedby calling upon its citizensto arm
themselvesin defense.Onecolonialnewspaperarguedthat it
wasimpossibleto complainthatthis actwasillegal sincethey
were "British subjects,to whom the privilegeof possessing
arms is expresslyrecognizedby the Bill of Rights" while
anotherarguedthat this "is a naturalright which the people
havereseryedto themselves, confirmedby theBill of Rights,to
keep arms for their own defense".29The newspapercited
Blackstone's commentarieson thelawsof England,whichhad
listed the "having and using arms for self preservationand
defense"among the "absoluterights of individuals." The
colonistsfelt theyhadanabsoluteright at commonlaw to own
firearms.

Togetherwith freedomof the press,the right to keep


andbeararmsbecameoneof theindividualrightsmostprized
by thecolonists.WhenBritishtroopsseizeda militia arsenalin
September, 1774,andincorrectrumorsthatcolonistshadbeen
killed spreadthroughMassachusetts, 60,000citizenstook up
arms.30A few monthslater,whenPatrickHenrydeliveredhis
famed"Give me liberly or give me death"speech,he spokein
support of a proposition "that a well regulated militia,
composed of gentlemenandfreemen,is thenaturalstrengthand
onlysecwityof a freegovernment.... " Throughoutthefollowing
revolution, formal and informal units of armed citizens
obstructed British communication, cutoff foragingparties,and
harassed thethinly stretchedregularforces.Whensevenstates
adoptedstate "bills of rights" following the Declarationof
Independence, eachof thosebills of rightsprovidedeitherfor
protectionof the conceptof a militia or for an expressright to
keepandbeararms.3l

Followingtherevolutionbutprevious to theadoptionof
theConstitution,debatesovermilitia proposalsoccupiedalarge
partof thepolitical scene.A varietyof planswereput forth by
figuresrangingfrom GeorgeWashingtonto Baronvon Steuben.
32 All theproposalscalledfor a generalútty of all citizensto
be armed, although some proposals(most notably von
Steuben's) alsoemphasized a "selectmilitia" whichwouldbe
paid for its servicesandgivenspecialtraining.In this respect,
this"selectmilitia"wasthesuccessorofthe "trainedbands"and
the predecessor of what is todaythe "nationalguard".In the
debatesover the Constitution,von Steuben's proposalswere
cnttcizedasundemocratic.In Connecticutonwriter complained
of aproposalthat"thislookstoomuchlike Baronvon Steuben's
militia, bywhich a standingarmywasmeantandintended."33
In Pennsylvania, a delegateargued"Congressmay give us a
selectmilitia which will, in fact, be a standingarmy - or
Congress,afraidof a generalmilitia, may saytherewill be no
militia at all.'When a selectmilitia is formed,the peoplein
generalmaybedisarmed."34RichardHenrylee, in his widely
read pamphlet "Letters from the Federal Farmer to the
Republican"worried that the peoplemight be disarmed"by
modelingthemilitia. Shouldonefifth or oneeighthpart of the
peoplecapableof bearingarmsbemadeinto a selectmilitia, as
hasbeenproposed,andthosetheyoungandardentpartsofthe
community,possessed of little or no propeúy,the formerwill
answerall the purposesof an army,while the latter will be
defenseless. " Heproposed that"theConstitutionoughtto secure
a genuine,andguardagainsta selectmilitia," addingthat "to
preserveliberty,it is essential thatthewholebodyof thepeople
always possessarms and be taught alike, especiallywhen
young,how to usethem."35

The suspicionof selectmilitia units expressed in these


passagesis a clear indication that the framers of the
Constitutiondid not seekto guarantee a Stateright to maintain
formed groups similar to the National Guard, but rather to
protectthe right of individualcitizensto keepandbeararms.
Lee,in particular,satin the Senatewhich approvedthe Bill of
Rights.He wouldhardlyhavemeantthesecondamendment to
applyonly to the selectmilitiashe so fearedanddisliked.

Other figuresof the periodwere of like mind. In the


Virginia convention,GeorgeMason,drafterof theVirginiaBill
of Rights,accusedthe British of havingplotted"to disarmthe
people- that wasthe bestandmosteffectiveway to enslave
them",while PatrickHenryobservedthat,"The greatobjectis
that everymanbe armed"and"everyonewho is ablemayhave
a gun".36

Nor weretheantifederalists,
to whomwe owecreditfor
a Bill of Rights,aloneon this account.Federalistarguments
alsoprovidea sourceof supportfor an individualrightsview.
Their argumentsin favor of the proposedConstitutionalso
relied heavily upon universal armament.The proposed
Constitutionhadbeenheavilycnticizedforits failureto banor
evenlimit standingarmies.Unableto denythis omission,the
Constitutionlssupportersfrequentlyarguedto the peoplethat
the universalarmamentof Americansmadesuch limitations
unnecessary. A pamphletwritten by NoahWebster,aimedat
swayingPennsylvania towardratification,observed.

Beforea standingarmycanrule,thepeople
must be disarmed;as they are in almost
every kingdom in Europe.The supreme
power in America cannotenforceunjust
lawsbythe slvord,becausethewholebody
of the peopleare armed,and constitutea
forcesuperiorto anybandof regulartroops
that canbe, on anypretense,raisedin the
United States.37

In theMassachusetts
convention,Sedgewickechoedthe
samethought,rhetoricallyaskinganoppressivearmycouldbe
formed or "if raised,whetherthey could subduea Nation of
freemen,who know how to pnzeliberty,andwho havearmsin
their hands?"38 In FederalistPaper46, Madison,laterauthor
ofthe SecondAmendment, mentioned"Theadvantage ofbeing
armed,which the Americanspossessover the people of all
other countries" and that "notwithstandingthe military
establishments in the severalkingdomsof Europe,which are
carriedasfar asthepublicresources will bear,thegovemments
areafraidto trustthepeoplewith arms."

A third andevenmorecompellingcasefor anindividual


rights perspective on the SecondAmendmentcomesfrom the
Statedemandsfor a bill ofrights. Numerousstateratifications
called for adoption of a Bill of Rights as a part of the
Constitution.The first such call came from a group of
Pennsylvaniadelegates.Their proposals,which were not
adoptedbut had a critical effect on futuredebates,proposed
amongotherrightsthat"thepeoplehavearight to beararmsfor
the defenseof themselvesand their own state,or the United
States,or for the purposeof killing game;andno law shallbe
passedfor disarmingthe peopleor any of them, unlessfor
crimes committed,or a real dangerof public injury from
individuals."39 In Massachusetts, SamAdamsunsuccessfully
pushedfor a ratificationconditionedon adoptionof a Bill of
Rights,beginningwith a guarantee "Thatthe saidConstitution
shallneverbe construedto authorizeCongress to infringethe
just libertyof thepressor therightsof conscience;or to prevent
thepeopleof theUnitedStateswho arepeaceable citizensfrom
keepingtheir own arms...."40 WhenNew Hampshiregavethe
Constitutiontheninth voteneededfor its passinginto effect,it
called for adoptionof a Bill of Rights which includedthe
provisionthat "Congressshallneverdisarmanycitizenunless
suchas areor havebeenin actualrebellion".41 Virginia and
North Carolinathereaftercalledfor aprovision"thatthepeople
have the right to keep and bear arms; that a well regulated
militia composedof the body of the peopletrainedto armsis
the proper,naturaland safedefenseof a free state."42

When the first Congressconvenedfor the purposeof


thetaskto JamesMadison.
draftingaBill of Rights,it delegated
Madisondid not write upona blanktablet.Instead,heobtained
a pamphletlisting the Stateproposalsfor a Bill of Rightsand
soughtto producea brieferversionincorporatingall the vital
proposalsof these. His purpose was to incorporate,not
distinguishby technicalchanges,proposalssuchasthat of the
Pennsylvania minority, SamAdams,andtheNew Hampshire
delegates.Madisonproposedamongotherrightsthat:

The right of the peopleto keep and bear


armsshall not be infringed;a well armed
and well regulatedmilitia being the best
securityof a free country;but no person
religiouslyscrupulousofbearingarmsshall
becompelledto rendermilitaryservice." 43

In the House,this was initially modified so that the


militia clausecamebeforethe proposalrccognizingthe right.
The proposalsfor the Bill of Rightswerethentrimmedin the
interestsof brevity. The conscientiousobjectorclausewas
removed following objections by Eldridge Gerry, who
complainedthatfutureCongresses might abusetheexemption
for the scrupulousto excuseeveryonefrom military service.

The proposalfinally passedthe Housein its present


form: "A well regulatedmilitia,beingnecessary for thesecurity
of a free state,the right of the peopleto keepandbeararrns,
shall not be infringed."In this form it was submittedto the
Senate,which passedit the following day. The Senatein the
processindicatedits intentthatthe right be an individualone,
for privatepu{poses,by rejectingan amendment which would
havelimitedthekeepingandbearingof armsto bearing"for the
commondefense".

The earliest American constitutionalcommentators


concurredin giving this broadreadingto theamendment.When
St. GeorgeTucker,laterChiefJusticeof theVirginia Supreme
Court,in 1803publishedaneditionof Blackstoneannotated to
American law, he followed Blackstone'scitation of the right of
the subject"of having arms suitable to their condition and
degree,and such as are allowed by law" with a citation to the
SecondAmendment, "And this without any qualification as to
their condition or degree, as is the case in the British
government." 44william Rawle's "View of the Constitution"
published in Philadelphiain 1825noted that under the Second
Amendment

"The prohibitionis general.No clausein


the Constitution could by a rule of
constructionbe conceived to give to
Congressa power to disarm the people.
Such a flagitious attemptcould only be
made under some generalpretenseby a
statelegislature.But if in blind pursuit of
inordinatepower,eithershouldat temptit,
this amendmentmay be appealedto as a
restrainton both."45

The Jeffersonpapersin the Llbrary of Congressshow


thatboth TuckerandRawlewerefriendsof, andcorresponded
with, ThomasJefferson.This suggests as
thattheir assessment,
contemporariesof the Constitution'sdrafters, should be
affordedspecialconsideration.

Latercommentators agreedwith TuckerandRawle.For


instance, Joseph Story in his "Commentarieson the
Constitution"considered therightto keepandbeararmsas"the
palladium of the libertiesof the republic", which deterred
tyrannyandenabledthe cittzewy atlargeto overthrowit should
it cometo pass.46

Subsequentlegislationin thesecondCongress likewise


supportsthe interpretationof the SecondAmendmentthat
createsan individual right. In the Militia Act of 1792,the
secondCongressdefined "militia of the United States"to
includealmosteveryfreeadultmalein theUnitedStates.These
personswere obligatedby law to possessa ftrearm and a
minimum supplyof ammunitionand military equipment.47
This statute,incidentally,remainedin effectintotheearlyyears
of thepresentcenturyasa legalrequirementof gunownership
for most of the populationof the United States.Therecanby
little doubt from this that when the Congressandthe people
spoke of a "militia"; they had referenceto the traditional
conceptof theentirepopulacecapableofbearingarTns, andnot
to any formal groupsuchaswhat is todaycalledthe National
Guard.The purposewas to createan armedcitizewy,suchas
the political theoristsat the time consideredessentialto ward
off tyranny. From this militia, appropriatemeasuresmight
createa "well regulatedmilitia" of individualstrainedin their
dutiesandresponsibilities ascitizensandownersof firearms.

The SecondAmendmentas suchwas rarelylitigated


prior to thepassage of theFourteenthAmendment. Priorto that
time, most courtsacceptedthat the commandsof the federal
Bill of Rightsdid not apply to the states.Sincetherewas no
federalfirearmslegislationatthis time,therewasno legislation
which was directlysubjectto the SecondAmendment,if the
acceptedinterpretationswere followed. However, a broad
vaiety of state legislation was struck down under state
guarantees of theright to keepandbeararmsandevenin a few
cases,under the SecondAmendment,when it came before
courtswhich consideredthe federalprotectionsapplicableto
thestates.Kentuckyin 18I 3 enactedthefirst carryingconcealed
weaponstatutein the United States;in 1822,the Kentucþ
Courtof Appealsstruckdownthe law asaviolationof the state
constitutionalprotectionof the right to keep and bear arms;
"And can there be entertaineda reasonabledoubt but the
provisionsof that act import a restrainton the right of the
cítizen to bear arms?The court apprehendsit not. The right
existedattheadoptionof the Constitution;it thenhadno limit
shortof the moral powerof the citizensto exerciseit, and in
fact consistedof nothingelsebut the liberty of the citizento
bear arms." 48 On the other hand, a similar measurewas
sustainedin Indiana,not uponthe groundsthata right to keep
andbeararmsdid not apply,but ratheruponthenotion thata
statutebanning only concealedcarryingstill permiued the
carrytngof arms and merely regulatedon possibleway of
car$ng them. 49 A few years late1,the SupremeCourt of
Alabamauphelda similarstatutebut added,"We do not desire
to be understoodasmaintaining,that in regulatingthemanner
of wearingarms,the legislaturehasno otherlimit thanits own
discretion.A statutewhich, underthe pretenseof regulation,
amountsto a destructionof thatright, or whichrequiresarmsto
be soborneasto renderthemwhollyuselessforthe purposeof
'When
defense,would be clearly unconstitutional."50 the
ArkansasSupremeCourtin 1842uphelda carcyrng concealed
weaponsstatute,the chief justice explainedthat the statute
would not "detractanythingfrom the powerof the peopleto
defendtheir free stateand the established institutionsof the
country.It prohibitsonlythewearingof certainarmsconcealed.
This is simply a regulationas to the mannerof bearingsuch
arrnsasarespecified",while the dissenting justiceproclaimed
"I deny that anyjust or free govemment upon earth has the
po\Mer to disarmits citizens".5l
'When
Sometimes courtswentfarther. in 1837,Georgia
totally bannedthe saleof pistols(exceptingthe largerpistols
"known andusedashorsemen's pistols") andotherweapons,
the GeorgiaSupremeCourt in Nunn v. Stateheld the statute
unconstitutionalunderthe SecondAmendmentto the federal
Constitution.The courtheld that the Bill of Rightsprotected
naturalrights which werefully ascapableof infringementby
statesas by the federal governmentand that the Second
Amendmentprovided"the right of the wholepeople,old and
yomg, men,womenandboys,andnot militia only,to keepand
beararmsof everydescription,andnot merelysuchasareused
bythe militia, shallnotbe infringed,curtailed,orbrokenin on,
in the slightestdegree;andall this for the importantendto be
attained:the rearingup and qualiffing of a well regulated
militia, so vitally necessaryto the securityof a free state."52
'War,
Prior to the Civil the SupremeCourtof theUnited States
likewiseindicatedthattheprivilegesof citizenshipincludedthe
individual right to own and carry firearms.In the notorious
Dred Scottcase,the courtheldthat blackAmericanswerenot
citizensandcouldnot bemadesuchby anystate.This decision,
which by strikingdowntheMissouriCompromisedid somuch
'War,
to bring on the Civil listed what the SupremeCourt
considered therightsofAmericancitizensbywayof illustrating
what rights would haveto be givento blackAmericansif the
Court wereto recognizethemasfull fledgedcitizens:

It would give to personsof thenegrorace,


who arerecognizedas citizensin any one
stateof the Union, the right to enterevery
otherstate,whenevertheypleased.. . .and
it wouldgivethemfull libertyof speechin
publicandin privateuponall subjectsupon
which its own citizensmight meet;to hold
public meetingsuponpolitical affairs,and
to keepandcarryarmswherevertheywent.
53

Followingthe Civil'War, the legislativeefforts which


gaveus threeamendments to the Constitutionandour earliest
civil rights actslikewiserecognizedthe right to keepandbear
armsasanexistingconstitutionalright of the individual cittzen
and as a right specificallysingledout as oneprotectedby the
civil rights acts and by the FourteenthAmendmentto the
Constitution,againstinfringementby stateauthorities.Muchof
thereconstruction effortin theSouthhadbeenhingeduponthe
creationof "blackmilitias" composedof the armedandnewly
freedblacks,offrceredlargelyby black veteransof the Union
Army. In themonthsaftertheCivil War,the existingsouthern
governments struckat theseunitswith theenactment of "black
codes"whicheitheroutlawedgunownershipbyblacksentirely,
or imposed permit systemsfor them, and permitted the
'When
confiscationof firearmsowned by blacks. the Civil
Rights Act of 1866wasdebatedmembers both of the Senate
andtheHousereferredto thedisarmament of blacksasa major
consideration. 54 SenatorTrumbullcitedprovisionsoutlawing
ownershipof armsby blacksas amongthosewhich the Civil
RightsAct wouldprevent.55 SenatorSulsburycomplainedon
the otherhandthatif the actwereto bepassedit wouldprevent
his own statefrom enforcinga law banninggun ownershipby
individual free blacks.56 Similar argumentswere advanced
duringthe debatesoverthe "anti-KKK act";its sponsorat one
point explainedthat a sectionmaking it a federalcrime to
deprivea personof "armsor weaponshemayhavein his house
or possession for thedefenseof his person,family,or property"
was "intended to enforce the well-known constitutional
provisionsguaranteeingthe right in the citizen'keepandbear
ams'." 57 Likewise, in the debatesover the Fourteenth
Amendment Congressfrequently referred to the Second
Amendmentasoneof the rightswhich it intendedto guarantee
againststateaction.58

Following adoptionof the FourteenthAmendment,


however, the SupremeCourt held that that Amendment's
prohibitionagainststatesdeprivinganypersons of their federal
"privileges and immunities" was to be given a narrow
construction.In particular,the "privilegesand immunities"
underthe Constitutionwould refer only to thoserights which
were not felt to exist as a processof naturalright, but which
were createdsolelyby the Constitution.Thesemight refer to
rightssuchasvotingin federalelectionsandof interstatetravel,
which wouldclearlynot existexceptby virtueof the existence
of a federalgovemmentand which could not be said to be
"naturalrights". 59 This paradoxicallymeantthat the rights
which most personswould acceptas the most important-
thoseflowing from conceptsof naturaljustice- weredevalued
attheexpenseof moretechnicalrights.Thuswhenindividuals
werechargedwith havingdeprivedblackcitizensof theirright
to freedomof assemblyandto keepandbeararms,by violently
breaking up a peaceableassemblyof black citizens, the
SupremeCourtin UnitedStatesv. Cruikshank60 held thatno
indictmentcouldbeproperlybroughtsincetheright "ofbearing
arms for a lawful purpose"is "not a nght grantedby the
Constitution.Neitheris it in anymannerdependent uponthat
instrumentfor its existence." Nor, in theview of theCourt,was
the right to peacefully assemblea right protectedby the
FourteenthAmendment:"Theright of thepeoplepeaceablyto
assemblefor lawful purposesexistedlongbeforethe adoption
of the Constitutionof the United States.In fact, it is and has
alwaysbeenone of the attributesof citizenshipunder a free
government.. . .It \ryasnot, therefore,a right grantedto the
peopleby the Constitution."Thusthe very importanceof the
rightsprotectedbythe First andSecondAmendmentwasused
asthe basisfor theargumentthattheydid not applyto the states
under the FourteenthAmendment.In later opinions,chiefly
Presserv. Illinois 6l andMillerv. Texas62 theSupremeCourt
adheredto theview.Cruikshankhasclearlybeensuperseded by
twentiethcenturyopinionswhichhold thatportionsof the Bill
of Rights- andin particulartheright to assemblywith which
Cruikshankdealtin additionto the SecondAmendment- are
I binding upon the state governments.Given the legislative
historyofthe Civil RightsActsandtheFourteenth Amendment,
and the more expandedviews of incorporationwhich have
becomeaccepted in our own century,it is clearthatthe right to
keepandbeararmswas meantto be andshouldbe protected
under the civil rights statutesand the FourteenthAmendment
againstinfringementby officialsactingundercolorof statelaw.

V/ithin our own centurythe only occasionuponwhich


the SecondAmendmenthasreachedthe SupremeCourt came
in United Statesv. Miller. 63 There,a prosecutionfor carrying
a sawedoff shotgunwas dismissedbefore trial on Second
Amendmentgrounds.In doingso,thecourttookno evidenceas
to the natureof the firearmor indeedanyother factualmatter.
The SupremeCourt reversedon proceduralgrounds,holding
that the trial court could not take judicial notice of the
relationshipbetweena firearmandtheSecondAmendment,but
mustreceivesomemannerof evidence.It did not formulatea
testnor statepreciselywhatrelationshipmightberequired.The
court'sstatement thattheamendment wasadopted"to assure the
continuationand renderpossiblethe effectivenessof such
[militia] forces"and"mustbe interpretedandappliedwith that
endin view", whencombinedwith thecourt'sstatement thatall
constitutionalsources"show plainly enoughthat the militia
comprisedall malesphysicallycapableof actingin concertfor
the common defense....thesemen were expectedto appear
bearing arms supplied by themselvesand of the kind in
commonuse at the time," 64 suggeststhat at the very least
privateownershipbyapersoncapableofselfdefenseandusing
an ordinaryprivatelyownedfirearmmustbe protectedby the
SecondAmendment.What the Court did not do in Miller is
evenmorestriking:It did not suggestthatthe lower courttake
evidenceon whetherMiller belongedto theNationalGuardor
a similar group.The hearingwas to be on the natureof the
firearm, not on the natureof its use; nor is there a single
suggestionthatNationalGuardstatusis relevantto the case.

The SecondAmendmentright to keep and beararms


therefore,is aright of theindividualcitizentoprivatelypossess
andcarryin a peacefulmannerfirearmsandsimilararms.Such
an "individual rights" interpretationis in full accordwith the
history of the right to keep and bear arms, as previously
discussed.It is moreoverin accord with contemporaneous
statementsand formulationsof the right by suchfoundersof
this nation as ThomasJeffersonand Samuel Adams, and
accuratelyreflectsthemajorityof theproposalswhich ledup to
the Bill of Rights itself. A number of state constitutions,
adopted prior to or contemporaneously with the federal
ConstitutionandBill of Rights,similarlyprovidedfor arightof
thepeopleto keepandbeararms.If in factthis language creates
a right protectingthestatesonl¡ theremight be a reasonfor it
to be insertedin thefederalConstitutionbut no reasonfor it to
beinsertedin stateconstitutions.Statebills ofrightsnecessarily
protectonly againstactionby thestate,andby definitiona state
cannotinfringe its own rights; to attemptto protecta right
belongingto thestatebyinsertingit in a limitationof thestate's
own powers would createan absurdity. The fact that the
contemporariesof the framers did insert thesewords into
severalstate constitutionswould indicate clearly that they
viewedthe right asbelongingto the individual citizen,thereby
making it a right which could be infringedeitherby stateor
federal govemmentand which must be protectedagainst
infringementby both.

Finally, the individual rights interpretationgives full


meaningto thewordschosenby thefirst Congress to reflectthe
right to keepandbeararms.The framersof the Bill of Rights
consistentlyusedthe words "right of the people"to reflect
individualrights- aswhenthesewordswereusedto recognize
the "right of thepeople"to peaceablyassemble, andthe "right
ofthe people"againstunreasonable searches andseizures. They
distinguishedbetween the rights of the peopleand of the state
in the TenthAmendment.As discussedearlier,the "militia"
itself referredto a conceptof a universallyarmedpeople,not to
any specificallyorganizedunit. When the framersreferredto
the equivalentof our NationalGuard,theyuniformlyusedthe
term "selectmilitia" and distinguishedthis from "militia".
Indeed,thedebates overtheConstitutionconstantlyreferredto
the organized militia unitsasa threatto freedomcomparable to
that of a standingarmy,andstressed that suchorganizedunits
did not constituted,andindeedwerephilosophicallyopposed
to, the conceptof a militia.
That the National Guard is not the "Militia" referred to
in the secondamendmentis even clearertoday. Congresshas
organized the National Guard under its power to "raise and
support armies" and not its power to "Provide for the
organizing, arming and discíplining the Militia". 65 This
Congress chose to do in the interests of organizing reserve
mllitary units which were not limited in deployment by the
stricturesof our power over the constitutionalmilitia, which can
be called forth only "to executethe laws of the Union, suppress
insurrectionsandrepel invasions." The modemNational Guard
was specifically intended to avoid statusas the constitutional
mlIitia, a distinctionrecognizedby l0 U.S.C. Sec.3l l(a).

The conclusion is thus inescapablethat the history,


concept, and wording of the second amendment to the
Constitution oftheUnited States,aswell asits interpretationby
every major commentatorandcourt in the first half century after
its ratification, indicatesthat what is protectedis an individual
right of a private citizento own and cany firearms in a peaceful
manner.

REFERENCES

1. CharlesHollister,Anglo-SaxonMilitary Institutionsll-42
(OxfordUniversityPress1962);FrancisGrose,Military
AntiquitiesRespecting a Historyof the British Army, Vol. I
atl-2(London,1812).

2. Grose,supra,at9-ll; BruceLyon,A Constitutionaland


I-egalHistoryof MedievalEngland.273 (2nd.ed.New York
1e80).

3. J.J.BagleyandP.B.Rowley,A Documentary History of


England.1066-1540, Vol. I at 155-56(NewYork 1965).
'Winchester
4. Statuteof (13 Edw.I c. 6). SeealsoBagleyand
Rowley,supraat 158.
s.7 E d .r c.2(1 2 79) .

6. Statuteof Northampton(2ndEdw. Itr c. 3).

7. Rexv. Knight,90Eng.Rep.330;87 Eng.Rep.75 (King's


Bench,1686).

8. E. G. Heath,TheGreyGooseWing 109(London,l97I).

9. 19Hen.Vtr c. 4 (1503).

10.3 Hen.VItr c. 13(1511).

11.64Hen.VItr c. 13(1514).

12.33Hen.VItr c. 6 (1514).

13.Noel Perrin,Giving Up the Gun 59-60(Boston,1979)

14.Jim Hill, TheMinutemanin War andPeace26-27


(Harrisburg,1968)

15.CharlesOman,A Historyof the Art of V/ar in the


SixteenthCentury288 (NewYork, 1937).

Vol. 2 at 412(St.
16.William Blackstone,Commentaries,
GeorgeTucker,ed.,Philadelphia1803).

17."An Act for SettlingtheMilitia," OrdinancesandActs of


theInterregnum, Vol. 21320(London,HMSO 1911).

18.8 Calenderof StatePapers(Domestic),CharlesII, No.


1 8 8 p, . 1 5 0 .
19.14Car.tr c.3 (1662).

20. JoyceMalcolm,Disarmed:TheLossof theRightto Bear


Arms in RestorationEngland,at 11(MaryIngrahamBunting
Institute,RadcliffeCollegeI 980).

2L.ThomasMacaulay,The Historyof Englandfrom the


of CharlesII, Vol. nat 137(London,1856).
Accession

22.Phrllip,Earl of Hardwicke,Miscellaneous
StatePapers
-17
from 1501-1726,vol. 2 at 407 (London,1778).
'Western,
23. J. R. MonarchyandRevolution:The English
Statein the1680's, at339(Totowa,N.J.,1972).

24. Joumalofthe Houseof Commonsfrom December26,


1688to October26,1693,at29. (London,1742).TheBill of
Rightswasultimatelyenactedin this form. I Gul. andMar.
S e s s . , 2 , c (. 2
1689).

25. JoyceMalcolm,supra,at 16.

26. William Hening,The Statutesat Large:Beinga


Collectionof All the Lawsof Virginia from the First Session
of the Legislaturein 1619,at pp. 127, 173-74 (New York,
1823).

27.rd.

28. V/illiam Brigham,The Compactwith the Charterand


Lawsof theColonyof New Plymouth,31,76 (Boston,1836).

29. OliverDickerson,ed.,BostonUnderMilitary Rule,61,


79 (Boston,1936).

PoliticalPartiesin Revolutionary
30. StevenPatterson,
at 103(UniversityofWisconsinPress,1973).
Massachusetts,

31.SeeSprecher,
TheLostAmendment,
514.8.4.J.554,
66s(re6s).
32.Themostextensive studiesof thesemilitiaproposalsare
'Wilson:
JohnMacaulyPalmer,V/ashington,Lincoln, Three
'War
Statesmen(New Yorlq 1930);FrederickStem,Citizen
Army (New York, 1957);JohnMahon,The American
Militia: Decadeof Decision1789-1800 (Univ.of Florida,
1e60).

33. Merrill Jensen,ed.,The Documentary of Historyof the


Ratificationof the Constitution,vol. 3 at378 (Madison,
V/isc.)

34.Id.,vol.2at 508.

35.WalterBennet,ed.,Lettersfrom the FederalFarmerto the


at 2I, 22, 124(Univ.of AlabamaPress,I975).
Republican,

36.DebatesandotherProceedings of theConventionof
Virginia, . . . takenin shorthandby David Robertsonof
Petersburg, at 27l, 275 (2nded.Richmond,I 805).

37.Noah'Webster, "An Examinationinto the Leading


Principlesof the FederalStates,at 56 (NewYork, 1888).

38. JonathanElliot, ed.,Debatesin the SeveralState


Conventionson theAdoptionof the FederalConstitution,
vol.2 at97 (Znded.,1888).

39.Merril Jensen,
supra,vol.2 at 597-98.

40. DebatesandProceedingat the Conventionof the


Commonwealth of Massachusetts,at86-87(Pierce&Hale,
eds.,Boston, 1850);2 B. Schwartz,theBill of Rights 675
(re7r).
41. DocumentsIllustrativeof the Formationof the Unionof
the AmericanStates,at 1.026(Washington,D.C., GPO,
1927).

42.[d.at 1030.

43. AnnalsofCongress434(1789).

44. St. GeorgeTucker,ed.,Blackstone's


Commentaries,
' I Volume I at 143n. 40,41 (Philadelphia,
1803).

45. William Rawle,A View of the Constitution125-6(Znd


ed.,Philadelphia,
I 803).

46. JosephStory Commentaries


on the Constitution,vol. 2 at
746 (1833).

47. Act of May 8,1792;SecondCong.,FirstSession,


ch.33.

12Ken.(zLitt.)90,92(1822).
48. Blissvs. Commonwealth,

49. Statev. Mitchell,(3 Black.)229.

i, I 50. Statev. Reid,I Ala. 612,35Am. Dec.44 (1840).

51. Statev.Bt¡zzard,4 Ark. 18,27,36(1842).TheArkansas


Constitutionalprovisionat issuewasnaffowerthanthe
secondamendment, asit protectedkeepingandbearingarms
"for the commondefense." Id. at34.

52.Nunnv. State,1Ga.243,251(1846).

53.DredScottv. Sanford.
60U.S.691.705.
54. The mostcomprehensive work in this field of
constitutionallaw is StevenHalbrook,TheJurisprudence
of
the SecondandFourteenthAmendments(Institutefor
HumaneStudies,Menlo Park,Califomía,1979),reprintedin
4 GeorgeMasonL. Rev.I (1981).

55. Cong.Globe,39thCongress, pt. 1,p. 474(Jan.


lst Sess.,
29,1866).

56.Id. at 478.

p. 3 (1871).
57.H.R.Rep.No.37,4lstCong.,3dsess.,

58. SeegenerallyHalbrook,supra,at 42-62.

Cases,83 U.S.36 (L873).


59. Slaughterhouse

92 U.S.542(1876).
60.UnitedStatesv. Cruikshank,

v. Illinois,I 16U.S.252 (1886).


61. Presser

62.}l{illerv. Texas,153U.S.535(1894).

63.UnitedStatesv. Miller, 307U.S. 175(1939).

64.Id,.at 178,179.

65.H.R.ReportNo. l4l, 73dCong.,lst sess.at2-5(1933).

APPEIIDIX
CaseLaw
The UnitedStatesSupremeCourthasonlythreetimes
commenteduponthe meaningof the secondamendment to
our constitution.The first comment,in Dred Scott,indicated
stronglythat the right to keepandbeararmswas an
individualright; the Courtnotedthat,wereit to hold blacks
to be entitled to equality oî citizenship,they would be entitled
to keep andcarry arms whereverthey went. The second,in
Miller, indicated that a court cannottakejudicial notice tbat a
short-barrelledshotgun is coveredby the secondamendment
- but the Court did not indicate that National Guard statusis
in any way required for protection by that amendment, and
indeed defined "militia" to include all citizens able to bear
arms. The third, a footnote in Lewis v. United States,
indicated only that "theselegislative restrictions on the use of
firearms" - abart on possessionby felons - were
permissable[sic]. But since felons may constitutionally be
deprived of many of the rights of citizens, including that of
voting, this dict¿ revealslittle. Thesethree comments
constitute all significant explanationsof the scopeof the
secondamendmentadvancedby our SupremeCourt. The
caseof Adam v. V/illiams has been cited as contrary to the
principle that the secondamendmentis an individual right. In
fact,that reading of the opinion comesonly in Justice
Douglas's dissent from the majorityruling of the Court.

The appendix which follows representsa listing of


twenty-one American decisions,spanningthe period from
l822to 1981,which have analyzedright to keep and bear
arms provisions in the light of statutesranging from complete
bans on handgun salesto bans on canytng of weaponsto
regulation of carrying by permit systems.Those decisionsnot
only explained the nature of such a right, but also struck
down legislative restrictions as violative of it, are designated
by asterisks.

2OTH CENTT]RY CASES


1. Statev. Blocker,291 Or.255,- - - P. 2d- - - (1981).
"The statueis written as a total proscription of the
mere possessionof certain weapons,and that mere
possession,insofar as a billy is concerned,is
constitutionally protected."
"In thesecircumstances, we concludethat it is
properfor us to considerdefendant's 'overbreadth'
atiacktomeanthatthe stafutesweptso broadlyas
to infringerightsthatit couldnot reach,which in
the settingmeanstheright to possess arms
guaranteed by sec27."

2. Statev. Kessler,289Or.359,614P.2d94,at95,at98
(1e80).
"'Wearenot unmindful that thereis current
controversyoverthewisdomof a right to bear
arrns,andthatthe originalmotivationsfor sucha
provisionmight not seemcompellingif debatedas
a new issue.Our task,however,in construinga
constitutionalprovisionis to respectthe principles
giventhe statusof constitutionalguarantees and
limitationsby the drafters;it is not to abandonthese
principleswhenthis fits theneedsof the moment."

"Therefore,theterm'arms'asusedby the drafters


of the constitutionsprobablywasintendedto
includethoseweaponsusedby settlersfor both
personalandmilitary defense.The term'arms'was
not limited to firearms,but includedseveral
handcarried weaponscommonlyusedfor defense.
Theterm'arms'wouldnot haveincludedcannonor
otherheavyordnancenot keptbymilitiamen or
privatecitizens."

3. Motley v. Kellogg,409N.E. 2d 1207,at l2l0 (ktd. App.


1980)(motionto transferdeniedl-27-1981).
"[N]ot makingapplicationsavailableattbe chiefs
office effectivelydeniedmembersof the
communitythe opportunityto obtain a gun permit
andbeararmsfor their self-defense."
v. DeBard,398N.E. 2d 1339,at I34l (hd. App.
4. Schubert
1980)(motionto transferdenied8-28-1980).
"We think it clearthat our constitutionprovidesour
citízenrythe right to beararmsfor their self-
defense."

5. Taylorv. McNeal,523 S.W.2d148,at 150(Mo. App.


reTs)
"Thepistolsin questionarenot contraband. :ß* t<
UnderArt.I, sec23,Mo.Const.1945,V.A.M.S.,
every citizenhasthe right to keepandbeararmsin
defenseof his home,person,andproperty,with the
limitationthat this sectionshallnotjustify the
wearingof concealedarms."

6. CityofLakewood v. Pillow,180Colo.20,501P.2d744,
at745 (enbanc1972).
"As an example,we notethatthis ordinancewould
prohibit gunsmiths,pawnbrokers andsporting
goodsstoresfrom canyingon a substantialpart of
their business.Also, the ordinanceappearsto
prohibit individualsfrom transportinggunsto and
from suchplacesof business. Furthermore, it makes
it unlawfulfor a personto possess a firearmin a
vehicleor in aplaceof businessfor thepurposeof
self-defense.Severalof theseactivitiesare
I constitutionallyprotected.Colo.Const.art. II, sec
13."

7. City of LasVegasv. Moberg,82N.M. 626,485P. 2d737,


at738(N.M.App. l97l).
"It is our opinionthat an ordinancemay not deny
the peoplethe constitutionallyguaranteedright to
beararms,andto that extentthe ordinanceunder
consideration is void."
8. Statev. Nickerson,126j|/lt.157,247P.2d 188,atl92
(res2).
"Thelaw of thisjurisdictionaccordsto the
defendantthe right to keepandbeararmsandto use
samein defenseof his own home,his personand
property."

9. Peoplev. Liss,406nI.419,94N.E.2d 320,at323(1950).


"The secondamendment to theconstitutionof the
United Statesprovidestheright of thepeopleto
keepandbeararmsshallnot be infringed.This of
coursedoesnot preventthe enactment of a law
againstcarryingconcealed weapons,but it does
indicateit shouldbe kept in mind,in the
constructionof a statueof suchcharacter, that it is
aimedat personsof criminalinstincts,andfor the
preventionof crime,andnot againstusein the
protectionof personor property."

10.Peoplev. Nakamura,99 Colo.262,at264,62P.2d246


(enbanc1936).
"It is equallyclearthat the actwholly disarmsaliens
for all purposes.The state. . . cannotdisarmany
classof personsor deprivethemof the right
guaranteed undersection13,articletr of the
Constitution,to beararmsin defenseof home,
personandproperty.The guarantythus extendedis
meaningless if anypersonis deniedthe right to
possess armsfor suchprotection."

11.Glasscockv. Cityof Chattanooga,l5T Tenn.518,at520,


(1 928) .
1 1S .W.2 d 6 7 8
"Thereis no qualificationof theprohibitionagainst
the carryingof a pistol in the city ordinancebefore
us but it is madeunlawful'to carryon or aboutthe
personanypistol,'that is, anysortof pistol in any
sortof manner.{<:ß* [W]e mustaccordinglyhold the
provisionof this ordinanceasto the carryingof a
pistolinvalid."

12.Peoplev. Zenllo,2l9Mich.635,189N.W. 927,at928


(re22).
"The provision in the Constitution granting the right
to all personsto bear arms is a limitation upon the
right of the Legislatureto enactany law to the
contrary. The exerciseof a right guaranteedby the
Constitution cannot be made subjectto the will of
the sheriff."

13.Statev.Kemer,181N.C. 574,1075.8.222,at224
(re2r).
"'Weareof theopinion,however,that'pistol'exvi
termini is properlyincludedwithin theword'arms,'
andthat the right to bearsucharmscannotbe
infringed.Thehistoricaluseof pistolsas'arms'of
offenseanddefenseis beyondcontroversy."
"Themaintenance of theright to beararmsis a
mostessentialoneto everyfreepeopleandshould
not be whittleddownby technicalconstructions."

14.Statev. Rosenthal,75VT.295,55 A. 610,at6ll (1903).


"Thepeopleof the statehavea right to beararms
for the defenseof themselves andthe state.{'{<*The
resultis that OrdinanceNo. 10,so far asit relatesto
the carryingof a pistol,is inconsistentwith and
repugnantto the Constitutionandthe laws of the
state,andit is thereforeto that extent,void."

15.In re Brickey,8 Ida. 597,at 598-99,70 p. 609(1902).


"Thesecondamendment to the federalconstitution
is in the following language:'A well-regulated
militia, beingnecessary to the securityof a free
state,the right of thepeopleto keepandbeararrns,
shallnot be infringed.'Thelanguage of section11,
articleI of the constitutionof ldaho,is asfollows:
'Thepeoplehavethe right to beararmsfor their
securityanddefense,but the legislatureshall
regulatethe exerciseof this right by law.'Under
theseconstitutionalprovisions,the legislaturehas
no powerto prohibit a citizenfrom bearingarmsin
anyportionof the stateof ldaho,whetherwithinor
withoutthe corporatelimits of cities,towns,and
villages."

19TTICENTT]RY CASES

16.Wilsonv. State,33 Ark. 557,at 560,34Am. Rep.52,at


54 (1878).
"If cowardlyanddishonorable mensometimes
shootunarmedmenwith armypistolsor guns,the
evil mustbe preventedby thepenitentiaryand
gallows,andnot by a generaldeprivationof
constitutionalprivilege."

17.Jennings v. State,5 Tex.Crim.App. 298,at 300-01


(1878).
"'Webelievethatportionof the actwhich provides
that,in caseof conviction,the defendantshall
forfeit to the countytheweaponof weaponsso
foundon or abouthis personis not within the scope
of legislativeauthority.{<* * Oneof his most
sacredrightsis that of havingarmsfor his own
defenceandthat of the State.This right is oneof
the surestsafeguards of liberty and
self-preservation."

18.Andrewsv. State,50 Tenn.165,8 Am. Rep.8, at l7


(187r).
"Thepassage from Storyshowsclearlythatthis
right wasintended,aswe havemaintainedin this
opinion,andwasguaranteed to andto be exercised
andenjoyedby the citizenassuch,andnot by him
asa soldier,or in defensesolelyof his political
rights."

19.Nunn v. State,I Ga.(1 Kel.)243, at25l (1846).


"Theright of thepeopleto beararmsshallnot be
infringed."Theright of thewholepeople,old and
yomg, men,womenandboys,andnot militia only,
to keepandbeararmsof everydescription,andnot
suchmerelyasareusedby themilitia, shallnot be
infringed,curtailed,or brokenin upon,in the
smallestdegree;andall this for the importantendto
be attained:therearingup andqualiffing a well-
regulatedmilitia, sovitally necessaryto the security
of a freeState."

20. Simpsonv. State,13Tenn.356,at359-60(1833).


"But supposeit to be assumedon anyground,that
our ancestorsadoptedandbroughtover with them
this Englishstatute,fthe statuteof Northampton,]
orportion of thecommonlaw, our constifutionhas
completelyabrogated it; it says,'thatthe freemenof
this Statehavea right to keepandbeararmsfor
I theircommondefence.'Article II, sec.26. * * * By
this clauseof the constifution,an expresspoweris
givenandsecuredto all the freecitizensof the State
to keepandbeararmsfor their defence,without any
qualificationwhateverasto their kind or nature;
andit is conceived, that it would be goingmuchtoo
far, to impair by constructionor abridgementa
constitutionalprivilege,which is so declared;
neíther,afterso solemnan instrumenthathsaidthe
peoplemaycaffyaÍns, canwe be permittedto
impute to the acts thus licensed,such a necessarily
consequentoperation as terror to the people to be
incurred thereby; we must attribute to the framers
of it, the absenceof such a view."

21. Bliss v. Commonwealth,l2Ky. QLitt.) 90,at92, and


93,13 Am. Dec. 251 (1822).
"For, in principle, there is no differencebetweena
law prohibiting the wearing concealedarrns, and a
law forbidding the wearing such as are exposed;
and if the former be unconstitutional.the latter must
be so likewise."

"But it shouldnot be forgotten,thatit is not only a


part of theright that is securedby theconstitution;
it is theright entireandcomplete,asit existedat
the adoptionof the constitution;andif anyportion
of that right be impaired,immaterialhow small the
partmaybe,andimmaterialtheorderof time at
which it be done,it is equallyforbiddenby the
constitution."

The following represents


a list of twelvescholarly
articleswhich havedealtwith the subjectof the right to keep
andbearaÍns asreflectedin the secondamendment to the
Constitutionof the UnitedStates.The scholarswho have
undertakenthis researchrangefrom professors of law, history
andphilosophyto a UnitedStatesSenator.All have
concludedthat the secondamendment is an individualright
protectingAmericancitizensin their peacefuluseof f,rrearms.

BIBLIOGRAPITY
Hays,TheRight to BearArms, a Studyin Judicial
Misinterpretation,
2Wm. &}ilary L. R. 381(1960)
a Sprecher,The LostAmendment,51 Am Bar Assn.J.
ss4 &.665(2 parts)(1965)
o Comment,The Right to KeepandBearArms: A
NecessaryConstitutionalGuarantee or an Outmoded
Provisionof the Bill of Rights?31 AlbanyL.R.74
(re67)
o Levine & Saxe, The SecondAmendment:The Right
to Bear Arms, 7 Houston L. R. I (1969)
o McClure, Firearms and Federalism,T ldaho L. R. 197
(re70)
o Hardy& Stompoly, Of ArmsandtheLaw,5l
Chi.-KentL. R. 62 (1974)
o Weiss,A Replyto Advocatesof GunControlLaw,52
Jour.UrbanLaw 577 (1974)
. Whisker,HistoricalDevelopmentandSubsequent
Erosionof the Right.toKeepandBearArms, 78 V/.
Va.L. R. 171(1976)
o Caplan,Restoringthe Balance:The Second
AmendmentRevisited,5 FordhamUrbanL. J. 3l
(re76)
. Caplan,HandgunControl:Constitutionalor
10N.C. CentralL. J. 53 (1979)
Unconstitutional?,
o Cantrell,The Right to BearArms,53 IVis Bar Bull.
2I (Oct.l980)
o Halbrook,The Jurisprudence of the Secondand
FourteenthAmendments.4 Geo.MasonL. Rev. I
(1e81)

ENFORCEMENT OF FEDERAL FIREARMS LA\ryS


FROM THE
PERSPECTIVE OF TIIE SECONDAMENDMENT

Federalinvolvementin firearmspossession and


transferwasnot significantprior to 1934,whentheNational
FirearmsAct wasadopted.TheNationalFirearmsAct as
adoptedcoveredonly fully automaticweapons(machineguns
and submachineguns) and rifles and shotgunswhose barrel
length or overall length fell below certain limits. Since the
Act was adoptedunder the revenuepower, sale of these
firearms was not made subjectto a ban or permit system.
Instead, eachtransferwas made subject to a $200 excisetax,
which must be paid prior to transfer; the identification of the
parties to the transfer indirectly accomplisheda registration
pulpose.

The 1934Act was followed by the FederalFirearms


Act of 1938,which placedsomelimitationsupon saleof
ordinary firearms. Personsengagedin the businessof selling
those firearms in interstatecommercewere required to obtain
a Federal FirearmsLicense,at an annual cost of $1, and to
maintain recordsof the name and addressof personsto whom
they sold firearms. Salesto personsconvicted of violent
felonies were prohibited, as were interstateshipmentsto
personswho lacked the permits required by the law of their
state.

Thirty yearsafter adoption of the Federal Firearms


Act, the Gun Control Act of 1968 worked a major revision of
federal law. The Gun Control Act was actually a composite
of two statutes.The first of these,adoptedas portions of the
Omnibus Crime and Safe StreetsAct, imposed limitations
upon imported firearms, expandedthe requirementof dealer
licensing to cover anyone"engagedin the businessof
dealing" ín firearms, whether in interstateor local coÍrmerco,
and expandedthe recordkeepingobligations for dealers.It
also imposed a variety of direct limitations upon salesof
handguns.No transferswere to be permitted between
residentsof different states(unlessthe recipient was a
federally licenseddealer),even where the transfer was by gift
rather than saleand even where the recipient was subject to
no state law which could have been evaded.The categoryof
personsto whom dealerscould not sell was expandedto
coverpersonsconvictedof anyfelony (otherthancertain
business-related feloniessuchasantitrustviolations),persons
subjectto a mentalcommitmentorderor finding of mental
incompetence, personswho wereusersof marijuanaand
otherdrugs, anda numberof othercategories. Anothertitle
of the Act definedpersonswho werebannedfrom possessing
firearms.Paradoxicallytheseclasseswerenot identicalwith
the list of classesprohibitedfrom purchasingor receiving
firearms.

The OmnibusCrimeandSafeStreetsAct waspassed


on June5, 1968,andsetto takeeffectin Decemberof that
year.Barelytwo weeksafterits passage, SenatorRobertF.
Kennedywasassassinated while campaigningfor the
presidency.Lessthata weekafterhis death,the secondbill
which would form part of the Gun ControlAct of 1968was
introducedin the House.It wasreportedout of Judiciaryten
dayslater, out of RulesCommitteetwo weeksafterthat, and
wason the floor barelya monthafterits introduction.the
secondbill workedavanetyof changesuponthe original
Gun ControlAct. Most significantly,it extendedto rifles and
shotgunsthe controlswhich hadbeenimposedsolelyon
handguns,extendedtheclassof personsprohibitedfrom
possessing firearmsto includethosewho wereusersof
marijuanaandcertainotherdrugs,expanded judicial review
of dealerlicenserevocations by mandatinga denovo hearing
oncean appealwastaken,andpermittedinterstatesalesof
rifles andshotgunsonly wherethe partiesresidedin
contiguousstates,bothof which hadenactedlegislation
permittingsuchsales.Similarlegislationwaspassedby the
Senateanda conference of the Housesproduceda bill which
wasessentiallya modificationof the Housestatute.This
becamelaw beforethe OmnibusCrimeConhol andSafe
StreetsAct, andwasthereforesetfor the sameeffectivedate.
Enforcementof the 1968Act wasdelegatedto the
Departmentof the Treasurywhich hadbeenresponsiblefor
enforcingthe earliergun legislation.This responsibilitywas
in turn givento the Alcohol andTobaccoTax Division of the
InternalRevenueService.This divisionhadtraditionally
devoteditself to thepursuitof illegalproducersof alcohol;at
the time of enactmentof the Gun ControlAct, only 8.3
percentof its arrestswerefor firearmsviolations.Following
enactmentof the Gun ControlAct theAlcoholandTobacco
Tax Division wasretitledthe Alcohol,TobaccoandFirearms
Division of the IRS. By July,1972it hadnearlydoubledin
sizeandbecamea completeTreasurybureauunderthe name
of Bureauof Alcohol. TobaccoandFirearms.

Themid-1970'ssawrapidincreases in sugarprices,
andthesein turn drovethebulk of the "moonshiners" out of
business. Over 15,000illegaldistillerieshadbeenraidedin
1956;but by 1976thishadfallento a mere609.The BATF
thusbeganto devotethe bulk of its effortsto the areaof
fi rearmslaw enforcement.

Complaintregardingthe techniques usedby the


Bureauin an effort to generatefirearmscasesled to hearings
beforethe Subcommittee on Treasury,PostOffice,and
GeneralAppropriationsof the SenateAppropriations
Committeein July 1979andApril 1980,andbeforethe
Subcommittee on the Constitutionof the SenateJudiciary
Committeein October1980.At thesehearingsevidencewas
receivedfrom variouscitizenswho hadbeenchargedby
BATF, from expertswho had studiedthe BATF, and from
officials of the Bureauitself.

Baseduponthesehearings,it is apparentthat
enforcementtacticsmadepossibleby currentfederalftrearms
laws areconstitutionally,legall¡ andpractically
reprehensible.AlthoughCongressadoptedthe Gun Control
Act with the primaryobjectof limiting accessof felonsand
high-riskgroupsto firearms,the overbreadth of the law has
led to neglect of precisely this areaof enforcement.For
example the Subcommitteeon the Constitution received
correspondencefrom two members of the Illinois Judiciary,
dated in 1980,indicating that they had beentotally unable to
persuadeBATF to acceptcasesagainstfelons who were in
possessionof firearms including sawed-off shotguns.The
Bureau's own figures demonstrate that in recent years the
percentageof its arrestsdevoted to felons in possessionand
personsknowingly selling to them have droppedfrom 14
percent down to 10 percentof their firearms cases.To be
sure, genuinecriminals are sometimesprosecutedunder other
sectionsof the law. Yet, subsequentto thesehearings,BATF
statedthat 55 percentofits gun law prosecutionsoverall
involve personswith no record of a felony conviction, and a
third involve citizens with no prior police contact at all. .

The Subcommitteereceived evidencethat the BATF


has primarily devotedits firearms enforcementefforts to the
apprehension,upon technical malum prohibifum charges,of
individuals who lack all criminal intent and knowledge.
Agents anxiousto generatean impressive arrestand gun
confiscation quota have repeatedlyenticedgun collectors into
making a small number of sales- often as few as four -
from their personalcollections. Although eachof the sales
was completely legal under state and federal law, the agents
then chargedthe collector with having "engagedin the
business"of dealing in guns without the required license.
Since existing law permits a felony conviction upon these
chargeseven where the individual has no criminal knowledge
or intent numerouscollectors have beenruined by a felony
record carrying a potential sentenceof five yearsin federal
prison. Even in caseswhere the collectors securedacquittal,
or grandjuries failed to indict, or prosecutorsrefusedto file
criminal charges,agentsof the Bureau have generally
confiscatedthe entire collection of the potential defendant
upon the ground that he intended to use it in that violation of
the law. In severalcases,the agentshave refusedto return the
collection even after acquiual by jury.

The defendant,under existing law is not entitled to an


award of attorney'sfees,therefore,should he securereturn of
his collection, an individual who has alreadyspentthousands
of dollars establishinghis innocenceof the criminal charges
is required to spendthousandsmore to civilly prove his
innocence of the sameacts,without hope of securingany
redress.This of course,has given the enforcingagency
enorrnousbargainingpower in refusing to return confiscated
firearms. Evidencereceivedby the Subcommitteerelated the
confiscation of a shotgunvalued at $7,000. Even the Bureau's
own valuations indicate that the value of firearms confiscated
by their agentsis over twice the value which the Bureauhas
claimed is typical of "streetguns" used in crime. In recent
months, the averagevalue has increasedrather than
decreased,indicating that the reforms announcedby the
Bureau have not infactredirected their agentsaway from
collector's items and toward guns used in crime.

The Subcommitteeon the Constitution has also


obtained evidenceof a variety of other misdirected conduct
by agentsand supervisorsofthe Bureau. In severalcases,the
Bureau has soughtconviction for supposedtechnical
violations basedupon policies and interpretationsof law
which the Bureauhad not published in the FederalRegister,
as required by 5 U.S.C. Sec 552. For instance,beginning in
1975, Bureau officials apparentlyreacheda judgment tbat a
dealer who sells to a legitimate purchasermay nonethelessbe
subject to prosecutionor licenserevocation if he knows that
that individual intends to transfer the firearm to a nonresident
or other unqualified purchaser.This position was never
published in the FederalRegister and is indeed contrary to
indications which Bureau officials had given Congress,that
such saleswere not in violation of existing law. Moreover,
BATF hadinformeddealersthat an adultpurchasercould
legallybuy for a minor, barredby his agefrom purchasinga
gun on his own. BATF madeno effortto suggestthat this
wasapplicableonly wherethe barrierwasoneof age.Rather
thaninformingthe dealersof this distinction,Bureauagents
setout to producemassarrestsuponthese"strawman" sale
charges,sendingout undercoveragentsto enticedealersinto
transfersof this t¡,pe.The first majoruseof thesecharges,in
SouthCarolinain l975,led to 37 dealers beingdrivenfrom
business,manyconvictedon felonycharges. Whenoneof the
judgesinformedBureauofficialsthathefelt dealershadnot
beenfairly treatedandgiveninformationof thepoliciesthey
wereexpectedto follow, andrefusedto permitfurther
prosecutions until theywereinformed,BureauofÍicials were
carefrilto inform only the dealersin thatonestateandeven
thencomplainedin internalmemoranda thatthis was
interferingwith the creationof the cases.WhenBATF was
laterrequested to placea warningto dealerson the front of
the Form4473,which eachdealerexecutes whena saleis
made,it insteadchoseto placethewarningin fine print upon
the back of the form, thus further concealingit from the
dealer'ssight.

The ConstitutionSubcommittee alsoreceived


evidencethat the Bureauhasformulateda requirement,of
which dealerswere not informedthat requiresa dealerto
keepofficial recordsof salesevenfrom his privatecollection.
BATF hasgonefartherthanmerelyfailingto publishthis
requirement.At onepoint, evenasit wasprosecutinga dealer
on the charge(admittingthat he hadno criminal intent), the
Directorof the Bureauwrote SenatorS. I. Hayakawato
indicatethattherewasno suchlegalrequirementandit was
completelylawful for a dealerto sell from his collection
without recordingit. Sincethat date,theDirectorof the
Bureauhasstatedthat that is not the Bureau'spositionand
that suchsalesarecompletelyillegal;aftermakingtbat
statement,however,he was quotedin an interview for a
magazinereadprimarily by licensedfirearmsdealersas
statingthat suchsaleswerein factlegalandpermittedby the
Bureau.In theseandsimilar areas,the Bureauhasviolated
not only thedictatesof commonsense, but of 5 U.S.C.Sec
552,which wasintendedto prevent"secretlawmaking"by
administrativebodies.

Thesepractices,amplydocumented in hearingsbefore
this Subcommittee, leavelittle doubtthattheBureauhas
disregarded rightsguaranteed by theconstitutionandlawsof
the United States.

It hastrampleduponthe secondamendment by
chilling exerciseof theright to keepandbeararmsby
law-abidingcitizens.

It hasoffendedthe fourth amendmentby


unreasonablysearchingandseizingprivateproperty.

It hasignoredthe Fifth Amendmentby taking private


propertywithoutjust compensation andby entrappinghonest
citizenswithout regardfor theirright to dueprocessof law.

Therebuttalpresented to the Subcommittee by the


Bureauwasutterlyunconvincing.RichardDavis,speakingon
behalfof the TreasuryDepartment,asserted vaguelythat the
Bureau'sprioritieswereaimedat prosecutingwillful
violators,particularlyfelonsillegallyin possession, andat
confiscatingonly gunsactuallylikely to be usedin crime.He
alsoasserted that the Bureauhasrecentlymadegreatstrides
towardachievingthesepriorities.No documentation was
offeredfor eitherof theseassertions. In hearingsbefore
BATF'sAppropriationsSubcommittee, however,expert
evidencewassubmittedestablishing thatapproximately75
percentof BATF gunprosecutions wereaimedat ordinary
citizenswho hadneithercriminalintentnor knowledge,but
wereenticedby agentsinto unknowingtechnicalviolations.
(In onecase,in fact,the individualwasbeingprosecuted for
an actwhich the Bureau'sactingdirectorhadstatedwas
perfectlylawful.) In thosehearings,moreover,BATF
concededthat in fact (l) only 9.8 percentof their firearm
arrestswerebroughton felonsin illicit possession charges;
Q) the average valueof gunsseized*ur $l 16,whereas
BATF hadclaimedthat "crimeguns"werepricedat lessthan
half that figure;(3) in the monthsfollowing rhe
ailrouncementof their new "priorities",thepercentage of gun
prosecutions aimedat felonshadin fact fallenby a third, and
the valueof confiscatedgunshadrisen.All this indicatesthat
theBureau'svagueclaims,both of focusupongun-using
criminalsandof recentreforms,areemptywords.

In light of this evidence,reformof federalfrrearm


lawsis necessary to protectthe mostvital rightsof American
citizens.Suchlegislationis embodiedin S. 1030.Thar
legislationwouldrequireproof of a willful violationasan
elementof a federalgunprosecution,forcingenforcing
agencies to ignorethe easiertechnicalcasesandaim solelyat
the intentionalbreaches. It would restrictconfiscationof
firearmsto thoseactuallyusedin an offense,andrequiretheir
retumshouldthe ownerbe acquittedof the charges.By
providingfor awardof attomey'sfeesin confiscationcases,
or in othercasesif thejudge finds chargeswerebrought
withoutjust basisor from impropermotives,this proposal
would be largelyself-enforcing.S. 1030would enhancevital
protectionof constitutionalandcivil libertiesof those
Americanswho chooseto exercisetheir SecondAmendment
right to keepandbeararms.

fOthersectionsomitted.]
PCL XL error

llarning: I I legalMediaSize
EXHIBIT C
PIIBLIC LAW 99-308-MAY 19, 1986 100STAT,449

Public Law 99-308


99th Congress
An Act
To a¡riendchapter44kelatingto 18,UnitædStategOode,
andfor
iffffÌ#T
__8" i! gnaeted-@rthe Seno.teønd House of Rcprcsentøtíuesof thn
United Stntes of Amcrícø in hngræs o.ssem.6led,- Firearos
Owuers'
SECTION I. SHORT TIîLE ÄND CONCRESSIONAL FINDINGS. Protestion AcL
l8 USC921note.
_ (a) S¡rom T¡rr¡.-Tt¡is Act may be cited as the "Firea¡ms Owners'
Protection Act".
(b) CoxcnussroNAl F¡r.¡or¡¡cs.-The Congressfinds that-
(1)the rights of citizens-
(A) to keep and bear arms under the secondamendment
to the Unit€d States Constitution;
(B) ø security against illegal and unreasonable searches
and seÍzuresunder the fourth nmendmen4
(C) against uncompeusated taking of propert5 double
jeopardy, and assurance of due process of law under the
fifthamendment; and
(D) against unconstitutional e¡cerciseof authority uuder
the ninth and tenth amendments;
require additional legislation to correct existing firearms stat-
utes and enforcement policies; and
(2) additional legislation is required to reaffirrr the intent of
the Congress,as expressedin section 101of the Gun Control Act
of 1968, that "it Ís not the purpose of this title ûo place any 18 USC921note.
undue or unnecessary Federal restrictions or burdens on law-
abiding citizeus with respect to the acquisition, possession,or
use of firearms appropriate to the puryose of hunting, trap
shooting, target shooting, personal protection, or any othér
lawful activity, and that this title is not intended to discourage
or eliminate the private ownership or use of fïrearms by law.
abiding citizens foi lawful purposes-.".
SEc' IOI. AMENDMENTS|TIOSECTION921.
Section921of title 18,United StatesCode,is o'nended-
(l) in subsection(aX10),by striking out'¡manufacture of' and
inserting in lieu thereof "businessof ma¡rufacturiad';
(2) in subsection(aXllXA), by striking out "or arnmunition";
(3) in subsection (aX12),by striking out "or ammunition";
(4) in subsection (aXfS), by striking out 'br ammunition";
(5) by amendÍng paragraph (20) of subsection (d to read as
follows:
'crime punishable by imprisonment for
"(20) The term a tenn I¿w
exceedingone year' doesnot include- enforcement
and crime.
"(A) any Federal or State offenses pertaining to antitrust
violations, unfaír trade practices, restraints of trade, or other
similar offensesrelating to the regulation of business practices,
or

7l-194 O - 89 - 17 : C[- 3 Partt


100STAT"450 PT'BLICLAW 99-308-I\{AY 19, 1986
"(B) any State offense classified by the laws of the State as a
misdeme,anorand punishable by a term of imprisonment of two
\44..Täitütüäi a conviction of such a crirne shall be deúerminedin
accordancewith the law of the juriediction in which the proceedings
were held. Any conviction which has been expunsd, orÈet asideor
for whlch a þerson has been pardoned or haã had civil righùs
restored shall not be considered a conviction for purposes of this
chapter, unless such pardon. expunsement. or reitorÄtion of civil
riglits expressly proviäes tþþt t{e põrson niay not ship, transport,
possess, or recerveurearms.-';and
Bueiness
and _ (6) in subsection (a),-by inserting after paragraph (20) the
indushy. followins new paragraphs.;
'eirgaeédin the business'meruu-
"(21) The tÞrm
_ "(A) as applied to a manufacturer of firearms, a person who
devotestime, attention, and labor to manufacturing firearms as
a regular courseof trade or businesswith the principal obiective
of livelihood and profit throueh the sale or âistribution-of the
flrrearmsma¡¡ufactured;
"(B) as applied þ a manufasturer of ammunition, a person
who devotes time, attention, and labor to manufacturing
ammunition as a regular course of trade or business with the
principal objective of livelihood and profit through the sale or
distribution of the ammunition manufactured:
"(C) as applied to a dealer in ñrearms, as defined in sestion
18 USC 921. 921(aXUXA),-apersonwho devotestime, áttention, and labor to
dealing in fïrearms as a rezular course of trade or businesswith
the piincipal objective oF livelihood and profrt through the
repetitive purchase and resale offirea¡rns, but such term shall
not include a perton who makes occasional sales, exchanges,or
purchasesof fire¿rms for the enhancement of a personal collec-
tion or for a hobby or who sells all or part of his personal
collection of frnearms;
"(D) as applied to a dealer in firearrns. as defined in section
921(aX11XB),-a peftroll ryho devotes time, áttentio¡, ar¡d labor to
engaging in such activity as a regular courte of trade or busi.
ness with the principal-objective of livelihood and profit, but
such term shall not include a pen¡on who makes occasional
repairc of firearms, or who occ-asionally fits special barrels,
stocks, or trigger mechanismsto firearms;
Importa "(E) as applied to an importer of firea¡ms, a ¡rerson who
devotes timq attention, and labor to importing firearms as a
regular course of trade or business with the principal objective
of livelihood and profit t]¡roush the sale or distribìution-of the
firearms imporædi and
Imports. "(F) as a¡iplied úo an importer of emrnunition, a person who
devotestime, attention, and labor to i"'Forüing amnunition as a
regular course of trade or businese witl¡ the principal objesüive
oflivelihood and profit through the sale or ãistribïtion-of the
ammunition imported.
'i'ith the principal objective of livelihood and
"(22) lbe term
profrt' meana that the Íntent underlying the sale or disposition of
firearms is prcdomiûantly one of obtaining livelihood and peeuniary
gain, as,opposedto other.Íntents, such as Ímproving or liquÍdating a
-Der60nar lrrear¡ns @llecuon.
'(28) The term 'machinegun' has the meaning given such term in
sestion 5845ô) of the National Firearms Act (26 U.S.C. 5845(bD.
PUBLIC L,AW99-308-MAY 19,1996 100STAT.451
"(24)The terms 'firearm silencer'and 'firearm muffler'mea¡r any
devicefor silencing, muflling, or dimiuishing the report of a portablä
firea-rm, including any combination of parts, designedor redesigned,
and intended for use in assemblingor fabricatine a firearm silãncer
or fire_arm Ìngfqer, and any part intended only for r¡se in such
assemblyor fabrication.".
SECI(l2.AIÌIENDMENfSTO SECNON 9?¿.
Sestion 922 of title 18,United StateeCode,is amended-
(1) so that paragraph (l) of subsection (a) reads as follows: I.ø¡y
"(1) for any Þergon- enforcemeú
"(Ð exõept a licensed importer, licensed manufacturer, äSffå""¿
or licensed dealer, tn e_ngagein the business of importing, trade.
manufacturing, or dealing in firearms, or in the cõurse õf
such business-to -ship, transport, or reóeive any firearrur in
interstate or foreign commerce;or
"(B) except a licensed importer or licensed manufacturer,
to engag- e in the business of imporüing or manufacturing
ammunition, or in the couree of such busÍness, to ship-,
transporf or receive any a'nmu'.rition in interstate or foÊ
erglr oommercei';
(2) in subsection (aXZ)-
(A) by stríking out'br ammunition"; and
(B) by striking out "or Licenseddealer for tlre sole purpose
-ühereof
of repai¡ or -customizírag" and inserting in lieu
"licensed dealer, or licenõédcollector;',;
(8) in subsection (aX3), bv strikine out "(B)" and all thaü
follows through "(bX8) of ttris section," and insertins in lieu
thereof tJre following: "(B) shall not apply to the transõortation
or rece^ipt of a firearm obtained ¡n confórnity ïeith sùbsection
(bX8)of this section,";
(4) in subsection (b).-
({)
þ paragraph (2), by striking out "or ammunitiorr"
eacn place rúappears;
in paragraph(3), by striking out "(A)" and all that
G)-in
_qB)
follows through "íntrastate transactionsother than at the
licensee's
licensee's business pr€mises."and
businesspremises," and inseÉiug
inseÉius ín
in lieu
lieu thereof
thereof
'l(A) shall not apply to the sale or deliveri of any rifle or
shotgun to a resid-ent
resident of a State other thanä
thanâ State
Statsinin which
tlre licensee's place of businessis located if the transferee
Eeets in person with the transferor to accomplish the
tra¡sfer, ar¡d_thesale, delivery, and receipt fully comply
with the legal conditionsof sale in both sùch Stãt€6(dnä
any licensed manufacturer,importer or dealer shaU be
p1esq4ed,for p_urposes of this subparagraph,in the abeence
of evidenceto the contrary,üo_have had actual knowledgeof
the State laws and publisìed ordinancesof both Statea),,';
ç) in paragraph (8), by inserting ¡rand" before rr(Rirr.
(D) in paragraph(8),by striking out ", and (C)" and all
that follows through the end of sughparagraphand insert-
ing in lieu thereofã semicolon;and
(E) in paragraph (5), by sirikine out 'br ammunition
excepü.22 lnliber rimf¡re ammunitJon"and inserting ,'or
-.armor-piercingammunition"in lieu thereof;
(5)in subsectíon(dÈ-
100STAT.452 PUBLICLAW 99-808-MAY 19,1986
(A) bv strikins out "licensed importer,licensed manufac-
tuiei, licensed dãaler, or licensed collecør" the first place iü
appears
-fg) and inserting in lieu thereof "personl';
Uv amendine parasraph (3) to rea<las follows:
Drugs and drugl
.'(S) ìã ãh untáwn¡i'use; oi or addicted to any controfled
abuse. subÈtãnce (as defined in section 102 of the Controlled Sub'
stancesAct (21 U.S.C.802)[";
(C) in paragraph (A),bi/ striking out the period and insert'
ine in lieu thereof a semicolon;and
iOl Uv insertins after paradaph (4) the following:
Aliens- "(5) who, being an alien, is ilteþ¿ly or unlawfully in úhe
United States;
"(6) who has been discharged from the Armed Forces under
dishonorable conditions; or
"(7) who, having beén a eitizen of the United Stat€s' has
renouncedhis citizenship.";
(6) in subsectionGÞ-
(A) in paragraph (1), by striking out "is under indictment
for, or who";
fO Uv aménding parag¡aph (3) to read as follows:
lìrugs and drug "(Ð ìs àä unlawful'user- of- or addicted to any conlrolled
aþuËe. zubÀtance (as defined in section 102 of the Controlled Sub
stances^ú(2L U.S.C.g0Ð)Í';
(C) by tnserting aftei paragraph (a) the following new
paraeraphs:
AlieDs. "(5) wño, being an alien, is i[egalty or unlawfrtlly in t'he
United St¿tes;
*(6) who hds been discharged from the Armed Forces under
dishonorable conditions: or
"(?) who, having beãn a ctïl¿en of the United States' has
renouncedhis citizenship;";'¡to and
(D) by striking oút ship or transport any frrearm or
ammu¡iition in interstate or foreigp commetce." and insert-
ing in lieu thereof "to ship or transport in interstate or
foleig¡ commerce,or possessin or affecting co¡nmerce' any
firearm or ammunition;-been or to receive any nrea¡:n or
ammunition which has shipped or tiansported in
interstate or foreigu commerce.tt'
gtd ffil;nú;;iããõ * duo**
"ft) id shall be unlavrfi¡l ior ""ã&
any individual, who to that- individ-
uatt tnãwledee and while being ehployed for-any persgn -in described
Í" pgragräph of subsection (g) õf úris section, the course of
""t
suchemployment-
"(i) to receive, po¡¡sess'or transport any firearm or ammuni-
tion in or affecting:interstate or foreiÊn commerce-;.o{ -
--1\2')
tô ;éóivé äny firearm or añmunition whieh has been
s¡iiipea oi transpoite¿ in intenstate or foreígn commerce.";
6ibv inse*ine Cfter subsection(m) ühefollowinç
"(n) it sñall be unlarvfr¡l for any person who is under indrctment
for ä'crime punishable by imprisän-menüfor a te¡sr exceedir¡g one
year to ship or transport in-interstaF or foreign conm€rçe,any
firea¡m Or ammUnition or recgive gny t¡rêarm or ammunltlon wlucn
tras teeïshipped oi transported iii iríterstate or foreign commerce.";
and
(9) by inserüing after the subsection added by paragraph (8) of
this section the follorving:
PLIBLICLA\ry 99-308-MAY 19,1986 100STAT.453
"(oXl) Except as provided in paragraph (2),it shell be unlawful for
any pers¡onto transfer or possessa machiDegun.
"(2) This subsectiondoesnot apply with respecüto-
"(A) a transfer to or by, or possessionby or untler the author-
ity of, the United States or any department or agencythereof or
a- State, or a department, agenc¡ or political subdivision
thereof; or
"(B) any laqrful transfer or lawfr¡l possessionof a machinqun
that was lawfully possessedbefore the date this subsestiontakes
effect.".
SEC. 103,ÁMENDMENTS TO SECTION 928.
Section 928of title f8, United States Code,is amended-
(1) in subsection(a)- InPorts'
(A) bv strÍking out the first sentenceand inserting in lieu
thereof "No ¡ærson shall engagein ühe businessof import-
ing, manufacturingt, or dealing in firearms, or importing or
manufacturing ammunition, r¡¡til he has filed an applica-
tion with and received a liceuse to do so from the Sec-
retar;1."; and
(B)-by striking out "and contain such information", and
insertÍñg in lieu thereof "and contaÍn only that infonnation
necessafoto dete¡mine elicibiüty for licensing.";
(2) in subsection (aXS)@),bystriking out "or qmmunition for
firearms other than destructive devices,";
(3) in subsection (b), by striking out "and contain zuch
information" and inserting in lieu thereof "and contain only
that information necessary-todetermine elisibilit/';
(4) in subsection (c), by adding at the eñd "Nothing in this
chapter shall be construed to prohibit a lÍcensedmanufacturer,
importer, or dealer from maintaining and disposing of a per'
soúal coliection of fireâr¡rs, Ëubject only to such restrictions as
aoplv in this chapter to dispositions bi a person other than a
liõênsed manufacturel impo-rter, or deãler.-If any firearm is so
disposedof bv a lieenseewithin one vear after its transfer from
his'businessínventory into such liaeñsee'spersonal oollection or
if such disposition or anv other acquisiüion is made for the
Durpooeof ivillfutlv evadi¡is the restri-ctions placed upon licens"
ã* by this chapteí then súch firea¡m shall-be deemed part of
such licensee'sbusinessinventor':y.":
(5) in subsection(e),by ínserti¡ig úwillfully'before "violated";
(6) in subsection(f)-
(Ð in para¡rraph (8)-
(i) bv íñseiting "de novo" before "judicíal"; and
GÐbv insertine "whether or not such evidence was
considered at tl¡õ hearing held under paragraph (2)."
after "to the proceeding"; and
(B) bv aildine ät the enð ihe following new paragraph:
"(4) If criminãl proceédingsare instituted against a licensee alleg: I¿w
enfOrCeme,¡rt
ine anv violation õf this chaptpr or of rulee oriegrrlations prescribed a¡d crime.
uñder-this chapter, and the licensee is aequitted of sush chargeo, or
such proceedfuiæáre terminated, other fhan upon motion of the
Goveräment beToretrial upon such charges,the-Secretary ehall be
absolutety barred from dtinying or revo-king any l[censq grantqd
under thü¡ chapter where such denial or revocation is basedin whole
or i¡ part on the facts whÍch for:n the basis of such crimínal
chaige$. No proceedings for the revocation of a license shall be
100STAT.454 PUBLICLA\4r99-308-MAY 19,1986
instituted by the Secretary more than one year after the frline of the
indictment or information.";
(?) so that subsectionG) reads as follows:
R€cords. '(gX1XA) Each licensed importer, licensed manufacturer, and li-
cens-eddealer shall maintain- euch records of importation,
-of produc-
tion, shipment, receipt, sale, or other disposition firearmõ at his
plac'eof businessfor subtrpeho¿, and in süch form, as the Secretary
may by regulations presciibe, Such irnporters,
-ø manufacturers, and
dealeré shãll not be iequired to submit the Secretary repoqtsand
information wiúh respett to such records and the contentà thereof,
except as expressly rriquíred by this section. The Secretar¡ when he
has reasonable cáuse-to believe a violation of thís chapter has
occurred and that evidence thereof may be found on such premises,
rnay, utrÐn demonstrating such cause before a Federal magistrate
and sedurÍng fmm such magistrate a warrant autl¡orizir¡g gntry,
enter durins businesshours the premises fincludins places of stor-
age) of any-licensed firearms imþorter, liiensed mãñufacturer, li-
censed deâler, licensed collector, or any lícensed importer or
manuf,acturer of ammunition, for the purpose of inspecting or
examinine-
"(i)-any records or documents required to be kept by such
Iicensedlmporter, licensed manufacturer, licensed dealer, or
licensed collector under this chapter or rules or regulations
under this chanter. and
"(ü) any fir€anns or arnmunition kept or stored by such
licensed ihporter, licensed manufacturen licensed dealer, or
licensed collecton at such premises.
"(B) the Secretary may inÊpect or examine the invenúo-ry and
records of a licenseri importer, licensed manufacturer, or licensed
dealer without such reasonablecauseor warrant-
"G) in the course of a reasonable inqui¡V during -the course of
a criminal investþatíon of a person or pôrsons õtlrer than the
licensee;
"Gi) fór ensuring compliance with the record keeping require
ments of this chaþter ñot more than once during any twelve
month period; or
-when'such
"(üi) inspection or examinaüion may be required
for determinine the disposition of one or more párticular fire
arms in the coulrseof a bbna fide criminal investigation.
'(C) Ttre Secretary may inspect the inventory and records of a
licensed collecüorwithout such reasonâblecauseor warrant-
*"Í'L':itffi i#,ärrl?i3,il#iiä"ätååË"åi"fsËi#
month neriod: or
"(ü) úhen such inspection or examiaation maybe required for
determinine the disposition of one or more paiticular flrrearms
in the course of a bona fide criminal investisation.
"(D) At the election of a licensed collector, tñe annual Ínspeçtion
of records and inventory permitted under tilis paragraph shall be
oerformed at the off¡ce óf the Secreta¡y desifl¡ated for such inspec-
iions which ie located in closest proximitv to the premisæ where-the
Ínventorv and records of euch liôensed coÏector aie maintained. The
inspectioin
-construedand examination authorized by this parag¡aph shal! not
be as auühorizing the Secretary to seize any records or
other documentsother than-those records õr docu-ents constituting
material evidence of a violation of law. If the Secretary seizessuch
records or documents,copiesshall be provided the licensee within a
PUBLIC LAW 99-308_IVIAY19, 1986 100srAT. 455
reasonabletime. lhe Secretarff may make available to anv Federal Statea¡d local
Statê, or locâl law enforcement aãency any information-which hé governmeuts.
may obtain by reason of this chapær with iespect to the identifi.ca-
tion of persons prohibited from purchasing or-receiving firearms or
ammunition who have purchasetl or receiÍed firearms or ammuni-
tior_r,-together with a dèscription of such fïrearms or ammunition,
and he may provide information to the extent such information may
be contained in the records required to be maintained bv thiê
chapter, wþen so requested by ãny Federal, State, or lodl law
enlorcement agencY.
"(2) Each licénseä co[ector shall maintåin in a bound volume the
nature of which the Secretary may by regulations prescribe, records
of the receipt sale, or othei disiosition of firearhs. Suctr records
shall include the narr¡e and address of any DerÉronto whom the
collector sells or otherwise disposesof a frrea-rd. Such collector shall
no-t_berequired to submit to t}¡e Secretary reports and inforrnation
with respect to such records and the.conterits thereof, except as
expressly
'(3) Each requircd by this section.
- licensee shall prepare a report of multiple salesor other Reoorts.
dispositions whenever the licensee eel-lsor otherwiËe disposesof, at
one t-ime or during auy five consecutive br¡si¡ess days, two or more
pistg_tg,or revolvers, or any combinatiou of pistols and revolvers
totaüing:two or more, to an unlicensed person-.Ttre report shall be
prepared on a form specifredby the Secrbtary and fonrarded to the
office specified thereon not later than the close of business on the
day that_the multiple sale or other disposition occurt.
"(4) Slhere a firearms or ammunitiob businessis discontinued and
succeededby a new licengee,the records required to be kept by this
chapter shall appropriately reflect such facts and shalt be delivered
to the successor.lilhere discontinuance ofthe business is absolute,
such records shall be delivered within thirtv days after the business
discontinuance to the Secretary. However, wheie State law or local
ordinance requires the delÍvéry of records to other responsíble
-anange -of
authority, the Secretary may for the delivery such
records to such other responsibleauthoritv.
"(õXA) Each licensee shall, when requiied by letter issued bv the
$ecretary, aqd gntil notifrdd to the contrarry in writi',g bi the
Secretary, eubmit on a foru specified bv the Secretan'.-infot'mation
foî ¡ériods
and at the times specifîed in- such leiter, all record
requÍred to be kept bv thb chapt€r or such lesser record information
as the Secretan¡ [n such letter mav specifv.
"(B) The Secietary may authotz¿- such record information to be
submitted in a manner oiher than that prescribed in sr¡bparasraph
(4) of this parag¡aph when it ís shqçrn by a licenseã, t¡ãt irn
alternate method of reporting is reasonably necessary and will not
-chapter.
uuduly hinder the effèctive-administratio-n of this ¿ li-
censee may use an alternate method of reportine if tlie licensee
des$ibes the prpposed alte¡nate method of ieportñs and the need
therefor in a letter application submitted to tñe Secfutary, and the
Secretary approves zu-Chalternate method of reporting."; ãnd
(8) so that subsection(i) reads as follows:
"(i) A licensed importen li-ceneedmanufacturer, or lÍænsed dealer Bu¡iness and
may, under rules or regulations prescribed by the Secretary, conduct industry.
busiless_tempor-arily-at a location_other than the losation specifred
on the license if such te_mporarylocation is the location foi a gun
show or event s¡ronsoredbV a"i national, Stat€, or local organrza-
tion, or any affiliate of any such organization devoted to the collec-
100STAT.456 PUBIJC LA1V99-308-MAY 19,1986
tion, compeçitiv_eu6e,_or other sportíng use of firearms in ttre
community, and such location is Íri tne State which is sp€cified on
Records. the licensê. Records of receipt and disposition of fireaims trans-
actions conducted at such tãmporary iosation shall include the
location of the sale or other dispositíe¡irand shall be entercd in the
permanent records of the liceneee and ¡etained on the location
specified on the license. Nothine in this subsection shall authorize
an-y-licenseeto condust business in or from any motorized or towed
vehicle. Notwithstanding-shallthe pmvisions of sübsection (a) of thís
section, a -separate fee ñot be required of a licensee wÍth
respect to bqsinessconducted under this subsection.Any ínspection
or examination of inventory or rccords under this chabter þ the
Secretary at-such temporary location ehall be limit€d tå inveiøry
consisting o{, or _reco¡dsrelating to, fïrea¡:¡ns held or disposed at
such temporary location. Nothine in this subsection shall be con-
struetl to authorize tþ Secretary-to inspect or exami¡re the inven-
þry or records of a lÍcensecl Íniporter,-licensed manufacturer, or
Iicensed dealer at any location other than the location speciñed on
the lÍcense. Nothing in this subsection shall be construeâ to dimin.
ish in any rnânner a¡V risht to displa¡ sell, or otåerwise disposeof
firearms or ammunition, which is-in-effect before the date-of the
enactment of the Firearms Owners'Prote¿tion Act,".
I¿w SEC.I()4.AìIE¡TDMEÌIITS TOSECTTON 924.
enforcsment
and crime. (a) þ-Grmrner--Section 9Ðt oî title 18, United St¿t€s Code, is
amended-
(1)so that subsec-tion(a) reads as follows:
j'(aXl) Except as otherlvise provided in paragraph (2) of this
18 USC 929. subsection, subsection (þ) or (c) of this sectiou, or in section 929,
whoever-
-'l(A) knowingly makes any false stâtement or representation
with respect to the infomation required bv this chapter to be
kept in the records of a person lÍcensed undãr this chapter or in
-dísabÍlity
applying for any license or exemption or relief from
under the provisions of thie chanf¿r
t@l knãfinsÍyviãt.teiË"ús"ãtlio-,å(aX4),(aX6),(0, G),(i), (i), or
-
18USC9æ. (k)of secüion{z'ã;
"(C) knowingly imports o¡ brings into the Unitcd Statesor
any possession thereof any firealr¡r or amnunition in violation
ofsection9220);or
_ __ "(D-)willfully violates any other provision of this chapter,
shall be ñned not more than $5,000,imprisonednot morethanfive
Iea¡s, -or bottr, and shail becomeelieible for parole as the Parole
Conmissionshall determine.
"(2) Any licenseddealer, licensed importer, licensedmanufac-
turer, or licensedcollectorwho knowinely-
"(A) makes any false statement or representatíonwith re
spect to the infrirmation required by tire provisíonsof this
chapterto be kept Ín the recoricls of a ftrson licensedunderthis
chapter,or
"(B) violatessubsectíon(m)of section922,
shall be fined not more than $1,000,imprisonednot more than one
Iear, o.rbottt, g¡r4 shall becomeeligible for parole as the Parole
Commissionshall determine.";
(2)in subsection(c!-
(A)by inserÈing"(1)" before"TVhoever,";
PUBLIC tAW 99-308-MAY 19, 1986 STAT.45?
1OO
(B) by strikÍng out "violenc€" each place
-or it appears and
-tlaffiching
inserting in lieu thereof 'liolence drug
crimer";-
(C) by inserting "or drug trafficktng cri.me" before "in
which the firearsr was usedor carried.'t;
(D) in the first sentence,by striking out the period at the
end and inserting in lieu thereof ", and if the ñrearm is a
machinegun, or is equipped with a firearm silence¡ or
firearrn mufher, to imñrGonment for ten veans.":
(E) ín the secôndseïtence, by strikindout th'e period at
the end and inserting Ín lieu thêreof ", rnd if the iuearm is
a machinegun, or il equipped witt¡ á ñrearm silencer or
firearm muffIér, to im¡iriðrinment for hyenty years."; and
(F) by adding at the eñd the following:
"(2) For purposes of this subsection, the term 'drug trafücking
c-rimg' means any felony violation of Federal law involving thé
distribution, manufacture, or importation of any controlleð suÞ
stance (as defrned in section 102 õf the Controlle-tl SubstancesAct
(21U.S.C.802)).
"(3) For purposes of this subsection the term 'crime of violence'
means an offense that is a felonv and-
"(A) has as an element,the use, attempted use, or threatened
use of physical force against the þerson or property of another,
or
"(B) that by its nature, involves a substantial risk that phys-
ícal force asainst the personor propertv of another mav be uded
in the courseof committing theäffËnse.a';
(g) by amending subsectiõn(d) to read ás foilows:
"(dxl) Any firearm or ammunition involved Ín or used in any Imports.
knowing violation of subsection(aX4),(aX6),(Ð, G), (h), (i), (i), or (k) df
section 922, or knowing Ímportation or brineins into the Unit€d 18 USC 922.
Statcs or any possessiõntliereof any firearå õr a-munition in
violation of section 92Klr, or knowÍng violation of section 9Ð1,or
willful violation of any other provision of this chapter or any rulè or
regulation promulgalird therèunder, or any violâtion of añy oúher
criminal law of the United States, or any firearm or ammunition
intended to be used in any offense refer:r,edto in parasraph (8) of
this subsection, where suóh Íntent is demonstrated bi ciear and
convincing evidence, shall be subject to seizure and forfeiture, a¡rd
all provisions of the Intemal Rev'enueCode of 1954relating to the 26 USC l et q.
seizure, forfeiture, and disposition of firearus, as deflrnedin-section
5845(d of that Code, shall, so far as applicable, extend to seizures 26 USC 5845.
and forfeitures under the provisions of this chapten hpuîdcd, That
upon acquittal gf thq owner or lxnsessor,or disriissal of tlre charges
against him other than upon motion of the Govemment priof ø
tñal, ttre seizedfrrearms e¡-arnrn¡¡¡ition shall be reüurned ¡orttrwitfr
to the owner or Dossessoror to a Dersondelesated bv the owner or
possessorunless-the retum of thä firea¡ms õr amnäunition would
place the owner or possessoror his delegate in violation of law. Any
action or proceeding for the forfeiture of flrrearms or ammunition
shall be commenced E'ithin one hundred and twenty days of such
seizure.
"(ZXA) In any action or proceeding for the return of firearms or
emmunition seized under the provisions of this chapter, the court
shall allow the prevailine party, other than the United States, a
reasonable attorney's fee, and the United Stat€s shall be liable
ttrerefor.
100STAT.458 PITBLICr,AW99-308-IvlAY19,1986
_"(B) rn any other action or proceedingunder the provisions of this
chapter, the court, when it- fïnds thãt such action was without
fbundation, o.r \¡vasinitiated vexatiouslS frivolously, or in bad faith,
shar qqou¡ tþg preyai\ne party, othdr than the-Ünited StateÊ, d
reasonaþle attorney's fee, and the united states shall be liable
therefor.
"(c) only those fhear¡ns or quantities of ammuniúion narticularlv
narned and individuallv identfüed as involved in or úsed in ani
polttþl of the- provisións o_fthis chapter or any rule oi iãeutaäói
issued thereunder, or any other crimirial law of õhe united States or
qp intended to be used in any offense referred to Ín parasraph (8) of
this subeection, where sucË intent is demonstratdl bl;iãår'á"ä
convincing evidence, ehatl be subject to seizure, forieiture, and
dispositioñ.
- l'(Dl îl¡e united statÆsshall be liable for attornevg' fees under
tþs p^araeranhonly to the extent ptoviaea in ãAvrn-öãUy;-ppõp-tü-
tion Acts.
]'(8) lhe offenses referred to in paragraphs (1) and (zxc) of this
subsestionare-
18USC924.
- ^"(Ð_any crime of violence, as that tcrm is defrned in section
924(d(8)of this title;
"(B) any offense iunishable under the Controlled Substances
Ac! [Zf U.S.C. 8-0^tèt qe^q.)^o_Ithe Conürolled SubstancesImport
andExport Aú(àLU.$.C-.gÞt et seqJ;
18USC9æ.
^^'j(C)__.any_g{ç+æ {eqcribed in- Cection ïH(a\t), 9ZZ(aXB),
9ã2lùd5),o1922(bX3)of this title, where the fireaä ol atnäúiri-
tion intended to be used in ani such offense is involved in a
pattern of activities which inclirdes a violation of any offense
described in sestion gZZ(aXl), gäplat{B),gZZ(aX1),or gãZ(bXB)of
thÍs title:
- "(D] añy offense ilescnibedin section gn/1d)of this title n¡here
the fïrearm or a¡nmunition is intended to be used Ín such
offe-nseby the_transferor of such firearm or ammunition;
^^:(El an¿ o_ffensedescribed in section gZZÃi),gZZçr, gZ?ÁD,
922(ú, ot 924(b)of this titlq and
_-"fF)-uly offens-e_which pay be prosecutedin a court of the
United States which involveis thd exportation of firearms or
ammunition."; and
. (4) by adding at the end the followins new subsection:
.'_'(eXl)_þ the case of q person who viol,ates ãection 922(g;)of this
title and has three previoüs convictions bv ãnv ôòurt refer:fed to in
sestion 92{gXl)_of this title for robbery õr bürelary, or both, such
person shall be frned not more than $25:000and-imräisoned nót less
tþan fifteen y_gars,and, nolwithstanding any other provÍeion of law,
the court shall not suspendthe sentenceof,-or srani a probationary
gentenceto, such persoh with respect to the conl¡iction ünder sectioi
?2?!g),and such percoq sha,ll ngt_be gligible for parole with respect
to the sentenceimposed under this subsecüion.
"(2) As used in thie subsecüion-
"(A) the term 'robbery' means any crÍme punishable bv a
te¡p of i_m-prisonmente¡-ceedlneone Íea¡ and öonsistine ofihe
taking ofthe property ofanotheÍ from the person or presenceof
another by force or violence, or by thrbatenins br placine
another _peryoq--in_ fear that any põrson will im--mineñtty tõ
subjected-tobodilv harm; and
"(B) the tern'burglaú' means any crime punishable by a
tenn of imprisonment exceeding onõ year añd consisting of

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